US Japan Conflicts1

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS NOVEMBER 2019
ASIA
REINVENTING THE TRADING NATION:

Japan, the United States, and
the future of Asia-Pacific trade
MIREYA SOLÍS
REINVENTING THE TRADING NATION:
Japan, the United States, and the
future of Asia-Pacific trade
MIREYA SOLÍS
EDITOR’S NOTE
This piece was originally written as an epilogue to the Japanese translation of the
author’s 2017 book Dilemmas of a Trading Nation: Japan and the United States in the
Evolving Asia-Pacific Order, published in Tokyo by Nikkei Publishing in October 2019. The
author’s purpose in writing the epilogue was to assess the trade policy developments
in the Asia-Pacific of the past two years, a time when Japan and the United States have
sharply reoriented their paths as trading nations. It has been further updated to reflect
recent developments.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international trading system is in turmoil. When the author’s Dilemmas of a Trading
Nation was first published in August 2017, the United States and Japan were on the cusp
of redefining their path as trading nations. The momentous change was best crystallized
in the American decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
Japanese resolve to salvage the trade deal against all odds. Precedents were broken in
that the United States had never withdrawn from a signed trade agreement, and Japan
had never displayed trade leadership of this caliber. The trade world has not looked at
the United States and Japan the same way ever since.
Two plus years on, this transformation is in full display. Under President Trump’s “America
First” mantra, the United States has set out to fundamentally restructure bilateral
trading relations with its closest partners and allies, jolt the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and compel China to restructure its economic model to level the playing field.
There is no higher priority in the “America First” trade strategy than to curb Chinese
market distorting policies and cajole structural reforms from China. Because of the
tactics chosen, however, this has largely been an “America alone” quest.
Japan’s choices over the past two years could not have been more different. In salvaging
the TPP, Japan and the other 10 original members ensured the survival of the most
ambitious rulebook structuring trade and investment relations in Asia-Pacific. Japan has
Foreign Policy at Brookings | 1

REINVENTING THE TRADING NATION: JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE
brokered not one, but two mega trade agreements, concluding an economic partnership
agreement with the European Union that covers one third of the world’s GDP. With its
higher level of ambition, Tokyo has been in the frontier of international governance for
the digital economy, and has worked with like-minded countries to upgrade trade and
investment rules and reform the WTO.
In the span of few years, Japan and the United States have sharply reoriented their
trade strategies as they navigate the dilemmas of a trading nation in their quest to
ink trade agreements that can reconcile the goals of economic competitiveness, social
legitimacy, and political viability. In the recent past, these two countries have twice met
at the negotiation table — and the outcomes of each negotiation have been dramatically
different. In the original TPP project, the United States and Japan were ready to forge
a regional trade architecture; in the mini trade deal they settled for the minimum
necessary to avoid friction in bilateral relations.
However, the broader horizons of coordinated economic statecraft for Japan and the
United States still beckon. These two nations have an abiding interest in working as
partners to improve international economic governance through the dissemination
of digital economy standards, the supply of high-quality infrastructure finance in the
developing world, and the codification of rules that alleviate the distortions of state
capitalism in the trading system. Equally pressing and consequential is for the allies
to work towards achieving a high-quality comprehensive bilateral trade agreement and
engineer an American return to the regional economic architecture.
INTRODUCTION
The international trading system is in turmoil. When the author’s Dilemmas of a Trading
Nation was first published in August 2017, the United States and Japan were on the cusp
of redefining their path as trading nations. The momentous change was best crystallized
in the American decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
Japanese resolve to salvage the trade deal against all odds. Precedents were broken in
that the United States had never withdrawn from a signed trade agreement, and Japan
had never displayed trade leadership of this caliber. The trade world has not looked at
the United States and Japan the same way ever since.
Two plus years on, this transformation is in full display. Under President Trump’s “America
First” mantra, the United States has set out to fundamentally restructure bilateral trading
relations with its closest partners and allies, jolt the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and compel China to restructure its economic model to level the playing field. American
trade policy has suffered from a domestic viability problem, essentially undercut by the
lack of investment in workforce development and policies that support social resilience
to economic change. But the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House brought
about a more drastic reorientation, questioning core tenets of postwar American trade
leadership.
The fixation with the trade balance and the demands to impose export restraints on
others are reminiscent of American managed trade practices of the 1980s. They were
not effective then in eliminating trade deficits, and they are even less compelling today
given the extensive globalization of production through regional production networks.
But the current shift is more profound, resting on President Trump’s deeply-held
convictions: his willingness to dismiss multilateralism, his understanding of trade
2 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

as zero-sum competition where one of the parties always loses, and his belief that
protectionism offers a pathway to prosperity. No one has captured the essence of
Trump’s trade doctrine better than the president himself in a tweet on December 4,
2018: “I am a tariff man. When people or countries come in to raid the great wealth
”
of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so. It will always be the best
way to max out our economic power. We are right now taking $billions in Tariffs. MAKE
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN.”
Japan’s choices over the past two years

In salvaging the TPP, Japan and the
could not have been more different. In
salvaging the TPP, Japan and the other other 10 original members ensured the
10 original members (Australia, Brunei, survival of the most ambitious rulebook
Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New structuring trade and investment
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) relations in the Asia-Pacific.
ensured the survival of the most
ambitious rulebook structuring trade
and investment relations in the Asia-Pacific. Japan has brokered not one, but two mega
trade agreements, concluding an economic partnership agreement with the European
Union that covers one third of the world’s GDP. Both mega trade deals have entered
into force, dramatically increasing the reach of Japan’s preferential trade network.
Nevertheless, solving the challenges of Japan’s most important trading relationships
with China and the United States is an ongoing effort clouded with uncertainty.
China’s recommitment to its state capitalism model, the unilateral turn in U.S. economic
diplomacy, and the intensification of U.S.-China high tech economic rivalry could
deal a fatal blow to an already fragile multilateral trading system. Japan’s prosperity
continues to hinge on an open economic order and at this time of systemic crisis, Japan
responded with multilateral solutions: pushing for an ambitious outcome in the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, working with the EU and the
United States on new rules to tackle market distortion from (China’s) state intervention
in the economy, and pressing for global standards on free data flows essential to the
digital economy during its G-20 chairmanship. And yet, Japan’s mettle as champion of
rules-based trade liberalization has been most sorely tested in the bilateral trade talks
with the United States launched in April 2019. Because both countries have moved
on in starkly different directions since they last met at the negotiation table; these
negotiations were anything but a repeat of the original TPP talks.1
“AMERICA FIRST” TRADE POLICY

