City of Manila Vs Chinese Community of Manila

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CITY OF MANILA VS CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

Private property already devoted to public use cannot be


expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general
grant of authority.

FACTS:

Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be


expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely,
the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation
was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity
existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a
cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was
covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it
(petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the
only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of
the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can
inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of
the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in
favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE:  W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity
of the expropriation?
Whether or not a private property devoted for public use can
still be expropriated?

HELD:  

Yes. Private property already devoted to public use cannot be


expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general
grant of authority.
Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character.
The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and
not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry.
Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R.
Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not
be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the
right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but
that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts
have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case
and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul.
48 Minn., 540.)

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