fm7 100 1 PDF

FM 7-100.
OPFOR
Opposing Force
Operations
DECEMBER 2004
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FOREWORD
In today’s complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of
future conflict that might involve the U.S. Army. So the Army must be ready to meet the
challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is
the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an
environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) is the Executive Agent for the development, management,
administration, integration, and approval functions of the OPFOR Program across the Army.
Thus, the TRADOC DCSINT is responsible for documenting the doctrine, organization, and
capabilities of a contemporary OPFOR that is appropriate for training the Army’s leaders,
soldiers, and units for the COE.
In the FM 7-100 series, the TRADOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(ODCSINT) has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a
variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the
COE. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined in FM 7-100.1 represents a realistic
composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of
the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and
challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the
OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.
This manual is approved for use in all Army training venues. However, as the contemporary
OPFOR and other aspects of the COE are integrated into Army training, the TRADOC
ODCSINT and the intelligence community will continue research and analysis of real-world
developments and trends. The goal of this continued effort is to keep our OPFOR and our
understanding of the COE truly contemporary and relevant as the world around us
changes. Thus, this manual is intended to be a living document, and the ODCSINT will
modify and change it as often as necessary in order to ensure its continued relevance in
light of changes and developments in the COE. In anticipation of such changes, this manual
will be published primarily in electronic format with only limited distribution of hard-copy,
printed manuals. The electronic version is available on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital
Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Users also need to monitor the TRADOC
ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center on AKO for information regarding periodic updates.
MAXIE L. MCFARLAND
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
*FM 7-100.1
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 7-100.1 Department of the Army
27 December 2004
Opposing Force
Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE .................................................................................................................. v
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK....................................................................................1-1

National Security Strategy ........................................................................................1-1
Strategic Campaign ..................................................................................................1-6
Strategic Operations.................................................................................................1-8
Regional Operations.................................................................................................1-9
Transition Operations .............................................................................................1-10
Adaptive Operations ...............................................................................................1-12
Principles of Operations Versus an Extraregional Power ......................................1-13
OPFOR Military and Operational Art ......................................................................1-17
The Role of Paramilitary and Irregular Forces in Operations.................................1-20
Systems Warfare ....................................................................................................1-23
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL...................................................................................2-1

Concept ....................................................................................................................2-1
Principles of Command and Control.........................................................................2-2
Command and Control Structures............................................................................2-3
Command and Control Process .............................................................................2-31
Command Posts .....................................................................................................2-42
Command and Control Systems ............................................................................2-46
_______________
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 100-61, 26 January 1998.
i
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................................................. 3-1

Strategic Context...................................................................................................... 3-1
Purpose of the Offense ............................................................................................ 3-3
Planning Offensive Operations ................................................................................ 3-4
Preparing for the Offense....................................................................................... 3-12
Executing the Offense............................................................................................ 3-13
Types of Offensive Action ...................................................................................... 3-14
Chapter 4 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.................................................................................... 4-1

Strategic Context...................................................................................................... 4-1
Purpose of the Defense ........................................................................................... 4-4
Planning Defensive Operations ............................................................................... 4-5
Preparing for the Defense...................................................................................... 4-15
Executing the Defense........................................................................................... 4-17
Integrated and Decentralized Defenses ................................................................ 4-18
Types of Defensive Action ..................................................................................... 4-19
Chapter 5 INFORMATION WARFARE .................................................................................... 5-1

New Concepts of Information in Warfare ................................................................. 5-1
Elements of IW......................................................................................................... 5-5
Tools and Targets .................................................................................................. 5-10
Strategic IW............................................................................................................ 5-10
Operational-Level IW ............................................................................................. 5-11
IW Planning and Execution.................................................................................... 5-13
Strategic Context.................................................................................................... 5-15
Chapter 6 RECONNAISSANCE ............................................................................................... 6-1

Mission ..................................................................................................................... 6-1
Concept.................................................................................................................... 6-1
Strategic Assets ....................................................................................................... 6-5
Operational Assets................................................................................................... 6-8
Chapter 7 FIRE SUPPORT....................................................................................................... 7-1

Fire Support Concepts ............................................................................................. 7-1
Command and Control ............................................................................................. 7-4
Fire Support Planning .............................................................................................. 7-6
Targeting ................................................................................................................ 7-10
Methods of Fire ...................................................................................................... 7-13
Fire Support of Maneuver Operations.................................................................... 7-15
ii
_________________________________________________________________________________ Contents
Chapter 8 AVIATION.................................................................................................................8-1
Organization .............................................................................................................8-1
Command and Control .............................................................................................8-4
Capabilities ...............................................................................................................8-7
Missions....................................................................................................................8-9
Principles of Employment .......................................................................................8-11
Degree of Air Dominance .......................................................................................8-12
Strategic Context ....................................................................................................8-13
Chapter 9 AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT .......................................................................................9-1
All-Arms Air Defense ................................................................................................9-1
Goals ........................................................................................................................9-2
Command and Control .............................................................................................9-4
Phases......................................................................................................................9-9
Assets .....................................................................................................................9-14
Reconnaissance .....................................................................................................9-19
Missions and Employment......................................................................................9-22
Offense ...................................................................................................................9-25
Defense ..................................................................................................................9-27
Sanctuary Areas .....................................................................................................9-28
Mountains and Water Obstacles ............................................................................9-29
Air Defense Ambushes and Roving Units ..............................................................9-29
Air Defense Against Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ....................................................9-31
Strategic Context ....................................................................................................9-33
Chapter 10 ENGINEER SUPPORT ..........................................................................................10-1
Assets .....................................................................................................................10-1
Command and Control ...........................................................................................10-1
Missions..................................................................................................................10-3
Engineer Reconnaissance......................................................................................10-6
Survivability ............................................................................................................10-8
Countermobility.......................................................................................................10-8
Strategic Context ..................................................................................................10-12
Chapter 11 NBC AND SMOKE OPERATIONS........................................................................11-1
Preparedness .........................................................................................................11-1
Staff Responsibility .................................................................................................11-3
Chemical Warfare...................................................................................................11-3
Nuclear Warfare .....................................................................................................11-7
Biological Warfare ................................................................................................11-10
NBC Protection.....................................................................................................11-11
Smoke...................................................................................................................11-13
Strategic Context ..................................................................................................11-17
iii
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 12 LOGISTICS............................................................................................................ 12-1

Tailored Logistics Units .......................................................................................... 12-4
Logistics Missions .................................................................................................. 12-5
Operational Logistics Concepts ............................................................................. 12-5
Command and Control ........................................................................................... 12-7
Materiel Support................................................................................................... 12-11
Maintenance......................................................................................................... 12-12
Transportation ...................................................................................................... 12-12
Personnel ............................................................................................................. 12-15
Medical Support ................................................................................................... 12-17
Support to Combat Operations ............................................................................ 12-19
Post-Combat Support .......................................................................................... 12-21
Chapter 13 AIRBORNE, SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES, AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS .. 13-1

Airborne and Heliborne Operations ....................................................................... 13-1
Special-Purpose Forces Operations ...................................................................... 13-8
Amphibious Operations........................................................................................ 13-17
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................... Bibliography-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-0
iv
Preface
This manual is one of a series that describes a contemporary Opposing Force
(OPFOR) for training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the
Bibliography section for a list of the manuals in this series. Together, these
manuals outline an OPFOR than can cover the entire spectrum of military and
paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in
any future conflict.
Applications for this series of manuals include field training, training simula-
tions, and classroom instruction throughout the Army. All Army training venues
should use an OPFOR based on these manuals, except when mission rehearsal or
contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based
threat. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the
OPFOR manuals to fill information gaps in a manner consistent with what they
do know about a specific threat.
The proponent for this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to the OPFOR and Threat In-
tegration Directorate (OTID) of the TRADOC Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence at the following address: Director, OTID, ADCSINT-Threats, ATTN:
ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at
http://www.us.army.mil and on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and
Doctrine Digital Library (ADTDL) at http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Readers should
monitor those sites and also the TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Knowledge Center
on AKO for the status of this manual and information regarding updates.
Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of
the normal production cycle in accordance with TRADOC regulation 25-36,
paragraphs 2-17 and 4-7. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic
version will reflect the latest update.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not re-
fer exclusively to men.
v
Introduction
This manual is part of the FM 7-100 series, which describes a contemporary
Opposing Force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces
for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects the characteristics of
military and paramilitary forces that may be present in the contemporary
operational environment (COE). Like those real-world threats, the OPFOR
will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The COE is
constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments
to keep pace with real-world developments.
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The DOD officially defines an operational
environment (OE) as “a composite of the Contemporary Operational
conditions, circumstances, and influences Environment (COE)
that affect the employment of military forces
and bear on the decisions of the unit The operational environment
commander” (JP 1-02). The contemporary that exists today and for the
operational environment (COE) is the clearly foreseeable future.
operational environment that exists today
and for the clearly foreseeable future. There are some “constants” or common
threads that define the general nature of this COE:
• The United States in not likely to have a peer competitor until 2020 or be-
yond.
• However, nations will continue to field armed forces and use these forces
as a tool to pursue national interests.
• As nations use their armed forces (or other instruments of national power)
in pursuit of national interests, their actions may cause U.S. intervention,
either unilaterally or as a coalition partner, with or without United Na-
tions mandate.
• Nations that believe the United States may act to counter their national
interests will develop diplomatic, informational, economic, and military
plans for managing U.S. intervention.
• Nations will continue to modernize their armed forces within the con-
straints of their economies, but in ways that may negate U.S. overmatch.
• Advanced technology will be available on the world market for a wide va-
riety of nation-state and non-state actors.
• Non-state actors will play an important role in any regional conflictas
combatants or noncombatants.
• All combat operations will be significantly affected by a number of vari-
ables in the environment beyond simple military forces.
Thus, one of the constants is that there are variables. Those “variables” in the
COE result in a number of different OEs that can occur in specific circumstances
or scenarios.
vi
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
CRITICAL VARIABLES
Any OE, in the real world or in the
training environment, can be defined Critical Variables of COE
in terms of eleven critical variables. • Nature and Stability of the State.
While these variables can be useful in • Regional and Global Relationships.
describing the overall (strategic) • Economics.
environment, they are most useful in • Sociological Demographics.
defining the nature of specific OEs. • Information.
Each of these “conditions, circumstances, • Physical Environment.
and influences” and their possible • Technology.
combinations will vary according to • External Organizations.
the specific situation. In this sense,
• National Will.
they are “variables.” These variables
• Time.
are interrelated and sometimes
• Military Capabilities.
overlap. Different variables will be
more or less important in different
situations. Each OE is different, because the content of the variables is different.
Only by studying and understanding these variablesand incorporating them
into its trainingwill the U.S. Army be able to keep adversaries from using them
against it or to find ways to use them to its own advantage.
Nature and Stability of the State

It is important to understand the nature and stability of the state (or states) with
which or in which the conflict takes place. Study of this variable measures how
strong or weak a country is and determines where the real strength of the state
lies; it may be in the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other
element of the population. Understanding this variable will allow U.S. forces to
better understand the nature of the military campaign and the true aims of an
enemy campaign, operation, or action. It also helps determine what kinds of
threats may be present in a particular country. The real threat to U.S. forces
may come from elements other than the military.
Regional and Global Relationships

Nation-states and/or non-state actors often enter into relationships, which can be
regional or global. These partnerships support common objectives, which can be
political, economic, military, or cultural. An actor’s membership or allegiance to
such a relationship can determine its actions of support and motivation. Virtually all
conflict will occur with alliances and coalitions, some involving the United States
and some involving its adversaries. When actors create regional or global alliances,
it can add to their collective capability and broaden the scale of operations and
actions.
As the world moves away from the traditional long-term, fixed alliances of the
past, regional and global relationships are much more fluid and unpredictable.
The choice of a state to be nonaligned does not mean that it will not become in-
volved in a conflict or crisis. It simply means that the state does not make a
commitment to another state, alliance, or cause before a situation arises. This
lack of precommitment makes it difficult to predict how actors and forces may
align when a situation does arise. Alliances can form or change rapidly, even dur-
ing the course of an operation or campaign.
vii
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Economics
The economic variable establishes the boundaries between the “haves” and the
“have-nots.” This gap of economic differences among nation-states and other ac-
tors can cause conflict. Economic superiority, rather than military superiority,
may be the key to power or dominance within a region. However, economic posi-
tion often represents a nation or non-state actor’s ability to buy military technol-
ogy or to conduct prolonged operations. Economics help define the relationship
between a nation or non-state actor and other actors at the regional or global
level. These regional or global economic relationships could result in military or
political assistance.
Sociological Demographics
The demographics variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of
a given region, nation, or non-state actor. Extreme devotion to a particular cause
or significant hatred of a particular group may provide an enemy with an unshak-
able will and a willingness to die for the cause. U.S. forces may also find that large
segments of the population around them are sympathetic to the same cause as the
enemy force. The needs of the local population can create heavy demands on U.S.
military units, particularly their supply and medical systems. Refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons may increase the complexity of the environment. The enemy
may use civilians as shields or obstacles or as cover for hostile intelligence services.
Information
Media and other information means can make combat operations transparent to
the world, visible to all who have access to data. Various actors seek to use per-
ception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things. They
will exploit U.S. mistakes and failures and use propaganda to sway the local
population to support their cause. Media coverage can impact on U.S. political
decision making, international opinion, or the sensitivities of coalition members.
Even without sophisticated sensors and information systems, actors native to the
area or region often have greater situational awareness than U.S. forces. Various
actors are able to access commercial systems (such as satellite communications
and imagery) for the larger picture. For a more detailed view, they can use hu-
man networks operating over normal telephone lines or with cellular telephones.
Physical Environment
The main elements in the physical environment are terrain and weather. Poten-
tial enemies clearly understand that less complex and open environments favor a
U.S. force with its long-range, precision-guided weapons and sophisticated re-
connaissance capability. So they will try to avoid the types of operations and en-
vironments for which such U.S. forces are optimized. They will try to operate in
urban areas and other complex terrain and in weather conditions that may ad-
versely affect U.S. military operations and mitigate technological advantages.1
1
Complex terrain is a topographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more
types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (Restrictive terrain or environ-
mental conditions include but are not limited to slope, high altitude, forestation, severe weather, and urbanization.)
Complex terrain, due to its unique combination of restrictive terrain and environmental conditions, imposes signifi-
cant limitations on observation, maneuver, fires, and intelligence collection.
viii
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
Technology
The technology that nations or non-state actors can bring to the OE includes
what they can develop and produce, as well as what they could import. Access to
technological advances available on the global market is slowly eating away at
the technological advantage the United States has enjoyed in the past.
It is likely that some high-end forces in a particular region of the world could
field a few systems that are more advanced than those of the U.S. force deployed
there. Easy access to new technology allows potential adversaries to achieve
equality or even overmatch U.S. systems in selected niche areas. Many countries
are trying to acquire relatively low-cost, high-payoff, new technologies. In addi-
tion, upgrades and hybridization allow older systems to compete with more mod-
ern capabilities, thus neutralizing the technical advantage of many modern
forces. In urban areas or other complex terrain, less advanced systems may still
find effective uses. Various actors may find adaptive and innovative ways of us-
ing systems for other than their originally intended applications.
External Organizations
When the U.S. Army goes into a failed state or into areas torn by conflict, it is
likely to find international humanitarian relief organizations at work there.
These external organizations continue to grow in influence and power, as well as in
willingness to become involved in crisis situations that were previously purely mili-
tary operations. These external organizations can have both stated and hidden in-
terests and objectives that can either assist or hinder U.S. mission accomplishment.
The presence of transnational corporations operating in a country or region can also
place added pressure on U.S. forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian life and
property. U.S. forces may have to divert troops and resources from their assigned
missions to conduct rescues or provide security for various external organizations.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in a given region (or at least prior to U.S. mili-
tary intervention there), during such hostilities, or after the conclusion of hostili-
ties in a particular area, members of external organizations and other civilian
noncombatants from outside the region may be endangered. Diplomatic person-
nel, other government employees, or private citizens from the United States or
other countries might be present in one or more countries within the region. The
private citizens might be associated with an external organization (media, hu-
manitarian relief organization, or transnational corporation) or might be there on
private business or as tourists. If their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest,
or natural disaster, such U.S. citizens and their dependents, as well as selected
host-nation citizens and third-country nationals, could be eligible for evacuation
in noncombatant evacuation operations conducted by U.S. forces.
National Will
The variable of national will reflects how much each country’s people and gov-
ernment are behind what the military or paramilitary forces are doing. This can
influence the objectives of a conflict, its duration, and the conditions for ending it.
A country will try to attack its opponent’s national will and still preserve its own.
Clearly, most foreign countries view U.S. national will as a point of vulnerability.
Thus, a potential adversary may perceive the collective will of his people as a
comparative advantage against the United States.
ix
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
History has proven that battlefield victory does not always go to the best-trained,
best-equipped, and most technologically advanced force. Victory often goes to the
side that most wants to win, needs to win, and is willing to sacrifice to do so.
Time
In most cases, potential opponents of the United States view time as being in
their advantage. When U.S. forces have to deploy into the area over long time
and distance, the opponent can use this time to adjust the nature of the conflict
to something for which the U.S. forces are not prepared.
First, the opponent will try to control the entry of U.S. forces into the area. If ac-
cess control fails, the enemy still has the opportunity to oppose lightly equipped
U.S. early-entry units and try to prevent full deployment of the rest of the force.
The opponent will try to speed up the tempo, to rapidly defeat its local or re-
gional enemy or to defeat U.S. early-entry forces before the United States can
deploy overwhelming military power. If that fails, the opponent will try to pro-
long the conflict and to outlast the U.S. will to continue.
Military Capabilities
Military capabilities of a nation-state or non-state actor are measured in relative
terms, in comparison to the capabilities of other actors against which they might
be applied. Most of the military forces in the world continue to operate in conven-
tional ways, which remain sufficient against other local and regional actors.
However, once the United States becomes involved, these same military forces
may have to use adaptive or asymmetric approaches. Various nations and
other foreign entities around the world study the United States and its military
forces. They generally view the United States as a major power—the world’s only
superpower—with an overall advantage in technology and warfighting capabil-
ity. Despite these strengths, other actors see some weaknesses that they may be
able to exploit. They can use these perceptions as a guide to optimizing the effec-
tiveness of their own forces and to find ways to negate current U.S. advantages.
Military capabilities may be the most critical and the most complex variable that
affects military operations. However, the military variable does not exist in isola-
tion from the other variables that help determine the overall OE. It interacts
with the other variables, and all the other variables can affect military capabilities.
Potential enemies can use any or all of these factors against the Army as it tries to
accomplish its missions in various parts of the world or in various training environ-
ments.
REAL WORLD
In the real world, the COE is the entire set of conditions, circumstances, and influ-
ences that U.S. Armed Forces can expect to face when conducting military opera-
tions to further the national interests of the United States, its friends, and allies.
The COE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that
existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather
those conditions that exist today and in the clearly foreseeable, near future. This
COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential
real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the ten other variables that
help define any OE.
x
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
TRAINING
In training environments, the COE is the OE created to approximate the de-
mands of the real-world COE and to set the conditions for desired training out-
comes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military
and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential
adversaries) and other OE variables in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner.
The purpose of the COE in training simulations is to produce the necessary training
outcomes.2
Even in the COE for training, it is possible to speak of an overall COE that ad-
dresses the qualities of virtually any OE in which the units or individuals being
trained might be called upon to operate. In this sense, there are the same “con-
stants” as in the real-world COE.
INTERACTION AND LINKAGE OF VARIABLES

The variables of the COE do not exist in isolation from one another. The linkages
of the variables cause the complex and often simultaneous dilemmas that a
military force might face. In order to provide realistic training, training
scenarios must try to simulate this synergistic effect to the maximum degree
that is feasible.
The COE is not just about the OPFOR. The COE variables and their interaction
provide the robust environment and context for OPFOR operations. The com-
plexity of the specific OE in training can be adjusted to keep it appropriate for
the required training objectives and the training state of various U.S. Army
units.
ADAPTIVE AND CHANGING

The nature of the COE is adaptive and constantly changing. As the United States
and its military forces interact with the COE in a real-world sense, the OE
changes. As the Army applies the lessons learned from training in a COE setting,
the OPFOR and potential real-world adversaries will also learn and adapt.
The development of the COE for training started with research to develop an un-
derstanding of the real-world COE and trends that affect military operations. Then,
taking into consideration the desired training outcomes and leader development
goals, the authors of the FM 7-100 series proceeded to document an OPFOR doctrine
and structure that reflect the real-world COE, and the Army began integrating this
OPFOR and other COE variables into training scenarios. Meanwhile, the authors of
the FM 7-100 series are continuing to research the real-world COE and to mature
the OPFOR and the COE in training in order to provide a richer, appropri-
ately challenging training environment and keep the OPFOR and the COE
truly “contemporary.”
2
The same type of COE conditions can be created to support some combat development activities that do not re-
quire simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary. However, some combat development activities may
require portrayal of an OE that extends further into the future than is typical for the COE.
xi
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ENEMY, THREAT, AND OPFOR

Before going further into the COE, the contemporary OPFOR, and the intended
uses of this manual, it may be useful to define some key terms and the distinc-
tions among them. It is important to distinguish among the terms enemy, threat,
and OPFOR and to use them correctly.
ENEMY
From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (or-
ganized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or na-
tional alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multina-
tional partners. In other words, the enemy is whoever is actually opposing the
United States in a particular conflict.3 Thus, this term is synonymous with ad-
versary or opponent.
THREAT
A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the
Army defines threat as “any specific foreign nation or organization with inten-
tions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or chal-
lenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” Once hos-
tilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.
OPPOSING FORCE
An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to
train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the
wide range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It en-
ables training of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential
combat operations.4
During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the OPFOR
may play the role of a “threat” (potential enemy) that is on the verge of becoming
an enemy. However, the actual training event usually deals with a state of hos-
tilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the OPFOR acts as the
“enemy” of the U.S. force in the training environment.5
During the Cold War period, the Army employed OPFORs based on specific real-
world threats. However, the Army needs a different type of OPFOR to meet its
training requirements for the COE.
3
This definition of enemy is from the U.S. point of view. After this Introduction, the chapters of this manual address
their topics from the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the OPFOR and its allies, and enemy refers to the
enemy of the OPFOR, which may be an opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent
(normally the United States or a U.S.-led coalition).
4
Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some combat de-
velopment activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to
portray the “threat” or “enemy.”
5
From the OPFOR point of view, its leadership plans and develops forces and methods to deal with one or more
threats to its own interests, goals, or survival.
xii
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
Cold War OPFOR

When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation
350-2, it could hardly have envisioned today’s computerized constructive and vir-
tual simulations, or even the evolving requirements of live simulations. It de-
fined an OPFOR simply as “an organized force created by and from U.S. Army
units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force.” Thus, all OPFORs
were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capa-
bilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or
potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified
only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union; by 1978, a
revision of the regulation added North Korea as a second threat for replication by
an OPFOR. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs to replicate other
threats emerging in places ranging from Latin America and Southwest Asia.
In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for
units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out,
for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep at-
tack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with spe-
cific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive
results on the battlefield. However, the OE is dynamic, and the pace of that dynamism
has increased with the end of the Cold War and the rapid advancement of informa-
tion technology.
Contemporary OPFOR
Training U.S. forces for the COE re- Contemporary OPFOR
quires a different kind of OPFOR from
that of the past. The contemporary A plausible, flexible military and/or
OPFOR must be less predictable and paramilitary force representing a
not based on the armed forces of a par- composite of varying capabilities of
ticular country. In today’s world, the actual worldwide forces, used in
U.S. Army must be prepared to go into lieu of a specific threat force, for
any OE and perform its full range of training and developing U.S. forces.
missions. It must be ready to do so in
the face of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to
deal with third-party actors that may have other interests. Not all threats are
purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now defines an OPFOR as “a
plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of
varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat
force, for training and developing U.S. forces.”
Thus, in some training environments, a military force alone may be the OPFOR.
In other cases, military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affilia-
tion with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environ-
ment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is driven by training re-
quirements.
Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United
States might have to face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats
as the threat against which to train, that threat would almost certainly not be
the one it would actually fight. What is needed is a composite that is representa-
tive of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit
xiii
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of everythingit could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual de-

fines this representative composite in a way that is flexible enough to fit the most
demanding U.S. Army training requirements and provides a framework for training
that creates the leaders, soldiers, and unit skills necessary for success on the next
battlefield.
CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND OTHER ACTORS

There are many types of actors or participants in today’s complex world envi-
ronment. Some of the actors are countries (also called nation-states) and some
are not. Nation-states are still dominant actors. However, some power is shifting
to nontraditional actors and transnational concerns. There are many potential
challenges to traditional concepts like balance of power, sovereignty, national in-
terest, and roles of nation-state and non-state actors.
Of course, not all actors are threats. To be a threat, a nation or organization must
have both the capabilities and the intention to challenge the United States. The
capabilities in question are not necessarily purely military, but encompass all the
elements of power available to the nation or organization.
NATION-STATE ACTORS
Nation-states fall into four basic categories according to their roles in the inter-
national community. The categories are core states, transition states, rogue
states, and failed or failing states.
The category of core states includes more than half of the nearly 200 countries in
the world today. These are basically democratic (although to varying degrees)
and share common values and interests. Within this larger group, there is an
“inner core” of major powers. These are the advanced countries, including the
United States, that generally dominate world politics. Most conflict with global
consequences will involve the core states in some fashion or another.
Transition states are other larger, industrial-based countriesmostly emerging
regional powersthat are striving to become major powers. High-end transition
states are moving from an industrial-based society to an information-based soci-
ety. Low-end transition states are seeking to move from an agricultural-based so-
ciety to an industrial base. As states try to make this transition, there are cycles
of political stability and instability, and the outcome of the transition is uncer-
tain. Some transition states may successfully join the ranks of core states and
even become major powers within that context; others may become competitors.
Rogue states are those that are hostile to their neighbors or to core states’ inter-
ests. These countries can sponsor international terrorism or even confront U.S.
military forces operating in the region. Failed or failing states are fragmented in
such a way that a rule of law is absent; their instability is a threat to their neigh-
bors and the core states.
Countries can move from one category to another, as conditions change. Some-
times countries join together in multinational alliances and coalitions. Together,
they have more strength and can become a power to be reckoned with.
xiv
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
NON-STATE ACTORS
Non-state actors are those that do not represent the forces of a particular
nation-state. Such non-state elements include rogue actors as well as third-
party actors.
Like rogue states, rogue actors are hostile to other actors; however, they may be
present in one country or extend across several countries. Examples include
insurgents, guerrillas, mercenaries, and transnational or subnational political
movements. Particular sources of danger are terrorists and drug-trafficking or
criminal organizations, since they may have the best technology, equipment, and
weapons available, simply because they have the money to buy them. These non-
state rogue actors may use terror tactics and militarily unconventional methods to
achieve their goals.
Third-party actors may not be hostile to other actors. However, their presence,
activities, and interests can affect the ability of military forces to accomplish
their mission when operating in a foreign country. These third-party actors can
be refugees, internally displaced persons, and other civilians on the battlefield,
including international humanitarian relief agencies, transnational corporations,
and the news media. These individuals and groups bring multiple sources of mo-
tivation, ideology, interests, beliefs, or political affiliations into consideration.
They may be sources of civil unrest. Their presence may require military forces to
consider the potential impacts of traffic congestion, demonstrations, sabotage,
and information manipulation.
REAL-WORLD AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

When U.S. forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must
take into account the presence and influence of these various types of threats and
other actors. In a training environment, an OPFOR can represent a composite of
those nation-state or non-state actors that constitute military and/or paramilitary
forces that could present a threat to the United States, its friends, or its allies.
Other, non-state actors that fall in the category of nonmilitary forces or elements
are not part of the OPFOR, but could be part of the COE used in the training
environment.
CONTEMPORARY OPFOR
This manual introduces the baseline operational doctrine of a flexible, thinking,
adaptive, contemporary OPFOR that applies its doctrine with considerable ini-
tiative. (See the definition of contemporary OPFOR above.) It is applicable to the
entire training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training
centers (CTCs), the TRADOC schools, and units in the field. It provides an
OPFOR that believes that, through adaptive use of all available forces and capa-
bilities, it can create opportunities that, properly leveraged, can allow it to fight
and win, even against a technologically superior opponent such as the United
States.
xv
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
BASELINE
As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments,
this manual describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of con-
temporary nation-states. This composite of the characteristics of real-world
military and paramilitary forces provides a framework for the realistic and
relevant portrayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might
face in the COE.
The State
For this composite of real-world threats, the manual refers to the country in
question as “the State.”6 It describes this artificial country in terms of the eleven
critical variables of the COE. As the baseline for the contemporary OPFOR that
is representative of real-world forces, the State is not a peer competitor of the
United States. However, it is a dominant power in its region of the world and is
capable of challenging U.S. interests there. The general characteristics of the State
could fit a number of different types of potential adversaries in a number of different
scenarios.
Like most countries in the world, the State does not design its forces just to fight
the United States or its allies. It designs them principally to deal with regional
threats and to take advantage of regional opportunities. Therefore, the State’s
national security strategy (including its doctrine, force design, and investment
strategy) focuses primarily on maintaining and expanding its position as a re-
gional power. It develops its military forces in a way that ensures conventional
power superiority over any of its regional neighbors. These forces, together with
the State’s other instruments of power, make it a dominant force in its region.
At the same time, the State is aware that aggressive pursuit of its regional goals
might lead to intervention by a major power, such as the United States, from out-
side the region. To the extent possible, therefore, it invests in technologies and
capabilities that have utility against both regional and extraregional opponents.
The basic force structure of the OPFOR is the same for either type of threat. The
State must go to waror continue the war after extraregional interventionwith
whatever it had going into the war.
When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to overmatch the
State’s, the State has to adapt its patterns of operation. It realizes that the forces
and technology that allow it to dominate its neighbors may not be a match for the
modern, high-technology forces of a wealthy extraregional power like the United
Statesat least not in a head-to-head conventional confrontation. However, it can
use those means in creative and adaptive ways. To the maximum extent possible,
the State plans and trains for adaptive operations and how it will make the transi-
tion to them. It is the combination of the State’s capabilities and its adaptive strat-
egy, operations, and tactics that make it believe it can take on such an extraregional
force and win.
6
In specific U.S. Army training environments, the generic name of the State may give way to other (fictitious)
country names such as Atlantis, Upper Flambokia, or Westland.
xvi
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
Broadened Context
At the strategic level, the State’s ability to challenge U.S. interests includes not
only the military and paramilitary forces of the State, but also the State’s dip-
lomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of power. Rarely
would any country engage the United States or a U.S.-led coalition with purely
military means. It is also possible that the State could be part of an alliance or
coalition, in which case the OPFOR could include allied forces. These nation-
state forces may also operate in conjunction with non-state actors such as insur-
gents, terrorists, and drug or criminal organizations.
The FM 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary forces
of the State, but also other, non-state paramilitary and nonmilitary organizations
present in the State’s region of the world. An extraregional power becoming involved
in that region may have to deal with any or all of these types of military, paramilitary,
and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter these elements individually or, more
likely, in combination with other such elements. Whether these elements operate in
concert or independently, they are an important part of the COE.
Trainers need to consider the total OE and all instruments of power at the
disposal of the State and the OPFORnot just the military element, but also
diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means. For a nation-state,
these are instruments of national power. For non-state actors whose forces are
paramilitary in nature, the other three instruments of power are generally
present to one degree or another. Together, these instruments represent the
power that actors can bring to bear against the United States.
Terminology
Since OPFOR baseline doctrine is a composite of how various forces worldwide
might operate, it uses some terminology that is in common with that of other
countries, including the United States. Whenever possible, OPFOR doctrine uses
established U.S. military termswith the same meaning as defined in FM 1-02
(formerly FM 101-5-1) and/or JP 1-02. However, the FM 7-100 series also in-
cludes some concepts for things the OPFOR does differently from how the U.S.
military does them. Even if various real-world foreign countries might use the
same concept, or something very close to it, different countries might give it dif-
ferent names. In those cases, the OPFOR manuals either use a term commonly
accepted by one or more other countries or create a new, “composite” term that
makes sense and is clearly understandable. In any case where an operational or
tactical term is not further specifically defined in the FM 7-100 series, it is used
in the same sense as in the U.S. definition.
FLEXIBILITY
As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring
partner, capable of stressing any or all battlefield operating systems of the U.S.
force. However, it also must be tailored to meet training requirements.
In the OPFOR baseline presented in this manual, the FM authors often say that
the State or the OPFOR “may” be able to do something or “might” or “could” do
something. They often use the progressive forms of verbs to say that the State has a
“growing” economy or “is developing” a capability or “is continually modernizing.”
xvii
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
The State participates in the global market, which can allow it to acquire things
it cannot produce domestically. Such descriptions give scenario writers consider-
able flexibility in determining what the State or the OPFOR actually has at a
given point in time or a given place on the battlefieldin a particular scenario.
The composite example of this baseline may meet the OPFOR requirements for
many U.S. Army training environments. For cases that require an OPFOR based
on a type of nation-state with characteristics different from those of the State de-
scribed in this manual, this baseline provides a framework from which trainers
can develop an OPFOR appropriate for their particular training requirements.
The OPFOR must be flexible enough to fit various training requirements. It must
be scalable and tunable. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR
may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art,
relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of those cate-
gories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.
THINKING
This manual describes how the OPFOR thinks, especially how it thinks about
fighting its regional neighbors and/or the United States. This thinking deter-
mines basic OPFOR operationsas well as strategy and tactics, which are the
subjects of other manuals in this series. It drives OPFOR organizational
structures and equipment acquisition or adaptation. It also determines how
the nation-state OPFOR that represents the armed forces of the State would
interact with other, non-state actors that may be present in the COE.
Just because the U.S. force knows something about how the OPFOR has fought
in the past does not mean that the OPFOR will always continue to fight that
way. A thinking OPFOR will learn from its own successes and failures, as well as
those of its potential enemies. It will adapt its thinking, its makeup, and its way
of fighting to accommodate these lessons learned. It will continuously look for
innovative ways to deal with the United States and its armed forces.
ADAPTABILITY
Like all military forces, the OPFOR has a basic, conventional design for dealing
with forces with capabilities equal to or inferior to its own. Prior to a U.S. force
becoming involved, therefore, the OPFOR can use the application or threat of ap-
plication of that conventional design to dominate or influence its regional neighbors.
The OPFOR plans these operations well in advance and tries to execute them as
rapidly as possible, in order to preclude regional alliances or outside intervention.
The OPFOR has developed its doctrine, force structure, and capabilities with an
eye toward employing them against both regional and extraregional opponents, if
necessary. It has thought about and trained for how to adapt once an extraregional
force becomes engaged. It has included this adaptability in its doctrine in the
form of general principles, based on its perceptions of the United States and
other threats to its goals and aspirations. It will seek to avoid types of operations
and environments for which U.S. forces are optimized. During the course of con-
flict, it will make further adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.
xviii
______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
When a U.S. force or a U.S.-led coalition first begins to deploy into theater, the
OPFOR will seek to disrupt the deployment and thus create opportunity. In such
cases, the conventional design the OPFOR used in regionally-focused operations
may still provide the framework for military operations against an advanced ex-
traregional force. The OPFOR will not shy away from the use of military means
against such an opponent, so long as the risk is commensurate with potential
gains. As a U.S. or coalition force builds up power in the region, the OPFOR must
rely on adaptive applications of its basic design in order to mitigate its disadvan-
tages and exploit its advantages compared to this new opponent.
In general, the contemporary OPFOR will be less predictable than OPFORs in
the past. It will be difficult to template as it adapts and attempts to create oppor-
tunity. Its patterns of operation will change as it achieves success or experiences
failure. OPFOR doctrine might not change, but its way of operating will.
INITIATIVE
Like U.S. Army doctrine, OPFOR doctrine must allow sufficient freedom for bold,
creative initiative in any situation. OPFOR doctrine is descriptive, but not prescrip-
tive; authoritative, but not authoritarian; definitive, but not dogmatic. The OPFOR
that U.S. units encounter in various training venues will not apply this doctrine
blindly or unthinkingly, but will use its experience and assessments to interpolate
from this baseline in light of specific situations. Thus, U.S. units can no longer say
that the OPFOR has to do certain things and cannot do anything that is not ex-
pressly prescribed in established OPFOR doctrine. Doctrine guides OPFOR actions
in support of the State’s objectives; OPFOR leaders apply it with judgment and
initiative.
KEEPING THE COE AND THE OPFOR CONTEMPORARY

The COE is extremely fluid, with rapidly changing regional and global relation-
ships. New actorsboth nations and non-state actorsare constantly appearing
and disappearing from the scene. The OPFOR operational doctrine provided in
this manual should meet most of the U.S. Army’s training needs for the foresee-
able future. During the period covered by the COE, almost anyone who fights the
United States would probably have to use the same kinds of adaptive action as
outlined in this doctrine. As the geopolitical situation, forces, or capabilities
change over time, OPFOR doctrine and its applications will evolve along with
them, to continue to provide the Army a “contemporary” OPFOR. Thus, the
OPFOR will remain capable of presenting a challenge that is appropriate to meet
evolving training requirements at any given point in time.
xix
Chapter 1
Strategic Framework
This chapter describes the State’s national security strategy and how the
State designs campaigns and operations to achieve strategic goals out-
lined in that strategy. This provides the general framework within which the
OPFOR plans and executes military actions at the operational level, which
are the focus of the remainder of this manual. The nature of the State and its
national security strategy are explained in greater detail in FM 7-100.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-1. The national security strategy is the State’s vision for itself as a nation
and the underlying rationale for building and employing its instruments of
national power. It outlines how the State plans to use its diplomatic-political,
informational, economic, and military instruments of power to achieve its
strategic goals. Despite the term security, this strategy defines not just what
the State wants to protect or defend, but what it wants to achieve.
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
PRESIDENT
MINISTER OF
NATIONAL
SECURITY
MINISTER MINISTER OF MINISTER OF MINISTER MINISTER

OF FOREIGN PUBLIC FINANCE AND OF THE OF
AFFAIRS INFORMATION ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR DEFENSE
STRATEGIC
INTEGRATION
DEPARTMENT
MINISTRY MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY MINISTRY

FINANCE AND OF THE OTHER
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OF
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS INTERIOR MINISTRIES
AFFAIRS INFORMATION DEFENSE
GENERAL
STAFF
SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND
Figure 1-1. National Command Authority
1-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

1-2. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the
application of all instruments of national power in planning and carrying out
the national security strategy. Thus, the NCA includes the cabinet ministers
responsible for those instruments of power: the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Minister of Public Information, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Defense, along with other members
selected by the State’s President, who chairs the NCA. (See Figure 1-1.)
1-3. The President also appoints a Minister of National Security, who heads
the Strategic Integration Department (SID) within the NCA. The SID is the
overarching agency responsible for integrating all the instruments of national
power under one cohesive national security strategy. The SID coordinates the
plans and actions of all State ministries, but particularly those associated
with the instruments of power.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

1-4. The NCA determines the State’s strategic goals. The State’s overall goals
are to continually expand its influence within its region and eventually
change its position within the global community. These are the long-term
aims of the State.
1-5. Supporting the overall, long-term, strategic goals, there may be one or
more specific goals, each based on a particular threat or opportunity. Exam-
ples of specific strategic goals might be
• Annexation of territory.
• Economic expansion.
• Destruction of an insurgency.
• Protection of a related minority in a neighboring country.
• Acquisition of natural resources located outside the State’s boundaries.
• Destruction of external weapons, forces, or facilities that threaten the
existence of the State.
• Defense of the State against invasion.
• Preclusion or elimination of outside intervention.
Each of these specific goals contributes to achieving the overall strategic
goals.
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-6. In pursuit of its national security strategy, the State is prepared to con-
duct four basic types of strategic-level courses of action. Each course of action
involves the use of all four instruments of national power, but to different de-
grees and in different ways. The State gives the four types the following names:
• Strategic operationsstrategic-level course of action that uses all in-
struments of power in peace and war to achieve the goals of the State’s na-
tional security strategy by attacking the enemy’s strategic centers of grav-
ity. (See the Strategic Operations section of this chapter for more detail.)
1-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
• Regional operationsstrategic-level course of action (including con-

ventional, force-on-force military operations) against opponents the
State overmatches, including regional adversaries and internal threats.
(See the Regional Operations section of this chapter for more detail.)
• Transition operationsstrategic-level course of action that bridges
the gap between regional and adaptive operations and contains some
elements of both, continuing to pursue the State’s regional goals while
dealing with the development of outside intervention with the potential
for overmatching the State. (See the Transition Operations section of
this chapter for more detail.)
• Adaptive operationsstrategic-level course of action to preserve the
State’s power and apply it in adaptive ways against opponents that
overmatch the State. (See the Adaptive Operations section of this chap-
ter for more detail.)
Although the State refers to them as “operations,” each of these courses of
action is actually a subcategory of strategy. Each of these types of “opera-
tions” is actually the aggregation of the effects of tactical, operational, and
strategic actions, in conjunction with the other three instruments of national
power, that contribute to the accomplishment of strategic goals. The type(s) of
operations the State employs at a given time will depend on the types of
threats and opportunities present and other conditions in the operational en-
vironment. Figure 1-2 illustrates the State’s basic conceptual framework for
how it could apply its various instruments of national power in the imple-
mentation of its national security strategy.
Peace War
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity
REGIONAL
OPERATIONS
TRANSITION
OPERATIONS
ADAPTIVE
OPERATIONS
Against Opponents Against Opponents

the State that Overmatch
Overmatches the State
Figure 1-2. Conceptual Framework for Implementing the State’s National Security Strategy
1-7. Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or

preparation for war. Once war begins, they continue during regional, transition,
1-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
and adaptive operations and complement those operations. Each of the latter
three types of operations occurs only during war and only under certain con-
ditions. Transition operations can overlap regional and adaptive operations.
1-8. The national security strategy identifies branches, sequels, and contin-
gencies and the role and scope of each type of strategic-level action within
these modifications to the basic strategy. Successful execution of these
branches and sequels can allow the State to resume regional operations and
thus achieve its strategic goals. (See Figure 1-3.)
State Achieves Strategic Goals
Against Opponents’ Strategic Centers of Gravity

1
REGIONAL and
OPERATIONS 2
3
or
REGIONAL 4
OPERATIONS 5 ON
I T I NS
or
6
7 A NS TIO or
REGIONAL A ADAPTIVE
TR ER 8 9
OPERATIONS OP OPERATIONS
11
10
Against Regional
Opponents Against Extraregional Opponents
1 State achieves its strategic goals without combat, through strategic

operations that compel other actors to yield to State’s will.
2 State must react to a particular regional threat or seizes an
opportunity to change status quo in region.
3 While strategic operations continue, State achieves its strategic
goals through regional operations against weaker neighbors, without
extraregional intervention.
4 Extraregional power threatens to intervene.
5 State deters extraregional intervention through strategic operations.
6 State achieves its strategic goals after deterring intervention.
7 State unable to deter intervention; begins transition operations.
8 State defeats early-entry forces or causes extraregional forces to
withdraw from region; transitions back to regional operations.
9 Extraregional forces fully deployed and overmatch State forces;
State conducts adaptive operations.
10 Extraregional forces withdraw from region after defeat or stalemate;
State begins transition back to regional operations.
11 State achieves its strategic goals after extraregional intervention.
Figure 1-3. Examples of Branches and Sequels in National Security Strategy
1-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-9. The national security strategy is designed to achieve one or more specific
strategic goals within the State’s region. Therefore, it typically starts with
actions directed at an opponent within the regionan opponent that the
State overmatches in conventional military power, as well as other instru-
ments of power.
1-10. The State will attempt to achieve its ends without resorting to armed
conflict. Accordingly strategic operations are not limited to military means
and usually do not begin with armed conflict. The State may be able to achieve
the desired goal through pressure applied by other-than-military instruments of
power, perhaps with the mere threat of using its superior military power against
the regional opponent. These actions would fall under the general framework of
“strategic operations.”
1-11. When nonmilitary means are not sufficient or expedient, the State may
resort to armed conflict as a means of creating conditions that lead to the de-
sired end state. However, strategic operations continue even if a particular re-
gional threat or opportunity causes the State to undertake “regional operations”
that include military means.
1-12. Prior to initiating armed conflict and throughout the course of armed
conflict with its regional opponent, the State continues to conduct strategic
operations to preclude intervention by outside playersby other regional
neighbors or by an extraregional power that could overmatch the State’s
forces. However, those operations always include branches and sequels for
dealing with the possibility of intervention by an extraregional power.
1-13. When unable to limit the conflict to regional operations, the State is
prepared to engage extraregional forces through “transition and adaptive
operations.” Usually, the State does not shift directly from regional to adap-
tive operations. The transition is incremental and does not occur at a single,
easily identifiable point. If the State perceives intervention is likely, transi-
tion operations may begin simultaneously with regional and strategic opera-
tions. Transition operations overlap both regional and adaptive operations.
Transition operations allow the State to shift to adaptive operations or back to
regional operations. At some point, the State either seizes an opportunity to
return to regional operations, or it reaches a point where it must complete
the shift to adaptive operations. Even after shifting to adaptive operations,
the State tries to set conditions for transitioning back to regional operations.
1-14. If an extraregional power were to have significant forces already de-
ployed in the region prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the State would not
be able to conduct regional operations using its normal, conventional design
without first eliminating those forces. In this case, the State would first use
strategic operationswith all means availableto put pressure on the al-
ready present extraregional force to withdraw from the region or at least re-
main neutral in the regional conflict. Barring that, strategic operations could
still aim at keeping the extraregional power from committing additional
forces to the region and preventing his forces already there from being able to
fully exercise their capabilities. If the extraregional force is still able to intervene,
the rest of the State’s strategic campaign would have to start with adaptive op-
erations. Eventually, the State would hope to move into transition operations. If
1-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
it could neutralize or eliminate the extraregional force, it could finally complete

the transition to regional operations and thus achieve its strategic goals.
STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN
1-15. To achieve one or more specific strategic goals, the NCA would develop
and implement a specific national strategic campaign. Such a campaign is the
aggregate of actions of all the State’s instruments of power to achieve a specific
set of the State’s strategic goals against internal, regional, and/or extraregional
opponents. There would normally be a diplomatic-political campaign, an infor-
mation campaign, and an economic campaign, as well as a military campaign.
All of these must fit into a single, integrated national strategic campaign.
1-16. The NCA will develop a series of contingency plans for a number of dif-
ferent specific strategic goals that it might want or need to pursue. These
contingency plans often serve as the basis for training and preparing the
State’s forces. These plans would address the allocation of resources to a po-
tential strategic campaign and the actions to be taken by each instrument of
national power contributing to such a campaign.
Neutral Allied
Country Country Sea
t
res
Un
a of
Are l:
oa cy
Hostile g ic G rgen
ate nsu
Country Str nteri
u Strategic Goal:
Co
Defense Against Invasion
“THE STATE”
Strategic Goal:
Annexation of Territory
Sea
Sea
Figure 1-4. Example of a Strategic Campaign
1-17. Aside from training exercises, the NCA would approve only one strate-
gic campaign for implementation at a given time. Nevertheless, the single
campaign could include more than one specific strategic goal. For instance,
any strategic campaign designed to deal with an insurgency would include
contingencies for dealing with reactions from regional neighbors or an ex-
traregional power that could adversely affect the State and its ability to
achieve the selected goal. Likewise, any strategic campaign focused on a goal
that involves the State’s invasion of a regional neighbor would have to take
into consideration possible adverse actions by other regional neighbors, the
1-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
possibility that insurgents might use this opportunity to take action against
the State, and the distinct possibility that the original or expanded regional
conflict might lead to extraregional intervention. Figure 1-4 shows an exam-
ple of a single strategic campaign that includes three strategic goals. (The
map in this diagram is for illustrative purposes only and does not necessarily
reflect the actual size, shape, or physical environment of the State or its
neighbors.)
NATIONAL STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-18. The purpose of a national strategic campaign plan (national SCP) is to
integrate all the instruments of national power under a single plan. Even if
the State hoped to achieve the goal(s) of the campaign by nonmilitary means,
the national campaign plan would leverage the influence of its Armed Forces’
strong military presence and provide for the contingency that military force
might become necessary.
1-19. The national SCP is the end result of the SID’s planning effort. Based
on input from all State ministries, this is the plan for integrating the actions
of all instruments of power to set conditions favorable for achieving the cen-
tral goal identified in the national security strategy. The Ministry of Defense
(MOD) is only one of several ministries that provide input and are then re-
sponsible for carrying out their respective parts of the consolidated national plan.
1-20. In waging a national strategic campaign, the State never employs mili-
tary power alone. Military power is most effective when applied in combina-
tion with diplomatic-political, informational, and economic instruments of
power. State ministries responsible for each of the four instruments of power
will develop their own campaign plans as part of the unified national SCP.
1-21. A national SCP defines the relationships among all State organizations,
military and nonmilitary, for the purposes of executing that SCP. The SCP
describes the intended integration, if any, of multinational forces in those in-
stances where the State is acting as part of a coalition.
MILITARY STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-22. Within the context of the national strategic campaign, the MOD and
General Staff develop and implement a military strategic campaign. During
peacetime, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff is responsible for
developing, staffing, promulgation, and continuing review of the military
SCP. It must ensure that the military plan would end in achieving military
conditions that would fit with the conditions created by the diplomatic-
political, informational, and economic portions of the national plan that are
prepared by other State ministries. Therefore, the Operations Directorate as-
signs liaison officers to other important government ministries.
1-23. Although the State’s Armed Forces (the OPFOR) may play a role in
strategic operations, the focus of their planning and effort is on the military
aspects of regional, transition, and adaptive operations. A military strategic
campaign may include several combined arms, joint, and/or interagency op-
erations. If the State succeeds in forming a regional alliance or coalition,
these operations may also be multinational.
1-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
1-24. The General Staff acts as the executive agency for the NCA, and all
military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff
(CGS), with NCA approval, defines the theater in which the Armed Forces
will conduct the military campaign and its subordinate operations. He de-
termines the task organization of forces to accomplish the operational-level
missions that support the overall campaign plan. He also determines whether
it will be necessary to form more than one theater headquarters. For most
campaigns, there will be only one theater, and the CGS will serve as thea-
ter commander, thus eliminating one echelon of command at the strategic
level.
1-25. In wartime, the MOD and the General Staff combine to form the Su-
preme High Command (SHC). The Operations Directorate continues to re-
view the military SCP and modify it or develop new plans based on guidance
from the CGS, who commands the SHC. It generates options and contingency
plans for various situations that may arise. Once the CGS approves a particular
plan for a particular strategic goal, he issues it to the appropriate operational-
level commanders.
1-26. The military SCP directs operational-level military forces, and each
command identified in the SCP prepares an operation plan that supports the
execution of its role in that SCP. The SCP assigns forces to operational-level
commands and designates areas of responsibility (AORs) for those com-
mands.
1-27. What the State calls “strategic operations” is actually a universal stra-
tegic course of action the State would use to deal with all situationsin
peacetime and war, against all kinds of opponents, potential opponents, or
neutral parties. Strategic operations involve the application of any or all of
the four instruments of national power at the direction of the national-level
decision makers in the NCA. They occur throughout a strategic campaign.
The nature of strategic operations at any particular time corresponds to the
conditions perceived by the NCA. These operations differ from the other op-
erations of a strategic campaign in that they are not limited to wartime and
can transcend the region.
1-28. Strategic operations typically target elements that constitute the en-
emy’s strategic centers of gravitysuch as soldiers’ and leaders’ confidence,
political and diplomatic decisions, public opinion, the interests of private in-
stitutions, national will, and the collective will and commitment of alliances
and coalitions. National will is not just the will to fight, but also the will to
intervene by other than military means.
1-29. The State will employ all means available against the enemy’s centers
of gravity: diplomatic initiatives, information warfare (IW), economic pres-
sure, terrorist attacks, State-sponsored insurgency, direct action by special-
purpose forces (SPF), long-range precision fires, and even weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) against selected targets. These efforts often place non-
combatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-political, economic, and
psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-30. Strategic operations occur continuously, from prior to the outbreak of

war to the post-war period. They can precede war, with the aim of deterring
other regional actors from actions counter to the State’s interests or compel-
ling such actors to yield to the State’s will. Before undertaking regional op-
erations, the State lays plans to prevent outside intervention in the region.
During the course of regional operations, the State uses strategic operations
primarily in defensive ways, in order to prevent other parties from becoming
involved in what it regards as purely regional affairs. At this point, the State
relies primarily on diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means in
a peacetime mode in relation to parties with whom it is not at war.
1-31. If preclusion of outside intervention is not possible, the State continues
to employ strategic operations while conducting transition and adaptive op-
erations. With the beginning of transition operations, the military aspects of
strategic operations become more aggressive, while the State continues to
apply other instruments of power to the full extent possible. The aim becomes
getting the extraregional force to leave or stop deploying additional forces
into the region. Successful strategic operations can bring the war to an end.
1-32. Once war begins, strategic operations become an important, powerful
component of the State’s strategy for total war using “all means necessary.”
What the various instruments of power do and which ones dominate in stra-
tegic operations at a given time depends on the same circumstances that dic-
tate shifts from regional through transition to adaptive operations. In most
cases, the diplomatic-political, informational, and economic means tend to
dominate. During strategic operations, military means are most often used to
complement those other instruments of national power. For example, the
military means are likely to be used against key political or economic centers
or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of gravity,
rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
1-33. Even within the military instrument of power, actions considered part
of strategic operations require a conscious, calculated decision and direction
or authorization by the NCA. It may not be readily apparent to outside par-
ties whether specific military actions are part of strategic operations or an-
other strategic course of action occurring simultaneously. In fact, one action
could conceivably fulfill both purposes. For example, a demoralizing military
defeat that could affect the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity could also be
a defeat from an operational or tactical viewpoint. In other cases, a particular
action on the battlefield might not make sense from a tactical or operational
viewpoint, but could achieve a strategic purpose. Its purpose may be to inflict
mass casualties or destroy high-visibility enemy systems in order to weaken
the enemy’s national will to continue the intervention.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
1-34. The State possesses an overmatch in most, and sometimes all, elements
of power against regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in a con-
ventional operational design focused on offensive action. A weaker regional
neighbor may not actually represent a threat to the State, but rather an op-
portunity that the State can exploit.
1-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
1-35. To seize territory or otherwise expand its influence in the region, the
State must destroy a regional enemy’s will and capability to continue the
fight. It will attempt to achieve strategic political or military decision or
achieve specific regional goals as rapidly as possible, in order to preclude re-
gional alliances or outside intervention.
1-36. During regional operations, the State relies on its continuing strategic
operations to preclude or control outside intervention. It tries to keep foreign
perceptions of its actions during a regional conflict below the threshold that
will invite in extraregional forces. The State wants to win the regional con-
flict, but has to be careful how it does so. It works to prevent development of
international consensus for intervention and to create doubt among possible
participants. Still, at the very outset of regional operations, it lays plans and
positions forces to conduct access-control operations in the event of outside
intervention.
1-37. At the military level, regional operations are combined arms, joint, in-
teragency, and/or multinational operations. They are conducted in the State’s
region and, at least at the outset, against a weaker regional opponent. The
State’s doctrine, organization, capabilities, and national security strategy al-
low the OPFOR to deal with regional threats and opportunities primarily
through offensive action.
1-38. The State designs its military forces and employs an investment
strategy that ensures superiority in conventional military power over any
of its regional neighbors. Regionally-focused operations typically involve
“conventional” patterns of operation. However, the term conventional does
not mean that the OPFOR will use only conventional forces and conventional
weapons in such a conflict, nor does it mean that the OPFOR will not use
some adaptive approaches.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
1-39. Transition operations serve as a pivotal point between regional and
adaptive operations. The transition may go in either direction. The fact that
the State begins transition operations does not necessarily mean that it
must complete the transition from regional to adaptive operations (or vice versa).
As conditions allow or dictate, the “transition” could end with the State conduct-
ing the same type of operations as before the shift to transition operations.
1-40. The State conducts transition operations when other regional and/or
extraregional forces threaten the State’s ability to continue regional opera-
tions in a conventional design against the original regional enemy. At the
point of shifting to transition operations, the State still has the ability to ex-
ert all instruments of national power against an overmatched regional en-
emy. Indeed, it may have already defeated its original adversary. However,
its successful actions in regional operations have prompted either other re-
gional actors or an extraregional actor to contemplate intervention. The State
will use all means necessary to preclude or defeat intervention.
1-41. Although the State would prefer to achieve its strategic goals through
regional operations, an SCP has the flexibility to change and adapt if re-
quired. Since the State assumes the possibility of extraregional intervention,
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
any SCP will already contain thorough plans for transition operations, as
well as adaptive operations, if necessary.
1-42. When an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the bal-
ance of power begins to shift away from the State. Although the State may
not yet be overmatched, it faces a developing threat it will not be able to han-
dle with normal, “conventional” patterns of operation designed for regional
conflict. Therefore, the State must begin to adapt its operations to the chang-
ing threat.
1-43. While the State and the OPFOR as a whole are in the condition of tran-
sition operations, an operational- or tactical-level commander will still re-
ceive a mission statement in plans and orders from higher headquarters stat-
ing the purpose of his actions. To accomplish that purpose and mission, he
will use as much as he can of the conventional patterns of operation that
were available to him during regional operations and as much as he has to of
the more adaptive-type approaches dictated by the presence of an extrare-
gional force.
1-44. Even extraregional forces may be vulnerable to “conventional” opera-
tions during the time they require to build combat power and create support
at home for their intervention. Against an extraregional force that either
could not fully deploy or has been successfully separated into isolated ele-
ments, the OPFOR may still be able to use some of the more conventional
patterns of operation. The State will not shy away from the use of military
means against an advanced extraregional opponent so long as the risk is
commensurate with potential gains.
1-45. Transition operations serve as a means for the State to retain the ini-
tiative and still pursue its overall strategic goal of regional expansion despite
its diminishing advantage in the balance of power. From the outset, one part
of the set of specific goals for any strategic campaign was the goal to defeat
any outside intervention or prevent it from fully materializing. As the State
begins transition operations, its immediate goal is preservation of its instru-
ments of power while seeking to set conditions that will allow it to transition
back to regional operations. Transition operations feature a mixture of offen-
sive and defensive actions that help the OPFOR control the strategic tempo
while changing the nature of conflict to something for which the intervening
force is unprepared. Transition operations can also buy time for the State’s
strategic operations to succeed.
1-46. There are two possible outcomes to transition operations. If the ex-
traregional force suffers sufficient losses or for other reasons must withdraw
from the region, the OPFOR’s operations may begin to transition back to re-
gional operations, again becoming primarily offensive. If the extraregional
force is not compelled to withdraw and continues to build up power in the re-
gion, the OPFOR’s transition operations may begin to gravitate in the other di-
rection, toward adaptive operations.
1-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
1-47. Generally, the State conducts adaptive operations as a consequence of
intervention from outside the region. Once an extraregional force intervenes
with sufficient power to overmatch the State, the full conventional design
used in regionally-focused operations is no longer sufficient to deal with this
threat. The State has developed its doctrine, organization, capabilities, and
strategy with an eye toward dealing with both regional and extraregional op-
ponents. It has already planned how it will adapt to this new and changing
threat and has included this adaptability in its doctrine.
1-48. The State’s immediate goal is survivalas a regime and as a nation.
However, its long-term goal is still the expansion of influence within its re-
gion. In the State’s view, this goal is only temporarily thwarted by the ex-
traregional intervention. Accordingly, planning for adaptive operations fo-
cuses on effects over time. The State believes that patience is its ally and an
enemy of the extraregional force and its intervention in regional affairs.
1-49. The State believes that adaptive operations can lead to several possible
outcomes. If the results do not completely resolve the conflict in the State’s
favor, they may at least allow the State to return to regional operations. Even
a stalemate may be a victory for the State, as long as it preserves enough of
its instruments of power to preserve the regime and lives to fight another day.
1-50. When an extraregional power intervenes with sufficient force to over-
match the State’s, the OPFOR has to adapt its patterns of operation. It still
has the same forces and technology that were available to it for regional op-
erations, but must use them in creative and adaptive ways. It has already
thought through how it will adapt to this new or changing threat in general
terms. (See Principles of Operation Versus an Extraregional Power below.) It has
already developed appropriate branches and sequels to its basic SCP and does
not have to rely on improvisation. During the course of combat, it will make fur-
ther adaptations, based on experience and opportunity.
1-51. Even with the intervention of an advanced extraregional power, the State
will not cede the initiative. It will employ military means so long as this does not
either place the regime at risk or risk depriving it of sufficient force to remain a
regional power after the extraregional intervention is over. The primary objec-
tives are to preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to
fight, and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
1-52. The OPFOR will seek to conduct adaptive operations in circumstances,
opportunities, and terrain that optimize its own capabilities and degrade
those of the enemy. It will employ a force that is optimized for the terrain or
for a specific mission. For example, it will use its antitank capability, tied to ob-
stacles and complex terrain, inside a defensive structure designed to absorb the
enemy’s momentum and fracture his organizational framework.
1-53. The types of adaptive actions that characterize “adaptive operations” at
the strategic level can also serve the OPFOR well in regional or transition
operationsat least at the tactical and operational levels. However, once an
extraregional force becomes fully involved in the conflict, the OPFOR will
conduct adaptive actions more frequently and on a larger scale.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION VERSUS AN EXTRAREGIONAL POWER

1-54. The State assumes the distinct possibility of intervention by a major
extraregional power in any regional conflict. Consequently, it has devised the
following principles for applying its various instruments of diplomatic-
political, informational, economic, and military power against this type of threat.
CONTROL ACCESS INTO REGION

1-55. Extraregional enemies capable of achieving overmatch against the
State must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. There-
fore, the State’s force design and investment strategy is focused on access
controlto selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extraregional forces
into the region and to force them to keep their operating bases beyond con-
tinuous operational reach. This is the easiest manner of preventing the ac-
cumulation of enemy combat power in the region and thus defeating a techno-
logically superior enemy.
1-56. Access-control operations are continuous throughout a strategic cam-
paign and can reach beyond the theater as defined by the State’s NCA. They
begin even before the extraregional power declares its intent to come into the re-
gion, and continue regardless of whether the State is conducting regional, transi-
tion, or adaptive operations. Access-control operations come in three basic forms:
strategic preclusion, operational exclusion, and access limitation.
Strategic Preclusion
1-57. Strategic preclusion seeks to completely deter extraregional involve-
ment or severely limit its scope and intensity. The State would attempt to
achieve strategic preclusion in order to reduce the influence of the extrare-
gional power or to improve its own regional or international standing. It
would employ all its instruments of power to preclude direct involvement by
the extraregional power. Actions can take many forms and often contain sev-
eral lines of operation working simultaneously.
1-58. The primary target of strategic preclusion is the extraregional power’s
national will. First, the State would conduct diplomatic and perception man-
agement activities aimed at influencing regional, transnational, and world
opinion. This could either break apart ad hoc coalitions or allow the State to
establish a coalition of its own or at least gain sympathy. For example, the
State might use a disinformation campaign to discredit the legitimacy of dip-
lomatic and economic sanctions imposed upon it. The extraregional power’s
economy and military would be secondary targets, with both practical and
symbolic goals. This might include using global markets and international fi-
nancial systems to disrupt the economy of the extraregional power, or con-
ducting physical and information attacks against critical economic centers.
Similarly, the military could be attacked indirectly by disrupting its power
projection, mobilization, and training capacity. Preclusive actions are likely
to increase in intensity and scope as the extraregional power moves closer to
military action. If strategic preclusion fails, the State will turn to operational
methods that attempt to limit the scope of extraregional involvement or cause
it to terminate quickly.
1-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Operational Exclusion
1-59. Operational exclusion seeks to selectively deny an extraregional force
the use of or access to forward bases of operation within the region or even
outside the theater defined by the NCA. For example, through diplomacy,
economic or political connections, information campaigns, and/or hostile ac-
tions, the State might seek to deny the enemy the use of bases in other for-
eign nations. It might also attack population and economic centers for the in-
timidation effect, using long-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), WMD,
or SPF.
1-60. Forces originating in the enemy’s homeland must negotiate long and
difficult air and surface lines of communication (LOCs) merely to reach the
region. Therefore, the State will use any means at its disposal to also attack
the enemy forces along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, at ae-
rial and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs), and even at their
home stations. These are fragile and convenient targets in support of transi-
tion and adaptive operations.
Access Limitation
1-61. Access limitation seeks to affect an extraregional enemy’s ability to in-
troduce forces into the theater. Access-control operations do not necessarily
have to deny the enemy access entirely. A more realistic goal is to limit or in-
terrupt access into the theater in such a way that the State’s forces are capa-
ble of dealing with them. By controlling the amount of force or limiting the
options for force introduction, the State can create conditions that place its
conventional capabilities on a par with those of an extraregional force. Capa-
bility is measured in terms of what the enemy can bring to bear in the thea-
ter, rather than what the enemy possesses.
1-62. The State’s goal is to limit the enemy’ accumulation of applicable com-
bat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the accomplishment
of a strategic campaign. This may occur through many methods. For example,
the State may be able to limit or interrupt the enemy’s deployment through
actions against his aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs)
in the region. Hitting such targets also has political and psychological value.
The State will try to disrupt and isolate enemy forces that are in the region or
coming into it, so that it can destroy them piecemeal. It might exploit and
manipulate international media to paint foreign intervention in a poor
light, decrease international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of
engagement (ROE) of the deploying extraregional forces.
EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING

1-63. The State will use any means necessary to protect key elements of its
combat power from destruction by an extraregional forceparticularly by air
and missile forces. This protection may come from use of any or all of the fol-
lowing:
• Complex terrain.
• Noncombatants.
• Risk of unacceptable collateral damage.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
• Countermeasure systems.
• Dispersion.
• Fortifications.
• IW.
1-64. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire force for an
extended time period. Rather, the State will seek to protect selected elements
of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to prose-
cute important elements of a strategic campaign.
CONTROL TEMPO
1-65. The OPFOR initially employs rapid tempo to conclude regional opera-
tions before an extraregional force can be introduced. It will also use rapid
tempo to set conditions for access-control operations before the extraregional
force can establish a foothold in the region. Once it has done that, it needs to
be able to control the tempoto ratchet it up or down, as is advantageous to
its own operational or tactical plans.
1-66. During the initial phases of an extraregional enemy’s entry into the re-
gion, the OPFOR may employ a high operational tempo. Taking advantage of
the weaknesses inherent in enemy power projection, it seeks to terminate the
conflict quickly before main enemy forces can be brought to bear. If the
OPFOR cannot end the conflict quickly, it may take steps to slow the tempo and
prolong the conflict, taking advantage of enemy lack of commitment over time.
CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES

1-67. The OPFOR will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on
enemy forces to weaken the enemy’s domestic resolve and national will to
sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations have shown an
apparent lack of commitment over time, and sensitivity to domestic and
world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties.
1-68. The OPFOR has the advantage of disproportionate interests: the ex-
traregional power may have limited objectives and only casual interest in the
conflict, while the State approaches it from the perspective of total war and a
threat to its aspirations or even to its national survival. The State is willing
to commit all means necessary, for as long as necessary, to achieve its strate-
gic goals. Compared to the extraregional enemy, the State stands more will-
ing to absorb higher military and civilian casualties in order to achieve vic-
tory. It will try to influence public opinion in the enemy’s homeland to the ef-
fect that the goal of intervention is not worth the cost.
NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH

1-69. Against an extraregional force, the OPFOR will forego massed forma-
tions, patterned echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy
targets for such an enemy. It will hide and disperse its forces in areas where
complex terrain limits the enemy’s ability to apply his full range of techno-
logical capabilities. However, the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and fires
from these dispersed locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its
own choosing.
1-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
1-70. Another way to operate on the margins of enemy technology is to ma-

neuver during periods of reduced exposure. The OPFOR trains its forces to
operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban envi-
ronments that shield them from the effects of the enemy’s high-technology weap-
ons and deny the enemy the full benefits of his advanced reconnaissance, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems.
1-71. Modern militaries rely upon information and information systems to
plan and conduct operations. For this reason, the OPFOR will conduct exten-
sive information attacks and other offensive IW actions. It can also use the
enemy’s robust array of RISTA systems against him. A sophisticated enemy’s
large numbers of sensors can overwhelm subordinate units’ ability to receive,
process, and analyze raw intelligence data and to provide timely and accurate
intelligence analysis. The OPFOR can add to this saturation problem by us-
ing deception to flood enemy sensors with masses of conflicting information.
Conflicting data from different sensors at different levels (such as satellite
imagery conflicting with data from unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the
enemy and degrade his situational awareness.
1-72. The OPFOR will concentrate its own RISTA, maneuver, and fire sup-
port means on the destruction of high-visibility (flagship) enemy systems.
This offers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat
power of the OPFOR and also maximizes effects in the information and psy-
chological arenas. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade
operational capability, but also undermine enemy morale. Thus, attacks
against such targets are not always linked to military objectives.
CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

1-73. The OPFOR will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the dif-
ferences between friendly and enemy capabilities. Following an initial period
of regionally-focused conventional operations and utilizing the opportunity af-
forded by phased enemy deployment, the OPFOR will change its operations
to focus on preserving combat power and exploiting enemy ROE. This shift in
the focus of operations will present the fewest targets possible to the rapidly
growing combat power of the enemy. Also, the OPFOR or affiliated forces can
use terror tactics against enemy civilians or soldiers not directly connected to
the intervention as a device to change the fundamental nature of the conflict.
1-74. Against early-entry forces, the OPFOR may still be able to use the de-
sign it employed in previous operations against regional opponents, particu-
larly if access-control operations have been successful. However, as the extrare-
gional force builds up to the point where it threatens to overmatch the OPFOR,
the OPFOR is prepared to disperse its forces and employ them in patternless op-
erations that present a battlefield that is difficult for the enemy to analyze and
predict.
1-75. The OPFOR may hide and disperse its forces in areas of sanctuary. The
sanctuary may be physical, often located in urban areas or other complex ter-
rain that limits or degrades the capabilities of enemy systems. However, the
OPFOR may also use moral sanctuary by placing its forces in areas shielded
by civilians or close to sites that are culturally, politically, economically, or
ecologically sensitive. It will defend in sanctuaries when necessary. However,
1-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
units of the OPFOR will move out of sanctuaries and attack when they can
create a window of opportunity or when opportunity is presented by physical
or natural conditions that limit or degrade the enemy’s systems.
1-76. OPFOR units do not avoid contact; rather, they often seek contact, but
on their own terms. Their preferred tactics under these conditions would be
the ambush and raid as a means of avoiding decisive combat with superior
forces. They will also try to mass fires from dispersed locations to destroy key
enemy systems or formations. However, when an opportunity presents itself,
the OPFOR can rapidly mass forces and execute decisive combat.
ALLOW NO SANCTUARY
1-77. Along with dispersion, decoys, and deception, the OPFOR uses urban
areas and other complex terrain as sanctuary from the effects of enemy
forces. Meanwhile, its intent is to deny enemy forces the use of such terrain.
This forces the enemy to operate in areas where the OPFOR’s long-range fires
and strikes can be more effective.
1-78. The OPFOR seeks to deny enemy forces safe haven during every phase
of a deployment and as long as they are in the region. It is prepared to attack
enemy forces anywhere on the battlefield, as well as to his strategic depth.
The resultant drain on manpower and resources to provide adequate force-
protection measures can reduce the enemy’s strategic, operational, and tacti-
cal means to conduct war and erode his national will to sustain conflict. The
goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Such
actions will not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national
will, particularly if the OPFOR or affiliated forces can strike targets in the
enemy’s homeland.
OPFOR MILITARY AND OPERATIONAL ART