President Trump has promised to leave no major U.S. trading relationship untouched.
He has complained of unfair treatment by the WTO, touting instead the advantages of
negotiating one-on-one deals with major players — China, Japan, the EU, and a post-
Brexit U.K. And he has reopened existing trade agreements to align them with the
goals of his “America First” trade program. The revision of the South Korea-U.S. trade
agreement (KORUS FTA) was a more limited undertaking, since the U.S. sought changes
that would not warrant congressional approval. The main revisions were to double the
number of U.S. cars qualifying for expedited verification in South Korea (even though
the current quota is not filled) and to push back on the deadline to eliminate U.S. truck
tariffs by another 20 years, till 2041. As part of the negotiations, South Korea accepted
a quota to cut its exports of steel to the United States in order to see the lifting of U.S.
tariffs on metals (more on this below).

In contrast, the redo of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was more
ambitious and carried greater risks. In remaking NAFTA, the Trump administration aimed
to craft a new template for trade agreements — with the goal of reducing bilateral trade
deficits front and center — that could be applied in subsequent trade talks. If negotiations
went sour, however, the reopening of NAFTA carried the potential of disrupting trade
and investment relations with Canada and Mexico, the first and second destinations
for U.S. exports. Such upheaval would be felt acutely in the economic sectors and
communities that are highly dependent on regional trade and integrated production
chains. Negotiators did succeed in drafting a successor agreement to NAFTA — the U.S.-
Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA) — and its pending ratification by Congress
has become a major test for the political viability of Trump’s trade policy. As U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer put it in congressional testimony: “There is no
trade program in the United States if we don’t pass the USMCA.”2
Given the high stakes, the renegotiation of NAFTA was full of drama. It was carried out
under the shadow of a potential U.S. pullout from the agreement. Press reports noted
that at least twice President Trump came close to invoking the exit clause of the existing
trade agreement. At the outset of the talks, the United States adopted maximalist
proposals that seemed to leave little room for a viable compromise for Mexico and
Canada, insisting on a sunset clause to phase out the USMCA after five years if the
three governments chose not to renew it, and demanding that autos benefiting from
duty-free treatment incorporate 50% U.S. content. At times, it was unclear if the
trilateral partnership would be preserved. Mexico and the United States reached an
understanding first, generating a scramble for Canada to finish the negotiations on time
and remain in the revamped agreement.
The United States eventually compromised (settling for a joint review towards renewal
by year six and working with regional — not national — content rules) and the USMCA
remained a tripartite agreement. On the positive side, the USMCA preserves the vast
majority of the North American duty-free zone and modernizes the 25-year-old NAFTA rules
by incorporating the provisions of the original TPP in areas such as intellectual property
and e-commerce. At U.S. insistence, the USMCA adopts two new rules that will be of
great import in future U.S. trade negotiations. The first is a currency manipulation clause
in the body of the text with enforceable provisions on the reporting and transparency
requirements, but which recognizes the legitimate role of monetary policy for domestic
purposes. The second is a surprise rule on non-market economy FTAs whereby it is
mandatory to notify the other USMCA parties of intention to negotiate with a non-market
economy (i.e. China) and to provide the full text of a negotiated deal prior to ratification.
Moreover, the clause stipulates that the future inking of a trade agreement with a non-
market economy may be grounds to be dropped from the USMCA.
Provisions on automobile export quotas and a dramatic tightening of rules of origin on

car manufacturing are undoubtedly the USMCA’s lowlights. Canada and Mexico signed
side letters providing “generous” export quotas (at 2.4 million vehicles per year above
current export levels) that would kick in if the 25% national security tariff materializes.
Separately, Mexico secured a lower quota of 1.6 million vehicles to enter duty free if
the United States were to increase its most favored nation (MFN) tariff on automobiles,
provided the vehicles meet the original NAFTA rules of origin. An unusual and concerning
pattern was thus inaugurated in the USMCA talks: one party using a free trade agreement
to advertise possible intent to raise tariffs, and the other members taking out an
insurance policy against such an eventuality. With the objective of concentrating car

