TOTALITY RULE

JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.

JD – 2C

HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA v. SPOUSES LUMOCSO

G.R. No. 158121
December 12, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners claim to be the rightful owners of the lots situated in Dipolog City under the Public Land Act.
Respondents are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots. The records show that
Valeriano, Sr. And his children filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with
Damages against Spouses Lumocso and Guya. They sought to annul the Free Patent and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of Gregorio Lumocso.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the cases against them on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for
reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches, and estoppels. On the issue of
jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complainants pursuant to
Section 19(2) of BP 129 as amended by RA7691, as in each case, the assessed value of the subject lots
are less than P20,000.00.

Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main
causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence,
the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the case at bar falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC considering the totality of claims
of the petitioners.

RULING:

The MTC has jurisdiction over the cases.

 
Petitioners' contention that the case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
 
In a number of cases, the Court held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to
quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein."
 
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, as
amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon
the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)."

Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject
matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving
title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first
level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the
subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of
the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed that the RTC has no jurisdiction in the respective civil
cases at bar.
TOTALITY RULE
JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.
JD – 2C

SANTE v. CLARAVALL and KALASHIAN

G.R. No. 173915
February 22, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages against petitioners
Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. Respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station in
Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, Irene Sante uttered the words,“How
many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to a
friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station, and a suspect in the killing of
petitioners’ close relative.

Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed for Moral Damages, Exemplary Damages,
Attorney’s fees, Litigation expenses.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. They claimed that the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio should take cognizance. They argued that the amount of the claim
for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the
claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of demand P420,000 was
above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro Manila. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the CA. Meanwhile, respondent filed an amended complaint increasing
the claim for moral damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, raising that RTC Baguio
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint.

CA ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that the MTCC had jurisdiction considering only the demand for
P300,000 moral damages. The CA held that the demand for exemplary damages was merely incidental.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could be
applied to the instant case.

RULING:

The nature of the complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the totality of the claim for damages,
including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint, such
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction.

The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under
B.P. Blg. 129 applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.

In the instant case, the complaint filed is for the recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners. The
complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent. Jurisdiction is conferred by
law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the
complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, such as exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not
merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the
complaint. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals
was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
TOTALITY RULE
JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.
JD – 2C

DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC. vs. DINOPOL

G.R. No. 75195
August 29, 1988
FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts:

Respondent Merced filed an action in the trial court for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioner for abruptly disconnecting his electric meter as a result of which he suffered moral
damages, loss of business and credit standing, and loss of profits.

Merced did not quantify his various claims for damages except for attorney's fees of P20,000.00 and
expenses of litigation of P5,000.00. He was only required to pay docket fees amounting to P82.50 based
on the quantified claims for attorney's fees and expenses of the suit.

Respondent judge finally declared the specific amounts of his principal demands as follows: P2,000,000
for loss of business and credit standing; P5,000,000 for moral damages, and Pl,845,384.50 for loss of
profits from cancelled job orders and proposals, or a grant total of P8,845,384.50.

Petitioner filed a motion and supplemental motion, respectively, to require Merced to

pay additional docket fees on his quantified claims for damages, alleging that he is supposed to pay
graduated docket fees based on the total amount of his money claims, or an additional sum of P35,080.00
as assessed by the clerk of court. Such motions were denied by Dinopol asserting that while the
determination of the amount of the filing fees is at the time the action is filed, there is no law which
prohibits claims to be proven during the trial or that the assessment thereof be left to the sound discretion
of the court.

Petitioner contends that respondent judge has the clear and positive duty to enforce the provisions of the
Rules of Court requiring the payment of docket fees, the amount of which is based on the  total amount of
the various claims.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in refusing to order the re-assessment of the filing fees based on
the totality of the principal demands.

Ruling:

Yes, respondent judge erred in refusing to order the re-assessment of the filing fees based on the totality
of the principal demands.

Rule 11 of the Rules of Court provides: Application of the totality rule. — In actions where the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the
aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or
not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil
action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

All claims for damages must now be specifically alleged for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. This
innovation is aimed at doing away with the pernicious practice by litigants of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the complaint, not only to be able to choose the forum for their case, but also
in order to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fees and thus evade the payment of the
correct charges.

The petition is granted.

TOTALITY RULE
JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.
JD – 2C

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 140746
March 16, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent
herein. A passenger bus, owned by petitioner, driven petitioner Buncan was trailing behind. When the two
vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing,
the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale
shouldered the balance. Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from
petitioners Pantranco and its driver Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the
RTC a complaint for sum of money.

Petitioners denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not
the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

The Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that: The appellants argue that appellee
Gicale’s claim of P13,415.00 and appellee insurance company’s claim of P8,000.00 individually fell
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the
Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that
determines the jurisdictional amount. The total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00
which at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction, to
constitute the amount of the demand be the totality of the claims.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the
jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a
single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against
petitioners.

Under the “totality rule”, “where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.”

Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to
the following conditions: (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.” This presupposes that the different
causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s
and that no misjoinder of parties is involved. The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped
together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above provision.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the
first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been
presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with
the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient,
speedy and orderly administration of justice. The petition is denied.
TOTALITY RULE
JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.
JD – 2C

REMEDIO V. FLORES vs. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS

G.R. No. L-66620
September 24, 1986
FERIA, J.:

Facts:

Flores sued the respondents for the collection of sum of money with the RTC. The first cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from
August to October, 1981.

The second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several
occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.

Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20,000.00.

Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.

Ruling:

Yes, the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.

The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(l) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

Section 33(l) of BP 129 provide that: where there are several claims or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions.

In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction
shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of
whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages
in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different
parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
TOTALITY RULE
JANGCAN, Christine Joy S.
JD – 2C

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3,

the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

The order appealed from is affirmed.