1-79. The OPFOR embraces the concept that military strategy and opera-
tions are an important part, but not the whole, of the conduct of war. Military
strategy is not separate from politics and political leadership but a means to
support the State in achieving its political objectives. The national security
strategy is essentially a political document that sets forth the goals of the
State and informs military strategists. It is their responsibility to build,
train, and employ forces for the purpose of achieving those political goals.
1-80. When the political leadership makes the decision to employ military
forces to achieve a goal, the military strategy for that employment is closely
associated with diplomatic-political, informational, and economic strategies
to bring about a favorable political result. Thus, the military leadership re-
quires a broad understanding of the overall national strategy, and the politi-
cal leadership needs an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
the military.
MILITARY STRATEGY
1-81. The OPFOR views military strategy as the art of developing the ways
and means for the application of military power to achieve State objectives.
Ways and means encompass the threatened or actual use of force. Military
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doctrine describes fundamental principles and provides guidelines for the use
of military forces in pursuit of national objectives.
1-82. Military and operational art is the theory and practice of conducting
armed conflict. It recognizes that war is a human endeavor and therefore not
amenable to quantifiable formulas that limit thinking and lead to unimagina-
tive and predictable solutions. It is the intellectual and intuitive synthesis of
military doctrine, military science, and intangibles to address the problem at
hand. Military science is not discarded but, like military doctrine, is seen as
providing tools that support the practice of military art. The single, most im-
portant ingredient in the practice of military strategy, and of military and
operational art, is the commander. The commander who develops creative so-
lutions to military problems is highly valued.
1-83. The study and analysis of political and military history has an impor-
tant place in the development of OPFOR military thought and doctrine. The
OPFOR views the role of history and past experience as one that provides in-
sights and observations into the present and future conduct of war. It is a
significant source for the development of new and adaptive ways of conduct-
ing military operations. The OPFOR has developed an effective method for
identifying, analyzing, validating, and applying new concepts. It is an inter-
active process that establishes a partnership between military colleges and
civilian institutions on one side and the active force on the other.
OPERATIONAL ART
1-84. Operational art links tactics and strategy to form a coherent structure
for the conduct of war. Some strategists have traditionally expressed opera-
tional art as the sequencing of battles and engagements so that the collective
outcomes will produce a specified military condition in a theater. Others de-
scribe operational art as the blending of direct and indirect approaches to
achieve necessary conditions in a theater. The OPFOR has developed a style
of operational art that is an amalgam of both theories, capturing the best
from each.
1-85. No particular level of command is uniquely concerned with operational
art. The Chief of the General Staff and the theater commander(s) normally
plan and direct strategic and theater campaigns, respectively, while field
group and operational-strategic command (OSC) commanders normally de-
sign the major operations of a campaign. The OPFOR recognizes the classic
division of warfare between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
However, the boundaries between these levels are not associated so much
with particular levels of command as with the effect or contribution to achiev-
ing strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
OPERATIONAL ART AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-86. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the national security strategy can
involve four types of strategic-level actions: strategic, regional, transition,
and adaptive operations. In specific terms, OPFOR operational art consists of
the sequencing of the actions of military forces to attain strategic goals set
forth within and across this spectrum of strategic-level actions. In practical
terms, this is expressed in the strategic campaign plan.
1-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
1-87. Regional operations are largely conventional actions against a less ca-
pable force. While dealing with such a regional opponent primarily
through offensive means, the State employs its economic, informational,
and diplomatic-political instruments of power in a peacetime, “defensive”
mode against other regional and extraregional parties with whom it is not at
war. This overall strategy constitutes a “strategic defense” that supports the
offensive military operations being conducted in the region while seeking to
preclude outside involvement. The practitioner of operational art must insure
that his plan for use of forces is congruent with the aims of the SCP and vice
versa. The soldier does not view the proper, coordinated use of these other in-
struments of power as a hindrance. From his perspective, their use to influ-
ence an extraregional power not to commit forces or to delay their commit-
ment is the equivalent of having extra divisions.
1-88. Transition and particularly adaptive operations are at the core of what
makes OPFOR military and operational art distinctive, if not unique. The po-
litical and military leadership recognizes that attempts to achieve national
strategic goals through the use of force can result in a military response from
within and outside the region. Strategic plans take this possibility into ac-
count and, depending on the degree of risk, contingencies are planned to ac-
count for such an eventuality.
1-89. Applying the principles of operation versus an extraregional power,
(discussed earlier in this chapter) and taking a “systems warfare” approach,
the State and the OPFOR seek to develop contingency plans that transition
to a “strategic offense” while conducting military operations that are, at least
initially, defensive in nature. The purpose of the strategy is to disaggregate
the enemy’s elements of power through the conduct of strategic operations,
while seeking to disaggregate his combat systems at the operational level.
The ultimate goal is to exhaust the enemy and destroy his will to continue
the fight.
1-90. In preparing contingency plans, the political and military leadership
conducts a detailed analysis to determine major actions that might be taken
by an intervening force to mobilize, deploy, and operate within the region.
Using this analysis (which is continually updated) and the assessed risk, they
further refine the plan. Actions to support the plan, prior to its execution,
could include increasing the readiness of units, organizations, and industry
required to support an intervention scenario. Other actions could include pre-
positioning forces, weapons, and logistics to those areas that support the con-
tingency plan. Plans for strategic operations in support of transition and
adaptive operations are developed while the military operational planners
continue to plan for the employment of tactical forces to achieve the aims set
forth in the strategy. All of this is set against a matrix that identifies key
events that would trigger execution of the contingency.
1-91. Inherent in the concept of adaptive operations is the idea that the op-
erational planner assigns missions and arrays tactical forces in such a way to
support the operation. Although the tactical commander will understand,
from a conceptual context, that he is involved in adaptive operations, from a
tactical perspective that will be transparent. It is through the manner in
which the operational commander arrays and employs his forces that adap-
tive operations are achieved. Tactical commanders are adaptive in the sense
1-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
that they have the flexibility within the missions assigned by the operational
commander and within the techniques and procedures they develop to more
effectively accomplish those missions.
1-92. The OPFOR includes in its planning and execution the use of paramili-
tary forces. It is important to stress that, with the exception of internal security
forces, those paramilitary organizations that are not part of the State structure
and do not necessarily share the State’s views on national security strategy.
THE ROLE OF PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN

OPERATIONS
1-93. Paramilitary forces are those organizations that are distinct from the
regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment, training,
or purpose. Basically, any organization that accomplishes its purpose, even
partially, through the force of arms is considered a paramilitary organization.
These organizations can be part of the government infrastructure or operate
outside of the government or any institutionalized controlling authority.
1-94. In consonance with the concept of “all means necessary,” the OPFOR
views these organizations as assets that can be used to its advantage in time
of war. Within its own structure, the OPFOR has formally established this
concept by assigning the Internal Security Forces, part of the Ministry of the
Interior in peacetime, to the SHC during wartime. Additionally, the OPFOR
cultivates relationships with and covertly supports nongovernment paramili-
tary organizations to achieve common goals while at peace and to have a high
degree of influence on them when at war.
1-95. The primary paramilitary organizations are the Internal Security
Forces, insurgents, terrorists, and drug and criminal organizations. The de-
gree of control the OPFOR has over these organizations varies from absolute,
in the case of the Internal Security Forces, to tenuous when dealing with ter-
rorist and drug and criminal organizations. In the case of those organizations
not formally tied to the OPFOR structure, control can be enhanced through
the exploitation of common interests and ensuring that these organizations
see personal gain in supporting OPFOR goals.
1-96. The OPFOR views the creative use of these organizations as a means of
providing depth and continuity to its operations. A single attack by a terrorist
group will not in itself win the war. However, the use of paramilitary organi-
zations to carry out a large number of planned actions, in support of strategy
and operations, can play an important part in assisting the OPFOR in achiev-
ing its goals. These actions, taken in conjunction with other adaptive actions,
can also supplement a capability degraded due to enemy superiority.
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

1-97. The Internal Security Forces subordinated to the SHC provide support
zone security and collect information on foreign organizations and spies. They
perform civil population control functions and ensure the loyalty of mobi-
lized militia forces. Some units are capable of tactical-level defensive ac-
tions if required. These basic tasks are not all-inclusive, and within their
capability these forces can perform a multitude of tasks limited only by
1-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
the commander’s imagination. While performing these functions, the Inter-

nal Security Forces may be operating within their own hierarchy of com-
mand, or they may be assigned a dedicated command relationship within an
OSC or one of its tactical subordinates.
1-98. During regional operations, the Internal Security Forces may serve to
control the population situated in newly seized territory. They are an excel-
lent source of human intelligence and can provide security for key sites lo-
cated in the support zones. The Internal Security Forces can either augment
or replace regular military organizations in all aspects of prisoner-of-war
processing and control. While continuing their normal tasks in the homeland,
they can assist regular military organizations in the areas of traffic control
and regulation.
1-99. During transition operations, the Internal Security Forces evacuate im-
portant political and military prisoners to safe areas where they can continue
to serve as important sources of information or means of negotiation. Traffic
control and the security of key bridges and infrastructure take on a higher
level of importance as the OPFOR repositions and moves forces transitioning
to adaptive operations. The Internal Security Forces can continue to gather
intelligence from the local population and assist in mobilizing civilians in oc-
cupied territory for the purpose of augmenting OPFOR engineer labor re-
quirements. Finally, the use of qualified personnel to stay behind as intelli-
gence gatherers and liaison with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organiza-
tions can provide the OPFOR an increased capability during the adaptive op-
erations that follow.
1-100. Especially important in the conduct of adaptive operations is the abil-
ity of the Internal Security Forces to free up regular military organizations
that can contribute directly to the fight. The security of support zones within
an OSC area of responsibility is just one example of this concept. Where nec-
essary, some units can augment the defense or defend less critical areas, thus
freeing up regular military forces for higher-priority tasks. Stay-behind
agents working with insurgent, terrorist, and criminal organizations can
contribute by directing preplanned actions that effectively add depth to the
battlefield. Their actions can cause material damage to key logistics and
command and control (C2) assets, inflict random but demoralizing casualties,
and effectively draw enemy forces away from the main fight in response to
increased force-protection requirements.
INSURGENT FORCES
1-101. The OPFOR ensures that the exploitation and use of insurgent forces
operating against and within neighboring countries is an integral part of its
strategic and operational planning. Insurgent forces, properly leveraged, can
provide an added dimension to the OPFOR’s capabilities and provide options
not otherwise available. During peacetime, a careful balance is kept between
covert support for insurgent groups that may prove useful later and overt re-
lations with the government against which the insurgents are operating.
1-102. During peacetime, support to insurgents can consist of weapons, stag-
ing and sanctuary areas within the State, and training by OPFOR SPF. It is
during this time that the OPFOR attempts to cultivate the loyalty and trust
1-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of insurgent groups they have identified as having potential usefulness in

their strategic and operational planning. In all operations of the strategic
campaign, insurgent forces serve as an excellent source of intelligence.
1-103. During the conduct of regional operations, the decision to influence in-
surgents to execute actions that support operations will depend on a number
of factors. If the OPFOR views extraregional intervention as unlikely, it may
choose to keep insurgent participation low. A key reason for making this de-
cision is the potential for those forces to become an opponent once the OPFOR
has accomplished its goals. On the other hand, the OPFOR may plan to have
these groups take part in directly supporting its operations in anticipation of
further support in the case of an extraregional intervention. Insurgent in-
volvement during regional operations may be held to furthering OPFOR IW
objectives by creating support for the State’s actions among the population,
harassing and sniping enemy forces, conducting raids, and assassinating
politicians who are influential opponents of the State. Insurgents can also
serve as scouts or guides for OPFOR regular forces moving through unfamil-
iar terrain and serve as an excellent source of political and military intelligence.
1-104. The usefulness of insurgent forces can be considerable in the event of
extraregional intervention and the decision to transition to adaptive opera-
tions. During transition operations, insurgent forces can support access-
control operations to deny enemy forces access to the region or at least delay
their entry. Delay provides the OPFOR more time to conduct an orderly tran-
sition and to reposition its forces for the conduct of adaptive operations. The
principal means of support include direct action in the vicinity of APODs and
SPODs and along LOCs in the enemy’s rear area. Dispersed armed action for
the sole purpose of creating casualties can have a demoralizing effect and
cause the enemy to respond, thus drawing forces from his main effort.
OPFOR regular forces can coordinate with insurgents, supported by SPF ad-
visors, to execute a variety of actions that support the strategic campaign or a
particular operation plan. Insurgents can support deception by drawing at-
tention from an action the OPFOR is trying to cover or conceal. They can de-
lay the introduction of enemy reserves through ambush and indirect fire,
cause the commitment of valuable force-protection assets, or deny or degrade
the enemy’s use of rotary-wing assets through raids on forward arming and
refueling points and maintenance facilities.
TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

1-105. Through the use of intelligence professionals and covert means, the
OPFOR maintains contact with and to varying degrees supports terrorist and
criminal organizations. During peacetime, these organizations can be useful,
and in time of war they can provide an added dimension to OPFOR strategy
and operations.
1-106. Although the OPFOR recognizes that these groups vary in reliability,
it constantly assesses both their effectiveness and usefulness. It develops re-
lationships with those organizations that have goals, sympathies, and inter-
ests congruent with those of the State. In time of war, it can encourage and
materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute
to the breakdown of civil control within a neighboring country. It can provide
support for the distribution and sale of drugs to enemy military forces, which
1-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
creates both morale and discipline problems within those organizations. The
production of counterfeit currency and attacks on financial institutions help
to weaken the enemy’s economic stability. Coordination with and support of
terrorists to attack political and military leaders and commit acts of sabotage
against key infrastructure (such as ports, airfields, and fuel supplies) add to
the variety and number of threats that the enemy must address. The State
and OPFOR leadership also have the ability to promote and support the
spread of these same kinds of terrorist acts outside the region. However, they
must carefully consider the political and domestic impact of these actions be-
fore making the decision to execute them.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
1-107. The OPFOR defines a system as a set of different elements so con-
nected or related as to perform a unique function not performable by the ele-
ments or components alone. The essential ingredients of a system include the
components, the synergy among components and other systems, and some
type of functional boundary separating it from other systems. Therefore, a
“system of systems” is a set of different systems so connected or related as to
produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone. The OPFOR
views the operational environment, the battlefield, the State’s own instru-
ments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of
complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and com-
ponents.
1-108. Systems warfare serves as a conceptual and analytical tool to assist in
the planning, preparation, and execution of warfare. With the systems ap-
proach, the intent is to identify critical system components and attack them
in a way that will degrade or destroy the use or importance of the overall system.
PRINCIPLE
1-109. The primary principle of systems warfare is the identification and iso-
lation of the critical subsystems or components that give the opponent the
capability and cohesion to achieve his aims. The focus is on the disaggrega-
tion of the system by rendering its subsystems and components ineffective.
While the aggregation of these subsystems or components is what makes the
overall system work, the interdependence of these subsystems is also a poten-
tial vulnerability. Systems warfare has applicability or impact at all three
levels of warfare.
APPLICATION AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

1-110. At the strategic level, the instruments of power and their application
are the focus of analysis. National power is a system of systems in which the
instruments of national power work together to create a synergistic effect.
Each instrument of power (diplomatic-political, informational, economic, and
military) is also a collection of complex and interrelated systems.
1-111. The State clearly understands how to analyze and locate the critical
components of its own instruments of power and will aggressively aim to pro-
tect its own systems from attack or vulnerabilities. It also understands that
an adversary’s instruments of power are similar to the State’s. Thus, at the
1-23
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
strategic level, the State can use the OPFOR and its other instruments of
power to counter or target the systems and subsystems that make up an op-
ponent’s instruments of power. The primary purpose is to subdue, control, or
change the opponent’s behavior.
1-112. If an opponent’s strength lies in his military power, the State and the
OPFOR can attack the other instruments of power as a means of disaggre-
gating or disrupting the enemy’s system of national power. Thus, it is possi-
ble to render the overall system ineffective without necessarily having to de-
feat the opponent militarily.
APPLICATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

1-113. At the operational level, the application of systems warfare pertains
only to the use of armed forces to achieve a result. Therefore, the “system of
systems” in question at this level is the combat system of the OPFOR and/or
the enemy.
Combat System
1-114. A combat system (see Figure 1-5) is the “system of systems” that re-
sults from the synergistic combination of four basic subsystems that are inte-
grated to achieve a military function. The subsystems are as follows:
• Combat forces (such as main battle tanks, IFVs and/or APCs, or infantry).
• Combat support forces (such as artillery, SSMs, air defense, engineers,
and direct air support).
• Logistics forces (such as transportation, ammunition, fuel, rations, main-
tenance, and medical).
• C2 and RISTA (such as headquarters, signal nodes, satellite downlink
sites, and reconnaissance sensors).
1-115. The combat system is characterized by interaction and interdepend-

ence among its subsystems. Therefore, the OPFOR will seek to identify key
subsystems of an enemy combat system and target them and destroy them
individually. Against a technologically superior extraregional force, the
OPFOR will often use any or all subcomponents of its own combat system to
attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system rather than
the enemy’s strengths. For example, attacking the enemy’s logistics, C2, and
RISTA can undermine the overall effectiveness of the enemy’s combat system
without having to directly engage his superior combat and combat support
forces. Aside from the physical effect, the removal of one or more key subsys-
tems can have a devastating psychological effect, particularly if it occurs in a
short span of time.
1-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 1
COMBAT LOGISTICS
FORCES FORCES
Examples: Examples:
Tanks, Transportation,
IFVs/APCs, Ammunition,
Infantry Fuel,
Rations,
Maintenance,
Medical
COMBAT
SYSTEM
COMBAT C2 AND
SUPPORT
FORCES RISTA
Examples: Examples:
Artillery, Headquarters,
SSMs, Signal Nodes,
Air Defense, Satellite Downlinks,
Engineers, Reconnaissance Sensors
Direct Air Support
Figure 1-5. Combat System
Planning and Execution

1-116. The systems warfare approach to combat is a means to assist the
commander in the decision-making process and the planning and execution of
his mission. The OPFOR believes that a qualitatively and/or quantitatively
weaker force can defeat a superior foe, if the lesser force can dictate the terms of
combat. It believes that the systems warfare approach allows it to move away
from the traditional attrition-based approach to combat. It is no longer neces-
sary to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability.
Commanders and staffs will locate the critical component(s) of the enemy com-
bat system, patterns of interaction, and opportunities to exploit this connectivity.
Systems warfare has applications in both offensive and defensive contexts.
1-117. The essential step after the identification of the critical subsystems
and components of a combat system is the destruction or degradation of the
synergy of the system. This may take the form of total destruction of a sub-
system or component, degradation of the synergy of components, or the sim-
ple denial of access to critical links between systems or components. The de-
struction of a critical component or link can create windows of opportunity
that can be exploited, set the conditions for offensive action, or support a con-
cept of operation that calls for exhausting the enemy on the battlefield. Once
the OPFOR has identified and isolated a critical element of the enemy com-
bat system that is vulnerable to attack, it will select the appropriate method
of attack.
1-25
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
1-118. Today’s state-of-the-art combat and combat support systems are im-
pressive in their ability to deliver precise attacks at long standoff distances.
However, the growing reliance of some extraregional forces on these systems
offers opportunity. Attacking critical ground-based C2 and RISTA nodes or
logistics systems and LOCs can have a very large payoff for relatively low in-
vestment and low risk to the OPFOR. Modern logistics systems assume se-
cure LOCs and voice or digital communications. These characteristics make
such systems vulnerable. Therefore, the OPFOR can greatly reduce a military
force’s combat power by attacking a logistics system that depends on “just-in-
time delivery.”
1-119. For the operational commander, the systems warfare approach to
combat is not an end in itself. It is a key component in his planning and se-
quencing of tactical battles and engagements aimed toward achieving as-
signed strategic goals. Systems warfare supports his concept; it is not the
concept. The ultimate aim is to destroy the enemy’s will and ability to fight.
APPLICATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

1-120. It is at the tactical level that systems warfare is executed in attacking
the enemy’s combat system. While the tactical commander may use systems
warfare in the smaller sense to accomplish assigned missions, his attack on
systems will be in response to missions assigned him by the operational
commander.
APPLICATION ACROSS ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC-LEVEL ACTIONS

1-121. Systems warfare is applicable against all types of opponents in all
strategic-level courses of action. In regional operations, the OPFOR will seek
to render a regional opponent’s systems ineffective to support his overall con-
cept of operation. However, this approach is especially conducive to the con-
duct of transition and adaptive operations. The very nature of this approach
lends itself to adaptive and creative options against an adversary’s techno-
logical overmatch.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE C2 PROCESS

1-122. The systems warfare approach to combat is an important part of
OPFOR planning. It serves as a means to analyze the OPFOR’s own combat
system and how it can use the combined effects of this system to degrade the
enemy’s combat system. The OPFOR believes that the approach allows its
decision makers to be anticipatory rather than reactive.
1-26
Chapter 2
Command and Control

This chapter examines the OPFOR system and process of command and
control (C2). It explains how the OPFOR expects to direct the forces and ac-
tions described in other chapters of this manual. It provides insights into the
OPFOR theory and practice of controlling combined arms, joint, interagency,
and multinational forces in war. Most important, it shows how OPFOR com-
manders and staffs think and work.
In modern war, victory is likely to go to the side that acts most quickly.
The overriding need for speedy decisions to seize fleeting opportunities
drastically reduces the time available for decision making and for issuing
and implementing orders. The need to seize opportunities on the battle-
field, coupled with dispersion to avoid the threat of precision weapons,
dictates the replacement of concentration in terms of space by concentra-
tion in terms of time and effects. Moreover, the operational and tactical
situation is subject to sudden and radical changes, and the results of
combat are more likely to be decisive than in the past. OPFOR C2 par-
ticipants, processes, and systems are designed to operate effectively
and efficiently in this new environment. The successful execution of an
information warfare (IW) plan is critical to victory.
Although dealing briefly with strategic control of forces, this chapter fo-
cuses on operational command and control. All OPFOR levels of command
share a common decision-making and planning process. They also share a
parallel staff organization and command post (CP) structure, tailored to
match the differences in scope and span of control.
CONCEPT
2-1. The OPFOR’s C2 concept is grounded in the essential principles of the
States’ process for exercising command and control. At the core of the State’s
C2 concept is the assumption that modern communications are susceptible to
attack and/or monitoring. Accordingly, the State operates from the view that
centralized planning defines the means for assuring both command (estab-
lishing the aim) and control (sustaining the aim). It leads to strategic and op-
erational directions. Necessarily, then, the State relies on the loyalty of its
forces and accords far-ranging authority to act within the aim while foregoing
rigorous control as both unproductive and unlikely in the modern environment.
2-2. For the OPFOR, this concept translates into centralized planning and
decentralized execution, requiring a high degree of initiative at low opera-
tional and tactical levels. The OPFOR not only accepts this condition as neces-
sary, but also considers decentralized execution the essence of its operational
2-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
doctrine. It requires the commander at each level of command to act flexibly,

exercising his judgment as to what best meets and sustains the aim of his
superior. The OPFOR believes that this approach provides an absolute ad-
vantage particularly when operating against a sophisticated enemy equipped
with advanced information technology. This view stems from the conviction
that, if the means to exercise control from the top exists, then there is a dan-
ger that it will be used to the extent that it stifles creativity and initiative.
The OPFOR seeks to avoid this pitfall in its own C2 process, while recogniz-
ing that even sophisticated opponents may fall prey to it. It realizes that sti-
fled initiative and creativity can ultimately preclude such an opponent from
acting decisively or quickly.
PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-3. The OPFOR specifically defines command and control at tactical and
operational levels as the actions of commanders, command groups, and staffs
of military headquarters to maintain continual combat readiness and combat
efficiency of forces, to plan and prepare for combat operations, and to provide
leadership and direction during the execution of assigned missions. The ob-
jective of command is to accomplish the mission. The objective of control is to
attain maximum combat effectiveness from all available resources. To obtain
this objective, the OPFOR identifies several principles of command and control.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING
2-4. OPFOR military art is fundamentally based on a system of political con-
trol and the presumption of loyalty among subordinates who have been pre-
pared for high position in either the civil or military structure. Thus, military
art and the principles of command within the military are closely related to
those found in the political system. Indeed, the State views military capabil-
ity as one of its four instruments of national power. Centralized planning
characterizes the State and its various components, including the military.
DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
2-5. The State accepts that decentralized execution is essential to controlling
the tempo of operations. The OPFOR, therefore, is organized to provide ini-
tiative within the bounds of the aim as stipulated in the planning process.
The OPFOR accepts some risk in this approach, but mitigates that risk in the
planning process by determining branches (accommodations made to the plan
that require diversion from the central plan) and sequels (follow-on opera-
tions in accordance with the plan). This approach depends on clearly stated
aims and delineation of the limits of authority at the each level of command.
It provides considerable flexibility to subordinates and is deemed essential by
the State and the OPFOR for meeting the needs of the modern operational
environment.
DELIBERATE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

2-6. The OPFOR decision-making process consists of five phases: assess,
orient, decide, act, and adapt. (See the section on Decision Making for more
detail.)
2-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

2-7. C2 at each level of command is very similar, designed with the same ba-
sic structure and emphasis on survivability through mobility, redundancy,
and security. The higher the level of command, the larger and more complex
the staff. Supporting each staff is a series of multiple CPs and communica-
tions systems, providing the flexibility required on a highly fluid, lethal
battlefield.
2-8. The professional training of commanders and staffs emphasizes consis-
tency in staff planning procedures at all levels of command. Emphasis on re-
sponsive planning (assisted by automation) in the C2 process has produced a
cadre of professional, highly-trained staff officers. Thoroughly educated in all
aspects of strategy, operations, and tactics, these officers are capable of func-
tioning from the General Staff down to tactical level.
2-9. Operational commanders must be equipped to control the full scope of
combined arms, joint, interagency, and multinational activity. The OPFOR
operational C2 structure is designed to facilitate this control.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-10. OPFOR units are organized using four command and support relation-
ships, summarized in Figure 2-1 and described in the following paragraphs.
These relationships may shift during the course of an operation in order to
best align the force with the tasks required. The general category of subordi-
nate units includes both constituent and dedicated relationships; it can also
include interagency and multinational (allied) subordinates.
Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from
Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining
Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining
Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported
Affiliated Self Self or “Parent” Self Mutual Agreement
Figure 2-1. Command and Support Relationships
2-11. Constituent. Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a

unit and forming an integral part of it. They may be organic to the table of
organization and equipment of the administrative structure forming the ba-
sis of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it
after its formation.
2-12. Dedicated. Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constitu-
ent with the exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support
from a parent organization of similar type. An example of a dedicated unit
would be the case where one or two surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battal-
ions from an SSM brigade could be dedicated to an operational-strategic
command (OSC). Since the OSC does not otherwise possess the technical experts
2-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
or transloading equipment for missiles, the dedicated relationship permits

the SSM battalion(s) to fire exclusively for the OSC while still receiving its
logistics support from the parent SSM brigade. In OPFOR plans and orders,
the dedicated command and support relationship is indicated by (DED) next
to a unit title or symbol.
2-13. Supporting. Supporting units continue to be commanded by and re-
ceive their logistics from their parent headquarters, but are positioned and
given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. This relationship
permits supported units the freedom to establish priorities and position sup-
porting units while allowing higher headquarters to rapidly shift support in
dynamic situations. The supporting unit does not necessarily have to be
within the supported unit’s area of responsibility (AOR). An example of a
supporting unit would be a fighter-bomber regiment supporting an OSC for a
particular phase of the strategic campaign plan (SCP) but ready to rapidly
transition to a different support relationship when the OSC becomes the
theater reserve in a later phase. In OPFOR plans and orders, the supporting
command and support relationship is indicated by (SPT) next to a unit title
or symbol.
2-14. Affiliated. Affiliated organizations are those operating in a unit’s AOR
that the unit may be able to sufficiently influence to act in concert with it for
a limited time. No “command relationship” exists between an affiliated or-
ganization and the unit in whose AOR it operates. Affiliated organizations
are typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal cartels, in-
surgencies, terrorist cells, or mercenaries. In some cases, affiliated forces
may receive support from the OSC as part of the agreement under which
they cooperate. Although there would typically be no formal indication of this
relationship in OPFOR plans and orders, in rare cases (AFL) is used next to
unit titles or symbols.
STRATEGIC-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
2-15. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the prepa-
ration and conduct of strategic campaigns. It also resolves issues regarding
the overall wartime situation of the State and the allocation of strategic re-
sources. The NCA allocates forces and establishes general plans for the con-
duct of national strategic campaigns.
General Staff
2-16. The General Staff is a major link in the centralization of military com-
mand at the national level, since it provides staff support and acts as the ex-
ecutive agency for the NCA. Together with the Ministry of Defense (MOD),
the General Staff forms the Supreme High Command (SHC) in wartime. (See
Figure 2-2.) The General Staff has direct control over the six services, and all
military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff
(CGS) commands the SHC. The General Staff consists of three functional
directorates. These are the Operations, Intelligence, and Organization and
Mobilization directorates.
2-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
NATIONAL
COMMAND
AUTHORITY
MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE
SUPREME
HIGH COMMAND
GENERAL
STAFF
ORGANIZATION &
OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE
MOBILIZATION
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
DIRECTORATE
STRATEGIC SPF INTERNAL

ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE SECURITY
FORCES COMMAND
FORCES
AIR
DEFENSE
FORCES
Figure 2-2. Supreme High Command
2-17. Working with the staffs of each of the services, the Operations Direc-
torate of the General Staff drafts the military SCP for the CGS. Once the
CGS approves the military SCP, it becomes part of the national SCP, and the
General Staff issues it to appropriate operational-level commanders. During
peacetime and preparation for war, the Operations Directorate continues to
review and refine the plan. The military SCP assigns forces to operational-
level commands and designates AORs for those commands.
2-18. During combat operations, the Operations Directorate is responsible,
along with the Intelligence Directorate, for maintaining a continuous esti-
mate of the situation for the SHC. Because of the uncertainties of combat, the
Operations Directorate continually reevaluates the military SCP and modifies it
or develops a new plan based on guidance from the CGS. The Organization and
Mobilization Directorate determines the assets that each component of the mili-
tary needs to execute its portion of the national strategic campaign.
Theater Headquarters
2-19. For the State, a theater is a clearly defined geographic area in which
the OPFOR plans to conduct or is conducting military operations. Within its
region, the State may plan or conduct a strategic campaign in a single thea-
ter or in multiple theaters, depending on the situation. The General Staff
may create one or more separate theater headquarters, even in peacetime,
for planning purposes. However, no forces would be subordinated to such a
headquarters until the activation of a particular SCP.
2-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
2-20. A theater headquarters provides flexible and responsive control of all

theater forces. When there is only one theater, as is typical, the theater head-
quarters may also be the field headquarters of the SHC, and the CGS may
also be the theater commander. Even in this case, however, the CGS may
choose to focus his attention on national strategic matters and to create a
separate theater headquarters, commanded by another general officer, to
control operations within the theater.
2-21. When parts of the strategic campaign take place in separated geographi-
cal areas and there is more than one major line of operations, the OPFOR
may employ more than one theater headquarters, each of which could have
its own theater campaign plan. In this case, albeit rare, the SHC field
headquarters would be a separate entity exercising control over the multiple
theater headquarters.
2-22. Theater command provides flexibility to the OPFOR, since the exis-
tence of one or more separate theater headquarters enables the SHC to fo-
cus on the strategic campaign and sustaining the forces in the field. A
theater headquarters acts to effectively centralize and integrate General
Staff control over theater-wide offensive and/or defensive operations. The
chief responsibility of this headquarters is to exercise command over all
forces assigned to a theater in accordance with mission and aim assigned by
the SHC. A theater headquarters links the operational efforts of the OPFOR
to the strategic efforts and reports directly to the SHC.
Administrative Force Structure

2-23. The OPFOR has an administrative force structure that manages its
military forces in peacetime. This structure is the aggregate of various military
headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations designed to man,
train, and equip the forces. In peacetime, forces are commonly grouped into
corps, armies, or army groups for administrative purposes. An army group
can consist of several armies, corps, or separate divisions and brigades. The
administrative force structure also has responsibility for disaster manage-
ment and support to other State agencies. In some cases, forces may be
grouped administratively under geographical commands designated as
military regions or military districts.1 Normally, these administrative group-
ings differ from the OPFOR’s go-to-war (fighting) force structure.
2-24. The administrative force structure includes all components of the
Armed Forcesnot only regular, standing forces (active component), but also
reserve and militia forces (reserve component). For administrative purposes,
both regular and reserve forces come under the headquarters of their respec-
tive service component. Each of the six service components is responsible for
manning, equipping, and training of its forces and for organizing them within
the administrative force structure.
2-25. If the General Staff or SHC elects to create more than one theater
headquarters, it may allocate parts of the administrative force structure to
each of the theaters, normally along geographic lines. One example would be
to divide Air Force assets into theater air armies. Another would be to assign
1
A military district may or may not coincide with a political district within the State government.
2-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
units from the Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command to each theater, ac-
cording to theater requirements.
2-26. The administrative force structure also includes some assets centrally
controlled at the national level. For instance, major portions of the Air Force,
Navy, Strategic Forces, and the SPF Command often remain under the direct
control of their respective service component headquarters. The Army com-
ponent headquarters may retain centralized control of certain elite units of
the ground forces, including airborne units and Army SPF. This permits
flexibility in the employment of these relatively scarce assets in response to
national-level requirements. In peacetime, the internal security forces are
under the administrative control of the Ministry of the Interior. The pool of
national assets also includes major logistics facilities and installations.
2-27. In wartime, the normal role of administrative commands is to serve as
force providers during the creation of operational- and tactical-level fighting
commands. After transferring control of its major fighting forces to one or
more task-organized fighting commands, an administrative headquarters, facil-
ity, or installation continues to provide depot- and area support-level adminis-
trative, supply, and maintenance functions. (See Chapter 12.) A geographically-
based administrative command also provides a framework for the continuing
mobilization of reserves to complement or supplement regular forces.
2-28. In rare cases, an administrative command could function as a fighting
command. This could occur, for instance, when a particular administrative
command happens to have just the right combination of forces for executing a
particular SCP. Another case would be in times of total mobilization, when
an administrative command has already given up part of its forces to a fight-
ing command and then is called upon to form a fighting command with what-
ever forces remain under the original administrative headquarters.
2-29. Operational-level commands in the administrative force structure that
are called upon to fight will employ the doctrine in this manual. However,
they will not be able to employ joint or interagency forces effectively without
additional training, staff, and C2 systems.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION
2-30. An SCP always contains both military and nonmilitary subordinate actions.
The operational level of command is that which executes military tasks as-
signed directly by an SCP. Operational-level commands translate actions di-
rectly supporting the SCP into an operation plan. The most common OPFOR
operational-level commands are field groups (FGs) and operational-strategic
commands (OSCs).2 Figure 2-3 shows one example of FG and OSC missions
within such a hypothetical SCP.
2
For the OPFOR, military actions above the tactical level will most commonly involve one or more OSCs, but could
possibly involve an FG as an additional level of operational command. In most cases, the statements about an
OSC in this manual would also apply to an FG, if one is created. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, references to
FG will appear only where it is important to make a distinction between the OSC and FG levels.
2-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Neutral Allied
Country Country
Sea
t
res
Un
of
ea
Ar
OSC AOR
Strategic Goal 3
Hostile Strategic Goal 1
Country
“THE STATE”
OSC AOR
OSC AOR OSC AOR
Strategic Goal 1
Sea
Strategic Goals 1+2
FG AOR
LEGEND
Strategic Goals
Sea 1: Coastal Defense
2: Invasion of Hostile Country
3: Neutralization of Unrest
Figure 2-3. Example of FGs and OSCs in an SCP
2-31. There is also the possibility that a division or division tactical group
(DTG) could be directly subordinate to the SHC in the fighting force structure
and thus perform tasks assigned directly by an SCP. In such cases, the OPFOR
would consider the divisions or DTGs to be operational-level commands. More
typically, however, they perform tactical missions as subordinates of an FG or
OSC. (For more detail of divisions and DTGs and their tactics, see FM 7-100.2.)
2-32. The SCP specifies the geographic AOR within which the operational-
level command’s allocated forces are intended to operate. A single SCP could
include more than one strategic goal. Thus, a particular FG or OSC could be
task organized to achieve one or more goals within its assigned AOR.
Field Group
2-33. A field group is the largest operational-level organization, since it has one
or more smaller operational-level commands subordinate to it. An FG is a group-
ing of subordinate organizations with a common headquarters, a common AOR,
and a common operation plan. FGs are always joint and interagency organiza-
tions and are often multinational. However, this level of command may or may
not be necessary in a particular SCP. An FG may be organized when the num-
ber of forces and/or the number of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the
theater commander’s desired or achievable span of control. This can facilitate
2-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
the theater commander’s remaining focused on the theater-strategic level of war

and enable him to coordinate effectively the joint forces allocated for his use.
Sea Neutral Country
XXX
OSC
FG LOR
Mountains
“THE STATE”
XXX Strategic Goal 2: Invasion of
Hostile Country
FG/OSC LOR
OSC Neighboring Country
Sea
XXX
OSC
Strategic Goal 1:
Defense of
Homeland
OR
Field Group A
OSC AOR
Neutral Country
Figure 2-4. Field Group in Control of Multiple OSCs in a Major Military Effort
2-34. The General Staff does not normally form standing FG headquarters,
but may organize one or more during full mobilization, if necessary. An FG
can be assigned responsibilities in controlling forces in the field during adap-
tive operations in the homeland, or forward-focused functionally (an FG may
be assigned an access-control mission). However, FGs may exist merely to ac-
commodate the number of forces in the theater.
2-35. FGs are typically formed for one or more of the following reasons:
• An SCP may require a large number of OSCs and/or operational-level
commands from the administrative force structure. When the number
of major military efforts in a theater exceeds the theater commander’s
desired or achievable span of control, he may form one or more FGs.
(See Figure 2-4.)
• In the rare cases when multiple operational-level commands from the
administrative force structure become fighting commands, they could
come under the command of an FG headquarters. (See Figure 2-5.)
2-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Due to modifications to the SCP, a standing operational-level head-

quarters that was originally designated as an OSC headquarters may
receive one or more additional major operational-level commands from
the administrative force structure as fighting commands. Then the
OSC headquarters would transition into an FG headquarters.
In the first two cases, a separate FG staff would be formed and identified as
having control over two or more OSCs (or operational-level commands from
the administrative force structure) as part of the same SCP. In the third case,
the original OSC headquarters would be redesignated as an FG headquar-
ters. In any case, the FG command group and staff would be structured in
the same manner as those of an OSC.
“THE STATE”
Field
Field
Group
Group
XXXX Sea
XXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

XXXX XXX XXX XXXX XXX
Neutral
Country
Hostile Country Sea
Figure 2-5. Field Groups Consisting of Multiple Operational-Level Commands from

the Administrative Force Structure
Operational-Strategic Command
2-36. The OPFOR’s primary operational organization is the OSC. Once the
General Staff writes a particular SCP, it forms one or more standing OSC
headquarters. Each OSC headquarters is capable of controlling whatever
combined arms, joint, interagency, or multinational operations are necessary
to execute that OSC’s part of the SCP. However, the OSC headquarters does
not have any forces permanently assigned to it.
2-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-37. Figure 2-6 shows an example of allocation of forces to an OSC. The

units allocated from the administrative force structure to form the OSC typi-
cally come from an army group, army, or corps (or perhaps a military district
or military region) or from forces directly subordinate to a service headquar-
ters. There can also be cases where forces from the services have initially
been allocated to a theater headquarters and are subsequently re-allocated
down to the OSC. The organizations shown under the OSC, like those shown
under the theater headquarters in this example, indicate a pool of assets
made available to that command. The commander receiving these assets may
choose to retain them at his own level of command, or he may choose to sub-
allocate them down to one or more of his subordinates for their use in their
own task organization.
THEATER
SPF OTHER OTHER

THEATER
THEATER ARMY
AIR ARMY BRIGADE ASSETS GROUPS
ARMY
OTHER FIGHTER-BOMBER
AIR FORCE AVIATION GROUP
ASSETS DIVISION
FIGHTER-BOMBER
AVIATION OTHER
OTHER AIRBORNE
REGIMENT ARMY ARMY GROUP
ARMIES ASSETS BRIGADE
ARTILLERY
OTHER OTHER MECHANIZED TANK BRIGADE
ARMY INFANTRY
DIVISIONS ASSETS DIVISION
DIVISION
UAV COMBAT SAM SSM

HELICOPTER
SQUADRON BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE
ANTITANK OSC
BRIGADE
OSC MECHANIZED TANK AIRBORNE

HQ INFANTRY DIVISION BRIGADE
DIVISION
LEGEND
Theater assets
resubordinated to
the OSC ARTILLERY
SPF SSM SAM
Army group assets BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE BRIGADE
resubordinated to
the OSC
Army assets
FIGHTER-BOMBER ANTITANK COMBAT UAV
resubordinated to AVIATION HELICOPTER
the OSC REGIMENT BRIGADE BRIGADE SQUADRON
Figure 2-6. Allocation of Forces to an OSC (Example)
2-38. When the NCA decides to execute a particular SCP, each OSC partici-
pating in that plan receives appropriate units from the OPFOR’s administra-
tive force structure, as well as interagency and/or multinational forces.
Forces subordinated to an OSC may continue to depend on the administra-
tive force structure for support.
2-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
2-39. If a particular OSC has contingency plans for participating in more

than one SCP, it could receive a different set of forces under each plan. In
each case, the forces would be task organized according to the mission re-
quirements in the given plan. Thus, each OSC consists of those division-,
brigade-, and battalion-size organizations allocated to it by the SCP currently
in effect. These forces also may be allocated to the OSC for the purpose of
training for a particular SCP. When an OSC is neither executing tasks as
part of an SCP nor conducting exercises with its identified subordinate
forces, it exists as a planning headquarters.
OSC
INTEGRATED INTEGRATED
DTGs DIVISIONS FIRES SUPPORT
COMMAND COMMAND
AIR FORCE MARITIME INTERAGENCY

BTGs BRIGADES UNITS UNITS UNITS
Figure 2-7. Possible OSC Organization (Example)
2-40. Figure 2-7 shows an example of the types of organizations that could
make up a particular OSC organization. The numbers of each type of
subordinate and whether they actually occur in a particular OSC can vary.
As shown in this example, the composition of an OSC is typically joint,
with Air Force and possibly maritime (naval or naval infantry) units,
and it can also be interagency. If some of the allocated forces come
from another, allied country, the OSC could be multinational. The
simplified example of an OSC shown here does not show all the combat
support and combat service support units that would be present in such an
organization. Many of these support units are found in the integrated fires
command (outlined below) and the integrated support command (outlined
below and in Chapter 12). Other support units could be allocated initially
from the administrative force structure to the OSC, which further allocates
them to its tactical subordinates.
2-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-41. Once allocated to an OSC, a division or brigade often receives augmen-

tation that transforms it into a DTG or brigade tactical group (BTG), respec-
tively. However, an OSC does not have to task organize subordinate divisions
and brigades into tactical groups. Most divisions would become DTGs, but
maneuver brigades in the administrative force structure may be sufficiently
robust to accomplish their mission without additional task organization.
2-42. The OPFOR has great flexibility regarding possible OSC organizations
for different missions. There is virtually no limit to the possible permutations
that could exist. The allocation of organizations to an OSC depends on what
is available in the State’s administrative force structure, the mission re-
quirements of that OSC, and the requirements of other operational-level
commands.
TACTICAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
2-43. In the OPFOR’s administrative force structure, the largest tactical-
level organizations are divisions and brigades. In wartime, they are often
subordinate to a larger, operational-level command. However, they may also
be directly subordinate to a theater headquarters or to the SHC. In either
wartime role, a division or brigade may receive additional assets that trans-
form it into a tactical group.
2-44. A tactical group is a task-organized division or brigade that has re-
ceived an allocation of additional land forces in order to accomplish its mis-
sion. These additional forces may come from within the Ministry of Defense,
from the Ministry of the Interior, or from affiliated forces. Typically, these
assets are initially allocated to an OSC or FG, which further allocates them
to its tactical subordinates. If the tactical group operates as a separate com-
mand, it may receive additional assets directly from the theater headquar-
ters or the SHC that are necessary for it to carry out an operational-level
mission. The same higher command that augments a division or brigade to
transform it into a tactical group can also use some units from one divi-
sion or brigade to augment tactical groups based on other divisions or bri-
gades.
2-45. The purpose of a tactical group is to ensure unity of command for all
land forces in a given AOR. Tactical groups formed from divisions are divi-
sion tactical groups (DTGs), and those from brigades are brigade tacti-
cal groups (BTGs).
2-46. If a DTG has a mission directly assigned by an SCP, it acts as an op-
erational-level command. If a DTG has a mission assigned by an intermedi-
ate operational-level command (such as an FG or an OSC), then it acts as a
tactical-level command. In either of those cases, the original division head-
quarters becomes the DTG headquarters.
2-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
INTEGRATED FIRES COMMAND

2-47. The integrated fires command (IFC) is a combination of a standing C2
structure and task organization of constituent and dedicated fire support
units. (See Figure 2-8.) All division-level and above OPFOR organizations
possess an IFC C2 structurestaff, CP, communications and intelligence ar-
chitecture, and automated fire control system (AFCS). The IFC exercises
command of all constituent and dedicated fire support assets retained by its
level of command. This includes aviation, artillery, and missile units. It also
exercises command over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) assets allocated to it.3
OSC
IFC
IFC
HEADQUARTERS
ARTILLERY AVIATION MISSILE SPF

COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT
INTEGRATED
SUPPORT
GROUP
Figure 2-8. Possible IFC Components in an OSC
2-48. The mission of the IFC is to execute all fire support tasks required to
accomplish the unit mission. It is designed to
• Exploit the combat power inherent in carefully integrated ground and
air fire support actions.
• Reduce the amount of time from target acquisition to attack to the ab-
solute minimum.
• Permit fire support assets to mass their effects without having to oper-
ate in concentrated formations.
3
Based on mission requirements, the commander may also allocate maneuver forces to the IFC. This is most often
2
done when he chooses to use the IFC CP to provide C for a strike, but can also be done for the execution of other
missions.
2-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
• Ensure the optimal fire support asset(s) are assigned any given mission.
• Ensure the commander’s priorities for fire support are adhered to.
• Act, if necessary, as the organization’s alternate command structure.
• Integrate the effects of fires from units placed in support of the
organization.
2-49. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an
IFC is mission-dependent. The IFC is not organized according to a table of
organization and equipment, but is task organized to accomplish the mis-
sions assigned.
IFC Headquarters
2-50. The OSC IFC headquarters, like the overall OSC headquarters, exists
in peacetime in order to be ready to accommodate and exercise C2 over all
forces made subordinate to it in wartime. The IFC headquarters is composed
of the IFC commander and his command group, a RISTA and IW section, an
operations section, and a resources section. (See Figure 2-9.)
IFC
COMMANDER
IFC COMMAND GROUP

DEPUTY
COMMANDER
CHIEF
OF
STAFF
RISTA/IW OPERATIONS RESOURCES

SECTION SECTION SECTION
FIRE SUPPORT
COORDINATION
CENTER
Figure 2-9. IFC Headquarters
2-51. The deputy commander (DC) of the OSC serves as IFC commander.
The RISTA and IW section provides the complete spectrum of intelligence
and IW support for the IFC. The operations section provides the control, co-
ordination, and communications for the headquarters. Located within the op-
erations section is the fire support coordination center (FSCC). To ensure the
2-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
necessary coordination of fire support and associated RISTA, the operations

section of the IFC headquarters also includes liaison teams from subordinate
units. The resources section provides control and coordination of various
logistics and administrative support functions.
Artillery Component
2-52. The artillery component is a task organization tailored for the conduct
of artillery support during combat operations. In an OSC’s IFC, it is typically
organized around one or more artillery brigades, or parts of these that are
not allocated in a constituent or dedicated relationship to tactical-level sub-
ordinates. The artillery component includes appropriate target acquisition,
C2, and logistics support assets.
2-53. The number of artillery battalions assigned to an IFC varies according
such factors as mission of friendly units, the enemy situation, and terrain.
However, the number of artillery units also can vary based on the capabili-
ties of the supporting AFCS. For example, a multiple rocket launcher (MRL)
brigade AFCS can have enough command and staff vehicles for the brigade
commander and his chief of staff, as well as the subordinate commanders of
battalions and up to 18 batteries (6 battalions). An AFCS supporting a can-
non, MRL, or mortar battalion may consist of enough command and staff ve-
hicles to support 3 to 4 batteries (each consisting of 4 to 8 systems).
Aviation Component
2-54. The aviation component is a task organization tailored for the conduct
of aviation operations. The aviation component is task organized to provide a
flexible and balanced air combat organization capable of providing air support to
the OSC commander. It may be organized around an Air Force aviation
regiment or an air army, or parts of these, as required by the mission. It may
also include rotary-wing assets from army aviation. It includes ground attack
aviation capability as well as requisite ground and air service support assets.
The IFC commander exercises control through facilities provided by the airspace
operations subsection of the OSC staff and/or the aviation unit(s).
Missile Component
2-55. The missile component is a task organization consisting of long-range
missiles or rockets capable of delivering conventional or nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) munitions. It is organized around an SSM or rocket bat-
talion or brigade and includes the appropriate logistics support assets. Mis-
sile and rocket units may come from the Strategic Forces or from other parts
of the administrative force structure (where they may be part of a corps,
army, or army group).
2-56. The State considers the long-range rocket and missile capability, even
when delivering conventional munitions, the responsibility of the NCA. For
example, the SHC or theater commander may allocate Strategic Forces as-
sets to an IFC in order to use long-range missiles and rockets to advance
State political ends during regional, transition, or adaptive operations. Un-
able to mount robust air campaigns, the State can use these weapons to
mount an equivalent effort.
2-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Special-Purpose Forces Component

2-57. The SPF component normally consists of assets from an SPF brigade.
Personnel of such a brigade are specially trained for insertion in small SPF
teams. These assets provide the OPFOR the ability to attack both regional
and extraregional enemies throughout their tactical, operational, and strate-
gic depth. SPF assets are inserted in advance of regional operations and in
support of transition and adaptive operations. They are an essential part of
the concept of using all means necessary and are critical to access-control
operations. SPF assigned to the Army, Air Force, and Navy are designed for
use at the operational level. The national-level SPF Command has its own
SPF units.
2-58. The SPF conduct operations to achieve strategic military, political, eco-
nomic, and/or psychological objectives or achieve tactical or operational goals
in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have either long-
range or immediate impact on the enemy. The OPFOR concept of SPF opera-
tions includes reconnaissance, direct action, and diversionary measures. The
SPF component of the IFC has a capability to support terrorist and irregular
forces operations.
2-59. If an OSC has received SPF units, it may further allocate some of these
units to supplement the long-range reconnaissance assets a division or DTG
has in its own IFC. However, the scarce SPF assets normally would remain
at OSC level.
Integrated Support Group

2-60. The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units perform-
ing logistics tasks that support the IFC. Other combat support and combat
service support units may be grouped in this component for organizational ef-
ficiency although they may support only one of the major units of the IFC.
The ISG is discussed in detail in Chapter 12. It can perform the same func-
tions as the integrated support command (see below and in Chapter 12), but
on a different scale and tailored to the support requirements of the IFC.
INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND

2-61. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat ser-
vice support units (and perhaps some combat support units) allocated from
the administrative force structure to an OSC and not suballocated in a con-
stituent or dedicated command relationship to a subordinate headquarters
within the OSC. The OSC further allocates part of its combat service support
units to its tactical-level subordinates and some, as an ISG, to support its
IFC. The rest remain in the ISC at OSC level to provide overall support of
the OSC. For organizational efficiency, other combat service support units
may be grouped in this ISC, although they may support only one of the major
units of the OSC. Sometimes, an ISC might also include units performing
combat support tasks (such as chemical warfare, IW, or law enforcement)
that support the OSC. (See Chapter 12 for more detail on the ISC.)
2-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZING THE OPERATIONAL BATTLEFIELD

2-62. The OPFOR organizes the battlefield in such a way that it can rapidly
transition between offensive and defensive operations and between linear
and nonlinear operations. This flexibility can help the OPFOR adapt and
change the nature of the conflict to something for which the enemy is not
prepared.
Battlefield Geometry
2-63. The OPFOR recognizes the complexity of the modern battlefield. This
will often lead to situations where part of the OPFOR may be able to effec-
tively operate in a linear fashion, while other parts may be able to (or need
to) conduct nonlinear operations. The OPFOR’s understanding of what makes
a battlefield linear or nonlinear is based on general military theory accepted
by the armed forces of many countries. Battlefield geometry can be described
in two dimensions: the relationship of units to each other, the enemy, and
their support base; and the expected effects of that relationship.
2-64. Linear Operations. Some military operations develop along a secure
line from a base toward a geographically-based objective. These linear opera-
tions are characterized by an easily definable front and rear across the entire
force. Orientation of the bulk of the force is in one general direction, defined
as the front, normally facing the enemy and/or the objective. (See Figure 2-
10.) During linear operations, the flanks of units are normally protected by
other units, natural terrain features, or manmade obstacles.
Rear Front
X
Base
Objective
X
Enemy
Figure 2-10. Linear Operations
2-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Objective X
Enemy
Base Enemy
Objective
Figure 2-11. Nonlinear Operations
2-65. Nonlinear Operations. Military operations that seek to complete a

force- or systems-based mission, with no secure connection to a base and no
easily defined front and rear across the force, are nonlinear. Orientation of
the force is determined by the location of the immediate threat or the objec-
tive. (See Figure 2-11.) In most cases, units in a nonlinear environment rely
on movement, deception, cover, and concealment to provide protection for po-
tentially exposed portions of the force.
2-66. Expected Effects. The OPFOR considers the difference between lin-
ear and nonlinear operations less in terms of geography and more in terms of
effects desired. Linear operations normally produce small effects from small
actions and large effects from large actions (or perhaps large effects from an
aggregation of small actions)a linear relationship. Linear operations are
proportional and additive, and typically produce a predictable, measurable
effect. In contrast, this relationship may not always be present in nonlinear
operations, which can produce large effects from small actions. In some cases,
small actions produce small effects or no effects at all. Thus, nonlinear opera-
tions produce disproportionate, often unpredicted effects.
2-67. The OPFOR believes the worst of all possible situations is for a force to
be operating in a linear mode against an enemy that can operate freely
throughout the battlespace with excellent situational awareness and signifi-
cant forces and fires. The OPFOR seeks, as a base case, to create such a
situation for its enemies.
2-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Areas of Responsibility
2-68. OPFOR organizations are given a specific area of responsibility. An
AOR is a clearly defined geographic area with associated airspace. An AOR is
bounded by a limit of responsibility (LOR) beyond which the organization
may not operate or fire without coordination through the next-higher head-
quarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear in nature (see Figures. 2-12 and
2-13 for examples; see Chapters 3 and 4 for additional examples). Linear
AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa.
2-69. AORs normally consist of three basic zones: the battle zone, the
disruption zone, and the support zone. An AOR may also contain one or
more attack and/or kill zones. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature.
These zones have the same basic purposes within each type of offensive and
defensive operation (see Chapters 3 and 4). The size of these zones depends
on the size of the OPFOR units involved, engagement ranges of weapon sys-
tems, the terrain, and the nature of the enemy’s operation.
2-70. An AOR is not required to have all of these zones in any particular
situation. A particular command might have a battle zone and no disruption
zone. It might not have a battle zone, if it is the disruption force of a higher
command. If it is able to forage, it might not have a support zone. (See exam-
ples in Figure 2-13.)
OSC
LOR
Support Battle Disruption

Zone Zone Zone
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OSC
LOR
Attack Zone
OSC
LOR Axis Objective
Kill
Zone
Support Battle
Line Line
OSC
LOR
Figure 2-12. Linear AOR Example
2-71. Within the overall LOR, the OPFOR normally refers to two types of
control lines. The battle line separates the battle zone from the disruption
zone. The support line separates the support zone from the battle zone. LORs
give maximum latitude to the subordinate commander. Within the LOR, the
2-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
commander has the flexibility to do as he sees fit unless the higher com-
mander also assigns a kill zone, which he proposes to support with additional
resources.
2-72. An operation plan or directive normally defines AORs and zones by
specifying boundary lines in terms of distinct local terrain features through
which a line passes, specifying whether each terrain feature is included or
excluded from the unit’s AOR or zones within it. Normally, a specified terrain
feature is included unless the order identifies it as “excluded.”
2-73. In either linear or nonlinear operations, military reason normally dic-
tates a contiguous force deployment. The OPFOR does not recognize the idea
of “‘noncontiguous operations.” Senior OPFOR commanders ensure that all
parts of a theater are within the assigned AOR of some subordinate organiza-
tion, whether or not ground forces are actually present or expected to operate
in any given area. A given AOR or zone might be not be contiguous with
other AORs of its level of command or with other zones of the same type, but
the geographic area between such control measures will be identified as be-
ing in the AOR of some other organization.
DTG OSC
Battle Line LOR
OSC
DTG LOR
Support Line
DTG
Battle Zone Atta DTG
c
DTG
LOR
Zon k AOR
e
DTG Support
AOR Zone Objective
Enemy
SPOD
ay
Highw Support
Enemy DTG Zone Kill
APOD Battle Zone Zone Sea
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

DTG/B
TG
LOR
DTG
OSC
Disruption TG
Zone /B Disruption
G R
DT LO Zone
l
Kil
ne
Zo
BTG
AOR
a y
hw
Hig
OSC
LOR
Figure 2-13. OSC Nonlinear AOR Example
2-74. In his operation plan, the commander specifies the organization of the
battlefield from the perspective of his level of command. Within his unit’s
AOR, as defined by the next-higher commander, he designates AORs for his
subordinates, along with zones, objectives, and axes related to his own over-
all mission. (See Chapter 3 for further discussion of objectives and axes.)
Whether the overall operation plan is offensive or defensive in nature, some
2-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate units are likely to be occupying defensive battle positions. (See

Chapter 4 for further discussion of simple and complex battle positions.)
2-75. Disruption Zone. The disruption zone is where the OPFOR sets the
conditions for successful operations by beginning the attack on the compo-
nents of the enemy combat system. A successful disruption zone operation
can create a window of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone. In
the disruption zone, the OPFOR attacks specific components of the enemy’s
combat system in order to begin the breakdown of the system. For example,
attack of all enemy engineer forces can leave a maneuver force unable to con-
tinue effective combat operations in complex terrainexposing them to de-
struction by forces in the battle zone. Actions of forces in the disruption zone
are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Disruption zones may be contiguous or non-
contiguous with other disruption zones, or they may be “layered.”
2-76. Battle Zone. The battle zone is the portion of the AOR where the
OPFOR expects to conduct decisive operations. Using all components of its
combat power, the OPFOR will engage the enemy and defeat him in this
zone. Units operating in the battle zone can have various missions and objec-
tives, depending on the nature of the overall offensive or defensive operation
(see Chapters 3 and 4).
2-77. An FG or OSC does not form an operational-level battle zone per
sethat zone is the aggregate of the battle zones of its subordinate units. In
a nonlinear operation, multiple, noncontiguous battle zones may exist, and
within each a certain task would be assigned to the OPFOR unit or units
charged to operate in that space. The battle zone provides the commander of
each of those units the battlespace in which to frame his operations.
2-78. Support Zone. The support zone is that area of the battlespace de-
signed to be free of significant enemy action and to permit the effective logis-
tics and administrative support of forces. Security forces operate in the sup-
port zone in a combat role to defeat enemy special operations forces and other
threats. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures oc-
cur throughout the support zone to protect the force from standoff RISTA and
precision attack. The OSC support zone may be dispersed within the support
zones of subordinate tactical units, or the OSC may have its own support
zone that is separate from subordinate AORs. The support zone may be in a
sanctuary that is noncontiguous with other zones of the AOR.
2-79. Attack Zone. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an of-
fensive mission, to delineate clearly where forces will be conducting offensive
maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a subor-
dinate unit inside a larger defensive operation.
2-80. Kill Zone. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the
OPFOR plans to destroy a key enemy target, usually by fires. A kill zone may
be within the disruption zone or the battle zone. In defensive operations, it
could also be in the support zone.
2-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF

2-81. Within the C2 structure, the headquarters includes the command group
and the staff. (See Figure 2-14.) These elements perform the functions re-
quired to control the activities of forces preparing for and conducting combat.
The primary functions of headquarters are to
• Make decisions.
• Plan combat actions that accomplish those decisions.
• Acquire and process the information needed to make and execute effec-
tive decisions.
• Support the missions of subordinates.
The commander exercises C2 functions through his staff and subordinate
commanders.
Command Group
2-82. The command group consists of the commander, deputy commander,
and chief of staff. Together, they direct and coordinate the activities of the
staff and of subordinate forces.
2-83. Commander. The commander directs subordinate commanders and,
through his staff and liaison teams, controls any supporting units. OPFOR
commanders have complete authority over their subordinates and overall re-
sponsibility for those subordinates’ actions. This centralized authority en-
ables the commander to maintain troop discipline and unity and to act deci-
sively. Under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even in the course of
carefully planned operations, the commander must accomplish assigned mis-
sions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above.
2-84. The commander is responsible for the combat capability of subordinate
units, the organization of combat operations, the maintenance of uninter-
rupted C2, and the successful conduct of combat missions. He examines and
analyzes the mission he receives (that is, he determines his forces’ place in
the senior commander’s concept of operations). He may do this alone or
jointly with the chief of staff. He then gives instructions to the chief of staff
on preparing his forces and staff for combat. He also provides instructions
about the timing of preparations. The commander makes his own assessment
of intelligence data supplied by the intelligence officer. Then, with advice
from the primary staff officers, he makes an assessment of his own forces.
After discussing his deductions and proposals with the operations officer
and his staff, the commander reaches a decision, issues combat missions to
subordinates, and gives instructions about planning the operation. He then
directs coordination within his organization and with adjacent forces and
other units operating in his AOR.
2-85. During the course of operations, the commander must constantly
evaluate the changing situation, predict likely developments, and issue new
combat missions in accordance with his vision of the battlefield. He also
keeps his superiors informed as to the situation and character of friendly and
enemy actions and his current decisions.
2-23
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMANDER
Command Group
Deputy
Commander
Commanders of
Chief Subordinate
of Forces
Staff
Primary Staff
Intelligence Operations Resources

Officer Officer Officer
Secondary Staff
Chief of Chief of Chief of

Current
Reconnaissance Operations Logistics

Information Future
Warfare Operations Administration
Chief of Chief of
Airspace
Communications Operations
Functional Staff

Integrated Special-Purpose Population
Fires Operations Management

Force WMD Infrastructure
Protection Management
Chief of
Littoral
Warfare
Figure 2-14. OSC Command Group and Staff
2-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-86. Deputy Commander. In the event the commander is killed or inca-

pacitated, the DC would assume command. Barring that eventuality, the
DC’s primary responsibility is to command the OSC’s IFC. As IFC com-
mander, he is responsible for executing operational-level fire support in a
manner consistent with the commander’s intent.
2-87. Chief of Staff. Preeminent among OPFOR staff officers is the chief of
staff position (found at every level from the General Staff down to battalion).
He exercises direct control over the primary staff. During combat, he is in
charge of the main CP when the commander moves to the forward CP. He
has the power to speak in the name of the commander and DC, and he nor-
mally countersigns all written orders and combat documents originating from
the commander’s authority. He alone has the authority to sign orders for the
commander or DC and to issue instructions in the commander’s name to sub-
ordinate units. In emergency situations, he can make changes in the tasks
given to subordinate commanders. Thus, it is vital that he understands
not merely the commander’s specific instructions but also his general con-
cept and train of thought. He controls the battle during the commander’s ab-
sences.
2-88. The chief of staff is a vital figure in the C2 structure. His role is to serve
as the director of staff planning and as coordinator of all staff inputs that as-
sist the commander’s decision making. He is the commander’s and DC’s focal
point for knowledge about the friendly and enemy situation. He has overall
responsibility for providing the necessary information for the commander to
make decisions. Thus, he plays a key role in structuring the overall recon-
naissance effort to meet the commander’s information requirements.
Staff
2-89. A staff provides rapid, responsive planning for combat activity, and
then coordinates and monitors the execution of the resulting plans on behalf
of the commander. Proper use of this staff allows the commander to focus on
the most critical issues in a timely manner and to preserve his energies.
2-90. The staff releases the commander from having to solve administrative
and technical problems, thereby allowing him to concentrate on the battle.
The primary function of the staff is to plan and prepare for combat. Evalua-
tion and knowledge of the situational elements of combat is fundamental to
the decision-making process and the direction of troops. After the commander
makes the decision, the staff must organize, coordinate, disseminate, and
support the missions of subordinates. Additionally, it is their responsibility to
train and prepare troops for combat, and to monitor the pre-combat and combat
situations.
2-91. In the decision-making and planning process, the staff—
• Prepares the data and estimates the commander uses to make a deci-
sion.
• Plans and implements the basic measures for comprehensive support
of a combat action.
• Organizes communications with subordinate and adjacent headquar-
ters and the next-higher staff.
2-25
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Monitors the activities of subordinate staffs.