production and job creation in the United States, the Americans pushed for and obtained
an increase in regional content levels from 62.5% to 75%, with sourcing requirements
for steel and core components such as engines, and, for the first time ever, stipulating
that 40% of the value of the vehicle must be generated by workers earning an average
wage of $16 per hour. The tighter rules of origin on automobiles are an instance where
the United States triumphed at the negotiation table but lost in competitiveness. An IMF
study recently estimated that the more stringent requirements on autos will result in
a $700 million welfare loss for the region, with the United States suffering the largest
losses due to higher prices of imported cars and auto parts from Mexico and Canada.3
The ratification prospects for the USMCA are clouded in uncertainty. Even though USTR
Lighthizer courted the support of Democrats and the labor movement by securing
commitments such as an overhaul of Mexico’s labor regime, these groups have still
demanded further revisions to the agreement and stronger guarantees on enforcement.
Precious months in the ratification campaign were lost when the USTR took a year
to remove “national security” tariffs on steel and aluminum on Canada and Mexico
(originally imposed in the spring of 2018 and affecting many other nations as well),
despite the fact that influential Republicans in Congress and the Canadian and Mexican
governments had indicated USMCA ratification was contingent on their revocation.
These “national security” tariffs have emerged as a major tool of the Trump
administration to protect specific sectors or to gain leverage in bringing reluctant parties
to the negotiation table. Rarely used in the past, Section 232 of the 1962 U.S. Trade
Act grants the executive the power to raise tariffs on imports deemed to harm national
security. President Trump seized on this wide discretionary power to impose a 25% tariff
on $10.2 billion of steel imports and a 10% tariff on $7.7 billion of aluminum imports.
Although the Department of Defense had deemed steel supply sufficient to meet the
demands of defense equipment manufacture, the Department of Commerce used the
dubious argument of imports hampering steel capacity utilization to recommend tariffs.4
This was in essence an economic, not national security, argument.
Ironically, the 232 metal tariffs targeted mostly allied nations (Chinese steel imports had
already decreased due to anti-dumping and countervailing duties) with Japan taking the
first hit. The Japanese government chose not to retaliate, confident that it could gain
exemptions for specialty Japanese steel products and desiring not to disrupt relations
with the United States. The reaction of other allies and countries subsequently targeted
was different and swift: retaliation (e.g. Canada raised tariffs on $12.8 billion of U.S.
imports, and the EU on $3.3 billion) and challenges to the U.S. measure at the WTO.
Far greater disruption would ensue if President Trump were to make good on his threat
to impose a 25% tariff on $208 billion dollars of auto vehicle imports. On May 2019,
President Trump issued an executive decree endorsing the conclusion of the Commerce
Department’s 232 investigation that imports from foreign-owned companies undermine
the research and development capabilities of domestic firms and impair national security
by hindering the development of technologies essential to U.S. military superiority. The
President imposed a tight six-month deadline for negotiations with Japan and with the
EU to achieve results in order to avoid auto tariffs.5 The argument that imported cars
impair U.S. national security is even more dubious than the steel case, but the potential
economic harm is far more significant. It would also deal a fatal blow to any coordinated
effort between the United States and its closest allies and partners to compel China to
change its market-distorting policies.

Sino-American relations have entered a new age, one increasingly defined by strategic
competition. The unfulfilled expectation that China’s insertion into the world economy
would eventually usher a market economy and a plural political system has fractured the
bipartisan support for engagement. China’s military buildup, its growing authoritarian
tilt, and the use of economic clout for political influence in Asia and beyond, has
triggered a raging debate in Washington on new terms of interaction with China. A new
consensus has yet to emerge on what China’s strategic intentions are, and the optimal
American strategy and tactics to deal with the China challenge. But economic relations
are increasingly viewed with a strategic competitive slant. When Dilemmas of a Trading
Nation was first published, the debate over the “China trade shock” (loss of factory jobs
due to China’s emergence as an export powerhouse) had figured prominently in the
presidential election that delivered Donald Trump to the White House. Since then, a new
focal point has gained greater saliency: China’s quest for high tech supremacy with the
state playing an even more dominant role in the industries of the future, as laid out in
the 2015 “Made in China 2025” blueprint.
There is no higher priority in the “America First” trade strategy than to curb Chinese
market distorting policies and cajole structural reforms from China to level the playing
field. Because of the tactics chosen, however, this has largely been an “America alone”
quest. The opening salvo in the U.S.-China trade war was the imposition of 25% tariffs
on $50 billion of goods shipped from China during the summer of 2018. This action
followed the findings of a U.S. Section 301 investigation (whereby the U.S. reserves the
right to punish what it deems are discriminatory foreign barriers to trade) into Chinese
“
unfair intellectual property and technology practices. A rapid tit-for-tat tariff escalation
ensued with an additional 10% tariff imposed by the United States on $200 billion of
Chinese imports and by China on $60 billion of American goods in September 2018.
Early casualties of the tariff war included
American farmers and global supply
The prospects for achieving a chains.6
comprehensive trade agreement that
In late 2018, the United States and China
both the United States and China can decided to pull back from the brink of
live with are dim. an all-out tariff war and try instead for a
negotiated outcome. As talks progressed,
the contours of a potential deal appeared
to include large-scale Chinese purchases of U.S. goods to appease President Trump’s
concern with the trade deficit, and some commitments from China in areas like
intellectual property (IP) protection, disciplines on state subsidies, and elimination of
the practice of forced technology transfer. By the spring of 2019, however, negotiations
had broken down and positions have since hardened. The American side complained
that China backpedaled from incorporating agreed-upon reforms into Chinese law; the
Chinese side denied any backtracking and insisted that the lifting of U.S. tariffs was
required in order to strike a deal.
The prospects for achieving a comprehensive trade agreement that both sides can live
with are dim. Tariff walls went up quickly in the months that followed the negotiation
impasse. By September 2019, the United States applied tariffs on $360 billion dollars
of Chinese imports with additional tariffs scheduled on $160 billion dollars of imports
for December 15. In turn, China’s retaliatory tariffs on $110 billion dollars of U.S. goods
were set to target an additional $75 billion dollars of American exports by year’s end.7
As both sides contemplated the harm to come from applying punitive tariffs to the lion’s

share of their bilateral trade, they tried once again for a truce of sorts. On October 11,
2019, President Trump announced a “Phase One” trade deal whereby China agreed to
very large purchases of U.S. farms products (in the range of $40-50 billion dollars), and
to make some improvements on IP protection and financial services liberalization, in
exchange for the United States to postpone a tariff increase scheduled to kick in a few
days later.
A preliminary understanding is a far cry from a completed negotiation. The Chinese

