G.R. No.

72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited
drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as
follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and testimonial
evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves
weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in
the plastic container; "B-1-a"—another plastic container; "C"—Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1"
Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with
Pat. Daniel Obiña and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—Victory Liner Ticket No.
84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obiña, "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana
from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field Test
dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the
prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and
Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc,
Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City,
dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900
grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with
a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her examination, she
prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three
eliminations; microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination
of thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a
representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years old, married, policeman and residing
at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obiña testified that he has been a member of the INP,
since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative.
His job then was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit;
and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back
to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the
second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and
took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obiña.
The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some
vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion and
made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He
inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana.
The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of
marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that
time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was
marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused
alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted
from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman
and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said
bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did
not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and
brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator
Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big
bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect
marijuana even before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the
accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obiña and that of Investigator
Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2"
and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container
(Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to
his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the
time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the accused and for
Identification purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the
ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City
because as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and underwent
treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed in
Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981,
witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the
same Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed
the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Witness Obiña
became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga,
after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted
one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to
which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag behind his
seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only
after having taken his medicine that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right
hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag.
He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G."
Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City,
testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation Division of
the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, Pat. Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the
Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves were contained in a
buri bag with some vegetables such as camote tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The
marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white.
Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obiña which are his
initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed by Pat. Obiña
after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.

After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed apprehending
officer Obiña and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña
 (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation
room seated on a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether
she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements were
taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which
were already previously Identified by Pat. Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures
as that of Pat. Obiña and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.

Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City,
testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City,
Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit.
On July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of
suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field test on this
marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July
22,1981 (Exh. "H").

In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a Certificate of Fleld
Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetra-
hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC
Danilo Santiago, the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.

The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married, residing at No. 27
Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station
"21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the
Patrol Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at
the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty
patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he saw Pat. Obiña alighted from the Victory
Liner bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obiña he approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obiña told him he apprehended a certain woman
possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat. Obiña then brought the
woman to the police department who was bringing with her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the
woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver. He then followed in his
motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police
Station and he was there when Pat. Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman
possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the Investigation Section placed in a
buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by
Pat. Obiña in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself.
Policeman Bagang Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from
the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas, Witness Identified in open Court,
the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature
of Pat. Obiña, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.

While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's
questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long at the
investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos
question the place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an
initial DO-21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands
for Daniel Obiña. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-
47)

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
 II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED
BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.

III

APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE
SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF
APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425
and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.

The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore, she
may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which
is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was
caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is unknown.

This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana. This
is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of
such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is
not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and
deliver said marijuana.

The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest
is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1
kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having had with her
marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a
complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere
fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen.
Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary
(People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses
should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo
City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People
v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La
Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,

vs.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT

BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the
right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on
our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social
security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a
system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:

SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A

decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security
providers is hereby established.

SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC)

to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby
created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:

Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority

Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government

Secretary, Department of Health

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System

Administrator, Social Security System

Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing Director, National Computer Center.

 SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to
the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.

SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the
NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services
Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.

SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other
concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.

SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced
from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to
the Office of the President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.

SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred
and Ninety-Six.

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23,
1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Petitioner contends:

"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE

SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

B . THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION." 2

Respondents counter-argue:

A . THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL
REVIEW;

B . A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;

C . THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
 D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3

We now resolve.

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds
and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early
as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national
identification system.7 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the
dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to
throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

II

We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes
a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter
scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority,
under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in
their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The
grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as
limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.13cräläwvirtualibräry

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.14 The executive
power is vested in the President. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control
over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary
to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20cräläwvirtualibräry
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders."23cräläwvirtualibräry

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.[24] We reject the argument that
A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general
law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance"25 and "embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the
people."26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration,
Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the
President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the
organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the
rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e,
internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27cräläwvirtualibräry

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes
no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given
this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations
however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its
scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make
laws."28

III

Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,30 the United
States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a
constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,31 viz:

"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that
help give them life and substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers `in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment
in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: `The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'"

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to
privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:

"xxx

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on
the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson
is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
--industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution.33 It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights,
viz:34cräläwvirtualibräry

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2 . The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x.

Sec. 6 . The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

x x x.
Sec. 8 . The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17 . No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and
punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets,39 and trespass to dwelling.40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special
laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act42 and the Intellectual Property
Code.43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information.44cräläwvirtualibräry

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs."

Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data."45 The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics.[46] A physiological characteristic is a
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features.
A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and
keystroke.47 Most biometric identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN) for initial
identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the
PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN.48cräläwvirtualibräry

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns
the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in
computer data banks49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology
requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal
scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye.
This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as
the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the
skin of people.52 The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that
by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different
densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat
signature."53cräläwvirtualibräry

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science
facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new
science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for
identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it
threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals
with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency
will necessarily be recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of
the files.[55] The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that
may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.56cräläwvirtualibräry

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic
personal information about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from
constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these
information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under
what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to
the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code
of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the
system.59cräläwvirtualibräry

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.60 The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing
expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded.[62] They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights
seeks to prevent.63cräläwvirtualibräry

The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual

and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The
computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different
times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to
date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the
computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty
in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.

Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the
right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The
Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother
the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand.
The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation.68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in
A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances,
the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer
data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations
merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.

Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the
NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment
records and reports.74 These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear
whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System.
The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to
Congress.

Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using
the rational relationship test.75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed
up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and
(3) generate population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions
into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76cräläwvirtualibräry

We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a
public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses,
did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public
administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service.78cräläwvirtualibräry

The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative
order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and
penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled
by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.  And we now hold
that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law,
administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to
prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state
interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent
authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger
the rights protected by the Constitution.

The case of Whalen v. Roe79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized
computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's
prescription. The New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients
obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a
potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer
file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people
might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available
and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs
alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e, the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an
aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The
Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of
dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational
legislative decision made upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held
extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous
safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the
gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also
prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed
above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se against the use
of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many
information systems in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objectives, such
as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance
programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored
in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those
who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information
superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and
classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards
and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades
individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down
in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:

"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of
the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-- has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age-- industrialization, urbanization,
and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."87

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In the case at bar,
the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people
to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive
the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result
could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the
threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to
this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental
right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.