• Coordinates ongoing activity with higher-level and adjacent staffs
during an operation.
2-92. All operational-level headquarters have the same basic organization,
although each differs in size and complexity. The higher the level, the larger
and more complex the staff. Therefore, the organization of command and
staff elements is similar at theater, FG, or OSC.
2-93. The staff consists of three elements: the primary staff, the secondary
staff and the functional staff. Figure 2-14 depicts the primary, secondary,
and functional staff officers of an OSC headquarters; it does not show the li-
aison teams, which support the primary, secondary, and functional staff.
Primary and Secondary Staff

2-94. Each member of the primary staff heads a staff section. Within each
section are two or three secondary staff officers heading subsections subordi-
nate to that primary staff officer.
2-95. Operations Officer. The operations officer heads the operations
section, and conducts planning and prepares operation plans and operational
directives. Thus, the operations section is the principal staff section. It
includes current operations, future operations, and airspace operations
subsections, as well as the functional staff.
2-96. The operations officer is responsible for training and the formulating of
plans and orders. He monitors the work of all other staff sections, remains
knowledgeable of the current situation, and is ready to present information
and recommendations concerning the situation. He writes combat orders and
important combat reports. In coordination with the information section, the
operations officer keeps the commander informed on the progress of the op-
eration. Specific duties of the operations section include—
• Assisting the commander in the making and execution of combat decisions.
• Collecting information concerning the situation of friendly forces.
• Preparing and disseminating operational directives, plans and reports,
summaries, and situation overlays.
• Providing liaison for the exchange of information within the headquar-
ters and with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
• Organizing the main CP.
• Organizing troop movement and traffic control.
• Coordinating the organization of reconnaissance with the information section.
2-97. The chief of current operations is a secondary staff officer who proac-
tively monitors the course of current operations and coordinates the actions of
forces to ensure execution of the commander’s intent. He serves as the represen-
tative of the commander, chief of staff, and operations officer in their absence
and has the authority to control forces in accordance with the operation plan.
2-98. The chief of future operations is a secondary staff officer who heads the
planning staff and ensures continuous development of future plans and pos-
sible branches, sequels, and contingencies. While the commander and the
2-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
chief of current operations focus on the current operation, the chief of future op-
erations and his subsection monitor the friendly and enemy situations and their
implications for future operations. They try to identify any developing situations
that require command decisions and/or adaptive measures. They advise the
commander on how and when to make adjustments to the operation plan during
the fight. Planning for various contingencies and anticipated opportunities can
facilitate immediate and flexible response to changes in the situation.
2-99. The chief of airspace operations (CAO) is a secondary staff officer who
is responsible for the control of the OSC’s airspace. See Chapters 8 and 9 for
further information on his duties.
2-100. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence
and information section, which consists of the reconnaissance subsection, the
IW subsection, and the communications subsection. The intelligence officer is
responsible for the acquisition, synthesis, analysis, dissemination, and protec-
tion of all information and intelligence related to and required by the OSC’s
operations. He ensures the commander’s intelligence requirements are met.
He provides not only intelligence on the current and future operational envi-
ronment, but also insight on opportunities for adaptive and creative re-
sponses to ongoing operations. The intelligence officer works in close coordi-
nation with the chief of future operations to establish feedback and input for
future operations and the identification of possible windows of opportunity.
2-101. The intelligence officer also formulates the OSC’s IW plan and must
effectively task organize his staff resources to conduct and execute IW in a
manner that supports the strategic IW plan. He is responsible for the coordi-
nation of all necessary national or theater level assets in support of the IW
plan and executes staff supervision over the IW and communications plans.
He is supported by three secondary staff officers: the chief of reconnaissance,
the chief of IW, and the chief of communications.
2-102. The chief of reconnaissance develops collection plans, gathers
information, and evaluates data on the battlefield situation. During combat,
he directs the efforts of subordinate reconnaissance units and reconnaissance
staff subsections of subordinate units. Specific responsibilities of the
reconnaissance subsection include—
• Collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on the enemy, terrain,
and weather to the commander and subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.
• Organizing reconnaissance missions, including requests for aerial re-
connaissance, in coordination with the operations section and in sup-
port of the IW plan.
• Preparing the reconnaissance plan, in coordination with the operations section.
• Preparing the reconnaissance portion of operation plans and opera-
tional directives.
• Preparing intelligence reports.
• Supervising the exploitation of captured enemy documents and materiel.
• Supervising interrogation and debriefing operations throughout the command.
• Providing targeting data for long-range fires.
2-27
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
2-103. The chief of information warfare is responsible supervising the execu-

tion of the OSC’s IW plan. (Chapter 5 details the components of the IW plan.)
These responsibilities include
• Coordinating the employment of IW assets, both those constituent to
the OSC and those available at the national or theater level.
• Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
• Supervising the implementation of the deception and perception man-
agement plans.
• Working with the operations staff to ensure that targets scheduled for
destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving conflicts between
IW needs and operational needs.
• Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
2-104. The chief of communications develops a communications plan for the

command that is approved by the intelligence officer and chief of staff. He or-
ganizes communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters.
The communications subsection plans the use of all forms of communications, to
include satellite communications (SATCOM), wire, radio, digital, cellular, and
couriers, to ensure that the commander has continuous and uninterrupted
control. Specific responsibilities of the communications subsection include
• Establishing SATCOM and radio nets.
• Establishing call signs and radio procedures.
• Organizing courier and mail service.
• Operating the command’s message center.
• Supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of signal equipment.
2-105. An additional and extremely important role of the communications of-

ficer is to ensure the thorough integration of joint, interagency, and allied
forces into the OSC’s C2 structure. The OSC headquarters is permanently
equipped with a full range of C2 systems compatible with each of the services
of the State’s Armed Forces as well as with government agencies commonly
operating as part of OSCs (such as special police or border guard units that
were originally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior). Other govern-
ment agencies and allied partners are also the responsibility of the communi-
cations officer and he plans and provides for their C2 integration.
2-106. Resources Officer. The resources officer is responsible for the requi-
sition, acquisition, distribution, and care of all of the command’s resources,
both human and materiel. He ensures the commander’s logistics and admin-
istrative requirements are met and executes staff supervision over the com-
mand’s logistics and administrative procedures. (Sustainment procedures are
detailed in Chapter 12.) He is supported by two secondary staff officers: the
chief of logistics and the chief of administration. One additional major task of
the resources officer is to free the commander from the need to bring his
influence to bear on priority logistics and administrative functions. He is also
the officer in charge of the sustainment CP.
2-28
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-107. The chief of logistics heads the logistics system. He is responsible for
managing the order, receipt, and distribution of supplies to sustain the com-
mand. He is responsible for the condition and combat readiness of armaments
and related combat equipment and instruments. He is also responsible for their
supply, proper utilization, repair, and evacuation. He oversees the supply and
maintenance of the command’s combat and technical equipment. These respon-
sibilities encompass the essential wartime tasks of organizing and controlling
the command’s recovery, repair, and replacement system. During combat, he
keeps the commander informed on the status of the command’s equipment.
2-108. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and
transactions in the command. His subsection maintains daily strength re-
ports and TO&E changes; assigns personnel; requests replacements; records
losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and dis-
poses of war booty.
Functional Staff
2-109. The functional staff consists of experts in a particular type of military
operation or function (see Figure 2-15). These experts advise the command
group and the primary and secondary staff on issues pertaining to their indi-
vidual areas of expertise.
Operations
Officer

Chief of
Integrated Force Special-Purpose
WMD
Fires Protection Operations

Population Infrastructure Littoral
Management Management Warfare
Figure 2-15. OSC Functional Staff
2-110. In peacetime, the functional staff is a cadre with personnel assigned

from appropriate branches and services. It has enough personnel to allow
continuous 24-hour capability and the communications and information
management tools to allow them to support the commander’s decision-
making process and exercise staff supervision over their functional areas
throughout the AOR. In wartime, the functional staff receives liaison teams
from subordinate and supporting units that perform tasks in support of those
functional areas.
2-29
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
2-111. Chief of Integrated Fires. The chief of integrated fires is responsi-

ble for integrating C2 and RISTA means with fires and maneuver. He works
closely with the OSC chief of reconnaissance and the IFC staff. He also coor-
dinates with the chief of IW to ensure that deception and protection and se-
curity measures contribute to the success of the fire support to offensive and
defensive operations.
2-112. Chief of Force Protection. The chief of force protection is responsi-
ble for coordinating activities to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile ac-
tions against OPFOR personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information.
This protection includes air, space, and missile defense; NBC defense; defensive
IW; counterterrorism; counterreconnaissance; and engineer survivability
measures. This subsection works closely with those of the chief of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and the chief of IW. Liaison teams from internal se-
curity, air defense, chemical defense, and engineer forces provide advice within
their respective areas of protection.
2-113. Chief of Special-Purpose Operations. The chief of special-purpose
operations is responsible for planning and coordinating the actions of SPF
units allocated to an OSC. When possible, this subsection receives liaison
teams from any affiliated forces that act in concert with the SPF.
2-114. Chief of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The chief of WMD is re-
sponsible for planning the offensive use of WMD. This functional staff ele-
ment receives liaison teams from any subordinate or supporting units that
contain WMD delivery means.
2-115. Chief of Population Management. The chief of population man-
agement is responsible for coordinating the actions of Internal Security
Forces, as well as psychological warfare, perception management, civil affairs,
and counterintelligence activities. There is always a representative of the Minis-
try of the Interior, and frequently one from the Ministry of Public Information.
This subsection works closely with the chief of IW and receives liaison teams
from psychological warfare, civil affairs, counterintelligence, and Internal Secu-
rity Forces units allocated to the OSC or operating within the OSC’s AOR.
2-116. Chief of Infrastructure Management. The chief of infrastructure
management is responsible for establishing and maintaining roads, airfields,
railroads, hardened structures (warehouses and storage facilities), inland
waterways, ports, and pipelines. He coordinates with the OSC resources offi-
cer regarding improvement and maintenance of supply and evacuation
routes. He exercises staff supervision or cognizance over the route construc-
tion and maintenance functions of both civil and combat engineers operating
in the OSC’s AOR. He coordinates with civilian agencies and the OSC chief of
communications to ensure adequate telecommunications support.
2-117. Chief of Littoral Warfare. The chief of littoral warfare is responsi-
ble for planning and coordinating coastal defense and amphibious operations.
His subsection includes liaison teams from not only naval and naval infantry
units, but also any ground forces, aviation, air defense, airborne, SPF, or af-
filiated forces that participate in or support the coastal defense or amphibi-
ous operation. He also coordinates with border guard units assigned to patrol
coastal border areas.
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Liaison Teams
2-118. Liaison teams support the staff with detailed expertise in the mission
areas of their particular branch or service and provide direct communications
to subordinate and supporting units executing missions in those areas. Liaison
team leaders speak for the commanders of their respective units. Liaison teams
to OSCs are organized with a liaison team leader, two current operations officers
or senior NCOs and two plans officers or senior NCOs. This gives liaison teams
the ability to conduct continuous operations and simultaneously execute current
plans and develop future plans. The staff would also receive liaison teams from
multinational and interagency subordinates and from affiliated forces.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS

2-119. C2 is a continuous process at all levels of command. The OPFOR rec-
ognizes five elements in this process:
• Acquiring and processing information.
• Decision making.
• Planning.
• Preparation.
• Execution.
ACQUIRING AND PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
2-120. Acquiring and processing information is always the first function in
the C2 process. This function is a continuous, active process of requesting, re-
ceiving, collating, analyzing, and disseminating information commanders and
staffs need for decision making and planning. However, the physical collec-
tion of information is not actually part of the C2 process.
2-121. An operational-level commands receives information collected at
higher and lower levels, as the information relates to its own requirements.
Likewise, operational-level commands pass information to both those levels
to meet strategic or tactical information requirements.
Strategic-Level Information Requirements

2-122. At the General Staff level and above, military and political informa-
tion requirements are global in scope. The OPFOR has a continuous re-
quirement to evaluate changes in the military or political capabilities and in-
tentions of foreign nations in relation to the State. The accuracy of these as-
sessments can directly influence the selection of strategic military and politi-
cal goals, the structure of the State’s Armed Forces, and the strategic concept
for using military power.
Operational-Level Information Requirements

2-123. FG and OSC staffs are the focal points for detailed situation evalua-
tion and large-scale planning for combat units. Therefore, they have a par-
ticularly heavy demand for information to support the decision-making and
planning process. To function efficiently, operational-level staffs require high-
resolution data on both enemy and friendly forces. Required periodic and special
reporting is the primary source of detailed, accurate, and timely information on
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
friendly forces. The availability and timeliness of such friendly force data de-
pends largely on the availability and efficiency of the necessary communica-
tions links. On the other hand, acquiring information on the enemy involves
collecting and reporting in a hostile environment. Operational staffs must
analyze conflicting and incomplete data and assess and correlate intelligence
provided by higher headquarters.
Tactical-Level Information Requirements

2-124. The commander and staff must bring together all available data ap-
plicable to their mission and use the data skillfully to achieve their objec-
tives. At a minimum, these data include information on enemy and friendly
forces, the combat environment, and the population in the AOR.
2-125. Enemy. Of these elements, information about the enemy is the most
important. An OPFOR commander must have continuous, reliable informa-
tion about the enemy’s effective combat strength and organization to conduct
forces analysis. He must receive information concerning enemy locations, re-
inforcing units, C2 systems, and defensive positions. Information pertaining
to the disposition and potential use of precision weapons is important. The
required degree of detail will vary in different situations and at various lev-
els of command. Constant attention is given to identifying enemy deception
efforts. The OPFOR emphasizes multi-spectral collection efforts to reduce the
potential effects of the enemy’s deceiving a single RISTA asset.
2-126. Friendly Forces. Information about friendly forces is necessary to
help the commander determine how best to use them and to identify re-
quirements for coordination. OPFOR planners consider training status when
making qualitative calculations of relative strengths of their own and enemy
forces. In addition, they must consider how missions of other friendly forces
may affect the accomplishment of their own assigned tasks.
2-127. Combat Environment. The NBC environment, terrain, weather,
and climatic and seasonal conditions also provide OPFOR planners insight as
to what they can and cannot do effectively during a combat action. Planners use
this information to determine routes, use of NBC weapons, and types of camou-
flage. This information can also help determine the effects these factors could
have on friendly actions and on the enemy’s possible courses of action.
2-128. Population. The economic and sociopolitical makeup of the AOR in-
terests OPFOR military planners. Information about potentially hostile, neu-
tral, and friendly populations in the AOR enables the OPFOR to exploit local
resources and to plan appropriate levels of security and perception manage-
ment strategies to manipulate the population.
DECISION MAKING
2-129. The military decision-making process consists of five phases: assess,
orient, decide, act, and adapt. These phases are not completely independent
processes or stages of thought. Each phase overlaps and relies on the others.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Assess
2-130. The command group and staff develop estimates across the compo-
nents of the combat system, including combat, combat support, C2, RISTA,
and logistics forces. There are three separate purposes served by the assess-
ment process, including
• Develop situational awareness of forces and means at the disposal of
the OPFOR and the enemy.
• Determine possible enemy weaknesses.
• Develop an understanding of OPFOR requirements.
2-131. The assessment phase requires the staff elements responsible for the
discrete components of the combat system to conduct analysis and synthesis.
Typically the analysis includes
• Mission. The commander must understand the senior commander’s
concept of the campaign or operation and his own command’s role in it.
• Time and Space. The OPFOR considers time a factor it can use to its
advantage and prefers to exercise patience if that will achieve the goal.
The OPFOR views time as an ally in developing a strategy of exhaust-
ing the enemy in pursuit of the State’s goals.
• Environment. In the assessment of the environment, the OPFOR
includes terrain, population, and other physical dimensions of the
battlespace.
• Capabilities and Intentions. This is not limited to the immediate
opponent, but includes all relevant regional and global actors.
• Opportunities and Risks. In its decision making, the OPFOR at-
tempts to identify both risks and opportunity posed by the environ-
ment, time and space, or capabilities and intentions of other actors.
Orient
2-132. The orientation step or phase in the process enables the commander to
direct preparatory steps prior to determining his aim or making his final de-
cision. He first examines the mission given his unit and determines what
tasks must be performed to accomplish this mission. This phase also includes
activating RISTA assets to develop information requirements identified in
the assessment of the situation. Typically, the orientation phase would in-
clude preliminary instructions appropriate to the assessment of the situation.
If the assessment phase reveals shortfalls or information requirements es-
sential to reaching a final decision, orienting the command group, staff, and
units enables the OPFOR to develop “pace” prior to final decision. This phase
requires coordination with appropriate civilian authorities at the higher
echelons, particularly in support of transition operations or adaptive operations.
During the orientation phase, the commander and his staff develop several
courses of action and compare them, attempting to refine the information re-
quired for decision.
Decide
2-133. In the “decide” step, the commander determines his aim or decision
and communicates his concept for execution. He includes his directions for
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
sustaining the aim. Typically, sustaining the aim involves assigning re-
sources and developing parameters for execution that define the limits of
subordinates’ discretion. In communicating his thinking, the commander al-
ways includes branches and sequels that he is able to anticipate. In establishing
the aim, he remains focused on the mission that he was assigned, but does so
in the context of the systems warfare approach to combat and how he may best
achieve the ends envisioned in his mission. He attempts to reach a choice that
enables the OPFOR to operate successfully by defeating an opponent through
disaggregating one or more components of the enemy combat system. Conse-
quently, the OPFOR is not very interested in classic calculations of correlation of
military forces, but more in finding a way to produce disproportionate effects.
2-134. When the commander has selected a base course of action with appro-
priate branches and sequels, he provides this decision to his staff for further
planning and for dissemination of the finalized missions to the troops. The
decision includes the concept, missions for major subordinates, the organiza-
tion of forces, and the organization of the AOR. The components of the deci-
sion are the following:
2-135. Objective (Subordinate Unit Missions). The commander deter-
mines the objective of the operation and the missions to be assigned to con-
stituent and dedicated forces. This part of the decision defines the priorities
for supporting and affiliated forces.
2-136. Opportunity. The commander describes how the unit will achieve
the necessary window of opportunity to execute the plan. This includes meas-
ures for protecting the force from standoff attack as well as creating or taking
advantage of an enemy vulnerability.
2-137. Method (Concept of Operations). The commander describes by
what means to accomplish the task or mission. He organizes the battlefield
and his forces. He lays out the method by which the OSC will support the
theater or national IW campaign.
2-138. End State. The commander describes his vision for how the operation
ends on OPFOR terms. He also describes how this operation sets the stage
for follow-on operations.
Act
2-139. On the basis of the available data and the recommendations from the
staff, the commander makes a decision. The decision may be one of the rec-
ommended courses of action, a combination of two or more recommendations,
or a new solution. The commander can also keep the more promising non-
selected variants as contingency plans.
2-140. Commanders avoid using stereotyped patterns that would make en-
emy templating and targeting easier. To aid in deception, they may create
courses of action that appear on the surface as established fighting methods
but are actually something else.
Adapt
2-141. Operational-level decision making is highly flexible. This flexibility
comes from mission-type orders from the General Staff (or SHC or theater
2-34
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
headquarters) to the operational-level commands. The staff structure pro-

vides operational-level commanders the capability for rapid situation as-
sessment and decision making.
2-142. Since operational planning occurs well in advance, it would be difficult
for the enemy to disrupt the initial decision making and planning. However,
the operational-level commanders and staffs are continually updating and
adapting the operation plan. The OPFOR uses IW measures to help ensure
that the OPFOR commander has sufficient time to acquire and process in-
formation on the combat situation.
PLANNING
2-143. The commander conveys his decision to the chief of staff, who, with his
subordinates, fleshes it out with detailed planning tailored to the circum-
stances of the operation and the terrain. The chief of staff issues detailed,
precise orders for the initial phase of an operation only. At this point, there
usually is not enough hard data to allow an accurate forecast of how the
situation will develop. The plan includes intelligence, the commander’s deci-
sion, limits of responsibility, the missions of flanking forces, the missions of
combat support and combat service support units, coordinating instructions,
and the deployment of CPs.
2-144. Planning usually begins with the receipt of preliminary instructions
for execution of the SCP. The planning process is continuous and will be af-
fected by changes in the battlefield situation, amendments to orders and di-
rectives, or assignment of new missions. Situational intensity dictates the
planning method used.
2-145. Central to OPFOR planning is the concept of opportunity. In transition
or adaptive operations, the OPFOR recognizes that it will often be operating
in conditions where it is overmatched by enemy technological superiority. In
these conditions, the OPFOR will plan and conduct deliberate operations to
create windows of opportunity in which to operate proactively with freedom
of maneuver from enemy RISTA and standoff attack. Each OPFOR plan in-
cludes specific instructions to subordinate units concerning how this oppor-
tunity will be achieved and utilized.
2-146. Examples of means by which the OPFOR can create opportunity are
• IW activities, including selective denial of enemy situational understanding.
• Use of complex terrain.
• Freedom-of-movement operations (such as feints, ruses, demonstra-
tions, or ambushes).
Planning Framework
2-147. The military SCP developed and issued by the General Staff directs
operational-level military forces. Each operational-level command identified in the
SCP prepares an operation plan that supports the execution of its role in that SCP.
2-148. From the General Staff down through the operational and tactical lev-
els, the staff of each military headquarters has an operations directorate or
section that is responsible for planning. The plan at each level specifies the
AOR and task organization of forces allocated to that level of command, in
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
order to best accomplish the mission assigned by a higher headquarters.

Once the commander at a particular level approves the plan, he issues it to
the subordinate commanders who will execute it. Figure 2-16 illustrates the
framework for planning from the national level down through military chan-
nels to the operational and tactical levels.
Decision-Making Staff
Executing
(Plan-Approval) Planning Plan
Organizations
Authority Organization
Strategic Level
National
National Strategic
Strategic All State
Command Integration
Campaign Ministries
Authority Department
Plan
Military
Chief of Operations Strategic Armed
General Staff Directorate Campaign Forces
Plan
Theater Forces
Theater Operations
Campaign Allocated to
Commander Directorate
Plan Theater
Operational Level
Forces
Field Group Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
Field Group
Forces
OSC Operations Operation
Allocated to
Commander Section Plan
OSC
Tactical Level
Forces
Tactical-Level Operations Allocated to
Battle Plan
Commander Section Tactical-Level
Command
Figure 2-16. State and OPFOR Planning Framework
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
Planning Factors
2-149. Planning factors serve as a basis for staff calculations and as meas-
ures against which to test and assess troops and units. The OPFOR sees
these planning factors as guides in planning rather than figures to which one
must adhere rigidly in all circumstances.
2-150. The OPFOR views planning factors as practical expressions of the re-
lationships dictated by military common sense and the principles of war. Op-
erations planning factors include space and time factors concerning the mis-
sions of forces and their areas of combat activity. For example, such planning
factors establish parameters for the time available to take advantage of a
window of opportunity, the space required to disperse forces, and the number
of ambushing forces necessary to ensure a key target is destroyed. The basis
for these planning factors is a close study of potential adversaries, military
history, field training exercises, and military simulations. The resulting plan-
ning factors are tailored to the makeup of OPFOR organizations, their
capabilities, enemy capabilities, and conditions on the modern battlefield.
2-151. Planning factors also express timeliness and quantitative and qualita-
tive factors. Examples include normal expenditures of ammunition to destroy
a given target, rates of fuel consumption under specific conditions, and the
number of halts in a road march of a given duration. Such factors ensure a
uniform and objective approach to expected performance in combat and a
standard for evaluating the training level of personnel and units.
Forces Analysis
2-152. For determining the amount and type of force required to accomplish
a given mission (for planning purposes), OPFOR planners use a very detailed
method known as forces analysis. This involves qualitative calculations of the
relative strengths of their own and enemy forces. Forces analysis includes study
of opponents previous military operations and the historical trends for application
of military power at all levels. Vulnerabilities and strengths are assessed for
potential exploitation by OPFOR operational forces. Forces analysis is seldom a
simple one-to-one comparison of combat systems. It involves an examination of
the enemy’s entire combat system and the linkages of military forces to national
strategies. By determining the relationships of the systems that give a military
force its strength the OPFOR can determine where, and now much combat
power to apply for desired effects. The results of forces analysis are used to rec-
ommend to the commander the organization of forces and the battlefield, as well
as to identify any shortfalls in the available components of combat power.
Advances in Planning
2-153. Advances in information technology have resulted in changes in the
OPFOR’s planning process. Some of the advances have resulted in the fielding of
new hardware providing increased capabilities, while others caused changes in how
the OPFOR conducts operations. The following paragraphs address these factors.
2-154. Timeliness. The high pace of modern combat imposes time con-
straints on the OPFOR decision-making process and planning cycle.
Commanders must expect the situation to be subject to sudden, sharp
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
changes, or to be shrouded in obscurity and ambiguity. As a result, there may

be insufficient time to produce and disseminate intelligence and to formulate
and issue plans and orders.
2-155. Timely and rapid information collection and reporting are critical to
ensuring that commanders have constant, up-to-date knowledge of the situa-
tion. To be successful, the commander must be able to react swiftly to
changes, while updating subordinate unit missions.
2-156. To OPFOR decision makers and planners, time assumes a role of un-
paralleled importance on the battlefield. The effectiveness of their C2 is in-
separably linked to the ability to make and implement decisions that allow
the OPFOR to control the pace of combat.
2-157. Commanders and staffs must plan their available time carefully. The
OPFOR emphasizes parallel planning and action at all levels. Even when less
time is available for planning, it works out plans in as much detail as possible.
2-158. Staff Procedures. While the time available for making and commu-
nicating decisions has decreased, the quantity of information collected has
increased dramatically. Improved reconnaissance systems have increased the
volume of information to be processed and analyzed. Despite this information
explosion, commanders must still be able to make rapid decisions while
guarding against information overload and a resulting slowdown of the
decision-making process.
2-159. The OPFOR has increased automation of the staff calculations sup-
porting the decision-making and planning processes. Automation extends the
use of prepared calculations and formulas, while reducing paperwork.
OPFOR staff procedures are streamlined to provide commanders with more
time to prepare their forces for combat. The issuance of preliminary instruc-
tions outlining the broad concept of operations, along with the acceptance of
subordinates’ initiative, allows subordinate staffs to use parallel planning.
2-160. Detailed Planning. When the commander decides on the final con-
cept of operations, the staff begins detailed planning. Detailed planning is a
prerequisite for success. Modern combined arms, joint, interagency, and multi-
national operations integrate the actions of many types of forces and combat
equipment, as well as diverse support requirements. In terms of detail, OPFOR
planning considers forces an echelon below the immediately subordinate units to
which it assigns tasks in the operation plan. Thus, planning in an OSC with
division-size subordinates looks at brigade-level requirements in detail.
PREPARATION
2-161. Preparation links planning and execution. The commander supervises
the preparations of his subordinates, either personally or through his DC or
chief of staff. He issues instructions and directives.
Dissemination of Missions
2-162. The dissemination of missions to subordinates is a critical C2 task.
The commander usually establishes the general procedures of staffs and
other headquarters for disseminating missions to the troops. However, the chief
of staff is the main organizer for carrying out this work. He must accomplish
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
this quickly, in order to give subordinate commanders and staffs, and units
as well, sufficient time to prepare for their combat missions. In order to de-
crease the time this task requires, the OPFOR applies technology, such as
graphic display panels and other sophisticated signal equipment.
2-163. Disseminating mission-type information concerning upcoming or
planned combat activity occurs at several points in the decision-making and
planning process. At any level, preliminary instructions from higher-level
commanders first present this information in general outline, allowing sub-
ordinate commanders and staffs to begin preliminary planning (as part of the
decision-making process). Only when they receive the senior commander’s fi-
nal decision in operational directives can lower-level commanders decide on
their own final concept of the operation. The process at a given level ends
when commanders issue combat orders to their own subordinates.
2-164. Preliminary Instructions. The means by which commanders can
make the earliest possible dissemination of information concerning an up-
coming operation are preliminary instructions. These instructions contain the
missions of the subordinate units and the higher commander’s general concept
of operations. These normally serve as a vehicle to provide the outline of the
commander’s decision, basic information on the situation, and the mission for
which the receiving headquarters should begin planning. These instructions
may revise a previous order or issue a new, time-sensitive mission. Similar to a
warning order in the U.S. Army, they allow subordinate units to prepare for the
flurry of activity demanded of headquarters on receipt of a new mission. They
enable subordinate headquarters to begin their planning process concurrently
with the higher command levels. The commander may issue preliminary in-
structions to subordinates in either oral or written form. However, it is normal
to transmit preliminary instructions by electronic, secure-voice means rather
than in written form.
2-165. Operation Plan. Operational-level commands prepare operation
plans to control execution of their portion of an SCP. The operation plan must
• Optimally allocate forces and resources to each mission.
• Provide concrete methods to coordinate the actions of maneuver, fire
support, and logistics support.
• Provide for a specific sequence and methods for conducting each sub-
task required to assure mission success.
From the completed operation plan, the staff creates operational directives or
combat orders to inform subordinates of their missions, roles, and time re-
quirements for executing the plan.
2-166. The operation plan details the commander’s thinking and reflects the
input of various subordinates and staff elements according to their functional
responsibilities. It normally includes the following specific areas:
• Assessment of the enemy situation and probable intentions.
• Scope, aim, and concept of operations.
• Organization of forces.
• Organization of the battlefield.
• Results of forces analysis.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Plan for commitment of reserves.

• Missions of subordinate units.
• Missions of supporting and adjacent units.
• Plan for logistics support.
• Locations of CPs.
2-167. The operation plan includes a varying number of annexes. There are
normally annexes for C2, SPF, airborne landings, preparation and occupation
of assembly areas, and movement routes, among others.
Execution Orders
2-168. After planning and preparation, it is time to issue directives and or-
ders for execution of the planned operation. The commander may continue to
revise and re-issue these during the course of the operation.
2-169. Operational Directive. An operational directive contains complete
information for accomplishing a particular mission. Commanders issue op-
erational directives during the course of an operation to implement upcoming
phases of the operation plan, implement a foreseen contingency, or to effect
changes in the operation plan. Time constraints necessitate heavy dependence
on verbal dissemination of missions and planning guidance. The operational-
level staff usually issues a formal, written directive to supplement the verbal
instructions the commander has already issued.
2-170. The operational-level staff may also prepare and issue annexes to op-
erational directives. If annexes are incomplete when the staff transmits the
directive, it sends them out separately to prevent delay in dissemination of
the directive. Types of annexes include coordination requirements, recon-
naissance, IW, force protection, communications, fire support, logistics, and
counterattack plans.
2-171. Combat Orders. Commanders at all levels issue combat orders both
during combat and during the preparation for combat. The orders are de-
signed to direct a unit to perform a specific task or to adjust a former mis-
sion. Combat orders typically include an estimate of the enemy situation, the
new (or revised) mission, the support available from the commander for the
mission, and the time when the unit must be ready to execute the task. Be-
cause they are time-sensitive, combat orders are usually disseminated orally
either by radio or in person.
Rehearsals
2-172. Rehearsals are an integral part of OPFOR preparation for combat.
OPFOR commanders expect all key phases of an operation to be well re-
hearsed using the most realistic means possible. OPFOR staffs take action to
relieve subordinate units of other time pressures to permit the maximum
time for rehearsals and other combat checks during preparation. OPFOR
commanders often forego planning detail in order to spend time with key
subordinates during their rehearsals.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
EXECUTION
2-173. Planning and preparation are important, but they alone are not suffi-
cient for success. The enemy’s actions can have a dynamic effect on executing
plans. Friction and uncertainty can distort the best of plans, imposing new
realities on the situation. Dealing with those realities is the art of execution.
Planned Flexibility
2-174. Operational-level C2 is highly flexible. This flexibility comes from mis-
sion-type orders from the General Staff (or SHC or theater headquarters) to
the operational-level commands. The staff structure provides operational-
level commanders the capability for rapid situation assessment and decision
making. A standardized, streamlined process, using automated support, pro-
duces the decision and the accompanying plans to implement it.
2-175. Since operational planning occurs well in advance, it would be difficult
for the enemy to disrupt the initial decision making and planning. However,
the operational-level commanders and staffs are continually updating of the
operation plan. By limiting a commander’s time to plan, an enemy could force
the OPFOR staff to forsake the preferable parallel or sequential planning
methods for less desirable executive planning. The OPFOR uses IW meas-
ures to help ensure that the OPFOR commander has sufficient time to ac-
quire and process information on the combat situation.
2-176. Planning continues during execution. The process of forecasting and
modeling the commander began in his decision process usually has produced
a series of variants, or contingency plans, which the commander can imple-
ment without completely changing his concept of operations. Such planning
also accounts for a range of probable enemy responses to OPFOR combat
actions. Each variant, however, must allow the achievement of the assigned
mission by the designated time; this aspect of the plan is not subject to
contingency planning.
Monitoring Execution and Sustaining the Aim

2-177. Issuing directives does not ensure they will be carried out or under-
stood. The OPFOR places great emphasis on supervision after the directive is
issued. The chief of staff is responsible to the commander for the overall or-
ganization of staff supervision. Each staff section is responsible for checking
on the execution of the directives it prepares and also ensuring that subordi-
nates have correctly understood the directives. The chief of staff may issue
additional directives, with the operational commander’s approval, to resolve
any misunderstandings.
2-178. Proper supervisory control takes many forms. These include observa-
tion from air and ground observation points, and instructions and questions
passed by radio, wire, or messenger. The preferred method is personal
contact. The OSC commander may personally supervise the most important
combat action. In fast-moving situations, control is somewhat looser. Subor-
dinate commanders then react as the situation dictates, realizing they are re-
sponsible for acting in accordance with the commander’s concept.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND POSTS
2-179. The OPFOR plans to exercise strategic, operational, and tactical con-
trol over its wartime forces from an integrated system of CPs. It has designed
this system to ensure uninterrupted control of forces.
2-180. CPs are typically formed in three parts: a control group, a support
group, and a communications group. The control group includes members of
the command group and staff. The support group consists of the transport
and logistics units. Whenever possible, the communications group, is remoted
from the control and support groups, because of its large number of signal vans,
generators, and other special vehicles that would provide a unique signature.
2-181. Because the OPFOR expects its C2 to come under heavy attack in war-
time, its military planners have created a CP structure that emphasizes sur-
vivability through dispersal, stringent security measures, redundancy, and
mobility. They have constructed a CP system that can sustain damage with
minimum disruption to the actual C2 process. In the event of disruption, they
can quickly reestablish control. This extensive system of CPs extends from
the hardened command facilities of the NCA to the specially designed com-
mand vehicles from which OPFOR tactical commanders control their units.
Most operational-level CPs have been designed to be very mobile and smaller
than comparable enemy CPs. The number, size, and types of CPs depend on
the level of command.
COMMAND POST TYPES

2-182. OPFOR ground forces use five basic and three special types of CPs.
Not all levels of command use all types at all times. (See Figure 2-17, where
parentheses indicate that a type of CP may or may not be employed at a cer-
tain level.) The redundancy provided by multiple CPs helps to ensure that
the C2 process remains survivable.
Basic Special
Sustainment CP
Deception CP
Alternate CP
Auxiliary CP
Airborne CP
Forward CP
Main CP
IFC CP
Level of
Command
OSC X X X X (X) (X) (X) (X)
Field Group* X X (X) X X (X) (X) (X)
Theater* X X (X) X X (X) (X) (X)
* When formed.
Figure 2-17. Command Post System
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-183. FGs and OSCs can use the same basic types of CPs (main, IFC, for-
ward, sustainment, and airborne). FG and OSC airborne CPs may be aboard
fixed-wing aircraft. However, helicopters are more likely to serve this pur-
pose at OSC level.
2-184. A theater headquarters normally deploys main, IFC, and sustainment
CPs. An airborne CP will always be available to the theater commander. A
theater forward CP may be established. The main CP at this level may ini-
tially be in permanent, hardened bunkers; the other CP types may be at less-
protected sites. The airborne CP is most likely aboard fixed-wing aircraft.
2-185. For brevity, OPFOR plans and orders may use acronyms for the
various types of CP. Thus, main CP may appear as MCP, integrated fires
command CP as IFC CP, forward CP as FCP, sustainment CP as SUSCP,
airborne CP as AIRCP, alternate CP as ALTCP, auxiliary CP as AUXCP,
and deception CP as DCP.
Main Command Post

2-186. The main CP generally is located in a battle zone or in a key sanctu-
ary area or fortified position. It contains the bulk of the staff. The chief of
staff directs its operation. Its primary purpose is to simultaneously coordi-
nate the activities of subordinate units not yet engaged in combat and plan
for subsequent missions. The particular emphasis on planning in the main
CP is on the details of transitioning between current and future operations.
The main CP is the focus of control. It is less mobile and much larger than
the forward CP. It makes use of hardened sites when possible.
2-187. The chief of staff directs the staff in translating the commander’s deci-
sions into plans, directives, and orders. He also coordinates the movement
and deployment of all subordinate units not yet in combat and monitors their
progress and combat readiness. In addition to the chief of staff, personnel
present at the main CP include the liaison teams from subordinate, supporting,
allied, and affiliated units, unless their presence is required in another CP.
IFC Command Post

2-188. The DC directs the IFC from the IFC CP. The IFC CP possesses the
communications, airspace control, and automated fire control systems re-
quired to integrate RISTA means and execute long-range fires. Each secon-
dary staff subsection and some functional staff subsections have an element
dedicated to the IFC CP. The IFC CP includes liaison teams from fire sup-
port, army aviation, and Air Force units. The IFC CP is typically separated from
the main CP. Also for survivability, the various sections of the IFC headquarters
that make up the IFC CP do not necessarily have to be located in one place.
Forward Command Post

2-189. An OSC commander often establishes a forward CP with a small
group of selected staff members. Its purpose is to provide the commander
with information and communications that facilitate his decisions. The for-
ward CP is deployed at a point from which he can more effectively and per-
sonally observe and influence the operation. The need for this is less likely at
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
the FG and theater levels. This CP is mobile, but at the operational level may
consist of a large number of command vehicles.
2-190. The personnel at the forward CP are not permanent. The assignment
of officers to accompany the commander is dependent on the mission, situa-
tion, availability of officers, communications, and transport means. Officers
who may accompany the commander include the operations officer and the
chief of reconnaissance. Other primary and or secondary staff officers may
also deploy with the forward CP, depending on the needs of the situation.
The secondary staff contains enough personnel to man the forward CP with-
out degrading its ability to man the main or IFC CPs.
2-191. When formed, and when the commander is present, the forward CP is
the main focus of command, though the chief of staff (remaining in the main
CP) has the authority to issue directives in the commander’s absence.
Sustainment Command Post

2-192. The resources officer establishes and controls the sustainment CP.
This CP is deployed in a position to permit the supervision of execution of
sustainment procedures and the movement of support troops, typically in the
support zone. It contains staff officers for fuel supply, medical support, com-
bat equipment repair, ammunition supply, clothing supply, food supply, pris-
oner-of-war, and other services. It interacts closely with the subordinate
units to ensure sustained combat capabilities. In nonlinear operations, mul-
tiple sustainment CPs may be formed.
Airborne Command Post

2-193. To maintain control in very fluid situations, when subordinates are
operating over a wide area, or when the other CPs are moving, a commander
may use an airborne CP. This is very common in higher-level commands and
typically employs fixed-wing aircraft above OSC level.
Alternate Command Post

2-194. The alternate CP provides for the assumption of command should the
CP containing the commander be incapacitated. The alternate CP is a desig-
nation given to an existing CP and is not a separately established entity. The
commander establishes which CP will act as an alternate CP to take com-
mand if the main (or forward) CP is destroyed or disabled. For example, the
commander might designate the IFC CP as the alternate CP during an op-
eration where long-range fires are critical to mission success. For situations
that require reconstituting, he might designate the sustainment CP instead.
Alternate CPs are also formed when operating in complex terrain, or if the
organization is dispersed over a wider area than usual and lateral communi-
cation is difficult.
Auxiliary Command Post

2-195. At OSC and FG levels, the operational commander may create an aux-
iliary CP to provide C2 over subordinate units operating on isolated or remote
axes. He may also use it in the event of disrupted control or when he cannot
adequately maintain control from the main CP. An officer appointed at the
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
discretion of the commander mans it. The auxiliary CP may also find uses at
the theater level, when subordinate forces may be far from the main CP.
Deception Command Post

2-196. As part of the overall IW plan, the OPFOR very often employs decep-
tion CPs. These are complex, multi-sensor-affecting sites integrated into the
overall deception plan to assist in achieving battlefield opportunity by forcing
the enemy to expend command and control warfare (C2W) effort against
meaningless positions.
COMMAND POST MOVEMENT

2-197. Plans for relocating the CPs are prepared by the operations section.
The CPs are deployed and prepared in order to ensure that they are reliably
covered from enemy ground and aerial reconnaissance, or from attack by en-
emy raiding forces.
2-198. Commanders deploy OSC CPs in depth to facilitate control of their
AORs. During lengthy moves, CPs may bound forward along parallel routes,
preceded by reconnaissance parties that select the new locations. Normally,
the main and forward CPs do not move at the same time, with one moving
while the other is set up and controlling operations. During an administra-
tive movement, when there is little or no likelihood of contact with the en-
emy, a CP may move into a site previously occupied by another CP. However,
during a tactical movement or when contact is likely, the OPFOR does not
occupy a site twice, because to do so would increase the chances of an enemy
locating a CP. While on the move, CPs maintain continuous contact with
subordinates, higher headquarters, and flanking organizations. During
movement halts, the practice is to disperse the post in a concealed area, cam-
ouflaging it if necessary and locating radio stations and special vehicles some
distance from the control and support groups. Because of dispersion in a mobile
environment, CPs are often responsible for their own local ground defenses.
2-199. During the movement of a main CP, the OPFOR maintains continuity
of control by handing over control to either the forward or airborne CP or,
more rarely, to the alternate CP. Key staff members often move to the new
location by helicopter to reduce the time spent away from their posts. Before
any move, headquarters’ troops carefully reconnoiter and mark the new
location. Engineer preparation provides protection and concealment.
COMMAND POST LOCATION

2-200. The OPFOR locates CPs in areas affording good concealment, with
good road net access being a secondary consideration. It situates CPs so that
no single weapon can eliminate more than one. Remoting communications
facilities lessens the chance of the enemy’s locating the actual CP by radio
direction finding.
2-201. During some particularly difficult phases of an operation, where close
cooperation between units is essential, the forward CP of one unit may be col-
located with the forward or main CP of another. Examples are the commit-
ment of an exploitation force, the execution of a strike, or the passing of one
organization through another.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND POST SECURITY

2-202. Security of CPs is important, and the OPFOR takes a number of
measures to ensure it. CPs are a high priority for air defense protection. Ideally,
main CPs also locate near reserve forces to gain protection from ground at-
tack. Nevertheless, circumstances often dictate that they provide for their
own local defense. Engineers normally dig in and camouflage key elements.
2-203. Good camouflage, the remoting of communications facilities, and the
deployment of alternate CPs make most of the C2 structure fairly survivable.
Nevertheless, one of the most important elements, the forward CP, often re-
mains vulnerable. It forms a distinctive, if small, grouping, well within en-
emy artillery range, even at OSC level. The OPFOR therefore typically pro-
vides key CPs with sufficient engineer and combat arms support to protect
them from enemy artillery or special operations raids.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

2-204. The OPFOR commander’s C2 requirements are dictated generally by
the doctrine, tactics, procedures, and operational responsibilities applicable
to commanders at higher echelons. Battlefield dispersion, mobility, and in-
creasing firepower under conventional or WMD conditions require reliable,
flexible, and secure command and control.
2-205. Expanding C2 requirements include the need for
• High mobility of combat headquarters and subordinate units.
• Rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of information as the ba-
sis for planning and decision making.
• Maintaining effective control of forces operating in a hostile IW envi-
ronment.
Supporting communications systems, which are the principal means of C2,
must have a degree of mobility, reliability, flexibility, security, and surviv-
ability comparable to the C2 elements being supported.
2-206. Modern warfare has resulted in a shift away from large formations
arrayed against one another in a linear fashion, to maneuver warfare con-
ducted across large areas with more lethal, yet smaller, combat forces. C2 must
provide the reliable, long-range communications links necessary to control
forces deployed over greater distances. In order to move with the maneuver
forces, the communications systems must be highly mobile.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-207. The chief characteristics of communications supporting the C2 struc-
ture are security, survivability, and flexibility. In the OPFOR view, centrali-
zation of operational planning is a prerequisite to achieving the flexibility re-
quired to ensure timely concentration of forces and fires. Redundancy in
equipment, as well as communications links and CPs, is the primary means
of ensuring the control structure’s security and survivability.
2-208. The organization of communications to meet operational requirements
is the responsibility of the commander at each level. Prior to combat, the OSC
chief of communications, under the personal direction of the intelligence officer,
2-46
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
prepares the communications plan. After approval by the chief of staff, it be-
comes an annex to the operational directive for implementation by subordi-
nate signal units. OPFOR communications reflect the concern of commanders
to maintain uninterrupted C2, flexibility, and security.
Signal Assets
2-209. Communication systems employed include
• Manportable high-frequency (HF) and very-high-frequency (VHF)
radios.
• HF radio stations.
• VHF and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) multichannel radio relay.
• Super-high-frequency (SHF) troposcatter systems.
• Satellite communications (SATCOM).
• Wire and cable (landline as far forward as possible).
• Commercial communications networks (including cellular, microwave,
radio, wire, digital, and satellite)
• Local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs).
• Internet and Intranet.
Encrypted communications are common from brigade upward, but may ex-
tend to the lowest levels in the most modern OPFOR units.
2-210. At the operational level, headquarters normally task-organize their
signal assets to support the formation of forward, main, IFC, and sustain-
ment CPs. The numbers and types of signal units can vary greatly depending
on the size and makeup of the operational force grouping under a particular
headquarters.
2-211. Signal communications are organized through the communications
groups that are established to provide communications for the CPs. Telephone
exchanges and cable are used extensively to integrate the control and sup-
port groups of the CPs with the communications groups. It is possible to ex-
tend mobile communications through the integration of wire and wireless
and by connecting with fixed military and civil communications facilities.
2-212. The OPFOR also stresses the use of non-electronic means of communi-
cations. While radio must be the principal means of communication in a fluid,
mobile battle, the OPFOR is aware of the threat from enemy signals intelli-
gence, direction finding, and communications jamming. Also, wire and cable
are often not practical in fast-moving situations.
2-213. During periods of radio silence or disruption of radio communications,
the OPFOR employs messengers, liaison teams, and visual and sound signals.
Messengers are the preferred method for delivering combat orders at any
time. Representatives from the OSC staff may observe and supervise the exe-
cution of directives. Whenever possible, the OPFOR prefers personal contact
between commanders (or their representatives) and subordinates.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Communications Nets
2-214. C2 of OPFOR organizations relies on extensive and redundant com-
munications. The OPFOR primarily uses UHF/SHF SATCOM, radio relay
multichannel, HF radio stations, HF and VHF single-channel radios, and
wire or cable. In modernized OPFOR units, the command, operations, intelli-
gence, and logistics nets may operate over a digital network of linked com-
puters, obviating the need for voice communications.
2-215. The OSC operates two command nets. The commander normally con-
trols the primary command net from the forward CP, while the chief of staff
maintains control of the alternate net from the main CP. Depending on the
distances involved, the primary net may be either HF or VHF. All of the
command’s constituent and dedicated units monitor the command nets. The
IFC CP also monitors the command nets
2-216. The operations officer maintains an operations net monitored by
the commander, subordinate and supporting units, and any alternate or
auxiliary CP created. The resources officer also monitors this net from the
sustainment CP.
2-217. The DC, as IFC commander, maintains the integrated fires net. This
net is monitored by the subordinates of the IFC and RISTA assets assigned
IFC missions.
2-218. The resources officer maintains the support net. The OSC’s materiel
support, maintenance, and medical units monitor this net. Subordinate com-
bat arms units may also use this net when requiring additional, immediate
assistance that constituent support assets are unable to provide.
2-219. The chief of reconnaissance maintains an intelligence net, monitored
by reconnaissance units, maneuver units, the commander, DC, chief of staff,
and resources officer.
2-220. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for the purpose of control-
ling the command’s airspace. Organizations on this net include aviation
units, air defense assets, and army aviation and Air Force liaison teams.
2-221. When required, the commander can create a special mission net,
monitored by the chief of staff, that is employed to control the activities of
units conducting a special mission, such as a reconnaissance detachment or
an airborne or heliborne landing force deployed behind enemy lines. Specific
communications systems employed are dependent on the depth and type of
mission.
2-222. The chief of force protection maintains an air defense and NBC warn-
ing communications net, monitored by all constituent, dedicated, and sup-
porting units. This net is used for passing tactical alerts or NBC and air
warning reports. The chief of staff maintains a watch on the OSC-level warning
nets at the main CP; he then disseminates warning where appropriate.
2-223. The command establishes multichannel links between the main and
sustainment CPs and the CPs of subordinate units. These links are used for
high-capacity voice and data transmissions. The OSC also establishes
multichannel links between the main and sustainment CPs.
2-48
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 2
2-224. The primary responsibility for maintaining communications of an

OSC with the General Staff or SHC (or a parent FG or theater headquarters)
rests with the main CP. With the larger staffs and greater communications
capabilities of the main CP, the commander is allowed to focus more on the
actual conduct of the operation from the forward CP. Obviously, when staff
members, such as the CAO or chief of reconnaissance, accompany the com-
mander, they will establish control over their respective nets as required.
2-225. The chief of IW may also control one or more deception nets designed
to mislead enemy signals intelligence analysis. Integrated into the IW plan
are a description of these nets and procedures for their use.
Procedures
2-226. Before making contact with the enemy, most radio and radio-relay
systems maintain a listening watch with transmission forbidden or strictly
controlled. OPFOR units usually observe radio silence when defending or de-
parting assembly areas. During radio silence, wire and courier are the pri-
mary communications means. While moving toward the enemy, units nor-
mally limit radio transmissions to various code words informing commanders
they have accomplished assigned tasks or have encountered unexpected diffi-
culties. The OPFOR also uses visual signals, such as flags and flares, to a
great extent during movement. Usually only the commander and reconnais-
sance forces have permission to transmit.
2-227. In the offense, OPFOR units maintain radio silence until the outbreak
of battle, when those authorized to transmit may do so without restriction.
When contact with the enemy occurs, units initiate normal radio procedures.
Subordinate commanders inform the OSC commander—usually by code
wordwhen they reach objectives, encounter NBC contamination, make con-
tact with the enemy, or have important information to report.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY

2-228. Survivability of C2 systems is of great concern, since the C2 elements
are typically located within range of enemy standoff systems, with increased
potential for disruption or destruction. The OPFOR stresses the need to
maintain continuous, reliable control of its forces and has undertaken a
number of measures to prevent disruption and enhance survivability,
while remaining flexible enough to retain control of units in combat. These
include
• High mobility of C2 systems and facilities.
• Redundancy of the C2 elements and networks.
• Adherence to operations- and information-security measures.
• Deception
2-229. IW activities contribute to C2 survivability. So does the principle of

centralized planning and decentralized execution. The survivability of the
headquarters’ command group is facilitated by the fact that the commander,
DC, and chief of staff can be in separate CPs (forward, IFC, and main CPs,
respectively).
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Mobility
2-230. C2 elements must be highly mobile, due to the emphasis on maintain-
ing combat at a rapid tempo. Because of their proximity to the enemy, CPs
and supporting communications must frequently relocate to avoid detection
and subsequent destruction.
2-231. CPs are usually mobile (that is, in vehicles) but may also be fixed. By
emphasizing the use of multiple, mobile CPs, planners minimize the disrup-
tion of C2 that would occur with the enemy’s destruction of this element of
the C2 structure. Highly mobile signal units employing transportable com-
munications equipment support mobile CPs. This gives OPFOR commanders
great flexibility in organizing and deploying their C2 elements. Thus, they
are able to provide effective control in varied situations.
Redundancy
2-232. The OPFOR has built extensive redundancy into the C2 structure.
Multiple CPs are fielded as low as possible. For communications between
levels of command, multiple communications types are employed. Providing a
variety of single- and multichannel links, these systems operate over a wide
frequency spectrum.
Operations and Information Security

2-233. The consistent adherence to operations- and information-security
measures is especially critical, given the increased capabilities of enemy re-
connaissance, the increased role of surprise, and the proliferation of precision
weapons. Given the high priority the enemy places on C2 elements as targets,
maintaining operations security is an important requirement for C2 nodes.
This is achieved by the stringent adherence to information-security proce-
dures and extensive use of C3D.
2-50
Chapter 3
Offensive Operations
The OPFOR sees the offensive as the decisive form of operations and the
ultimate means of imposing its will on the enemy. While conditions at a
particular time or place may require the OPFOR to defend, defeating an
enemy force ultimately requires shifting to offensive operations. Even
within the context of defense, victory normally requires some sort of of-
fensive action. Therefore, OPFOR commanders at all levels seek to create
and exploit opportunities to take offensive action, whenever possible.
In the context of the theater strategic or operational level of war, offensive

operations are often “conventional” in nature. Conventional operations
are not, however, the only form of offensive operations. Accordingly, this
chapter includes discussions of operational-level offensive actions that
do not rely only on large formations of mechanized or motorized units.
Offensive operations may include operations done by paramilitary or
irregular forces. The OPFOR recognizes the traditional forms of ma-
neuver: envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and
frontal attack.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
3-1. Offensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR strate-
gic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of offensive actions may differ
during the various types of strategic-level actions.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
3-2. Offensive operations during regional operations attempt to achieve stra-
tegic political or military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and capabil-
ity to fight. This is brought about by destroying components of the enemy’s
combat system. This may include discrete attacks on any of the four compo-
nents of an enemy’s combat system: combat forces, combat support forces, lo-
gistics forces, and command and control (C2) and reconnaissance, intelli-
gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). It may also include an
attempt to destroy one or more of the enemy’s systems simultaneously.
3-3. Due to its military superiority over a regional adversary in regional op-
erations, the State is able to pursue primarily offensive military courses of
action. It is also prepared to use offensive means against internal and possi-
ble extraregional threats.
3-4. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
gional neighbor, but may not be a match for the forces an extraregional
power can bring to bear. Thus, the State seeks to exploit its numerical and
3-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other

regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. Thus, a
characteristic of regional operations is a rapid tempo of offensive combat.
3-5. The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re-
gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State
plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is
feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very
outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct ac-
cess-control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional
forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time they
require to build combat power and create support at home for their intervention.
3-6. In comparison to the forces of the State’s regional neighbors, the OPFOR
is a relatively large and modern force. Therefore, it is capable of offensive op-
erations against such opponents. The OPFOR will use armor, mechanized in-
fantry, airborne, and heliborne forces, when available. Generally, it will use
infantry forces suitable for operating in the complex terrain that dominates por-
tions of the region. When the OPFOR is dependent on infantry forces or ir-
regular forces, it will attack by infiltration or maneuver to conduct ambushes
of more capable enemy forces.
3-7. The OPFOR may attack along a suboptimal approach to exploit an en-
emy vulnerability or to achieve surprise. To maintain a high tempo of opera-
tions and reach key targets, the OPFOR often accepts the risk of bypassing
pockets of resistance.
3-8. Offensive operations play two key roles in transition operations. First,
they are used to continue to achieve the State’s regional goals as rapidly
as possible, to make the act an extraregional power is trying to prevent a fait
accompli. Second, they are a component of access-control operations to ex-
clude the extraregional power from key areas and contain him in areas of the
OPFOR’s choosing. The OPFOR uses offensive operations to preclude or put a
quick end to expansion of the conflict and to either consolidate its previous
gains or conduct further operations against the original regional enemy.
3-9. During transition operations, military forces solidify gains made during
regional operations. However, the central aim is to prevent or defeat outside
intervention. Although transition operations are primarily defensive in
nature, attacks will continue. As a minimum, the OPFOR will maintain
counterattack forces at virtually all levels of command and will attempt to
physically attack one or more components of an enemy’s combat system. A
combination of operational and tactical offensive and defensive actions help
the OPFOR control tempo.
3-10. Military forces in the immediate vicinity of the point of intervention
move into sanctuary as opportunity allows, making use of existing C2 and
logistics. They conduct limited-objective attacks to secure positions, protect
flanks, and control access. They may attack vulnerable early-entry forces
before the enemy can bring his technological overmatch to bear. Even at this
stage, the State may be able to inflict politically unacceptable casualties that
could cause the extraregional power to terminate its intervention.
3-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-11. During transition operations, the OPFOR plans and conducts sophisti-
cated ambushes to destroy high-visibility enemy systems or cause mass casu-
alties. These ambushes are not always linked to maneuver or ground objec-
tives, but are designed to have a huge psychological and political impact by
demonstrating enemy vulnerability. The OPFOR may use niche technology it
has acquired to achieve technological surprise and limited-duration over-
match in specific areas.
3-12. The OPFOR can use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to deny an
extraregional opponent the use of complex terrain for a period of time. This
creates opportunities for operational forces to destroy key enemy systems
with precision fires or to engage the enemy forces with fires and maneuver.
3-13. Transition operations are combined arms and/or joint efforts, although
the air and naval forces increasingly revert to defensive measures to preserve
their capability. Ground forces or, more often, Special-Purpose Forces (SPF)
conduct raids against logistics sites, lines of communication (LOCs), and
other vulnerable military targets in the region, along the routes to the region,
and to the enemy’s strategic depth. Occasionally, if the risks are worth the
costs, the OPFOR attacks such targets by air and sea. It may also use long-
range missiles or rockets to deliver conventional warheads or WMD against
these kinds of targets. Paramilitary forces, air defense forces, and precision
attack can also play important roles. The OPFOR may also use long-range
weapons or SPF to conduct attacks outside the theater, to divert enemy re-
sources to protect politically or ecologically sensitive targets.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
3-14. Once an extraregional power commits forces in the region, the OPFOR
does not avoid battle. It seeks it often, but on its own terms. Battles will occur at
a place and time of the OPFOR’s choosing and involve dispersed maneuver,
precision fires, and simultaneous actions by all services of the Armed Forces as
well as affiliated forces. Tactical counterattacks characterize adaptive opera-
tions, and larger counteroffensive operations are undertaken when feasible.
3-15. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR may conduct limited-objective
operational- and tactical-level offensive actions to prevent buildup of inter-
vening forces, to facilitate the defense, or to take advantage of an opportunity
to counterattack.
3-16. When the OPFOR can create a window of opportunity or exploit oppor-
tunity created by natural conditions that limit or degrade enemy capabilities, its
forces move out of sanctuary and attack. They try to force the enemy to operate
in areas where OPFOR interdiction fire can be most effective. The OPFOR uses
windows of opportunity to destroy key enemy systems or cause mass casualties.
PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

3-17. All offensive operations are designed to achieve the goals of a strategic
campaign through active measures. However, the purpose of any given offen-
sive operation varies with the situation. The primary distinction among types
of offensive operations is their purpose. Thus, the OPFOR recognizes three
general types of offensive operations according to their purpose: to destroy,
seize, or expel.
3-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ATTACK TO DESTROY
3-18. An attack to destroy is designed to eliminate a target entity as a useful
fighting force. Operational-level attacks to destroy usually focus on key en-
emy combat formations or capabilities. Not every soldier or system need be
destroyed for such an attack to be successful. Attacks to destroy are often fo-
cused on a single component of an enemy’s combat system. For example, it
may be enough to remove the enemy force’s ability to sustain itself or exer-
cise effective command and control. Therefore, attacks to destroy are often fo-
cused on the logistics and C2 systems of the target entity. Such attacks are
most often conducted during regional operations. However, an attack to de-
stroy may also occur during transition or adaptive operations, whenever the
OPFOR can recognize and exploit a window of opportunity.
ATTACK TO SEIZE
3-19. An attack to seize is designed to gain control of a key terrain feature or
man-made facility. The OPFOR does not adhere to the idea that seizure may
be accomplished simply by placing a feature in weapons range. In the
OPFOR lexicon, seize means to have OPFOR soldiers on and/or in the feature
in question. Attacks to seize can occur as part of all strategic-level courses of
action during OPFOR strategic campaigns. In regional operations, the sei-
zure may facilitate the movement of an exploitation force. In transition or adap-
tive operations, the seizure may be part of a campaign to control access into the
theater.
ATTACK TO EXPEL
3-20. An attack to expel is used to force the defender to vacate an area. At-
tacks to expel often have a strong information warfare (IW) component, so
that the enemy removes himself from the area largely through a loss of re-
solve. Attacks to expel typically focus on a key enemy capability or vulner-
ability. Attacks to expel are primarily conducted within the context of transi-
tion or adaptive operations.
PLANNING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3-21. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning offensive operations are
• Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
offense).
• Organizing the battlefield.
• Organizing forces.
• Organizing IW activities (see Chapter 5).
• Determining the objective of the offensive operation.
3-22. Offensive actions during transition and adaptive operations are not
able to rely simply on massing combat power at a decisive point. Such actions
typically include increased use of
• Infiltration.
• Perception management (see Chapter 5) in support of operations.
• Affiliated forces in support of operations.
3-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
PLANNED OFFENSE
3-23. A planned (deliberate) offense is an offensive operation or action under-
taken when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare
and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in prepared de-
fensive positions and in a known location. The OPFOR plans an offense using
the method described in Chapter 2. Key considerations in offensive planning
are
• Selecting a clear and appropriate objective.
• Determining which enemy forces (security, reaction, or reserve) must
be fixed.
• Developing a reconnaissance plan that locates and tracks relevant en-
emy targets and elements.
• Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity to free
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness.
• Determining which component or components of an enemy’s combat
system to attack.
SITUATIONAL OFFENSE
3-24. The OPFOR may also conduct a situational (hasty) offense. It recog-
nizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic. Fleeting opportunities to at-
tack an enemy weakness continually present themselves and just as
quickly disappear. Although detailed planning and preparation greatly
mitigate risk, they are often not achievable if a window of opportunity is
to be exploited.
3-25. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situ-
ational offense:
• A key enemy unit, system, or capability is exposed.
• The OPFOR has an opportunity to conduct a spoiling attack to disrupt
enemy defensive preparations.
• An OPFOR unit makes contact on favorable terms for subsequent of-
fensive action.
3-26. In a situational offense, the commander develops his assessment of the

conditions rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He provides
a basic course of action to the staff, who then quickly turn that course of ac-
tion into an executable operational directive. The situational offense relies
heavily on implementation of battle drills by subordinate tactical units (see
FM 7-100.2).
3-27. Organization of the battlefield in a situational offense is normally lim-
ited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces in
a situational offense typically requires the use of detachments or tactical
groups (see FM 7-100.2). The nature of situational offense is such that it of-
ten involves smaller, independent forces accomplishing discrete missions dis-
persed from the main body of the operational-strategic command (OSC).
3-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR THE OFFENSE

area of responsibility (AOR), as defined by the next-higher commander, he
designates AORs for his subordinates, along with zones, objectives, and axes
related to his own overall mission.
Enemy Main Line of

Resistance
OSC
LOR
Initial Initial
Support Initial Battle Zone Disruption
Zone Zone
OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY Kill

Zone
OSC
LOR
Objective
Axis
Attack Zone
Kill
Zone
OSC
LOR
Initial Subsequent Initial Initial Subsequent
Support Support Battle LOR LOR
Line Line Line Subsequent
Battle Line
Figure 3-1. Example of an AOR (Linear Battlespace)
3-29. OPFOR AORs normally consist of three basic zones: the disruption
zone, the battle zone, and the support zone. These zones have the same basic
purposes in all types of offense. In the offense, AORs also may contain one
or more attack zones, kill zones, objectives, and/or axes. Zones may be linear
or nonlinear in nature. See Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for generalized examples of
AORs and zones.
3-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Kill Battle Zone
DTG/BTG
II
Zone
LOR
Support
OSC
DTG
LOR
OSC Zone
AOR
LOR Attack
Zone
Disruption
Zone BTG
AOR
Axis
X
X OSC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
Support BTG
Zone LOR
Battle Zone
BTG
Battle Zone AOR
R G
LO /BT
G
Support
DT
Zone
OSC
LOR
Figure 3-2. Example of AOR (Nonlinear Battlespace)
3-30. The intent of this method of organizing the battlefield is to preserve as

much flexibility as possible for subordinate units within the parameters that
define the aim of the senior commander. An important feature of the basic
zones in an AOR is the variations in actions that can occur within them in
the course of a specific offensive operation.
Disruption Zone
3-31. In the offense, the disruption zone is that battlespace in which the
OPFOR seeks to use direct and indirect fires to destroy the integrity of en-
emy forces and capabilities without decisive engagement. In general, this
zone is the space between the battle line and the limit of responsibility (LOR). In
linear operations, it typically begins at what the OPFOR anticipates to be the
enemy main line of resistance and extends to the LOR. The dimensions of this
zone are based on OPFOR weapons envelopes and the targets the OPFOR
wishes to affect. For example, counterreconnaissance activity may draw the at-
tention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the kill zone of a sophisticated
ambush (described later in this chapter) executed by long-range precision fires.
3-32. The OSC disruption zone may be the aggregate of the disruption zones
of subordinates, such as division and brigade tactical groups (DTGs and
BTGs). However, assets directly controlled by the OSC could also operate
throughout the OSC disruption zone. In that case, each subordinate would be
responsible for a portion of the OSC disruption zone, and that portion would
constitute the subordinate’s disruption zone within its own AOR. In other
3-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
cases, an OSC disruption zone may extend beyond those of its subordinates,
to include an area occupied by forces sent out under direct control of the
OSC. OSC-level forces could include SPF and affiliated forces, which could be
operating in enemy-held territory even before the beginning of hostilities.
There could also be stay-behind forces in areas seized by the enemy. A field
group (FG) or theater commander controlling multiple OSCs can have a disrup-
tion zone and may assign an OSC to operate in that zone.
3-33. In the offense, the disruption zone exists to
• Disrupt defensive works and preparations.
• Delay or fix enemy counterattacks or response forces.
• Attack lucrative targets (key systems or vulnerable troops).
3-34. Disruption forces often maneuver to fix enemy forces and place long-
range fire on key enemy units. They can also strip away the enemy’s recon-
naissance assets (to deceive him of the location and configuration of the at-
tack) while denying him the ability to acquire and engage the OPFOR with
deep fires. This includes an air defense effort to deny aerial attack and re-
connaissance platforms from targeting forces in the zone. A disruption force
seeks to conduct highly damaging local attacks. It ensures that a covered
withdrawal route exists to avoid decisive engagement.
3-35. Typical systems, units, or facilities to be attacked by a disruption force
are
• C2 systems.
• RISTA assets.
• Aviation assets.
• Precision fire systems.
• Logistics support areas.
• LOCs.
• Mobility and countermobility assets.
• Casualty evacuation routes and means.
3-36. The disruption zone is bounded by the battle line and the LOR of the
overall AOR. In linear offensive operations, the higher headquarters may
move this LOR forward as the force continues successful offensive operations.
Thus, the boundaries of the disruption zone will also move forward during
the course of an operation. The higher commander can push the disruption
zone forward or outward as forces adopt a defensive posture while consolidat-
ing gains at the end of a successful offensive operation and/or prepare for a
subsequent offensive operation.
Battle Zone
3-37. In the offense, the battle zone is that battlespace in which the OPFOR
seeks to fix and/or destroy enemy forces through simultaneous or sequential
application of all components of combat power. The dimensions of this zone
are based on OPFOR objectives and the time-space relationships for the
forces involved.
3-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-38. The battle zone is separated from the disruption zone by the battle line
and from the support zone by the support line. The commander may adjust
the location of these lines in order to accommodate successful offensive op-
erations. In a linear situation, those lines can shift forward during the course
of a successful attack. Thus, the battle zone would also shift forward.
3-39. In the offense, the battle zone exists to
• Control forces in proximity to the enemy.
• Define objectives.
• Support understanding of roles and missions.
3-40. Forces operating in the battle zone engage the enemy in close combat to
achieve a specific operational objective. This objective is typically one of the
following:
• Create a penetration in the enemy defense, through which exploitation
forces can pass.
• Draw enemy attention and resources to the action.
• Seize operationally significant geographic areas.
• Inflict casualties on a vulnerable enemy unit.
• Prevent the enemy from moving a part of his force to impact OPFOR
actions elsewhere on the battlefield.
3-41. In nonlinear offensive operations, multiple battle zones may exist, and
within each a certain task would be assigned to the OPFOR unit or units
charged to operate in that space. The tasks given to the units that operate in
the zone can range from demonstration to attack. The battle zone provides
the commander of those units the battlespace in which to frame his operations.
Support Zone
3-42. The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be free of
significant enemy action and to permit the effective logistics and administra-
tive support of forces. Security forces operate in the support zone in a combat
role to defeat enemy special operations forces and other threats. Camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures throughout the support
zone aim to protect the force from standoff RISTA and precision attack. If the
battle zone moves during the course of an operation, the support zone would
move accordingly.
Attack Zone
3-43. The attack zone is the assigned zone of action for an attacking force. In
operation plans and directives, the senior commander assigns attack zones to
subordinate units.
Kill Zone
3-44. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the OPFOR
plans to destroy a key enemy target. Kill zones are tied to enemy targets and
the OPFOR weapon systems that will engage them, and not a particular zone
3-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of the AOR. They may be designated by a senior commander in order to focus

combat power.
Objectives and Axes

3-45. An objective is a geographic location or physical object, the seizing
and/or holding of which is a goal of an offensive operation.1 An axis is a con-
trol measure showing the location through which a force will move as it pro-
ceeds from its starting location to its objective.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE OFFENSE

3-46. In planning and executing offensive actions, the OPFOR organizes and
designates various forces according to their function. This provides a common
language for how the OPFOR fights functionally, rather than geometrically.
The functions do not change, regardless of where the force might happen to
be located on the battlefield. Thus, functional forces that perform the common
operational and tactical tasks of disrupting, fixing, assaulting, exploiting,
providing security, and deceiving are logically designated as disruption, fix-
ing, assault, exploitation, security, and deception forces, respectively. A force
held in reserve is designated as a reserve, until it receives a mission to per-
form a specific function.
3-47. In his operation plan, the operational-level commander specifies the
organization of the forces within his level of command. Thus, subordinate
forces understand their roles within the overall operation. However, the or-
ganization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of an operation,
if part of the plan does not work or works better than anticipated. For exam-
ple, a unit that started out being part of a fixing force might split off and be-
come an exploitation force, if the opportunity presents itself.
3-48. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two DTGs are acting as the OSC’s fixing force,
the senior of the two DTG commanders is the fixing force commander. Since,
in this option, each force commander is also a subordinate unit commander,
he controls the force from his unit’s command post (CP). Another option is to
have one of the OSC’s or FG’s CPs be in charge of a functional force. For ex-
ample, the forward CP could control a disruption force or a fixing force. An-
other possibility would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or
the exploitation force or any other force whose actions must be closely coordi-
nated with fires delivered by the IFC.
3-49. In any case, the force commander is responsible to the OSC or FG
commander to ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to
take charge of the force during the operation. This frees the operational-level
commander from decisions specific to the force’s mission. Even when tactical-
level subordinates of an OSC or FG have responsibility for parts of the dis-
ruption zone, there is still an overall OSC or FG disruption force commander.
1
The term objective may also refer to the defined aim(s) of a particular operation. It is not always tied to ground or
places. It could be a desired effect on a particular enemy formation or capability.
3-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Disruption Force
3-50. In the offense, the disruption force would include the disruption force
that already existed in a preceding defensive situation (see Chapter 4). It is
possible that forces assigned for operations in the disruption zone in the de-
fense might not have sufficient mobility to do the same in the offense or that
targets may change and require different or additional assets. Thus, the dis-
ruption force might require augmentation.
Fixing Force
3-51. OPFOR offensive operations are founded on the concept of fixing enemy
forces so that they are not free to maneuver. The OPFOR recognizes that
units and soldiers can be fixed in a variety of ways. For example
• They find themselves without effective communication with higher
command.
• Their picture of the battlefield is unclear.
• They are (or believe they are) decisively engaged in combat.
• They have lost mobility to due to complex terrain, obstacles, or WMD.
3-52. In the offense, planners identify which enemy forces need to be fixed
and the method by which they will be fixed. They then assign this responsi-
bility to a force that has the capability to fix the required enemy forces with
the correct method. The fixing force may consist of a number of units sepa-
rated from each other in time and space, particularly if the enemy forces re-
quired to be fixed are likewise separated. A fixing force could consist entirely of
affiliated irregular forces. It is possible that a discrete attack on logistics or
C2 (or other systems) could fix an enemy without resorting to deploying large fix-
ing forces.
Assault Force
3-53. The assault force is charged with creating the conditions that allow the
exploitation force the freedom to operate. In order to create a window of op-
portunity for the exploitation force to succeed, the assault force may be re-
quired to operate at a high degree of risk and may sustain substantial casu-
alties. However, an assault force may not even make contact with the enemy,
but instead conduct a demonstration.
Exploitation Force
3-54. The exploitation force is assigned the task of achieving the objective of
the mission. It typically exploits a window of opportunity created by the as-
sault force. However, effective IW, a mismatch in system capabilities, or even
the enemy’s own dispositions may create a situation in which the exploitation
force is able to achieve the objective without a formal assault force. An exploi-
tation force could engage the ultimate objective with fires only.
Security Force
3-55. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall operational-level command and/or its
key components. If the commander chooses, he may charge this security force
3-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
with providing force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the
functional forces; logistics and administrative elements in the support zone;
and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may
include various types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counterreconnais-
sance, and signals reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy special opera-
tions and long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AOR. It
can also include internal security forces units allocated to the operational-
level command, with the mission of protecting the overall command from at-
tack by hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces. The secu-
rity force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of WMD.
Deception Force
3-56. When the IW plan requires combat forces to take some action (such as
a demonstration or feint), these forces are designated as deception forces in
close-hold executive summaries of the plan. However, wide-distribution cop-
ies of the plan refer to these forces according to the designation given them in
the deception story.
Reserves
3-57. At the commander’s discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. OPFOR offensive reserve formations are given priorities in
terms of whether the staff thinks it most likely that they will act as a fixing,
assault, or exploitation force. The size and composition of an offensive reserve
is entirely situation-dependent. (See Chapter 4 for more detail on the various
types of reserves, some of which are more common in defensive operations.)
PREPARING FOR THE OFFENSE

3-58. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to place the enemy in the
weakest condition and position possible. Commanders prepare their forces for
all subsequent phases of the offensive operation. They organize their forces
and the battlefield with an eye toward capitalizing on conditions created by
successful attacks.
ESTABLISH CONTACT
3-59. The number one priority for all offensive operations is to gain and
maintain contact with key enemy forces. As part of the decision-making proc-
ess (see Chapter 2), the commander and staff identify which forces must be
kept under watch at all times. The OPFOR will employ whatever technical
sensors it has at its disposal to locate and track enemy forces, but the method
of choice is ground reconnaissance. It may also receive information on the en-
emy from the civilian populace, local police, or affiliated irregular forces.
MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS

3-60. The OPFOR understands that there is as much chance of an offensive
operation being brought to culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support
3-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
as by enemy action. Careful consideration is given to carried days of supply

and advanced caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted LOCs.
MODIFY THE PLAN WHEN NECESSARY

3-61. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one operation, it is continuously in the execution
phase. Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the
course of their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield
events.
REHEARSE CRITICAL ACTIONS IN PRIORITY

3-62. The commander establishes the priority for the critical actions expected
to take place during the operation. The force rehearses those actions in as re-
alistic a manner as possible for the remainder of the preparation time.
EXECUTING THE OFFENSE

3-63. The degree of preparation often determines the nature of the attack in
the execution phase. Successful execution depends on forces that understand
their roles in the operation and can swiftly follow preparatory actions with
the maximum possible shock and violence and deny the enemy any opportu-
nity to recover. A successful execution phase often ends with transition to the
defense in order to consolidate gains, defeat enemy counterattacks, or avoid
culmination. In some cases, the execution phase is followed by continued of-
fensive action to exploit opportunities created by the operation just completed.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
3-64. The OPFOR will go to great lengths to ensure that its forces maintain
contact with key elements of the enemy force throughout the operation. This
includes rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and forces and the use
of whatever combat power is necessary to ensure success.