government has already stated that further negotiations are needed and that the
planned December tariffs must be suspended as well. Even if the United States and
China succeed in drafting a mini-trade deal by mid-November,8 they will have merely
punted the ball on their most critical goals: for the United States, abating industrial
subsidies, disciplining state-owned enterprises, comprehensive IP protection, and an
enforcement mechanism; and for China the roll-back of tariffs and relief from a series
of restrictions that threaten the viability of China’s tech giants.
Indeed, the tech war could very well be the most decisive front in this era of U.S.-China
strategic competition. The Trump administration has adopted more restrictive screening
procedures for investments in critical technology and infrastructure sectors — and is in
the process of tightening export controls for emerging and foundational technologies.
Both steps were undertaken with the thinly-disguised intention of curbing Chinese
access to core American technologies. The Chinese telecom company Huawei has
become the lightning rod in this broader contest. The U.S. government sharply raised
the stakes with its decision in May 2019 of placing Huawei on the entity list, thereby
mandating that all sales of U.S. technology products to the company must be licensed.
This move was accompanied by an executive order banning American companies from
purchasing telecom equipment deemed to harm national security. An additional 28
Chinese tech companies were blacklisted in September, this time for human rights
violations in Xinjiang. The American government has also sought to exclude Huawei
from participating in the 5G networks of allies and partners citing cyber security risks.
The American persuasion campaign has had mixed results. As Adam Segal points out,
while the security risks are real, the United States would be more effective in enlisting
support from other countries if it could “offer them alternatives that can compete in
price and efficiency.”9
Economic rivalry between the United States and China has system-wide repercussions,
both concerning the fate of the multilateral system and the health of the global
economy. On the former, recent actions by the two largest economies in the world
have added strain to WTO operations, complicating chances of much-needed reform
and increasing the risk of irrelevancy for the multilateral body. China’s rampant use of
industrial subsidies and its refusal to graduate from developing country status with its
accompanying special and differential treatment are major stressors on the system and
undermine chances of meaningful WTO reform. The United States’ decision to block
nominations for the WTO appellate body by citing judicial overreach and its position that
it will not accept WTO review of its national security tariffs has brought the WTO dispute
settlement system to a crisis point.
In addition, the uncertainty created by the deterioration in U.S.-China relations has

become a major headwind for global growth.10 The newly appointed IMF chief, Kristalina
Georgieva, put the expected economic damage in perspective when she noted that the
costs of the trade war — $700 billion dollars by 2020 — are equivalent to the size of

the Swiss economy. As tariffs have gone up, trade flows have suffered — so much so,
that the WTO’s forecast for global trade growth in 2019 at 1.2% is the lowest since
the onset of the global financial crisis.11 While in the past, the United States had been
a force in abating protectionism, the speed at which the United States has undone
decades of liberalization is breathtaking. In 2018 alone, the U.S. trade weighted tariff
rate more than doubled from 1.5% to 3.4%, and at its current level of 4.2%, it is the
highest among G-7 countries.12 Under the Trump administration, America has become
a nation of tariffs.
FIGHTING THE FIGHT FOR A RULES-BASED ECONOMIC ORDER: JAPAN’S

QUEST FOR NEW ROLE
Japan’s new calling has been in the making for years. Dilemmas of a Trading Nation
tracked the confluence of economic and political changes that enabled Japan’s trade
leadership to emerge: political and administrative reforms that empowered the prime
minister to overrule recalcitrant ministries and vested interests, the transformation of
Japan’s political economy away from mercantilism toward greater integration into the
world economy through global supply chains that called for deep trade agreements, and
the consolidation of a control tower in Shinzo Abe’s Kantei (prime minister’s office) with
the return of political stability. And so, Japan surprised many with its ability to finally join
the TPP negotiations, to negotiate with a unified voice, and to partner with the United
States in advocating an ambitious rules-agenda in the mega trade agreement. When
the United States pulled out of the TPP, many trade experts expected Japan’s proactive
stance to fade away too, letting the TPP wilt when confronted with America’s absence.
Dilemmas of a Trading Nation first went to press with a markedly different prognosis:
that Japan should and could give TPP a new lease on life cementing its new role as a
leader of free trade. The eventful past couple of years have proven this to be possible.
Japan’s motives for joining the big leagues of trade diplomacy reflect both longer-term
trends and an abrupt geopolitical shift. Japan has become more closely intertwined with
the world economy, both as corporate Japan weaved complex production networks in
Asia and elsewhere, and as persistent population decline accentuates the importance
of external demand to Japan’s prosperity. The investment-trade nexus at the core of
global supply chains prompted a new phase for Japan’s economic diplomacy: rule-
making on behind-the-border disciplines to update a WTO rulebook that has laid largely
dormant for a quarter century. Stagnation in negotiations has long plagued the WTO,
but a more immediate crisis point threatens to hamper its ability to adjudicate disputes
among nations. By the end of 2019, the appellate body will cease to operate if no new
appointments are made. The inability to enforce rules would greatly impair the WTO
system. The systemic crisis of the postwar trading system — exacerbated by the stresses
from China’s interventionist industrial policies and the U.S. disengagement from
multilateralism — has compelled Japan to step up to defend the rules-based economic
order. A more proactive economic diplomacy also helps Japan avoid a future Asia where
China alone sets the terms of the economic integration while creating opportunities to
re-anchor the United States to the regional architecture.
These hefty considerations likely weighed on Prime Minister Abe’s decision in the
spring of 2017 to, after some initial hesitation, take the lead in working with the other
ten remaining nations to resuscitate the TPP. As the largest remaining economy in
the trade deal, Japan’s push was essential to give this undertaking a fighting chance.
But it was a challenging mission because many countries had agreed to the TPP’s

