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Appraisal Theory of Emotion

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_493-1

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Appraisal Theory of Emotion Introduction

Agnes Moors Appraisal theories (e.g., Arnold 1960; Ellsworth

Research Group of Quantitative Psychology and 2013; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Ortony et al.
Individual Differences; Centre for Social and 1988; Roseman 2013; Scherer 2009) are a species
Cultural Psychology, KU Leuven, Leuven, of emotion theory. The basic premise of appraisal
Belgium theories is that emotions are caused and differen-
Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health tiated by appraisal, a process in which values are
Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium determined for a number of appraisal factors such
as goal relevance, goal in/congruence, un/expect-
edness, control, and agency. To situate appraisal
Synonyms theories in the theoretical landscape, the current
chapter starts by clarifying how scientific theories
Cognitive emotion theory; Evaluation theory of often develop, and then applies it to the case of
emotion; Information processing theory of emotion theories and appraisal theories in partic-
emotion ular. This should allow a sharper characterization
of appraisal theories and help demarcate them
from other emotion theories. In addition to the
interspecies variety, the current chapter will also
Definition
consider a few important axes that allow under-
standing the intra-species variety, the variety
Appraisal theory of emotion proposes that emo-
within the family of appraisal theories.
tions or emotional components are caused and
Theory development often takes the form of a
differentiated by an appraisal of the stimulus as
cycle comprising four steps. The first step is a
mis/matching with goals and expectations, as
provisional demarcation or working definition of
easy/difficult to control, and as caused by others,
the explanandum (i.e., the to-be-explained
themselves or impersonal circumstances.
phenomenon). In the second step, an explanation
is proposed in which the explanandum is linked to
an explanans (i.e., an explaining fact). Explana-
tions come in different types. Common types are
Author Note: Preparation of this chapter was supported by
structural explanations (in which the components
Research Program G.0223.13N of the Research
Foundation – Flanders (FWO) and the Research Fund of of a phenomenon are specified), causal explana-
KU Leuven (GOA/15/003). tions (in which observable factors are identified as
# Springer International Publishing AG 2017
V. Zeigler-Hill, T.K. Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_493-1
2 Appraisal Theory of Emotion

the cause of the phenomenon), and mechanistic Step 2: Explanations of Emotion

explanations (in which the processes mediating
between the cause and the phenomenon are The types of explanations put forward by
specified on a lower level of analysis). In the emotions theories include structural, causal, and
third step, the explanation is verified in empirical mechanistic ones. Structural explanations specify
research. If the explanation is sufficiently vali- the components of emotions; causal explanations
dated, there is often a fourth step in which the specify the cause of emotions on a high
proposed explanans eventually becomes part of (preferably observable) level of analysis; and
the scientific definition of the phenomenon. These mechanistic explanations specify the mechanism
four steps can also be identified in the develop- on a lower level of analysis (mental level or brain
ment of emotion theories and in appraisal theories level) that intervene between the cause and the
in particular. The following sections describe the emotion. In the case of mental mechanisms, some
working definitions, explanations, empirical mechanisms specify the content of the input or
research programs, and eventually, the scientific output representations whereas others specify the
definitions that appraisal theories have proposed operations acting on these representations. Now
for emotions. follows a discussion of the structural, causal, and
mechanistic explanations provided by emotion
theories and appraisal theories in particular.
Step 1: Working Definition of Emotion
Structural Explanation
All emotion theories set out to explain emotions Regarding the structural explanation of emotion,
(explandum), but different theories take different two classes of theories can be distinguished: the-
working definitions as their starting point. Some ories that are inspired by or try to vindicate folk
theories set out to explain specific emotions as ideas of emotions – let’s call them folk theories –
they figure in natural language, such as anger, and componential theories. Folk theories equate
fear, sadness, and happiness. Other theories aim emotions with emotional experience or feelings;
to explain certain striking features of emotions, they thus include only one component. Compo-
such as their intense, overwhelming, nature, that nential emotion theories, in contrast, propose that
they have positive or negative valence, and/or emotions are better conceived of as episodes in
their embodied aspects (see more below). The which besides changes in feelings (subjective
first working definition (in terms of specific component), there is also room for changes in
emotions) is a definition in divisio format, as it information processing (cognitive component),
specifies the subsets within the total set of changes in action tendencies (motivational
emotions. The second working definition component), changes in physiological responses
(in terms of features) qualifies as a definition in (somatic component), and changes in overt
intensional format, as it specifies necessary and behavior (motor component). For instance, a
sufficient, or at least typical, conditions for a loud noise in the hall may prompt an information
phenomenon to be included in the provisional process in which the noise is evaluated as a threat,
set of emotions. Appraisal theories can be divided and it may induce a tendency to flee, an adrenaline
into two flavors based on what they try to explain rush, a startled facial expressions, and actual flight
(Moors 2014). A first flavor of appraisal theories behavior. All these changes may be accompanied
tries to explain specific emotions; they start from a by feelings, which can but do not have to
working definition in divisio format. A second be labeled as fear. Most contemporary appraisal
flavor of appraisal theories tries to explain features theories qualify as componential emotion
or components of emotions; they start from a theories.
working definition in intensional format. The explananda of the two flavors of appraisal
theories can now further be specified as follows:
Appraisal Theory of Emotion 3