3-65. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemy’s actions may well make an OPFOR unit’s original mission
achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, a unit of the fixing
force in an attack may be keeping its portion of the enemy force tied down while
another portion of the enemy force is maneuvering nearby to stop the exploita-
tion force. In this case, the OPFOR unit in question must be ready to transition
to a new mission quickly and break contact to fix the maneuvering enemy force.
SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
3-66. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the operational directive.
3-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
DOMINATE THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS

3-67. Through all actions possible, the OPFOR plans to control the tempo
of operations. It will use continuous attack, IW, and shifting targets, objectives,
and axes to ensure that operational events are taking place at the pace it
desires.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

3-68. The types of offensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical meth-
ods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. An FG or OSC of-
fensive operation plan may include subordinate units that are executing different
offensive and defensive courses of action within the overall offensive mission
framework.
ATTACK
3-69. An attack seeks to achieve operational decision through primarily mili-
tary means by defeating the enemy’s military power. This defeat does not
come through the destruction of armored weapons systems but through the
disruption, dislocation, and subsequent paralyzation that occurs when com-
bat forces are rendered irrelevant by the loss of the capability or will to con-
tinue the fight. Attack is the method of choice for OPFOR offensive action.
There are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack.
3-70. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for “exploitation” as a dis-
tinct offensive course of action. Rather, exploitation is considered a central
part of all integrated and dispersed attacks.
3-71. The OPFOR does not have a separate design for “pursuit” as a distinct
offensive course of action. A pursuit is conducted using the same basic
course-of-action framework as any other integrated or dispersed attack. The
fixing force gains contact with the fleeing enemy force and slows it or forces it
to stop while the assault and exploitation forces create the conditions for and
complete the destruction of the enemy’s C2 and logistics structure or other
systems.
Integrated Attack
3-72. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the OPFOR seeks
military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and/or ability to continue
fighting through the application of joint and combined arms effects.
Integrated attack is often employed when the OPFOR enjoys overmatch
with respect to its opponent and is able to bring all components of offensive
combat power to bear. It may also be employed against a more sophisticated
and capable opponent, if the appropriate window of opportunity is created or
available. See Figures 3-3 through 3-5 for examples of integrated attacks.
3-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
Enemy Main Line of

Resistance
OSC
XX
XX X
Enemy
Support
Area
Exploitation Assault Force
Force
Enemy Tactical
Fixing Force Airfield
OSC
Battle Line
Figure 3-3. Integrated Attack (Linear Battlespace Example1)
3-73. The primary objective of an integrated attack is the enemy’s will and
ability to fight. The OPFOR recognizes that modern militaries cannot con-
tinue without adequate logistics support and no military, modern or other-
wise, can function without effective command and control.
3-74. Integrated attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
• Fixing the majority of the enemy’s force in place with the minimum
force necessary.
• Isolating the targeted subcomponent(s) of the enemy’s combat system
from his main combat power.
• Using complex terrain to force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage.
• Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemy’s
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.
• Using flank attack and envelopment, particularly of enemy forces that
have been fixed.
3-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Initial
Battle Line
Subsequent
OBJ B Battle Line
II
X
X
a y
Highw
X
OSC
Enemy
OBJ A Objective Red Sea
APOD
II X
X
y
wa
XX
gh
XX X
Hi
Assault Force
OSC Fixing Force
Assault X
Force
X X
II
Exploitation Force
II
Fixing
Force
Figure 3-4. Integrated Attack (Linear Battlespace Example 2)
3-75. The OPFOR prefers to conduct integrated attacks when most or all of
the following conditions exist:
• The OPFOR possesses significant overmatch in combat power over en-
emy forces.
• It possesses at least air parity over the critical portions of the battle-
field.
• It is sufficiently free of enemy standoff reconnaissance and attack sys-
tems to be able to operate without accepting high levels of risk.
3-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
OSC
OSC
(moves to capture the APOD

X through the path created by assault
Exploitation
Force force)
X
Fixing
XX Force 2
Assault
Force
II
Enemy
Base Enemy
Camp QRF
Enemy
Enemy Base
Support Camp
Area
APOD
X
Fixing
Force 1
Enemy
Base
Camp
OSC
Figure 3-5. Integrated Attack (Nonlinear Battlespace Example)
Organizing Forces for an Integrated Attack

3-76. An integrated attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A
disruption forces exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offen-
sive action.
3-77. Fixing Force. The fixing force in an integrated attack is required to
prevent enemy defending forces, reserves, and quick-response forces (QRF)
from interfering with the actions of the assault and exploitation forces. The
battle will develop rapidly, and enemy forces not in the attack zone cannot be
allowed to reposition to influence the assault and exploitation forces. Maneu-
ver forces, precision fires, air defense units, long-range antiarmor systems,
situational obstacles, chemical weapons, and electronic warfare (EW) are
well suited to fix defending forces.
3-78. Assault Force. The assault force in an integrated attack is charged
with creating conditions that allow the exploitation force to rapidly penetrate
enemy defenses. Since the exploitation force is principally required to act
within the window of opportunity, the assault force may successfully employ in-
filtration of infantry to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploitation
3-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
force in its penetration. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket fires, com-
bat engineer units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this mission.
3-79. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in an integrated attack
must be capable of penetrating or avoiding enemy defensive forces and at-
tacking and destroying the enemy’s support infrastructure before he has time
to react. An armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the
core of an exploitation force in an integrated attack due to the combination of
mobility, protection, and firepower possessed by such forces.
Dispersed Attack
3-80. Dispersed attack (also known as decentralized attack) is the primary
manner in which the OPFOR conducts offensive action when threatened by a
superior enemy and/or when unable to mass or provide integrated C2 to an
attack. This is not to say that the dispersed attack cannot or should not be
used against peer forces, but as a rule integrated attack will more completely
attain objectives in such situations. Dispersed attack relies on IW and dis-
persion of forces to permit the OPFOR to conduct tactical offensive opera-
tions while overmatched by precision standoff weapons and imagery and
signals sensors. The dispersed attack is continuous and comes from multi-
ple directions. It employs multiple means working together in a very in-
terdependent way. The attack can be dispersed in time as well as space.
See Figures 3-6 and 3-7 for examples of dispersed attacks.
3-81. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to take advantage of a win-
dow of opportunity to bring enough joint and combined arms force to bear to
destroy the enemy’s will and/or capability to continue fighting. To achieve
this, the OPFOR does not necessarily have to destroy the entire enemy force,
but often just a key portion of that force.
3-82. Selecting the appropriate portion of the enemy to destroy is the first
step in planning the dispersed attack. This element is chosen because of its
importance to the enemy and varies depending on the force involved and the
current military situation. For example, an enemy force dependent on one
geographical point for all of his logistics support and reinforcement would be
most vulnerable at that point. Disrupting this activity at the right time and
to the right extent may bring about operational decision on the current bat-
tlefield or it may open further windows of opportunity to attack the enemy’s
weakened forces at little cost to the OPFOR. In another example, an enemy
force preparing to attack may be disrupted by an OPFOR attack whose purpose
is to destroy long-range missile artillery, creating the opportunity for the
OPFOR to achieve standoff with its own missile systems. In a final example, the
key system chosen may be the personnel of the enemy force. Attacking and caus-
ing mass casualties among infantrymen may delay an enemy offensive in com-
plex terrain while also being politically unacceptable for the enemy command
structure.
3-83. Dispersed attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused on complete destruction of ground combat power but
rather on destroying a key portion of the enemy force (often targeting
enemy C2 and logistics).
• Fixing and isolating enemy combat power.
3-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
• Using smaller, independent subordinate elements.

• Conducting rapid moves from dispersed locations.
• Massing at the last possible moment.
• Conducting simultaneous attack at multiple, dispersed locations.
• Using deception and other components of IW to degrade the enemy’s
situational understanding and ability to target OPFOR formations.
Neutral Country Hostile Country

Sea
XX X
XX
X X
X Enemy X
APOD
X
Mountains
X
OSC X
Sea “THE STATE” X

X
XX
Neutral Country
Figure 3-6. Dispersed Attack (Example 1)
3-84. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to

the execution of a dispersed attack may be one created by the OPFOR or one
that develops due to external factors in the operational environment. When
this window must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that must be
accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
• Deceive enemy imagery and signals sensors.
• Create an uncertain air defense environment.
• Selectively deny situational awareness.
• Maximize use of complex terrain.
3-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
X
Neutral Allied
Enemy Country Country
APOD
Sea
X
st
nre
of U X
Hostile Area
XX
NSF
Country XX
X Mountains
XX
X
OSC
XX X XX “THE STATE”
Mountains
XX XX
XX City
City
OSC
X
XX
XX Sea
Enemy X LEGEND
SPOD
NSF = National Security
Forces
Sea
Figure 3-7. Dispersed Attack (Example 2)
Organizing Forces for a Dispersed Attack

3-85. A dispersed attack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. A dis-
ruption force exists, but is not created specifically for this type of offensive action.
Deception forces can also play an important role in dispersed attack operations.
3-86. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a dispersed attack is primarily fo-
cused on fixing enemy response forces. Enemy reserves, response forces, and
precision fire systems that can reorient rapidly will be those elements most
capable of disrupting a dispersed attack. Maneuver forces, precision fires, air
defense and antiarmor ambushes, situational obstacles, chemical weapons,
and EW are well suited to fix these kinds of units and systems.
3-87. Assault Force. The assault force in a dispersed attack is charged with
creating favorable conditions for the exploitation force to rapidly move from
dispersed locations and penetrate or infiltrate enemy defenses. Since it is the
exploitation force that is principally required to act within the window of op-
portunity, the assault force may successfully employ infiltration of infantry
to carefully pre-selected points to assist the exploitation force in its penetra-
tion. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket fires, combat engineer
units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this mission. Dispersed
attacks often make use of multiple assault forces separated in time and/or space.
3-20
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-88. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a dispersed attack must

be capable, through inherent capabilities or positioning relative to the en-
emy, of destroying the target of the operation. An armored force may be the
weapon of choice to maneuver throughout the battlefield as single platoons in
order to have one company reach a vulnerable troop concentration or soft C2
node. Alternatively, the exploitation force may be a widely dispersed group of
SPF teams set to attack exposed logistics targets simultaneously. Dispersed
attacks often make use of multiple exploitation forces separated in time
and/or space, but often oriented on the same objective(s).
LIMITED-OBJECTIVE ATTACK
3-89. A limited-objective attack seeks to achieve results critical to the strate-
gic campaign plan (SCP) by destroying or denying the enemy key capabilities
through primarily military means. The results of a limited-objective attack
typically fall short of operational decision on the day of battle, but may be vi-
tal to the overall success of the SCP. Limited-objective attacks are common
during adaptive operations in which the objective is to preserve forces and
wear down the enemy, rather than achieving a military decision.
3-90. The primary objective of a limited-objective attack is a particular enemy
capability. This may or may not be a particular man-made system or group of
systems, but may also be the capability to take action at the enemy’s chosen
tempo.
3-91. Limited-objective attacks are characterized by
• Not being focused solely on destruction of ground combat power but of-
ten on C2 and logistics.
• Denying the enemy the capability he most needs to execute his plans.
• Maximal use of the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1).
• Significant reliance on a planned or seized window of opportunity.
3-92. At the operational level, there are three types of limited-objective at-
tack: sophisticated ambush, spoiling attack, and counterattack. One of these
types, the sophisticated ambush, requires conditions similar to those needed
for a dispersed attack, but is executed by autonomous tactical-level forces
with the OSC providing coordination and support. The other two types, the
spoiling attack and counterattack, share some common characteristics, but
differ in purpose.
Sophisticated Ambush
3-93. A sophisticated ambush is the linking in time and task of RISTA, at-
tacking forces, and window of opportunity to destroy key enemy systems or
cause politically unacceptable casualties. What makes a sophisticated am-
bush “sophisticated” is not the actual attack means. In fact, the actual am-
bush is executed by tactical-level forces. (See FM 7-100.2 for examples.) What
makes it “sophisticated,” however, is the linking of sensor, ambusher, window
of opportunity, and a target that affects an enemy center of gravity. This
typically requires sophisticated ambushes to be planned, coordinated, and
resourced at the operational level.
3-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
3-94. Like any other ambush, a sophisticated ambush is conducted against a

moving or temporarily halted target. In this case, however, the IW plan is de-
signed to facilitate infiltration or positioning of the ambushing forces and ex-
pose the target. The OSC will be involved in IW planning and the coordina-
tion of operational-level assets needed to support the ambush.
3-95. A sophisticated ambush is conducted by forces autonomous on the bat-
tlefield, but linked by C2 and purpose. It can often involve affiliated forces,
particularly when conducted as part of adaptive operations. A sophisticated
ambush is not necessarily tied to scheme of maneuver in that the larger part
of the OPFOR force may be involved in an operation not directly related to
the ambush.
3-96. Sophisticated ambushes are characterized by
• A key enemy target that, if destroyed, would significantly degrade the
enemy’s will or ability to fight.
• OPFOR sensor(s) with capability and mission to find and track the
target. Sensors are often ground reconnaissance, but may include un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or satellites.
• A C2 method to link the ambushing forces and sensors.
• Supporting operation(s)usually primarily IWto create a window of
opportunity for the ambushing forces to act.
3-97. A sophisticated ambush requires conditions similar to those needed for

a dispersed attack. However, since less combat power is typically at risk in a
sophisticated ambush, the window of opportunity does not need to be as ex-
tensive. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable
to the execution of a sophisticated ambush may be one created by the OPFOR
or one that develops due to external factors in the operational environment.
When this window must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that
must be accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance in the ambush area.
• Establish effective air defense protection for ambushing forces.
• Locate and track enemy security and response forces that could inter-
fere with the ambush.
• Locate and track ambush target.
Spoiling Attack
3-98. A spoiling attack is designed to control the tempo of combat by disrupt-
ing the timing of enemy operations. This is accomplished by attacking during
the planning and preparation for the enemy’s own offensive operations. Spoil-
ing attacks do not have to accomplish a great deal to be successful. Con-
versely, planners must focus carefully on what effect the attack is trying to
achieve and how the attack will achieve that effect. In some cases, the pur-
pose of the attack is to remove a key component of the enemy’s force array or
3-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
combat system so it is unavailable for the planned attack and therefore re-
duces his overall chances of success. More typically, the attack is designed to
slow the development of conditions favorable to the enemy’s planned attack.
See Figure 3-8 for an example of a spoiling attack.
3-99. Quite often, the spoiling attack develops as a situational attack (see
above). This occurs when an unclear picture of enemy dispositions suddenly
clarifies to some extent and the commander wishes to take advantage of the
knowledge he has gained to disrupt enemy timing. This means that spoiling
attacks are often conducted by reserve or response forces that can rapidly
shift from their current posture to attack the enemy.
OSC
DTG
X Battle
Zone X
Forest
Mountains
X
X X
X
Mountains
Marsh
DTG
Battle
II Zone
Enemy X
Attack X
Position Disruption
Zone
X
DTG
APOD Battle
X
Zone
X
X
X
Mountains
X
X
OS
C LEGEND
Complex
Battle
Position
Figure 3-8. Spoiling Attack (Example)
3-23
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
3-100. Spoiling attacks are characterized by

• A requirement to have a clear picture of enemy preparations and dis-
positions.
• A number of independent subordinate unit actions.
• Highly focused objectives.
• The possibility that a spoiling attack may open a window of opportu-
nity for other operations.
3-101. The OPFOR seeks to have the following conditions met in order to
conduct a spoiling attack:
• RISTA establishes a picture of enemy attack preparations.
• Enemy security, reserve, and response forces are located and tracked.
• Enemy ground reconnaissance in the attack zone is destroyed or ren-
dered ineffective.
3-102. Spoiling attacks are actually executed using one of the other types of
offensive action as the base method: integrated attack, dispersed attack, or
sophisticated ambush. Thus, the forces engaged in a spoiling attack would be
organized accordingly. The primary difference between a spoiling attack and
the other types of limited-objective attack is the purpose of the attack.
Counterattack
3-103. A counterattack is designed to cause an enemy offensive operation to
culminate and allow the OPFOR to return to offensive operations. A counter-
attack is designed to control the tempo of operations by returning the initia-
tive to the OPFOR. Like a spoiling attack, a counterattack often develops as
a situational attack, when the commander wishes to take advantage of a
fleeting opportunity. The difference is that the counterattack occurs after the
enemy begins his attack. See Figure 3-9 for an example of a counterattack.
3-104. Counterattacks are characterized by
• A shifting in command and support relationships to assume an offen-
sive posture for the counterattacking force.
• A proper identification that the enemy is at or near culmination.
• The planned rapid transition of the remainder of the force to offensive
operations.
• The possibility that a counterattack may open a window of opportu-
nity for other operations.
3-105. The OPFOR seeks to set the following conditions for a counterattack:
• Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be committed.
• Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack
preparations.
3-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
OSC
LOR
Support Zone Battle Zone Disruption Zone
II
XX
Main
Defense
Force
OSC
LOR
Assault II
Force XX
XX
III
Exploitation
Force
XX
XX
Fixing XX
Force (Former XX
Main Defense
Force)
Figure 3-9. Counterattack (Example)
Organizing Forces for a Counterattack

3-106. Since counterattacks develop out of a defensive posture, the organiza-
tion of forces involves the rapid shifting of some forces from their previously
defensive roles to attack the enemy. Generally, the disruption force was al-
ready part of a previous OPFOR defensive posture and continues to perform
the same functions during a counterattack. Like other offensive actions, a
counterattack employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. Within the
context of a larger defensive action, these forces come from the main defense
force and/or the reserve, and they collectively make up the counterattack force.
Other forces in the AOR may continue to perform their original defensive roles.
3-107. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a counterattack is that part of the
force engaged in defensive action with the enemy. These forces continue to
fight from their current positions and seek to account for the key parts of the
enemy array and sure they are not able to break contact and reposition.
Additionally, the fixing force has the mission of making contact with and
destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and any combat forces that may
have penetrated the OPFOR defense.
3-108. Assault Force. In a counterattack, the assault force (if one is used) is
assigned the mission of forcing the enemy to commit his reserve so that the
enemy commander has no further mobile forces with which to react. If the fixing
3-25
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
force has already forced this commitment, the counterattack design may
forego the creation of an assault force.
3-109. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a counterattack ma-
neuvers through or bypasses engaged enemy forces to attack and destroy the
enemy’s support infrastructure before he has time or freedom to react. An
armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be the core of an ex-
ploitation force in a counterattack due to the combination of mobility, protec-
tion, and firepower possessed by such forces.
STRIKE
3-110. A strike is an offensive course of action that rapidly destroys a key en-
emy organization through a synergistic combination of massed precision fires
and maneuver. The targeted enemy formation is usually a battalion task
force or larger. Defeat for the enemy does not come through the simple de-
struction of armored weapon systems or combat soldiers but through the sub-
sequent paralyzation that occurs when a key organization is completely dev-
astated in a small span of time. See Figures 3-10 and 3-11 for examples of
strikes. The overall objective is to destroy an enemy formation, typically after
carefully setting the conditions for its destruction. The strike can be em-
ployed in larger operations that are either defensive or offensive in nature.
Enemy Main Line of

Resistance
OSC
Attack Zone
Kill
Assault Force
XX XX
X Zone
X
Exploitation
Force
Enemy
Support
Area
X
X
Exploitation
Force Enemy Tactical
Airfield
X
Fixing Force
OSC
Battle Line
Figure 3-10. Strike (Example 1)
3-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 3
3-111. The primary objective of a strike is the enemy’s will and ability to
fight. The OPFOR recognizes that modern militaries cannot rapidly reconsti-
tute entire combat formations and that significant destruction is both capa-
ble of removing all momentum possessed by a combat formation and elimi-
nating support at home for continued combat operations.
3-112. Strikes are characterized by
• Being focused on the complete destruction of a particular enemy for-
mation.
• Typically following a period of reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7).
• Requiring effective and integrated C2 and RISTA means.
• The use of complex terrain to force the enemy to fight at a dis-
advantage.
• Significant reliance on deception and other IW measures.
OSC
X
X
DTG DTG
Battle Battle
Zone Zone
l
Kil e
o n
Disruption X Z
Zone
Disruption
Zone
Axis
Enemy
Attack
X
Zone
DTG
Battle
Zone
LEGEND
OS Complex
C Battle
Position
Support Zone
Figure 3-11. Strike (Example 2)
3-27
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
3-113. The window of opportunity needed to establish conditions favorable to

the execution of a strike may be one created by the OPFOR or one that devel-
ops due to external factors in the operational environment. When this window
must be created, the OPFOR keys on several tasks that must be accomplished:
• Destroy enemy ground reconnaissance.
• Create an uncertain air defense environment.
Reconnaissance Fire
3-114. In addition to the above, the OPFOR will typically precede a strike
with significant reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7) designed to remove one
or more key capabilities from the enemy force. The targeted capabilities could
be ground reconnaissance, effective C2, effective logistics, or casualty evacuation.
Organizing Forces for a Strike

3-115. A strike employs fixing, assault, and exploitation forces. The disrup-
tion force can play an important role in determining when the target forma-
tion will enter the kill zone for the strike.
3-116. Fixing Force. The fixing force in a strike is primarily focused on fix-
ing enemy forces that might come to the aid of the target formation. The bat-
tle will develop rapidly, and enemy forces cannot be allowed to reposition to
influence the assault and exploitation forces. Maneuver forces, precision
fires, air defense units, long-range antiarmor systems, situational obstacles,
chemical weapons, and EW are well suited to fix defending forces.
3-117. Assault Force. The assault force in a strike is charged with creating
the conditions that allow the exploitation force to complete the destruction of
the target formation. Since the exploitation force is principally required to
act within the window of opportunity, the assault force may successfully em-
ploy infiltration of infantry to carefully pre-selected points to assist the ex-
ploitation force in its action. Smoke and suppressive artillery and rocket
fires, combat engineer units, and air-delivered weapons are also suited to this
mission.
3-118. Exploitation Force. The exploitation force in a strike has the mis-
sion of completing the destruction of the target formation. Strike exploitation
forces are almost always combinations of highly lethal ground maneuver
formations and precision long-range fire systems. A strike must be capable of
eliminating the target enemy force before the higher enemy commander has
time to react. An armored or attack helicopter unit is often best suited to be
the core of an exploitation force in a strike, due to the combination of mobil-
ity, protection, and firepower possessed by such forces. However, a strike
may be successfully executed without any maneuver forces, and the exploita-
tion force may consist entirely of long-range fire systems.
3-28
Chapter 4
Defensive Operations
While the OPFOR sees the offense as the decisive form of military action,
it recognizes defense as the stronger form of military action, particularly
when faced with a superior, extraregional foe. Defensive operations can
lead to strategic victory if the extraregional enemy abandons his mission.
It may be sufficient for the OPFOR simply not to lose. Even when an
operational-level commandsuch as a field group (FG) or operational-
strategic command (OSC)as a whole is conducting an offensive operation,
it is likely that one or more subordinate units may be executing defensive
missions to preserve offensive combat power in other areas, to protect an
important formation or resource, or to deny access to key facilities or geo-
graphic areas.
OPFOR defenses can be characterized as a “shield of blows.” Each force

and zone of the defense plays an important role in the attack of the en-
emy’s combat system. An operational-level defense is structured around
the concept that destroying the synergy of the enemy’s combat system will
make enemy forces vulnerable to attack and destruction.
Commanders and staffs do not approach the defense with preconceived

templates. The operational situation may cause the commander to vary
his defensive methods and techniques. Nevertheless, there are basic
characteristics of defensive operations (purposes and types of action) that
have applications in all situations.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
4-1. Defensive operations are an important component of all OPFOR stra-
tegic campaigns. However, the scale and purpose of defensive actions may
differ during the various types of strategic-level actions.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
4-2. The State possesses an overmatch in all elements of power against
internal and regional opponents. It is able to employ that power in regional
operations in a conventional operational design. This overmatch does not
imply, however, that regional operations are entirely offensive. Consolidation
of gains, security actions, and economy-of-force measures can all produce de-
fensive courses of action inside a larger offensive design.
4-3. The State’s military forces are sufficient to overmatch any single re-
gional neighbor, but not necessarily an alliance or coalition of neighboring
countries. They may not be a match for the forces an extraregional power
can bring to bear. Thus, the OPFOR seeks to exploit its numerical and
4-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
technological overmatch against one regional opponent rapidly, before other

regional neighbors or an extraregional power can enter the fight. In some
cases, this may require defensive operations against one or more regional
neighbors who are not the main target of the strategic campaign, to mitigate
their ability to disrupt an OPFOR offensive against the one that is.
4-4. Regional operations include essentially defensive security actions to
maintain internal stability. In addition, the Internal Security Forces help
control the population in territory the OPFOR seizes or engage enemy forces
that invade State territory.
4-5. The State’s military goal during regional operations is to destroy its re-
gional opponents’ military power in order to achieve specific ends. The State
plans regional operations well in advance and executes them as rapidly as is
feasible in order to preclude intervention by outside forces. Still, at the very
outset of these operations, it lays plans and positions forces to conduct access-
control operations in the event of outside intervention. Extraregional
forces may also be vulnerable to conventional operations during the time
they require to build combat power and create support at home for their
intervention.
4-6. If an extraregional force starts to deploy into the region, the balance of
power begins to shift away from the State. Although the OPFOR may not yet
be totally overmatched by the enemy force, it faces a threat it cannot handle
with normal, “conventional” patterns of operation designed for regional
conflict. Therefore, the OPFOR must begin to adapt its operations to the
changing threat.
4-7. As the State begins transition operations, its immediate goal is preser-
vation of its instruments of power while seeking transition back to regional
operations. Transition operations therefore feature a mixture of offensive and
defensive actions.
4-8. This combination of offensive and defensive actions can allow the State
to control the strategic tempo while changing the nature of conflict to
something for which the intervening force is unprepared. If these actions are
successful and the extraregional force is no longer a factor, the OPFOR may
be able to transition back to regional operations without having to complete
the shift to adaptive operations.
4-9. During transition operations, the State must decide whether to keep
its forces in any territory it has occupied in a neighboring country or to
withdraw them back to its home territory. The decision to stay or withdraw
at this point may be based on the presence or absence of complex terrain
suitable for defensive operations in the occupied territory against an
extraregional power with overmatch in technology and conventional forces.
The OPFOR is more likely to remain in the occupied territory if it has already
achieved its strategic goal in regional operations or at least achieved major
intermediate objectives leading toward that goal and can structure an
effective defense in that territory. Military forces in the immediate vicinity
of the point of intervention move into defensive positions as opportunity
allows, making use of existing command and control (C2) and logistics.
4-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-10. The OPFOR can use the time it takes the extraregional force to prepare
and deploy into the region to change the nature of the conflict into something
for which the intervening force is unprepared. The OPFOR tries to establish
conditions that force the new enemy to fight at less than full strength and on
terrain for which his forces are not optimized. It seeks to take advantage of
complex terrain whenever possible, while controlling the enemy’s access to
such terrain. It plans operations to exploit the opportunities created by the
presence of NGOs, PVOs, media, and other civilians on the battlefield.
4-11. Meanwhile, transition operations permit other key forces the time,
space, and freedom of action necessary to move into sanctuary in preparation
for a shift to adaptive operations. These forces preserve combat power and
prepare to defend the State homeland, if necessary. Transition operations
usually include mobilization of reserve and militia forces to assist in defending
the State.
4-12. At some point, the OPFOR may conclude that it cannot deny entry or
defeat the extraregional force by destroying his early-entry forces. The
OPFOR then shifts its emphasis to completing the transition to adaptive
operations as soon as possible, before the enemy can deploy overwhelming
forces into the region.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
4-13. From the perspective of the extraregional power, any regional crisis has
the potential to expand into a major theater war. Therefore, it will try to
avoid crisis expansion by early engagement and rapid response. The longer
the State can delay effective extraregional response to the crisis in the region,
the greater its chances for success. Failing to limit or interrupt access to the
region, the State will attempt to degrade further enemy force projection, hold
initial gains, and extend the conflict, while preserving its own military capa-
bility and other instruments of national power.
4-14. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, these are more defensive
in nature than were regional or transition operations. When overmatched
in conventional power, the OPFOR seeks to preserve its own power and
apply it in adaptive ways. It expects its commanders to seize opportunity,
tailor organizations to the mission, and make creative use of existing
resourceseven more than they did in regional and transition operations.
4-15. Generally, the OPFOR conducts adaptive operations during the strate-
gic campaign as a consequence of intervention from outside the region. If it
cannot control the extraregional enemy’s access into the region or defeat his
forces before his combat potential in the region equals or exceeds its own, the
OPFOR must resort to adaptive operations. The primary objectives are to
preserve combat power, to degrade the enemy’s will and capability to fight,
and to gain time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed.
4-16. Adaptive operations occur as a result of an extraregional power
intervening with sufficient forces to thwart the OPFOR’s original of-
fensive operations in the region. The OPFOR disperses to the extent its C2
allows and conducts decentralized operations in both offense and defense.
The OPFOR views adaptive operations as temporary in nature, serving as a
means for the OPFOR to return to regional operations.
4-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
4-17. Adaptive operations are often sanctuary-based. Sanctuaries are areas

that limit the ability of an opponent to apply his full range of capabilities.
The OPFOR can use physical and/or moral sanctuaries for preserving and
applying forces. It can defend in sanctuaries or attack out of them. It may
conduct limited-objective attacks from these positions to prevent buildup
of intervening forces, to facilitate the defense, or to take advantage of an
opportunity to counterattack. When defending, the OPFOR generally does
not employ fixed, contiguous defensive fronts.
4-18. The OPFOR uses flexible and unpredictable force structures task-
organized for particular missions. Forces may be combined arms, joint,
interagency, and possibly multinational. The State may fully mobilize all
available means to create large conventional force and paramilitary capability in
support of adaptive operations. Full mobilization involves all military and
paramilitary forces, including militia. During adaptive operations, the
State will use conventional forces in adaptive ways. It will also employ
unconventional and specialized forces tailored to the needs of combat against
an extraregional force with technological overmatch. Operations may also
involve various types of affiliated forces.
PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

4-19. Defensive operations are designed to achieve the goals of the strategic
campaign through active measures while preserving combat power. However,
the purpose of any given defensive operation depends on the situation.
4-20. The primary distinction among types of OPFOR defensive operations is
their purpose. Therefore, the OPFOR recognizes three general types of defen-
sive operations according to their purpose: to destroy, preserve, or deny.
DEFENSE TO DESTROY
4-21. A defense to destroy is designed to eliminate an attacking formation’s
ability to continue offensive operations while preserving friendly forces and
setting the military conditions for a favorable political settlement. Such a
defense may be the entirety of an operation or may be used to defeat a
counterattack during a larger OPFOR offensive action. An operational
defense to destroy often has one or more tactical offensive actions as
subcomponents.
DEFENSE TO PRESERVE
4-22. A defense to preserve is designed to protect key components of the
OPFOR from destruction by the enemy. Such a defense may occur
• To preserve combat power for future operations.
• Before the outbreak of a war, or in its early stages, to cover the mobili-
zation and deployment of the main forces.
• When facing numerically or qualitatively superior enemy forces.
• During an offense, to economize force in one area and achieve superior-
ity in another.
4-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
DEFENSE TO DENY
4-23. A defense to deny is intended to deny the enemy access to a geographic
area or use of facilities that could enhance his combat operations or provide
him substantial value for information operations. An example of this would
be enemy capture of a religious or cultural center. This type of defense is
most often used as part of an overall campaign of theater access control.
It may also be used to consolidate, retain, and protect critical positions that
attacking forces have captured.
PLANNING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

4-24. For the OPFOR, the key elements of planning defensive operations
are
• Determining the level of planning possible (planned versus situational
defense).
• Organizing the battlefield.
• Organizing forces.
• Organizing information warfare (IW) activities in support of the de-
fense (see Chapter 5).
4-25. Defensive actions during transition and adaptive operations will not be
able to rely simply on attrition-based operations in layered engagement
areas. Such actions will typically include increased use of
• Infiltration to conduct spoiling attacks and ambushes.
• Perception management (see Chapter 5) in support of defensive opera-
tions.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures.
• Affiliated forces for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, security,
and attacks against key enemy systems.
PLANNED DEFENSE
4-26. A planned (or deliberate) defense is a defensive operation undertaken
when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and re-
hearse forces for specific tasks. Typically, the enemy is in a staging or assembly
area and in a known location and status. The OPFOR plans a defense using the
method described in Chapter 2. Key considerations in defensive planning are
• Selecting operationally significant areas in complex terrain from which
to dominate surrounding avenues of approach.
• Determining the method that will deny the enemy his operational
objectives.
• Developing a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) that locates and tracks major enemy forma-
tion and determines enemy patterns of operations and probable objectives.
• Creating or taking advantage of a window of opportunity that frees
friendly forces from any enemy advantages in precision standoff and
situational awareness.
4-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
SITUATIONAL DEFENSE
4-27. The OPFOR recognizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic, and fleet-
ing opportunities to attack an enemy weakness will continually present
themselves and just as quickly disappear. If the OPFOR determines that, by
conserving resources in one area, it may be able to take advantage of a win-
dow of opportunity in another, it may assume a situational (or hasty) defense.
It may also do so when an OPFOR attack culminates prior to achieving the
objective.
4-28. The OPFOR may also be forced to employ a situational defense when it
has been conducting offensive operations against a regional neighbor and in-
tervention by a powerful extraregional force materializes more quickly than
anticipated. Thus, the OPFOR may have to make the transition from regional
to adaptive operations more rapidly than planned. Units may still be able to
move into preplanned positions in complex terrain, but without some meas-
ures they anticipated being able to take during transition operations. They
may or may not have fully-prepared, complex battle positions, with engineer
preparation, C3D measures, and logistics caches.
4-29. The commander develops his assessment of the conditions leading to a
situational defense rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He
provides a basic course of action to the staff, who then quickly turn that
course of action into an executable operational directive.
4-30. Organization of the battlefield in a situational defense is normally lim-
ited to minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces in
a situational defense typically relies on minor modifications to existing
structure.
4-31. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a
situational defense:
• The enemy gains or regains air superiority sooner than anticipated.
• An enemy counterattack was not effectively fixed.
• An attacking force makes contact with an enemy formation it did not
expect.
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD FOR THE DEFENSE
area of responsibility (AOR), as defined by the next-higher commander, he
designates AORs for his subordinates, along with zones related to his own
overall mission.
4-33. In organizing the defensive battlefield, the operational commander
organizes forces to begin attack of the combat system of the enemy force as
soon as feasible. By attacking subsystems or components of the enemy’s
combat system appropriate to the situation, the operational commander can
create windows of opportunity for offensive action.
4-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-34. OPFOR AORs normally consist of three principal zones: disruption,
battle, and support zones. Zones may be linear or nonlinear in nature and
are designed to facilitate rapid transition between linear and nonlinear
operations, as well as between offense and defense. These zones have the
same basic purposes in all types of defenses. In addition to the basic zones in an
AOR, the operational-level commander may also employ attack zones and kill
zones to control subordinate offensive operations conducted in support of the
overall defensive scheme. See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for generalized examples of
AORs and zones in linear and nonlinear defensive operations.
OSC
OSC DTG DTG OSC
X
Disruption Disruption
X
Battle Zone Support
Zone Zone
(if employed) Zone
X
X
KI NE
ZO
LL
KILL
E
ZON
X
Enemy X
DTG DTG
X XXX
X
Disruption Battle Zone
Zone OSC
(if employed)
X
X
X
KIL LL
ZON
L KI NE
E ZO OSC
X Reserve
X
BTG
Battle Zone II
Enemy
ZO ILL
E
X
K
OSC
N
Antilanding
Reserve
OSC
Figure 4-1. Example of AOR (Linear Battlespace)
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OSC
DTG
Battle
Zone
DTG
Battle
Zone
l
Kil e
n
Zo
Disruption
Zone Disruption
Zone
DTG
Battle
Zone
LEGEND
Complex
O Battle
SC
Position
Support Zone
Figure 4-2. Example of AOR (Nonlinear Battlespace)
Disruption Zone
4-35. In the defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace where opera-
tional forces begin their attack on the designated component or subsystem of
the enemy’s combat system. It is located between the OSC’s battle zone and
the limit of responsibility (LOR) that defines the extent of the AOR. Within
this battlespace, the OPFOR seeks to set the conditions for the defeat of the
attacking force in the battle zone. For example, the operational-level com-
mander may determine that destruction of the enemy’s mobility assets will
create an opportunity to destroy maneuver units in the battle zone. The dis-
ruption force would be given the mission of seeking out and destroying enemy
mobility assets while avoiding engagement with maneuver forces.
4-36. The disruption zone is the primary area in which the operational-level
commander will employ long-range joint fires and strikes. He may establish
kill zones within his disruption zone for the purpose of integrating the actions
of long-range fire elements and disruption force elements.
4-37. The operational-level disruption zone may be the aggregate of the disrup-
tion zones of subordinates. For example, an FG’s disruption zone could include
the disruption zones of one or more OSCs and/or tactical-level commands directly
subordinate to the FG. An OSC’s disruption zone could include disruption zones
4-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
of subordinate division and brigade tactical groups (DTGs and BTGs), al-
though assets directly controlled by the OSC could also operate throughout
an OSC disruption zone. In such cases, each subordinate would be responsi-
ble for a portion of the operational-level disruption zone, and that portion
would constitute the subordinate’s disruption zone within its own AOR. In
other cases, an operational-level disruption zone may extend beyond those of
the FG’s or OSC’s subordinates, to include an area occupied by forces sent out
under direct control of the FG or OSC commander.
4-38. Operational-level forces in the disruption zone could include special-
purpose forces (SPF) and affiliated forces, which could be operating in enemy-
held territory even before the beginning of hostilities. There could also be
stay-behind forces in areas seized by the enemy.
Battle Zone
4-39. The battle zone is that battlespace in which the main defense force uses
fires and maneuver to exploit the conditions created by successful disruption
zone operations. In the battle zone, the main defense force completes the dis-
aggregation of the enemy’s combat system by destroying the components ex-
posed by the disruption force. By inflicting significant damage or denying the
enemy his objectives, the main defense force causes the enemy to culminate
and, in the best case, to quit the field entirely. An operational-level battle
zone is often the aggregate of the battle zones of subordinate units.
4-40. The battle zone ties all available obstacles into an integrated fire sup-
port plan of all available weapons. It denies complex terrain to the enemy. It
allows the enemy to enter easily, but to exit only at great cost or ideally not
at all. The operational-level commander may establish kill zones within the
battle zone for the purpose of integrating long-range fire, ground attack avia-
tion, and main defense forces. Long-range fires from the battle zone may also
reach kill zones in the disruption zone, where these fires can be integrated
with the actions of disruption forces.
Support Zone
4-41. The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be free of
significant enemy action and to permit the effective logistics and administra-
tive support of forces. Security forces (see Organizing Forces for the Defense
below) operate in the support zone in a combat role to defeat enemy special
operations forces and other threats. Camouflage, concealment, cover, and de-
ception (C3D) measures occur throughout the support zone to protect the force
from standoff RISTA and precision attack.
Attack Zone
4-42. During an overall defensive operation, an attack zone may be employed
to conduct an offensive action inside a larger defensive action. It will have the
characteristics described in Chapter 3. An axis is a control measure showing
the location through which a counterattack force, for example, will move as it
proceeds from its assembly area to its attack zone. At the operational level,
multi-division OSCs may conduct offensive actions as a part of a larger de-
fensive scheme.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Kill Zone
4-43. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the OPFOR
plans to destroy a key enemy target, usually by fire. Kill zones may be within
any of the zones described above.
Battle Position
4-44. Within the AOR of an operational command, tactical-level subordinates
may occupy battle positions. A battle position is a defensive location designed
to maximize the occupying unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. A battle
position is selected such that the terrain in and around it is complementary
to the occupying unit’s capabilities and its tactical task. There are two kinds
of battle positions: simple and complex. See Figure 4-3.
Enemy
Enemy
Enemy
Enemy Enemy
Complex Battle Position

Simple Battle Positions
Figure 4-3. Battle Positions
4-45. A simple battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most

likely enemy avenue of approach. Simple battle positions are not necessarily
tied to complex terrain but often employ as much engineer effort as time allows.
4-46. Complex battle positions are defensive locations designed to protect the
units within them from detection and attack while denying their seizure and
occupation by the enemy. They typically employ a combination of complex
terrain, C3D measures, and engineer effort to protect combat forces from en-
gagement by precision standoff attack.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-47. A typical complex battle position contains

• Complex terrain.
• A substantial logistics cache.
• Extensive engineer fortification and obstacle work.
• C3D effort to confuse the enemy picture of strength and disposition.
• Precision fire capability.
• Mobile reserves.
• Air defense systems.
• Redundant C2 systems.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE

4-48. In his operation plan, the operational-level commander also specifies
the organization of the forces within his level of command. Thus, subordinate
forces understand their roles within the overall operation. However, the or-
ganization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of an operation.
For example, a unit that initially was part of a disruption force may eventu-
ally occupy a battle position within the battle zone and become part of the
main defense force or act as a reserve.
4-49. Each of the separate functional forces has an identified commander.
This is often the senior commander of the largest subordinate unit assigned
to that force. For example, if two DTGs and a separate BTG are acting as the
OSC’s main defense force, the senior of the two DTG commanders is the main
defense force commander. During decentralized operations, even when the force
consists of like units of the same command level, control can be delegated to the
senior commander of that force’s like units. Since, in this option, each force
commander is also a subordinate unit commander, he controls the force from
his unit’s command post (CP).
4-50. Another option is to have one of the OSC’s or FG’s CPs be in charge
of a functional force. Particularly during dispersed defensive operations,
functional forces that contain units of the same command level might be
controlled from the forward, auxiliary, or airborne CP of the OSC or FG.
For example, the forward CP could control a disruption force. Another
possibility would be for the IFC CP to command the disruption force or
any other force whose actions must be closely coordinated with fires deliv-
ered by the integrated fires command (IFC).
4-51. In any case, the force commander is responsible to the OSC or FG
commander to ensure that combat preparations are made properly and to
take charge of the force during the operation. This frees the operational-level
commander from decisions specific to the force’s mission. Even when tactical-
level subordinates of an OSC or FG have responsibility for parts of the OSC
or FG disruption zone, there is still an overall OSC or FG disruption force
commander.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Disruption Force
4-52. The size and composition of forces in the disruption zone depends on
the level of command involved, the commander’s concept of operations, and
the circumstances in which the unit adopts the defense. An operational-level
disruption force has no set organization but may be as large as a multi-division
OSC or consist only of SPF teams to direct reconnaissance fires and conduct
direct action. The operational-level commander will always make maximum use
of stay-behind forces and affiliated forces existing within his AOR. Subordinate
commanders can employ forces in a disruption zone role independent of the
operation plan only with approval of the operational-level commander.
4-53. A disruption force has no set order of battle, but may contain
• Ambush teams (ground and air defense).
• SPF teams.
• RISTA assets and forces.
• Counterreconnaissance forces.
• Artillery systems.
• Target designation teams.
• Affiliated forces (such as terrorists, insurgents, criminals, or special police).
• Antilanding reserves.
4-54. The purpose of the disruption force is to prevent the enemy from
conducting an effective attack. The disruption force does this by initiating
the attack on components of the enemy’s combat system. Successful attack of
designated components or subsystems begins the disaggregation of the
enemy’s combat system and creates vulnerabilities for exploitation in the
battle zone. Skillfully conducted disruption operations will effectively deny
the enemy the synergy of effects of his combat system.
4-55. The disruption force may also have a counterreconnaissance mission.
It may selectively destroy or render irrelevant the enemy’s RISTA forces.
There will be times, however, when the OPFOR wants enemy reconnaissance
to detect something that is part of the deception plan. In those cases, the dis-
ruption force will not seek to destroy all of the enemy’s RISTA assets.
Main Defense Force

4-56. The main defense force is the component of the operational-level command
that is charged with execution of the defensive mission. It operates in the battle
zone to accomplish the purpose of the operation (destroy, preserve, or deny).
Protected Force
4-57. In a defense to preserve, the protected force is the force being kept from
detection or destruction by the enemy. Protection can be afforded by C3D
and/or the actions of other OPFOR units. There is generally some force that
the OPFOR is trying to protect from enemy observation and fire, to ensure
that it will still have that force after the current operation is over. At the
operational level, this force is critical to future operations and the preser-
vation of the regime. It may be in the battle zone or the support zone.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
Security Force
4-58. The security force conducts activities to prevent or mitigate the effects
of hostile actions against the overall operational-level command and/or its
key components. If the commander chooses, he may charge this security force
with providing force protection for the entire AOR, including the rest of the
functional forces; logistics and administrative elements in the support zone;
and other key installations, facilities, and resources. The security force may
include various types of unitssuch as infantry, SPF, counterreconnaissance,
and signals reconnaissance assetsto focus on enemy special operations and
long-range reconnaissance forces operating throughout the AOR. It can also
include internal security forces units allocated to the operational-level com-
mand, with the mission of protecting the overall command from attack by
hostile insurgents, terrorists, and special operations forces. The security
force may also be charged with mitigating the effects of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The security force commander can be given control over
one or more reserve formations, such as the antilanding reserve.
Counterattack Forces
4-59. In a defensive operation with a planned counterattack scheme (typically in
a maneuver defense), the operational-level commander designates one or
more counterattack forces. He also shifts his task organization to create a
counterattack force when a window of opportunity opens that leaves the enemy
vulnerable to such an action. At the operational level, the counterattack force
may be a multi-division force with the mission to destroy a major enemy for-
mation that is exposed. The operational-level commander uses counterattack
forces to complete the defensive mission assigned and regain the initiative
for the offense. The counterattack force can have within it fixing, assault,
and exploitation forces (as outlined in Chapter 3).
Types of Reserves
4-60. At the commander’s discretion, forces may be held out of initial action
so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing
opportunities. He may employ a number of different types of reserve forces of
varying strengths, depending on the situation.
4-61. Maneuver Reserve. The size and composition of a reserve force is
entirely situation-dependent. However, the reserve is normally a force
strong enough to respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at
the operational level. A reserve may assume the role of counterattack
force to deliver the final blow that ensures the enemy can no longer conduct his
preferred operation.
4-62. A reserve force is given a list of possible missions for rehearsal and
planning purposes. The staff assigns to each of these missions a priority,
based on likelihood that the reserve might be called upon to execute that
mission. Some missions given to the reserve may include
• Conducting a counterattack. (The counterattack goal is not limited to
destroying enemy forces, but may also include recovering lost positions
or capturing positions operationally advantageous for subsequent
combat actions.)
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Conducting counterpenatration (blocking or destroying enemy pene-

trations).
• Conducting antilanding operations (eliminating vertical envelopments).
• Assisting forces heavily engaged on a defended line to break contact
and withdraw.
• Act as a deception force.
4-63. Antitank Reserve. OPFOR commanders faced with significant ar-

mored threats may keep an antitank reserve (ATR). It is generally an anti-
tank unit and often operates in conjunction with an obstacle detachment (OD).
Based on the availability of antitank and engineer assets, an operational-level
command may form more than one ATR.
4-64. Antilanding Reserve. Because of the potential threat from enemy
airborne or airmobile troops, an operational-level commander may designate
an antilanding reserve (ALR). Operational-level ALRs would be resourced for
rapid movement to potential drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs). The
ALR commander would have immediate access to the operational intelligence
system for early warning of potential enemy landing operations. ALRs typically
include maneuver forces, air defense assets, and engineer units, but may be
allocated any unit capable of disrupting or defeating an airborne or heliborne
landing, such as smoke or electronic warfare (EW). While other reserves can
perform this mission, the commander may create a dedicated ALR to prevent
destabilization of the defense by vertical envelopment of OPFOR units or seizure
of key terrain. ALRs assume positions prepared to engage the enemy primary DZ
or LZ as a kill zone. They rehearse and plan for rapid redeployment to other sus-
pected DZs or LZs. Operational-level commanders may direct long-range fires or
SPF direct action to prevent enemy forces from mounting air insertions. The de-
struction of airframes or fuel sources, or the positioning of air defense assets may
serve to take this option away from enemy forces.
4-65. Special Reserves. An operational-level command may form an
engineer reserve of earthmoving and obstacle-creating equipment. A com-
mander can deploy this reserve to strengthen defenses on a particularly
threatened axis during the course of the operation. An operational-level
command threatened by enemy use of WMD may also form a chemical
defense reserve.
Deception Force
4-66. When the IW plan requires the creation of nonexistent or partially ex-
isting formations, these forces are designated deception forces in close-hold
executive summaries of the operation plan. Wide-distribution copies of the
plan make reference to these forces according to the designation given them in
the deception story. The deception force in the defense is typically given its own
command structure to both replicate the organization(s) necessary to the decep-
tion story and to execute the multidiscipline deception required to replicate an
actual military organization. For example, FG commanders can use deception
OSC command structures to deny enemy forces information on operation plans
for the defense.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
PREPARING FOR THE DEFENSE

4-67. In the preparation phase, the OPFOR focuses on ways of applying all
available resources and the full range of actions to conduct defensive operations.
Commanders organize their forces and the battlefield with an eye toward
capitalizing on conditions created by successful defensive actions, and seizing
opportunities for offensive actions wherever possible. The defensive dispositions
are based on the application of the systems warfare approach to combat, as
described in Chapter 1. OPFOR defensive operations focus on attacking
components or subsystems to of the enemy’s combat system to disaggregate
the “system of systems.” By denying the enemy the synergy created by an
integrated, aggregated system, vulnerabilities are created that defensive
forces can exploit.
DENY ENEMY INFORMATION

4-68. Operational-level commanders realize that enemy operations hinge on
an appreciation of the situation. So, defensive preparations focus on de-
struction and deception of enemy national and theater sensors. Lethal and
nonlethal attack of enemy intelligence satellites and reconnaissance aircraft
can limit the ability of enemy forces to understand the OPFOR defensive
plan. The OPFOR recognizes that, when conducting operations against an
extraregional power, it will often be impossible to destroy the ability of the
enemy’s standoff RISTA means to observe its defensive preparations.
However, the OPFOR also recognizes the reluctance of enemy military
commanders to operate without human confirmation of intelligence, as well
as the relative ease with which imagery and signals sensors may be deceived.
The OPFOR operational-level commander considers ground reconnaissance
by enemy special operations Forces as a significant threat in the enemy
RISTA suite and focuses significant effort to ensure its removal. While the
OPFOR will execute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, C3D would
be the method of choice for degrading the capability of such systems.
MAKE THOROUGH COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY PREPARATIONS

4-69. The more time available, the greater the preparation of an AOR for
the defense. This is a reflection of engineer effort and time to devote to
that effort. The OPFOR employs every method to maximize the time
available to prepare for the defense. This includes preparation of the State
during peacetime and highly detailed plans for transition from regional to
adaptive operations to take full advantage of any operational lull as the
enemy builds combat power. This might involve an offensive operation
with limited objectives that transitions to the defense by design.
4-70. Operational-level commanders realize that engineer works are vital to
the stability of the defense. Engineer assets will be used to improve the ad-
vantages of complex terrain in protecting friendly forces and exposing enemy
forces to engagement. Engineer efforts can contribute to creating windows of
opportunity by degrading the ability of the enemy’s combat system to inte-
grate the effects of its subsystems.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
4-71. Engineer units specializing in rapid obstacle construction and minelaying

form mission-specific units known as ODs. These ODs normally deploy in
conjunction with reserves to block enemy penetrations or to protect the flanks
of counterattack forces. In the initial stages of the defense, engineer assets
concentrate on creating obstacles in the disruption zone, in gaps in the combat
formation, and to the flanks, and preparing lines for counterpenetration and
counterattack and routes to such lines. The obstacle plan ensures that the
effort is coordinated with fires and maneuver to produce the desired effects.
In conjunction with other tasks, engineers support the IW plan through
activities such as constructing false defensive positions and preparing false
routes. More information on countermobility and survivability planning at the
operational level can be found in Chapter 10.
MAKE USE OF COMPLEX TERRAIN

4-72. The OPFOR tries to make maximum use of complex terrain in all
defensive operations. Complex terrain provides cover from fires, concealment
from standoff RISTA assets, and intelligence and logistics support from the
population of urban areas. It plays into the strength of OPFOR resolve to win
through any means and through protracted conflict if necessary.
MAKE THOROUGH LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS

4-73. The overwhelming ability of extraregional intervention forces to attack
exposed logistics elements makes it difficult to resupply forces. The OPFOR
understands that there is as much chance of a defensive operation being
brought to culmination by a lack of sufficient logistics support as there is by
enemy action. Careful consideration is given to carried days of supply and
pre-established caches to obviate the need for easily disrupted lines of
communication (LOCs).

4-74. The OPFOR takes into account that, while it might consider itself to be
in the preparation phase for one operation, it is continuously in the execution
phase. Plans are never considered final. Plans are checked throughout the
course of their development to ensure they are still valid in light of battlefield
events.
REHEARSE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE, IN PRIORITY

4-75. At the operational level, rehearsals are usually confined to map or
sand table exercises to ensure understanding by subordinate commanders.
The commander establishes the priority for critical parts of the operation,
and rehearses those operations with his subordinates. Typical actions to
be rehearsed in a defensive operation include
• Commitment of a reserve.
• Initiation of a counterattack.
• Execution of the fire support plan.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
EXECUTING THE DEFENSE

4-76. Successful execution depends on forces that understand their roles in
the operation and can swiftly follow preparatory actions with implementation
of the operation plan or rapid modifications to the plan, as the situation
requires. A successful execution phase results in the culmination of the
enemy’s offensive action. It ideally ends with transition to the offense in
order to keep the enemy under pressure and destroy him completely. During
adaptive operations against superior enemy force, however, a successful
defense may end in a stalemate.
4-77. A successful operational-level defense sets the military conditions for a
return to the offense or a favorable political resolution of the conflict. The
OPFOR may have to surrender territory to preserve forces. Territory can al-
ways be recaptured, but the destruction of OPFOR operational formations
threatens the survival of the State. Destruction of the protected force is
unacceptable.
4-78. Success criteria for an operational-level commander conducting an area
or maneuver defense may include
• Major combat formations remain intact.
• The enemy is forced to withdraw or, at a minimum, forego offensive
operations due to losses.
• A stalemate allows theater- and national-level assets time to conduct
attacks against enemy strategic centers of gravity.
MAINTAIN CONTACT
4-79. OPFOR operational-level commanders go to great lengths to maintain
contact with enemy formations and headquarters that may influence theater
operations. This includes rapid reconstitution of reconnaissance assets and
forces.

4-80. The OPFOR is sensitive to the effects of mission dynamics and realizes
that the enemy’s actions may well make the original mission of an OPFOR
unit achievable, but completely irrelevant. As an example, an OSC assigned a
mission to secure a critical area or facility may find that mission is not viable
if the enemy conducts a major air insertion that threatens the overall defen-
sive plan. Parts of that OSC may be called upon to initiate limited offensive
action while the air insertion is still vulnerable.
SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES
4-81. The OPFOR places maximum emphasis on decentralized execution, ini-
tiative, and adaptation. Subordinate units are expected to take advantage of
fleeting opportunities so long as their actions are in concert with the purpose
of the operational directive.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
INTEGRATED AND DECENTRALIZED DEFENSES

4-82. The OPFOR recognizes two general forms of defense: integrated and
decentralized. The distinction between the two rests on the ability of the
OPFOR to operate freely in the battlespace with full joint and combined arms
synchronization and adequate C2 and logistics support.
INTEGRATED DEFENSE
4-83. A defensive operation is integrated if the OPFOR has the ability to
achieve full joint and/or combined arms synchronization through all levels of
command and throughout the battlespace. This requires a modernized C2
system, a robust logistics capability, and the ability to operate relatively
free of enemy influence in the support zone and battle zones prior to the
commencement of full-fledged enemy offensive action. The OPFOR force
structure possesses the first two of these characteristics, at least in relation
to regional opponents. Thus, during regional operations and perhaps
transition operations, it would often be operating in an integrated fashion
unless the enemy is able to achieve a sufficient level of overmatch in RISTA
and standoff attack capability to deny the OPFOR freedom of action.
4-84. Integrated defenses are able to
• Operate, at least partially, without the requirement for windows of
opportunity.
• Maximize the effects of destructive fire and maneuver.
• Achieve operational decision through primarily military means.
DECENTRALIZED DEFENSE
4-85. A defensive operation is decentralized if the OPFOR’s C2 and/or logis-
tics capability has been significantly degraded or it does not have the ability
to operate freely in the battlespace. This typically occurs when the enemy en-
joys significant technological overmatch, particularly in technical RISTA
means and standoff precision attack. Decentralized defenses do not achieve
decision in and of themselves. Rather, they focus on preserving combat power
while buying time for the execution of strategic operations (see Chapter 1).
4-86. In some cases, an operational-level commander may chose to adopt a
decentralized defense to preserve his C2 and logistics, understanding that
his ability to synchronize operations will be degraded. Operational-level
commanders are constantly estimating the situation to determine risk versus
reward for active measures. A decentralized defense relies on initiative of
subordinate commanders and the discrete targeting of elements of the
enemy’s combat system to reduce combat capability and expose enemy forces
to destruction.
4-87. To be successful, decentralized defenses must
• Operate primarily in complex terrain.
• Maximize the effects of countermobility and survivability measures.
• Rely heavily on IW.
• Make the best possible use of reconnaissance fires (see Chapter 7).
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

4-88. The types of defensive action in OPFOR doctrine are both tactical
methods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. The two
basic types are maneuver and area defense. An operational-level defensive
plan may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations
of maneuver and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action,
within the overall defensive mission framework.
MANEUVER DEFENSE
4-89. In situations where the OPFOR is not completely overmatched, it
may conduct an operational maneuver defense. This type of defense is
designed to achieve operational decision by skillfully using fires and
maneuver to destroy key components of the enemy’s combat system and
deny enemy forces their objective, while preserving the friendly force.
Maneuver defenses cause the enemy to continually lose effectiveness until
he can no longer achieve his objectives. They can also economize force in
less important areas while the OPFOR moves additional forces onto the
most threatened axes.
4-90. Maneuver defenses are almost always integrated defenses. Decentralized
maneuver defenses typically occur as part of transition operations. As an
extraregional enemy builds combat power to overmatch levels, but before
the OPFOR is completely overmatched, maneuver defense can buy time
for other forces to move into sanctuary areas and prepare for adaptive
operations.
4-91. Even within a maneuver defense, the OPFOR may use area defense on
some enemy attack axes, especially on those where it can least afford to lose
ground. (See Figure 4-1.) An operational-level commander may use both
forms of defense simultaneously across the theater. A command may employ
maneuver defense techniques to conduct operations in the disruption zone if
it enhances the attack on the enemy’s combat system and an area defense in
the battle zone.
Method
4-92. Maneuver defense inflicts losses on the enemy, gains time, and protects
friendly forces. It allows the operational defender to choose the place and
time for engagements. Each portion of a maneuver defense allows a
continuing attack on the enemy’s combat system. As the system begins to
disaggregate, more elements are vulnerable to destruction. The maneuver
defense accomplishes this through a succession of defensive battles in
conjunction with short, violent counterattacks and fires. It allows
abandoning some areas of terrain when responding to an unexpected enemy
attack or when conducting the battle in the disruption zone. In the course
of a maneuver defense, the operational-level commander tries to force the
enemy into a situation that exposes enemy formations to destruction. See
Figures 4-4 and 4-5 for examples of maneuver defense.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OSC
Support Zone Battle Zone Disruption Zone I I
XX XX
XX I
I
II
X
KILL
ZONE
XX XX XX XX
II
X I
Counterattack
I
LEGEND
Ambush
XX
XX
Disrupt
XX
Fix
I II
Contain
Counterattack
OSC
Figure 4-4. Maneuver Defense (Example 1)
4-93. A maneuver defense trades terrain for the opportunity to destroy

portions of the enemy formation and render the enemy’s combat system
ineffective. The OPFOR might use a maneuver defense when
• It can afford to surrender territory.
• It possesses a mobility advantage over enemy forces.
• Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire or deliver decisive counterattacks.
4-94. Compared to area defense, the maneuver defense involves a higher de-
gree of risk for the OPFOR, because it does not rely heavily on the inherent
advantages of prepared defensive positions. Units conducting a maneuver de-
fense typically place smaller forces forward in defensive positions and retain
much larger reserves than in an area defense.
Defensive Lines
4-95. The basis of maneuver defense is for units to conduct maneuver from
position to position on a succession of defensive lines. In this case, the “line”
defended on is not a continuous line of defenses, but rather a notional line on
which one or more units have orders to defend for a certain time at a certain
depth within a unit’s AOR. The OPFOR accepts large intervals between de-
fensive positions on such a line. Part of the line may consist of natural or
manmade obstacles or of deception defensive positions.
4-96. These “lines” are not necessarily linear, in the sense of forming a
straight line. Nor are they necessarily at regular intervals from one another.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
A particular unit’s position on a subsequent line may not be directly behind

its previous position. In the spaces between the lines, the defenders can or-
ganize reconnaissance fire, raids, and counterattacks. Thus, it is difficult for
the enemy to predict where he will encounter resistance.
4-97. The number of lines and duration of defense on each line depend on the
nature of the enemy’s actions, the terrain, and the condition of the defending
units. Lines are selected based on the availability of natural obstacles and
shielding terrain, with consideration of being able to leave the lines without
being observed.
OSC
Support Zone Shielding Force Battle Zone Contact Force Disruption Zone
City X
X
XX
KILL
X Marsh ZONE
KILL
Attack Zone ZONE
XX
KILL
X ZONE
C
X X
X
KILL
ZONE
C
X
City
Attack Zone X XX
KILL
X ZONE
Mountains
LEGEND
C Cover Shielding Contact

Force Force
OSC
Figure 4-5. Maneuver Defense (Example 2)
Defensive Maneuver
4-98. Defensive maneuver consists of movement by bounds and the mainte-
nance of continuous fires on enemy forces. A disruption force and/or a main
defense force (or part of it) can perform defensive maneuver. In either case,
the force must divide its combat power into two smaller components: a con-
tact force and a shielding force. The contact force is the component occupying
the forward-most defensive line at any point in time. The shielding force is
the component occupying the next line immediately to the rear.
4-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
4-99. At each line, the contact force ideally forces the enemy to deploy his
maneuver units and perhaps begin his artillery preparation for the attack.
Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it maneuvers to its
next preplanned line, behind the line occupied by the shielding force. While
the original contact force is moving, the shielding force is able to keep the en-
emy under continuous fires. When the original contact force passes to the
rear of the original shielding force, the latter force becomes the new contact
force. When the original contact force occupies its next line, it becomes the
shielding force for the new contact force. In this manner, units continue to
move by bounds to successive lines, preserving their own forces while delay-
ing and destroying the enemy.
4-100. Figures 4-1, 4-4, and 4-5, due to the operational scope of the overall
maneuver defense shown, depict only the general location of a BTG or DTG
as it moves to subsequent positions. These figures do not reflect the reality
that the contact and shielding forces moving by bounds are likely to be de-
tachments within a BTG or DTG. See FM 7-100.2 for examples of how this
process works at the tactical level.
4-101. Subsequent lines are far enough apart to permit defensive maneuver
by friendly units. The distance should also preclude the enemy from engaging
one line and then the other without displacing his indirect fire weapons. This
means that the enemy, having seized one line, must change the majority of
his firing positions and organized his attack all over again in order to get to
the next line. However, the lines are close enough to allow the defending
units to maintain coordinated, continuous fires on the enemy while moving
from one to the other.
4-102. OPFOR commanders may require a unit holding a line to continue
defending, even if this means it becomes decisively engaged or enveloped.
This may be necessary in order to allow the construction of defenses to the
rear of the line this unit is defending.
Disruption Force
4-103. An operational-level defense may have an OSC occupying an opera-
tional disruption zone if it is important to delay enemy forces to allow theater
transition to adaptive operations. The task organization of such an OSC
would have sufficient mobility to conduct a maneuver defense and a signifi-
cant allocation of artillery and rocket units. The disruption force initiates the
attack on the enemy’s combat system by targeting and destroying subsystems
that are critical to the enemy. If successful, the disruption force can cause
culmination of the enemy attack before the enemy enters the battle zone. In
the worst case, the enemy would enter the battle zone unable to benefit from
an integrated combat system and vulnerable to defeat by the main defense
force.
4-104. Forces committed to the disruption zone battle for an OSC usually
would be a BTG or DTG, along with supporting and affiliated assets from the
OSC. The OSC conducts the defense throughout the depth of the disruption
zone. Maneuver units conduct the defense from successive battle positions.
Intervals between these positions provide space for deployment of mobile
attack forces, precision fire systems, and reserves.
4-22
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-105. The distance between successive positions in the disruption zone is

such that the enemy is forced to displace the majority of his supporting weap-
ons to continue the attack on the subsequent positions. This aids the force in
breaking contact and permits time to occupy subsequent positions. Long-
range fires, ODs, and ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist
units in breaking contact and withdrawing.
4-106. If the disruption force has not succeeded in destroying or halting
the attacking enemy, but is not under too great a pressure from a pursuing
enemy, it may occupy prepared battle positions in the battle zone and assist
in the remainder of the defensive mission as part of the main defense
force. A disruption force may have taken losses and might not be at full
capability; a heavily damaged disruption force may pass into hide positions.
In that case, main defense or reserve forces occupy positions to cover the dis-
ruption force’s disengagement.
Main Defense Force

4-107. The mission of the main defense force is complete the defeat of the enemy
by attack of those portions of the force exposed by disruption zone operations.
In a multi-OSC operation, this may involve resubordination of units and in some
cases attacks by fire or maneuver forces across OSC limits of responsibility.
4-108. The main defense force in a maneuver defense divides its combat
power into contact and shielding forces. These forces move in bounds to
successive defensive lines. If maneuver defense in the disruption zone has
provided sufficient time, the defensive positions on these lines may take on
more of the characteristics of prepared battle positions.
4-109. The basic elements of the battle zone are battle positions, firing lines,
and repositioning routes. Battle positions use the terrain to protect forces
while providing advantage in engagements.
4-110. The commander may order a particular unit to stand and fight on a
line long enough to repel an attack. He may order this if circumstances are
favorable for defeating the enemy at that line. The unit also might have to
remain on that line because the next line is still being prepared or a vertical
envelopment threatens the next line or the route to it.
Reserves
4-111. An operational-level command in the maneuver defense can employ a
number of reserve forces of varying strengths. The maneuver reserve is a
force strong enough to respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies
at the operational level. It is normally strong enough to defeat the enemy’s
exploitation force. The commander positions this reserve in an assembly area
using C3D to protect it from observation and attack. From this position, it
can transition to a situational defense or conduct a counterattack. The re-
serve must have sufficient air defense coverage to allow maneuver. If the
commander does not commit the reserve from its original assembly area, it
maneuvers to another assembly area, possibly on a different axis, where it
prepares for other contingencies. (See the Reserves section above for discussion
of other types of reserves.)
4-23
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
AREA DEFENSE
4-112. In situations where the OPFOR must deny geographic areas (or the
access to them) or where it is overmatched, it may conduct an operational
area defense. An area defense uses complex battle positions to protect key
components of the OPFOR’s combat power while creating opportunities, if
possible, to attack the enemy’s combat system. Not every component of
OPFOR combat power needs to or will be able to operate from complex battle
positions. However, those components most central for the OPFOR com-
mander’s plan will be the priority for preservation. Area defense is designed to
achieve a decision in one of two ways:
• By forcing the enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before he can
achieve his objectives.
• By denying the enemy his objectives while preserving combat power until
decision can be achieved through strategic operations (see Chapter 1).
See Figures 4-6 and 4-7 for examples of area defense.
OSC
my
Ene
Kill
Zone X
X X
Marsh
DTG X
X
Battle X
Zone II Forest
DTG
Battle
Zone
Disruption
Zone Kill
Kill Zone
X
Zone
Ene
my
X
DTG Disruption
my Battle Zone
Ene Zone
X
X
X
OS LEGEND
C
Complex
Battle
Position
Figure 4-6. Area Defense (Example 1)
4-24
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
C OSC
OS Disruption
II
Zone
C I II
C C
XX OSC Battle
Zone
I City X
XX
X
I OSC
Reserve
XX
C
OSC I II
Disruption C II
Zone
C
C
I
II OSC
C Disruption
C Zone
OS
C
Figure 4-7. Area Defense (Example 2)
4-113. The area defense does not surrender the initiative to the attacking
forces, but takes action to create windows of opportunity that permit forces to
conduct small-scale offensive actions to attack key components of the enemy
combat system and cause unacceptable casualties. Area defense can set the
conditions for destroying a key enemy force in a strike. Extended windows of
opportunity permit the action of maneuver forces and facilitate transition to a
larger offensive action. IW is particularly important to the execution of the
area defense in adaptive and transition operations. Deception is critical to the
creation of complex battle positions, and effective perception management is
vital to the creation of the windows of opportunity needed to execute ma-
neuver and fires.
4-25
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Method
4-114. Area defense inflicts losses on the enemy, retains ground, and protects
friendly forces. It does so by occupying battle positions in complex terrain and
dominating the surrounding battlespace with reconnaissance fire (see
Chapter 7). These fires attack designated elements of the enemy’s combat
system to destroy components and subsystems that create an advantage for the
enemy. The operational design of an area defense is to begin disaggregating
the enemy’s combat system in the disruption zone. When enemy forces enter
the battle zone, they should be incapable of synchronizing combat operations.
4-115. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct
spoiling attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. In the
course of an area defense, the operational-level commander uses terrain that
exposes the enemy to continuing attack.
4-116. An area defense trades time for the opportunity to attack enemy forces
when and where they are vulnerable. The OPFOR might use an area defense
when
• It is conducting access-control operations.
• Enemy forces enjoy a significant RISTA and precision standoff advantage.
• Conditions are suitable for canalizing the enemy into areas where the
OPFOR can destroy him by fire and/or maneuver.
4-117. A skillfully conducted area defense can allow a significantly weaker force
to defeat a stronger enemy force. However, the area defense relies to a significant
degree on the availability of complex terrain and decentralized logistics. Units
conducting an area defense typically place small ambushing and raiding
forces in complex terrain throughout the AOR to force the enemy into
continuous operations and steadily drain his combat power and resolve.
4-118. Within an overall operational area defense, the OPFOR might use
maneuver defense on some portions of the AOR, especially on those where it
can afford to lose ground. This occurs most often during transition operations
as forces initially occupy the complex terrain positions necessary for the
execution of the area defense.
Disruption Force
4-119. In an area defense, the disruption zone is that battlespace surrounding
its battle zone(s) where the OPFOR may cause continuing harm to the enemy
without significantly exposing itself. For example, counterreconnaissance ac-
tivity may draw the attention of enemy forces and cause them to enter the
kill zone of a sophisticated ambush using long-range precision fires. RISTA
assets and counterreconnaissance forces occupy the disruption zone, along
with affiliated forces. Paramilitary forces may assist other disruption force
units by providing force protection, controlling the civilian population, and
executing deception operations as directed.
4-120. The disruption zone of an area defense is designed to be an area of un-
interrupted battle. OPFOR RISTA maintains contact with enemy forces, and
other parts of the disruption force attack them incessantly with ambush and
precision fires.
4-26
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 4
4-121. The disruption force has many missions. The most important mission
at the operational level is the destruction of appropriate elements of the en-
emy’s combat system, to begin disaggregating it. The following list provides
examples of other tasks that the disruption force may perform:
• Detect the enemy’s main groupings.
• Force the enemy to reveal his intentions.
• Deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of battle
positions.
• Delay the enemy, allowing time for preparation of defenses and
counterattacks.
• Force the enemy into premature deployment.
• Attack lucrative targets (key systems, vulnerable troops).
• Canalize the enemy into situations unfavorable to him.
The disruption force mission also includes maintaining contact with the
enemy and setting the conditions for successful reconnaissance fire and
strikes.
4-122. In an area defense, the disruption force often occupies and operates
out of battle positions in the disruption zone and seeks to inflict maximum
harm on selected enemy units and destroy enemy systems operating through-
out the AOR. An area defense disruption force permits the enemy no safe
haven and continues to inflict damage at all hours and in all weather
conditions.
4-123. Disruption force units break contact after conducting ambushes and
return to battle positions for refit and resupply. Long-range fires, ODs, and
ambushes to delay pursuing enemy units can assist units in breaking contact
and withdrawing.
4-124. Even within the overall context of an operational area defense, the
disruption force might employ a maneuver defense. In this case, the distance
between positions in the disruption zone is such that the enemy is forced to
displace the majority of his supporting weapons to continue the attack on the
subsequent positions. This aids the force in breaking contact and permits
time to occupy subsequent positions.
4-125. The disruption zone often includes a significant obstacle effort.
Engineer effort in the disruption zone also provides mobility support to
disruption force units requiring maneuver to conduct their attacks or
ambushes.
4-126. Within the overall structure of the area defense, disruption force units
seek to conduct highly damaging local attacks. They deploy on likely enemy
avenues of approach. They choose the best terrain to inflict maximum dam-
age on the attacking enemy and use obstacles and barriers extensively. They
defend aggressively by fire and maneuver. When enemy pressure grows too
strong, these forces can conduct a maneuver defense, withdrawing from one
position to another in order to avoid envelopment or decisive engagement.
4-27
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
4-127. Since a part of the disruption force mission to attack the enemy’s
combat system, the following are typical targets for attack:
• C2 systems.
• RISTA assets.
• Precision fire systems.
• Aviation assets in the air and on the groundat attack helicopter
forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and airfields.
• Logistics support areas.
• LOCs.
• Mobility and countermobility assets.
• Casualty evacuation routes and means.
4-128. In some cases, the disruption force can have a single mission of detect-
ing and destroying a particular set of enemy capabilities. This does not mean
that no other targets will be engaged; it means that, given a choice between
targets, the disruption force will engage the targets that are the most damag-
ing to the enemy combat system.
Main Defense Force