ambitious standards in exchange for preferential access to the large U.S. market. The
rescue operation worked for three main reasons. One, the TPP-11 countries agreed to
keep market access commitments intact (reopening tariff talks would have unraveled
the agreement). Two, at Japan’s insistence and with an eye to a potential U.S. return,
amendments to the TPP rules were minimal. Twenty-two provisions were suspended
(mostly on IP rules in areas like biologics and copyright extension that only the
Americans had championed in the original talks), and the scope of the investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism was narrowed (to exclude investment agreements and
authorizations). But no whole chapter was excised, leaving the TPP rulebook virtually
”
intact. Third, ratification conditions were eased, requiring only that six members conclude
their domestic procedures for the agreement to begin taking effect. In March 2018, the
eleven members signed a newly baptized Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), which entered into
force on December 30 of that year. The shifting geopolitical context has
The economic footprint of the CPTPP
given the CPTPP a new meaning: a
is certainly smaller than the original shared project by middle powers
twelve-member grouping at 13.5% of the to defend rules-based economic
world’s GDP. Nevertheless, the effects of multilateralism.
the new mega trade agreement were felt
wide and far. For one, producers in the
CPTPP have quickly taken advantage of tariff preferences to increase their market share
in Japan at the expense of American producers. In early 2019, American beef producers
complained of a 6% market share loss, while beef imports from CPTPP members —
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand — increased by 56% compared to the year prior.
American beef producers feared a more disadvantageous situation, if the rapid increase
of beef imports were to trigger a Japanese safeguard raising the MFN tariff to 50%,
whereas CPTPP producers only pay a 27.5% duty (which will eventually go down to 9%).13
Moreover, the impact of the CPTPP goes well beyond economic competition for market
share. The shifting geopolitical context has given the CPTPP a new meaning: a shared
project by middle powers to defend rules-based economic multilateralism. As China’s
appetite for reform has waned and the United States is turning inward, the CPTPP offers
a hedge against the adverse trends of Chinese mercantilism and U.S. protectionism.
As the CPTPP circle grows with the admission of new members, its heft will increase.
For instance, Peter Petri, Michael Plummer, Shujiro Urata and Fan Zhai estimate that
a potential TPP-16 with South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines
joining the current 11 members would generate larger economic gains for members
($486 billion by 2030) than the original TPP with the United States.14 Nevertheless,
the recent trade spat between Japan and South Korea has dented the expectations
that South Korea could make a bid for CPTPP entry any time soon. On July 1, 2019, the
Japanese government suddenly announced tighter export controls on three chemicals
that are critical for South Korean semiconductor manufacture, and a month later it
dropped South Korea from its “whitelist” of preferred trading partners, requiring instead
catch-all controls on dual-use products. Tokyo has cited South Korean breaches in
the export-control protocols and the absence of periodic meetings among export
control officials to justify these actions. Rejecting these arguments, the South Korean
government, considers these moves retaliation for the South Korean Supreme Court’s
decision in favor of individual claims of compensation for wartime labor.15 The South
Korean government’s countermeasures were swift and expansive: removing Japan from
its own whitelist, refusing to renew the military information sharing agreement, and

lodging a WTO complaint accusing Japan of abusing the national security exemption
to unduly restrict trade. Both Japan and South Korea have much to lose if the current
trade row adds uncertainty to the operation of global supply chains, slows down the
dissemination of CPTPP standards across the region, and compels a weakened WTO
adjudication system to address a national security exemption case. Tokyo’s approval
of some licenses under the revised protocols has a helped alleviate some of these
concerns. But both sides will be better served by launching export control talks with the
aim of achieving an eventual return to preferred whitelist status.16
Asia’s regional trade architecture will also be shaped by the fate of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. Negotiators from 16 nations
(the 10 members of ASEAN, plus Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand,
and India) launched these trade talks in 2013 with the aim of concluding them by 2015.
Getting to the finish line in these negotiations has been difficult, especially as India has
resisted ambitious liberalization targets out of concern with worsening the trade balance
with China.17 RCEP negotiators pushed hard to conclude talks this year, but at the end
India balked. After a ministerial meeting in Bangkok in early November, the remaining
fifteen nations announced they intend to sign the agreement next year, while continuing
to engage with India to address its concerns.18 If RCEP materializes, especially with its
original membership configuration, this trade agreement would generate substantial
economic gains given the size of the markets involved and its ability to streamline Asia’s
FTA spaghetti bowl. With a new CPTPP in hand, Japan aimed to improve the quality
of RCEP’s rules and speed up the negotiation process. This new level of effort was
reflected in Japan hosting the RCEP Ministerial Meeting on July 2018, the first time
this gathering took place outside of ASEAN. But as Takashi Terada points out, RCEP
standards will not mimic CPTPP rules (the agreement comprises three least developing
economies) and there are no plans to introduce provisions in areas like environment,
labor, and state-owned enterprises.19 For these reasons, Japan has pursued a different
route to curb China’s market distorting policies, one that also seeks to avoid the perils of
U.S. unilateral tariffs and an all-out U.S.-China trade war: a trilateral effort at rulemaking
with the United States and the European Union. The rulemaking campaign builds from
Japan’s two mega trade agreements: the CPTPP and its trade deal with the European
Union.
Japan and the European Union inked their trade deal on December 2017. When it
entered into force in February 2019, it inaugurated the world’s largest trade agreement,
comprising a third of the world’s GDP. The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
eliminates most tariffs, including the eventual phase out of European auto tariffs, and
Japan’s opening of the wine and cheese markets to European producers, while also
recognizing scores of European Geographical Indicators. In the end, the EU and Japan
decided to set aside the two issues that had bedeviled the talks: investment protection
(with the European Union pressing for an investment court which Japan declined), and
data flows (opting instead for a separate adequacy decision to enable the safe transfer
of personal data).20 The decision of both parties to wrap up what had been protracted
negotiations and seek swift ratification of the partnership agreement reflects strategic
intent. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Prime Minister Abe
noted in their joint statement concern about “widening protectionist movements” and
their desire to jointly “wave the flag of free trade.”21

