1.

Meneses vs Secretary if Agrarian Reform paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of

(2006) respondents’ Complaint.
@Maria Cristina Angela Serrano
However, petitioners admitted but denied in
part paragraphs 2 and 3, and paragraph 14,
2. De Dios Carlos vs Sandoval (2008) for lack of sufficient knowledge and
@Faith Turno information sufficient to form a belief
thereon, and specifically denied paragraph
13; and paragraph 15.
3. BASBAS, et al.vs. SAYSON
G.R. No. 172660 August 24, 2011
The RTC found that petitioners’ Answer does
@Marcellanne Valles not essentially tender an issue since the
material allegations of the Complaint were
FACTS: admitted. Hence, the RTC granted
respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the
Respondents spouses Sayson filed a Petition Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment and
for Registration of an agricultural land issued an order in favor of the plaintiffs.
located in Leyte The said application was
opposed by the Republic of the Philippines The CA denied petitioners’ appeal. It noted
and herein petitioners Eugenio Basbas et al. that petitioners’ Answer admitted almost all
of the allegations in respondents’ complaint.
The CFI rendered a Decision adjudicating to
the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and ISSUE:
approving its registration under their names.
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in
The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA. granting respondents’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings and/or summary judgment.
The CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the
CFI. This CA Decision became final and RULING:
executory.
There is no merit in the petition.
The RTC ordered the original oppositors to
vacate the subject property. The instant case is proper for the rendition of
a summary judgment.

In Tan v. De la Vega, the court distinguished

Respondent and her son, as successor-in- summary judgment from judgment on the
interest filed a Complaint for Revival of pleadings, viz:
Judgment.

In their Answer with counterclaim, The existence or appearance of ostensible

petitioners admitted the allegations in issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and
their sham or fictitious character, on the
other, are what distinguish a proper case for The issues raised are not genuine issues,
summary judgment from one for a judgment hence rendition of summary judgment is
on the pleadings. In a proper case for proper.
judgment on the pleadings, there is no Judgment on the pleadings is not proper
ostensible issue at all because of the failure because petitioners’ Answer tendered issues.
of the defending party’s answer to raise an
issue. On the other hand, in the case of a In this case, we note that while petitioners’
summary judgment, issues apparently exist – Answer to respondents’ Complaint practically
i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint admitted all the material allegations therein,
regarding which there is as yet no admission, it nevertheless asserts the affirmative
disavowal or qualification; or specific denials defenses that the action for revival of
or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in judgment is not the proper action and that
the answer – but the issues thus arising from petitioners are not the proper parties. As
the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not issues obviously arise from these affirmative
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is
or admissions. x x clearly improper in this case.

Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment

on the pleadings from a summary judgment Post Judgment Remedies:
is the presence of issues in the Answer to the
Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender 4. University of the East vs U. E. Employees
any issue, that is, if it does not deny the Association (2011)
material allegations in the complaint or @Ka Ka
admits said material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal 5. Mcburnie vs Ganzon (2013)
with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings @Carlu Yoo
is appropriate.

On the other hand, when the Answer 6. Heirs of Agapatio Olarte vs Office of the
specifically denies the material averments of President of the Philippines (2011)
the complaint or asserts affirmative @Erwin S. Zambrano
defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a
summary judgment is proper provided that
the issue raised is not genuine. 7. Maricslum Mining Corp vs Remington
Industrial Sales Corp (2008)
“A ‘genuine issue’ means an issue of fact @JJ Al
which calls for the presentation of evidence,
as distinguished from an issue which is MARICALUM MINING CORP. V. REMINGTON
fictitious or contrived or which does not G.R. No. 158332, 2008

constitute a genuine issue for trial.”

FACTS: Remington Industrial Sales Corporation
(private respondent) sued Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (Marinduque Mining) for
payment of P921,755.95 worth of construction
materials and other merchandise docketed as CV
Case No. 84-25858. Petitioner was impleaded ISSUE: Whether the Court's Decisions in DBP v. CA
along with 5 other defendants since they were and PNB v. CA inured to the benefit of petitioner
assignees/transferees of certain properties of which was not a party to either case
Marinduque Mining. The RTC decided in favor of
Remington ordering Maricalum among others to HELD: Indeed, one party's appeal from a judgment
pay jointly and severally the amount sought by will not inure to the benefit of a co-party who
Remington. failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the
judgment will continue to run its course until it
Consequently, the Maricalum and its co- becomes final and executory. To this general rule,
defendants filed an appeal with the Court of however, one exception stands out: where both
Appeals. But the CA dismissed the said appeal. parties have a commonality of interests, the
appeal of one is deemed to be the vicarious
DBP and PNB filed before the Court separate appeal of the other. As the Court held in John
appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 126200 and Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo :
122710, respectively.
The modification made by this Court to the
On its own, herein petitioner also attempted to judgment of the Court of Appeals must operate as
institute an appeal with the Court by filing a against Yoro, for as fittingly held by the court a
motion for an extension of 30 days within which to quo:
file a petition for review on certiorari and to pay
the legal fees but such motion was denied. While it is settled that a party who did not appeal
from the decision cannot seek any relief other
Thus, on December 5, 2000, private respondent than what is provided in the judgment appealed
filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution solely from, nevertheless, when the rights and liability of
against petitioner on the ground that: With the the defendants are so interwoven and dependent
finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolution as to be inseparable, in which case, the
of denial of December 4, 1996 and the entry of modification of the appealed judgment in favor of
said resolution in the book of entries of judgment appellant operates as a modification to Gen. Yoro
itself, for which reason, issuance of a writ of who did not appeal. In this case, the liabilities of
execution for its satisfaction would be most proper Gen. Yoro and appellant being solidary, the
at this stage against said [petitioner]. The RTC above exception applies. 
granted the Motion for Execution and a Writ of In Director of Lands v. Reyes , the Court identified
Execution was issued and on the basis of which the circumstances indicative of a commonality in
certain bank accounts of the herein petitioner the interests of the parties, such as when: a) their
were garnished. rights and liabilities originate from only one source
or title; b) homogeneous evidence establishes the
In the interregnum, the Court rendered a Decision existence of their rights and liabilities; and c)
dated August 16, 2001 in DBP v. CA dismissing the whatever judgment is rendered in the case or
original complaint filed in the Regional Trial Court appeal, their rights and liabilities will be affected,
in CV Case No. 84-25858. even if to varying extents.