4-129. The units of the main defense force conducting an area defense occupy
battle positions in complex terrain within the battle zone. That terrain is re-
inforced by engineer effort and C3D measures. These complex battle positions
are designed to prevent enemy forces from being able to employ precision
standoff attack means and force the enemy to choose costly methods in order
to affect forces in those positions. They are also arranged in such a manner as
to deny the enemy the ability to operate in covered and concealed areas himself.
4-130. The main defense force in an area defense conducts attacks and
employs reconnaissance fire against enemy forces in the disruption zone.
Disruption forces may also use the complex battle positions occupied by the
main defense force as refit and rearm points.
Reserves
4-131. An operational-level command in the area defense can employ a num-
ber of reserve forces of varying strengths. In addition to its other functions,
the maneuver reserve in an area defense may have the mission of winning
time for the preparation of positions. This reserve is a unit strong enough to
respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at the operational
level. It is normally strong enough to defeat the enemy’s exploitation force.
The commander positions his reserve in an assembly area within one or more
of the battle positions, based on the commander’s concept of the operation.
(See the Reserves section above for discussion of other types of reserves.)
4-28
Chapter 5
Information Warfare
Modern information technologies (ITs) have created conditions for the con-
frontation of states, combatants, and non-state actors in a fundamentally
new arenathe information sphere. Information, information processing,
and communications networks are at the core of every military activity.
The concepts of time, space, force, navigation, speed, precision, and lethality
have changed because of the capabilities of information-age technology
and the availability of information. These changes have a tremendous
effect on how military forces conduct activities. The OPFOR addresses this
issue through continued refinement of its information warfare (IW) doctrine.
The OPFOR defines information warfare as the specifically planned and

integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical
points and times. The ultimate goal of IW is to influence decision makers.
The OPFOR conducts IW at all levels of warfarestrategic, operational,
and tacticalbut without regard to strict definitional boundaries among
these levels. Opponents of the State are subject to IW regardless of the
level and degree of engagement in other types of operations. The State’s
leadership integrates all instruments of powerdiplomatic-political,
economic, military, and informationalto implement an information
strategy. One element of power may have primacy over the others at a
given time, but all work together.
In the OPFOR’s view, skillful application of IW can facilitate the defeat of

a technologically superior enemy. It can challenge or counter an enemy’s
goal of information dominance. The OPFOR can target key components
(such as technology providing situational awareness, and advanced com-
puting and communications technologies) that provide such dominance,
thus shaking the opponent’s confidence.
NEW CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE

5-1. The State envisions an operational environment (OE) in which the bat-
tlespace stretches from the depths of an opponent’s territory to the center of
the State’s political, economic, and military organizations. This OE is con-
ducive to the practice of IW. Combat cannot be confined to a single battle-
space, but instead will often expand globally to encompass attacks on an
adversary’s information and space systems or his entire information envi-
ronment.
5-2. Information is a powerful strategic, operational, and tactical multiplier.
It enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and
protection at decisive points. The OPFOR can use information as a component
of combat power to shape the OE and create the conditions for employing the
5-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
other components of its combat power. Information has become a vital strate-
gic and operational resource. The OPFOR clearly understands the power of
information and the revolution in IT and is actively developing doctrine and
tactics to supplement more traditional types of warfighting. The OPFOR can
use IW activities to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity for itself.
5-3. The importance of information, and its flow and control, to the conduct of
military operations is not a new concept. The OPFOR has for years employed an
integrated approach to attacking, disrupting, or manipulating information inside
the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Objectives have included not only the sys-
tems and information its enemies collect, process, and analyze, but also the leaders
and the decisions they make. What is new, however, is the speed and volume of
information available; networking, routing, and switching technologies; and the
global connectivity of information systems and infrastructures. This information
explosion, coupled with an integrated IW doctrine, provides the OPFOR a
greater opportunity to inflict damage, trigger chaos, weaken national will, or
permanently cripple an opponent. In effect, IW challenges traditional approaches
to warfare. The following are ways in which IW redefines operations.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
5-4. Most of today’s information environment is outside of military control,
making it harder to regulate, dominate, or protect. While neither the State
nor its opponents can control the global information environment or global
information infrastructure (GII), they must prepare to operate within it. The
GII is defined as the worldwide interconnection of communications networks,
computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. Within the GII, various countries have their
own national information infrastructures (NIIs) and defense information
infrastructures (DIIs).
5-5. The NII is the physical and virtual backbone of a nation. It is composed
of multiple critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures are those in-
formation and communication assets, systems, and functions so vital to a
nation that their disruption or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on national security, economy, governance, public health and safety, and morale.
5-6. The DII is defined as the shared or interconnected system of computers,
communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other sup-
port structures serving an actor’s defense needs. The DII connects computers
used for mission support, command and control (C2), and intelligence through
voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and multimedia services.
5-7. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs introduces multiple actors into
the information environment. This increases vulnerabilities and dependen-
cies, and creates many legal issues.
BLURRED BOUNDARIES
5-8. The OPFOR understands that there is no clear-cut line of demarcation
between the military, economic, and diplomatic-political aspects of an opera-
tion or strategic campaign and that the informational element cuts across the
other three. Therefore, it uses all types of IW across all these dimensions.
5-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-9. In an information-based world, the boundaries between nations, individu-

als, and private-sector organizations can be undefined and nebulous. The tradi-
tional distinction between enemy and friendly forces becomes harder to observe,
define, and ultimately defend against. The OPFOR is keenly aware of this devel-
opment and can use it to its advantage when conducting IW actions. For exam-
ple, the OPFOR could employ third-party individuals or organizations (either
domestic or international) to conduct IW activities, making traceability difficult.
5-10. There may also be an inherent difficulty in isolating a specific OPFOR
IW activity. For example, the distinction between OPFOR-sponsored IW at-
tacks and other types of activities and events (such as espionage, accidents,
system failures, disgruntled employee actions, and hacker pranks) are hard
to distinguish. This period of confusion, and time spent trying to identify the
attacker, can benefit and be manipulated by the OPFOR.
5-11. The interaction of the GII, NIIs, and DIIs compresses and blurs the dis-
tinction among tactics, operations, and strategy. For example, images of
tactical military actions, disseminated by the media, are likely to influence
strategic decision makers or the populace.
EXPANDED ROLE FOR PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

5-12. Thus, perception management is a critical piece of IW. The OPFOR
constantly attempts to “spin” any conflict or situation to its advantage. IW
planning and implementation emphasizes increased use of psychological
warfare (PSYWAR) and deception designed to manipulate public opinion,
coupled with attacks against an opponent’s centers of gravity.
5-13. New information-based techniques and tools can dramatically increase
the ability to conduct perception management and supporting deception op-
erations. Modern technologies allow the OPFOR to target a global audience
for support and sympathy. The OPFOR stresses the importance of perception
management from the strategic to the tactical level. (See the Perception
Management section of this chapter for further detail.)
ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
5-14. Rapid advances in technology have produced an incredibly complex
global information environment. Information and communications technolo-
gies have grown exponentially in recent years. Satellite and cellular commu-
nications, direct-broadcast television (expanding the awareness of events, is-
sues, and military activities), personal computers, global positioning system
(GPS) technologies, wireless communication capabilities, and the Internet are
a few examples of the capabilities widely available to nations, as well as in-
dependent organizations and individuals. Given such advances, the capabili-
ties of both the OPFOR and its potential adversaries are increasing in both
sophistication and lethality. The OPFOR tries to exploit such technologies to
gain the operational advantage.
INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY
5-15. The State is committed to creating an IT research and development
base. However, until such a capability is developed, the State actively seeks
5-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
international sources (overt and covert) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)

products to satisfy its civilian and military requirements.
5-16. The OPFOR focuses its investment strategy on the following areas:
• Computers (including increasingly complex distributed information
systems).
• Telecommunications (traditional and wireless communications).
• Electronics (to included microelectronics).
• Computer integrated manufacturing.
• Nanotechnology.
• Robotics.
• Biotechnology.
• Space-based communications.
• Sophisticated sensing capabilities.
VULNERABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
5-17. The OPFOR can manipulate an enemy’s unresolved problems of inter-
operability and dependence on COTS systems to its advantage. COTS mate-
rials are usually not hardened against electronic spikes, remote collection ca-
pabilities, or extreme weather conditions. The OPFOR understands that se-
curity cannot be constructed or guaranteed when depending on COTS. For
example, if hackers (working independently or for a government or criminal
organization) disrupted Internet communications or links while a military
operation was in progress, information exchange between combat units could
be severely disrupted.
NEUTRALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

5-18. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing dependence of modern extrare-
gional forces on information systems and their desire to obtain information
superiority. However, the OPFOR also understands that information superi-
ority does not equate to perfect information, nor does it eliminate the “fog of
war.” Information systems, processors, and links add their own source of fric-
tion and vulnerability to the operational environment. Systems and sensors
can be tricked, destroyed, or overwhelmed with data, thus causing an enemy
to question the value and validity of his gathered intelligence. The OPFOR
seeks to exploit this uncertainty and friction at all times.
5-19. The OPFOR recognizes that it cannot stand toe-to-toe with most ex-
traregional enemies in a conventional war, and therefore seeks to target en-
emy weaknesses. IW will be the tool of choice to counter a technologically su-
perior opponent and to challenge his relative information dominance. In addi-
tion, IW actions designed to break the will of a conventionally more powerful
adversary will be common.
NEW TARGETS
5-20. Societies rely increasingly on a high-performance, networked informa-
tion infrastructure for everything from air travel to electric-power generation
and telecommunications to financial transactions. This means that a new set
5-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
of lucrative strategic and operational targets is now open to attack. The

OPFOR will focus all elements of its power, as well as the State’s, on the de-
struction of the adversary’s critical information infrastructures.
EASY OF OPERATION AND LOW COST

5-21. In contrast to other forms of warfare, IW actions might occur without
access to large financial resources or backing or without state sponsorship.
Information weapons could be software logic bombs or computer worms and
viruses. IW could be conducted with such easily accessible means such as cel-
lular telephones and the Internet.
ELEMENTS OF IW
5-22. OPFOR IW occurs through the combinations of seven elements:
• Electronic warfare (EW).
• Computer warfare.
• Deception.
• Physical destruction.
• Protection and security measures.
• Perception management.
• Information attack (IA).
The seven elements of IW do not exist in isolation from one another and are
not mutually exclusive. Often they are mutually supporting. The overlapping
of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all be inte-
grated into a single, integrated IW plan. However, effective execution of IW
does not necessary involve the use of all elements concurrently. Although one
element might be all that is required to successfully execute a tactical IW ac-
tion, that would seldom be the case at the operational level. Likewise, using
one element or subelement, such as camouflage, does not by itself necessarily
constitute an operational application of IW.
5-23. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by
the operational situation and support to the overall strategic objective. The
size and sophistication of an enemy force also determines the extent to which
the OPFOR employs the various elements of IW. The commander has the
freedom to mix and match elements to best suit his operational needs, within
the bounds of guidance from higher headquarters.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
5-24. EW consists of measures conducted to control or deny the enemy’s use
of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the State and the
OPFOR. EW capabilities allow the OPFOR to exploit, deceive, degrade,
disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors, and C2 nodes. Spectrum
supremacy and delay, denial, or distortions of information in the adversary’s
information infrastructure are the objectives. At a minimum, the goal of
OPFOR EW is to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical
locations and times in the battlespace or to attack the enemy.
5-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-25. To accomplish these EW goals and objectives, the OPFOR employs both
lethal and nonlethal measures. Lethal EW activities include the physical de-
struction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy’s decision-making
processsuch as reconnaissance sensors, command posts, and communica-
tions systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppres-
sion measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate
high-technology C2 assets and associated links. Nonlethal means range from
signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner
reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. Sophisticated
camouflage, deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of
enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems. Also, the OPFOR can employ low-cost GPS jammers to
disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and
navigation.
5-26. EW activities especially focus on the enemy’s advanced C2 systems de-
veloped to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational
awareness. The enemy relies on the availability of friendly and enemy force
composition and locations, digital mapping displays, and automated targeting
data. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the OPFOR can disrupt
the enemy’s ability to digitally transfer and share such information. The
OPFOR enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy’s abil-
ity to mass fires with dispersed forces, while increasing enemy crew and staff
workloads and disrupting his fratricide-prevention measures.
5-27. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of OPFOR IW
elements. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures,
deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense,
artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for IW
purposes.
COMPUTER WARFARE
5-28. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the
computer systems, networks, and/or nodes. This includes a wide variety of ac-
tivities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems
for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (vi-
ruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses) and deceptive information entry
into enemy computer systems. Such attacks concentrate on the denial, dis-
ruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure’s integrity. The OPFOR may
attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-
party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. It can also
continually access and attack systems at great distances via communications
links such as the Internet.
5-29. OPFOR computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or
during a military action. For example, by accessing databases related to an
enemy’s projected force deployments and troop movements, the OPFOR can
effectively disrupt planning and misdirect movement, producing substantial
confusion and delays. As modern armies increasingly rely on “just-in-time”
logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can
produce delays in the arrival of critical materiel such as ammunition, fuel,
and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.
5-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-30. The OPFOR can successfully conduct invasive computer warfare activities
from the safety of its own territory, given the distributed ability to reach targeted
computers anywhere in the world (as long as they are connected to the Internet).
The OPFOR can continuously exploit the highly integrated information
systems of an adversary.
DECEPTION
5-31. OPFOR deception activities include measures designed to mislead ad-
versaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information. The aim
of deception is to influence opponents’ situational understanding and lead
them to act in a manner that favors the OPFOR or is prejudicial to their own
interests. Deception measures are a part of every military operation, and are
also used to achieve political and economic goals. The international media
may be a target for deceptive information at the operational level, being fed
false stories and video that portray tactical-level actions with the goal of in-
fluencing operational or even strategic decisions.
5-32. The OPFOR applies all forms of deception in support of IW. These
range from physical decoys and electronic devices to operational activities.
The OPFOR can even use its own information systems to pass misleading
or false information in support of deception activities. Such information
may cause the adversary to analyze incorrectly OPFOR capabilities and
intentions.
5-33. Because of the number and sophistication of sensors available to an ex-
traregional adversary, the OPFOR recognizes that a multispectral effort is
required to deceive him. This includes providing false or misleading thermal,
visual, and electronic signatures.
5-34. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and ex-
ploitation of enemy information systems and networks, as well as other
“conduits” for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the conduits
receive, process, analyze, and distribute information are priority intelligence
requirements for the OPFOR.
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
5-35. Physical destruction, as an element of IW, involves measures to destroy
critical components of the enemy’s information infrastructure. The OPFOR
integrates all types of conventional and precision weapon systems to conduct
the destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles. It can
also utilize other means of destruction, such explosives delivered by special-
purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or even co-opted civilians.
5-36. The OPFOR may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially ar-
tillery and aviation, with other IW activities. Physical destruction activities
are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific missions are
carefully timed and coordinated with the IW plan and the actions of the sup-
ported units.
5-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-37. Due to the mobility and fleeting nature of many IW targets, precision
weapons deliver the munitions of choice against many high-value targets.
The increased accuracy provided by such weapons allows the OPFOR to
attack specific IW-related targets rapidly and accurately. The OPFOR
continues to research and develop directed energy weapons, to include ra-
dio frequency weapons and high-power lasers.
PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

5-38. The purpose of protection and security measures in IW is to protect
the OPFOR’s information infrastructure, maintain OPFOR capabilities for
effective C2, and deny protected information to other actors. The OPFOR con-
tinues to develop capabilities to effectively preserve OPFOR C2 at all levels of
command.
5-39. Protection and security measures conducted as part of IW include
• Information collection, processing, and utilization.
• Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.
• Information and operations security.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
• Force protection.
• Secure use of information-collection and -processing systems.
Information and Operations Security

5-40. Information and operations security is used to protect the physical and
intellectual assets used to facilitate command and control. It must function
continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only operational intentions,
current locations and configurations, and actions but also the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures of information systems employment and operation.
5-41. The OPFOR clearly understands the importance of information security.
Commanders understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through
their own information systems and develop means to protect these systems.
In addition, the OPFOR must be capable of isolating attacks on its informa-
tion systems while maintaining the ability to execute. In order to reduce the
vulnerability, the OPFOR emphasizes strong communications, computer, and
transmission security. It uses all State assets to support this process and sup-
ply the necessary resources and intelligence.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

5-42. The OPFOR gives particular attention to protective measures aimed
at reducing the enemy’s ability to target and engage OPFOR systems with
precision munitions. Knowing that the enemy cannot attack what his
RISTA systems do not find, the OPFOR employs a variety of C3D tech-
niques. These range from the most simple and inexpensive methods to
hide from observation to the most modern multispectral signature-
reducing technology.
5-43. All OPFOR units can use one or more forms of technical camouflage.
The purpose of these techniques is to alter the appearance of personnel and
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equipment and to blend them with the surrounding terrain. Capabilities

available include—
• Natural concealment.
• Camouflage paint.
• Artificial camouflage (nets and screens).
• Antiradar camouflage (radar-absorbing nets and paints).
• Decoy equipment (mockups) and deception positions.
• Light and thermal camouflage.
• Smoke camouflage.
PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
5-44. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a percep-
tion of truth that furthers the OPFOR’s objectives. It integrates several
widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or
manipulated information. Enemy or foreign audiences, as well as the State’s
own public, may be targets. Perception management can include misinforma-
tion, media manipulation, and PSYWAR. Perception management is critically
important to all types of OPFOR operations.
5-45. PSYWAR is the capability and activities designed to influence selected
friendly, neutral, and/or hostile target audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in
support of the OPFOR. PSYWAR can target either specific decision-making
systems or the entire information system of the target audience, while influ-
encing key communicators and decision makers. The OPFOR attacks an en-
emy’s perceived centers of gravity. For example, prolonging an operation and
using all forms of media to show the devastation of conflict can sway public
opinion against the effort.
5-46. Statecraft (the art of conducting state affairs) and diplomacy (the art
and practice of conducting negotiations with other states) are aspects of
perception management conducted with foreign governments, and include
those countries’ populations as a target. The OPFOR skillfully employs
media and other neutral players, such as nongovernmental and private
volunteer organizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. It
exploits the international media’s willingness to report information without in-
dependent and timely confirmation. Individuals such as agents of influence,
sympathizers, and antiwar protesters are also employed advantageously by the
State or OPFOR to influence the enemy’s media, politicians, and citizenry.
5-47. The State’s Ministry of Public Information controls its own population’s
access to information and perceptions of reality. Successful preparation of the
population significantly enhances public support for the OPFOR’s military actions.
INFORMATION ATTACK
5-48. An information attack (sometimes called cyber attack) focuses on the in-
tentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports a
comprehensive IW campaign. Unlike, computer warfare attacks that target the
information systems, IAs target the information itself. Attacks on the commer-
cial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber
5-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
and information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or

distortion techniques. OPFOR information attackers (cyber attackers) learn from
and expand upon these methods.
5-49. IA offers a powerful tool for the OPFOR. For example, an information
attacker may target an information system for sabotage (electronically or
physically) or manipulate and exploit information. This may involve altering
data, stealing data, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it was
not intended, such as spoofing the air traffic control grid.
5-50. Likely targets for an IA are information residing in the critical in-
frastructures of an opponent: telecommunications links and switches, com-
mercial infrastructures, and economic infrastructures. The OPFOR will at-
tempt to manipulate, control, or monitor data and information that are criti-
cal for the infrastructures.
TOOLS AND TARGETS

5-51. Tools for waging IW can include conventional physical and electronic
destruction means, malicious software, denial-of-service attacks, news agen-
cies, television, radio, the Internet, traditional print media, communication
networks, and diplomatic activities and well as various types of reconnaissance,
espionage, and eavesdropping technologies. The OPFOR can employ IW tools
from both civilian and military sources and assets of third-party sources.
5-52. The OPFOR sees the targets of IW as decision makers, weapons and
hardware, an opponent’s critical information infrastructure, C2 system, in-
formation and telecommunications systems, and C2 centers and nodes. An
adversary’s national communications media are also among the important
targets in an OPFOR IA. Information links, such as transmitters, communi-
cation devices, and protocols, will be targeted. These targets may be more
susceptible to precision fires and more traditional forms of attack based on
EW. However, the OPFOR is extremely adaptive and will employ the best op-
tion available to degrade or destroy an information link.
STRATEGIC IW
5-53. Strategic information warfare (SIW) is the synergistic effort of the
State to control or manipulate information events in the strategic environ-
ment, be they political, economic, military, or diplomatic in nature. Specifi-
cally, the State defines SIW as any attack (digital, physical, or cognitive)
against the information base of an adversarial nation’s critical infrastructures.
The ultimate goal of SIW is strategic disruption and damage to the overall
strength of the opponent. This disruption also focuses on the shaping of foreign
decision makers’ actions to support the State’s strategic objectives and goals.
5-54. The National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for determining
and articulating the State’s strategic goals. The Strategic Integration De-
partment (SID) then develops a strategic information warfare plan (SIWP) to
support the national security strategy. The SID has a special Strategic In-
formation Warfare Planning Office (SIWPO) dedicated to reviewing and
integrating information-related plans of all State ministries, both military
and civilian. The SIWPO can directly task information- or IW-related
5-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
elements of any ministry to support the SIWP. In time of war, the SIWPO
continues to coordinate with all government ministries for further develop-
ment and modification of the SIWP. However, it works most closely with the
Ministry of Defense, specifically the General Staff, to ensure the development
of the SIWP in concert with the military IW plan.
5-55. In the General Staff, the Chief of IW handles IW functions that tran-
scend service component boundaries. He reviews and approves the IW plans
of all operational-level commands as well as any separate theater headquar-
ters that might be established. He drafts the overall military IW plan that,
upon approval by the Intelligence Officer, is forwarded to the Operations
Directorate of the General Staff for inclusion in the military strategic
campaign plan (SCP). Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, the
military IW plan and the rest of the military SCP are forwarded to the SID
for incorporation into the national-level SIWP and the national SCP, respec-
tively. During peacetime and preparation for war, the Chief of IW continues
to review and refine the military IW plan.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL IW
5-56. The OPFOR conducts IW actions at the operational level to support
strategic campaigns or operational objectives. The focus at this level is on
affecting an adversary’s lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, C2, and critical
decision-making processes. The OPFOR targets information or information sys-
tems in order to affect the information-based process, be it human or automated.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
5-57. In the systems warfare approach to combat (see Chapter 1), the OPFOR
often focuses on attacking the C2 and/or RISTA elements that are critical compo-
nents of the enemy’s combat system. It is often more feasible to attack these
types of targets, rather than directly engaging the combat power of the enemy’s
combat or combat support forces or even his logistics forces. Operational-level IW
can be a primary means of attacking C2 and RISTA assets, either on its own or in
conjunction with other elements of the OPFOR’s own combat system.
OFFENSIVE IW
5-58. Offensive IW involves the integrated use of subordinate and supporting ca-
pabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect an adversary’s
decision makers or to influence others in order to achieve or promote specific
OPFOR objectives. Using the elements of IW offensively, the OPFOR can either
prevent an adversary from exercising effective C2, challenge his quest for infor-
mation dominance, or leverage enemy information systems to its own advantage.
Purpose of Offensive IW
5-59. Simply put, offensive IW seeks to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, deceive,
and exploit an adversary’s information systems and capabilities. Offensive IW
helps the OPFOR seize and retain the initiative by degrading the enemy’s infor-
mation systems and forcing the enemy commander to be reactive. This can result
in slowing the enemy’s tempo, disrupting his decision cycle, and impacting his
overall ability to generate combat forces and execute and sustain operations.
5-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Possible Actions
5-60. Possible OPFOR offensive IW activities and actions can include
• Denying the enemy the information necessary to conduct operations
(destroy, degrade, or distort).
• Influencing the information (misinformation, manipulation, or “spinning”).
• Disrupting the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and
obtain or maintain information dominance.
• Degrading enemy information collection or destroying his collection means.
• Deceiving the decision makers by manipulating perception and causing
disorientation within the decision cycle.
• Neutralizing or destroying the opponents’ information capability by
physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
DEFENSIVE IW
5-61. Defensive IW is the integration and coordination of policies and procedures,
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly informa-
tion and information systems. Defensive IW also seeks to conceal the physical lo-
cations of critical information systems. IW activities, particularly defensive
measures, play a significant role in ensuring the viability and survivability of
the OPFOR C2 process. IW defensive actions are planned at the strategic, op-
erational, and tactical levels. IW measures, combined with the mobility and
redundancy of C2 systems, can provide a high degree of survivability, even if
the enemy is successful in disrupting or destroying some elements of the process.
Purpose of Defensive IW
5-62. The objectives of OPFOR defensive IW activities and actions are
• Protecting the information environment.
• Detecting attack.
• Restoring capabilities.
• Responding to attack.
Specific objectives of defensive IW include misleading the enemy concerning
the OPFOR’s force structure, location, and intent; protecting all critical in-
formation and communication links; and ensuring maximum survivability of
friendly high-value assets and combat power.
Possible Actions
5-63. To achieve these objectives, the OPFOR conducts a variety of activities
and actions that can
• Provide for uninterrupted control of friendly forces.
• Ensure survivability through extensive use of signature-reducing
measures.
• Conceal the identities and locations of critical elements.
• Portray false force dispositions and OPFOR unit strengths.
• Portray false levels of preparation, readiness, and morale.
• Portray false impressions of OPFOR operational intent.
5-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
IW Element Objectives Targets
Electronic Warfare Exploit, disrupt, deny, and degrade the en- C2 and RISTA assets and
emy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. networks.
Computer Warfare Disrupt, deny, or degrade the enemy’s C2 and RISTA assets and
computer networks and information flow. networks (both civilian and
military).
Deception Mislead enemy decision makers. Key decision makers from

political, military, economic,
Cause confusion and delays in decision-
and diplomatic elite.
making process.
Persuade adversary’s population and inter- General population and in-

national community to support OPFOR ob- ternational media sources
jectives. and Internet sites.
Physical Destruction Destroy enemy’s information infrastructures C2 nodes and links, RISTA
(both civilian and military). assets, telecommunications,
and power sources.
Protection and Security Protect critical assets. Enemy RISTA assets.

Measures
Perception Management Distort reality or manipulate information to RISTA assets, media

support OPFOR goals. sources (international and
domestic).
Information Attack Objectives vary based on situational needs Information residing in net-
and objectives of the attack. works, software, data re-
positories, databases, and
any other electronic source
or conduit of communication
or information.
Figure 5-1. IW Elements, Planning Objectives, and Targets
IW PLANNING AND EXECUTION

5-64. An effective IW action demands the coordination of activities and capa-
bilities into a single, focused plan. Any or all elements of IW may be effec-
tively used in any given plan. Figure 5-1 provides examples of objectives and
targets.
5-65. OPFOR IW planning occurs at all levels of conflict and before and after
conflict. At the strategic level, the initial focus is achieving State objectives
and supporting the strategic campaign plan. Perception management, protec-
tion and security measures, and computer warfare activities are critical at
this level.
5-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-66. As tensions escalate, IW at the operational level can be employed to

disrupt the enemy’s information systems, further demonstrating national re-
solve and military capability. The chief of IW formulates the IW plan as an
integral part of all ground, air, sea, and space operations.
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
5-67. Just as there is a Chief of IW in the General Staff, there is a chief of IW
under the intelligence officer in all military staffs down to brigade level.
Within those operational- and tactical-level staffs, the intelligence officer and
chief of IW are responsible for ensuring that all IW actions undertaken at
their levels are in concert with the overall military IW plan and the SIWP.
As necessary, the Chief of IW in the General Staff can directly task each
operational- or tactical-level chief of IW to support the SIW campaign. (See
the Strategic IW section of this chapter.)
5-68. The intelligence officer heads the intelligence and information section
of the primary staff of an operational-strategic command (OSC). He ensures
that all intelligence requirements are met and coordinates all necessary
national- or theater-level assets for the IW plan. He must effectively task or-
ganize his staff resources to plan, conduct, and execute IW. Traditional staff
functions and relationships may be expanded or even redefined. (See Chapter 2
for a more detailed discussion of staff responsibilities and organization.)
5-69. The chief of IW belongs to the secondary staff, heading a subsection
under the intelligence officer. The chief of IW supervises the execution of the
OSC’s IW plan. He is responsible for
• Coordinating the employment of IW assets, including those subordi-
nate to the OSC or affiliated forces and any supporting assets available
at the national or theater level.
• Planning for and supervising all information protection and security
measures.
• Supervising the implementation of the deception plan and perception
management objectives.
• Working with the operations section of the staff to ensure that targets
scheduled for destruction support the IW plan, and if not, resolving
conflicts between IW needs and operational needs.
• Recommending to the intelligence officer any necessary actions re-
quired to implement the IW plan.
5-70. The chief of IW at each level of command submits his IW plan to the
chief of IW at the next-higher level. The senior chief of IW issues directives to
subordinate units’ chiefs of IW. These directives are part of the operation
plan or operational directive, and can be part of the SCP. What the subordi-
nates plan and execute must be in concert with the higher plan, and the
higher headquarters also needs to ensure that the IW plan of one subordinate
does not conflict with that of its adjacent units.
5-71. The chief of IW also plays a key role in coordinating IW activities with
other staff sections and subsections, particularly with members of the func-
tional staff. For instance, he coordinates with the chief of integrated fires to
5-14
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
ensure that deception and protection and security measures contribute to the
success of fire support to offensive and defensive operations. He will also
work directly with the chief of the RISTA and IW section of the OSC’s IFC
headquarters to coordinate all necessary IW support to the IFC. IW activities
can support the overall fire support plan or provide a feasible nonlethal
alternative to destroying key enemy formations or systems. The chief of
IW also coordinates with the chief of force protection to prevent or mitigate
the effects of hostile actions on critical information and information systems.
He works closely with the chief of population management and representa-
tives from the Ministry of Public Information regarding coordination of
PSYWAR and other perception management activities.
PLANNING
5-72. The components of an IW plan include, at a minimum, the following:
• Statement of overall State and military objectives and goals.
• Definition of the missions of IW (public, private, military, and nonmilitary).
• IW objectives of the next-higher command.
• Use of affiliated forces.
• Use of civilians (individuals or organizations) on the battlefield.
• Identification of all applicable State elements of power to assist in the
execution of the IW plan.
• Potential targets and tools for destruction, degradation, or exploitation.
• Specific unit responsibilities.
Specific plan elements include a review of the enemy’s IW capabilities, an
operational analysis of all relevant information infrastructures (location,
ownership and vulnerabilities), requirements of IW capabilities, an organ-
izational plan and staff responsibilities, a deception plan, and perception
management objectives.
EXECUTION
5-73. Throughout the implementation of the IW plan, activities and success
are monitored, and may result in a revision of the plan. The intelligence offi-
cer and the chief of IW are providing feedback to the planning process.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
5-74. The OPFOR uses IW activities during all four strategic-level courses of
action: strategic, regional, transition, and adaptive operations (see Chapter 1
or FM 7-100). While certain elements of IW may be highlighted for a particu-
lar strategic course of action, all elements can be applied as necessary. IW
can support the OPFOR against a regional peer or a technologically superior
enemy. IW can also be used to create and/or exploit windows of opportunity
across all types of operations.
5-75. Strategic operations can occur before and after armed conflict and in
conjunction with any of the other three strategic courses of action during war.
The State recognizes the value of IW in peacetime actions as well as during
5-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
actual conflict. At this level, the State employs all the elements of IW to sup-
port its strategic objectives.
5-76. Perception management, deception, and protection and security meas-
ures are especially critical during strategic operations. The State attempts to
use all forms of international media to support State actions and objectives.
It uses all types of information dissemination to project its desired “spin” of
events, to gather international support, to weaken its enemy’s resolve, and to
force key decision makers to rethink any potentially damaging action against
the State. In addition, the State develops a strategic deception plan to conceal
its intentions from both the international audience and its own population.
Once extraregional intervention begins, the military aspects of strategic
operations become more aggressive, including use of physical destruction
accompanied by other IW efforts to exploit its effects on enemy confidence
and resolve.
5-77. Strategic operations involve the application of any or all of the four in-
struments of power (including the informational) to target enemy strategic
centers of gravity. Thus, IW targets during strategic operations might include
• Key leaders and decision makers (military and civilian).
• All relevant media outlets.
• Diplomatic entities.
• Relevant private institutions or influential organizations.
• Public opinion (international and domestic).
• National will (enemy and friendly).
• Commitment of alliance and coalition members.
5-78. The Ministry of Public Information is responsible for the control and
appropriate dissemination of all political, diplomatic, economic, and military
information to the public and the international audience. That ministry is a
key player in the development and execution of all strategic IW campaigns.
At the operational level, the intelligence officer and chief of IW are responsi-
ble for ensuring that all IW actions are in concert with the national-level
SIWP.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
5-79. IW activities during regional operations focus on controlling foreign
perceptions of such operations and preventing the development of any inter-
national consensus to intervene. The State tries to keep foreign perceptions of
its actions below the threshold that could invite intervention by extraregional
forces. To this end, perception management and deception campaigns are
critical, for both domestic and international consumption.
5-80. During regional operations, the State also conducts an internal in-
formation campaign to help maintain and strengthen the national will.
The overall goal is to give the entire country a common focus and guarantee
internal support. All elements of IW are important in regional operations.
Depending on the specific conditions, EW, IAs, protection and security
measures, or perception management may dominate.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 5
5-81. During transition operations, the OPFOR focuses IW activities on
access-control operations, perception management and deception campaigns,
and protection and security of its IW assets. Deception activities focus on
concealing the intentions of the OPFOR as well as the likely course of the
transitioneither into adaptive operations or back to regional operations.
5-82. Denying an adversary information dominance is critical during transi-
tion operations. The OPFOR attempts to take advantage of the enemy’s
reliance on advanced C2 and RISTA technology. Such technology and related
communications and data links are critical to the enemy’s maintaining
enhanced situational awareness and thus become the key targets of all IW
actions.
5-83. The protection and security of OPFOR IW assets and related communi-
cations is always a critical element. However, its importance increases during
transition operations, since the OPFOR’s paramount goal is to preserve all
instruments of power and prepare for a possible move to more adaptive
operations.
5-84. The State’s internal IW goal might be to convince its citizens that
transition operations are necessary in order to exploit the many gains it has
already made and to prevent the intervention of an extraregional force. The
State also conducts a ubiquitous information campaign to strengthen its
national will by portraying the State as a victim of impending antagonistic
actions, thus rallying support for State actions.
5-85. In perception management campaigns targeting the international
community, the State increases its emphasis on popularizing the State
and its actions. If it is obvious that the OPFOR will be overmatched by the
extraregional force that is about to intervene, the State may depict the
intervening force as an unwanted aggressor involving itself in regional af-
fairs in order to support its own selfish interests. This may lead to intense
international media pressure. During transition operations, the State may
implement a cleverly developed plan to fracture alliance or coalition support
to extraregional intervention.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
5-86. Against extraregional threats, the OPFOR begins to use more offensive
and adaptive forms of IW. These include not only more aggressive information
campaigns, but also IA, EW, and increased emphasis on physical destruction. As
extraregional forces continue to deploy into the region, the OPFOR can use IAs
on enemy C2 systems and to strip away the enemy’s RISTA capabilities.
5-87. The OPFOR uses perception management and other tools to attack the
enemy’s will to fight or otherwise continue its intervention, and to manipulate
international opinion. If it still occupies territory of a neighboring country, it also
tries to turn the populace there against the intervening extraregional force.
5-88. The State continues to leverage international media to influence world
perception and public opinion within the extraregional power’s own populace.
It also continues to censor and manipulate the media.
5-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
5-89. The specific focus of IW in adaptive operations may include

• Control access. Use all means necessary, including IW, to delay or
disrupt entry into the region and ultimately defeat the intervening force.
• Control tempo. Use IW to attack critical C2 and logistics links.
• Exploit atrocities of conflict. Use IW to weaken the enemy’s resolve
to remain committed while promoting the OPFOR’s position as a victim.
• Neutralize technological overmatch. Use IW to attack critical C2
and RISTA nodes and destroy supporting infrastructures.
• Attack reach-back links. Use IW to detect, jam, disable, or degrade
critical nodes of communication.
• Counter information dominance. (See the following paragraph.)
5-90. The very systems and links upon which technologically advanced ene-
mies rely for information dominance are also high-payoff targets for IAs or
physical destruction. Denial of these resources at critical times can deny
forces complete situational awareness. The OPFOR can also use the enemy’s
robust array of RISTA systems against him. His large numbers of sensors can
overwhelm his units’ ability to receive, process, and analyze raw intelligence
data and to provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis. The OPFOR
can add to this saturation problem by using deception to flood enemy sensors
with masses of conflicting information. Conflicting data from different sen-
sors at different levels (such as satellite imagery conflicting with data from
unmanned aerial vehicles) can confuse the enemy and degrade his situational
awareness.
5-18
Chapter 6
Reconnaissance
The OPFOR considers reconnaissance the most important element of
combat support. All commanders and staffs organize reconnaissance to
acquire information about the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets, precision weapons,
force disposition, intentions, and terrain and weather in the area of
responsibility (AOR). This information is crucial to the planning process
in OPFOR command and control (C2). Reconnaissance can decisively
influence the outcome of an operation or even the strategic campaign.
MISSION
6-1. For the OPFOR, reconnaissance is a mission, not a force or unit. OPFOR
reconnaissance is an integrated combined arms effort, not solely the business
of reconnaissance troops. Besides reconnaissance units, the OPFOR will
use other arms for reconnaissance missions, as necessary. It will also use para-
military forces, affiliated forces, and/or friendly civilians to collect information.
CONCEPT
6-2. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection are critical to OPFOR military
operations. Commanders and planners place significant emphasis on the de-
struction of enemy precision weapons and on conducting high-speed, continuous,
combined arms operations throughout the depth of the theater. Reconnaissance
and intelligence collection has three distinct levelsstrategic, operational, and
tactical. These three categories overlap, mutually support, and differ primar-
ily by the level of command and the commander’s AOR.
6-3. Commanders require continuous, timely, and accurate intelligence on the
enemy, terrain, and meteorological situation. Thus, the OPFOR devotes sub-
stantial effort to all forms of reconnaissance. Commanders prefer to confirm
their plan only after thorough reconnaissance.
PRINCIPLES
6-4. The OPFOR uses six principles to guide its reconnaissance activities:
focus; continuity; aggressiveness; timeliness; camouflage, concealment, cover
and deception (C3D); accuracy and reliability. For the greatest likelihood of a
successful operation, OPFOR reconnaissance must satisfy all of these princi-
ples simultaneously and continuously.
Focus
6-5. The actions of reconnaissance must serve the commander’s needs and
focus on elements and objectives critical to the execution of combat operations.
6-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Each level of command, from theater to battalion, develops a comprehensive

reconnaissance plan in accordance with the organization’s mission.
Reconnaissance resources are always scarce. The commander must care-
fully define and limit ground reconnaissance objectives and concentrate
reconnaissance assets on the critical areas of the battlefield.
6-6. To use reconnaissance assets effectively, the commander must be
flexible. If the situation changes, he must redirect the reconnaissance effort,
even altering the plan. The reconnaissance plan must coordinate all available
assets into an integrated plan.
Continuity
6-7. The modern, fluid battlefield demands continuous reconnaissance to pro-
vide an uninterrupted flow of information under all conditions. Reconnaissance
provides constant coverage of the enemy situation and helps prevent en-
emy operational surprise. To ensure continuity, the OPFOR employs a
wide variety of redundant assets with deep overlapping coverage ranging
from satellites to human agents to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
6-8. Reconnaissance attempts to maintain contact with the enemy at all
times. The OPFOR conducts reconnaissance in all directions and against all
key enemy formations. Reconnaissance collects information during all battle
phases, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in all weather conditions. Not only
must reconnaissance answer specific requests for information; it also must
continuously collect information on all aspects of the enemy, weather, and
terrain to fully meet future requirements.
6-9. Units conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection must main-
tain a high state of combat readiness. Reconnaissance is a critical responsibil-
ity for all commanders at all times. In the event that a specialized reconnais-
sance unit is destroyed or becomes combat ineffective, commanders reassign
the mission to appropriate forces.
Aggressiveness
6-10. Aggressiveness is the vigorous search for information, including the
willingness to fight for it if necessary. The OPFOR recognizes that reconnais-
sance is an offensive combat operation, requiring successful penetration or
avoidance of enemy security forces to be successful. Reconnaissance must
conduct intelligence collection creatively and make maximum use of assets on
the battlefield to ensure success. The OPFOR vigorously employs all avail-
able collection resources and adheres carefully to the reconnaissance plan.
However, it will alter the plan when its own initiatives or enemy actions
dictate.
6-11. The OPFOR stresses initiative, resourcefulness, and daring in the
conduct of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance attempts to penetrate enemy
defenses, ambush and raid enemy forces, and as a last resort, draw fire to
determine enemy positions. In short, it does what is necessary to fulfill the
commander’s intelligence needs.
6-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
6-12. Commanders use all available means to seek information. The informa-
tion requirement determines the techniques to use, such as clandestine infil-
tration by Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) or quick mechanized reconnaissance.
Ambushes and raids are fruitful means of gathering intelligence from prison-
ers of war, captured documents, and equipment. Such information-gathering
actions are generally more important than any associated damage, but there
are exceptions. Reconnaissance must sometimes destroy high-value targets
they find. Elements of enemy long-range fire systems, precision weapons,
multiple rocket launchers, and forward operating sites for attack helicopters
or ground-attack aviation are some high-priority targets.
Timeliness
6-13. Timely information is critical on the modern battlefield. Because of the
high mobility of modern armies, there are frequent and sharp changes in the
battlefield situation. As a result, information quickly becomes outdated.
Timely reporting enables the commander to exploit temporary enemy vulner-
abilities and windows of opportunity. He can adjust plans, using increased
data automation to fit a dynamic battlefield.
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover and Deception

6-14. The OPFOR is aware that the enemy may learn a great deal about its in-
tentions by discovering its reconnaissance plan. Therefore, OPFOR commanders
try to conceal the scale, missions, targets, and nature of reconnaissance efforts.
They understand it is not possible to hide the fact that reconnaissance is
being conducted. However, they do strive to prevent the enemy from dis-
covering where they are concentrating their main strength in the defense or
where they are preparing to launch their main attack.
6-15. The OPFOR can also use C3D to “paint a picture” that confirms the en-
emy’s stereotyped views of how the OPFOR fights. By showing the enemy
what he wants to see, the reconnaissance effort can help to establish the con-
ditions for success during ensuing operations.
Accuracy and Reliability

6-16. The OPFOR uses every available means to verify the accuracy and
reliability of reported information. A commander must base his decisions on
accurate and timely reconnaissance information. Reconnaissance must reliably
clarify the true enemy situation in spite of enemy C3D and counterreconnais-
sance activities. Multiple means of acquisition help defeat enemy counterre-
connaissance. To maximize results, the commander’s plan requires accurate
information on the enemy’s size, location, equipment, and combat readiness.
Accuracy is crucial to destroying high-value targets such as enemy precision
weapons, C2, and communications.
CHARACTERISTICS
6-17. OPFOR reconnaissance operations are characterized by—
• Flexibility. The OPFOR must be able to switch priorities from one
target to another without degrading the overall mission.
6-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Sustainability. Reconnaissance forces must be able to sustain them-

selves wherever they are operating, without relying on others for
transport or subsistence.
• Security. A reconnaissance asset should be as secure as possible dur-
ing operations. This means operating in a manner that conceals activi-
ties and areas of interest at all times. Reconnaissance activity should
not reveal the parent unit’s plan of action.
• Communications. Reconnaissance forces must have reliable communi-
cations. An intelligence organization may successfully gather all necessary
information, but if it cannot transmit this information to the user (such as
the maneuver commander or an artillery unit), the entire effort is useless.
• Reserves. All levels should maintain a reconnaissance reserve to take
on unforeseen tasks or redeem failure on key missions.
PRIORITIES
6-18. Reconnaissance activities must support the information requirements
of the commander. Therefore, priorities vary at different levels of command:
strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic
6-19. The highest priority of strategic reconnaissance is to provide indications and
warning of impending hostilities, as well as targeting information for weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). However, strategic intelligence can also gather informa-
tion useful to operational and even tactical commanders. In this case, the informa-
tion must pass down through reconnaissance staff channels to the potential user.
Operational
6-20. The operational commander conducts reconnaissance to locate the most
critical enemy targets, including the following:
• Precision weapons.
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems.
• Air defenses.
• Intelligence-collection assets.
• Higher headquarters and communications centers.
• General support artillery.
• Operational maneuver formations and their movements.
• Contents of airfields and army aviation forward operating bases.
• Major concentration areas of reserves.
• Unit boundaries.
• Location and extent of defended areas.
• The enemy’s combat capabilities and intentions.
Tactical
6-21. Tactical groups also address more local threats, including the following:
• Location of direct support artillery and mortars and attack helicopters.
6-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
• Disposition of tanks and medium- and long-range antitank systems.

• Deployment of air defense weapons.
• Location of brigade and battalion command posts.
• Nature and extent of natural and manmade obstacles.
• Locations of field defenses.
STRATEGIC ASSETS
6-22. Strategic reconnaissance acquires and analyzes information about the
military-political situation in individual countries and coalitions of probable
or actual enemy nations; their armed forces; and their military, industrial,
and economic potential. Strategic reconnaissance provides the information
required by the highest military-political leadership. Needed information
concerning a potential enemy includes the following:
• Intentions and capabilities.
• Preparation and disposition of forces in various theaters.
• NBC capability.
• Diplomatic initiatives.
• Strength and weaknesses of alliances and coalitions.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-23. The General Staff normally reserves some units of the SPF Command
under its own control for reconnaissance missions supporting national-level
intelligence requirements. It may control these units either through the SPF
Command or by placing them directly under the control of its own Intelligence
Directorate. SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Internal Security Forces
could temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General
Staff when they become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level
requirements. If the General Staff creates a theater headquarters, it may dedi-
cate one or more SPF units to it. Even SPF units allocated to an operational-
strategic command (OSC) may conduct strategic missions, if required.
6-24. The SPF represent an important element in the total integrated recon-
naissance network planners try to achieve. These elite troops are a major
source of human intelligence (HUMINT). They provide reconnaissance and
combat capabilities for strategic and operational employment. They gather in-
formation to satisfy strategic and operational requirements at extended dis-
tances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical reconnaissance, in
nonlinear situations. For more information on SPF, see Chapter 13.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

6-25. Signals reconnaissance is an integral part of information warfare (IW).
The overall scope of signals reconnaissance includes the interception, analy-
sis, and exploitation of electromagnetic (radio and radar) emissions, coupled
with measures to disrupt or destroy the enemy’s radio and radar assets. Sig-
nals reconnaissance assets are found in two types of organizations. The ma-
jority are organic to signals reconnaissance units at all echelons and provide
significant support to the chief of reconnaissance. Additional assets are or-
ganic to jamming units, where they provide targeting support.
6-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
AIR ASSETS
6-26. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAV
reconnaissance, and signals reconnaissance. Since most reconnaissance air-
craft must penetrate enemy airspace, many of these missions are possible for
manned aircraft only when the OPFOR has established air superiority. How-
ever, UAVs do not necessarily require air superiority. They are generally
harder to detect because they are smaller and fly at lower altitudes than manned
aircraft. Also, they are relatively low-cost and may be considered expendable.
Fixed-Wing
6-27. The Air Force has varying reconnaissance assets to meet specific needs.
These units use high-performance aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance,
including visual, photographic, radar, and signals reconnaissance missions.
Aircraft on photographic reconnaissance missions normally fly at high speed
and may fly at high or low altitudes. They fly in pairs or singly, out to about
600 km from their operating base. Aircraft with side-looking airborne radar
(SLAR) normally work at high altitude and may not need to cross the battle
line to achieve their objectives. Similarly, signals reconnaissance aircraft may
not need to cross the battle line to identify and locate enemy radar emissions.
Rotary-Wing
6-28. Helicopters are a primary means to transport and insert reconnais-
sance units behind enemy lines. They can emplace observation posts or
reconnaissance patrols rather than perform air reconnaissance, especially
when the OPFOR does not have air superiority.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

6-29.There are two types of UAV: drones and remotely-piloted vehicles
(RPVs). A drone flies a set course programmed into its onboard flight control
system prior to launch. An RPV, on the other hand, can be flown by remote
control from a ground station, over a flight path of the controller’s choosing.
Flight patterns can vary according to the mission. For surveillance missions, the
UAV typically uses a figure-eight or racetrack pattern to maintain it over the
assigned surveillance area. For reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target
acquisition, and battle damage assessment missions, a loop or zigzag pattern
allows thorough coverage over a specific target area. RPV operators can vary
these basic flight patterns by taking control of the RPV and changing its altitude,
speed, or direction of flight. This allows RPVs to search for high-priority targets
or to collect more detailed information on such targets once it locates them.
While the radio command link gives an RPV greater flexibility, it also limits the
range of the RPV to the line-of-sight transmission range from its control station.
However, many RPVs can also operate in a preprogrammed mode at longer
ranges. UAV operations are also described in greater detail in FM 7-100.2.
SATELLITES
6-30. The Intelligence Directorate controls satellite reconnaissance to support the
OPFOR. These satellites provide unique capabilities of noninvasive reconnaissance
(not violating enemy airspace), “free” access, and continuous communications or
6-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
surveillance from their orbits. The OPFOR can use three basic types of reconnais-
sance satellites: photographic, early warning, and signals reconnaissance.
Photographic
6-31. Satellite reconnaissance is not as flexible as other types of reconnais-
sance, because a satellite only reconnoiters an area when its orbit takes it
into range. As a result, the OPFOR uses specialized photographic reconnais-
sance satellites to record designated enemy activity. Satellites may photo-
graph an area 40 to 50 km wide from an altitude of 200 to 250 km.
Early Warning
6-32. Early warning satellite orbits cross over foreign countries and the
oceans. The satellites might be used to detect infrared signatures from inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches or the deployment of enemy troops.
Signals Reconnaissance
6-33. The OPFOR could use several classes of signals reconnaissance satel-
lites to gather information on the electronic order of battle. Signals recon-
naissance satellites locate C2 nodes, battlefield radars, and forward units.
Some might also monitor transoceanic shipping and air traffic. Another func-
tion could be to detect unknown electronic signatures that might indicate the
presence of new equipment.
Distance in Kilometers
10 20 40 60 100 200 400 800
1. Satellite No Limit
2. Air
a. Photographic Reconnaissance 600
b. UAV (RPV and Drone) 300+
3. Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding Against

a. Artillery and Air Defense Radars 25 50
b. VHF/UHF (low / high power) 30 80
c. HF Ground Wave 80+
d. HF Sky Wave No Limit
e. Airborne Radar and Communications (Visual Limits)
4. Special Reconnaissance
a. Theater SPF Assets 100-500+
b. OSC SPF Assets 100-500
c. From Division Long-Range
100
Reconnaissance Company
5. Mechanized Reconnaissance
a. Patrols from Division
Reconnaissance Battalion 50+
b. Patrols from Brigade
Reconnaissance Company 50
6. Artillery Observation
a. Surveillance and Countermortar/
20+
Counterbattery Radars
b. Sound Ranging 25
c. Flash Spotting (Visual Limits)
d. RPV 60
Figure 6-1. Effective Ranges of Reconnaissance Assets
6-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL ASSETS
6-34. Operational reconnaissance forces support OSC commanders. They
acquire and analyze information about an actual or probable enemy, to
prepare for the successful conduct of combat operations. Operational recon-
naissance forces usually collect information throughout the entire depth of an
enemy corps area (300 to 600 km). Operational reconnaissance collection as-
sets include signals reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, and SPF. OSCs
conduct operational reconnaissance using their own resources, plus those of
their subordinate tactical groups. Figure 6-1 illustrates the effective ranges of
various reconnaissance means that may support OSC operations.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES
6-35. The General Staff often allocates SPF units to support the operations of
an OSC or to become part of the OSC in a constituent or dedicated command
relationship. Such units have SPF troops specially trained to insert by
parachute, helicopter, light aircraft, or infiltration to conduct reconnaissance.
Of course, commanders do not insert all of the assets at the outset to operate
simultaneously; they might retain some in the reconnaissance reserve to be
inserted against new targets or original ones left uncovered by the compro-
mise or destruction of a team inserting in the first group.
SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

6-36. The OPFOR typically allocates radio and radar intercept and direction
finding units to OSC level. These assets report gathered information to
higher and lower levels.
AIR ASSETS
6-37. The theater commander normally controls aerial reconnaissance but
may allocate aircraft to lower headquarters to support a particular operation
or battle. The number and composition of units, and the types of fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft can vary greatly. The OPFOR also employs UAVs to con-
duct aerial reconnaissance.
ARTILLERY ASSETS
6-38. OSCs often have constituent target acquisition units to obtain and transmit
meteorological, topographic, and targeting information. This can include sound-
ranging systems, battlefield surveillance and countermortar/counterbattery radars.
NBC ASSETS
6-39. OSCs operating in potential NBC environments typically have chemical
defense units and chemical reconnaissance units allocated to them.1 These units
perform decontamination and detect, report, and mark all contaminated areas.
ENGINEER ASSETS
6-40. Engineer units have reconnaissance specialists to accompany maneuver
unit reconnaissance forces. There are specialized engineer reconnaissance
1
Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually
encompass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance. (See Chapter 11.)
6-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 6
patrols that assess routes, reporting on obstacles, road conditions, and the
general nature of the terrain. These engineer assets help units maintain a
rapid rate of advance or prepare for effective defense.
AIRBORNE FORCES
6-41. Airborne forces are elite troops whose primary purpose is to conduct active
combat operations in the enemy’s rear area. Airborne forces might conduct recon-
naissance operations and relay information directly to the main command post or
headquarters as they operate against targets in the enemy’s rear. See Chapter 13.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

6-42. At OSC level, UAVs provide aerial reconnaissance support. An OSC of-
ten is assigned one or more UAV units.
GROUND FORCES TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

6-43. Reconnaissance is a combined arms responsibility. Thus, ordinary mecha-
nized infantry and tank units perform two functions: they perform their own close
reconnaissance tasks with organic resources, and they provide reconnaissance de-
tachments of up to battalion strength. Leading units may also conduct reconnais-
sance attacks (see FM 7-100.2). OSCs and tactical groups may also form task-
oriented reconnaissance detachments based on a combat arms battalion,
augmented by engineer and chemical reconnaissance and, often, by mecha-
nized infantry and tank units. Generally, these groups try to avoid combat in
fulfilling their tasks, although they may direct artillery fire or air attacks.
Typical missions might include
• Locating, identifying, and reporting enemy precision weapons and nu-
clear delivery means, headquarters, communications centers, troop
concentrations, and movements of enemy units.
• Determining the strength and disposition of the enemy’s defenses and
locating his boundaries.
• Providing topographical information concerning routes to, or bypasses
around, enemy positions as well as concerning lateral routes.
• Identifying the extent and depth of minefields and the types of mines
employed (assessing obstacles and possible crossing points).
• Establishing the extent of zones of NBC contamination.
• Identifying potential communications facilities and other sites for use
by their own forces.
6-44. The chief of reconnaissance, with input from other staff elements, must
prepare a detailed reconnaissance plan, specifying—
• The organization of reconnaissance activities for a specific time.
• Goals and mission for each reconnaissance activity.
• Completion times.
• Reporting procedures.
6-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
6-45. Reconnaissance plays a critical role in all OPFOR strategic courses of
action. Targets of reconnaissance actions may be the same during different
strategic courses of action, but for different reasons.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
6-46. Military operations during regional operations attempt to achieve stra-
tegic political or military decision by destroying the enemy’s will and capabil-
ity to fight. This is often brought about by destroying the C2 and logistics sys-
tems the enemy needs for continued operations. Reconnaissance actions dur-
ing this period are therefore focused on locating and tracking enemy C2 nodes
and logistics centers.
6-47. Other targets of OPFOR RISTA during regional operations include the
enemy’s
• Precision weapons delivery means.
• Long-range fire systems.
• WMD.
• RISTA assets.
6-48. A key reconnaissance task during transition operations is to support
the requirements of access-control operations. RISTA assets can gather in-
formation on likely enemy aerial and sea ports of debarkation and other
targets of access-control activities, such as potential operating or staging
bases.
6-49. Reconnaissance efforts are directed against vulnerable early-entry
forces before the enemy can bring his technological overmatch to bear. They
can also support sophisticated ambushes to destroy high-visibility enemy
systems or cause mass casualties.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
6-50. In adaptive operations, RISTA assets support the creation of windows
of opportunity that permit OPFOR units to move out of sanctuary and attack.
OPFOR RISTA can do this by locating and tracking key elements of the
enemy’s C2, RISTA, air defense, and long-range fires systems for attack.
6-51. RISTA assets can also play a direct role in supporting counterrecon-
naissance operations. Extraregional powers rely heavily on situational
awareness, both to employ standoff weapons and to preclude being deceived
by OPFOR IW efforts.
6-10
Chapter 7
Fire Support
The integration of air, artillery, and missile assets into a unified fire support
plan is a major task for the combined arms commander. Integration is a
decisive element, fundamental to the success of any operation on the
modern battlefield. The OPFOR does not consider itself to be an “artillery-
centric” army. Rather, it views itself as using various forms of fire support
to achieve success during offensive and defensive operations. In the offense,
fire support is important to the success of any attack. It can destroy key
systems; disrupt, immobilize, or destroy enemy groupings; and repel
counterattacks. Fire support is also the cornerstone of any defense, blunt-
ing attacks at the crucial point in the battle. It disrupts enemy prepara-
tions for the attack, causes attrition as he approaches, and repels forces.
FIRE SUPPORT CONCEPTS

7-1. Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition,
indirect fire weapons, aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in
support of operational or tactical objectives. The goal is to synchronize all
available fire support systems to achieve the most effective results,
thereby maximizing combat power. Effective fire support enables OPFOR
ground forces to attack successfully and quickly to exploit weaknesses.
Commanders try to accomplish their missions using a combination of
maneuver and fire. The OPFOR continues to expand and upgrade fire
support systems to achieve a qualitative edge over its regional opponents.
However, it realizes that it may be at a qualitative disadvantage compared to
a modern extraregional force.
7-2. The OPFOR stresses that fire support should integrate air assets, surface-
to-surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery to attack enemy targets throughout the
area of responsibility (AOR). The combined arms commander always seeks to
increase the effectiveness of air and missile attacks and artillery fire to destroy
enemy formations, weapon systems, or key components of an enemy combat
system. (See Systems Warfare later in this chapter and in Chapter 1.) This
ensures continuous fire support for maneuver units throughout the AOR.
7-3. The OPFOR considers information warfare (IW) an essential element of
fire support. It provides a nonlethal alternative or supplement to attack by
fire and maneuver. It is integrated into the overall concept of the operation,
to confuse, deceive, delay, and disorganize the enemy.
FIRE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

7-4. The principles of fire support are the framework for a thought process
that ensures the most effective use of fire support assets. These principles apply
at all levels of command, regardless of the specific fire support assets available:
• Plan early and continuously.
7-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Exploit all available reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and

target acquisition (RISTA) assets.
• Consider airspace management and the use of all fire support (lethal
and nonlethal) means.
• Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.
• Avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
• Use the most effective means to accomplish the mission.
• Provide rapid and effective coordination.
• Provide for flexibility of employment.
• Provide for safeguarding and survivability of OPFOR fire support assets.
• Attempt to achieve surprise when possible.
• Deliver highly accurate and effective fire.
SYSTEMS WARFARE
7-5. The foundation of OPFOR planning is the systems warfare approach to
combat. Thus, the OPFOR analyzes its own combat system and how it can use
the combined effects of this “system of systems” to degrade or destroy the en-
emy’s combat system. In systems warfare, the subsystems or components of a
combat system are targeted and destroyed individually. Once a favorable com-
bat situation has developed, the targeted enemy subsystem is quickly destroyed
in high-intensity operations, thus making the enemy’s overall combat system
vulnerable to destruction or at least degrading its effectiveness. (See Systems
Warfare in Chapter 1 for further information.)
7-6. Within the systems warfare approach, the OPFOR employs a fire sup-
port concept centered on a phased-cycle of finding a critical component of the
enemy combat system and determining its location with RISTA assets;
engaging it with precision fires, maneuver, or other means; and recovering to
support the fight against another part of the enemy force. The primary
reason for attacking an enemy with fires is to degrade or destroy one or more
key components of the enemy’s combat system and/or to create favorable
conditions for degrading or destroying other parts of his combat system.
TECHNIQUES TO EXPLOIT ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

7-7. The OPFOR seeks to avoid enemy strengths and exploit his vulnerabilities.
In conflicts with extraregional powers, the OPFOR typically would be operat-
ing from relative strategic weakness. Therefore, it seeks to operationally
outmaneuver, overwhelm, and outpace the enemy. It also seeks to deny him
any sanctuary on the battlefield, as well as in the local theater or in his
strategic depth. (See Strategic Context later in this chapter.)
7-8. The OPFOR will also leverage the effects of its available fire support
means by integrating them into an integrated fires command (IFC) in or-
ganizations down to division or division tactical group (DTG) level. The
IFC (described in detail in Chapter 2) synchronizes and focuses the efforts
of RISTA and fire to destroy key enemy formations or systemsor key
components of an enemy combat system. Destroying such targets can not
7-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
only shift the balance of power in the region in the OPFOR’s favor, but
also undermine enemy morale and resolve.
TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA

7-9. Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military target. It results
in total, partial, or temporary loss of the target’s combat effectiveness.
The OPFOR categories of target damage are annihilation, demolition,
neutralization, and harassment.1 Of these categories, the first three fall
under the general term destruction.
Annihilation
7-10. Annihilation fires render targets completely combat-ineffective and
incapable of reconstruction or token resistance. For a point target such as
an antitank guided missile launcher, the OPFOR must expend enough
munitions to ensure a 70 to 90 percent probability of kill. For area targets
such as platoon strongpoints or nuclear artillery assets, the OPFOR must fire
enough rounds to destroy from 50 to 60 percent of the targets within a group.
These fires result in the group ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force.
Demolition
7-11. The OPFOR uses the term demolition in reference to the destruction of
buildings and engineer works (such as bridges, fortifications, or roads).
Demolition requires enough munitions to make such material objects unfit for
further use.
Neutralization
7-12. Fire for neutralization inflicts enough losses on a target to—
• Cause it to temporarily lose its combat effectiveness, or
• Restrict or prohibit its maneuver, or
• Disrupt its command and control (C2) capability.
To achieve neutralization, the OPFOR must deliver enough munitions to de-
stroy 30 percent of a group of unobserved targets. The expectation is that the
target is severely damaged but could again become capable of coordinated re-
sistance after the fire is lifted. The term neutralization applies only in an ar-
tillery context.
Harassment
7-13. The OPFOR uses a limited number of fire support systems and
munitions within a prescribed time to deliver harassment fires. The goal of
these fires is to put psychological pressure on enemy personnel in locations
such as defensive positions, command posts (CPs), and logistics installations.
Successful harassment fire inhibits maneuver, lowers morale, interrupts
rest, and weakens enemy combat readiness.
1
The use of precision weapons may render such target damage criteria obsolete, since precision weapons
are always supposed to “annihilate” the targets completely, not just destroying a certain percentage of them.
7-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND AND CONTROL

7-14. The nature of fire support units, with assets capable of long ranges and
their potential wide influence and flexibility on the battlefield, requires that
C2 be more complex than for maneuver units. The ability to engage and de-
stroy targets at longer ranges has generally resulted in C2 being retained at a
high level of command in order to maximize overall effectiveness. However,
the requirement for a rapid response between the detection of targets and their
subsequent engagement requires C2 to be exercised at a low level of command.
Low-level C2 facilitates accurate judgement in both the timing of engagements
and the fire support adjustments as the combat situation develops. The OPFOR
instituted the IFC as the principal fire support C2 structure to ensure flexibility
of C2 and response in meeting the fire support challenges on future battlefields.
CHIEF OF INTEGRATED FIRES

7-15. Within the operations section of the operational-strategic command
(OSC) staff, there is a chief of integrated fires. This officer is responsible for
coordinating and advising the commander on the effective integration of C2
and RISTA means with fire support means (including precision fires) to sup-
port the overall operation plan. He controls, but does not command, the fire
support units subordinate to or supporting the OSC. He advises the OSC
commander on how best to use available fire support assets.

7-16. The IFC is a combination of a standing C2 structure and task organiza-
tion of constituent and dedicated fire support units. All division-level and
above OPFOR organizations possess an IFC C2 structurestaff, CPs,
communications and intelligence architecture, and automated fire control
system. The IFC exercises C2 of all constituent and dedicated fire support
assets retained by its level of command. This can include Air Force, army
aviation, artillery, and SSM units. It also exercises C2 over all RISTA assets
constituent or dedicated to it. There is one IFC per OSC.
7-17. An OSC-level IFC is capable of engaging designated operational and
strategic targets. However, there are circumstances where an IFC may be
formed at the theater level. For example, the theater could have two separate
campaigns, requiring a centralization of critical fire support assets at theater
level to achieve the strategic or theater campaign objectives. When this oc-
curs, the theater commander forms a theater-level IFC commanded by the
deputy theater commander. This IFC exercises C2 over all fire support assets
retained at the theater level of command.
7-18. The mission of the IFC is to execute all fire support tasks required to
accomplish the mission of the command to which the IFC belongs. The IFC is
designed to
• Exploit the combat power inherent in carefully integrated ground and
air fire support actions.
• Reduce to the absolute minimum the amount of time from target acqui-
sition to engagement.
7-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
• Permit fire support assets to mass their effects without having to oper-
ate in concentrated formations.
• Ensure the optimal fire support asset(s) are assigned any given mission.
• Ensure the commander’s priorities for fire support are adhered to.
• Act, if necessary, as the organization’s alternate command structure.
• Integrate the effects of fires from units placed in support of the organi-
zation.
7-19. The number and type of fire support and RISTA units allocated to an
IFC is mission dependent. The IFC is not organized according to a table of
organization and equipment, but is task organized to accomplish the missions
assigned.
7-20. In addition to constituent or dedicated assets that become part of its
IFC, an OSC can receive fire support and/or RISTA assets allocated to it from
national or theater level in a supporting relationship. In that case, the OSC or its
IFC commander can position those assets and give them mission priorities, but
the supporting assets would still be commanded by their parent organization.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

7-21. A fire support coordination center (FSCC) is established at each
organizational level (maneuver battalion to IFC). The FSCC is the staff
element responsible for the planning and coordination of fires to support
the respective maneuver unit. It performs the following coordination functions:
• Acquire and identify high-payoff targets (HPTs).
• Recommend targets.
• Use target value analysis to identify target priorities.
• Determine fire support needs.
• Expedite fire support.
• Assess fire support effects.
• Change fire support plans.
• Coordinate the timing of fire support attacks (to include IW).
• Recommend the use of aviation.
SUPPORTING MANEUVER COMMANDERS’ FIRE REQUESTS

7-22. Requests for supporting fires may originate at any organizational level.
They are initiated when constituent or dedicated fire support means at that
level are fully engaged, when the range of the target exceeds the constituent
or dedicated fire support means, or when the constituent or dedicated fire
support means have suffered combat loss. There are two methods of request-
ing supporting fires. The preferred method is for the request to be forwarded
from the division or DTG commander to the integrated fires subsection in the
OSC headquarters. An alternate method is for the division or DTG com-
mander to request supporting fires from the OSC commander. The OSC
commander either approves or denies the request. If the request is approved,
the OSC commander tasks the IFC to provide the requested support.
7-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
NAVAL FIRE SUPPORT

7-23. Naval fire support, when available, gives the ground maneuver
commander long-range indirect fires. Naval fire support includes shipborne
gunfire and sea-launched cruise missiles. Depending on the hydrography and
the orientation of the ground operation, naval fire support may provide deep
indirect fire attacks on enemy formations and installations.
7-24. Naval fire support assets allocated to a theater or OSC in a constituent
or dedicated relationship are under the command of the theater- or OSC-level
IFC. Another option is for naval fire support assets to remain under the
command of the Navy but to provide support for ground operations. During
the course of such a supporting relationship, if enemy actions threaten naval op-
erations, the target attack priorities of the ship may cause it to suspend or cancel
land fire missions until the other threats subside. Once the threats have sub-
sided, the fire support assets resume their support of the ground maneuver force.
7-25. A naval fire support liaison team augments the operations section of
the IFC staff when naval fire support is required to support the ground ma-
neuver force, whether in a constituent, dedicated, or supporting relationship.
The liaison team provides special staff representation and advice on naval
fire support to the IFC commander. Additionally, it coordinates requests for
naval fire support and operates the naval fire support nets in the IFC’s FSCC.
FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

7-26. Fire support planning is the determination of the content, manner, and
sequence of delivery of fire on the enemy in an operation. The OPFOR accom-
plishes fire support planning at the highest possible levels. The fire support
plan also includes input from subordinate units. The fire support planning
process includes—
• Target acquisition.
• Organization of forces for combat.
• Assignment of fire support missions.
• Determination of ammunition requirements.
• Formulation of a detailed fire support plan.
7-27. Fire support planning includes consideration of the following:

• The scheme of maneuver of the supported forces.
• The enemy force to receive fire.
• The location and character of individual targets within the designated
enemy force.
• The required or desired level of target damage.
• Fire support assets available, both delivery systems and ordnance.
• Requirements for allocation of weapons and units (organization of
forces for combat).
• Missions assigned to IFCs, units, and weapons.
• The manner and procedure of delivery of fire during the performance of
missions.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
• Requirements and distribution of ammunition by missions.

