This Study Explores An Under
This Study Explores An Under
This Study Explores An Under
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background and research questions
3. Testing methodology
4. Findings
5. Conclusions
1. Introduction
While a 2005 study by the Open Net Initiative found China’s Internet
filtering system to be “the most sophisticated in the world” (OpenNet
Initiative, 2005), this layer of censorship is imperfect because the
“Great Firewall” can be “scaled” by proxy servers, secure tunneling, and
other circumvention methods. As a result, the U.S. government and
many non–governmental organizations hoping to promote free speech in
China have invested substantial resources into the dissemination of
information about circumvention tools to Chinese Internet users (Ha,
2006). Circumvention on its own, however, cannot solve the whole
problem of access to information or open the door to a truly free public
discourse in China. It does nothing to address the separate problem
of domestic Internet censorship. For content on Web sites hosted on
computer servers inside China, circumvention tools are irrelevant
because content has been deleted or prevented from existing.
Lokman Tsui (2008) has suggested that the focus on the “Great
Firewall” and Internet filtering by Western scholars, policymakers,
media, and activists is due to their misguided tendency to view China
through “Iron Curtain” Cold War–era paradigms. Others have pointed
out that filtering is the one aspect of Chinese Internet censorship which
foreigners visiting China are most likely to encounter personally, while
censorship affecting the domestic Chinese–language Internet is much
less apparent to visitors and outsiders. Furthermore, overseas–based
free speech activists themselves — such as the Radio Free Asia, Human
Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders — have all had their own Web
sites blocked by Chinese Internet filtering, making filtering the most
immediate concern for them and their causes (MacKinnon 2008c).
Whatever the reason for the focus on filtering and lack of attention to
other kinds of censorship, this paper aims to help address the imbalance
by shedding light on another part of China’s Internet censorship system:
The process of domestic Web site censorship by which domestically
hosted content is deleted completely or prevented from being published
in the first place. The whole process is carried out almost entirely by
employees of Internet companies, not by “Internet police” or other
government officials. This study focuses specifically on one small piece
of this domestic censorship system: How blog service providers (BSPs)
censor blogs written by their Chinese users.
2. Background and research questions
Blogging gained critical mass in China in 2004 and 2005. Because all the
major international BSPs (Blogspot, Typepad, Wordpress.com, etc.)
were blocked by the “Great Firewall,” most Chinese bloggers — who like
most bloggers worldwide are not technically skilled enough to arrange
their own Web–hosting and install their own blogging software — were
forced to publish on domestic Chinese BSPs. By 2006, concerned about
the role played by blogs, chatrooms and forums in the 2005 anti–
Japanese street protests, authorities had created a system of
regulations and obligatory “self discipline” pledges in hopes of
compelling Web companies to keep user–generated content from going
beyond certain limits (MacKinnon 2008a).
3. Testing methodology
Log into the blog of one BSP, copy and paste the content unit into
the “back end” edit window of the blog; take a screenshot;
Hit “publish.” If the content was blocked from publication, or “held
for moderation” take a screenshot of what kind of error message or
other message appeared;
If the content was not blocked from publication, take a screenshot
of what the blog post looks like when the author is logged in to the
system;
Log out and check whether the content is still visible to the public,
not just the logged–in author. Take a screenshot;
Check back 24–48 hours later to see if the blog post is still visible.
Take a screenshot showing either the still visible post, or the error
message saying “this page does not exist,” or whatever else can be
seen;
Access the the blog post on a mainland Chinese ISP to see
whether it is accessible (i.e., not filtered) on at least one Chinese
domestic ISP [3]. Take a screenshot. (This step was primarily a way to
check whether any of the services were geo–filtering their material as
will be discussed further in the “Findings” section.)
Upload all of these screenshots into a database according to the
unique number assigned to the content unit, along with descriptive
comments noting any interesting or unusual circumstances surrounding
the situations in which censorship occurred.
4. Findings
The names of the BSPs have not been published alongside these
aggregate results. People who work in the Chinese Internet sector have
expressed strong concern that published results of an independent
academic study showing who censors more than whom could be used as
a tool for reward and retribution by regulating authorities. The purpose
of this study is to increase global understanding of how Chinese BSP
censorship works. Naming company names alongside aggregate
censorship results would certainly enable deeper examination of why
certain companies censor a great deal more than others. However, this
benefit is outweighed by the costs, not only to individuals working in
Chinese Internet companies, but also to companies that are clearly
trying to respect their users’ interests and rights over regulatory
demands to the extent possible while not losing their business licenses.