First-flavor appraisal theories aim to explain whether the cause of the stimulus is the self,
specific emotions, such as anger, fear, and sad- another person, or impersonal circumstances.
ness; second-flavor appraisal theories aim to Some appraisal theories take appraisal factors
explain specific components of emotions, such to be nothing more than descriptions of the deep
as specific action tendencies (e.g., tendencies to features of the situation (e.g., Clore and Ortony
flee, fight, and give in), specific somatic response 2013). These appraisal theories have been labeled
patterns, specific facial expressions, and/or descriptive appraisal theories. Most appraisal the-
specific feelings. ories, however, go further in that they submit that
appraisal is also a literal mechanism, which deter-
Causal Explanation mines the value of stimuli for the respective
Causal explanations of emotions try to discover appraisal factors. In other words, these theories
regularities between features of the environment put forward a mechanistic explanation of emotion
and features (or the occurrence) of emotions. Cer- with appraisal as the explanans. These appraisal
tain evolutionary theories capitalize on discover- theories have been labeled process theories of
ing fixed regularities between specific (innate) appraisal (e.g., Scherer 2009, see Moors 2013).
stimuli and specific emotions (e.g., wild animals They are discussed in the next section.
elicit fear). Appraisal theories, in contrast, empha-
size that there are hardly any one-to-one relations Mechanistic Explanation
between features of stimuli and features of emo- For process theories of appraisal, it makes sense to
tions. One stimulus can produce different emo- split the process from stimulus to emotion into
tions in different individuals or on different two step: one step in which a stimulus is processed
occasions. For instance, a loud noise in the hall by appraisal and another step in which the output
may elicit fear in one person, but annoyance or no of the appraisal process is translated into a specific
emotion at all in another person. Turning it emotion (in first-flavor appraisal theories) or in
around, one emotion can be elicited by different specific values of the other emotional components
stimuli. For instance, anger can be elicited by a (in second-flavor appraisal theories). For ease of
loud noise, an insult, watching moral injustice, a communication, we group these other compo-
flat bike tire, or hitting one’s foot against the bed. nents under the label of output components.
Appraisal theories take these observations to sug- After zooming in on the operations that appraisal
gest that perceptual stimulus information is com- theories have proposed for these two steps, the
bined with other types of information, such as the moderating role of person factors on both steps is
person’s goals and expectations, the amount of considered.
action options that are available, and the cause of Step 1. Regarding the first step, it is worth
the stimulus. According to appraisal theories, the pointing out that even so-called process theories
occurrence and variety in emotions can be (who take appraisal to be a mental process) have
explained by the interaction between the stimulus not put any restrictions on the operations that may
and each of these other types of information. The be involved in appraisal, as long as the output of
interaction of the perceptual stimulus information these operations are representations of values on
with these other sources of information is cap- the proposed appraisal factors (Moors 2013).
tured in so-called appraisal factors. Goal rele- Many appraisal theorists distinguish between
vance refers to the extent to which a stimulus (at least) two types of operations: rule-based
impacts on goals; goal in/congruence refers to computation and the activation of associations
whether the stimulus mis/matches with these (Leventhal and Scherer 1987; Smith and Kirby
goals; un/expectedness refers to whether the stim- 2001). Stimuli that are encountered for the first
ulus mis/matches with expectations; high/low time require rule-based appraisal in which a value
control refers to whether there are more/less is computed for each appraisal factor separately
action options available for solving a goal- and the values are integrated in an appraisal
incongruent situation; and agency refers to pattern. Once an association is established in
4 Appraisal Theory of Emotion