In PNB v. CA, the court also dismissed the In DBP v. CA and PNB v. CA , the Court has
complaint of Remington Industrial Sales conclusively adjudicated the commonality in the
Corporation in Civil Case No. 84-25858 interests of DBP, PNB and petitioner, in relation to
private respondent.
Thus, citing PNB v. CA, petitioner filed in CA-G.R.
No. 65209, a Manifestation urging it to dismiss the To recall DBP v. CA, the main issue resolved therein
claim of private respondent and annul the March was whether Marinduque Mining and DBP and its
9, 2001 and May 10, 2001 RTC Orders transferees, including petitioner, are one and the
same corporate entity such that the latter may be herein petitioner Ramon Torres. Said MTCC
held liable for the obligations of the former. The Decision became final and executory and
contention of private respondent was that such pursuant to a writ of execution, a Notice of Levy
piercing of the corporate veil separating was annotated on the titles of respondents
Marinduque Mining, DBP and its transferees was Alamag's and Ngoju's properties. These are the
warranted because DBP foreclosed on the properties subject of the present case.
mortgage of Marinduque Mining and acquired
the latter's properties by auction sale but later Thereafter, in a letter request dated December 4,
dispersed said properties to various corporations, 1998, respondent Alamag asked petitioner Sheriff
including petitioner, all for the fraudulent purpose Jessie Belarmino for confirmation of the initial
of placing said properties beyond the reach of computation of the estimated redemption price of
private respondent and thereby frustrating its ₱389,570.00. On December 28, 1998, petitioner
efforts to collect on the obligation of Marinduque Torres likewise requested for an estimate of the
Mining. redemption price.

On December 29, 1998, petitioner Torres

redeemed the two lots from the Spouses Chua by
paying the amount of ₱402,993.60. An additional
₱22,000.00 for interest and taxes was paid by
8. Torres vs Alamag (2010) petitioner Torres on January 8, 1999.
@Lemuel Atup
However, respondent Alamag also deposited
RAMON TORRES and JESSIE BELARMINO,  vs. ₱404,000.00 as redemption money on January 7,
SPOUSES VIHINZKY ALAMAG and AIDA A. NGOJU 1999, as evidenced by an Official Receipt and a
Notice of Tender, both bearing the same date.
G.R. No. 169569 (August 3, 2010)
On January 12, 1999, Sheriff Jessie Belarmino issued
PERALTA, J.: a Certificate of Redemption to petitioner Torres.

Facts: Respondents Alamag and Ngoju then filed a case

for Redemption and Injunction with Prayer for the
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order with the
of land which are covered by two (2) titles. RTC, praying that they be declared to be the
rightful persons to redeem the disputed foreclosed
Said property was extrajudicially foreclosed by the properties from the Spouses Chua, and that a
Bank of the Philippine Islands to satisfy a loan certificate of redemption be issued in their favor
obligation. by petitioner Sheriff Belarmino.