Table 1 breaks down how many content units tested were censored by
how many BSPs. Of 108 valid tests, 21 content items were censored by
none of the 15 BSPs. Twenty–four content items were censored by only
one BSP [4].
Items tagged with “crime,” “foreign trade and investment,” and “anti–
Japanese” were not censored by any BSP. Posts related to Falun Gong,
the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, and Tibet independence were heavily
censored, as expected. Items labeled with the following subject
categories also received heavy censorship (more than 10 instances in
which a post with one of these labels was censored): sudden incidents,
Olympics, Tibet, corruption, dissidents, ethnic minorities, national
leaders, political arrests, labor issues, censorship/surveillance, critiques
of government human rights practices, independence movements,
involuntary relocation, “rights defending” cases, historical issues, and
misc. religious matters. Contrary to expectation, content items tagged
“Taiwan politics” and even “Taiwan independence” were lightly censored
— perhaps due to the fact that Taiwan elected a more moderate
president in the spring of 2008 as well as the fact that pro–Taiwan
independence politicians were plagued by corruption scandals, with both
developments being reported openly in the mainland Chinese media.
In our effort to discover where the censorship fault lines lie, testing
emphasized topics related to controversial current events and breaking
news. Of the 23 tests of content related to “sudden incidents,” subjects
included: developments in the poisoned milk powder case, local protests
or clashes with police (including Tibet but also in other places),
explosions in Xinjiang, the knifing of tourists in Beijing during the
Olympics, natural or man–made disasters. Two BSPs censored 14 of 23
posts tagged with “sudden incidents,” and most censored at least five
posts, although one BSP censored only one and one BSP censored none
at all. Censorship was very inconsistent in terms of which BSPs censored
what content. For example: four items related to the melamine poisoned
milk powder scandal were tested. Two of the items were censored by
two BSPs, one was censored by three BSPs, and one was censored by
four BSPs. One BSP (iFeng) censored all four items; one BSP (Tianya)
censored two of the four items (including a report which originated from
the Web site of China’s national state–run television, about a visit by
Premier Wen Jiabao to a store selling milk powder); Sina, MSN, Blogbus,
Mop and Myspace censored one each.
Below are four more examples of just how inconsistently certain hot
topics were handled across different BSPs:
Some BSPs used primarily one method, but most services utilized a
combination of different methods: blocking at publication stage, holding
for moderation, or removal after publication. This indicates that many
BSPs have set up complex systems in which different sets of keywords
fall into different categories of sensitivity.
5. Conclusions
The findings of this study point to the need for more study — both of
Chinese domestic Internet censorship as well as censorship in other
countries. This study was highly experimental and limited in its scope,
timeframe, and resources. Larger–scale testing would help to shed
greater light on the way in which different kinds of content are
censored. This study was limited to blogs; it did not test other forms of
social networking Web sites, chatrooms or bulletin board systems (BBS),
which are extremely popular and influential on the Chinese Internet,
instant messaging, and mobile services. Surveys of Internet company
employees would help to shed better light on the reasons behind the
wide variation of censorship practices. Surveys of Chinese bloggers and
Internet users would help us to answer questions such as: How often do
average Chinese bloggers encounter censorship? What do they think
about it? How have they reacted and in what ways have they modified
their online behavior after encountering censorship? How do censorship
practices impact his or her loyalty towards a particular BSP?
There are also some global research questions: Where else in the world
is this kind of political censorship by web service companies of user–
generated content happening? Companies in the West already censor for
child porn, copyright violations and sometimes hate speech, but to what
extent are Web companies in other countries besides China
systematically complying with government demands to delete politically
sensitive material? Will the “Censorship 2.0” model — in which
governments demand censorship by Web companies — spread globally?
Given how difficult it is to carry out such censorship consistently and
effectively, and how much staff time and resources must nonetheless be
taken up in attempting to implement it, would it be in companies’
commercial interests to resist or reject government efforts to delegate
censorship to companies? Further research is needed in order to
understand the global trends and emerging practices.
Acknowledgements
This study was made possible by a seed research grant from the
University of Hong Kong. I am also grateful for the support and
encouragement of Prof. Yuen–Ying Chan, Director of the Journalism and
Media Studies Centre.
Notes
3. This was done either via mainland Chinese proxies or Chinese Tor exit
nodes, or by people physically in mainland China when possible and
practicable. See Villeneuve (2008) for more details about use of Tor
nodes as a method of testing Chinese ISP behavior.
References
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Editorial history
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089