Japan’s efforts at global coordination on updated trade and investment rules has
centered on a trilateral initiative launched on the sidelines of the WTO Ministerial
Meeting in Buenos Aires in December 2017. Its mandate is to tackle non-market policies
that create overcapacity and distort trade flows. The trade ministers of Japan, the
United States, and the European Union identified areas where improvement is sorely
needed, including stronger rules on industrial subsidies and non-market behavior of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the elimination of forced technology transfers, WTO
reform, and the codification of rules on digital trade. The trilateral effort has made
headway with a reform proposal on transparency and subsidy notification tabled at
the WTO in the fall of 2018. Japan, in particular, has made digital governance a focal
point of its contribution to WTO reform. At the Davos World Economic Forum in January
2019, Prime Minister Abe announced the launch of an Osaka track under the WTO
to enable free data flows with due provisions for privacy and cyber security. In this
way, Japan is pushing back on rising digital protectionism and offering an alternative
to China’s cyber sovereignty vision. These efforts to address the China challenge
share a common denominator, which is that they represent an investment toward a
rules-based multilateral framework. This approach is likely to gain more traction that
a purely bilateral negotiation for reasons well-elucidated by Wendy Cutler: It will be
easier for China to acquiesce to reforms framed as part of systemic change and not
exclusively as a “China problem,” and the demandeurs of change (U.S., EU, Japan)
will have greater leverage working together given that they represent 40% of China’s
exports. Problems like overcapacity, Cutler admonishes, cannot be addressed with
bilateral solutions.22
There is great promise in the like-minded approach, but it has always rested on an
uneasy premise: that the United States would not train its auto “national security”
tariffs on treaty allies and that parallel bilateral trade talks with both the European
Union and with Japan would manage to reach safe harbor.
NEGOTIATING TRADE AGAIN: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC

PARTNERSHIP
Although U.S.-Japan relations are robust and strong, trade once again had the potential
to be a divisive issue among the two allies. The differences in the trade philosophy
animating each government were on display in the Abe-Trump joint statement released
in fall 2018 giving the green light for bilateral talks. President Trump emphasized
reciprocity and the reduction of the bilateral trade deficit as his main concerns, while
Prime Minister Abe endorsed the principle of rules-based trade. Both sides also took
the opportunity to reference sensitive areas. For the United States, the achievement
of market access outcomes that increase American manufacturing production and
jobs, and for Japan, a ceiling on agricultural liberalization to be on par with its existing
economic partnership agreements.23
In the months prior to the launch of the trade negotiations, each side characterized
differently the scope of the proposed bilateral agreement. Japan insisted the
negotiations aim for a trade agreement on goods as well as some services where early
achievements are possible. Tokyo was interested in narrower (and faster) negotiations
that fend off problematic demands from the Trump administration on issues such
as currency manipulation, FTAs with non-market economies, and “voluntary” export
restraints; while reserving the TPP as the most comprehensive rulebook in order to
incentivize an eventual American return to the deal. In contrast, Washington aimed for

a comprehensive FTA that can be negotiated in stages, with a particular interest on

an early harvest agreement in agriculture to appease American farmers losing market
share in Japan.
Japan and the United States have pursued contrasting trajectories on trade since
they parted ways on the TPP. Therefore, their most pressing objectives motivating the
bilateral negotiations were different this time. For Japan, it was about deflecting U.S.
unilateralism. In effect, avoiding the harm to a major economic sector if a 25% national
security tariff were to hit the 1.7 million vehicles exported annually to the United States
(equivalent to a third of all Japanese brand cars sold in the American market). For the
United States, it was about catching up with Japan’s trade leadership. In essence,
preventing the marginalization of American farmers from lucrative markets now that
Japan demonstrated it could mobilize others in support of rules-based trade.
The high-stakes trade talks moved uncannily fast with Prime Minister Abe and
President Trump announcing a final deal by the time they met on the sidelines of the
UNGA meeting in late September 2019. Described as a first stage outcome, American
and Japanese negotiators hammered out two separate agreements: one on market
access and the other on the digital economy. Ratification will also move expeditiously:
Japan has already started deliberations in the Diet and the ruling coalition has the
votes to pass the agreement; while the U.S. Congress will not vote on the deal given
“
that the executive branch has availed itself — for the first time ever — of limited tariff
proclamation authority to negotiate an entire trade agreement (section 103 of Trade
Promotion Authority).24 Four months after the expected entry into force in January
2020, both sides have promised to come
back to the negotiation table to hammer
The United States and Japan stand a truly comprehensive trade agreement.
to benefit greatly from avoiding trade
friction that could hinder the alliance at The mini trade deal has important
a time of profound geopolitical change upsides for the U.S.-Japan relationship.
American farmers — long the casualties
and the proliferation of security risks in of the tariff war with China and the
Asia. decision to abandon TPP — will find
relief with some of the improved terms
of access to the large Japanese market. The chances that the Trump administration
will impose punitive tariffs on Japanese cars have gone down. Both sides stand to
benefit greatly from avoiding trade friction that could hinder the alliance at a time of
profound geopolitical change and the proliferation of security risks in Asia. And yet,
the bilateral trade agreement is inferior to the original TPP project, both in terms of
economic benefits and the potential for the U.S.-Japan partnership to improve global
governance.
Given the centrality of the digital economy, it is certainly a positive for the United
States and Japan to reconfirm their shared vision on the importance of free data flows
and unhindered e-commerce. But even here, the (CP)TPP has greater potential: it
has hammered out a compromise on high level standards that both developed and
developing countries can abide by. In terms of reciprocal tariff reductions, the bilateral
market access agreement is decidedly TPP-minus. Japan excluded rice, refused to
allow participation for 33 goods in the broader CPTPP import quotas, did not make
allowances in dairy to avoid restrictions based on Geographical Indicators (GI), and
made no concessions on soybeans.25 On the other hand, American beef and pork