memory between the stimulus and an appraisal form the emotion (Scherer 2009). Each appraisal
pattern, the pattern can again be activated by output has an influence on the action tendency,
the same or similar stimuli. Dual process models which mobilizes somatic responses that prepare
typically assume that associative but not rule- the organism for overt action. Aspects of all these
based operations can be automatic. Yet, the components seep into consciousness where their
question whether (or the degree to which) rule- integrated sum makes up the content of the feeling
based appraisal can be automatic must be studied component. In this scenario, the organism at no
in empirical research (Moors 2010). Finally, it is point has to determine the specific emotion that is
worth mentioning that some appraisal theorists at stake; instead, emotions are considered as emer-
have also studied the brain correlates of appraisal gent phenomena. The episode can be labeled by
(see review by Brosch and Sander 2013). Sander the person undergoing the episode or by an
et al. (2003), for instance, have shown that regions outside observer, but this is not necessary. If the
(e.g., the amygdala) that were previously thought person does label her emotion or elaborates on its
to be specific for one basic emotion (fear) are meaning, these thoughts also figure into
actually specific for one appraisal factor (goal consciousness and in this way, they do also
relevance). It is an open question, however, influence the quality of the person’s feelings.
whether appraisal factors are tied to specific Some appraisal theories build in the notions of
neural substrates (and whether we should search recurrence and immediate efference (Scherer
for these susbtrates) or whether they are processed 2009). Recurrence means that changes in motiva-
by content-independent neural mechanisms. tional, somatic, motor, and feeling components
Step 2. Appraisal theories have not only pro- feed back as input in the appraisal component
posed operations involved in the transition from either directly or indirectly (i.e., via a change in
stimulus to appraisal output but also operations the stimulus). Immediate efference means that the
involved in the transition from the output of the processes in each of the components do not need
appraisal process to specific emotions (in first- to be completed before they can produce changes
flavor theories) or to the values of the other in later components. In this way, the appraisal
emotional components (in second-flavor theo- process can start influencing the output compo-
ries). Appraisal theories of the first flavor set out nents before it is fully completed. Both notions of
to explain specific emotions. They propose that recurrence and immediate efference make it clear
the appraisal pattern resulting from the appraisal that the components in emotional episodes do not
process is integrated in a summary appraisal value follow a strict linear sequence.
(called a core relational theme by Lazarus 1991) Influence of person factors on Step 1 and 2.
and that this summary value determines the Appraisal theories have started from the observa-
specific emotion that is at stake. This, in turn, tion that there is a variable relation between stim-
determines the values of the output components. uli and emotions: The same stimulus does not
For instance, a pattern consisting of the appraisal always lead to the same emotion. To explain this
values goal relevance, goal incongruence, and low variability, appraisal theories have inserted
control can be summarized as danger. Danger appraisal as a third, mediating factor. Inserting
determines that the emotion at stake is fear, and a third factor, however, is not sufficient to explain
this determines the tendency to flee, somatic a variable relation between two other factors. If
responses preparing for fleeing, actual fleeing, one stimulus always causes the same appraisal
and feelings of fear. pattern and the same appraisal pattern always
Appraisal theories of the second flavor, by causes the same emotion, the stimulus always
contrast, set out to explain the values of the output causes the same emotion. Appraisal theories
components, without linking them to specific make the additional assumption that appraisal is
emotions. They propose that each appraisal not only influenced by the stimulus but also by
value has a separate influence on the values of person factors and that this is responsible for the
the output components and together these values variable relation between stimuli and emotions
Appraisal Theory of Emotion 5