At the public auction sale of the mortgaged Petitioner Torres countered that he is a valid
property, the same was awarded to the spouses redemptioner under Section 27(b), Rule 39 of the
Rudy and Dominica Chua, being the highest Rules of Court; hence, the issuance to him of a
bidder for the amount of ₱310,000.00. They were, certificate of redemption was only proper.
subsequently, issued a Certificate of Sale, which
was registered in the Office of the Register of RTC: Petitioner Torres, who is a creditor having a
Deeds of Cebu City. lien by judgment on the subject property, which is
subsequent to the lien under which the property
Meanwhile, in a separate case for ejectment filed was sold, is a valid redemptioner under Section
by petitioner Ramon Torres against respondent 27(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Alamag, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cebu City, rendered a Decision dated in favor of
CA: CA rendered the assailed Decision holding Indeed, it has been held that for a valid
that both petitioner Torres, on the one hand, and redemption, the amount tendered must include
respondents Alamag and Ngoju, on the other, had the following:
the right to redeem the disputed lots, but it was
respondents who were the first to tender the full (1) the full amount paid by the
redemption price, so respondents should have purchaser;
been issued the certificate of redemption.
(2) with an additional one percent
The CA held that petitioner Torres' per month interest on the
payment of ₱402,993.60 made on purchase price up to the time of
December 29, 1998, was not the full redemption;
redemption price as it did not include
interests and taxes. Petitioner Torres only (3) together with the amount of
paid the additional amount of ₱22,000.00 any assessments or taxes which
for realty taxes on January 8, 1999, but the purchaser may have paid
according to the CA, by that time, thereon after purchase;
respondent Alamag had already
tendered the full amount of the (4) interest on the taxes paid by
redemption price, as he deposited the purchaser at the rate of one
₱404,000.00 with the Office of the Clerk of percent per month up to the time
Court on January 7, 1999, one day ahead of redemption; and
of Torres' payment for taxes with interest
thereon.  (5) if the purchaser be also a
creditor having a prior lien to that
Issue: Whether or not respondents are the ones of the redemptioner, other than
entitled to a certificate of redemption. the judgment under which such
purchase was made, the amount
Held: No. of such other lien, with interest.

Indeed, under Section 27 (b), Rule 39, petitioner However, in Baluyut v. Poblete, the Court held that
Torres had a right to redeem the properties sold at the purchaser is required to furnish copies of the
public auction. He is a creditor who had lien on amounts of assessments or taxes which he may
the disputed lots by virtue of the Notice of Levy have paid to inform the mortgagor or
annotated on the respective titles of the properties redemptioner of the actual amount which he
as a result of a final and executory judgment for should pay in case he chooses to exercise his right
rental arrearages and attorney's fees against of redemption and if no such notice is given, the
respondent Alamag. property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments or taxes.
The Court is unconvinced by the CA's reasoning
that petitioner Torres failed to pay the full Then, in Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading
redemption price on December 29, 1998. The Corporation, the Court reiterated the ruling
amount of ₱402,993.60 paid by petitioner Torres in Estanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals    that the
already included the bid price paid by the payment of the full purchase price and interest
Spouses Chua, capital gains and documentary thereon by a redemptioner, who had not been
stamp taxes, fees due to the Register of Deeds, apprised of the amount of taxes paid by the
and interest on the total amount for 18 months purchaser, should already be considered sufficient
from June 30, 1997 to December 30, 1998. for purposes of redemption if the redemptioner
The only amounts not included were the expenses immediately pays the additional amount for taxes
for payment of realty taxes and interest thereon. once notified of the deficiency. 
The Court deemed this to be in consonance with e. September 22, 2008 – The petitioner received
the policy of the law to aid rather than defeat the the COMELEC en banc Resolution of September
right of redemption. Therefore, the amount paid 18, 2008
by petitioner Torres on December 29, 1998 shall
also be deemed sufficient for purposes of Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on the final
redemption. Petitioner Sheriff Jessie Belarmino COMELEC Resolution on October 22, 2008 or two
acted properly in issuing a Certificate of days late which must be filed 30 days from such
Redemption to petitioner Torres. notice however it fell on a Saturday (October 18,
2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining
period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up
4 days in preparing and filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. His petition was dismissed. He
insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a
9. Gagui vs Dejero (2013) petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise
@Rikki Banggat apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings
filed under Rule 64. He asks for Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
10. Pates vs COMELEC June 30, 2009
@Mark Ian Gersalino Bicodo ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for
reconsideration should be granted.
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which
provides: RULING:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be
filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the As a Matter of Law
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or No. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
reconsideration of said judgment or final order or provides that unless otherwise provided by the
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the of each Commission may be brought to the Court
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days
aggrieved party may file the petition within the from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of specifically applicable only to decisions of the
denial. COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
FACTS: expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the
The following material antecedents: filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the
a. February 1, 2008 – The COMELEC First Division exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
issued its Resolution (assailed in the petition); Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to
b. February 4, 2008 – The counsel for petitioner Nilo Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule.
T. Pates (petitioner) received a copy of the Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to
February 1, 2008 Resolution; Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule.
c. February 8, 2008 – The petitioner filed his motion Procedurally, the most patent difference between
for reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64
Resolution (4 days from receipt of the February 1, refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special
2008 Resolution) period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
d. September 18, 2008 – The COMELEC en banc decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The
issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s MR period is 30 days from notice of the decision or
(also assailed in the petition). ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the
filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible
from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the 14. Concrete Solutions , inc vs Cabusas
fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). (2013)
Significantly, the petitioner presented no
@Cyril Gonzales
exceptional circumstance or any compelling
reason to warrant the non-application of Section
3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why
his filing was late. Other than his appeal to history, 15. G.R. No. 165544               October 2, 2009
ROMEO SAMONTE, Petitioner,
uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain
vs.
why we should adopt and apply the fresh period S.F. NAGUIAT, INC., Respondents.
rule to an election case.
As a Matter of Policy
The reason, as made clear above, is FACTS
constitutionally-based and is no less than the Petitioner Romeo Samonte is the President and
importance our Constitution accords to the General Manager of S.B. Commercial Traders,
prompt determination of election results. This Inc. (SB Traders, for brevity), a corporation
engaged in the business of retailing motor oils
reason far outweighs convenience and uniformity.
and lubricants. It (sic) purchases Mobil products
Our Liberal Approach
on credit basis from one of Mobil Oil Philippines'
Largely for the same reason and as discussed authorized dealers in Bulacan, herein private
below, we are not inclined to suspend the rules to respondent S.F. Naguiat, Inc., with an express
come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has agreement to pay within a period of 60 days from
blundered by reading the wrong applicable date of delivery.
provision. The Rules of Court are with us for the
prompt and orderly administration of justice; On September 4, 2000, the private respondent
litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against SB Traders and the petitioner with Branch
simply cry for the liberal construction of these rules.
9 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
We add that even for this Court, liberality does not Bulacan. The private respondent alleged that SB
signify an unbridled exercise of discretion. It has its Traders incurred an obligation to pay the total
limits; to serve its purpose and to preserve its true sum of ₱1,105,143.27 arising from the sale of
worth, it must be exercised only in the most Mobil Oil products. It further averred that SB
appropriate cases. Traders was merely an alter ego of the petitioner
and that it was operating for his sole benefit..
Therefore, the petitioner and SB Traders must be
held solidarily liable for the subject amount.