• Organization of coordination and command and control.
• Preparation of appropriately detailed fire support plans at various levels.
7-28. In the OPFOR’s “top-down” approach to the planning and allocation of

fire support, fire support planning occurs at the highest level possible. The
IFC commander at the OSC or theater level plans and coordinates fire sup-
port, always under the direction of the maneuver commander. The highest
level of participating units coordinates and approves the fire support plan,
with input from subordinate units. The OSC headquarters performs general
fire support planning. Detailed planning occurs in maneuver units, IFCs, and
fire support units. The fires of all indirect fire support units within a brigade
or brigade tactical group (BTG) are incorporated into the brigade or BTG fire
support plan. In turn, brigade or BTG fire support plans become part of divi-
sion or DTG fire support plans. Division or DTG fire support plans become part
of OSC fire support plans.
7-29. In its simplest form, fire support planning is the process of determining
the best way to engage all of the enemy’s units with firesensuring that the
required level of damage is inflicted in a manner consistent with the com-
mander’s concept of the operation. Above all else, this means that the fire
support plan must match his concept for the sequence with which the opera-
tion will develop. The focus of fire support planning is on establishing and
maintaining fire superiority over the enemy. Therefore, timing is critical.
ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
7-30. The planning process begins with an estimate of the situation. This
estimate includes the following:
• Scheme of maneuver of supported forces.
• Locations and type of enemy targets.
• Required level of damage.
• Delivery means and ordnance available.
7-31. The OSC commander, his IFC commander, and other staff members
establish the basis for fire support planning during the commander’s
reconnaissance of the area of anticipated action. During this reconnaissance,
the commander refines the organization of forces for combat and the
means of coordination. The OSC commander gives the IFC commander the
information base to determine the following:
• Targets for fire support weapons to engage and fire upon.
• Priority of each target.
• Sequence in which to attack targets.
• Time to attack each target.
7-32. The commander of a fire support unit at any level coordinates the fires
under his control. He determines new requirements and missions and, with
the IFC commander, makes suggestions to the maneuver commander about
adjustments in organization of forces as the situation develops.
7-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
IFC PLANNING
7-33. An IFC commander and members of his staff conduct their planning in
coordination with the rest of the OSC staff, concurrently with the OSC staff
developing the operation plan. The IFC has targets for each phase of the
battle. Planning considerations include target type, dimensions, degree of
fortification, mobility, and depth into the enemy’s defense.
Allocation Procedures
7-34. The OPFOR carefully calculates fire support requirements in terms of
weapons and munitions needed to produce a required effect on enemy targets.
If insufficient fire support or ammunition is available to achieve the neces-
sary result, the OPFOR does not fire less and hope for the best. Rather, if
necessary, it engages fewer targets, adjusting the fire support plan and the
operation plan.
7-35. The priority of allocation of fire support assets to the OSC from the ad-
ministrative force structure is normally to the OSC’s IFC. Fire support assets
that are allocated to the OSC and not used in the IFC are allocated, normally
in a constituent or dedicated relationship, to maneuver units such as DTGs.
Fire support units remaining under IFC command may provide fires for tacti-
cal maneuver units in a supporting relationship. The supporting relationship
allows the IFC commander the flexibility to task fire support assets to engage
key enemy targets throughout the AOR.
Synchronization
7-36. The IFC is synchronized at two levels. First, the OSC commander and his
staff are responsible for synchronizing fire support with ground maneuver.
The key element is to ensure that all fire support occurs at the right place
and time to produce the desired effect. The OSC commander’s maneuver plan
forms the basis for the synchronization of the IFC.
7-37. The commanders of the individual fire support components accomplish
the second level of synchronization when they plan and execute the fire sup-
port operations. They must synchronize the supporting fire components to
produce the concentration of combat power at the decisive point. For exam-
ple, the priority of initial attack helicopter fires may be to suppress enemy air
defense systems to protect attacking fixed-wing aircraft. The artillery may be
assigned missions to attack targets to assist the attacking ingress and egress
of aircraft.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

7-38. Fires from mortars, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs),
and SSMs pose a potential hazard to friendly maneuver forces and aircraft
activities. The highest probability of conflict between aircraft and indirect fire
weapons occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing
positions and targeted areas. (See Chapter 8 for more information on air and
artillery coordination measures.) To reduce potential conflicts between indi-
rect fires and maneuver forces or aircraft, information pertaining to firing po-
sitions, targeted areas, and fire support plans is distributed to all involved
7-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
commanders and their staffs. The fire support plan includes a map with
graphics outlining the following control lines:
• Coordinated Fire Line. A line beyond which indirect fire systems
can fire at any time within the AOR of the establishing headquarters
without additional coordination.
• Final Coordination Line. A line established by the appropriate
maneuver commander to ensure coordination of fire of converging
friendly forces. It can be used to prohibit fires or the effects of fires
across the line without coordination with the affected force. For
example, this line may be used during link-up operations between an
airborne or heliborne insertion and converging ground forces.
• Joint Fire Line. A line established by the appropriate OSC-level and
above commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his control
but which may affect his operations. The joint fire line is used to coor-
dinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using various types
of ammunition against surface targets.
• Safety Line. A line that denotes the fragmentation footprint of
indirect fire munitions or bombs/rockets released from aircraft.
This indicates the minimum distance between the impact area and
the nearest friendly troops.
ASSIGNING FIRE MISSIONS
7-39. When assigning missions, indirect fire support commanders and plan-
ners consider several variables, depending on the situation. These variables
include
• Type of target (for example, equipment or personnel, deliberate or
hasty defensive positions, hard- or soft-skinned vehicles, point or area
targets).
• Deployment of target (dug-in or in the open).
• Whether the target is stationary or moving.
• Whether the target is under direct observation during the artillery
attack.
• Range to the target.
• Type, caliber, and number of weapons engaging the target.
• Types of ammunition available.
• Time available to prepare for firing.
PRECISION MUNITIONS
7-40. The OPFOR defines a precision weapon as one capable of delivering
guided conventional munitions with a high probability of destroying enemy
targets with a first-round hit (within range of the weapon delivery system).
The presence of the precision munition transforms a weapon into a precision
weapon. However, a precision weapon system must also incorporate a target
acquisition and tracking subsystem and a missile or projectile guidance sub-
system. Some of these subsystems may be combined. Precision munitions are
primarily designed to effectively defeat armored vehicles; self-propelled artil-
lery systems; MRLs; C2 and RISTA centers; defensive fortifications; and bridges.
7-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
7-41. Precision weapons have enabled the OPFOR to mass firepower at

critical points on the battlefield and simultaneously reduce ammunition
expenditure and mission time. Reconnaissance fire (defined later in this
chapter) is an effective form of precision weapon engagement. It is some-
times called a “unified precision weapon system,” because it links the
highly accurate weapon to an automated reconnaissance and control system.
7-42. Precision munitions delivered by mortars, artillery, missiles, and air-
craft can include—
• Homing and guided SSMs (some delivering advanced submunitions).
• Semiactive laser-guided artillery projectiles and bombs.
• Sensor-fuzed artillery submunitions.
• Terminally homing cannon and mortar projectiles.
• Terminally homing submunitions.
Air-delivered precision munitions include homing and guided air-to-surface
missiles (including radar-seeking antiradiation missiles); guided bombs and
cluster bombs containing homing elements; and air-launched cruise missiles.
7-43. Not all OPFOR artillery units have precision munitions, making it nec-
essary to allocate those rounds available against high-value targets (HVTs).
Even the units that do receive them do not distribute them evenly among all
delivery means, but typically designate one particular unit to fire them.
NBC WEAPONS
7-44. The OPFOR might use nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weap-
ons either to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack on the
State. The State considers the employment of NBC weapons as a responsibil-
ity of the National Command Authority. Delivery means such as long-range
missiles and rockets are political tools, first and foremost. The OPFOR
has SSMs capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.
Additionally, it can employ aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an
NBC attack.
7-45. OPFOR military doctrine distinguishes between fire support and an
NBC attack. However, the two are closely related. Strategic and operational
fire support units must plan and deliver the attacks. They must also adjust
the fire support plan to account for the effects of NBC attacks on the enemy.
Such attacks greatly affect the tempo of combat activity. This, in turn, influ-
ences the type of fire support required. It also influences the kind of logistics
support needed, such as fuel or ammunition.
7-46. If needed, the majority of OPFOR artillery (152-mm and above) is ca-
pable of firing nuclear or chemical munitions. However, continued improve-
ments in conventional munitions, especially precision munitions, increase the
likelihood that the OPFOR can achieve operational- or tactical-level fire su-
periority at the desired location and time without resorting to NBC weapons.
TARGETING
7-47. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appro-
priate response, taking into account operational requirements and OPFOR
7-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
capabilities. Targeting requires constant interaction between maneuver,

reconnaissance, fire support, and IW, at all levels. Target value analysis is an
analytical tool that is used in the targeting process by which the supported
maneuver commander
• Provides focus for his target acquisition effort.
• Identifies priorities for the engagement of enemy targets that will
facilitate the success of his mission.
• Identifies the target damage criteria.
• Permits planning for identified contingencies based on enemy options
available when the enemy operation fails.
HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
7-48. HVTs are targets deemed important to the enemy commander for the
successful accomplishment of his mission. The loss of HVTs can be expected
to contribute to a substantial degradation of an important battlefield function.
HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS
7-49. HPTs are HVTs that must be successfully acquired and attacked to
contribute substantially to the success of OPFOR operations. They are devel-
oped on the basis of factors such as enemy situation, unit mission, terrain,
and the time and resources available. They are not dependent on the ability
of the fire support unit to acquire or attack them. If an HPT is beyond the ca-
pability of the target acquisition or reconnaissance unit to acquire, it should
be passed to the next-higher headquarters as a priority intelligence requirement.
7-50. Based on a battlefield analysis, the OSC commander, with advice from
his IFC commander, selects HPTs and establishes a prioritized list of them.
The HPT list identifies the HPTs for a specific point in the operation in the
order of their priority for acquisition and attack. While their target value is
usually the greatest factor contributing to the target payoff, other considera-
tions include the following:
• Sequence or order of occurrence.
• Ability to locate and identify the target.
• Degree of accuracy and identification available from the acquisition system.
• Ability to engage and defeat the target in accordance with the estab-
lished target damage criteria.
• Resource requirements necessary to accomplish all of the above.
TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS
7-51. Time-sensitive targets are those targets requiring an immediate re-
sponse. The reason for this urgency is that they either pose (or will soon pose)
a clear and present danger to the OPFOR or are highly lucrative, fleeting
targets of opportunity.
TARGET ATTACK METHODOLOGY

7-52. The vast array of targets anticipated on the battlefield can generate
competing demands for fire support. These demands could exceed the capability
7-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of fire support assets to adequately respond to all requirements. Therefore, the

OPFOR uses the target attack methodology of plan, detect, deliver, and assess.
Plan
7-53. The plan phase provides the focus and priorities for the reconnaissance
collection management and fire planning process. It employs an estimate of
enemy intent, capabilities, and vulnerabilities in conjunction with an under-
standing of the OPFOR mission and concept of operations. During the plan
phase, the OSC commander, with advice from his IFC commander, makes a
determination of what HPTs to look for, when and where they are likely to
appear on the battlefield, who (reconnaissance or target acquisition assets)
can locate them, and how the targets should be attacked.
Detect
7-54. During the detect phase, the reconnaissance plan is executed. As speci-
fied targets are located, the appropriate command observation post (COP) or
delivery system is notified to initiate the attack of the target. Figure 7-1 illus-
trates the varying methods of reporting targets for attack from the point of
detection by a sensor through delivery. The figure displays the methods along
a range from the least to the most responsive.
WEAPON
PLATFORM
LEGEND
Units equipped with firing

systems with onboard manual
FIRING UNIT or automated fire direction
capability
COP/FDC
WEAPON
PLATFORM
OSC IFC
FSCC
FIRING UNIT WEAPON

OSC COP/FDC PLATFORM
INTEL & INFO
SECTION
OSC IFC FIRING UNIT WEAPON

SENSOR HQ
OR DOWNLINK FSCC COP/FDC PLATFORM
SITE
HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH HUMINT/TECH

SENSOR OR
SENSOR MANEUVER CDR SENSOR SENSOR
Less Responsive More Responsive
Figure 7-1. Target Report Flow
7-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
Deliver
7-55. Timely, accurate delivery is the culmination of synchronization of
fire support. The delivery is rapidly executed by having designated attack
systems respond to the maneuver commander’s guidance when the HPTs are
observed.
Assess
7-56. Following the attack of the target, the RISTA assets are cued to deter-
mine if the target has been defeated in accordance with the established target
damage criteria. If it is determined that the target damage criteria are not
achieved, delivery assets re-engage the target until the desired target dam-
age has been achieved.
METHODS OF FIRE
7-57. Critical to the success of OPFOR operations is the ability to plan, de-
tect, deliver, and assess fire (in accordance with the commander’s target
damage criteria) against enemy C2 and RISTA and weapons systems
throughout the AOR. The focus is a systems warfare approach to combat,
where the objective of the combat action is to deny the enemy’s combat sys-
tem its synergistic capabilities. Thus, the OPFOR is able to compel enemy
forces into multiple and rapid tactical transitions and to create opportunity
by keeping them off balance, breaking their momentum, and slowing
movement. The OPFOR uses various types of fires against the enemy. The
methods of fire may have different purposes in the offense and defense.
FIRE SUPPORT TO A STRIKE

7-58. At the operational level, a strike involves the employment of a combina-
tion of strategic- and operational-level RISTA systems with fire support, SPF,
and maneuver forces to conduct precision strike operations that can result in
a decisive operational victory. The strike can be employed in both defensive
and offensive operations.
7-59. Fire support to a strike involves the employment of a wide variety of
ammunition types (such as standard, course-corrected, advanced, and precision
munitions) to destroy an enemy formation after typically setting the conditions
for its destruction through reconnaissance fire. IFC fire support units are as-
signed interdiction fire missions to support the maneuver component throughout
the strike. Constituent and dedicated indirect fire support units (allocated to the
maneuver component) provide close support fire throughout the operation. Thus,
fire support to a strike incorporates other methods of fire.
RECONNAISSANCE FIRE
7-60. Reconnaissance fire is the integration of RISTA, fire control, and weapon
systems into a closed-loop, automated fire support system that detects,
identifies, and destroys critical targets in minutes. This integration capability
normally exists only within an IFC. One reason for this requirement for acceler-
ated engagement is that high-value targets may expose themselves for only
fleeting periods. Reconnaissance fire is primarily designed to attack and destroy
key enemy capabilities and/or set the conditions for a strike (see Chapter 3).
7-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
7-61. Reconnaissance fire enables the OPFOR to deliver fixed- and rotary-
wing air, SSM, cruise missile, and artillery fires (including precision muni-
tions) on enemy targets within a very short time after acquisition. The
OPFOR can use reconnaissance fire in offensive and defensive phases of com-
bat. Assets designated for reconnaissance fire use are under control of the
IFC commander, and control remains centralized for planning, analysis, and
evaluation of reconnaissance data, and for execution of the reconnaissance
fire mission. This type of arrangement allows the assets to execute other mis-
sions or taskings until the desired HPTs are detected. The IFC commander
may establish a window of time for assets tasked to support reconnaissance
fire (based on an intelligence assessment of when the enemy targets should
be in designated kill zones).
7-62. The OSC commander selects and establishes the target priority and
target damage criteria of the combat system component or components to be
attacked in order to force the favorable condition to conduct a strike. The IFC
staff and fire support component commanders develop the fire support plan
designed to conduct reconnaissance fire necessary to create the favorable
condition. The IFC commander then briefs the fire support plan to the OSC
commander to ensure compliance with the overall operation plan. The IFC
executes reconnaissance fire in accordance with the approved fire support plan.
CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE

7-63. Close support fire is fire used to support maneuver forces and attack
targets of immediate concern to units such as battalions and BTGs. The re-
quirement is to provide a quick response time and accurate fires capable of
either neutralizing or destroying all types of targets.
INTERDICTION FIRE
7-64. Interdiction fire is fire designed to attack targets in depth (such as
logistics sites or assembly areas) and to prevent enemy follow-on or reserve
forces from reinforcing or influencing a battle or situation. Generally,
interdiction fire (when compared to close fire) has a slower response time,
especially for stationary targets; accuracy may be lower; and the targets are
generally not as well protected. However, technological improvements such as
course-corrected rockets, projectiles, and fuzes facilitate long-range precision
targeting.
7-65. The OPFOR employs long-range fire systems (operating from dispersed
areas) to continuously engage targeted forces and systems. Operational and
tactical RISTA systems direct them.
COUNTERFIRE
7-66. Counterfire is fire designed to destroy the enemy fire support infra-
structure throughout the battlefield. The fire support infrastructure includes
mortars, cannon, rockets, missiles, fire support C2 and RISTA, and logistics
assets. Counterfire enables the ground forces to achieve effective fire support
on the battlefield. It is especially important for the early destruction of the
enemy’s long-range and precision weapons.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
COUNTERBATTERY FIRE
7-67. Counterbattery fire is fire that accomplishes the annihilation or neu-
tralization of enemy artillery batteries. It enables ground forces to maneuver
on the battlefield with little to no suppression by enemy artillery. However,
combat with enemy artillery requires more than counterbattery fire.
FIRE SUPPORT OF MANEUVER OPERATIONS

7-68. The fire support of maneuver operations is characterized by the use of
all available fire support to carry out the commander’s plan. The OPFOR be-
lieves that fire support must be flexible to meet all contingencies during com-
bat operations. The OPFOR masses fires against an enemy objective with
available fire support assets, with the goal of achieving the OSC commander’s
specified target damage criteria in the shortest time possible.
OFFENSE
7-69. Fire support considerations for the offense apply to all types of offensive
action discussed in Chapter 3. The OPFOR plans and executes fires to sup-
port the offensive action and complete the destruction of the enemy. The use
of selected lines or zones controls the shifting of fires, and the displacement of
fire support units reflects changes in command and support relationships be-
tween fire support units and maneuver units. Fires are planned to
• Suppress enemy troop activity and weapon systems.
• Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
• Prevent the enemy from restoring fire support, C2, and RISTA systems
neutralized during previous fire support missions.
• Deny the enemy the ability to use reserve forces to conduct a counter-
attack.
• If necessary, create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike.
• Support the exploitation force.
DEFENSE
7-70. Fire support considerations for the defense apply to all types of
defensive action discussed in Chapter 4. Key is the application of fire support
as early as possible throughout the AOR in support of the defensive operation
plan. Emphasis is placed on RISTA assets locating enemy formations and
attack positions, with the goal of determining the direction and composition
of the enemy main attack. Carefully analyzing the terrain over which the
enemy will advance and canalizing his movement into kill zones can create
conditions for fires in the defense. Fires are planned to
• Deny the enemy information about friendly forces.
• Develop the situation early by forcing the enemy to deploy early and
thus reveal the location of his main effort.
• Maximize the effect of obstacles as combat multipliers.
• Create favorable conditions for the conduct of a strike or counterattack.
7-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
7-71. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR may use various
fire support assets to attack the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat
system. These attacks are coordinated with perception management efforts to
convey a message of political and military dominance to the regional civilian
populace as well as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional
opponent.
7-72. The OPFOR is able to employ all of its methods of fire in regional and
transition operations. However, it is unable or finds it difficult to employ the
counterbattery method of fire during adaptive operations due to an extrare-
gional force’s technological advantage in ability to target OPFOR fire support
assets.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
7-73. During regional operations, the OPFOR can use fire support means
(primarily aviation, SSMs, and long-range rockets) to attack targets in the
homeland of a regional opponent. The OPFOR generally possesses an
overmatch in military capability against its regional neighbor and is able
to control the airspace, thus allowing it freedom of maneuver. However, the
OPFOR is concerned about the intervention of an extraregional force during a
strategic campaign against a regional neighbor.
7-74. The OPFOR realizes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA
support (such as satellite and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery)
from an extraregional power. OPFOR fire support planners also develop con-
tingency plans to preserve their fire support assets during transition and
adaptive operations, if necessary. Common countermeasures are to disperse
fire support assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
7-75. During transition operations, the OPFOR is concerned about the
extraregional force’s military capabilities arriving or being established be-
fore the OPFOR can completely achieve its strategic objectives. Therefore, the
overall focus is on the disaggregation of the enemy’s combat system (see
Systems Warfare earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 1).
7-76. Starting with transition operations, the OPFOR may use various fire
support assets in access-control operations and attack of the enemy’s LOCs
and rear. It attacks the most vulnerable parts of the enemy’s combat system.
This may include attacks on the infrastructure or even civilian targets. The
OPFOR coordinates such attacks with perception management efforts to
convey the view that these terror tactics are no worse than enemy bombing
campaigns.
7-77. The goal of the OPFOR is to disrupt the deployment tempo of the ex-
traregional force by attacking unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of
debarkation. These targets include key C2 nodes, contractors and contractor-
operated facilities, logistics operating bases, and ground and airborne RISTA
platforms. For example, the OPFOR can greatly reduce an extraregional
force’s combat power by attacking a logistics system that depends on “just-in-
time” or “reach-back” delivery. The OPFOR would also seek to conduct these
7-16
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 7
attacks in concert with the perception management portion of the IW plan to

leverage the world media to report adverse perceptions of the extraregional
force.
7-78. During transition operations, the OPFOR begins to disperse its fire
support assets and emphasize the use of fire and decoy tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP). The OPFOR employs the fire and decoy TTP to in-
crease survivability as well as to deceive the enemy as to the actual firing
unit location.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
7-79. An extraregional force must maintain a degree of information domi-
nance that enables it to use information systems to achieve an operational
advantage, while denying that capability to the OPFOR. Such systems pro-
vide battlefield visualization, situational awareness, combat identification,
spectrum supremacy, and C2 attack and protection. Therefore, the OPFOR
primarily shifts its emphasis to force preservation and seeks opportunities to
attack and destroy key components of the enemy’s combat system, including
his information systems.
7-80. The extraregional force may have the perception that the tempo of
OPFOR continuous fire support has substantially decreased, since the
OPFOR no longer possess the advantage of information dominance nor the
ability to control its airspace. However, the OPFOR mindset is that the tempo
has been adjusted to attack targets (using reconnaissance fire) at critical times
in order to preserve the force. For example, during adaptive operations, fire
support is centrally planned and executed. The OSC commander can establish
both the firing and target damage criteria and exercise C2 of units conducting
fire support. The IFC headquarters develops the firing orders and firing data
computation and transmits this information in a coded format to the firing
unit. Because the OPFOR’s communications are particularly vulnerable to
attacks, transmission may have to be via a civilian telephone system (to
include cellular phone), messenger, or even newspaper.
7-81. The OPFOR continues to emphasize the use of the fire and decoy TTP.
While using such TTP, it seeks to colocate its fire support assets with the ci-
vilian populace, especially in urban areas to create a moral sanctuary. If the
extraregional force attacks the fire support assets colocated with the civilian
populace, the OPFOR will seek to leverage the world media to report adverse
perceptions of the extraregional force through the perception management
portion of the IW plan.
7-17
Chapter 8
Aviation
Aviation operations are an integral part of all OPFOR operations. Most
fixed-wing assets belong to the Air Force, while most of the rotary-wing
aircraft belong to the Army. The Air Force is the largest, best equipped,
and best trained in the geographic region. The capabilities of the
OPFOR’s fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft far exceed those of its neighbors,
allowing for regional air superiority. However, the Air Force is not strong
enough to defeat the air force of a modern power from outside this region.
Realizing this limitation, the OPFOR will modify its use of aviation assets
to ensure effective use against high-payoff targets. The air doctrine of the
OPFOR represents a blend of principles growing out of past experience
and doctrine adapted from foreign advisors.
ORGANIZATION
8-1. The State’s aviation organizations are structured similar to the ground
components. As with the ground forces, the administrative force structure is
a system in peacetime that mans, trains, and equips units to deploy for war.
In wartime, the Air Force’s peacetime air armies may be utilized in whole or
may be parceled to provide units to a theater- or operational-level command.
The Army’s aviation units are structured similarly to other Army units, with
brigades and battalions being the primary size of deployable units. This
structure provides timely and effective use of assets at all levels of combat
from the strategic campaign to the tactical ground maneuver plan.
AIR FORCE
8-2. The OPFOR has a variety of Air Force assets at national and theater
levels in the administrative force structure. It has organized these assets so
that each of these levels of command can have its own aviation forces to fulfill
mission requirements. The subordinate Air Force organizations are grouped
on a functional, mission-related basis, into divisions, regiments, and
squadrons. For example, a bomber division is composed primarily of bomber
regiments, and a fighter regiment is composed mainly of fighter squadrons.
Rotary-wing assets of the Air Force are organized along the same lines as
those of army aviation, with brigades and battalions. The Air Force also has
some mixed aviation units with a combination of fixed- and rotary-wing
assets; these follow the normal Air Force organization pattern, with mixed
aviation regiments and squadrons, although rotary-wing subordinates would
be battalions and companies. Various fixed- and/or rotary-wing assets of the
Air Force may be task organized as part of an operational-level command in
wartime.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
National-Level Air Force

8-3. The State has subordinated air armies directly to the Supreme High
Command (SHC) for strategic missions. Aircraft include bombers, interceptors,
fighters, electronic warfare (EW) platforms, transport aircraft, and tankers.
Some bombers can deliver long-range, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)
with high accuracy and a standoff range of 3,000 km or more. Tankers
provide a capability for air-to-air refueling of bombers. A national-level air
army has the mission of inflicting losses on vital targets and conducting aerial
reconnaissance in support of the strategic campaign. The SHC can also allocate
these air armies to support a specific theater- or operational-level command.
8-4. The size and composition of an air army can vary greatly. However, most
air armies have one or more units each for
• Fighter aviation.
• Bomber aviation.
• Reconnaissance aviation.
• Mixed aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing).
• Heliborne jamming.
In addition, some air armies may have one or more units for
• Ground-attack aviation.
• Airborne jamming aviation.
• Transport helicopters.
• Air ambulance.
Generally, units with the term aviation in their titles are either fixed-wing
units or mixed aviation units with a mixture of fixed-and rotary-wing
aircraft. During wartime, some aviation divisions and regiments may be task
organized into aviation tactical groups.
Theater-Level Air Force

8-5. Theater air armies are subordinate to the theater headquarters (if
created) and play a key role in all types of combat, from participating in
theater-level campaigns to supporting low-level tactical units of the ground
forces. In the former role, they complement national-level aviation, and in the
latter, army aviation.
8-6. High-performance fighters, interceptors, and some light bombers com-
prise the air army of the theater. At theater level, the Air Force also controls
a substantial number of fixed- and rotary-wing EW aircraft, as well as
medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. Thus, a theater air army can have the
same types of units as found in air armies at the national level.
8-7. The size and composition of the theater air army vary greatly depending
on the theater’s needs. Those aviation assets retained to provide fire support
at the theater level are part of the theater’s integrated fires command (IFC).
Theater headquarters may also use these assets to support high-priority
operational-level actions.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
Operational-Level Air Force

8-8. At the operational level, an operational-strategic command (OSC) is a
joint command. Therefore, the SHC may include Air Force units in the forma-
tion of the OSC. These units are sized and equipped according to the mission
assigned to the OSC. Those Air Force assets allocated to an OSC in a con-
stituent or dedicated relationship for fire support become part of the OSC’s IFC.
ARMY AVIATION
8-9. The OPFOR has a variety of attack, transport, multipurpose, and special-
purpose helicopters that belong to the ground forces (Army) rather than the
Air Force. Hence the term army aviation. In addition to these helicopters,
army aviation also owns a limited number of small fixed-wing aircraft to sup-
port transport and reconnaissance missions. Army aviation units may remain
under centralized control at theater level or may be task organized within an
OSC, division tactical group (DGT), or brigade tactical group (BTG).
Theater-Level Army Aviation

8-10. The theater headquarters’ army aviation assets are critical in theater
campaigns. Army aviation provides reconnaissance, lift for heliborne land-
ings, and direct air support (DAS) for ground forces. The OPFOR generally
uses helicopters for reconnaissance only within the protection of the ground
forces’ air defense umbrella. Helicopters perform such tasks as route or NBC
reconnaissance. In the DAS role, it is common for army aviation to supple-
ment theater’s fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft. All attack helicopter units
and perhaps some other army aviation assets retained at theater level would
be part of the theater IFC.
8-11. The type and number of army aviation brigades or battalions subordinate
to the theater headquarters or theater IFC varies according to the theater’s
needs and the importance of that theater in the OPFOR’s strategic campaign.
Army aviation assets at theater-level can include one or more units of each of
the following:
• Attack helicopters.
• Medium-lift helicopters.
• Heavy-lift helicopters.
• Reconnaissance, jamming, and command and control (C2) helicopters.
• Drones.
• Light and medium transport airplanes, replacing some lift helicopters
in mixed aviation units.
Other than these standing army aviation organizations, the OPFOR may also
form some task-organized army aviation tactical groups or detachments with
a mix of different aircraft types.
Operational-Level Army Aviation

8-12. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSC is a standing headquarters. When
the OSC is formed for combat operations, an army aviation brigade or battalion
may be task organized under this command to provide agility, versatility, and
increased firepower. The type, size, and quantity of the units vary depending
8-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
on the mission of the OSC. In some cases, the OPFOR may include a limited
number of army aviation assets in the formation of a DTG or BTG.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-13. The commander of the theater air army (Air Force asset) is subordinate
to the theater commander. If the majority of the air army’s assets retained at
theater level are allocated to the theater IFC, the air army commander may
also become subordinate to the IFC commander. The air army command post
(CP) is normally within 10 to 15 km of the theater’s main CP or IFC CP to
ensure a close relationship. This relationship ensures that there is no danger
of the air army conducting separate, divergent operations as opposed to sub-
ordinating the air effort to the needs of the ground operation.
8-14. The senior commander of the army aviation component is also directly
subordinate to the theater commander or the theater IFC commander. The
army aviation CP is located within 30 km of the theater main CP or IFC CP
to allow for rapid coordination from theater to the executing unit. The staff of
the aviation unit works closely with the theater staff to plan and coordinate
the employment of the theater’s army aviation assets.
8-15. The command structure at the OSC level is similar to that at theater
level. The OSC may have an air army, division, or regiment as the largest Air
Force organization. Depending on the type of aviation assets involved, the
commander of this unit is subordinate to the OSC commander or to the OSC
IFC commander.
8-16. The command structure for army aviation units in an OSC depends on
the types of aviation units assigned and whether or not they perform or support
fire support missions. Thus, the commander of the army aviation unit may be di-
rectly subordinate to the commander of the OSC or to the OSC IFC commander.
CENTRALIZED CONTROL
8-17. The OPFOR has a limited number of aviation units compared to the
size of the ground force. For this reason, it believes that maintaining centralized
control over its aviation assets is essential to the effective employment of both
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, centralization is a relative term,
depending on what levels of command are involved.
Fixed-Wing
8-18. The OPFOR establishes relatively centralized control over its fixed-
wing assets. Centralization takes advantage of the mobility and maneuver-
ability of aircraft to concentrate them at the decisive point and time from
dispersed bases. Centralized control simplifies the coordination with ground
forces and allows for the integration of aircraft being used in different, but
complimentary roles (for example, reconnaissance, fighter, and ground attack). It
also allows a rapid reallocation of air support resources to accomplish the
more important missions that suddenly arise during an operation. Aviation
units not originally assigned for ground support may sometimes take part in
delivering air attacks against ground targets. To execute their missions, the
OPFOR uses centralized planning to allocate air support resources to the ground
commander by flights or aircraft sorties with the appropriate ammunitions.
8-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
Rotary-Wing
8-19. The OPFOR can use less centralized procedures for the allocation of its
helicopter assets, especially the combat helicopter in the DAS role. However,
if the number of assets in theater allows and the mission dictates, it may de-
centralize control over an aviation unit. It can do this in two ways. The first
is a constituent subordination of an aviation unit, or the higher headquarters
can establish a dedicated or supporting relationship for a specified period of time.
AIRSPACE OPERATIONS SUBSECTION

8-20. The chief of airspace operations (CAO) at theater, OSC, and tactical
group levels is the primary person in the staff responsible for the coordina-
tion of all airspace users. He, along with his staff, make up the airspace
operations subsection (AOS). They work directly for the operations officer in
the planning of future operations and the execution of current operations. At
theater level, this AOS generally consists of—
• An air controller team (Air Force).
• An intelligence team.
• A communications team.
• Liaison teams from subordinate units requiring airspace deconfliction.
8-21. At OSC level and below, the AOS is sized according to needs, but per-
forms the same functions. Some functions of this staff are to—
• Recommend the employment of air assets.
• Deconflict airspace for all users.
• Plan the effective suppression of enemy air defense.
• Transmit air support requests.
• Maintain communications with aircraft in the area of responsibility.
• Provide the commander with all air reconnaissance information.
8-22. The AOS at every level is manned and equipped to provide 24-hour
operations. Additionally, the AOS provides representation to the IFC CP and
to the forward CP when the latter is operational.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION

8-23. The theater air army and ground forces have an integrated C2 struc-
ture. This ensures close and continuous coordination in joint operations. The
CAO evaluates the situation based on the theater commander’s guidance. He
then plans the air portion of an operation and recommends the proper em-
ployment of air assets. The same process is being performed simultaneously
at the OSC-level AOS.
8-24. In addition to the air missions planned at theater level, the theater
staff allocates assets to integrate into the subordinate ground commander’s
plan. To achieve a coordinated operation plan, the theater air army sends
personnel and communications equipment to ground force units at battalion
level and above. These personnel forward requests for air assets through the
chain of command to the theater staff. The theater CAO then screens the
8-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
requests and identifies the missions that can be supported by army aviation
and those that must be supported with Air Force assets. The allocations are
then sent to the theater commander for approval.
8-25. At OSC level, the commander consults his CAO and develops detailed
targeting plans for the current fight through the next 48 hours. He also
makes rough estimates for 5 subsequent days. Requests are formulated for
mission type, not for specific type of aircraft. For example, the OSC does not
identify helicopters in its request for DAS. These requests are forwarded to
the theater CAO and continually revised until 48 hours prior to execution.
Once approved, these become part of the published theater aviation support
plan (ASP). There can also be an ASP at OSC level, particularly when the
OSC is not subordinate to a theater headquarters.
8-26. Then, the theater or OSC AOS issues the ASP to the executing aviation
units. These orders cover targets, numbers of sorties, air approach corridors,
communications codes, and mission timing. Air Force representatives at sub-
ordinate levels then confirm, for their respective commanders, the allocation
of air resources. Normally, the commander holds a percentage of his air
power in reserve to meet the unforeseen demands.
8-27. Once the allocation is received by the OSC, the OSC commander may
assign specific air support to a subordinate unit or maintain control at his
level. The OSC AOS then continues to coordinate the effort until the end of
the mission.
MISSION REQUEST TYPES

8-28. The OPFOR recognizes the criticality of providing support to the
ground forces. Available air support is assigned missions according to the
following categories of requests: preplanned, on-call, and immediate.
Preplanned
8-29. A preplanned mission is a mission planned well in advance of its execu-
tion, usually 24 hours prior to launch. Such missions are normally planned
against static or non-moving targets with known locations.
On-Call
8-30. An on-call mission is one in which the target may be predesignated,
but the timing of the attack remains at the discretion of the ground force
commander. These missions are normally planned to support maneuver
forces not yet in contact with the enemy, but expected to make contact
once the aircraft are available. The on-call mission is planned the same as
preplanned missions, with the exception of the attack’s timing. A “window of
availability,” usually no longer than 4 to 5 hours, is established. The mission
can be launched at any time during that window. On-call missions are
planned with secondary targets in the event the window of availability
expires before the primary target becomes available for attack.
Immediate
8-31. The OPFOR designates a limited number of aircraft to respond only to
requests from ground commanders for unplanned immediate air support.
8-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
A request for immediate air support is forwarded through AOS channels.

As with preplanned support, the AOS at each command level participates
directly in the evaluation of each air support request.
LEVELS OF COMBAT READINESS

8-32. The OPFOR recognizes three levels of combat readiness for aircraft and
crews. (See Figure 8-1.) Aircraft in categories one and two respond to on-call
missions.
Category Crew and Aircraft Duration of Time

Readiness Before
Takeoff
One Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed on 1-2 hours 3-5
their mission and are in the aircraft ready to start engines. Ground minutes
personnel are assisting the combat crews.
Two Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are briefed and 2-4 hours 15
are on standby in the vicinity of the aircraft, ready to take off within a minutes
specified short period of time after receiving a mission order.
Three Aircraft are refueled and serviced. Cannons are loaded. External sys- 2-4 days 1-2 hours
tems (bombs, rockets, missiles, fuel tanks, etc.) are not loaded. Com-
bat crews are designated, but not on standby; they have not been
briefed on the air and ground situation, but will be before takeoff.
Figure 8-1. Levels of Combat Readiness
CAPABILITIES
8-33. The priority for organizational strength and equipment modernization
depends on the importance of a unit within the overall strategic plan. Mod-
ernization, in particular, depends greatly on the economic capability of the
State to acquire the latest-generation fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. As
an example, the OPFOR helicopter combat units range from armed lift air-
craft employed as gunships to state-of-the-art attack helicopters. The OPFOR
continues to modernize units with aircraft having—
• Improved avionics.
• Improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM) equipment.
• Increased payload.
• Longer combat radius.
• Increased night capability.
8-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
8-34. The OPFOR will continue to modify the employment of its aviation
units as the modernization continues. On the lowest level, for example, gun-
ship units are employed almost exclusively during daytime, while modernized
attack helicopter battalions can be effectively employed at night.
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT

8-35. Aviation continues to improve nighttime and poor-weather air recon-
naissance and ordnance delivery in support of ground maneuver formations.
With the heavy emphasis on night combat, the OPFOR recognizes limitations
in its ability to maintain continuity of air support at night and in poor weather.
8-36. The OPFOR is making efforts to correct these shortcomings. The all-
weather fighters and bombers are capable assets to support ground forces
even for night missions. They have the range and payload to attack deep targets.
Many modern fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters have electronic and in-
frared instruments that enable pilots to conduct sorties at night and in poor
weather at low altitudes. The pilots can search for, detect, and destroy targets.
COUNTERAIR
8-37. The Air Force has the most lethal air intercept aircraft in the region.
However, it would be challenged by air forces of a first-class power and would
modify its operations when required. The deployment of a wide array of
mobile and semi-mobile ground air defense systems has freed some aircraft
from air defense missions for ground support roles. (See Chapter 9 for more
details on air defense support.)
RECONNAISSANCE
8-38. Aerial reconnaissance includes visual observation, imagery, and signals
reconnaissance. Imagery reconnaissance encompasses all types of optical
cameras utilizing conventional fixed-frame and strip photography, infrared
photography, and television systems; it also includes side-looking airborne
radar (SLAR) and synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) capabilities. Airborne
signals reconnaissance includes communications and noncommunications
emitter intercept and direction finding.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
8-39. The OPFOR continues to improve its capabilities to conduct EW, in-
cluding sophisticated jamming equipment. It might deploy equipment on its
aircraft to—
• Jam multiple enemy radars.
• Jam only when the target radar reaches a certain intensity.
• Select the correct jamming signal for the specific target radar.
8-40. The OPFOR can jam the enemy air defense network’s major surveillance
and acquisition radars. It also uses advanced deception jamming techniques.
All these capabilities allow OPFOR aviation to provide increased support that
combines accuracy in ordnance delivery, greater flexibility in employment,
increased survivability, and increased responsiveness to combined arms
commanders.
8-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

8-41. The OPFOR is currently acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
As technology allows, it will develop doctrine for employing UAVs in the
reconnaissance, attack, deception, and resupply roles.
MISSIONS
8-42. Based on the capabilities outlined in the preceding section, the OPFOR
conducts a wide variety of missions with its aviation assets. This section
describes the typical missions assigned to aviation units.
COUNTERAIR
8-43. If engaged in a regional operations, the Air Force attempts to establish
and maintain the desired degree of air dominance. Air superiority is
established through a combination of offensive and defensive actions.
Preplanned attacks while the enemy’s aircraft are on the ground would be
an example of offensive air defense missions, while flying intercept missions
to engage enemy aircraft firing on air or ground troops is an example of a
defensive mission.
8-44. When the State is attacked by a major power, the Air Force will at-
tempt to defend strategic centers and conduct precision attacks early to inflict
politically significant damage on invaders. An invasion of the State may dic-
tate an “all-out” effort to control access to the region or harass the early-entry
forces before they build up sufficient air and air defense capabilities to domi-
nate the airspace. Alternatively, the OPFOR could save its Air Force assets
for a surge effort at a critical point later in the conflict. However, it will not
delay use of its air forces until such a surge unless it has means to ensure the
survivability of its aircraft on the ground. Survivability means may include
underground shelters. The OPFOR also will attempt to conduct missions from
more dispersed locations or from a safe haven such as neighboring country.
RECONNASSIANCE
8-45. Aerial reconnaissance is a principal method of gathering target in-
telligence. The theater and OSC staffs each prepare a reconnaissance plan,
which details tasks for Air Force and/or army aviation assets. Theater avia-
tion’s reconnaissance forces gather tactical and operational intelligence up to
a 300-km radius. They may also be tasked to collect strategic intelligence to
support national-level requirements.
8-46. Aircrews on any mission should immediately report observed enemy
activity or conspicuous inactivity. Specialized reconnaissance aviation
regiments have the primary responsibility for aerial reconnaissance. These
regiments have specially-equipped reconnaissance aircraft. Aviation assets
also can have airborne signals reconnaissance collectors.
8-47. The processing of data from an air reconnaissance mission can take 2 to
8 hours. To shorten this time, the aircraft transmit perishable target intelli-
gence by radio to ground CPs. OPFOR planners are also modernizing their
techniques to shorten the process.
8-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
8-48. The OPFOR knows the significance of having reconnaissance forces on the
battlefield to ensure mission success. For this reason, it heavily emphasizes the
destruction of the enemy reconnaissance teams and dedicates numerous assets
to accomplish this mission. The OPFOR includes either armed or lift helicopters
in the counterreconnaissance plan to search for, locate, and report enemy
reconnaissance teams. Depending on the plan, the OPFOR may use the armed
helicopters, infantry, artillery, or other methods to destroy these teams.
DIRECT AIR SUPPORT

8-49. DAS is a mission to disrupt or destroy enemy forces in proximity to friendly
forces. This mission can be accomplished using fixed-wing assets and fire support
helicopters. Because these assets are centrally controlled, the missions are
formulated at various staff levels and allocated based on assets available and
significance of the mission. DAS missions are part of the fire support plan.
INTERDICTION
8-50. Air interdiction is planned and executed to destroy targets that are not
in proximity to friendly troops. These missions are planned at the theater or
OSC level to support the ground commander’s overall plan. Interdiction mis-
sions can be conducted in advance of ground maneuver to set the conditions,
or simultaneously to force the enemy to fight on different fronts.
HELICOPTERS AS A MANEUVER FORCE

8-51. As an exception to the rule, the OPFOR might employ a highly-trained
unit equipped with modern attack helicopters as a maneuver force in the
ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. In this role, the attack helicopter
unit can be used as the fixing, assault, or exploitation force in the offense or
as the disruption or counterattack force in the defense. In either offense or
defense, it could be a deception force or reserve. Such employment is among
the most complex missions conducted by aviation units and requires detailed
planning, rehearsals, and execution.
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MISSIONS

8-52. Lift helicopters can support the ground commander in numerous
combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles. For example,
they can
• Transport ground units conducting heliborne assaults.
• Rapidly move forces on the battlefield.
• Insert reconnaissance teams.
• Conduct emergency resupply missions to isolated units.
The aircraft can also be equipped as a gunship, minelayer, electronic jammer,
or C2 platform.
8-53. The OPFOR has a variety of medium- and heavy-lift helicopters that
can provide transport capability throughout the battlefield. These aircraft are
lightly armed and are used to move troops, equipment, and supplies in the
relatively safe areas. Periodically, these aircraft are tasked to assist in CS
8-10
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
and CSS missions such as large heliborne assaults, combat search and
rescue, and forward arming and refueling point (FARP) emplacement.
PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
8-54. The OPFOR’s use of aviation assets is guided by key employment prin-
ciples. Because the State has purchased aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing)
with a wide array of capabilities, some units are equipped with the latest
technology, while other units make do with older systems. This requires the
OPFOR to modify its operations based on the capabilities of the unit’s air-
craft, but within these employment principles.
PURPOSE
8-55. Every mission must be focused toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable task. It must directly contribute to the higher commander’s imme-
diate plan. As an example, a lift helicopter unit is given a mission to insert a
reconnaissance team. All planning efforts should be aimed at accomplishing this
goal. Actions that do not contribute to achieving this mission must be avoided.
COORDINATION
8-56. The coordination of aviation with artillery, air defense, and maneuver
units is one of the most difficult tasks of modern combat, particularly in the
absence of air superiority. CAOs are assigned at various levels of command to
ensure a coordinate effort among the airspace users. Liaison teams from
aviation units also assist in this effort. The aviation commanders and staffs
develop detailed plans, working closely with the other members of the
combined arms team, not only to ensure the most effective use of all systems
employed, but also to prevent fratricide.
CONCENTRATION OF EFFECTS
8-57. The OPFOR does not distribute resources evenly throughout the theater.
A commander identifies goals to be achieved with his aviation assets and
organizes them accordingly. As an example, commanders can use fixed-wing
aviation to concentrate on opening a few corridors through enemy air de-
fenses to attack specific targets. The OPFOR makes every effort to maintain
air superiority over these corridors when it cannot do so over the entire theater.
ECONOMY
8-58. If the OPFOR hopes to achieve the principles of concentration and purpose,
it cannot use air assets to perform missions that can be adequately executed by
other means. The OPFOR must carefully assess the risks and payoff of using the
limited assets of aviation for each mission. For example, the OPFOR may employ
its artillery fires instead of ground-attack aircraft for targets within artillery
range. Additionally, the OPFOR can minimize the risk of all missions through
thorough planning and the use of artillery fires to suppress enemy air defense.
RECONNASSIANCE
8-59. Aerial reconnaissance is an important source of information for the
OPFOR commander. It can provide timely and accurate information that can
8-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
have a significant impact on the outcome of an operation. For this reason,

every aviation mission has an implied task to conduct reconnaissance along
the route of flight and report any activity or inactivity that may affect the
ground commander’s plan. However, the execution of this implied mission does
not alter the specified mission plan, in keeping with the principle of purpose.
SURPRISE
8-60. To maximize the effects that aviation can bring to the operation,
surprise is an essential element of all aviation missions. Means of achieving
surprise include—
• Choosing unexpected or concealed axes.
• Attacking at unlikely times.
• Attacking in unanticipated strength.
• Using new weapons or tactics.
• Limiting or eliminating radio and radar emissions.
• Degrading the enemy’s early warning radar net.
• Making decoy raids.
• Using camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) on airfields.
RESPONSIVENESS
8-61. The OPFOR aviation assets provide the most agile, flexible, and reactive
firepower to the ground commander. Plans to employ aviation assets must
capitalize on these traits and provide the commander the responsiveness to
be employed in a timely manner across the entire area of responsibility
(AOR). An example to illustrate this principle is the attack helicopters used
as the reserve force in the operation plan. In addition to attack helicopters,
commanders can use lift aircraft with infantry soldiers. By using helicopters to
move ground forces, the OPFOR can use a smaller force to cover larger AORs.
DEGREE OF AIRSPACE DOMINANCE

8-62. The OPFOR uses standardized terms to define the degree of airspace
dominance of its airspace. This allows planners to best employ assets in the
theater to satisfy the requirements to support ground forces.
AIR SUPREMACY
8-63. Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is
incapable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the
enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of air operations. Yet, this
condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur, however,
through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone.” Under the condition of
air supremacy, the OPFOR commander employs all of his aircraft at will.
AIR SUPERIORITY
8-64. Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of opera-
tions is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by
the enemy. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack
8-12
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 8
early warning and C2 sites, ground-based air defense sites, and enemy
aviation assets close to their source of maintenance and launch facilities.
LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY

8-65. Even though the OPFOR hopes to attain air superiority, it recognizes
the potential for only local air superiority to exist. Purely geographic in nature,
this condition is characterized by well-timed aviation missions to coincide
with enemy aircraft downtime, returning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps
in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in areas across the theater
where the OPFOR or the enemy may not have adequate assets available to
ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air
superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal.
AIR PARITY
8-66. Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and
friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under
the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy
capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
8-67. OPFOR aviation planners modify the employment of aviation assets
(both fixed- and rotary-wing) according to the strategic goals of the State and the
degree of airspace dominance attained by the OPFOR. This section examines
some of these differences as the OPFOR fights in regional, transition, and
adaptive operations.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
8-68. The OPFOR relies heavily on its aviation assets when planning its
strategic campaign against a regional enemy. It does not initiate hostilities
unless air superiority can be attained prior to ground combat. Because the
OPFOR has a superior aviation force, it is confident that it can attain air su-
periority quickly against any regional opponent.
8-69. In the initial days of any strategic campaign against a regional oppo-
nent, the OPFOR focuses the air campaign on attaining air superiority. Once
that is established, aircraft apportionment is gradually shifted to ground at-
tacks while maintaining air superiority. The ultimate goal of the OPFOR is to
dedicate minimal aircraft to maintaining air superiority while dedicating
maximum assets to ground attacks. Secondary missions include reconnais-
sance, transportation, logistics support, and insertion of troops.
8-70. Rotary-wing aircraft can fly missions with relative ease with few
restrictions during day and night operations while the OPFOR maintains air
superiority. The regional opponent’s limited air defense assets can be
targeted early to improve the survivability of all aviation missions.
8-71. With the introduction of superior forces from an extraregional enemy,
the OPFOR cannot rely on the continued dominance of the airspace. In re-
sponse, it shifts its air operations to control the access of the enemy into the
8-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
region and slow or alter the enemy’s deployment progress by attacking ports,
airfields, railheads, and other infrastructure. The OPFOR tries to maintain
air superiority as long as possible without losing excessive aircraft to the
extraregional forces. During this limited time of marginal airspace dominance,
it can use its aviation forces to support the ground forces’ transition to adaptive
operations by performing security, support, and deception missions. The
OPFOR transitions to maintaining local air superiority and even air parity to
support the ground transition to adaptive operations.
8-72. Transition operations can also be a shift from adaptive operations
to regional operations. In this case, the OPFOR uses its aviation assets to
regain air superiority once the air dominance of the extraregional force has
diminished. This process may be initiated by establishing and maintaining
local air superiority in a given area, followed by establishing air superiority
over the entire region.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
8-73. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR has realized that the domi-
nance of the airspace by the extraregional enemy has severely limited the
employment of its aviation forces in the conventional manner. The OPFOR is
not willing to lose its aviation assets and will find creative means to use its
air power during limited windows of opportunity. The primary concern,
though, is to preserve combat power in order to remain a dominant force
within the region after the extraregional force has departed.
8-74. As the OPFOR transitions to adaptive operations, it relies more on
helicopter operations and less on fixed-wing assets for ground attacks.
This allows the OPFOR to keep the fixed-wing assets in sanctuaries, while
helicopters use flight profiles minimizing the risk against enemy air defense
systems. Because helicopters do not require runways, they provide the
OPFOR the means to attack quickly from more dispersed locations.
8-75. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR can employ operational shielding
to protect its aviation assets. Helicopters will be more dispersed than in regional
operations. Fixed-wing assets may be shielded by positioning them in relative
safe areas of the regionsuch as neighboring neutral countries, areas of high
civil population, and areas that may cause high collateral damage if attacked.
8-76. The centralized control of aviation assets may be elevated to a higher
level during adaptive operations. Because of the high risk associated with fly-
ing missions against the extraregional force, theater and OSC commanders
may retain the authority to determine what targets are valuable enough to
risk aviation assets. This elevation of employment authority also allows for
windows of opportunity to be recognized or created in a timely manner using
other assets found at these levels.
8-77. In addition to scrutinizing the target selection, the theater or OSC
commanders closely analyze the mission planning. During adaptive opera-
tions, the OPFOR commander is more likely to plan and execute missions:
during periods of limited visibility, within specified ranges, and with minimal
numbers of aircraft. The objective of every aviation mission during adaptive
operations must support a strategic goal.
8-14
Chapter 9
Air Defense Support

The OPFOR system of air defense includes assets and actions at the stra-
tegic (national), operational, and tactical levels. The focus in this chapter
is on air defense of maneuver forces at the operational level. However, op-
erational-level air defense does not exist in isolation from the overall sys-
tem of OPFOR air defense. For more information on tactical-level air de-
fense, see FM 7-100.2.
ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE

9-1. The main objective of air defense is to prevent enemy air action from in-
terfering with mission accomplishment of the entire force. For the OPFOR,
air defense is not just a particular organization or branch of service. It is a
mission.
9-2. To do this, the OPFOR uses a combined arms and joint approach, involv-
ing not only air defense units, but also other forces such as
• Aviation.
• Special-purpose forces (SPF).
• Rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
• Artillery and mortars.
• Infantry.
• Engineers.
• Affiliated forces.
These forces are often used in combination or participate separately in at-
tacking targets, which in effect achieves a combined result.
9-3. Against a sophisticated enemy, the OPFOR recognizes that it will have
to adapt the operations and tactics employed by air defense units to improve
their chances of success. It also views the creative and adaptive use of other
arms to accomplish air defense objectives as part and parcel of the overall air
defense effort. This practical application of the combined arms concept calls
for the simultaneous employment of several arms, in some cases including air
defense systems, to achieve an effect against the enemy air threat that will
render greater results than the use of air defense assets and systems alone.
9-4. The extent to which the concept of all-arms air defense can be applied is
limited only by the commander’s and staff’s knowledge of the enemy air
threat, capabilities of their own systems, and their ability to apply that
knowledge to come up with innovative solutions. The air defense-related
activities of all arms are part of an overall campaign to defeat or at least
degrade enemy air capabilities. The results may produce effects at the
strategic, operational, or tactical levels.
9-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
GOALS
9-5. Air defense forces and other arms work together to protect ground
units and other potential targets from attacks by fixed-wing ground-attack
aircraft, cruise missiles, and armed helicopters. They also try to deny aerial
reconnaissance platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A
secondary mission is to protect OPFOR air and airborne or heliborne mis-
sions over enemy-held territory. OPFOR air defense focuses on destroying or
disrupting the activities of not only enemy aircraft, but also the command
and control (C2) systems associated with enemy air operations.
CONCEPTS
9-6. The OPFOR’s concept of air defense is not purely defensive in nature.
Destruction of enemy aircraft is not always linked to military objectives. The
destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by enemy forces of-
fers exponential value in terms of increasing the relative combat power of the
OPFOR. However, it also has possibly decisive effects in the information and
psychological arenas. Losses among these premier systems demonstrate the
vulnerability of even a technologically superior enemy and may undermine
enemy morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of
other enemy weapon systems. High-visibility (flagship) systems that could be
identified for destruction could include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, or
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance platforms. The OPFOR can also at-
tack high-payoff targets such as high-technology communications nodes and
other information systems that support enemy air operations.
9-7. The OPFOR emphasizes that air defense does not necessarily have to
destroy aircraft to accomplish the mission, although that is obviously de-
sirable. The mission is accomplished if air defense prevents enemy aircraft
from conducting successful air activities. For example, air defense units can
force enemy aircraft to break off their attacks or to expend their ordnance
inaccurately without having to destroy the aircraft. In fact, the mere
presence of active and effective air defense weapon systems can reduce the
effectiveness of enemy air activities by forcing aircraft to avoid the systems
or otherwise use less than optimum procedures. The OPFOR can also use air
defense jammers, GPS jammers, and other electronic warfare (EW) methods
to disrupt the enemy’s air capability.
9-8. The role of air defense can be to create opportunity for fire and ma-
neuver by clearing or minimizing the air threat in the airspace above
friendly forces. This is especially important when the OPFOR lacks the air
power or air superiority necessary to create opportunity with air attacks. The
OPFOR can concentrate the fires of its air defense assets to create a window
of opportunity for a limited-duration and limited-objective offensive action
(such as a spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, or ambush). Likewise, air
defense can enhance the ability to defend or transition from defense to
offense. Air defense can also mass fires to protect the key reconnaissance
and fire assets that perform reconnaissance fires.
9-9. Another important OPFOR concept is that air defense is an integral part of
combined arms combat. The maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy
air threat or fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure.
9-2
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-10. A closely related concept is that air defense weapons, radars, and asso-
ciated equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even
units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an integrated air defense system
(IADS). Proper integration of these assets in mission planning and execution is
the only way the commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
PRINCIPLES
9-11. In pursuit of these goals and concepts, the OPFOR follows several basic
principles when conducting air defense: surprise, firepower, mobility, conti-
nuity, initiative, coordination, and security. Of these, the element of surprise
is the most critical.
Surprise
9-12. Achieving surprise is fundamental to successful air defense. Surprise
can be achieved by
• Positioning air defense systems in unexpected locations.
• Using other arms for air defense.
• Using camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D).
The OPFOR is aware of the potential physical destruction it can achieve by
attacking an unsuspecting and unprepared enemy. It is also aware of the
psychological effects of violent and unexpected fires on aviation crews. These
effects are often only temporary, but at critical moments they can reduce the
effectiveness of aircrews preparing to attack.
9-13. The element of surprise is also increasingly important because of
modern technological advances. The speed and evasiveness of modern air-
craft reduce engagement times. Modern aircraft also have a great amount of
firepower with which to suppress air defenses. These two factors make it
necessary for units to achieve some degree of surprise. Of course, the air
enemy also is trying to achieve surprise, and the OPFOR must consider how
enemy aircraft might exploit the terrain in making a concealed approach.
9-14. The principle of surprise is also important in the wider context of
denying the enemy's intelligence organization an accurate and comprehensive
picture of the deployment of air defense weapons and radars. Otherwise, the en-
emy also can use air defense formations as a principal means of determining the
organization for combat and organization of forces of supported maneuver units.
Firepower
9-15. The OPFOR force structure includes a wide variety of air defense
weapons (both missiles and guns). This mix of capabilities gives ground force
commanders outstanding firepower for air defense. It is important that air
defense planning consider and employ all assets available, across all arms, to
achieve maximum firepower.
Mobility
9-16. Air defense assets must have mobility comparable to the ground forces
for which they provide cover. When planning air defense, the commander
must always consider the mobility of air defense weapons and the time required
9-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
for their deployment. The ground forces, for which air defenses provide cover,
are quite mobile and frequently change formation as they deploy. The air en-
emy is mobile and can attack from many directions or altitudes. Therefore,
the commander must use to the maximum the mobility and firepower of his
assets, creating optimum groupings and fire plans.
Continuity
9-17. Air defense forces must provide continuous protection of critical or-
ganizations and assets. Only constantly-moving air defense units that have
adequate logistics support can ensure comprehensive air coverage. They
must provide air defense day or night in all weather conditions. Mobility
contributes directly to continuity.
Initiative
9-18. The modern battlefield is a fluid and volatile environment. Air defense
unit commanders must respond to constant changes in the situation with ini-
tiative and aggressive action. Units must continue to operate efficiently even
when communications with other air defense units fail. For example, if the
supported unit receives a modified mission, the air defense commander must
reevaluate his own unit’s deployment in light of the new requirements. He also
must be aware of changes in the tactics that enemy air forces are employing.
Coordination
9-19. The OPFOR stresses coordination between air defense units and
supported maneuver units, other air defense units, and units of other arms
performing air defense functions. It views air defense as a single, integrated
system composed of various parts. Air defense is an integral element of the
air and ground battle.
9-20. All tactical-level air defense weapons must coordinate precisely with
flanking units, with operational-level air defense units, and with aviation
units. Failure to coordinate can result in gaps in the air defense umbrella,
excessive ammunition expenditure, and casualties to friendly air forces. To
achieve efficient coordination, the OPFOR stresses centralization of control,
with operational-level headquarters playing a key role as a land-air interface.
Security
9-21. The OPFOR recognizes that enemy air assets can attack from any
quarter. Therefore, it must provide security for units anywhere on the battlefield
or in sanctuary areas against air attack from any direction. Air defense must
function with unremitting reliability and overall security. This requires careful
deployment, uninterrupted ammunition supply, and a comprehensive early-
warning system. Commanders must factor security into air defense planning.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

9-22. The OPFOR combines ground-based national-, operational-, and tactical-
level air defense assets with fixed-wing aircraft forces to provide an integrated
air defense umbrella for ground units. Consequently, effective control of the
9-4
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
airspace becomes more complex. The OPFOR stresses the need for operations
conducted with a single integrated plan under unified command and control.
INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

9-23. OPFOR air defense weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of
command are part of an integrated air defense system (IADS) that presents a
threat to any potential enemy. Air defense effectively supports the concept
and requirements of combined arms combat. The best way to accomplish this
is to integrate a large number and variety of weapons and associated equip-
ment into a redundant air defense system.
9-24. The OPFOR’s intent is to integrate air defense assets at all levels of
command into a continuous, unbroken umbrella of air defense coverage. In-
tegration can be vertical and/or horizontal. Vertical integration is between
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, while horizontal integration is
within each of those levels.
9-25. The dispersed positions of OPFOR units, as well as enemy actions to
suppress OPFOR air defense and C2 capabilities, may make it difficult to
maintain vertical or horizontal integration. Enemy capabilities may present
a situation where a vertically integrated system at the strategic or even
operational level is neither possible nor desirable.
9-26. An integrated communications system is established to provide target
information and early warning to air defense and ground maneuver units. If
communications with other air defense units fail, however, commanders may
have to use their own initiative and flexibility, in order to respond to fre-
quent changes in the ground or air situation.
National Level
9-27. Against regional opponents, the OPFOR may be able to use an IADS
that is centrally directed from the national level. Centralization of control
gives the OPFOR flexibility in the employment of resources to meet the over-
all goal of air defense. The national-level air defense organization can play a
major role in the control of air defense assets of operational-level commands.
Sector Level
9-28. Against a modern extraregional force, however, the OPFOR accepts
that it may not be able to employ a nationally integrated air defense system
to defend its entire airspace. In fact, a vertically integrated system centrally
directed from the national level could be a liability from a C2 standpoint.
Thus, the OPFOR is prepared to adapt its air defense operations to use IADS
at sector levels. Within sectors, it may be able to challenge the most modern
air forces, at least initially. It can prevent extraregional air forces from at-
taining air supremacy, for a time.
9-29. Air defense sector boundaries do not necessarily parallel geographic
boundaries or the boundaries of military areas of responsibility (AORs). It is
quite possible that boundaries could coincide, if air defense assets are allo-
cated to provide support for theater- or operational-level commands. In some
cases, however, an air defense sector could cover a larger area that includes
9-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
the AORs of one or more operational-level commands and could cover air-
space not included in any of those AORs. It is possible that the OPFOR could
divide a large geographic area into air defense sectors even when it does not
establish multiple theater headquarters within that area.
9-30. Sector air defense can reduce the physical and electronic signature of
defensive systems. To the extent possible, the OPFOR disperses high-value
assets. Still, air defense assets may be close enough together to be hard-
wired. Sector IADS enables the OPFOR to mass the effects of air defense assets
from dispersed sites to protect the most critical targets. It also facilitates the use
of passive air defense techniques including dispersal, deception, and camouflage.
9-31. In choosing to fight within sectors, the OPFOR accepts risk, in that air
defense sectors present seams in the defenses and may be unable to provide
mutual support. Within sectors, the OPFOR develops air defense ambushes
along the most likely air avenues of approach.
Operational and Tactical Level

9-32. In most situations, an operational-strategic command (OSC) directs the
employment of the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level
subordinatesdivisions and division tactical groups (DTGs) or separate bri-
gades or brigade tactical groups (BTGs). Brigades and BTGs that are part of
a division or DTG provide coverage for their own units and vertically inte-
grate with division or DTG coverage. When not part of a division or DTG,
they vertically integrate with OSC-level coverage, which would be their next-
higher level of command. There may be skip-echelon situations when the
OSC will specify how divisional maneuver brigades employ their air defense
batteries. Normally, however, the division or DTG will dictate that.
9-33. At the tactical level, the commander normally strives to achieve
horizontal integration. His ability to integrate or be integrated vertically will
depend on the air defense course of action taken at the next-higher level.
CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION

9-34. Air defense control relationships are subject to conflicting pressures for
centralization and decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control
include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection
systems and the increased ranges of modern surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Centralized control is necessary, especially during defensive operations, to
ensure that the coverage of air defense units is mutually supporting and
comprehensive. Centralization of control gives the OPFOR flexibility in the
employment of air defense resources to meet the overall goal of an operation. In most
situations, therefore, an operational-level command directs the employment of
the air defense assets of at least its immediate tactical-level subordinates.
9-35. Nevertheless, the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlefield
require the possibility of some decentralization. Decentralized control provides
flexibility and shorter response times for supporting fast-paced operations by
ground maneuver units and the many contingencies that can arise in local
situations. The OPFOR expects its air defense commanders, like their
maneuver counterparts, to demonstrate aggressive action and originality,
responding to changes in the tactical situation and operating effectively when
9-6
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
cut off from communications with other air defense units. In general, the
OPFOR imposes enough centralization to optimize efficiency while allowing
sufficient decentralization for effectiveness.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
9-36. When the OPFOR Air Force is able to fly, airspace management is the
most complex aspect of air defense operations. Commanders must divide the
airspace among ground-based air defense systems and aviation.
Staff Responsibility
9-37. A single operational-level commander must control the full scope of
combined arms and/or joint activity, including air defense within his AOR. It
is the combined arms or joint commander who is ultimately responsible for
the success or failure of air defense in his AOR. He approves the overall
operation plan prepared by his staff. The operation plan includes the air
defense plan and coordinating instructions.
9-38. The OSC is the lowest level of joint command with control of both Army
and Air Force units. On the staff of an OSC, under the operations officer, the
chief of airspace operations (CAO) is responsible for airspace management is-
sues and procedures. The CAO maintains the airspace control net for control-
ling the command’s airspace. OSC headquarters typically receive liaison
teams from all constituent, dedicated, and supporting Air Force, army avia-
tion, and air defense units associated with the command. All these units and
their liaison teams are on the airspace control net.
Zones of Responsibility
9-39. The OPFOR establishes zones of responsibility in order to minimize
mutual interference between its fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense
weapons. Zones of responsibility could also be used to determine areas or
altitudes to be covered by national-level Air Defense Forces, as opposed to
operational- or tactical-level air defense assets. However, the use of such
zones does not preclude engagement of high-priority targets by more than
one type of weapon system if there is centralized control of all weapon
systems involved.
9-40. The OPFOR may assign zones of responsibility in the vertical dimen-
sion. Thus, fighter aviation would engage enemy aircraft at certain altitudes,
while ground-based air defense assets would be responsible for engagement
at other altitudes. See example A in Figure 9-1.
9-41. In the horizontal dimension, zones of responsibility may be in terms of
the direction from which target aircraft are approaching (example B). The
OPFOR may also choose to delineate responsibility according to the type of
target (example C). For instance, fighter aircraft might engage manned
aircraft, while ground-based air defense might be responsible for engaging
enemy missiles or UAVs. Sometimes, specific targets are assigned to specific
systems. However, the latter is likely only in a very low air threat environment.
9-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
(A) In terms of altitude (B) In terms of direction (axis) (D) In terms of lines (no air superiority)
30,000 m
Zone lll:
Zone of responsibility
of SAM units.
Fighter aviation may
operate only in complicated
situations and by special
permission.
7000 m
Zone ll:
Zone of responsibility
(C) In terms of targets (E) In terms of lines (with air superiority)
of fighter aviation.
SAM units may
operate only
in complicated
situations and
by special
permission.
2000 m
Zone l:
Zone of
responsibility
of AA guns and
low-altitude
SAMs.
Legend:
Enemy Aircraft AA Gun Battery

SAM Battalion SAM Battery
Coverage Combat Air Patrol
Figure 9-1. Coordination of Fighter Aviation and Ground-Based Air Defenses (Examples)
9-42. Another way of dividing air defense responsibility is in terms of lines.