(see Fig. 1). Different individuals may appraise and Emotion, 23, 2009). The question arises
the same stimulus in different ways (e.g., as more whether and how these two seemingly contradic-
or less goal relevant, goal in/congruent, un/ex- tory positions (fixed vs. variable relation between
pected, controllable, and attributable to others) appraisal and emotion) can be reconciled. One
depending on person factors like goal priorities, possibility would be to assume that the influence
expectations, self-efficacy, and attributional style. of appraisal outweighs the influence of person
In addition to the claim that the relation factors. For instance, one could assume that
between stimuli and appraisals is variable because individual differences in propensities for the
of the influence of person factors, appraisal activation of action tendencies merely add shades
theories have traditionally made the claim that to emotions that are primarily determined by
the relation between appraisals and emotions appraisal.
or components is stable across individuals
(irrespective of culture or gender) and hence
universal (e.g., Ellsworth 1994; Roseman and
Step 3: Empirical Testing of Explanations
Smith 2001). Same appraisal patterns cause
same emotions (in Flavor 1 theories) or same
Empirical work has focused on evaluating the
patterns of values on the output components
hypotheses put forward by appraisal theories
(in Flavor 2 theories). In addition, all individuals
about links between appraisal patterns and
in all cultures dispose of the same repertoire
specific emotions and/or specific values of com-
of appraisal factors and the same repertoire of
ponents. Appraisal theories of the first flavor
output components (but see Mesquita and
examine hypotheses about causal relations
Ellsworth 2001).
between specific appraisals and specific emotions.
On closer consideration and in line with what
For instance, they examine the hypothesis that
some authors have argued (Kuppens et al. 2007;
goal-incongruent stimuli that are difficult to con-
Scherer 2009), emotions or components are not
trol lead to fear whereas goal-incongruent stimuli
only determined by appraisals but also by person
that are easy to control lead to anger (Roseman
factors that do not exert their influence via the
2013). Appraisal theories of the second flavor, on
appraisal factors (see Fig. 1). For example, people
the other hand, examine hypotheses about causal
may have different thresholds or propensities for
relations between specific appraisal values and
the activation of particular action tendencies inde-
specific values of output components, such as
pendent of the way in which they appraise the
the motivational component (Frijda 1986; Frijda
situation, as in people with a fiery temper
et al. 1989), the somatic component (central and
(Frijda, 2009). This should lead to variable
peripheral, Scherer 1993, 2009; Smith 1989), and
relations between appraisals and emotions or
the motor component (facial expressions, Smith
components in contrast with the traditional
and Ellsworth 1985; Laird and Bresler 1992;
claim. Detailed hypotheses about which aspects
vocal expressions, Scherer 2009). For instance,
of appraisal and output components can be
they study the appraisal patterns responsible for
influenced by person factors are described by
the elicitation of the tendency to fight vs. flee
Scherer and Brosch (2009; see also Cognition
without linking these to the emotions of anger

person factors person factors

stimulus appraisal values emotions / components

Appraisal Theory of Emotion, Fig. 1 Relations between stimuli, appraisal values, emotions, and person factors
6 Appraisal Theory of Emotion

vs. fear, or they examine causal relations between been countered by measuring emotions via com-
appraisal values (e.g., goal incongruence) and ponents such as action tendencies, somatic
facial action units (e.g., frown). In this way, responses, and behavior instead of via emotion
they circumvent unproductive discussions about labels (Aue and Scherer 2008; Bossuyt et al.
which emotions are really studied. Detailed 2014; Frijda et al. 1989; Scherer and Ellgring
hypotheses about relations between appraisals 2007; van Reekum et al. 2004). Yet measuring
and values of output components are listed by emotions via one component only makes sense if
Scherer (2001; Table 5.3) and Moors and Scherer it is assumed that the emotion under study has a
(2013, Table 2.8). They also review empirical unique value for that component. For instance, it
studies that attempt to test some of these hypoth- only makes sense to measure anger via aggressive
eses, and they organize these studies according to behavior if it is assumed that aggression is unique
the various methods used for the manipulation of for anger (and does not occur in other emotions).
appraisals and the measurement of the output Importantly, this problem does not arise for
components. research aimed at testing hypotheses about
Hypotheses about relations between specific relations between appraisal values and values of
appraisals and specific emotions (proposed by output components (proposed by second-flavor
first-flavor appraisal theories) are often studied appraisal theories).
with questionnaires using self-reports of The development of hypotheses and their
appraisal values and emotion labels. This method empirical testing and subsequent adjustment is a
has received extensive criticism (Frijda and work in progress. This enterprise is further
Zeelenberg 2001; Parkinson 1997). A first criti- complicated by at least two issues. First, appraisal
cism concerns the use of correlational studies theories have traditionally presented the relation
because these do not yield evidence for causal between appraisal values and emotions or output
relations. A second criticism questions the use of components as following the logic of a hierarchi-
emotion labels to measure emotions because cal tree. Yet, some authors (Scherer 2009) have
(a) an emotion label is not a component of emo- voiced the possibility that appraisal factors inter-
tion and (b) appraisals and emotion labels are act in such a way that the values of some factors
conceptually related, hence observed relations receive different weights depending on the values
may reflect conceptual relations in people’s of other factors. For instance, it is possible that
minds instead of causal or other relations in the control has a stronger weight when a stimulus is
world (Frijda and Zeelenberg 2001; Parkinson appraised as goal incongruent than when it is
1997). A third criticism concerns the use of self- appraised as goal congruent. The level of com-
report to assess appraisal values. The appraisal plexity that can be anticipated to result from these
process is supposed to be largely interactions makes them a suitable topic for com-
automatic. Even though some appraisal values putational modeling. Second, appraisal theories
may pervade into consciousness, they often do embrace the idea that stimuli are constantly
so in an integrated form that is difficult to dissect reappraised. This makes it difficult (but perhaps
(Scherer 2009) and they tend to be forgotten and not impossible) to isolate one emotion-generative
replaced by stereotypic scripts about appraisals cycle and to distinguish between appraisals that
and emotions (Robinson and Clore 2002). cause emotions and those that follow or coincide
To alleviate these criticisms, contemporary with them.
appraisal researchers have increasingly turned to Another line of empirical research systemati-
alternative methods. To accomodate the first and cally examines the question which appraisal
third criticisms, appraisal researchers have started factors can be processed automatically (using
to manipulate appraisal variables in real or simu- behavioral and neuroscientific methods).
lated environments instead of measuring them There is support for the automatic processing of
(Bossuyt et al. 2014; Smith and Ellsworth 1987; novelty (e.g., Berns et al. 1997) goal relevance
van Reekum et al. 2004). The second criticism has (e.g., Gati and Ben-Shakar 1990), intrinsic
Appraisal Theory of Emotion 7