The petitioner filed an answer denying all the

11. Yu vs Samson-Tatad (2011) material averments of the complaint, As special
@Kristine Guia Castillo and affirmative defenses, he claimed that he was
not acting in his personal capacity and was
merely acting for and in behalf of SB Traders; that
SB Traders never denied its obligation to pay for
12. Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas vs Limbaco the purchases it made with the private respondent
but was merely requesting for more time to settle
(2011) its accounts; and that to effect payment for the
@Joe Van de Gala subject amount, it had already issued postdated
checks of ₱25,000.00 per month covering the
period from June to December 1999 to the private
respondent.
13. Purcon, Jr. vs MRM Philippines (2008)
@Jade Ligan Eliab Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference on April 20, 2001. Hence, trial ensued
where the public respondent allowed the ex parte
presentation of the private respondent's evidence Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
before the Branch Clerk of Court. provide the requirements for a petition for relief
from judgment, thus:
On May 25, 2001, the public respondent rendered
judgment in favor of the private respondent. SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or
other proceedings. – When a judgment or final
The petitioner failed to appeal the said decision. order is entered, or any other proceeding is
Thereafter, on motion by the private respondent, thereafter taken against a party in any court
the public respondent ordered the issuance of a through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
writ of execution on July 30, 2001. negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment,
On August 22, 2001, the petitioner filed a petition order or proceeding be set aside.
for relief from judgment on the ground that the SEC. 3. Time for filing of petition; contents and
public respondent made serious and prejudicial verification.— A petition for in either of the
mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented. preceding sections of this rule must be verified,
He argued that a corporation had a personality filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
separate and distinct from that of its officers and learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding
therefore, he cannot be held solidarily liable for to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
obligations contracted by corporation. The petition after such judgment or order was entered, or such
was opposed by the private respondent. proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
On December 21, 2001, the public respondent mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and
issued the first assailed order denying the the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
petitioner's petition for relief from judgment for substantial cause of action or defense, as the
lack of merit. The petitioner moved for case may be.
reconsideration of the said order but the same
was denied in the second assailed order dated Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
February 12, 2002 on the grounds that the motion of Court is a remedy provided by law to any
failed to comply with the mandatory requirements person against whom a decision or order is
of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or
of Civil procedure and that it failed to raise an excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of
issue which would warrant a modification or equitable character, allowed only in exceptional
reversal of the order dated December 21, 2001.4 cases as where there is no other available or
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari adequate remedy.6 When a party has another
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary remedy available to him, which may either be a
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
injunction reiterating the grounds stated in his decision of the lower court, and he was not
petition for relief from judgment filed with the RTC. prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
Respondent filed its Comment. The parties excusable negligence from filing such motion or
subsequently filed their respective memoranda. taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the
On March 26, 2004, the CA issued its assailed relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief
Decision dismissing the petition. will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when
ISSUE the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
WON The Honorable Court gravely erred in negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure,
strictly applying the rules of procedure at the otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount
expense of substantial justice. to reviving the right of appeal which has already
been lost either because of inexcusable
HELD negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that procedure by counsel.7
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the RTC in dismissing the petition for relief from In his Petition for Relief from Judgment filed
judgment filed by petitioner therewith. before the RTC, petitioner alleged that the petition
was filed on the ground that the RTC made
serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating
the evidence presented. He then proceeded to
discuss the errors of judgment committed by the should state the reason why he did not avail of the
RTC in rendering its decision. remedy of appeal deserves scant consideration.
His failure to avail of the remedy of appeal within
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the the reglementary period despite receipt of the
Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of RTC decision rendered the same final and
fact, not of law, which relates to the case.8 The executory. He cannot be allowed to assail the
word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, RTC decision which had become final in a petition
does not apply and was never intended to apply for relief from judgment when there was no
to a judicial error which the court might have allegations of fraud, accident, mistake, or
committed in the trial.9 Such error may be excusable negligence which prevented him from
corrected by means of an appeal. interposing an appeal. Such appeal could have
corrected what he believed to be an erroneous
The arguments raised by petitioner in his petition judicial decision. To reiterate, petition for relief is
for relief from judgment, i.e., he cannot be held an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
civilly liable for obligations he, as corporate exceptional cases where there is no other
president thereof, has incurred in behalf of the available or adequate remedy11 which is not
corporation which is vested with a personality present in petitioner’s case. Thus, petitioner's
separate and distinct from its officers and resort to a petition for relief under Rule 38 was not
stockholders; and that he cannot be held jointly proper and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
and solidarily liable for the obligations, are proper did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issues which petitioner could have raised in a denying the petition for relief from judgment.
motion for reconsideration which he did not. The
RTC, in its Order denying the petition for relief,
ruled:

Going by the tenor of the aforequoted Rule, it is

the sense of this Court that the petition under
consideration cannot prosper, given the grounds
therefor which should have been raised, more
appropriately, in a simple motion for
reconsideration. It must be noted that the
petitioner does not assail the proceedings
16. Torres vs China Banking Corp (2010)
conducted by this Court which culminated in the
rendition of the judgment and issuance of the writ @Reina Anne Jayme
of execution rather; he questions only the validity
of the dispositive portion of the decision, an issue PERALTA, J.:
which, as already adverted to, should have been
ventilated via a motion for reconsideration. Facts:
In fact, the alleged errors committed by the RTC
could also be corrected by means of an appeal On August 27, 1986, petitioner Jaime T. Torres,
from the RTC decision. Petitioner did not also file as owner of St. James School, and respondent
an appeal causing the RTC decision to become China Banking Corporation executed a mortgage
final and executory and the subsequent issuance agreement over parcels of land to secure
of a writ of execution. Notably, petitioner never petitioner’s loan in the amount of P4,600,000.00
made any allegation in his petition for relief from evidenced by a Promissory Note dated August 22,
judgment that the RTC decision was entered
against him through fraud, accident, mistake, or 1986, which stated that the “loan was repayable
excusable negligence. The petition for relief did within a period of five years with interest, payable
not also show any reason for petitioner's failure to monthly in arrears at 20 percent per annum
file an appeal after the receipt of the RTC commencing on September 22, 1986 until fully
decision which the CA correctly observed in its paid.” Thereafter, petitioner requested the
assailed decision. restructuring of the loan.
Petitioner’s claim that Section 1, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court does not require that petitioner
On November 29, 1988 and February 20, 1989, deficient payment by petitioner in the sum of
respondent sent petitioner demand letters to P236,731.64.
settle his overdue account of P4,600,000.00,
exclusive of interest and penalties, rendering the On September 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a
obligation due and demandable; otherwise, Decision in favor of petitioner. It held that
respondent would extrajudicially foreclose the real respondent acted in bad faith and deceit in
estate mortgage. foreclosing the subject properties after the offer
for restructuring by petitioner, together with
In a letter dated February 20, 1989, respondent’s substantial payments made.
Senior Vice-President informed petitioner that his
partial payments of P200,000.00 and Respondent appealed the trial court’s decision to
P654,465.75 made on October 6, 1988 and the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found
October 28, 1988, respectively, were applied to respondent’s appeal to be partly meritorious. It
the interest on the loan. disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the
foreclosure sale was null and void, because the
On May 25, 1989, petitioner tendered another trial court’s conclusion that the foreclosure was
payment in the amount of P2,000,000.00, premature and attended by bad faith was not
together with a letter stating that the amount was supported by the facts of the case and the law on
to update payment of petitioner’s restructured the matter. The Court of Appeals agreed with
account, and the excess amount to be applied to respondent that the redemption price should be
the principal balance, under Official Receipt No. P2,993,219.41, which was petitioner’s outstanding
59845. Another payment was made on June 1, balance as of May 30, 1990 after deducting his
1989 for P1,000,000.00 under Official Receipt No. total payments amounting to P3,854,465.75. It
60084. also agreed with respondent that the applicable
law was Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337,
On June 6, 1989, respondent formally notified otherwise known as the General Banking Act, and
petitioner that since the latter refused to submit to not Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
the former the request for postponement of the
auction sale of the property, scheduled on June 7, On April 20, 2001, petitioner, through his counsel
1989, respondent would proceed with the auction of record, Atty. Salvador B. Britanico, filed a
sale. The following day, respondent caused the Motion for Reconsideration. On November 5,
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution,
mortgaged properties. The Clerk of Court and the [21]which denied the motion for reconsideration
Ex Officio Sheriff of pasig sold the properties to for lack of merit. The Resolution became final and
respondent as the highest bidder. On November executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued
3, 1989, petitioner filed an action for annulment of on November 30, 2001.
extrajudicial foreclosure sale against respondent
for the alleged illegal foreclosure of mortgage On July 10, 2002, almost eight months after the
over the parcels of land and the subsequent sale Entry of Judgment, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan
of the properties. entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner.
However, the records of the case did not show
On May 30, 1990, petitioner tendered payment in that petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Britanico
the amount of P2,756,487.77 as redemption price of the S.B. Britanico Lisaca Lisaca Apelado Law
of the foreclosed property. Respondent protested Offices, had withdrawn from the case.
the tender of payment, maintaining that Section
78 of the General Banking Act applied in this On March 19, 2003, petitioner, through Atty.
case, not Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Bonifacio A. Alentajan, filed a Motion to Set Aside
Court; hence, the redemption price due as of May Entry of Judgment and to Resolve Appellant’s
30, 1990 should be P2,993,219.41, resulting in a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the
motion for reconsideration had yet to be resolved. law, for this opportunity to be heard
In a Resolution dated September 10, 2004, the is the very essence of due process."
Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed this petition. 1. The Court of Appeals resolved petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated
Issues: November 5, 2001. The Resolution was properly
served on petitioner’s counsel of record on
1. Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration November 14, 2001. Notice sent to counsel of