producers are big winners in this negotiation receiving the same tariff preferences
than their competitors from CPTPP nations. USTR Lighthizer’s negotiation strategy —
making no concessions in autos and focusing first on agricultural outcomes — meant
that Japan scaled back some farm commitments available in the original TPP, and
that some American industries were put on the waiting list for a future negotiation
(pharmaceuticals and the services sector).
Four pages long (plus annexes and side letters), the market access agreement stands
out in many ways for its omissions. On the positive side, there are no provisions on
export quotas, as Japan remained steadfast in its opposition to such quantitative
restraints. There are, however, two other major omissions that are of concern to Japan:
U.S. commitments on tariff liberalization of automobiles and an explicit pledge to retire
for good the threat of punitive tariffs on cars. Since autos represent a third of the value
of Japanese exports to the United States, the mini trade deal is not in compliance
with the WTO’s injunction that preferential trade agreements must liberalize
substantially all trade. The leaders’ joint statement of September 25, 2019 made only
an indirect reference to the 232 threat, noting that as long as both parties faithfully
implement commitments, neither one will adopt measures contrary to the spirit of
the agreements.26 Also missing from the trade deal is an explicit dispute settlement
mechanism to adjudicate differences, with provisions instead for a consultation
process and an expedited exit mechanism with four months’ notice.
In the span of few years, Japan and the United States have sharply reoriented their
trade strategies as they navigate the dilemmas of a trading nation in their quest to
ink trade agreements that can reconcile the goals of economic competitiveness,
social legitimacy, and political viability. In the recent past, these two countries have
twice met at the negotiation table — and the outcomes of each negotiation have been
dramatically different. In the original TPP project, the United States and Japan were
ready to forge a regional trade architecture; in the mini trade deal they settled for
the minimum necessary to avoid friction in bilateral relations. However, the broader
horizons of coordinated economic statecraft for Japan and the United States still
beckon. These two nations have an abiding interest in working as partners to improve
international economic governance through the dissemination of digital economy
standards, the supply of high-quality infrastructure finance in the developing world,
and the codification of rules that alleviate the distortions of state capitalism in the
trading system. Equally pressing and consequential is for the allies to work towards
achieving a high-quality comprehensive bilateral trade agreement and engineer an
American return to the regional economic architecture.

REFERENCES
1 For a broader analysis of the decline of multilateralism, the rise of great power competition, and
the full-set of Japan’s economic statecraft see the author’s forthcoming book chapter “Follower no
more? Japan’s leadership role as a champion of the liberal trading order” in The Crisis of Liberal
Internationalism: Japan and the World Order, eds. Yoichi Funabashi and John Ikenberry (Washington, DC:
Brookings Press, February 2020).
2 ”Lighthizer: U.S. ’trade program’ has no future if USMCA doesn’t pass,” Inside U.S. Trade, February
27, 2019, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/lighthizer-us-trade-program-has-no-future-if-usmca-doesnt-
pass.
3 Mary E. Burfisher, Frederic Lambert, and Troy Matheson, “NAFTA to USMCA: What is Gained?”
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, March 26, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WP/Issues/2019/03/26/NAFTA-to-USMCA-What-is-Gained-46680.
4 Phil Levy, “The Commerce Department Makes a Feeble National Security Plea for Steel Protection,”
Forbes, February 16, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2018/02/16/the-commerce-
departments-feeble-national-security-plea-for-steel-protection/#1f2d5142dc53.
5 Donald J. Trump, “Proclamation: Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts in the United
States,” The White House, May 17, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/adjusting-
imports-automobiles-automobile-parts-united-states/. The Commerce Department completed its 232
report on automobiles completed in February 2019 but has not released it to the public.
6 Mary Lovely and Yang Liang show that foreign firms operating in China have been the hardest hit: More
than half of the products targeted in that tranche of U.S. tariffs are produced by multinational corporations
in China, and in the case of computer and electronic products the share is as high as 86%. See Mary
Lovely and Yang Liang, “Trump tariffs primarily hit multinational supply chains, harm U.S. technology
competitiveness,” (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2018), https://
piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/trump-tariffs-primarily-hit-multinational-supply-chains-harm-us.
7 Chad P. Bown, “U.S.-China Trade War: The Guns of August,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, September 20, 2019, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/us-
china-trade-war-guns-august.
8 The original target was to sign an agreement on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) leader’s summit. The Chilean government’s decision to cancel the APEC meeting due to domestic
political unrest, through a wrench at those plans.
9 Adam Segal, “The right way to deal with Huawei: The United States needs to compete with Chinese
firms, not just ban them,” Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2019-07-11/right-way-deal-huawei.
10 World Economic Outlook, April 2019: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery (Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund, April 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/
Issues/2019/03/28/world-economic-outlook-april-2019.
11 Both figures cited in Anna Swanson, “Trump’s Trade War Could Put Swiss-Sized Dent in
Global Economy, I.M.F. Head Warns,” The New York Times, October 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/10/08/us/politics/trump-trade-war-imf.html.