valence (e.g., Fazio et al. 1986; Grandjean and Conclusion

Scherer 2008), goal congruence (Moors et al.
2004), control (e.g., Aarts 2007; Moors and Appraisal theories were analyzed using the four
De Houwer 2005), and agency/intentionality steps of the scientific cycle for theory develop-
(Scholl and Tremoulet 2000). ment. This allowed identifying the specifics of
appraisal theories compared to other theories,
and to identify different approaches within the
family of appraisal theories. Regarding
Step 4: Scientific Definition of Emotion
the working definition of emotion (Step 1),
appraisal theories either take specific emotions
Emotion theories, including appraisal theories,
(Flavor 1) or features of emotions (Flavor 2) as
have come up with scientific definitions of
the explanandum. Regarding the explanation of
emotions based on the explanations that they
emotion (Step 2), appraisal theories take emotions
propose for emotions. One might argue, however,
to be episodes or collections of components
that these definitions are somewhat premature
(structural explanation). They propose hypotheses
given that the explanations have not received
about deep features of situations (causal explana-
irrefutable empirical evidence and that consensus
tion in descriptive theories), which in some theo-
is not imminent. Regarding the intensional defini-
ries also correspond to the contents of the
tion of emotion (specifying necessary and
representations that form the output of a mental
sufficient conditions), appraisal theories use their
appraisal process (mechanistic explanation in
causal explanation of emotions as a criterion to
process theories). Operations involved in
demarcate emotions from other phenonomena.
appraisal process are rule-based and associative.
Indeed, they define emotions as collections
Operations involved in the transition from the
of components in which the output components
appraisal output to the values of the output
are caused by a stimulus that is appraised as
components include the integration of appraisal
relevant for a highly important goal (Frijda
values in a summary appraisal value (Flavor 1), or
1988; Lararus 1991; Moors 2007; Oatley and
alternatively, the direct and separate influence of
Johnson-Laird 1987). This is manifested in an
each appraisal value on the output components
action tendency with control precedence (i.e.,
(Flavor 2). It was further argued that both steps
that calls for priority in influencing behavior and
in the stimulus-to-emotion/components chain can
experience; Frijda 1986, 2007), and/or in a high
be influenced by person factors. Regarding the
degree of synchronization among all components
scientific definitions (Step 4) that appraisal
(Scherer 2001, 2009).
theories have proposed for the demarcation of
Regarding the divisio definition of emotions
emotions (intensional definition), appraisal theo-
(i.e., the organization of the total set of emotions
ries take emotions to be episodes in which stimuli
into subsets), appraisal theories of the first flavor
are appraised as highly goal relevant, leading to
tend to endorse a discrete emotions view, that is,
action tendencies with control precedence, and
they organize the set of emotions internally into
a high level of synchronicity among components.
discrete subsets corresponding to specific emo-
Concerning the internal organization of the set of
tions. Appraisal theories of the second flavor, by
emotions (divisio definition), appraisal theories
contrast, hold a dimensional view. For them, the
either adopt a discrete (Flavor 1) or dimensional
set of emotions encompasses an infinite number of
view (Flavor 2), consistent with the working
subsets that can best be organized with the help of
definitions from which they started.
dimensions corresponding to appraisal factors:
goal relevance, goal in/congruence, un/expected-
ness, control, and agency.
8 Appraisal Theory of Emotion

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