had already been resolved. record is binding upon the client, and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
2. Whether or not the entry of judgment issued by adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right
the CA is premature, considering that petitioner’s to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
Motion for Reconsideration has not yet been judgment valid and regular on its face. Fifteen
resolved despite announcement of the CA that it days from receipt of the Resolution dated
had already resolved said Motion. November 5, 2001, the Decision became final and
executory absent any appeal by petitioner. Hence,
Held: the Entry of Judgment issued on November 30,
2001 was in order.
The petition lacks merit.
2. Based on the records of the case, the
In Saint Louis University v. Cordero, he Court Resolution dated November 5, 2001, denying
held: petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
Decision dated March 23, 2001, was received by
The doctrinal rule is that the petitioner’s counsel on November 14, 2001.
negligence of counsel binds the Petitioner failed to appeal the Court of Appeals’
client. Otherwise, there would Decision to this Court.
never be an end to a suit so long
as a new counsel could be The failure to file an appeal from the decision
employed who would allege and rendering it final and executory is not a denial of
show that the prior counsel had due process. The right to appeal is not a natural
not been sufficiently diligent, right or a part of due process; it is merely a
experienced, or learned. statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions
To fall within the exceptional of the law.
circumstances such as those found
in Amil v. Court Appeals relied upon Further, the proper remedy for allegations of
by the petitioners, it must be mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel,
shown that the negligence of which prevented a party from taking an appeal, is
counsel must be so gross that the a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of
client is deprived of his day in Court. The petition must be filed within 60 days
court, the result of which is that after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
he is deprived of his property order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
without due process of law. Thus, more than six (6) months after such judgment or
where "a party was given the final order was entered. It must be filed within the
opportunity to defend [its] interests reglementary period, which is reckoned from the
in due course, [it] cannot be said to time the party’s counsel receives notice of the
have been denied due process of decision for notice to counsel of the decision is
notice to the party.
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals No. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the
became final and executory and Entry of scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the
Judgment was issued on November 30, 2001, the following:
Section 1. Coverage.— This Rule shall govern the
Decision can no longer be reviewed by this Court.
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
17. Estate of the late Jesus Yujuico vs Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
Republic (2007) trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of
@Elle Mich the petitioner.
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC
judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
18. People bs Bitanga (2007) case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded
@Blessy Joyce Lagarto Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the
PEOPLE VS. BITANGA 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have
G.R. 158222, June 26, 2007 suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18,
Rule 124 thereof, provides:
FACTS: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure
On the basis of a complaint lodged by Traders Royal to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to
Bank (TRB), an information for estafa was filed 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of
against Rafael M. Bitanga (Bitanga) before the RTC Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 103677. Bitanga appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases
pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. He was insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
allowed to post bail. the provisions of this Rule.
During trial on the merits, the People presented the There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to
testimonies of three TRB employees on how Bitanga extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. 
duped the bank into accepting three foreign checks for
deposit and encashment, which were however returned
to TRB by reason of "unlocated accounts."
When it was time for the defense to present his case, 19. Grande vs university of the Philippines
however, Bitanga and his counsel failed to appear and (2006)
adduce evidence. Upon motion of the public @Jubelle Angeli C. Maturan
prosecutor, a warrant of arrest was issued against
respondent and his right to adduce evidence was
deemed waived.
On February 29, 2000, the RTC promulgated in 20. Artistica Ceramics vs Ciudad Del Carmen
absentia a Decision finding Bitanga guilty as charge. Homeowner's association (2010)
On January 28, 2002, Bitanga filed with the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for @Lara Miranda
Other Reliefs on the ground that extrinsic fraud was
allegedly perpetuated upon him by his counsel of
record, Atty. Benjamin Razon. He alleged that he
21. BF Citiland vs Otake (2010)
received copy of the February 29, 2000 RTC Decision
only on December 13, 2001. @Kwinteriz Padilla
The People filed an Answer opposing the Petition.
The CA granted the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment in the March 31, 2003 Decision
The foregoing decision of the CA are now being
On Execution and Satisfaction of Judgment:
question by petitioner before the Supreme Court.
22. Florendo vs Paramount Insurance Corp
ISSUE: Whether or Not Annulment of Judgment under (2010)
Rule 47 is applicable in Criminal Cases? @Niko Parrucho
RULING:
 parties then filed a Motion to Approve
23. KKK Foundation vs Hon Calderon-Bargas Compromise Agreement.
(2007) On April 1, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent
@Coleen Rapisura Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise
Agreement since the other property owner
G.R. No. 163785               December 27, and other trustees of petitioner were not
2007 consulted prior to the signing of the
KKK FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, agreement