Particularly when the OPFOR does not have air superiority, the first line(s)
of air defense responsibility could be for ground-based air defense weapons to
engage enemy aircraft. OPFOR fighter aviation would then operate in the
relatively safe airspace behind those lines, where its fighters would engage
only those aircraft that managed to get through the first line(s). See example
D in Figure 9-1.
9-43. If the OPFOR does have air superiority, it might establish a boundary
line parallel to and forward of the battle line. This boundary would be gener-
ally at the range limit of medium-range SAMs, possibly beyond the supported
ground force unit’s limit of responsibility. Ground-based air defense systems
would engage aircraft out to this boundary. Fixed-wing aircraft would engage
the enemy beyond this boundary. See example E in Figure 9-1. However, the
OPFOR is unlikely to use this technique unless it possesses air superiority.
9-44. There will never be sufficient specialized air defense assets to protect
all units and vital assets from air attack. Therefore, all units must be capable
of using their organic weapons for self-defense against air attack. Self-
defense is never denied. Thus, air defense units with short-range weapons
always have the capability to defend themselves from immediate air threats,
regardless of whether another aviation or ground-based air defense unit has
responsibility for the airspace above them.
9-8
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
Air Defense Control Measures

9-45. The OPFOR uses various types of air defense weapons control status
and procedural controls to coordinate the use of airspace by aviation assets
and ground-based air defense. Primarily, it employs a system of identification,
friend or foe (IFF) between aircraft and air defense systems. When using
non-IFF-capable systems, it may enact strict procedural controls in order to
protect friendly aircraft from fratricide. The air defense coverage may be
“switched off” to allow friendly aircraft to pass on a mission planned in ad-
vance and then “switched on” as they exit the area. For other missions, air
defense coverage may allow aircraft to transit only on “safe corridors” based
on air routes or other procedural methods. In general, however, the OPFOR
would prefer to risk losing some aircraft through fratricide, rather than al-
lowing gaps in its radar and air defense coverage that the enemy might exploit.
COMMAND POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

9-46. The CAO and his staff are part of the OSC staff at the main command
post (CP). Also located there are Air Force, army aviation, and air defense
liaison teams with whom he closely coordinates for airspace management. A
deputy CAO and possibly an air defense officer from the liaison team may
also be present at the forward CP to advise the OSC commander.
9-47. The basic rule for the establishment of communications between
supported and supporting unit is that the higher command allocates
landline, radio relay, and mobile communication means, while radio equip-
ment is allocated by both higher and subordinate levels. This ensures proper
coordination of communications. If communication is lost, the commanders
and staffs of all units involved are responsible for the immediate restoration
of communication. An air defense and NBC warning communications net
is established to warn maneuver units, the staffs, and logistics units of
incoming enemy aircraft. The warning is communicated through signal
equipment that is specially allocated for this purpose.
PHASES
9-48. The OPFOR plans to employ its air defense units and all-arms air de-
fense in three phases. The phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft
are and what they are doing:
• Phase I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the
ground before they are employed.
• Phase II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before
they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces.
• Phase III: Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into
that airspace.
While these phases may occur sequentially after the initiation of hostilities,
they are not wholly distinct. They may overlap, and all three may occur
simultaneously. The OPFOR roughly equates the three phases with where
they will primarily occur on the ground and in the air. Thus, phases I, II, and
III occur in the “basing area,” “flight area,” and “target area,” respectively.
The purpose of these phases and areas is to assist planners in rationalizing,
planning, and organizing the overall air defense effort.
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PHASE I
9-49. The first phase includes all actions taken to destroy enemy aircraft and
control systems before they are employed. It targets aircraft while they are
still on the ground at airfields or in marshalling or staging areas. This “basing
area” extends from enemy home territory, to allied basing and staging areas,
to and including in-theater enemy support areas down to enemy division
level.1 It is the area in which aircraft are based, refueled, maintained, and
resupplied. This area is the overall responsibility of the OPFOR theater
commander. A large part of it could be given an OSC. Part of the area as-
signed could fall within the OSC’s disruption zone, which can include enemy
airfields and attack helicopter forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
Planning
9-50. Planning for Phase I begins at the national level, when the General
Staff is considering various contingency plans for possible strategic campaigns
before the actual threat of war or extraregional intervention. This planning in-
cludes any OSCs that might be involved in a particular contingency.
9-51. Each contingency plan developed includes detailed analysis of the area
involved, including the identification of key airfields, facilities, and lines of
communication (LOCs) that could support enemy air operations. In those
areas controlled by the OPFOR, preparations are made to support planned
missions. These include the identification of complex terrain in the vicinity of
identified targets, potential cache sites, and forces to perform missions.
9-52. Areas not in the direct control of the OPFOR, but anticipated to be
included in the contingency, are also analyzed. In this case, in addition to all
the factors mentioned above, planners would also examine potential means
and routes of infiltration and potential sources of supply. They would also try
to identify potential “affiliated” forces that could assist in attacking key
targets: insurgent groups, groups with ethnic ties to the OPFOR, groups that
sympathize with the OPFOR for political reasons, individual sympathizers,
terrorist groups, and even criminal organizations.
9-53. Based on this information, planners identify key targets and missions
and task OPFOR units and/or affiliated forces to be prepared to perform
them. This information is shared with the OSCs assigned to the particular
contingency, and the planning effort is coordinated with them.
9-54. What is developed is an integrated plan consisting of a large number of
tactical actions that support air defense objectives at all levels. This is the
basic plan from which the OPFOR operates at the initiation of hostilities. It
is modified and updated and new missions are assigned as the contingency
situation develops.
9-55. Plans are developed which, taken as a whole, may constitute a battle or
operation within the designated area. This is particularly true in the basing
area, since most of the forces operating there will be small units. Their ac-
tions are timed to occur simultaneously or sequentially to achieve a result
over time. For example, a series of actions against an airfield, set to occur
1
For U.S. forces other than aviators, this phase may present the greatest threat.
9-10
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within certain timeframes, can have the net effect of not only destroying air-
craft and their support facilities but also degrading enemy air operations. An
additional payoff is the possible diversion of enemy forces from other areas to
secure the facility.
Participants
9-56. Attacks on airfields and related facilities feature coordinated opera-
tions by all available forces, and they are primarily not air defense units.
Aviation, SSMs, artillery, or SPF can destroy air C2 facilities, aviation
support facilities, and the enemy’s aircraft while they are still on the ground.
When the enemy is operating from bases in or near State territory, the de-
struction or degradation of these systems may be achieved through the use of
raids and ambushes by regular ground forces, insurgents, or partisans.
9-57. Disruption Forces. Typical targets for attack by all forces in the dis-
ruption zone include enemy airfields and attack helicopter FARPs. The forces
employed for such attacks consist almost exclusively of small units.
9-58. When the OPFOR is forced to withdraw from an area, this may become
a basing area for the enemy. In such cases, the OPFOR may leave behind
a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) in a hide position. In other cases, it can
infiltrate a single-round rocket launcher or single mortars to occupy hide
positions near the target. The hides are situated in complex terrain,
highly camouflaged, and dispersed over a wide area. Once given the order
to execute, the firing systems work on a predetermined firing schedule issued as
part of an overall plan.
9-59. MRL system hides might contain only one system, which is loaded and
ready to fire, with previously determined firing data set on the weapon.
Crews manning the systems bivouac away from the system to keep it cold.
Crews have communication capability but are kept on radio silence. When
monitoring and acknowledging one-time orders to execute, they do so away
from the system. Once given the order to execute, the firing systems work on
a predetermined firing schedule issued as part of an overall plan. Each MRL
may be assigned the mission of firing once. Firing occurs in a predetermined
sequence separated by time. The net effect of this tactic is to destroy or
damage facilities and/or aircraft on the ground and degrade the operating
capability of support personnel. Munitions loads can be mixed dependent
on the desired effect. They can include scatterable mines, delayed-fuzed
munitions, high-explosive (HE), and chemical.
9-60. This effort can be enhanced through the employment of single mortars
and/or single-round rocket launchers. The weapon crews operating from pre-
selected hides can move to firing positions where rounds are cached. Once
laid in, the mortars can fire rounds in rapid succession at targets on the air-
field and then move back to hides. Given range and terrain considerations,
larger-caliber mortars (120-mm) can be used in conjunction with laser target
designators to place rounds on point targets such as large aircraft, fuel stor-
age and ammunition facilities, and hangers.
9-61. Small SPF teams equipped with explosives or man-portable antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs) can target aircraft on the ground, or air traffic con-
trol or maintenance vehicles and facilities. SPF teams with shoulder-fired
9-11
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SAMs can engage enemy aircraft taking off or landing at airfields. OPFOR
SPF or affiliated insurgents or terrorists can conduct raids against enemy air
bases and other installations, using terror tactics to destroy enemy systems
and generate fear. The goal is to present the enemy with a nonlinear,
simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets not only denies the enemy
sanctuary, but also can weaken his national will to continue the conflict.
9-62. Infiltrated or stay-behind SPF and infantry can conduct on-call raids
against airfields and ground support facilities. These raids can be timed in
conjunction with other methods so that they assist in keeping the target
under constant pressure. SPF or infantry can also conduct ambushes along
LOCs to destroy certain types of vehicles or equipment related to air operations.
9-63. National- and Operational-Level Assets. Some of the means
available to attack these targets may be national- and operational-level
assets. Since the OPFOR may be unable to reach such targets with its own Air
Force aircraft, it may use long-range artillery, rockets, or missiles—possibly
to deliver persistent chemical attacks or other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—to disrupt or degrade enemy activities in the basing area.
9-64. Affiliated Forces. In each contingency area, OPFOR planners try to
identify insurgents, sympathizers, terrorist groups, and even criminal or-
ganizations that might participate in Phase I. Some of these affiliated forces
can conduct raids or ambushes and any of them can employ terror tactics to
disrupt enemy operations at bases. They can also intimidate host country
civilian contractors to force them to sabotage the enemy operations they
were hired to support.
PHASE II
9-65. The second phase of air defense aims at destroying enemy aircraft
while in flight and before they enter the airspace over OPFOR ground
maneuver forces. The “flight area” overlaps the basing area and extends
from enemy bases to the battle zones of OPFOR units. Thus, the OPFOR’s
disruption zone(s) are included in this area, since one of the missions per-
formed in this zone is to destroy aerial platforms before they get to the battle
zone. The OPFOR often plans air defense ambushes in the flight area.
Planning
9-66. As with Phase I, planning for Phase II occurs primarily at the national
and operational levels. This planning includes any OSCs whose AORs fall in
the “flight area.” Although tactical units in the disruption zone can carry out
air defense-related actions, these actions are part of a larger plan.
Participants
9-67. In Phase II, OPFOR SPF teams can infiltrate man-portable, shoulder-
fired SAMs close to airfields or along identified and potential flight routes in
the flight area. These teams are best employed in pairs. One team can over-
watch an airfield and transmit information on the departure of aircraft and
their direction of flight to another team with SAMs. Alternatively, the SPF
observers could pass this information as early warning to other air defense
units.
9-12
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9-68. After that, the Phase II mission is performed primarily by air defense
forces at the strategic and operational levels. Interceptor aircraft and long-
and medium-range SAMs conduct this phase of the air defense.
9-69. When the enemy aircraft enter an OPFOR disruption zone, shorter-range
operational- and tactical-level air defense systems can engage them. Such systems
often conduct air defense ambushes from positions within the disruption zone.
PHASE III
9-70. The third phase entails the destruction of enemy aircraft that have
penetrated into the airspace over OPFOR ground maneuver forces. Thus, the
“target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over
the OPFOR disruption, battle, and support zones. The disruption zone is in-
cluded here, since part of the air defense mission in it is to protect forces on
the ground within that zone.
9-71. In Phase III, it is not always necessary to destroy the enemy aircraft.
After all, the objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with
OPFOR ground maneuver units. The OPFOR can accomplish this either by
destroying enemy aircraft or by forcing them to expend their munitions beyond
effective range or by diverting the aircraft before they reach their targets.
Planning
9-72. Planning for Phase III extends down to the tactical level. However,
tactical efforts are typically part of a plan for integrated air defense at the
operational and perhaps the national level.
Participants
9-73. In Phase III, the OPFOR may be able to employ its own tactical fighter
aircraft, operating in the relatively safe airspace of the “target area.” These
fighters and fighter-interceptors can engage enemy aircraft that have “leaked
through” ground-based air defenses. However, the bulk of the air defense effort
in Phase III falls upon short- to medium-range SAMs and antiaircraft (AA)
guns of tactical air defense units, complemented by operational- and national-
level air defense assets and other weapons of the ground maneuver units.
9-74. In the “target area,” the OPFOR is particularly concerned about attack
helicopters using standoff firing techniques. It is critical to identify likely fir-
ing positions for these helicopters through terrain analysis. These sites will
be located primarily in the disruption zone. The planned combined use of
antihelicopter mines, artillery, and remote sensors by OSCs and their con-
stituent organizations can be an effective tactic against attack helicopters.
9-75. Once identified, potential sites for attack helicopter firing positions can
be seeded with antihelicopter mines. These are directional fragmentation
mines that function like a Claymore mine, but are larger. Once emplaced, the
mines can be left unattended. Built-in sensors detect approaching helicopters
and initiate the mine when a helicopter enters the lethal zone. Thus, the
antihelicopter mine systems can autonomously detect and engage enemy
helicopters. This technique can be used at some potential sites to economize
other air defense assets for use at the most likely sites.
9-13
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9-76. Another method is to emplace remote sensors to overwatch the sites,

and have the sites registered as preplanned artillery targets. Once the sen-
sors pick up the incoming helicopters, the information is relayed to artillery
units that take the sites under fire using variable-time-fuzed munitions. This
tactic can either destroy or damage the aircraft or cause the area to be unusable.
In lieu of remote sensors, small teams of SPF or affiliated forces can be posi-
tioned to overwatch the most likely sites and relay information back to the guns.
9-77. Another crude but potentially effective method is to have engineers
string cables across the helicopters’ avenues of ingress. Engineers can also
assist in the construction of deception positions to divert enemy air attack
from actual forces or to lure the enemy into air defense ambushes.
ASSETS
9-78. In the OPFOR’s approach to all-arms air defense, various services of
the Armed Forces and various branches within the services participate in the
mission of air defense. However, there are some forces that specialize in air
defense.
9-79. Both the Air Force and the Army maintain air defense forces. In
peacetime, all these air defense assets belong to the OPFOR’s administrative
force structure. Even in wartime, some of themsuch as the national-level
Air Defense Forcesmay remain centrally controlled at the national or
theater level. Other assets from the administrative force structure are
initially allocated to OSCs. An OSC, in turn, may allocate some of its air
defense assets to augment those of its tactical subordinates. Thus, it is
hard to predict where national-, operational-, and tactical-level assets may
actually appear in the wartime, fighting force structure.
9-80. Within the limits of its economic capabilities, the OPFOR has incorpo-
rated recent technological developments into its air defense weapons. It may
invest in a few high-technology systems that provide it a technological niche
that it can exploit against even the most modern enemy air forces. Deploy-
ment of advanced air defense systems, even in limited numbers, would affect
all enemy air operations.
NATIONAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-81. National-level air defense forces focus their efforts on destroying enemy
aircraft, while protecting critical defensive positions and key political and
economic sites. National-level assets include fighter-interceptor aircraft of
the Air Force. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR can use these aircraft
to prevent enemy aircraft from entering or operating in OPFOR airspace. It
can destroy enemy aircraft before they even take off by using air attacks and
the long-range rockets and missiles of the Strategic Forces or direct action
teams from its SPF Command.
9-82. The Air Force also includes Air Defense Forces with which the
OPFOR can successfully defend its airspace against regional opponents.
These national-level assets, along with operational-level air defenses, also
provide the capability to challenge or deny air access into the region by out-
side forces, at least initially.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
9-83. The State’s national-level Air Defense Forces have medium- and long-
range SAMs, some short-range AA guns, and early warning radar units.
These forces reflect the State’s force development philosophy. They combine
obsolescent and state-of-the-art air defense firing units to support area cov-
erage and point protection of high-value assets. The State is investing in
point-protection technology that it believes can prove effective in defending
against cruise missiles. This capability would include the ability to deploy
and use GPS jammers.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-84. The Army recognizes the importance of preventing or at least delay-
ing enemy air superiority. Therefore, it maintains its own operational- and
tactical-level air defense forces in addition to those subordinate to the Air
Force. Army air defense includes mobile air defense units and large numbers
of shoulder-fired SAMs. However, air defense involves use of all arms of the
ground forces, not just the specialized air defense units.
9-85. The inventory of operational-level air defense weapons includes a vari-
ety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. The numbers and types of air
defense assets vary with the size and composition of the OSC. An OSC may
have some air defense assets that it reserves for coverage of its own operational
support zone and for engaging enemy aircraft that get past tactical air defenses.
It also has assets it can allocate to subordinates to augment tactical air defenses
at critical points on the battlefield or to cover gaps in the air defense umbrella.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
9-86. Operational-level air defense systems include medium-range SAMs
(and perhaps some long-range SAMs) for medium- to high-altitude area cov-
erage. Some SAMs have the capability to engage ballistic or cruise missiles,
as well as aircraft. Medium-range SAM units typically have some AA guns or
shoulder-fired SAMs for self-protection.
Antiaircraft Guns
9-87. Operational-level commands may have some short-range AA guns for
point protection. The AA guns found at the operational level are typically
towed systems that lack the mobility of self-propelled SAM systems and
cannot fire on the move. These AA gun units are capable of only a limited
area coverage and are better suited for short-range, point protection of
individual locations. Within their range capabilities, however, these AA
guns are extremely lethal weapons.
Radars
9-88. OSCs normally have early warning units with a variety of air surveil-
lance and target acquisition radars, plus some AA guns or shoulder-fired
SAMs for self-protection. The majority of air defense surveillance radars are
at the operational level. (See the Air Surveillance section later in this chapter
for more detail.)
9-15
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TACTICAL-LEVEL ASSETS
9-89. Aside from air defense assets that might be allocated down from the
operational level, tactical maneuver units have a number of systems de-
signed for air defense. They also have systems belonging to other arms that
can contribute to the air defense mission.
Air Defense Systems

9-90. Tactical-level air defense includes short- and medium-range SAMs,
short-range AA guns, and shoulder-fired SAMs. Tactical assets may also
include some combination AA gun and missile systems, offering added
flexibility. The OPFOR’s tactical air defenses support the need to protect
ground forces and the desire to seize any opportunity to shoot down high-
visibility (flagship) enemy airframes.
9-91. The Army considers every soldier with a shoulder-fired SAM to be an
air defense firing unit. These weapons are readily available at a relatively
low cost. Therefore, the OPFOR is acquiring as many of them as possible,
within economic constraints, and issuing them in large numbers to a wide
variety of units. The small size and easy portability of these systems provides
the opportunity for ambush of enemy airframes operating in any area near
OPFOR units. The OPFOR could also employ them to set ambushes for enemy
helicopters in an attempt to bring down what it perceives to be an enemy flag-
ship system.
9-92. Radar-controlled self-propelled AA guns can fire on the move. Aside
from short-range air defense, they also can be employed against all but the
heaviest of enemy ground force systems, as well as against personnel, with
devastating effects. Shoulder-fired SAMs can also find use against light vehi-
cles when other, more likely systems are unavailable.
Other Arms
9-93. Throughout maneuver units, there are also a number of other systems
that can be used in an air defense role. The heavy AA machineguns on tanks
are specifically designed for air defense, although they can also be used
against ground targets. Machineguns on APCs and automatic cannon on
IFVs can engage both ground and air targets. Some ATGMs can be effective
against low-flying rotary-wing aircraft. Field artillery and small arms can
also be integral parts of the air defense scheme.
9-94. A variety of relatively new systems, which significantly enhance air defense
capabilities, have entered the OPFOR inventory. These include remote heli-
copter infrared (IR) sensing devices and passive acoustic acquisition systems.
Antihelicopter mines are widely available and increase the OPFOR ability to
deny firing positions and landing sites to enemy rotary-wing aircraft. Another
example of OPFOR all-arms air defense is the use of artillery in conjunction
with antihelicopter mines against attack helicopter firing positions.
9-95. The OPFOR continuously looks for new and adaptive ways of employ-
ing not only air defense systems but also systems not traditionally associated
with air defense. It attempts to adapt these systems and develop new tactics
9-16
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that may help to fill the void when a more sophisticated enemy denies the
OPFOR a specific capability.
NONLETHAL AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

9-96. The OPFOR also uses nonlethal air defense-related systems, such as
air defense jammers, radar corner reflectors, and GPS jammers. Such sys-
tems are potential combat multipliers, when employed in conjunction with
SAM and AA gun systems, to defend high-value assets.
Air Defense Jammers

9-97. OSCs can have air defense jamming units. These units employ a vari-
ety of radar and communications jamming and target acquisition systems.
Electronic intercept systems provide targeting information to the jammers.
9-98. Air defense jammers target the onboard emitters of enemy aircraft
used for terrain-following, navigation, and radar-aided bombing, as well as
airborne radar reconnaissance systems. The goal of jamming these systems is
twofold. The primary goal is to force the attacking enemy aircraft to alter
their flight profile, bringing them into the targeting umbrella of SAMs or AA
guns. Jamming the terrain-following radars or radar altimeters employed by
attacking aircraft does this by forcing low-flying aircraft to gain altitude. The
secondary goal is to cause the aircraft to miss their target or abort the
mission through the disruption of radar-aided bombing and target acquisition
systems.
9-99. The OPFOR deploys air defense jamming assets, in conjunction with le-
thal systems, to defend what the OPFOR has identified as high-value assets.
Examples of these include air bases, major logistics centers, critical LOCs
and choke points, and higher-level military CPs.
Corner Reflectors
9-100. Radar corner reflectors provide a low-cost and effective addition to ex-
pensive air defense jammers. These passive systems can deceive enemy air-
borne surveillance and target acquisition radars by providing false or multi-
ple targets. Corner reflectors can also mask or distort radar reference points.
GPS Jammers
9-101. The OPFOR also can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt aircraft
navigation and precision munitions targeting. GPS jammers are also effective
against cruise missiles.
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES

9-102. In addition to active air defense, the OPFOR practices a variety of
passive air defense measures. Many of these measures involve use of C3D or
maneuver and dispersal techniques. Sophisticated camouflage, deception, de-
coy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of enemy systems. When con-
ducting actions against a superior foe, the OPFOR must seek to operate on
the margins of enemy technology and maneuver during periods of reduced
exposure. These and other measures constitute passive air defense.
9-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception

9-103. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of natural terrain and vegetation,
camouflage netting and other artificial materials, smokescreens, and decoy
equipment to provide C3D. Deception includes deception positions and decoys.
The OPFOR can use quick-setup, high-fidelity decoys; derelict vehicles;
radar emitter decoys; quick-hardening foams; and many other types of
manufactured and field-expedient means. It also employs simple heat
sources to confuse IR sensors and weapons seekers.
9-104. The dispersion measures discussed below should be employed with
consideration of the protective and screening properties of natural and artifi-
cial screens, and would be combined with thermal camouflage and engineer
preparation of positions. Natural screens consist of vegetation, terrain folds,
populated areas, and local features or objects. Artificial screens include
camouflage nets that would enhance natural screens, and radar-opaque
screens using local features, radar nets, metallic nets, and corner reflectors.
Concealment would be combined with the use of deception positions, using
decoy equipment and activities. Like real positions, deception positions would
be changed periodically. Dummy emitters and jammers would be used to
attract enemy reconnaissance and targeting.
Maneuver and Dispersal

9-105. Maneuver and dispersal of air defense assets, both emitters and other
types of equipment, is important for their survival both during movement
and in combat formations. Sudden maneuver and periodic changes of position
are simple and effective means to counter enemy reconnaissance and preci-
sion weapons; these measures are planned and implemented at the tactical
level.
9-106. All, or only a portion of, an air defense unit may maneuver to alter-
nate positions, depending on such factors as the degree of air threat, time of
day, and meteorological conditions. The first parts of the unit to shift posi-
tions are those that have performed combat alert duty for an extended pe-
riod, or that have been deployed in the position they currently occupy since
before the onset of combat. The optimum configuration for shifting to alter-
nate positions involves no more than one-third of the assets of a given unit
shifting at one time, in order to maintain adequate air defense coverage.
9-107. The OPFOR uses certain rules of thumb for distances related to dis-
persion and distances of air defense units from supported units and from the
battle line. The OPFOR recognizes that these distances vary with the situa-
tion and the threat. Of special concern is the enemy ATGM and precision
weapon capability. If it is high, the OPFOR increases the spacing between
SAM launchers and the distances of air defense systems from the battle line.
Ideally, the degree of dispersal for units would be the same whether the en-
emy is employing conventional or precision weapons or even tactical nuclear
weapons. A general rule for the degree of dispersion is that the enemy attack
should not destroy two adjacent units simultaneously. A maximum of one-
third of a unit should be vulnerable to a single precision weapon attack.
9-18
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
Other Survivability Measures

9-108. Other measures taken to improve the security and survivability of air
defense systems include the following:
• Signals security. SAM and AA gun system radars, which move forward
to cover the offensive or defensive action of a maneuver unit, remain
silent until after the maneuver unit begins to execute its mission.
• Frequency spread. Each of the air defense systems operates within
separate radar frequency bands. (No one jamming system could oper-
ate simultaneously against all bands.)
• Frequency diversity. Tracking and guidance radars change frequen-
cies to overcome jamming.
• Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance systems. Some
OPFOR systems work on pulsed radar; others work on continuous
waves. Some radar tracking systems also possess optical tracking for
continued operations in a high electronic countermeasures environ-
ment; others systems use IR homing.
• Mobility. All OPFOR tactical air defense systems and most opera-
tional-level systems are mobile. They can quickly change positions af-
ter firing or after enemy reconnaissance units detect them.
RECONNAISSANCE
9-109. Reconnaissance related to air defense takes two basic forms. First,
commanders conduct terrain reconnaissance to determine likely avenues of
approach for enemy aircraft and optimum positions for air defense weapons.
Then air surveillance seeks to detect approaching aircraft and provide early
warning and target information.
TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE
9-110. The OPFOR places significant emphasis on identifying all potential
attack routes for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of approach suit-
able for armed helicopters and positions from which these helicopters might em-
ploy ATGMs are of special concern. The OPFOR considers armed helicopters to
be a serious threat to its ground maneuver units. The OPFOR trains command-
ers to look for areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain where enemy aircraft
might use nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar detection.
9-111. Both the commander of the supported maneuver unit and the com-
mander of the supporting air defense unit usually conduct terrain reconnais-
sance. A preliminary map reconnaissance can tentatively identify positions
for deployment of air defense weapons in defensive areas, along movement
routes, or in areas seized by advancing OPFOR units.
AIR SURVEILLANCE
9-112. The principle objective of air surveillance is to provide the earliest
possible warning of approaching enemy aircraft and to develop target informa-
tion for planning and conducting air defense. Forearmed with this information,
the OPFOR can ensure that it can mass the fires of dispersed air defense
units to engage the intruders. Ground-based and airborne reconnaissance assets
9-19
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at the operational level play a major role in gathering, integrating, and

disseminating information to tactical units. Continuous surveillance of
surrounding airspace ensures current data on the enemy air situation.
9-113. The OPFOR uses electronic and electro-optical means and visual
observation to conduct air surveillance. The air defense forces have a passive
early warning system based on a combination of radar systems and observers
that will serve them well in the early stages of combat operations against
even the most modern opponents. In later stages, the OPFOR accepts that it
will either lose many of its airborne and/or ground-based early warning systems
or at least not be able to use them with optimum effectiveness. When technical
early warning systems are not available, the OPFOR is prepared to continue air
defense operations while relying primarily on observers for air surveillance.
Radars
9-114. Air defense radars fall into two general categories: surveillance and
fire control. The category of surveillance radars includes early warning,
target-acquisition, and height-finding radars. Some fire control radars also
have limited target-acquisition capability.
9-115. National-, operational-, and tactical-level surveillance and target-
acquisition radars detect and monitor targets. The radars then provide the
necessary data for engagement. Radars work as part of the IADS rather than as
separate units. Air defense planners at all levels integrate radars into an overall
system of coverage.
9-116. Operational-level early warning units deploy their radars as close as
possible to the supported ground force unit’s battle line, in order to detect
enemy aircraft at maximum radar range. National-level early warning
units can establish a second line of radar posts behind the first line of op-
erational-level systems, in order to give depth. The types and capabilities
of the systems employed and whether the battlefield is linear or nonlinear
will determine the distances between lines.
9-117. Both national- and operational-level air defense forces maintain
reserves to expand coverage as the operation develops, to replace casualties,
or to establish a new line of radar posts. When the OPFOR is preparing for
offensive operations, operational-level early warning radars remain inactive
as part of C3D, and the national-level reserve radars deploy forward.
9-118. In many cases, long-range surveillance radars in early warning units
at the national and operational levels can gather target information long be-
fore the enemy aircraft come into the range of air defense firing units. These
radar units pass preliminary target data to air defense commanders and
their firing batteries. Commanders then select the weapon system that can
best engage a given target. The early warning units also pass warning infor-
mation to operational and tactical maneuver units and air defense firing units.
9-119. SAM systems and AA guns may have their own radars in the firing
positions or mounted on self-propelled systems. However, higher-level radars
can gather the information without unnecessarily exposing the air defense
firing units to detection and subsequent neutralization by enemy forces. This
practice reduces the vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun
9-20
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carriages and missile launchers to jamming or to destruction by antiradiation

missiles (ARMs) or other means.
9-120. The air surveillance radar network is difficult to avoid or defeat. Many
air defense radars are highly mobile and can displace quickly. Fire control
units turn on radars at the last minute to achieve surprise and to avoid exposing
themselves to enemy electronic or physical attack. The more advanced radar
systems have enhanced electronic protection from jamming and ARMs. The
wide spread of operating frequencies makes jamming difficult. Operator training
stresses electronic counter-countermeasure skills and the use of radio and elec-
tronic silence where possible. Units back up radar reconnaissance with visual
observation. Maneuver units have a radio net devoted exclusively to the passage
of air and NBC warnings. Radar provides an all-weather detection capability.
Visual Observation
9-121. Despite the presence of a technologically advanced early warning
system, the OPFOR continues to stress the importance of visual observation.
Air defense and maneuver units deploy air observers as a backup to radars
and so air defense units may not need to use their radars. In later stages of
combat against more modern opponents, the OPFOR may have to rely
heavily on observers after losing much of its radar capability.
9-122. An effective system of visual observation may often provide the first
warning of an enemy air attack, especially one conducted by low-flying aircraft
or armed helicopters using NOE techniques. When operating close to enemy
forces or in areas where enemy air attack is considered likely, all units post
air observers. In the defense, air observation posts are set up at suitable loca-
tions, usually on terrain offering good visibility, near CPs, and/or close to air
defense units in firing positions. During tactical movement and during both the
defense and offense, observers are posted on each vehicle. Observers are
changed frequently to reduce fatigue and maintain their effectiveness.
9-123. Whenever possible, the OPFOR tries to get SPF teams, human intelligence
(HUMINT) agents, or sympathetic civilians to visually observe enemy airfields
in or near the region. These observers report by radio or telephone the number
and types of aircraft taking off and their direction of travel. Other observers
stationed along probable approach routes can monitor and report the progress of
the enemy aircraft en route to their targets. Thus, OPFOR air defense units may
not need to use their radars to detect and track incoming aircraft.
REQUIREMENTS
9-124. The information required by air defense units falls into two categories:
information on enemy air actions and information that can complete the pic-
ture of the overall air situation. The first category is a joint responsibility of
all reconnaissance forces, and the second is the specific responsibility of air
defense reconnaissance units.
9-125. The first category includes data from which the OPFOR can determine
probable enemy air actions. This information is critical for planning and or-
ganizing the air defense system. Such information could include—
• The composition and strength of enemy air power.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• The capabilities of enemy aircraft.

• The enemy’s basic methods for operational and tactical employment of
air power.
• The locations of enemy airfields, C2 centers, resupply bases, and pro-
duction facilities.
• Avenues of low-level flight.
• Locations of FARPs.
• Locations of ground stations for UAVs.
9-126. The second category includes data from which the OPFOR can develop
a clear picture of the air situation as it unfolds. This information is necessary
to determine the enemy’s plans, air order of battle, and air attack objectives.
The OPFOR can then assign targets to fire units or redeploy resources.
Necessary data also include the positions, types, numbers, direction, speed,
and altitude of aircraft in flight. Radio intercept provides some data, but
most comes from air defense radars.
MISSIONS AND EMPLOYMENT

9-127. Whatever the nature of combat being conducted by maneuver
forcesoffense or defense, most actions of supporting air defense units are,
as the term implies, inherently defensive. The essence of an air defense unit’s
combat mission is to provide area coverage and/or point protection. However, air
defense missions can also have an offensive nature, with the purpose of destroy-
ing certain enemy air platforms or denying or disrupting their employment.
9-128. The OPFOR recognizes that it may be unable to defend its entire
airspace adequately. Therefore, it must establish priorities to ensure denser
coverage in certain areas or increased protection for key assets. Priorities
include airfields, SSMs, artillery, maneuver units, headquarters and
communications centers, and critical logistics units and LOCs. The priority
assigned to a particular area, entity, or site may change during the course
of operations, as the tactical, operational, or strategic situation changes.
NATIONAL-LEVEL
9-129. National-level Air Defense Forces use their own air defense weapons
for various missions, depending on the situation. Some of these assets might
cover the air defense weapons of subordinate commands. Others might fill
gaps between operational-level commands. They usually are somewhere to
the rear of operational-level air defense weapons in order to engage aircraft
that penetrate forward air defenses. Some national assets might provide
general air defense coverage of the State and nearby airspace. In any event,
the intent is for Air Defense Forces to ensure continuous coverage in both
detection and engagement capabilities.
OPERATIONAL-LEVEL
9-130. Operational-level commands (primarily OSCs) can use their air de-
fense units in many ways. Some medium-range SAM units may augment
tactical-level assets. Others provide cover for gaps between tactical units or
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provide general area coverage of the OSC’s entire AOR. This area coverage
gives depth to the defensive effort and overlaps with envelopes of tactical
units. Where possible, this SAM coverage overlaps the envelopes of adjacent
operational-level commands.
9-131. The medium-range SAM units engage enemy aircraft at some distance
from tactical maneuver units and other high-value assets within the OSC’s
AOR. These SAMs and shorter-range AA guns also protect key targets such
as operational-level CPs, tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), long-range
rockets and artillery, and reserves.
TACTICAL-LEVEL
9-132. In the best-case situation, a division or DTG will have sufficient air
defense assets to provide area coverage over its AOR, including the AORs of
subordinate units. At brigade or BTG level, there is a significant element of
point protection in support of subordinate units and brigade- or BTG-level
assets. This is due to the nature of the units defended and the relatively
short range of air defense weapons at this level.
9-133. Tactical-level short- and medium-range SAMs provide area coverage for
the entire tactical-level unit, overlapping with the envelopes of flanking units.
Short-range AA guns and shoulder-fired SAMs can provide point protection.
AIR DEFENSE UMBRELLA

9-134. Air defense assets from national down through tactical level create an
air defense umbrella. Radars can provide an unbroken detection envelope ex-
tending well into enemy territory and across the entire AOR. If OPFOR
fighter-interceptors are able to operate farther out against enemy aircraft in
the “flight area,” national-level long- and medium-range SAMs might be the
first to engage enemy aircraft that slip past fighters. When OPFOR fighters
must operate in “friendly” OPFOR airspace, the national-level SAMs proba-
bly would be the first air defense assets to engage the enemy aircraft. The
next layer of defense is operational-level medium-range SAMs. The final layer in
the battle zone would consist of tactical-level SAMs and AA guns. If enemy aircraft
escape air defenses in the battle zone, they may still encounter operational- or
national-level air defense systems protecting key assets in the support zone.
This deployment scheme causes enemy aircraft to run into overlapping defensive
systems as they approach and penetrate the airspace over OPFOR units.
9-135. There is no set pattern for the deployment of air defense assets. A
basic and flexible guideline is that, depending on their functions and weapon
capabilities, air defense units occupy positions at a distance from the battle
line that ensures the accomplishment of their mission and provides relative
safety from enemy fire. For area coverage, this generally means that weap-
ons at the operational level and below deploy rearward from the supported
unit’s battle line at from one-third to one-half of their engagement range.
However, the OPFOR recognizes that “rules of thumb” are just that, and the
operational or tactical situation and common sense may dictate that these
distances be modified. Actual deployment depends primarily on the supported
unit’s mission, terrain, and the ground and air situations at a given time and
place in the operation. Sometimes, air defense systems can be much closer to the
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battle line, realizing that such placement increases their vulnerability to enemy
direct fire systems. When necessary, tactical- or even operational-level air de-
fense systems may deploy beyond the battle line, out into the disruption zone.
9-136. As OPFOR units maneuver, the air defense umbrella also moves when
necessary, in order to prevent maneuver units from becoming exposed to enemy
ground-attack aircraft and armed helicopters. In a fluid, fast-developing
situation, textbook efficiency may not be possible. While the OPFOR strives
to maintain continuous area coverage, temporary gaps might appear in the air
defense umbrella, both in surveillance and in weapons coverage. Commanders
must be flexible and prepared to use standard and nonstandard solutions to
prevent gaps in air defense coverage from developing during combat. The
objective is to deny enemy aviation the ability to interfere with ground
maneuver units. Air defense forces can accomplish this either by destroying
enemy aircraft, by forcing them expend their munitions beyond effective
range, or by diverting the aircraft before reaching their targets.
30,000
25,000
20,000 OPERATIONAL-
STRATEGIC- LEVEL SAMs STRATEGIC-
LEVEL SAMs LEVEL SAMs
10,000
Height in
Meters
5,000 TACTICAL-
LEVEL
SAMs
3,000
2,000
1,000
250 200 150 100 50 0 50 100 150 200 250 km
Range in Kilometers
Figure 9-2. Air Defense Coverage (Example)
9-137. Figure 9-2 illustrates the vertical and horizontal coverage typically
provided by OPFOR air defense systems at the tactical, operational, and
strategic (national) levels. The example altitudes and ranges are illustrative
of a principle. The actual systems and their capabilities can vary. Although
not shown in this example, all SAM systems have a minimum range and a
minimum altitude. Of course, the range beyond the battle line or limit of
responsibility of supported forces depends on the situation and where the air
defense systems deploy within the supported unit’s AOR.
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_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURES
9-138. On a priority basis, the OPFOR engages aircraft posing the greatest
threat. The preferred technique is to fire at an already engaged target rather
than switching from target to target. This priority continues unless a later-
acquired target seriously threatens air defense units.
9-139. The OPFOR prefers to engage a hostile aircraft prematurely and
waste some ammunition rather than allowing the aircraft to expend its ord-
nance. The OPFOR fires on aircraft as long as they remain within range.
9-140. Air observers and weapon crews outside the attacked area maintain
observation and readiness to fire. This precludes enemy success through
simultaneous air attacks from several directions.
OFFENSE
9-141. Operations from the air have ceased to be auxiliary and have become
a critical component of combined arms combat. Thus, air defense is a
vital part of the combined arms operation. The OPFOR can successfully
execute operational offensive actions only if it can negate enemy air
power. Conversely, failure to provide effective air defense against enemy air
power can result in operational and tactical failures. Therefore, the OPFOR
has an extensive air defense system to protect attacking maneuver units. Air
defense weapons can fully support dynamic offensive combat.
DEPLOYMENT
9-142. In an offense, the exact location of air defense weapons depends on the
following factors:
• The assessment of the air threat.
• The mission of the supported unit.
• The commander’s chosen organization of forces.
• The tempo of operations.
• The terrain.
• Fields of fire and observation.
9-143. The shape of the air defense deployment can change as supported
units maneuver. The most common methods follow:
• Where the air threat is low, the commander assigns the complete air
defense unit lines of deployment to occupy in succession.
• When the air threat is continuous, air defense units may move forward
in bounds into successive firing positions, maintaining continuous
coverage of supported units.
• In a highly mobile, fragmented operation, the OPFOR might integrate
air defense into combat formations and occupy temporary firing positions
on less likely approaches or in gaps between the coverage of the main
air defenses.
SAM units at the operational and tactical levels deploy where they can provide
area coverage for as much as possible of the supported maneuver unit’s AOR.
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Disruption Zone
9-144. In many cases, dispersed ground ambushing forces and other key as-
sets in the disruption zone will require point air defense protection. Regular
infantry, SPF, and affiliated forces operating in the disruption zone should
have air defense systems as mobile and survivable as the force they are
protecting. This may require extensive use of man-portable, shoulder-fired
SAMs. Some forces may rely strictly on C3D for protection from enemy air.
9-145. Some air defense forces may be deployed in the disruption zone, par-
ticularly in the form of air defense ambush teams. Their purpose can be to
deny aerial attack and/or to prevent enemy reconnaissance platforms from
targeting forces in the disruption zone or battle zone.
9-146. Area coverage is desirable for protecting the overall disruption force.
When necessary, the OPFOR will move divisional assets or even OSC assets
(both normally located in the battle zone) well out into the disruption zone to
assist in area coverage or to provide early warning for other air defense units.
Battle Zone
9-147. Most air defense forces would normally be within the battle zone. In
order to provide continuous coverage for supported maneuver forces, air de-
fense systems need to have the mobility to move with those forces. Their
main role is to allow friendly ground forces the freedom to maneuver as the
operational situation develops rapidly. Air defense units in a fixing force can
help prevent enemy aviation from coming to the aid of the enemy formation
targeted for attack by assault and exploitation forces. Air defense action or
even an uncertain air defense environment can help create the window of
opportunity for an attack.
Support Zone
9-148. Some air defense units may be deployed in the support zone to help
keep this zone free of significant air action and thus permit the effective logistics
and administrative support of forces. Generally, commanders can afford to de-
fend the support zone with less mobile air defense assets than in the disruption
and battle zones. Throughout the support zone, the OPFOR makes extensive use
of passive air defense measures, including C3D, maneuver, and dispersal.
MOVEMENT
9-149. The OPFOR anticipates that its units may be subject to air attack
during movement. Accordingly, units engaged in movement are protected by
their constituent air defense assets and, in many cases, by additional air de-
fense assets allocated by their parent unit.
9-150. When a subordinate tactical unit is conducting tactical movement, an
operational-level command may order its own air defense assets to provide
cover for the moving unit. Due to their longer-range systems, operational-
level air defense units may be able to provide this coverage from their
original positions or with minimal repositioning. Alternatively, the opera-
tional command may direct that the subordinate unit conducting movement
receive air defense coverage from another, adjacent tactical subordinate
whose air defense assets are within range of the moving unit.
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9-151. Air defense units relocate as necessary to provide continuous and ef-
fective protection to the supported unit. OPFOR commanders maintain effective
protection by leaving at least one air defense battery in firing position to cover
the movement. Air defense units constituent to or augmenting a maneuver unit
usually move as a part of that unit if the air threat is high. If there is little or no
air threat, these air defense assets may move separately to a new location.
DEFENSE
9-152. Air defense units seek to provide coverage to all levels of the organiza-
tion. They must integrate this coverage with the ground operation and ensure
continuous air defense. Air defense must provide all-around security because
air attack can come from any direction. The OPFOR must coordinate fires
among all air defense units and supported maneuver units. This provides an
integrated air defense.
9-153. Under conditions when the OPFOR can employ integrated defense, it
generally can also employ integrated air defense, integrated both vertically
and horizontally. During transition and adaptive operations, however, decen-
tralized conditions may affect the ability to integrate horizontally and thus
provide mutual support. The same would apply to the commander’s ability to
achieve vertical integration between the tactical and operational levels.
DEPLOYMENT
9-154. Deployments closely parallel those in the offense, but there are some
differences. The positioning of operational-level air defense assets depends on
the overall organization of the battlefield for the defense. Operational-level
SAM units might deploy to provide point protection for the main CP, SSM
units, airfields, or other high-value assets. The SAMs might cover units in
sanctuary areas or sanctuaries into which maneuver units may deploy. They
might cover lines of commitment for an operational-level counterattack. The
OPFOR sees the threats posed by air reconnaissance and airborne or heli-
borne assault as being greater in the defense and devotes greater effort to
guarding against those threats.
Disruption Zone
9-155. Air defense in the disruption zone should provide area coverage to de-
fend forces in the zone and provide point protection for key assets involved in
conducting fires. Even the systems providing point protection must be highly
mobile and capable of moving with units as they displace to hides or new fir-
ing positions or conduct survivability moves.
9-156. Forces operating in the disruption zone are typically separated from
sanctuary areas in both time and space. This separation typically requires
the OSC commander to place air defense units in the disruption zone to sup-
port the disruption mission. Such deployment allows the OPFOR to detect,
track, and attack air platforms in the disruption zone and beyond. This can
involve deployment of divisional or even OSC air defense assets (radars as
well as weapon systems) well into the disruption zone. These forces occupy pre-
pared and camouflaged positions to support other units in the disruption zone.
As in the offense, they try to prevent enemy aerial reconnaissance platforms
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
from targeting forces in the disruption zone or the battle zone. This is a key
part of the OPFOR’s aggressive and creative counterreconnaissance effort.
Battle Zone
9-157. In maneuver or area defense, air defense units provide protection for
the battle positions of DTGs or BTGs of the main defense force. In a maneuver
defense, they especially cover units maneuvering from line to line. Especially in
an area defense, they help preserve key components of OPFOR combat power or
assist units in the stubborn holding of tactically favorable defensive positions
that the OPFOR would prefer to retain. A typical battle position incorporates
air defense systems, in conjunction with extensive use of C3D. In any type of
defense, air defense units conduct air defense ambushes to provide opportunities
for other forces to conduct counterattacks or reconnaissance fires.
9-158. An OSC in the defense usually employs a strong reserve positioned in
an assembly area with good C3D measures and strong air defense protection.
The reserve must have sufficient air defense coverage to allow it to maneuver
from the assembly area in order to conduct a variety of contingency missions
the OSC commander might give it as the operation develops.
Support Zone
9-159. The OPFOR usually deploys some air defense units in the support zone
to protect key logistics units and administrative support elements. However, it
also relies heavily on passive air defense measures, including C3D and dispersal.
ANTILANDING DEFENSE
9-160. Air defense units have a significant role in defending ground forces
against attacks by enemy airborne and air assault troops. When the OPFOR
detects an enemy airborne operation, Air Force units (if available) attempt to
intercept and destroy enemy transport aircraft. They try to do this while the
enemy is at marshalling airfields or en route to drop zones.
9-161. Operational- and tactical-level SAM units engage transport aircraft
entering their respective air defense zones of responsibility. Short-range air
defense assets near the drop zones also engage transport aircraft. These air
defense forces typically act in the form of either air defense ambushes or roving
air defense units. Self-propelled AA guns, vehicle-mounted machineguns, and
small arms all fire on descending paratroops and equipment.
SANCTUARY AREAS
9-162. A sanctuary area may exist because of natural or manmade features.
However, it only remains a sanctuary if the OPFOR can prevent the enemy
from striking it with standoff weapons, including air power. Thus, OPFOR
units in a sanctuary area use all available C3D techniques to reduce likeli-
hood of detection or identification. They may also exploit political restrictions
placed on the enemy force.
9-163. The air defense of the sanctuary area is integrated into the overall air
defense scheme at the tactical, operational, and strategic (national) levels. The
net result is the requirement for enemy aviation to pass through overlapping
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coverage to attack the sanctuary area. Attacking enemy aircraft must first
penetrate the strategic (national), operational, and tactical engagement
envelopes. Then they must face the air defenses within the sanctuary itself.
9-164. Within the sanctuary area, the air defense unit commander and the
supported maneuver commander work closely together to integrate their
weapons into an effective air defense plan. The maneuver commander
provides guidance for the placement of all air defense systems, while the air
defense commander supervises the details of the placement of his weapons
and ensures that they remain within mutually supporting distance. As a
rule, one crew in each pair of air defense systems remains alert, except when
they have received warning of an air attack. Any available shoulder-fired
SAMs supplement the defense, and the supporting air defense commander
may exercise some degree of control over the SAM gunners. Air defense units
observe radio silence and light discipline and dig in, as time allows.
9-165. A 360-degree surveillance of the surrounding airspace increases the air
defense engagement envelope to the maximum extent possible. Air observation
posts and air defense firing positions are positioned to provide comprehensive
observation and interlocking fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. All other weapons, including vehicle-mounted
machineguns and ATGMs, are further integrated. Even planning for the use and
integration of massed small-arms fire is essential to an effective air defense.
MOUNTAINS AND WATER OBSTACLES

9-166. Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain have unique
problems. The rugged terrain makes it difficult to maintain the integrity of
maneuver and air defense units. This, in turn, makes maintaining compre-
hensive air surveillance and air defense fire support more difficult, resulting
in a greater degree of decentralization than normal.
9-167. Air defense forces play a major role in water obstacle crossings. They
protect crossing sites and forces from air attack by creating envelopes of
protected airspace above and around crossing sites. Major problems in air
defense of water obstacle crossings include
• Providing comprehensive radar and visual observation.
• Handling simultaneous threats on multiple approach axes.
• Maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage.
• Supplying ammunition to firing units on the far shore.
AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS

9-168. The OPFOR recognizes the disproportionate effects that sudden, un-
expected destruction of an aircraft or small group of aircraft can have can on
enemy tactics and morale. For example, the surprise destruction of one or
two lead aircraft, on what the enemy perceived to be a clear avenue of ap-
proach, could cause an enemy air assault to be called off or seriously disrupted.
Air defense ambushes may set up at temporary firing positions to surprise and
destroy enemy aircraft and disorganize enemy fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-
wing operations. Ambushes and roving air defense units can cause the enemy to
believe that significant air defense assets are located in areas where actually
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
there are only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of enemy recon-
naissance and the likelihood of enemy air attack in the area concerned.
AMBUSHES
9-169. Air defense ambushes usually comprise a single AA gun or SAM
weapon, section, platoon, or battery with the mission of engaging enemy air-
craft from a hidden or unexpected position. However, the OPFOR may also
employ antihelicopter mines.
Placement
9-170. By their very nature, the placement of air defense ambushes is unpre-
dictable. They might be placed on the most likely air avenues of approach or along
secondary and tertiary avenues. They can be along flanks, forward, behind, and
in gaps between maneuver units. Their purpose can possibly be to fill apparent
gaps in air defense coverage or to defend key units or sites. Typical missions in-
clude defending maneuver units, CPs, reserves, artillery and missile units, other
air defense units in firing positions, and water obstacle-crossing sites.
9-171. Ambushes can be placed
• In valleys or defiles likely to be used as ingress or egress routes by
infiltrating aircraft.
• On adjacent heights to shoot down into valleys or defiles.
• Just behind a crest to catch aircraft from behind as they clear a ridge.
Single-launcher shoulder-fired SAM ambushes may be set up on wooden plat-
forms built in treetops to catch aircraft flying over a forest. In urban areas,
AA guns could be set up within the top or middle floors of buildings to fire
laterally or even down on low-flying aircraft while remaining unseen from
almost every angle. Often, air defense ambushes are placed in complex ter-
rain that offers poor fields of observation but allows them to fire “window shots.”
Planning and Preparation

9-172. Air defense ambushes may be planned and executed on short notice
with little preparation. In other cases, they may involve elaborate prepa-
ration and camouflage, and tracking enemy aircraft over several days to
discern operational patterns and possible weaknesses, or optimum weather
patterns for a specific ambush site.
9-173. Weather conditions may facilitate the use of an air defense ambush.
For example, low cloud bases may force enemy aircraft down into the enve-
lope of a particular weapon. Ambushing units may work in concert with
smoke- or aerosol-dispensing units or ground-based jammers that jam a low-
flying aircraft’s terrain-following radar, forcing it up into the ambush
weapon’s optimum engagement envelope. The OPFOR may create a deception
position using decoys or derelict weapons and vehicles, to draw the attention
of enemy aircrews and cause them to enter the ambush zone of an air defense
ambushing unit positioned nearby.
9-174. The unit or weapon assigned to an air defense ambush usually occu-
pies a temporary firing position in hours of darkness or under the cover of
poor visibility conditions. It may assume a hide position near the firing position
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and establish local ground security and air observers. The unit or weapon is
carefully camouflaged and keeps all its emitters off or in “dummy load” until
ordered to engage a target. While in this mode, it can receive automated sur-
veillance and target tracking data from its parent air defense unit or be
alerted by air observers posted nearby. All this can allow the ambushing unit
to delay using its own radars and other emitters until the last possible mo-
ment, in order to achieve surprise.
9-175. Occasionally, AA guns may choose not to employ their radars, using
strictly electro-optical sights. This tactic takes into account the capability of
modern aircraft, including attack helicopters, to detect radar and IR systems.
9-176. More than one air defense ambush, involving more than one weapon
type may be established along the same air avenue of approach. These may
work independently or in concert depending on the situation. Target en-
gagement decisions may be left up to the ambushing unit commander.
Execution and Redeployment

9-177. When an air target is detected, the ambushing weapon or unit prepares to
engage. This may involve removal of some camouflage or a short movement from
its hide position to its firing position. It then fires on the target until the target
is destroyed or moves out of the firing zone. Then the ambushing unit or weapon
immediately displaces to a new ambush site or returns to its parent unit.
ROVING UNITS
9-178. Employment of roving units is similar to that of air defense ambushes.
The primary difference is that, while an ambushing unit lies in wait in one
position for approaching enemy aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most
likely areas of enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated
positions in the supported unit’s AOR. The commander of the roving unit
identifies these positions during his terrain reconnaissance and coordinates
them with the air defense and maneuver unit commanders. The roving unit
occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of
the air defense unit commander. Roving units terminate their missions and
return to previously designated primary firing positions upon direction of the
commander of the parent air defense unit.
AIR DEFENSE AGAINST UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

9-179. The OPFOR recognizes the increasing importance of UAVs on the battle-
field, to both its own forces and those of the enemy. They can perform high- and
low-altitude missions, collect the full spectrum of intelligence, and immediately
downlink the data to a ground station. They have the capability to loiter or to fly
deep. They can collect against a predetermined target or look for targets of opportu-
nity. Their construction can make them difficult or easy to detect. Since UAVs can
support targeting for enemy long-range fires, their priority for destruction increases.
9-180. Typically the enemy conducts reconnaissance missions using UAVs
operating in the “window” between low-flying helicopters and higher-altitude
fixed-wing aircraft. This altitude window is between 300 and 4,000 m. The most
common technique is to approach the target area at high altitude and, once at
the target area, drop down to a lower altitude that optimizes the capabilities
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
of the sensor package on board. Once the mission in the target area is com-
plete, the UAV climbs to higher altitude and departs the mission area.
TARGETED SUBSYSTEMS
9-181. Countering UAVs should not be viewed as just a defense against the aerial
vehicle, although that is important. Most UAV systems consist of three basic
subsystems: the air vehicle, the ground station, and the launcher. (In some
cases, the latter two may be one vehicle.) There are also a variety of communica-
tion data links between the ground station and the air vehicle. Some systems
also include satellite links. The air defense commander must coordinate with
other arms to ensure that UAVs are being attacked not just in the air, but that
their related subsystems are also addressed. The successful destruction of a UAV
ground station has a far greater impact than the destruction of a single air vehicle.
9-182. Thus, air defense against UAVs requires not only an IADS but also an
integrated all-arms approach. Air defense commanders and planners should
view the three UAV subsystems as three separate targets that can be coun-
tered through a variety of means. These means are both active and passive.
ACTIVE MEASURES
9-183. A wide variety and large number of active measures are available to
the OPFOR to counter UAVs. The effectiveness of air defense radars can vary
dependent on the radar cross section (RCS) and altitude of the vehicle. Of
course, this does not preclude the use of radar, since these factors are consid-
erations in detecting any aircraft. The relatively small size of many UAVs
obviously reduces their RCS.
9-184. A variety of sound-ranging systems are available that can provide
early warning and azimuth of an approaching UAV. This in turn provides air
defense weapons and maneuver unit weapons an opportunity to prepare for the
vehicle’s approach and to put up a large volume of fire, provided the UAV can
subsequently be visually detected. The early warning provided by sound ranging
increases the probability that visual observers will be able to spot the vehicle.
9-185. The location of UAV ground stations and launchers is typically a high
priority for reconnaissance. The OPFOR will use all available means (from
the civilian population to commercially available satellite imagery) to locate
these key targets. Reconnaissance assets for locating these targets can be
tied to artillery, MRLs, or aircraft that can quickly engage the targets once
the information is received. SPF operating in the enemy rear can also be a
valuable asset in locating launchers and ground stations. They can either
take direct action to destroy the targets or relay location information to allow
the OPFOR to employ other means against them.
9-186. The OPFOR can also use jamming techniques to counter UAV system
data links. In some cases, data links cannot be jammed but they can be
monitored. The effectiveness of these procedures varies according to the UAV
system being attacked. High-power spot or barrage noise jammers can be
effectively used to mask ground targets from side-looking airborne radars.
Many satellite up- and downlinks employed are through the use of the
commercial telecommunication infrastructure. This infrastructure and
supporting satellites can be jammed or monitored to some degree.
9-32
_________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 9
PASSIVE MEASURES
9-187. Since the mission the UAV is executing may not be apparent, actions
should be taken to counter all possibilities. The integrated use of the passive
air defense measures described earlier in this chapter can reduce the ef-
fectiveness of UAVs. The use of a variety of decoys provides a false picture of
the mission area to the enemy and, to a large extent, can deny information or
distort the information collected by the UAV.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
9-188. The OPFOR accepts that, while it has a full range of capabilities to
deal with its neighbors, air defense against a technologically superior force is
problematic. It believes that comprehensive planning and the creative use of
all capabilities, including some normally not associated with air defense, can
serve to mitigate many disadvantages.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
9-189. Within the context of regional operations, the OPFOR views its air de-
fense system as fully capable of protecting ground forces and infrastructure
from air attack by any of its neighbors. To accomplish this, it believes that its
aircraft will be capable of conducting successful counterair operations, thus
denying any major encroachment into its territory or significant attacks by
fixed-wing aircraft against its military forces operating in enemy territory.
The ability to use ground-based systems to defeat any “leakers” and rotary-
wing attacks serves to reinforce this belief. This confidence does not preclude
the OPFOR from using a wide variety of other options, to include TBMs or SPF.
9-190. While desiring to attack its regional opponent with overwhelming
force, the OPFOR plans for the possibility of extraregional intervention. In
doing so, it may choose to husband certain assets that may not be essential to
accomplishing its air defense objectives against its neighbor.
9-191. The first OPFOR combat actions against extraregional forces may be
against the enemy air threat. Past operations have shown that one of a major
power’s first steps in support of intervention is the deployment of aircraft to
third countries within range of the battlespace. Deployment could also in-
clude movement of aircraft to the territory of the regional neighbor with
which the State is already at war. Attacking sites within these countries, espe-
cially third countries or the extraregional enemy’s homeland, is a decision made
at the highest political levels. Once the State leadership has assessed this as a
viable option, however, the OPFOR will use every means available to preclude
deployment or, more realistically, limit access and delay deployment timelines.
9-192. Taking early action against the air threat is essential to forces
transitioning to adaptive operations. It provides time for ground forces to
reposition. It also allows the use of OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft against
targets they can range. Waiting too long to employ fixed-wing aircraft could
result in an effective loss of the capability.
9-33
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
9-193. OPFOR air defense actions during transition and adaptive operations
are based on the premise that it is essential to attack aircraft while they are
on the ground. While defensive in nature, OPFOR air defense has an impor-
tant offensive component to it. Therefore, it must use every means available
to attack enemy air capability. TBMs provide the OPFOR with the means to
continue to attack after the effective loss or degradation of its fixed-wing ca-
pability. The key to the use of TBMs is that they are systems that have been
held in reserve during regional operations and positioned in hides. These
hides are dispersed and not tied to any operational pattern of the ground forces.
Armed with a mix of high-explosive and persistent chemical warheads, they can
destroy aircraft and make airfields unusable for extended periods of time.
9-194. Augmenting early OPFOR air employment and the continuous use of
TBMs is the employment of SPF, insurgents, and terrorist groups. These
forces can be a means of providing depth to the battlefield. SPF pre-
positioned in anticipation of intervention can operate in third countries or
within the theater. Typical SPF missions include air defense ambushes of
aircraft along routes of ingress or egress from airfields. Shoulder-fired SAMs
equipped with night-vision devices serve as the weapon of choice for these
ambushes. In some cases, the ambushing forces could be instructed to fire only
at certain types of aircraft. These may include Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS), reconnaissance aircraft, and fuel tankers. SPF can also con-
duct raids to destroy maintenance facilities and fuel storage sites. Insurgent
forces, advised by SPF, can conduct similar missions. They can ambush
cargo trucks en route to airfields or aviation facilities. SPF or insurgents
can intimidate local contractors and force them to contaminate fuel supplies or
sabotage air traffic control facilities. Where plausible deniability is important,
terrorists may be more suitable for conducting some of these operations.
9-195. Air defense by ground-based systems still plays a key role in both
transition and adaptive operations. The OPFOR recognizes that strategically
and operationally it cannot maintain a fully integrated air defense system
over all areas all of the time. However, it does believe that, through niche
technologies and creative means, it can achieve integration in some sectors
while taking a degree of risk in others. Longer-range systems, normally posi-
tioned deep, can be moved forward to cause enemy aircraft to operate from
greater standoff distances. By investing in key technologies, the OPFOR has
some capability to provide early warning and target information to firing
units from remote locations. This protects the firing units from detection and
significantly lowers their radar transmission times. There is heavier reliance
on the use of passive systems. Air defense ambushes along likely routes of
ingress serve as effective means of augmenting ground force protection. In
key areas, these ambushes would be positioned forward and in depth.
9-196. The use of other arms is an effective means of augmenting air defense
capability. An in-depth analysis of the battlespace is conducted to identify
likely helicopter firing positions. These can be sowed with antihelicopter mines
and remote sensors. The sensors serve to key artillery fires to attack these sites
and render them unusable or prevent effective fires by attack helicopters.
9-34
Chapter 10
Engineer Support
The OPFOR believes success in battle requires extensive engineer support
at every level. Engineer plans at the operational level support the various
strategic-level courses of action involved in the State’s strategic campaign.
Engineers facilitate the mobility and high rate of movement of combined
arms forces while enhancing the survivability of forces. Although the
OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities at the
tactical level, it also maximizes activities conducted at the operational
level to disaggregate, disrupt, delay, block, or canalize enemy forces. See
FM 7-100.2 for more information on tactical-level engineer actions.
ASSETS
10-1. Military engineers fall into two basic categories: combat engineers and
special-category engineers. Combat engineers are those whose tasks may
bring them in direct contact with the enemy. Special-category engineers (such
as bridge- and road-building units) do not normally engage the enemy and
generally use utility vehicles as their primary transportation rather than
engineer vehicles designed to survive close combat. Together, these two
categories of engineers are responsible for the more difficult and complex
engineering tasks. Their missions require specialized training and the use of
special equipment or munitions. Often the distinction of engineer categories is
blurred somewhat depending on task organizations and their mission-driven
employment.
10-2. At the operational level, the OPFOR plans the complete integration of
civilian and military engineer resources. For example, maneuver command-
ers may use civilian earthmoving, road-building, and construction equipment
and personnel, especially in support zones. This allows constituent combat
engineer equipment and personnel to accompany maneuver forces in battle.
Civilian workers or maneuver units can perform many basic combat engineer
tasks, with engineers providing guidance and technical expertise.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

10-3. Engineer units allocated to an operational-strategic command (OSC) in
constituent or dedicated relationships may be directly under the command of
the OSC commander. The OSC commander or his subordinate commanders
can controlbut do not commandother engineer assets that are allocated to
them in a supporting relationship. Rather than keeping all allocated engineer
assets under his direct command and control (C2), the OSC commander may
suballocate some engineer units to his subordinate maneuver units or to his
integrated fires command (IFC) and/or integrated support command (ISC).
10-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
10-4. Various staff elements under the operations officer advise him on
engineer matters and allow him to advise the commander on the employment
of engineer assets. The chief of force protection and the chief of infrastructure
management receive liaison teams from each constituent, dedicated, or
supporting engineer unit. These teams provide the staff with detailed
expertise on engineer functions and provide a direct communications conduit
to the engineer units executing such functions. Based on the advice of the
liaison teams and coordination with the engineer units through the re-
spective liaison teams, these functional staff chiefs advise the commander on
engineer employment within their functional areas. Other liaison teams may
fall under the chief of current operations, to advise and assist in mobility and
countermobility functions. The engineer liaison teams also coordinate, as
necessary, with other staff elements, including the chief of information
warfare (IW). Liaison team leaders speak for the commanders of their
respective units.
TASK ORGANIZATION
10-5. At each level of command, the commander or his operations officer de-
cides on the task organization of subordinate engineer units. Operational
employment of engineer units does not follow strict organizational lines. The
OPFOR does not always employ engineer units as complete entities.
10-6. Engineer tasks are integral to all OPFOR organizations. Although
engineer assets generally are constituent at no lower than brigade or brigade
tactical group (BTG) level, the OPFOR prefers to task organize for mission
success at even lower levels, when the assets are available. This may dictate
that, instead of maintaining large engineer units, the commander may choose
to break them down and combine them into smaller (sometimes much, much
smaller) multirole engineer support groupings. These engineer groupings
range in size from brigades down to multirole platoons and engineer squads.
An example of this flexible task organization would be the allocation more
minelaying assets on an exposed flank or a high-speed avenue of approach for
enemy armored vehicles. Another would be that an OSC that is task-
organized for operations in a desert environment would not receive water ob-
stacle-crossing units, but might add more mineclearing units.
10-7. There are no real doctrinal constraints on task organization for mission
success. The ability to allocate assets downward and to task organize is
restrained only by the availability of assets and the nature of the mission.
At the operational level, however, the primary responsibility of the engineers
is to support and ensure the mobility and survivability of operational
units while retaining a significant countermobility capability to impede
(or canalize) the enemy’s progress. The primary engineer reconnaissance
function at the operational level is route reconnaissance.
10-8. With advice from engineer experts on his functional staff, the operations
officer on the OSC staff uses the OSC’s engineer resources to form task-
oriented groupings according to the commander’s decision for the operation
and his instructions on engineer support. He forms groupings to
10-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Conduct engineer support (reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility,

and survivability) at any level.
• Augment maneuver units.
• Augment other operational-level units.
• Support IW.
10-9. The most frequent operational employment of constituent or dedicated en-

gineer, engineer reconnaissance, and road- and bridge-construction units generally
involves the formation of one or more functional groupings. Some of these are—
• Obstacle detachments (ODs) to create minefields and other obstacles.
• Movement support detachments (MSDs) to perform route reconnais-
sance, route preparation, mineclearing, and route marking.
• Obstacle-clearing detachments.
• Engineer reconnaissance patrols.
An OSC may form several of each, and each may be based on an engineer
unit as large as a battalion. The OSC may also create an engineer reserve.
MISSIONS
10-10. The primary engineer missions performed in combat are in the catego-
ries of reconnaissance, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The
OPFOR recognizes several basic combat tasks engineers perform in support
of combined arms operations. Some of these tasks are to
• Reconnoiter the enemy and the terrain.
• Prepare fortifications.
• Prepare and maintain movement routes.
• Clear passages through obstacles and areas of destruction.
• Equip and maintain gap crossings.
• Establish engineer obstacles.
• Support IW.
• Extract and purify water and establish water supply points.
• Carry out engineer measures to eliminate the effects of nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) and precision weapons.
For more detail, see the sections later in this chapter dedicated to Engineer
Reconnaissance, Survivability, Countermobility, and Support to Information
Warfare. For more detail on mobility support, see FM 7-100.2.
SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-11. In the offense, the engineers’ primary mission is to support the
operation plan. Emphasis is on
• Clearing and maintaining routes for maneuver units.
• Clearing or removing mines and other obstacles.
• Crossing gaps.
• Creating obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against
counterattacks.
10-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Preparation
10-12. To prepare for offensive operations, engineer tasks include
• Performing engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy.
• Preparing assembly areas and movement routes for maneuver forces,
including reserves.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and command
posts (CPs).
• Establishing and improving road networks to support maneuver forces.
• Preparing alternative airfields and highway strips to support air assets.
• Ensure the integration of engineer support to IW.
Conduct
10-13. During the conduct of offensive operations, engineer support in-
cludes
• Providing tailored engineer support where it is needed, when it is needed.
• Continuing reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Maintaining airfields and roads.
• Improving road networks and other movement routes to support com-
mitment of reserves or follow-on forces.
• Providing support for the crossing of water obstacles and other gaps.
• Constructing protective positions for systems, units, and CPs, as they
relocate.
• Helping to repel enemy counterattack.
• Supplying engineer equipment, materials, and technical assistance to
maneuver units and other OPFOR units.
• Facilitate maneuver despite enemy and natural obstacles and possibly
NBC-contaminated areas.
SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
10-14. OSC engineer forces are heavily engaged in the preparation and con-
duct of an operational defense. Comprehensive engineer preparation in the
entire area of responsibility (AOR) is an important precondition for holding
battle positions, as well as for troop maneuver.
10-15. Engineer support for defensive operations places emphasis on fortify-
ing battle positions and assembly areas, performing engineer camouflage,
concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) measures, and adapting the terrain
for defense. The defense is also conducive to the extensive use of various ob-
stacles to interfere with the enemy’s advance.
10-16. The general aims of engineer support to defensive operations include
• Controlling access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canaliz-
ing enemy forces.
• Establishing conditions necessary for organizing the defense.
• Protecting personnel and equipment from the effects of conventional
direct and indirect fires, precision munitions, and NBC attacks.
10-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
• Building fortifications, battle positions, and assembly areas.