12 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein, ”The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on
U.S. Prices and Welfare,” (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, March 2, 2019), https://
www.princeton.edu/~reddings/papers/CEPR-DP13564.pdf; Anna Swanson, ”Trump’s Tariffs Once
Seen as Leverage, May be Here to Stay.” The New York Times, May 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/14/us/politics/trump-tariffs-china.html.
13 Connor Cislo, “TPP-11 exports gain ground over U.S. in Japan’s beef market,” Nikkei Asian Review,
February 28, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/TPP-11-exporters-gain-ground-over-US-in-Japan-s-
beef-market. The same pattern is evident in pork with exports to Japan down by 35%. See James Politi,
“US farmers being cut out of Japan after TPP withdrawal,” Financial Times, March 18, 2019, https://www.
ft.com/content/07d14730-4831-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62.
14 Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, Shujiro Urata and Fan Zhai, “Going it alone in the Asia-Pacific:
Regional Trade Agreements without the United States,” (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics, October 2017), https://piie.com/publications/working-papers/going-it-alone-asia-pacific-
regional-trade-agreements-without-united. P. 8.
15 Tokyo‘s position is that this ruling undermines the treaty normalizing bilateral relations where
all compensation claims were settled, and that this disagreement should be taken by the arbitration
mechanism contemplated in said treaty. But Seoul has not agreed to an arbitration proceeding. Broadly
speaking, unsolved historical issues emanating from Japan’s annexation of Korea and divergent threat
perceptions regarding the North Korea threat and the China challenge have long hindered this bilateral
relationship. However, the current downturn is more severe as it has affected economic ties and valuable
defense cooperation. For a discussion of the vicissitudes of the Japan-South Korea relationship and its
impact on U.S. Asia policy, see: Richard Bush, Lindsey Ford, Ryan Hass, Adam Liff, Michael O’Hanlon,
Jonathan Pollack, and Mireya Solís, ”Stress Test: Japan in the Era of Great Power Competition,”
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-
stress-test-japan-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/.
16 For analysis of the export control dispute see: Bruce Klingner and Riley Walters, ”The U.S. Must Limit
Damage from the Japan-South Korea Trade Dispute,” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, August
7, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-us-must-limit-damage-the-japan-south-korea-trade-
dispute; and Katsuhisa Furukawa and Daniel Sneider, “Japan Has More to Gain Than to Lose from Its Export
Controls on South Korea,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 24,
2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-japan-has-more-gain-lose-its-export-controls-south-korea.
17 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, China Looking at RCEP protocol to fix trade imbalance,” The Economic
Times, October 14, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/india-
china-looking-at-rcep-protocol-to-fix-trade-imbalance/articleshow/71573569.cms.
18 Masayuki Yuda and Kiran Sharma, “16 Asia-Pacific Nations fail to seal RCEP trade deal,” Nikkei Asian
Review, November 4, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/16-Asia-Pacific-nations-
fail-to-seal-RCEP-trade-deal.
19 Takashi Terada, “RCEP negotiations and the implications for the United States,” (Seattle: National
Bureau of Asian Research, December 20, 2018 ), https://www.nbr.org/publication/rcep-negotiations-and-
the-implications-for-the-united-states/.
20 Mireya Solís and Shujiro Urata, “Abenomics and Japan’s Trade Policy in a New Era,” Asian Economic
Policy Review 13, no. 1 (January 2018): 106-23; Andrei Lungu, “Japan and Europe’s Triple Partnership,”
The Diplomat, February 14, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/japan-and-europes-triple-
partnership/.

21 “Joint statement by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Junker and the Prime
Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe,” European Commission, December 8, 2017, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-17-5182_en.htm.
22 Wendy Cutler, “Strength in numbers: Collaborative approaches to addressing concerns with China’s
state-led economic model” (Washington, DC: Asia Society Policy Institute, April 2019), https://asiasociety.
org/policy-institute/strength-numbers.
23 “Joint Statement of the United States and Japan,” The White House, September 26, 2018, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-japan/.
24 Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and Brock R. Williams. “U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement Negotiations,”
Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11120.pdf.
25 “日米貿易協定（概要)” [Japan-United States Agreement, Outline], Japan Cabinet Secretariat,

October 18, 2019, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/ffr/pdf/191018_TPP_bunseki_04.pdf; Mathew Goodman,
“Scoring the Trump-Abe Trade Deal,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 1, 2019,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/scoring-trump-abe-trade-deal; Jeffrey J. Schott, “Reinventing the Wheel:
Phase One of the U.S.-Japan Trade Pact,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 27,
2019, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/reinventing-wheel-phase-one-us-
japan-trade-pact.
26 ”Joint Statement of the United States and Japan,” The White House, September 25, 2019, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-japan-2/.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mireya Solís is director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP), Philip Knight
chair in Japan studies, and senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings
Institution. Prior to her arrival at Brookings, Solís was a tenured associate professor
at American University’s School of International Service, an assistant professor in the
Department of Politics at Brandeis University, and a visiting professor at El Colegio
de México’s Center for International Relations. She has authored and edited several
books on Japan’s foreign economic policy, international trade, and U.S.-Japan relations
including: Banking on Multinationals (2004), Cross-Regional Trade Agreements (2008),
and Competitive Regionalism (2009). Her latest book Dilemmas of a Trading Nation
(2017) offers a novel analysis of the complex tradeoffs Japan and the United States
face in drafting trade policy that reconciles the goals of economic competitiveness,
social legitimacy, and political viability. Dilemmas of a Trading Nation received the
2018 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Award.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am thankful to David Dollar for offering his expert peer review and appreciate the
excellent research assistance from Laura McGhee and the first-rate editorial work from
Ted Reinert. Rachel Slattery performed layout. All remaining errors are my own.
The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and

policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based
on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and
the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely
those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or
its other scholars.
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
brookings.edu

US Japan Conflicts1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

US Japan Conflicts1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

US Japan Conflicts1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS NOVEMBER 2019

REINVENTING THE TRADING NATION:

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 1

2 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

Japan’s choices over the past two years

“AMERICA FIRST” TRADE POLICY

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 3

Provisions on automobile export quotas and a dramatic tightening of rules of origin on

4 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 5

6 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

A preliminary understanding is a far cry from a completed negotiation. The Chinese

In addition, the uncertainty created by the deterioration in U.S.-China relations has

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 7

FIGHTING THE FIGHT FOR A RULES-BASED ECONOMIC ORDER: JAPAN’S

8 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 9

10 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

NEGOTIATING TRADE AGAIN: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 11

a comprehensive FTA that can be negotiated in stages, with a particular interest on

12 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 13

14 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

Foreign Policy at Brookings | 15

25 “日米貿易協定（概要)” [Japan-United States Agreement, Outline], Japan Cabinet Secretariat,

16 | Foreign Policy at Brookings

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and

You might also like