vs. On May 2, 2002, Judge Calderon-Bargas
HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, issued an Order, which reads in part:
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Record shows that the Urgent Ex-Parte
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 78 Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement
of Morong, Rizal, SHERIFF IV SALES T. and Motion to Approve Compromise
BISNAR, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s].
FOR MORONG, RIZAL, and IMELDA A. 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both
ANGELES, Respondents. proceedings have no specific date of hearing.
Facts: The reason why the Motion to Approve
On March 1, 2002, petitioner KKK Compromise Agreement up to now has not
Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint for yet been acted upon was that it has no date of
Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure of hearing.
Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of WHEREFORE, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
Sheriff’s Auction Sale and Damages with to Recall Compromise Agreement and the
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Motion to [Approve] Compromise Agreement
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary are considered mere scrap[s] of paper.
Injunction. Petitioner alleged that: (1) the In its Decision dated June 28, 2002, the trial
auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad court approved the Compromise Agreement,
faith since there was no public bidding; (2) as
the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of The parties, duly assisted by their respective
Sheriff’s Sale; (3) the petition for counsels, submitted before this Court a
extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally defective Compromise Agreement, as follows:
since it sought to foreclose properties of two xxxx
different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties [1.] The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant,
were awarded and sold to Imelda A. Angeles Imelda Angeles, the amount of P5,500,000.00
for an inadequate bid of only ₱4,181,450; and representing the bid price for all the eight
(5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of titles (TCT Nos. M-95417, 95419, 95418,
land covered by individual titles but the same 95420, 95421, 50889, 50890 and 50893)
were sold en masse. subject of the auction sale dated March 7,
On March 7, 2002, Judge Adelina Calderon- 2001 plus whatever taxes [and/or]
Bargas issued a temporary restraining order assessments and expenses of the public
preventing Angeles from consolidating her auction as prescribed under Act 3135, within
ownership to the foreclosed properties. On twenty (20) days from the signing of this
even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a compromise agreement. Said payment shall
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner be considered full settlement of all
agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the obligations stated under that Real Estate
eight parcels of land within 20 days. The Mortgage, dated July 15, 1997…and that
Deed of Assumption of Mortgage dated process when the trial court issued the
August 11, 1999…. October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002
2. Upon the payment of the afore-stated Orders since it was given sufficient time to
amount, the defendant shall make, sign, file its comment. The appellate court did not
execute and deliver to the plaintiff a rule on the second and third issues after
Certificate of Deed of Redemption of all the noting that petitioner’s motion for
above titles, and shall surrender and deliver to reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order
the plaintiff all the eight titles mentioned had not yet been resolved by the trial court. It
above. The defendant shall also make, sign, did not resolve the issues even after the trial
execute and deliver to the plaintiff a Deed of court denied petitioner’s motion for
Cancellation of Mortgage annotated at the reconsideration on December 12, 2003,
back of all the eight titles above-mentioned. ratiocinating that the trial court’s denial of
The defendant shall also return to the plaintiff petitioner’s motion for reconsideration did not
all checks issued by the plaintiff to the operate to reinstate the petition because at the
defendant as payment of its obligations. time it was filed, petitioner had no cause of
Finding the Compromise Agreement quoted action.
above to be not contrary to law, morals, good Issues:
customs and public policy, the same is hereby Simply, the issues are whether the trial court
APPROVED. seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3,
xxxx 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders
Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ without awaiting petitioner’s comment; (2) in
of execution. On September 9, 2002, the trial granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
court required petitioner to comment on the Execution although it lacked the requisite
motion within ten (10) days. On October 3, notice of hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ
2002, the trial court directed the Clerk of of execution since it varied the tenor of the
Court to issue a writ of execution. On the decision dated June 28, 2002.
same date, the trial court received petitioner’s Ruling:
Motion for Extension of Time to File On the first issue, we note that in its
Comment with Entry of Appearance which September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court gave
was denied on October 10, 2002.Petitioner petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment to
then moved for reconsideration of the Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
October 3, 2002 Order. Execution. While petitioner claims that it
Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via received the Order only on September 21,
petition for certiorari alleging that Judge 2002, Angeles counters that petitioner
Calderon-Bargas committed grave abuse of received it on September 12, 2002. We are
discretion amounting to lack or excess of more inclined to believe Angeles’s allegation
jurisdiction when: (1) she issued the October since the trial court itself declared in its Order
3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders even dated October 10, 2002 that the Order dated
before petitioner could file its comment; (2) September 9, 2002 was personally served
she granted the Motion for Issuance of Writ upon petitioner on September 12, 2002. Thus,
of Execution although it lacked the requisite petitioner had until September 22, 2002
notice of hearing; and (3) the writ of within which to file its comment or to request
execution changed the tenor of the decision for an extension of time. Consequently,
dated June 28, 2002. petitioner’s motion for extension and
In dismissing the petition, the appellate court comment were not seasonably filed and such
ruled that petitioner was not deprived of due procedural lapse binds petitioner.
Anent the second issue, we have consistently Clearly, petitioner was given time to study
held that a motion which does not meet the and comment on the motion for which reason,
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 the very purpose of a notice of hearing had
of the Rules of Court is considered a been achieved.
worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of The notice requirement is not a ritual to be
Court has no right to receive and the trial followed blindly. Procedural due process is
court has no authority to act upon. Service of not based solely on a mechanical and literal
a copy of a motion containing a notice of the application that renders any deviation
time and the place of hearing of that motion is inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are
a mandatory requirement, and the failure of liberally construed to promote their objective
movants to comply with these requirements and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and
renders their motions fatally defective. inexpensive determination of any action and
However, there are exceptions to the strict proceeding.
application of this rule. These exceptions are: On the last issue, we note that the
(1) where a rigid application will result in a Compromise Agreement approved by the
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice trial court in its Decision dated June 28,
especially if a party successfully shows that 2002 merely provided that petitioner would
the alleged defect in the questioned final and pay Angeles the bid price of ₱5,500,000, for
executory judgment is not apparent on its face the eight parcels of land subject of the
or from the recitals contained therein; (2) auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon
where the interest of substantial justice will payment, Angeles would execute a
be served; (3) where the resolution of the Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a
motion is addressed solely to the sound and Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and
judicious discretion of the court; and (4) surrender to petitioner the titles to the
where the injustice to the adverse party is not eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when
commensurate with the degree of his the trial court issued the writ of execution,
thoughtlessness in not complying with the the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to
procedure prescribed. allow the consolidation of the subject real
A notice of hearing is an integral component properties in favor of the defendant Imelda
of procedural due process to afford the Angeles."
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a Undoubtedly, the writ of execution
motion is resolved by the court. Through such imposed upon petitioner an alternative
notice, the adverse party is given time to obligation which was not included or
study and answer the arguments in the contemplated in the Compromise
motion. Records show that while Angeles’s Agreement. While the complaint originally
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution sought to restrain Angeles from
contained a notice of hearing, it did not consolidating her ownership to the
particularly state the date and time of the foreclosed properties, that has been
hearing. However, we still find that petitioner superseded by the Compromise
was not denied procedural due process. Upon Agreement. Therefore, the writ of
receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of execution which directed Sheriff Bisnar to
Execution, the trial court issued an Order "cause the Register of Deeds of Morong,
dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the
(10) days to file its comment. The trial court subject real properties in favor of the
ruled on the motion only after the defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly
reglementary period to file comment lapsed. erroneous because the judgment under
execution failed to provide for the totality of the prosecution's evidence was
consolidation. sufficient to establish that he physically and
Because the writ of execution varied the sexually abused AAA.
terms of the judgment and exceeded them,
it had no validity. The writ of execution The CA Ruling
must conform to the judgment which is to
be executed, as it may not vary the terms of The CA affirmed Escalante's conviction for
the judgment it seeks to enforce. Neither
the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a)
may it go beyond the terms of the
of R.A. No.7610
judgment sought to be executed. Where the
execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, The SC
it has pro tanto no validity. Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child
abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The correct provision, however, should be
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which imposes
a higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its
24. Araulio vs Office of the Ombudsman medium period to reclusion perpetua.
(2013)
@Maria Cristina Angela Serrano Issue: Can an accuse be convicted of a crime
not categorically stated in the Information?

25. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corp vs Tan ) Even if the Information does not categorically
2013) state that Escalante was being charged with
@Faith Turno child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, he may still be convicted for the said
crime. It is doctrinal that it is not the title of
26. Escalante vs People (2013) the complaint or information which is
@Marcellanne Valles controlling but the recital of facts contained
therein. The information must sufficiently
Escalante v. People allege the acts or omissions complained of to
inform a person of common understanding
Facts: what offense he is being charged with—in
other words the elements of the crime must
Escalante was charged with the crime of child be clearly stated.
abuse committed against AAA, who was then
a twelve (12) year old minor. When 27. Land Bank vs Listana (2011)
arraigned, he pleaded "not guilty." @Ka Ka
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The RTC Ruling 28. PCI Leasing vs Milan (2010)

@Carlu Yoo
The RTC found Escalante guilty of violating
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It ruled that