• Preparing and maintaining maneuver and supply routes.
• Creating or improving existing obstacles.
• Preparing decoys and deception positions.
• Ensuring the integration of engineer support to IW.
10-17. The type and scale of engineer support depends on the operational
situation, enemy forces, and the conditions under which an OPFOR transitions
to the defense. If the OPFOR does so during the course of the offense, support
may have to begin with the protection of threatened axes by ODs and antitank
reserves (ATRs) and the route work needed for regrouping.
Preparation
10-18. Engineer support for preparing an AOR for defensive operations
consists of the following:
• Conducting engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain.
• Preparing fortifications for protecting weapons, personnel, and equip-
ment.
• Preparing routes for counterattack forces.
• Constructing obstacles (coordinated with the fire support plan and
natural obstacles).
• Preparing C3D measures in support of IW.
• Maintaining the water supply.
Conduct
10-19. During defensive operations, engineer support consists of improving
on and expanding the scope of all the above measures and undertaking new
tasks as situations develop. Such tasks include clearing obstacles, crossing
gaps, and eliminating the effects of NBC and precision weapons.
SUPPORT TO INFORMATION WARFARE

10-20. The OPFOR has responded at all organizational levels to the chal-
lenge posed by enemy advances in sensors and weapons. A wide variety of
engineer activities contribute to IW, particularly in support of C3D measures.
This support involves three interrelated areas:
• Deception (signature-enhancing measures).
• Camouflage and concealment (signature-reduction measures).
• Obscurants (measures used both to conceal real equipment and en-
hance the effectiveness of decoy equipment).
10-21. OPFOR combat engineer units are a high priority for deception efforts,
since their composition and disposition on the battlefield are indicators of
how and where the OPFOR expects to conduct its main offensive or defensive
effort. Therefore, the OPFOR establishes deception positions and engineer
obstacles, supported by decoy vehicles.
10-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Offense
10-22. During the offense, engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Construction of decoys and deception positions.
• Preparation of false routes to provide misleading indicators.
Defense
10-23. The OPFOR uses various deception measures to mislead the enemy
about size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of
defensive engineer preparations. Engineer support of deception measures can
include
• Use of screening characteristics of terrain, darkness, and other con-
ditions of limited visibility during engineer preparation of defensive
positions and positioning of forces.
• False actions to draw attention from actual defensive preparations.
• Construction of artificial screens and concealment (such as horizontal
and vertical screens, or corner reflectors).
10-24. Sufficient engineer support is critical to the success of any defensive

deception plan. Units in the main defense force receive the priority of effort.
However, engineers typically do not begin work supporting deception until they
have completed all measures required for camouflage, concealment, and cover.
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE
10-25. The specific missions of engineer reconnaissance are to—
• Discover enemy engineer measures taken to fortify battle positions and
to lay and clear minefields and demolitions.
• Determine movement routes (by the conditions of roads, bridges, and
fording sites).
• Determine the characteristics of obstacles and locate bypass routes.
• Determine water availability (or add more robust capability).
• Observe enemy engineer activity.1
• Determine requirements for special engineer equipment, allocation of
engineer assets, and the subsequent task organizations of subordinate
and supporting engineer units.
• Report the locations of any enemy units encountered.
• Advise the commander and staff on locations the enemy is likely to
occupy, based on the presence of favorable conditions, such as accessi-
bility, concealment, and water supply.
1
The composition and disposition of enemy combat engineer units are important indicators of how and where the
enemy expects to conduct his main offensive or defensive effort. Positioning of bridging and mineclearing assets
may tip off planned enemy offensive action. When the enemy is preparing to defend, all obstacle-creating assets,
such as minelayers, are of particular interest.
10-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
10-26. A primary goal of engineer reconnaissance at the operational level is
to provide comprehensive information on the suitability of movement routes.
Engineer reconnaissance, performed independently or with other reconnais-
sance forces, plays a significant role in ensuring freedom of movement and
access to various areas of the battlefield. Units performing engineer recon-
naissance make the following determinations:
• The degree of trafficability of the entire route.
• The location and nature of obstacles and forces or assets needed to
overcome them.
• The condition of crossing sites over rivers, canals, streams, and ravines.
• The location and quantity of material potentially useful for improving
the movement route.
• The nature of the terrain and location of areas without natural
concealment.
10-27. The purpose of route reconnaissance is to select suitable routes along

the axis of movement and to identify suitable halt areas that provide con-
cealment. Engineer reconnaissance can also identify possible infiltration
routes. The reconnaissance patrol relays topographical and terrain informa-
tion back to the unit that sent it out. Route reconnaissance can occur
throughout the AOR, in offense or defense.
OFFENSE
10-28. During the offense, the primary engineer reconnaissance mission is to
obtain more precise information on
• Battle damage created both during offensive preparation and during
the execution of the offense.
• Troop movement routes and trafficability of off-road terrain.
• Locations where the enemy established obstacles.
• Locations for establishing obstacles during enemy counterattacks.
• Water obstacles on friendly forces’ axes of advance.
10-29. Engineer reconnaissance during the offense seeks to obtain informa-

tion on the nature of enemy fortifications, defensive positions, and obstacles.
The basic methods for obtaining this information are observation and aerial
or ground photography.
DEFENSE
10-30. Engineers assist in reconnaissance and preparation of the defense by
determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and by
helping select positions for CPs and unit battle positions. Engineers also de-
termine road and bridge conditions in the AOR, availability of local materials
for construction of positions, and the status of the water supply.
10-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
SURVIVABILITY
10-31. Preparing fortified positions is a task for engineers in both the offense
and defense. Fortified positions increase weapons effectiveness and protect
personnel, weapons, and materiel. Engineers give priority to digging in CPs
and key components of the OPFOR’s combat power. Fortification preparation
combines and uses to best advantage the terrain’s protective properties, local
construction materials, and engineer excavation equipment. The C3D meas-
ures discussed above, under Support to Information Warfare, also contribute
to survivability.
OFFENSE
10-32. In preparation for offensive action, the primary use of field fortifi-
cation is in the preparation of assembly areas. Even there, the tasks of
preparation typically exceed the capability of engineers in the limited time
available. Consequently, the preparation of assembly areas becomes a
shared responsibility involving all available personnel and equipment of
all branches.
10-33. Normally, the OPFOR locates assembly areas far enough from enemy
forces to deny the enemy ground observation and to lessen direct-fire effects.
It uses field fortification in a way that allows a smooth and protected move-
ment of troops and supplies in and out of the assembly areas.
DEFENSE
10-34. When the OPFOR is transitioning to the defense and preparing com-
plex battle positions or sanctuary areas, advance engineer deployment allows
better use of terrain features and constructed fortifications. Engineers also
have more time to construct or improve routes for movement of troops and
supplies and to conceal forces and caches or short-duration storage facilities.
In most cases, engineer units must concentrate their effort on only the most
important parts of the AOR.
10-35. The full preparation of defensive positions involving entrenchments,
communications trenches, positions for tanks and infantry vehicles, and pro-
tected CPs is a labor-intensive process. It often exceeds the capability of pure
engineer units. Consequently, the OPFOR’s approach is to use all available
personnel and equipment. Units of all arms and services receive training in
preparing field fortifications and emplacements.
COUNTERMOBILITY
10-36. Creating engineer obstacles and carrying out demolition activities are
significant engineer functions in all phases of combat. The obstacle plan is
tailored and integrated into the overall operation plan. Engineer obstacles in-
clude any actions taken to inflict losses and to delay and impede enemy
movement. In the offense, obstacles protect flanks, disrupt counterattacks,
and strengthen captured positions. In the defense, engineer obstacles may
strengthen the defense, disrupt enemy operations, and cover gaps.
10-8
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
EXPLOSIVE OBSTACLES
10-37. The widespread use of landmines on today’s battlefields results from a
combination of mass production, plastic mines, improved battlefield delivery
systems, and development of sophisticated fuzing. Remotely-delivered mines
have expanded capability for changing the tempo of combat.
Minefields
10-38. The five basic types of OPFOR minefields are antitank (AT), anti-
personnel (AP), mixed, decoy, and antilanding. AT minefields are the
primary type of OPFOR engineer obstacle and serve to destroy or disable
armored and other vehicles. They are primarily established in belts consist-
ing of multiple rows on avenues that are favorable for armored vehicles.
Wherever possible, minefield belts will be tied into natural terrain obstacles
to reduce the mine requirement. The OPFOR sets up conventional AP mine-
fields in support of friendly battle positions, in front of AT minefields, or
along dismounted avenues of approach. Mixed minefields consist of both AP
and AT mines. Decoy minefields are a significant form of deception used to
slow movement or deceive as to true unit locations. Antilanding minefields
prevent landings by amphibious, airborne, or heliborne assault forces.
Minelaying
10-39. The methods and extent of minelaying depend on
• The OPFOR’s intentions.
• The operational and/or tactical situation.
• Terrain characteristics.
• The type of mine.
• Time available.
• Available engineer support.
10-40. Emplacement means may be manual, mechanical, or remote. Manual

emplacement is the most labor-intensive and time-consuming method and
may not always be possible in a fluid battlespace. The OPFOR not only will
use mechanical minelayers, but also will continue to develop methods of
remote minelaying, including delivery by minelaying helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, or cannon and rocket artillery. Rapidly laid and scatterable AT mines in
support of maneuver operations will predominate on most battlefields. The
same types of minefield may also support a situational defense. If the OPFOR
plans only a temporary halt or defensive action, it can mechanically surface-
lay small protective minefields. It may also use remotely-laid minefields
(probably with self-destruct options) and controlled minefields.
Remotely-Delivered Mines
10-41. The ability to remotely deliver mines provides the OPFOR with the
capability to respond rapidly with thousands of landmines at any point on the
battlefield. The OPFOR can employ remotely-delivered minefields against
choke points to delay and cause bunching that could create vulnerability to
air or artillery attack. Remotely-delivered minefields fill gaps created by enemy
10-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
minefield breaching efforts and can cause confusion and delay in assembly
areas. They can halt enemy attacks in areas not covered by an OD (or gain
time for an OD to do its work). Maneuver forces use remote mining to protect
their flanks or to attack targets deep in enemy territory or anywhere in the
AOR. Remote minelaying can be useful against enemy columns, areas of con-
centration, CPs, firing positions, and other targets. Such unpredictable mine-
fields increasingly dominate OPFOR countermobility operations.
10-42. Remotely-delivered (or scatterable) mines are laid without regard to
classical patterns. They are designed to be delivered by aircraft, cannon
artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), or ground vehicles, or they can
be hand-thrown or emplaced by man-portable mine dispensers.
10-43. Artillery. Some cannon artillery systems are capable of delivering
both AP and AT mines. However, MRLs are the primary means of remote
minelaying. The principal advantage of MRL mine delivery is its ability to
quickly emplace large minefields in a single volley, while minimizing expo-
sure to enemy targeting and weapon systems.
10-44. Ground Vehicles. Within recent years, the trend has been to mount
scatterable-mine dispensers on ground vehicles. Both AP and AT mines can
be launched from ground vehicles. This also gives the engineers the ability to
re-seed or reinforce an obstacle without entering the minefield itself.
10-45. Infantry. OPFOR infantry units may employ man-portable remote
mine dispensers. These man-portable dispensers, weighing only a few pounds,
are ideal for installing small, defensive, AP or AT minefields. Infantry-fired
ground dispensers allow units to remotely emplace minefields to protect their
battle positions, flanks, and boundaries between units, or to cover firing lines
and gaps in combat formations. They can quickly close breaches in existing
protective minefields and increase the density of mines on armor avenues of
approach.
10-46. Aerial. Both AT and AP minefields can be laid using aerial minelay-
ing systems. Bombers or ground-attack aircraft can lay remotely-delivered
minefields throughout the AOR.
10-47. Helicopter minelaying systems are used to emplace small or large
minefields in the execution of offensive or defensive operations. This type of
aerial minelaying is normally conducted over friendly territoryalong flanks
or in support zones. When supporting an airborne or heliborne landing, heli-
copters may lay mines on enemy-held territory. Helicopter mine chutes are a
tool available to even low-technology helicopter forces for installation on a va-
riety of helicopters by low-echelon maintenance units.
OBSTACLE DETACHMENT
10-48. The OD is the basic building block of the OPFOR’s countermobility
effort. It is a task organization composed primarily of engineers. An OD can
vary in size depending on the operational situation and the needs of the
commander. An OSC may form several ODs based on its constituent or
dedicated engineer units. An OD formed at this level is typically based on an
engineer unit as large as a battalion. The OSC generally tries to create one
OD for each ATR formed from its AT assets.
10-10
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
10-49. ODs formed by an OSC may be assigned in a supporting relationship

to the OSC’s subordinate maneuver units, or they can act independently at
the OSC level (for example, to protect an exposed flank). They are a standard
feature of tactical and operational task organizations. With their ability to
rapidly lay mines and construct obstacles, their mission is to deny the enemy
access to key terrain, particularly those avenues of approach most suitable
for armored vehicles.
10-50. Although the OD can operate independently, it usually operates with
an ATR to provide flank protection and to repel enemy counterattacks. ATRs
may provide covering fire over the minefields that the ODs emplace. The OD
sometimes operates with mechanical minelaying platoons.
Offense
10-51. In the offense, the OD usually moves with the ATR either on an open
flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any threatened axis. In the
latter case, it usually advances with maneuver units to ensure a prompt re-
sponse to any threat.
10-52. The OPFOR considers surprise a critical factor in mine warfare.
Enemy reconnaissance can discover minefields laid too long in advance and
can take measures to overcome them. Therefore, it is often more effective to
lay a minefield during the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute,
directly in the path of a developing threat. Using mines in this way is not
only tactically advantageous, but also economical. This may be an important
consideration when supplies are limited.
10-53. The OPFOR uses ODs aggressively, maintaining close contact with
the enemy and attempting to mine areas in which the enemy has already
committed himself. An OD may join an ATR to ward off enemy counterattack
threats.
Defense
10-54. In the defense, the OPFOR commander may hold the OD and other
forces in reserve and can quickly employ them during an enemy attack, to
mine potentially vulnerable gaps. Engineer tasks during the defense imple-
ment obstacle plans, particularly AT obstacles. Together with ATRs, ODs
provide a quick-reaction AT force to block enemy penetrations.
10-55. Engineers create obstacles on possible enemy approaches to OPFOR
battle positions or artillery and air defense firing positions, in the gaps
between battle positions, and on flanks. They normally construct barrier
systems in coordination with the overall fire support plan.
10-56. Engineers can lay mines and construct obstacles in the disruption
zone and on likely enemy armored avenues of approach. They can also lay
obstacles in the depth of friendly units in the battle zone, and at subsequent
defensive lines throughout the AOR. However, simultaneous obstacle
construction throughout the AOR can only occur when sufficient time, equip-
ment, and personnel are available. In any part of the AOR, minefields and
other obstacles require barriers, security, and marked maneuver passages.
10-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE COUNTERMOBILITY
10-57. Engineer countermobility missions are not strictly an engineer function.
Rather, they are part of an overall, all-arms effort to deny the enemy freedom
of maneuver. For example, many remotely-delivered mines are emplaced by
means other than engineer assets. The OPFOR will also employ all means
available to attack the enemy’s mobility assets at every opportunity. The
elimination or degradation of key mobility assets (such as bridging and mine-
clearing assets) can severely limit the enemy’s progress, range, or sustain-
ability. This is part of the OPFOR’s systems warfare approach to combat.
10-58. Preemptive attacks against the enemy’s bridging and mineclearing
systems can occur at very early stages in the conflict, often well before the
foreseen usage of such mobility assets. The OPFOR might try to destroy all
mobility assets, thereby confining the enemy to his aerial or sea port of
debarkation (APOD or SPOD), or it might let the enemy commit his assets
and then destroy them piecemeal. Whichever method the OPFOR chooses, it
would attempt to mask the identity of the true target by also hitting what the
enemy may deem “higher-value targets,” such as maneuver troops and equip-
ment, during the same attack. Thus, the enemy may believe the destruction of
his mobility assets to be collateral damage rather than the intended target, and
he may not place a high priority on replacing these as critical items.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
10-59. Operational-level engineers support the State’s various strategic-level
courses of action and the OPFOR principles of operations versus an
extraregional power (discussed in Chapter 1 and in FM 7-100). Specific
engineer requirements are determined by the operational mission of the sup-
ported OSC within whichever strategic-level course of action is occurring in a given
AOR at a given time. That may be regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
Because of the requirement to transition rapidly from regional to adaptive
operations and perhaps back to regional operations, engineers assigned to
OSCs may be supporting more than one course of action simultaneously.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
10-60. Operational-level engineer units involved in regional operations facilitate
the mobility and high rate of advance of joint, combined arms, interagency,
and/or multinational forces while enhancing the survivability of forces.
Although the OPFOR generally conducts engineer countermobility activities
at the tactical level, it tailors the obstacle plan to the overall operation and
integrates it into the operation plan. It uses obstacles to disaggregate, delay,
block, and canalize enemy forces.
10-61. Since transition operations can overlap both regional and adaptive
operations, engineer actions can be various combinations of those occurring
during regional or adaptive operations. The need for rapid transition from
regional to adaptive operations (and vice versa) presents the engineers
several challenges. For example, engineers still supporting regional
operations may be involved in water-crossing activities, while engineers
10-12
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
supporting units transitioning to adaptive operations may be blowing up

bridges to preserve friendly forces. Engineers supporting joint, combined
arms, interagency, and/or multinational units transitioning to regional
operations may be laying minefields to fix an extraregional foe while other
engineers are providing mobility and survivability support to units launching
offensive operations against a regional foe. Therefore, some engineers in
transition operations may be involved in those tasks normally associated
with regional operations while other engineers units may be involved in tasks
normally associated with adaptive operations.
10-62. Several engineer missions become more critical during transition
operations when shifting to adaptive operations. For example, IW takes on a
more significant role with use of C3D measures to protect forces while they
are attempting to get into sanctuary and begin adaptive operations. Engineer
reconnaissance must locate clear, and preferably concealed, routes to expedite
units’ movement to sanctuary and limit their exposure to extraregional forces.
10-63. The State may have done some advance preparation of defensive
positions in peacetime or during regional operations. However, the OPFOR
takes advantage of any time required for the extraregional enemy to build up
combat power, using that time for additional engineer preparation involving
all means available. Engineer units or other forces supervised by engineers
provide fortified positions or repair or reinforce those positions already in
place. Caches and water sources, if not in place, will have to be prepared.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
10-64. During adaptive operations, several trends in engineer employment
may be at odds with one another. On the one hand, the dispersal of forces
may require task organization of engineer units into smaller groupings. With
dispersal and decentralization, however, the task organization of operational-
level engineer assets to support tactical-level missions becomes increasingly
difficult. As the OPFOR goes into a force-preservation mode, commanders
may tend to create larger engineer reserves and put into protected storage
some scarce engineer assets that will be critical to success in later operations.
Examples of such high-value assets could be bridging, route-clearing equip-
ment, mechanical minelayers, and other heavy engineer equipment. The
process begins during transition operations but has the largest impact during
adaptive operations. This equipment will be protected and might only be used
for high-priority missions or in areas shielded from the enemy. The shortage
of key equipment is further intensified by any combat losses.
10-65. Since requirements for engineer support do not change during the
absence of heavy equipment, the OPFOR has planned the complete integra-
tion of civilian and military engineer resources to help compensate for this
loss. The lack of engineer units and assets available to the lower levels is
compensated for by the sharing of engineer tasks and responsibilities
throughout the OPFOR branches and maximizing the use of manual labor
(military and civilian) and assets other than those of engineer units. Since
maneuver units or civilian workers may have to perform the majority of engineer
tasks, engineers are also responsible for supervising and providing guidance and
technical expertise to these groups. This allows the tasks to be performed with
the least amount of engineers and mitigates the loss of units and equipment.
10-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
10-66. The basic engineer missions during adaptive operations remain

reconnaissance, countermobility, survivability, and mobility, along with the
task of support to IW. These all occur at all levels of command all over the
battlefield, and priorities of engineer effort vary according to the specific
situation, which can be unpredictable. Examples of how these missions and
tasks support adaptive operations are listed below.
Reconnaissance
10-67. The focus of engineer reconnaissance during adaptive operations
will be on areas that support the creation of windows of opportunity or the
exploitation of opportunities that result from existing conditions in the AOR.
Engineers can help determine the most likely routes the enemy might take,
as well as identify routes for OPFOR units undertaking counterattacks or the
maneuver component of a strike.
Countermobility
10-68. The OPFOR makes extensive use of countermobility operations to con-
trol access and tempo by delaying, disaggregating, and canalizing enemy
forces. The obstacle plan is completely integrated with the maneuver, fire
support, and IW plans. Minefields and other obstacles used in support of
adaptive operations are extremely innovative, irregular-shaped, and thoroughly
merged with the terrain. Minefields also tend to be much smaller than those laid
in regional operations (especially linear operations). Many are nuisance mine-
fields, rather than being designed to destroy large numbers of enemy forces.
Survivability
10-69. The construction of battle and fighting positions is a labor-intensive
process and is therefore a shared responsibility of engineers and supported
units. Maximum use of civilian engineer assets and personnel continues dur-
ing adaptive operations. Survivability activities during adaptive operations
have several unique engineer requirements. Some examples are to—
• Take full advantage of the screening, protective, C3D techniques, along
with careful selection of terrain to passively deny the enemy the ability
to acquire OPFOR positions for targeting.
• Make extensive use of local building materials, equipment, and work force.
• Protect CPs and logistics sites.
• Bury communications lines.
• Construct false positions, equipment, movement routes, and lines of
communication.
• Assimilate minefields and obstacles to the terrain.
• Prepare caves, tunnels, and tunnel complexes in which troops can live
and from which they can fight.
Mobility
10-70. It is critical that the OPFOR maintain the ability to move unimpeded
during adaptive operations. This ability allows the OPFOR to control the ac-
cess and tempo of enemy forces. As long as the OPFOR has complete access to
10-14
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 10
the battlefield, it will allow no sanctuary to the enemy and determine the na-
ture of the conflict. Engineer support can create opportunities for infiltration
of small forces into unexpected locations, to inflict damage or to support IW.
10-71. Rarely during adaptive operations would the OPFOR attempt the
classic opposed water crossings it can use during regional operations.
However, there may be times when the OPFOR must cross rivers in terri-
tory occupied by the enemy. Even then, it would attempt an opposed crossing
only if convinced of success and if the enemy did not believe the OPFOR
would attempt the crossing. Such crossings would be integrated into the
overall operation plan and the IW plan.
10-72. More likely, however, is that the OPFOR would attempt to cross the
river surreptitiously at night or during inclement weather. This would allow
the OPFOR to infiltrate units—a few vehicles at a timeacross the river.
The units would regroup at a designated area and continue operations. Engi-
neer support for this may be only engineer reconnaissance of the river and
routes. The situation may also call for the engineers to build (undetected) an
underwater bridge out of sandbags, or to make rafts rigged to transport vehicles.
10-73. The OPFOR may be required to breach enemy minefields. Although it
may breach them in the more conventional manner described in FM 7-100.2,
the OPFOR can also devise innovative methods the cross the minefield. One such
method might be to manually clear a path through the minefield surreptitiously.
Several paths could be cleared in this fashion. Then, at a time of the OPFOR’s
own choosing, dismounted troops could infiltrate through the minefield and
rendezvous at a designated location on the other side, undetected by the enemy.
Support to Information Warfare

10-74. The complete integration of engineer support to IW continues to be
critical in adaptive operations. Deception is one of the basic elements of IW.
Engineer support of the deception plan is vital for the deception to succeed.
Engineers’ largest role in an integrated deception plan is that of constructing
physical decoys (simulations in deception positions) enabling the enemy to
see what he expects to see. These decoys cover a wide spectrum of types and
must be introduced or allowed to be “discovered” in the same sequence in
which a “real or existing” unit would emplace them. The general priority of
engineer construction is from front to rear, beginning with the primary
fighting positions, then the temporary and alternate positions. The time
sequence in which these “appear” gives credibility to the deception.
10-75. However, engineer support to IW is not limited to C3D measures. For
example, engineers may support psychological warfare with activities to
lower morale and instill a sense of tentativeness among enemy soldiers or to
undermine confidence of “enemy-friendly” populations. This can be achieved
simply by the ubiquitous use of booby traps and AP mines.
10-15
Chapter 11
NBC and Smoke Operations

The use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons can have an
enormous impact on all battlefield operations.1 Not only does the sheer
killing and destructive power of these weapons affect the battlefield, but
the strategic, operational, psychological, environmental, economic, and
political consequences of their use affect strategic campaign plans and
operational design.
In response to foreign developments, the OPFOR maintains a capability

to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological warfare. However, it
would prefer to avoid the use of NBC weapons by either sideespecially
nuclear and biological weapons. Both nuclear and biological weapons
characteristically have lethal effects over much larger areas than do
chemical weapons. The effects of biological weapons can be difficult to
localize and to employ in operations without affecting friendly forces;
their effects on the enemy can be difficult to predict. Unlike nuclear or
biological weapons, chemical agents can be used to affect limited areas of
the battlefield. The consequences of chemical weapons use are more pre-
dictable and thus more readily integrated into operation plans.
Because chemical employment is more likely than nuclear or biological,

this chapter begins by focusing on OPFOR chemical capabilities. Because
the OPFOR may also have some nuclear and biological capabilities, these
also deserve discussion, despite of the lower probability of their em-
ployment. The chapter concludes with discussions of NBC protection and
employment of smoke.
PREPAREDNESS
11-1. Due to the proliferation of NBC weapons, the OPFOR must anticipate
their use, particularly the employment of chemical weapons. OPFOR plan-
ners believe that the best solution is to locate and destroy enemy NBC weap-
ons and their supporting infrastructure before the enemy can use them
against OPFOR troops or the State. In case this fails and it is necessary to
1
NBC weapons are a subset of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although the latter exclude the delivery means
where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. WMD are weapons or devices intended for or
capable of causing a high order of physical destruction or mass casualties (death or serious bodily injury to a
significant number of people). The casualty-producing elements of WMD can continue inflicting casualties on the
enemy and exert powerful psychological effects on the enemy’s morale for some time after delivery. Existing types
of WMD include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. However, technological advances are making it possi-
ble to develop WMD based on qualitatively new principles, such as infrasonic (acoustic), radiological (enhanced-
radiation), or particle-beam weapons. In addition, conventional weapons, such as precision weapons or fuel-
air explosives, can also take on the properties of WMD.
11-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
continue combat operations despite the presence of contaminants, the

OPFOR has developed and fielded a wide range of NBC detection and
warning devices, individual and collective protection equipment, and decon-
tamination equipment.
MULTIPLE OPTIONS
11-2. Force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility previously
unavailable to combined arms commanders. It creates multiple options for
the employment of forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with or
without the use of NBC weapons. Many of the same delivery means available
for NBC weapons can also be used to deliver precision weapons that can often
achieve desired effects without the stigma associated with NBC weapons.
11-3. The OPFOR might use NBC weapons either to deter aggression or as a
response to an enemy attack on the State. It has surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Most
OPFOR artillery is capable of delivering chemical munitions, and most sys-
tems 152-mm and larger are capable of firing nuclear rounds. Additionally,
the OPFOR could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver an NBC
attack. The State has also trained special-purpose forces (SPF) as alternate
means of delivering NBC munitions packages. The threat of using any or all
of these means to deliver NBC weapons is an intimidating factor that the
State can use against potential regional and/or extraregional adversaries.
TARGETING
11-4. The OPFOR considers the following targets to be suitable for the em-
ployment of NBC weapons:
• NBC delivery means and their supply structure.
• Prepared defensive positions.
• Reserves and troop concentrations.
• Command and control (C2); reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RISTA); and communications centers.
• Key air defense sites.
• Logistics installations, especially port facilities.
• Airfields the OPFOR does not intend to use immediately.
Enemy NBC delivery means (aircraft, artillery, missiles, and rockets) nor-
mally receive the highest priority. The suitability of other targets depends on
the OPFOR’s missions, the current military and political situation, and the
NBC weapons available for use.2
2
The same list of targets would apply for enemy use of NBC weapons against the OPFOR.
11-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
STAFF RESPONSIBILITY
11-5. On the functional staff of an operational-level headquarters (such as an
OSC), the chief of WMD is responsible for planning the offensive use of
WMD, including NBC weapons. (See the subsections on Release under Chemical
Warfare, Nuclear Warfare, and Biological Warfare below.) The WMD staff element
advises the command group and the primary and secondary staff on issues per-
taining to NBC employment. The WMD element receives liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting units that contain WMD delivery means.
11-6. NBC defense comes under the chief of force protection. The force pro-
tection element of the functional staff may receive liaison teams from any
subordinate or supporting chemical defense units.3 However, those units can
also send liaison teams to other parts of the staff, as necessary (including, for
example, the chief of reconnaissance).
CHEMICAL WARFARE
11-7. The OPFOR is equipped, structured, and trained to conduct both offen-
sive and defensive chemical warfare. It is continually striving to improve its
chemical warfare capabilities. It believes that an army using chemical weap-
ons must be prepared to fight in the environment it creates. Therefore, it views
chemical defense as part of a viable offensive chemical warfare capability. It
maintains a large inventory of individual and collective chemical protection and
decontamination equipment. (See the NBC Protection portion of this chapter.)
WEAPONS AND AGENTS

11-8. Chemical delivery means include aircraft, multiple rocket launchers
(MRLs), artillery, mines, rockets, and missiles. Virtually all OPFOR indirect fire
weapons can deliver chemical agents. Other possible delivery means could in-
clude SPF, affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations, or civilian sympathizers.
11-9. One way of classifying chemical agents according to the effect they
have on persons. Thus, there are two major types, each with subcategories.
Lethal agents, categorized by how they attack and kill personnel, include
nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Nonlethal agents include incapaci-
tants and irritants. (See FM 7-100.2 for more details on these agent types.)
11-10. Chemical agents are also categorized according to their persistency.
Generally, the OPFOR would use persistent agents on areas it does not plan
to enter and nonpersistent agents where it does.
11-11. Persistent agents can retain their disabling or lethal characteristics from
days to weeks, depending on environmental conditions. Aside from producing
mass casualties initially, persistent agents can produce a steady rate of attrition
and have a devastating effect on morale. They can seriously degrade the perform-
ance of personnel in protective clothing or impose delays for decontamination.
11-12. Nonpersistent agents generally last a shorter period of time than per-
sistent agents, depending on weather conditions. The use of a nonpersistent
3
Although the OPFOR calls these units are “chemical defense” or “chemical reconnaissance,” their functions actually en-
compass nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense or reconnaissance.
11-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
agent at a critical moment in battle can produce casualties or force enemy

troops into a higher level of individual protective measures. With proper
timing and distance, the OPFOR can employ nonpersistent agents and then
have its maneuver units advance into or occupy an enemy position without
having to decontaminate the area or don protective gear.
OTHER TOXIC CHEMICALS

11-13. In addition to traditional chemical warfare agents, the OPFOR may
find creative and adaptive ways to cause chemical hazards using chemicals
commonly present in industry or in everyday households. In the right combi-
nation, or in and of themselves, the large-scale release of such chemicals can
present a health risk, whether caused by military operations, intentional use,
or accidental release.
Toxic Industrial Chemicals

11-14. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) are chemical substances with acute
toxicity that are produced in large quantities for industrial purposes.
Exposure to some industrial chemicals can have a lethal or debilitating
effect on humans. The near-universal availability of large quantities of
highly toxic stored materials, their proximity to urban areas, their low
cost, and the low security associated with storage facilities, make them a
potentially attractive option for use as weapons of opportunity or weapons
of mass destruction. Employing a TIC against an opponent by means of a
weapon delivery system, whether conventional or unconventional, is consid-
ered a chemical warfare attack, with the TIC used as a chemical agent. The
target may be the enemy’s military forces or his civilian population.
11-15. In addition to the threat from intentional use as weapons, catastro-
phic accidental releases of stored industrial chemicals may result from collat-
eral damage associated with military operations, electrical power interrup-
tion, or improper facility maintenance or shutdown procedures. These events
are common in armed conflict and post-conflict urban environments.
11-16. The most important factors to consider when assessing the potential
for adverse human health impacts from a chemical release are acute toxicity,
physical properties (volatility, reactivity, flammability), and the likelihood
that large quantities will be accidentally released or available for exploitation.
Foremost among these factors is acute toxicity.
11-17. The following are examples of high- and moderate-risk TICs, based on
acute toxicity by inhalation, worldwide availability (number of producers and
number of countries where the substance is available), and physical state
(gas, liquid, or solid) at standard temperature and pressure:
• High-Risk. Ammonia, chlorine, fluorine, formaldehyde, hydrogen chlo-
ride, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, sulfuric acid.
• Moderate-Risk. Carbon monoxide, methyl bromide, nitrogen dioxide,
phosphine.
This list does not include all chemicals with high toxicity and availability.
Specifically, chemicals with low volatility are not included. Low-vapor
pressure chemicals include some of the most highly toxic chemicals widely
available, including most pesticides.
11-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
11-18. Some of the high-risk TICs are frequently present in an operational

environment. Chlorine (water treatment and cleaning materials), phosgene
(insecticides and fertilizers), and hydrogen cyanide are traditional chemical
warfare agents that are also considered TICs. Cyanide salts may be used to
contaminate food or water supplies. Hydrogen chloride is used in the produc-
tion of hydrochloric acid. Formaldehyde is a disinfectant and preservative.
Fluorine is a base element that is used to produce fluorocarbons. Fluorocar-
bons are any of various chemically inert compounds that contain both carbon
and fluorine. Fluorocarbons are present in common products are refrigerants,
lubricants, and nonstick coatings, and are used in the production of resins
and plastics.
Household Chemicals
11-19. The OPFOR understands that some everyday household chemicals
have incompatible properties that result in undesired chemical reaction when
mixed with other chemicals. This includes substances that can react to cause
an imminent threat to health and safety, such as explosion, fire, and/or the
formation of toxic materials. For example, chlorine bleach, when mixed with
ammonia, will generate the toxic gases chloramine and hydrazine that can
cause serious injury or death. Another example of such incompatibilities is
the reaction of alkali metals, such as sodium or potassium, with water.
Sodium is commonly used in the commercial manufacture of cyanide, azide,
and peroxide, and in photoelectric cells and sodium lamps. It has a very large
latent heat capacity and is used in molten form as a coolant in nuclear
breeder reactors. The mixture of sodium with water produces sodium hydrox-
ide, which can cause severe burns upon skin contact.
CHEMICAL RELEASE
11-20. Among NBC weapons, the State is most likely to use chemical weap-
ons against even an extraregional enemy, particularly if the enemy does not
have the capability to respond in kind. Since the State does not believe that
first use of chemical agents against units in the field would provoke a nuclear
response, it is less rigid than other nations in the control of chemical release.
11-21. Initially, the use of chemical weapons is subject to the same level of
decision as nuclear and biological weapons. At all levels of command, a
chemical weapons plan is part of the fire support plan. Once the National
Command Authority (NCA) has released initial authorization for the use of
chemical weapons, commanders can employ them freely, as the situation de-
mands. Then each commander at the operational-strategic command (OSC)
and lower levels who has systems capable of chemical delivery can imple-
ment the chemical portions of his fire support plan, as necessary.
11-22. After a decision for nuclear use, the OPFOR can employ chemical
weapons to complement nuclear weapons. However, the OPFOR perceives
that chemical weapons have a unique role, and their use does not depend on
initiation of nuclear warfare. It is possible that the OPFOR would use chemi-
cal weapons early in an operation or strategic campaign or from its outset.
11-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT

11-23. The basic principle of chemical warfare is to achieve surprise. It is
common to mix chemical rounds with high-explosive (HE) rounds in order to
achieve chemical surprise. Chemical casualties inflicted and the necessity of
chemical protective gear degrade enemy defensive actions. The OPFOR also
may use chemical agents to restrict the use of terrain. For example, contami-
nation of key points along the enemy’s lines of communication can seriously
disrupt his resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those
points intact for subsequent use by the attacking OPFOR.
11-24. Nonpersistent agents are suitable for use against targets on axes the
OPFOR intends to exploit. While possibly used against deep targets, their
most likely role is to prepare the way for an assault by maneuver units,
especially when enemy positions are not known in detail. The OPFOR may
also use nonpersistent agents against civilian population centers in order to
create panic and a flood of refugees.
11-25. Persistent agents are suitable against targets the OPFOR cannot de-
stroy by conventional or precision weapons. This can be because a target is
too large or located with insufficient accuracy for attack by other than an area
weapon. Persistent agents can neutralize such targets without a pinpoint attack.
11-26. In the offense, likely chemical targets include—
• Troops occupying defensive positions, using nonpersistent agents delivered
by MRLs to neutralize these troops just before launching a ground attack.
Ideally, these nonpersistent agents would be dissipating just as the at-
tacking OPFOR units enter the area where the chemical attack occurred.
• NBC delivery systems, troop concentration areas, headquarters, and
artillery positions, using all types of chemical agents delivered by tube
artillery, MRLs, missiles, and aircraft.
• Bypassed pockets of resistance (especially that pose a threat to the
attacking forces), using persistent agents.
• Possible assembly areas for enemy counterattack forces, using persis-
tent agents.
11-27. The OPFOR could use chemical attacks against such targets simulta-
neously throughout the enemy defenses. These chemical attacks combine
with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability,
C2 systems, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks may target logistics
facilities. The OPFOR would use persistent agents deep within the enemy’s
rear and along troop flanks to protect advancing units.
DEFENSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT

11-28. When the enemy is preparing to attack, the OPFOR can use chemical
attacks to disrupt activity in his assembly areas, limit his ability to maneuver
into axes favorable to the attack, or deny routes of advance for his reserves.
Once the enemy attack begins, the use of chemical agents can impede an attack-
ing force, destroying the momentum of the attack by causing casualties or caus-
ing attacking troops to adopt protective measures. Persistent chemical agents
can deny the enemy certain terrain and canalize attacking forces into kill zones.
11-6
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
NUCLEAR WARFARE
11-29. The OPFOR believes a war is most likely to begin with a phase of non-
nuclear combat that may include the use of chemical weapons. The OPFOR
emphasizes the destruction of as much as possible of enemy nuclear
capability during this nonnuclear phase. To do so, it would use air and missile
attacks; airborne, heliborne, and special-purpose forces; and rapid, deep
penetrations by ground forces. The OPFOR hopes these attacks can deny the
enemy a credible nuclear option.
DELIVERY MEANS
11-30. Nuclear delivery systems may include aircraft from both national- and
theater-level aviation, and SSMs. Most artillery 152-mm or larger is capable
of firing nuclear rounds, if such rounds are available. Other possible delivery
means could include SPF. The OPFOR is unlikely to use affiliated forces for
nuclear delivery.
TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR
11-31. Even when nuclear weapons are not used at the outset of a conflict,
OPFOR commanders deploy troops based on the assumption that a nuclear-
capable enemy might attack with nuclear weapons at any moment. The OPFOR
continuously updates its own plans for nuclear employment, although it pre-
fers to avoid nuclear warfare. As long as it achieves its objectives, and there
are no indications that the enemy is going to use nuclear weapons, the
OPFOR would likely not use them either. However, it could attempt to pre-
empt enemy nuclear use by conducting an initial nuclear attack. Otherwise,
any OPFOR decision to go nuclear would have to be made early in the con-
flict, so that sufficient nonnuclear power would remain to follow up and to
exploit the gains of nuclear employment.
11-32. If any opponent were to use nuclear weapons against the State, the
State would respond in kind, as long as it is still capable. The same would
be true of any nuclear-capable opponent, if the State were the first to use
nuclear means. While the State recognizes the advantage of its own first use,
it may risk first use only when the payoff appears to outweigh the potential
costs. Therefore, it would probably avoid the use of nuclear weapons against
an extraregional power unless survival of the regime or the nation is at
stake.
11-33. The OPFOR is probably more likely to use its nuclear capability
against a regional opponent. The likelihood increases if that opponent uses or
threatens to use its own nuclear weapons against the State or does not have
the means to retaliate in kind. This could account for a nuclear or nuclear-
threatened environment existing at the time an outside force might choose to
intervene in the region.
11-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
TYPES OF NUCLEAR ATTACK

11-34. The OPFOR categorizes nuclear attacks as either massed or indi-
vidual attacks. The category depends on the number of targets hit and the
number of nuclear munitions used.
11-35. A massed nuclear attack employs multiple nuclear munitions simul-
taneously or over a short time interval. The goal is to destroy a single large
enemy formation, or several formations, as well as other important enemy
targets. A massed attack can involve a single service of the State’s Armed
Forces, as in a nuclear missile attack by the Strategic Forces, or the com-
bined forces of different services.
11-36. An individual nuclear attack may hit a single target or group of
targets. The attack consists of a single nuclear munition, such as a missile or
bomb.
NUCLEAR RELEASE
11-37. At all stages of a conflict, the OPFOR keeps nuclear forces ready to
make an attack. The decision to initiate nuclear warfare occurs at the highest
level of the State government. National-level planners develop the fire plan
for the initial nuclear attack for approval by the NCA.
11-38. After the initial nuclear release, the NCA may delegate employment
authority for subsequent nuclear attacks to an OSC commander. The
commander of the OSC’s integrated fires command (IFC) submits to the
OSC commander, for approval and integration into OSC fire support
plans, recommendations for the subsequent employment of nuclear and
chemical weapons.
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT

11-39. Once the NCA releases nuclear weapons, two principles govern
their use: mass and surprise. The OPFOR plans to conduct the initial
nuclear attack suddenly and in coordination with nonnuclear fires. Initial
nuclear attack objectives are to destroy the enemy’s main combat forma-
tions, C2 systems, and nuclear and precision weapons, thereby isolating
the battlefield.
11-40. Nuclear attacks may target and destroy the enemy’s defenses and set
the conditions for the exploitation force. Other fire support means support
the assault and fixing forces. The OPFOR may plan a high-speed air and
ground offensive operation to exploit the nuclear attack.
11-41. If the enemy continues to offer organized resistance, the OPFOR
might employ subsequent nuclear attacks to reinitiate offensive operations.
Nuclear attacks can eliminate the threat of a counterattack or clear re-
sistance from the opposite bank in a water-obstacle crossing. If the enemy
begins to withdraw, the OPFOR plans nuclear attacks on choke points where
retreating enemy forces present lucrative targets.
11-8
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
Planning
11-42. Although the opening stages of an offensive operation are likely to be
conventional, OPFOR planning focuses on the necessity of—
• Countering enemy employment of nuclear weapons.
• Maintaining the initiative and momentum.
• Maintaining fire superiority over the enemy (preempting his nuclear
attack, if necessary).
11-43. In deliberately planned operations, the OPFOR plans nuclear fires in

detail. An exploitation force would probably receive the highest percentage of
weapons; however, the OPFOR may also reserve weapons for other large, im-
portant targets. In more fluid situations, such as during exploitation, the
commander may keep some nuclear weapon systems at high readiness to fire
on targets of opportunity. Nuclear allocations vary with the strength of the
enemy defense and the scheme of maneuver.
11-44. Since the enemy too is under nuclear threat, he also must disperse his
formations, which can make him more vulnerable to penetration by an at-
tacking force. However, the OPFOR realizes that enemy troops are also highly
mobile and capable of rapidly concentrating to protect a threatened area. There-
fore, it considers surprise and timing of operations to be extremely critical in or-
der to complicate enemy targeting and deny him the time to use his mobility.
Execution
11-45. Upon securing a nuclear release, the OPFOR would direct nuclear at-
tacks against the strongest points of the enemy’s formations and throughout
his operational depth. This would create gaps through which maneuver
units, in “nuclear-dispersed” formations, would attack as an exploitation
force. As closely as safety and circumstances permit, maneuver forces follow
up on attacks near the battle line. Airborne troops may exploit deep attacks.
11-46. An exploitation force would probably attack to take full advantage
of the speed of advance it could expect to achieve. The aim of these maneu-
ver units would be to seize or neutralize remaining enemy nuclear weapons,
delivery systems, and C2 systems. By attacking from different directions, the
maneuver units would try to split and isolate the enemy.
11-47. Commanders would ensure a rapid tempo of advance by assigning
tank and mechanized infantry units to the exploitation force. Such units are
quite effective in this role, because they have maneuverability, firepower,
lower vulnerability to enemy nuclear attacks, and the capability to achieve
penetrations of great depth.
DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT

11-48. Primary uses of nuclear weapons in the defense are to—
• Destroy enemy nuclear and precision weapons and delivery means.
• Destroy main attacking groups.
• Eliminate penetrations.
• Support counterattacks.
11-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
• Deny areas to the enemy.

• Conduct preemptive attack.
If nuclear weapons degrade an enemy offensive, the defender could gain the
opportunity to switch quickly to an offensive role.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
11-49. The State closely controls information about the status of its biological
warfare capabilities. This creates uncertainty among its regional neighbors
and potential extraregional opponents as to what types of biological agents
the State might possess and how it might employ them.
11-50. Biological weapons can provide a great equalizer in the face of a nu-
merically and/or technologically superior adversary that the OPFOR cannot
defeat in a conventional confrontation. However, their effects on the enemy
can be difficult to predict, and the OPFOR must also be concerned about the
possibility that the effects could spread to friendly forces.
WEAPONS AND AGENTS

11-51. Biological weapons consist of pathogenic microbes, micro-organism
toxins, and bioregulating compounds. Depending on the specific type, these
weapons can incapacitate or kill people or animals and destroy plants, food
supplies, or materiel. The type of target being attacked determines the choice
of agent and dissemination system.
11-52. Biological weapons are extremely potent and provide wide-area
coverage. Some biological agents are extremely persistent, retaining their
capabilities to infect for days, weeks, or longer. Biological weapons can take
some time (days, weeks, or monthsdepending on the agent) to achieve their
full effect. To allow these agents sufficient time to take effect, the OPFOR may
use clandestine means, such as SPF or civilian sympathizers, to deliver
biological agents in advance of a planned attack or even before the war begins.
DELIVERY MEANS
11-53. It is possible to disseminate biological agents in a number of ways.
Generally, the objective is to expose enemy forces to an agent in the form of a
suspended cloud of very fine biological agent particles. Dissemination
through aerosols, either as droplets from liquid suspensions or by small par-
ticles from dry powders, is by far the most efficient method.
11-54. There are two basic types of biological munitions: point-source bom-
blets delivered directly on targets and line-source tanks that release the
agent upwind from the target. Within each category, there can be multiple
shapes and configurations.
11-55. Military systems, as well as unconventional means, can deliver biological
agents. Potential delivery means include rockets, artillery shells, aircraft spray-
ers, saboteurs, and infected rodents. Aside from SPF and civilian sympathizers,
the OPFOR might use affiliated insurgent or terrorist organizations to deliver
biological agents within the region, outside the immediate region (to divert enemy
attention and resources), or even in the homeland of an extraregional opponent.
11-10
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
TARGETS
11-56. Probable targets for biological warfare pathogen attack are nuclear
delivery units, airfields, logistics facilities, and C2 centers. The OPFOR may
target biological weapons against objectives such as food supplies, water
sources, troop concentrations, convoys, and urban and rural population cen-
ters rather than against frontline forces. The use of biological agents against
rear area targets can disrupt and degrade enemy mobilization plans as well
as the subsequent conduct of war. This type of targeting can also reduce the
likelihood that friendly forces would become infected.
BIOLOGICAL RELEASE
11-57. The decision to employ biological agents is a political decision made at
the national levelby the NCA. Besides the political ramifications, the State
recognizes a degree of danger inherent in the use of biological agents, due to
the difficulty of controlling an epidemic caused by them.
11-58. The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to track down the
initial location and circumstances of contamination. Thus, there is the possi-
bility of plausible deniability. Even if an extraregional opponent might be
able to trace a biological attack back to the State, it may not be able to re-
spond in kind.
NBC PROTECTION
11-59. The OPFOR’s ability to protect itself against NBC weapons and to op-
erate in contaminated environments is at least the equal of any force in the
world, including extraregional forces. OPFOR planners readily admit that
casualties would be considerable in any future war involving the use of NBC
weapons. However, they believe that the timely use of active and passive
measures can significantly reduce a combat unit’s vulnerability. These meas-
ures include but are not limited to protective equipment, correct employment
of reconnaissance assets, and expeditious decontamination procedures. The
OPFOR conducts rigorous training for chemical defense.
11-60. The OPFOR believes the best way to protect against NBC weapons is
to destroy delivery systems, which are always high-priority targets. Other
operational-tactical responses to the threat include
• Dispersion: Concentrations of forces must last for as short a time as
possible.
• Speed of advance: If the advance generates enough momentum, this
can make enemy targeting difficult and keep enemy systems on the
move.
• Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D): C3D measures
complicate enemy targeting.
• Continuous contact: The enemy cannot attack with NBC weapons as
long as there is intermingling of friendly and enemy forces.
11-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
ORGANIZATION
11-61. Chemical defense units are responsible for nuclear and biological, as
well as chemical, protection and reconnaissance measures. In the adminis-
trative force structure, such units are organic to all maneuver units brigade
and above. Operational-level commands may provide some chemical defense
augmentation to subordinate units, particularly those conducting the main
effort. However, they must also retain some chemical defense assets at the
operational level to deal with the threat to the support zone and provide
chemical defense reserves.
11-62. Chemical troops are a vital component of combat support. They pro-
vide trained specialists for chemical defense units and for units of other
arms. Basic tasks chemical troops can accomplish in support of combat troops
include
• Reconnoitering known or likely areas of NBC contamination.
• Warning troops of the presence of NBC contamination.
• Monitoring changes in the degree of contamination.
• Monitoring the NBC contamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment.
• Performing decontamination activities.
• Providing trained troops to handle chemical munitions.
They perform specialized NBC reconnaissance in addition to supporting
regular ground reconnaissance efforts.
11-63. NBC protection functions are not limited to maneuver units. Artillery
and air defense regiments and brigades have their own chemical defense
units. Medical and SSM units have some decontamination equipment.
Engineer troops also are important, performing functions such as decon-
taminating roads, building bypasses, and purifying water supplies. Of course,
all arms have a responsibility for chemical reconnaissance and at least par-
tial decontamination without specialist support. However, they can continue
combat actions for only a limited time without complete decontamination by
chemical troops.
EQUIPMENT
11-64. OPFOR troops have protective clothing. Most combat vehicles and
many noncombat vehicles have excellent overpressure and filtration systems.
Items of equipment for individual or collective protection are adequate to pro-
tect soldiers from contamination for hours, days, or longer, depending on the
nature and concentration of the contaminant. Antidotes provide protection from
the effects of agents. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are available in
adequate quantities and are capable of detecting all standard agents.
11-65. Chemical troops have a wide variety of dependable equipment that,
for the most part, is in good supply and allows them to accomplish a number
of tasks in support of combat troops. They have specialized equipment for de-
tecting and monitoring NBC contamination. They have some specialized
NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and they may use helicopters for NBC recon-
naissance. Decontamination equipment is also widely available.
11-12
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
NBC DETECTION AND WARNING REPORTS

11-66. The OPFOR transmits NBC warning information over communica-
tions channels in a parallel form using both the command net and the air
defense and NBC warning communications net. Depending of what type of
unit initially detected the contamination, detection reports leading to such
warnings may go either through chemical defense and force protection chan-
nels or through the maneuver unit or ground reconnaissance reporting chain.
Detection Reports
11-67. Upon detection of contamination, an NBC observer or NBC reconnais-
sance patrol normally transmits an NBC detection report to the chief of force
protection on the staff of the commander that sent out the observer or patrol.
When NBC observers (whether from the chemical troops or another branch)
are attached to regular ground reconnaissance forces, security forces, or ma-
neuver units, the NBC observers that detect contamination would initially
pass the detection report through reconnaissance or maneuver unit reporting
channels. Of course, they would also report the detection to the commander
of the unit to which they are attached. When the maneuver unit chief of staff
or chief of reconnaissance receives an NBC detection report through his own
channels, he immediately passes it to the chief of force protection at that level.
Warning Reports
11-68. The chief of force protection and his staff evaluate the NBC detection
report and determine whether it warrants the issuing of a warning. If it does,
they inform the maneuver commander (or his chief of staff). At this point,
the NBC detection report changes into an NBC warning report. Then, the
maneuver commander (or chief of staff) disseminates the NBC warning re-
port via his command net to all subordinate unit commanders and via the
next-higher commander’s command net to the higher commander and other
subordinates of that command. Simultaneously, the chief of force protection
disseminates the same report to all of his own command’s subordinates over
the air defense and NBC warning communications net. He would also inform
the chief of force protection at the next-higher headquarters. The desired goal
it to disseminate the warning as rapidly as possible to all affected units.
11-69. The chief of force protection (and/or the chief of staff) may issue an
advance NBC warning based on the predicted development of an NBC
situation. NBC protective measures would change or be rescinded based on
subsequent NBC detection reports or on warning reports from higher, lower,
or adjacent units. Changes in the NBC protective measures are disseminated
by the maneuver commander or chief of staff and the chief force protection
using their respective communications nets.
SMOKE
11-70. The OPFOR plans to employ smoke extensively on the battlefield
whenever the situation permits. Use of smoke can make it difficult for the
enemy to conduct observation, determine the true disposition of OPFOR
troops, and conduct fires (including precision weapon fires) or air attacks.
The possible presence of toxic smokes may cause the enemy to use chemical
11-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
protection systems, thus lowering his effectiveness, even if the OPFOR is us-
ing only neutral smoke.
ORGANIZATION
11-71. In the administrative force structure, army groups, armies, and corps
typically have smoke companies in their chemical defense battalions and/or
smoke battalions. In either case, the smoke companies each consist of nine
smoke-generating trucks. These assets are often allocated to OSCs, which
can then suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates.
AGENTS
11-72. Smoke agents may be either neutral or toxic. Neutral smoke agents
are liquid agents, pyrotechnic mixtures, or phosphorus agents with no toxic
characteristics. Toxic smokes (commonly referred to as combination smoke)
degrade electro-optical (EO) devices in the visual and near-infrared (near-IR)
wavebands; they also can debilitate an unmasked soldier by inducing water-
ing of eyes, vomiting, or itching.
11-73. The OPFOR may use a number of different smoke agents or other
obscurants together. For instance, obscurants such as fog oil block portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum more fully when seeded with chaff. The vast
quantities of white phosphorus (WP) on the battlefield also suggest that
random mixtures of this agent with other obscurants (both manmade and
natural) could occur, by chance or by design. The OPFOR recognizes the need
to counter target acquisition and guidance systems operating in the IR and mi-
crowave regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. It has fielded obscurants, in-
cluding chaff, capable of attenuating such wavelengths.
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
11-74. The OPFOR has an ample variety of equipment for smoke dissemina-
tion. Its munitions and equipment include—
• Smoke grenades.
• Vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems (VEESS).
• Smoke barrels, drums, and pots.
• Mortar, artillery, and rocket smoke rounds.
• Spray tanks (ground and air).
• Smoke bombs.
• Large-area smoke generators (ground and air).
Although not designed for this purpose, some decontamination vehicles with
chemical defense units can also generate smoke.
11-75. Smoke grenades include hand grenades, munitions for various gre-
nade launchers, and smoke grenade-dispensing systems on armored vehicles.
These grenades can provide quick smoke on the battlefield or fill gaps in
smokescreens established by other means. Some armored fighting vehicles
have forward-firing smoke grenade dispensers that can produce a bispectral
screen up to 300 m ahead of vehicles.
11-14
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
11-76. All armored fighting vehicles can generate smoke through their ex-
haust systems. With these VEESS-equipped vehicles, a platoon can produce a
screen that covers a battalion frontage for 4 to 6 minutes.
11-77. Smoke-filled artillery projectiles, smoke bombs, spray tanks, and gen-
erator systems are also common. Artillery can fire WP rounds (which have a
moderate degrading effect on thermal imagers and a major one on lasers).
The OPFOR makes considerable use of smoke pots emplaced by chemical
troops, infantrymen, or other troops. The OPFOR still uses smoke bombs or
pots dropped by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
TYPES OF SMOKESCREENS
11-78. The OPFOR recognizes three types of smokescreens: blinding, cam-
ouflage, and decoy. Classification of each type as frontal, oblique, or flank
depends on the screen’s placement. Smokescreens are either stationary or mo-
bile depending on prevailing winds and the dispensing means used. Each basic
type can serve a different purpose. However, simultaneous use of all types is
possible.
Blinding
11-79. Blinding smokescreens can mask friendly forces from enemy gunners,
observation posts, and target-acquisition systems. They can restrict the en-
emy’s ability to engage the OPFOR effectively. Delivery of WP and plasti-
cized white phosphorus (PWP) is possible using MRLs, artillery, mortars,
fixed-wing aircraft, or helicopters. The OPFOR lays blinding smoke directly
in front of enemy positions, particularly those of antitank weapons and ob-
servation posts. Blinding smoke can reduce a soldier’s ability to acquire tar-
gets by a factor of 10, and its use can reduce casualties significantly.
11-80. Likely targets for blinding smokescreens are enemy defensive positions,
rear assembly areas, counterattacking forces, and fire support positions. The
screening properties of a blinding smokescreen can couple with dust, HE
combustion effects, and the incendiary effects of phosphorus. This can create
an environment in which fear and confusion add to the measured effective-
ness of the smoke.
Camouflage
11-81. The OPFOR uses camouflage smokescreens to support all kinds of
C3D measures. Such screens can cover maneuver, conceal the location of
units, hide the nature and direction of attacks, or mislead the enemy regard-
ing any of these. The camouflage smokescreen is useful on or ahead of
friendly troops.
11-82. These screens are normally effective up to the point where forces de-
ploy for combat. The number, size, and location of camouflage smokescreens
vary depending on terrain, weather, and type of combat action. Camouflage
also forces enemy attack helicopters to fly above or around a screen, thus
exposing themselves to attack. Camouflage smoke can also cover assembly
areas, approaches of exploitation forces, or withdrawals. Smokescreens can
also cover a wide surface area around fixed installations or mobile units that
do not move for extended periods.
11-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
11-83. Establishing camouflage smokescreens normally requires use of a

combination of smoke grenades, smoke barrels, smoke pots, vehicles mounting
smoke generating devices, and aircraft. Some decontamination vehicles also
have the capability to generate smoke.
11-84. Two smoke-generator vehicles can lay a smokescreen of sufficient size
to cover a battalion advancing to the attack. For larger smokescreens, the
OPFOR divides the smokescreen line into segments and assigns two vehicles
to each segment. Doctrinally, camouflage smokescreens should cover an area
at least five times the width of the attacking unit’s frontage.
11-85. The threat of enemy helicopter-mounted antitank systems concerns
the OPFOR. Consequently, its doctrine calls for advancing forces to move as
close behind the smokescreen as possible. The higher the smokescreen, the
higher an enemy helicopter must go to observe troop movement behind the
smokescreen, and the more vulnerable it is to ground-based air defense
weapons. Depending on weather and terrain, some large-area smoke
generators can produce screens up to several hundred meters high. There is
considerable observation-free maneuver space behind a screen of this height.
Conversely, smoke pots provide a screen 5 to 10 m high. This screen masks
against ground observation but leaves the force vulnerable to helicopters
“hugging the deck” and popping up to shoot.
11-86. The protection produced by camouflage smoke also interacts as a
protective smoke. Just as smokescreens can degrade enemy night-vision
sights, the protective smoke can shield friendly EO devices from potentially
harmful laser radiation. This protective effect is greater with a darker smoke
cloud because of the better absorption capability of that cloud. Protective
smokescreens are also a good means of reducing the effects of thermal ra-
diation from nuclear explosions. A protective smokescreen is useful in front
of, around, or on top of friendly positions.
Decoy
11-87. A decoy screen can deceive an enemy about the location of friendly
forces and the probable direction of attack. If the enemy fires into the decoy
smoke, the OPFOR can pinpoint the enemy firing systems and adjust its fire
plan for the true attack. The site and location of decoy screens depend on the
type of combat action, time available, terrain, and weather conditions. One
use of decoy smoke is to screen simultaneously several possible crossing sites
at a water obstacle. This makes it difficult for the enemy to determine which
site(s) the OPFOR is actually using.
OFFENSIVE SMOKE EMPLOYMENT

11-88. The OPFOR emphasizes the use of smoke during the offense to help
reduce friendly battle losses. However, it understands that smoke may hin-
der its own C2, battlefield observation, and target engagement capabilities. In
addition, the enemy may take advantage of OPFOR smokescreens to shield
his own maneuvers or to carry out a surprise attack or counterattack. Thus, a
smokescreen is successful when the OPFOR attackers are able to maintain
their assigned axis and retain sight of the objective. To prevent the smoke from
11-16
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 11
interfering with friendly maneuver, OPFOR commanders must coordinate the

planned location and duration of smokescreens with the scheme of maneuver.
DEFENSIVE SMOKE EMPLOYMENT

11-89. In the defense, the OPFOR may use smokescreens for—
• Camouflaging or covering the maneuver of friendly units.
• Concealing engineer activities from enemy observation.
• Screening replacements of units under conditions of good visibility.
• Camouflaging the approach of friendly units for a counterattack.
• Providing flank and maneuver security.
• Misleading the enemy on the disposition of reserves and planned
counterattack axes.
11-90. Because a completely obscured environment tends to aid the attacker
more than the defender, an OPFOR defense uses smoke to minimize the
enemy’s vision while allowing the defenders a fairly clear view of the enemy’s
location. Smoke from artillery and mortar shells is the most effective means
of blinding an advancing enemy while keeping friendly forces out of the
obscured area.
SIGNALING SMOKE
11-91. Aside from smokescreens, the OPFOR also uses colored smoke for
signal purposes. Smoke can mark enemy positions or, occasionally, friendly
positions or movement routes for the information of supporting aircraft or
artillery. By prearrangement, colored smoke may—
• Identify friendly units.
• Identify targets.
• Control the commencing and lifting of fire.
• Coordinate fire and maneuver of combat units.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
11-92. During all strategic-level courses of action, the OPFOR will ensure
that the employment of NBC weapons is coordinated with perception man-
agement efforts. The purpose of this coordinated effort is to convey a message
of political and military dominance to the regional civilian populace as well
as to convey an adverse view of an intervening extraregional opponent.
11-93. The OPFOR may use the threat of employing NBC weapons as an in-
timidating factor. Any regional opponent with an NBC capability of its own
knows that the OPFOR is prepared to retaliate in kind. The fact that NBC
weapons may also place noncombatants at risk is a further intimidating
factora positive factor from the State’s perspective. Thus, it may use or
threaten to use NBC weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or
psychological pressure by allowing the enemy no sanctuary. This applies to
both regional and extraregional foes.
11-94. The OPFOR realizes that an extraregional force will possess a techno-
logical edge in the ability of its RISTA means to target OPFOR fire support
11-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
assets capable of delivering NBC munitions. Additionally, the OPFOR real-

izes that its regional opponent may receive RISTA support (such as satellite
and fixed-wing signals intelligence and imagery) from an extraregional
power. Therefore, OPFOR fire support planners develop contingency plans to
preserve their NBC-capable fire support assets during all strategic-level
courses of action. Common countermeasures are to disperse fire support
assets and to use decoys and camouflage.
REGIONAL OPERATIONS
11-95. During regional operations, the State may be able to employ NBC
weapons with little fear of retaliation from its regional neighbors. Thus, it is
possible that the OPFOR would use chemical weapons early in an operation
or from its outset, against key targets in a neighbor’s homeland. However, it
is aware that use of any NBC weapons could have both positive and negative
affects on its ability to achieve its strategic goals. On the one hand, it may be
concerned that NBC use during a strategic campaign against a regional
neighbor might lead to the intervention of an extraregional force. On the
other hand, the OPFOR could use NBC against a regional neighbor as a
warning to any potential extraregional enemy that it is willing to use such
weapons. The State would prefer not to use chemical weapons within its own
boundaries, except perhaps in an area populated by a particularly rebellious
dissident minority opposed to of the State government.
11-96. During transition operations, the OPFOR may use NBC weapons to
attack unique or key targets in aerial and sea ports of debarkation in order to
disrupt the deployment tempo of the extraregional force. These targets in-
clude key C2 nodes, logistics operating bases, ground and airborne RISTA
platforms, and contractors and contractor-operated facilities. The OPFOR
will also seek to conduct these attacks in concert with the perception man-
agement portion of the information warfare (IW) plan, in order to leverage
the world media to report adverse perceptions of the extraregional force.
ADAPTIVE OPERATIONS
11-97. When the OPFOR shifts to adaptive operations, it will employ all
means availableeven WMD against selected targetsto allow the enemy
no sanctuary. As in regional operations, the OPFOR would prefer not to use
even chemical weapons within the boundaries of the State. However, it would
contaminate its own soil if necessary in order to preserve the regime or the
State’s sovereignty.
11-98. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR seeks to use a nontraditional
approach to NBC warfare. This approach revolves around the creation of
WMD-like events in concert with the perception management portion of the
IW plan. For example, the OPFOR may seek to use the media to amplify and
embellish the results of a fire at a facility that produces chemicals used in
everyday households. The media campaign would seek to attribute the cause
of the fire to enemy action and would emphasize that injuries caused to the
civilian population are similar in nature to those caused by the release of a
chemical munition.
11-18
Chapter 12
Logistics
Operational logistics links strategic-level logistics resources with the
tactical level of logistics, thus creating the conditions for effective
sustainment of a combat force. It covers the support activities required to
sustain campaigns and major operations. A dependable logistics system
helps commanders seize and maintain the initiative. Operational
maneuver and the exploitation of operational or tactical success often
hinge on the adequacy of logistics and the ability of the force to safeguard
its critical lines of communication (LOCs), materiel, and infrastructure.
Operational logistics normally supports campaigns and provides theater-

wide logistics support, generally over a period of months. Operational
logisticians coordinate the allocation and distribution of resources within
the area of responsibility (AOR). They interface with tactical-level
logisticians in order to determine shortfalls and communicate these
shortfalls back to the strategic logistics complex to support operational
priorities. Operational logisticians coordinate the flow of strategic
capabilities within the theater based on the commander’s priorities.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
12-1. The State strategic logistics complex is the foundation for the logistics
system. Fundamental to the logistics concept are the twin notions of total war
and all means necessary. As a consequence, the State fully integrates civilian
and military components of both its materiel and service industries. Thus,
the State strategic logistics complex includes the national industrial base
with its supply points, distribution centers, arsenals, plants, manufacturing
facilities, medical support, and personnel support centers. The national
industrial base is capable of building everything from small arms to nuclear-
capable missiles. However, while the State has the ability to design, produce,
and field weapon systems, there are some serious qualitative shortcomings in
production and integration.
12-2. The State logistics system is designed to provide continuous support to
the civilian populace while simultaneously supporting military forces from
the strategic level to the individual fighting unit. The State’s national
security strategy requires that the OPFOR and the entire population be
constantly prepared for the sudden outbreak of war or natural disasters. The
State continues to make major improvements in all aspects of its logistics
system. This includes an increased emphasis on support zone security and
plans for stockpiling war materiel throughout the country.
12-3. For the OPFOR, all strategic logistics support is coordinated at the
national level through the Chief of Logistics in the Ministry of Defense
12-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
(MOD). The responsibilities of the Chief of Logistics are the same during war
and peace. These responsibilities include
• Procuring of personnel, materiel, and services required by the military.
• Preparing the economy and the people to provide sustained support in
case of war.
• Ensuring that an uninterrupted flow of personnel, materiel, and equip-
ment reaches the individual fighting unit at the proper place and time.
12-4. Organizations within the national-level military logistics establishment

include materiel support and maintenance units, as well as mobilized civilian
resources, to include medical personnel and facilities. Some national-level
logistics units may be allocated to subordinate commands to augment the
units forming their logistics bases, while the remaining units are centralized
under General Staff control.
LOGISTICS STOCKPILES
12-5. In preparation for war, the State’s national security strategy includes
plans for stockpiling war materials, as well as critical civilian supplies and
materials, throughout the country. The logistics storage of war materials
consists of four major categories: national, strategic, mobilization, and mobile
reserves.
National and Strategic Reserves

12-6. Government warehouses store national-level reserves consisting of
foodstuffs, petroleum products, manufactured goods, and strategic raw
materials. While these stocks are separate from the military items held in
strategic reserve, the military will likely use part of these stocks.
12-7. Strategic reserves are stocks of supplies and equipment controlled by
the General Staff. These stocks are similar to stocks in national reserves and
are not planned for early use in a conflict.
Mobilization Reserves
12-8. The OPFOR holds mobilization reserves for issue to newly activated, large
military units and for resupply to combat units in the early stages of a conflict.
The Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff determines
the level and configuration of these stocks. That directorate also is responsible
for accountability and maintenance. If the administrative force structure
includes military districts or regions, these geographic commands can coordinate
mobilization measures between military and civilian sectors. Mobilizing reserve
and militia units are generally dependent on stockpiled supplies.
Mobile Reserves
12-9. Deployed ground units hold and transport mobile logistics reserves
consisting of ammunition, fuel, rations, and equipment. Ground forces maintain
these supplies for use in the conduct of ground operations and distribute them to
both tactical and support units. Published planning factors establish quantities
of these supplies. Each OPFOR unit maintains an emergency reserve of supplies,
and only the unit commander can order the use of these supplies.
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DEPOT FACILITIES AND OPERATION

12-10. Depots are part of the
strategic logistics support structure Depot Categories
and hold national-level stockpiles and
strategic reserves. They occupy fixed The depots are generally divided
into the following categories:
peacetime facilities, aboveground and
• Area distribution depots.
underground structures, plus dispersal
sites throughout the country. They • Ammunition depots.
manage the distribution of war stocks • Maintenance depots.
and armaments and materiel, and • Medical depots.
perform any higher-level repair work
that is accomplished in country. Examples of these repairs include aircraft
instrumentation, optics, and electronics. The depots manage the distribution
of consumables such as fuel, food, and other items from the civilian economy.
Rocket and missile units, aviation support units, and air defense
maintenance units receive logistics support direct from the nearest depot.
12-11. A single depot may have one or more of the above missions. An area
distribution depot (ADD) receives, stores, and distributes items for units
operating or assigned within its geographic support area. Major end items
may also be stored in an ADD, but normally are stored in a maintenance
depot. The materiel stored within an ADD should accommodate a majority of
the demands placed on the distribution system for the units located in its
respective support area. An ammunition depot receives stores, renovates,
issues, and demilitarizes munitions of all types. Maintenance depots overhaul
major end items and repairable components and, as necessary, perform
limited fabrication and manufacturing. All overhaul items are stored at a
maintenance depot until disposition instructions are received from the MOD.
Medical depots are discussed in the Medical Logistics section of this chapter.
Aboveground Structures
12-12. Aboveground structures range from factory warehouses to
aboveground hardened structures. Hardened structures are reinforced for
protection against aerial and ground attack. Earth mounded bunkers are an
example of an aboveground hardened structure. The State uses extensive
camouflage and concealment techniques to reduce the detection signature of
these structures to enemy reconnaissance platforms. The State will also
develop sophisticated decoy sites.
Underground Structures
12-13. Underground structures include shallow buried and deep underground
bunkers and complexes. There are cases where the State uses underground
storage facilities to house its C2 complexes and medical facilities.
Underground structures are dispersed throughout the country and consist of
intersecting tunnels with multiple exits. Some of these exits may lead to
either external combat positions or other subterranean facilities. Large
camouflaged doors cover the entrances. The camouflage material matches the
surrounding rock so closely that one has to knock on the surface to determine
the difference. Normally, a complex may extend over a square kilometer or
12-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
more. Auxiliary casements in the underground facility may hold fuel, water,
food, medical supplies, clothing, or life support equipment.
Short-Duration Facilities
12-14. Short-duration storage facilities play a central role in any strategic
campaign that may involve intervention by an extraregional power. For
example, prior to conducting adaptive operations, the State plans, develops,
and builds short-duration storage facilities for the pre-positioning of
equipment and supplies to sustain deployed forces. The State attempts to
anticipate outside intervention and plan accordingly. Logistics items are
stockpiled or cached in underground caves and dugout holes, tents, or
warehouses, and are dispersed over a wide area. These facilities can be
considered a mini-supply depot. They also undergo extensive camouflage and
concealment to reduce their detection signature.
THEATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

12-15. Theater distribution is the
flow of personnel, equipment, and Theater Distribution Network
materiel within a theater, which The theater distribution network
enables combat forces to accomplish consist of
their assigned missions. The theater • Physical network.
distribution network consists of the • Resource network.
physical and resource networks.
12-16. The physical network consists of fixed structures and established
facilities to support distribution operations. It includes roads, airfields,
railroads, hardened structures (warehouses and storage facilities), inland
waterways, ports, and pipelines. The quantity, capacity, and capability of
these structures and facilities determine the robustness of the distribution
network.
12-17. The resource network consists of personnel (military and civilian),
organizations, materiel, and equipment. These resources operate within the
physical network of the distribution system.
TAILORED LOGISTICS UNITS

12-18. The OPFOR concentrates the bulk of its logistics units at two
levelstheater and operational-strategic command (OSC). This concentration
supports the OPFOR philosophy of streamlined, highly mobile combat forces
at the tactical level. These higher levels maintain the responsibility and the
primary means for logistics support.
12-19. Tailoring allows allocation of logistics resources to the combat forces
most essential to mission success. It also allows the OPFOR to assign
priorities for logistics support. Subordinate units receive assets according to
the importance of their mission, the nature of the terrain, and the level of
fighting anticipated. Commanders not only can reallocate their own resources
in line with changes in the situation, but also can take away their
subordinates’ organic resources and give them to other subordinates if the
situation warrants.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

12-20. The administrative force structure is the aggregate of military
headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations that are designed to
man, train, and equip the OPFOR. After transferring control of its major
fighting forces to one or more task-organized fighting commands, an
administrative headquarters, facility, or installation continues to provide
depot and area support-level administrative, supply, and maintenance
functions. The logistics function of the administrative force structure is
extensive and complex, serving as the major connecting link between the
industrial base of the State and forces engaged in combat.
FIGHTING FORCE STRUCTURE

12-21. The OPFOR’s fighting force structure is a flexible organization. It
receives logistics assets from the administrative force structure and tailors
them to meet specific objectives, based on forces available, mission
requirements, enemy forces, and the geography of the AOR. Tailoring affects
both the number and type of subordinate combat units and the number and
type of logistics units allocated to support them.
LOGISTICS MISSIONS
12-22. In operational (and tactical) logistics, three terms describe how the
OPFOR provides support to the field. These terms are primary support, area
support, and depot support.
12-23. Primary support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation,
and maintenance units that normally provide support directly to other units.
This allows the primary support unit to respond directly to the supported
unit’s request for assistance or supplies.
12-24. Area support is a mission given to supply, services, transportation, and
maintenance units that normally provide support to primary support units and
other area support units. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area support,
rather than receiving supplies and services directly from the next-higher echelon.
12-25. Depot support is a mission given to national- or theater-level units
that normally provide support to area support units. Depot support
operations include the receipt, storage, and issue of war stocks and
domestically produced armaments and materiel, and the overhaul and
rebuilding of major end items.
OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS CONCEPTS

12-26. The OPFOR understands
that there is as much chance of Operational Logistics Concepts
an operation being brought to The OPFOR relies on the following logis-
culmination by a lack of tics concepts:
sufficient logistics support as • Centralized planning and decen-
by enemy action. Therefore, it tralized execution.
considers thorough logistics • Support forward.
planning and preparation • Sustainment from other sources.
essential to executing operation
12-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
plans. The OPFOR relies on three concepts: centralized planning and

decentralized execution, support forward, and sustainment from other
sources.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

12-27. To ensure both priority of effort and efficiency in the logistics process,
the OPFOR’s logistics operations are characterized by the concept of
centralized planning and decentralized execution. Logistics plans are
developed at higher levels and executed by units and organizations at lower
levels. At OSC level, the resources officer has overall responsibility for
logistics planning. Centralized planning requires a focal point for logistics
planning and resource allocation at all levels. Regardless of whether the focal
point is an individual (the resources officer or his secondary staff) or a unit, it
must be constantly aware of requirements and capabilities. Decentralized
execution enhances the flexibility of lower-level commanders to meet local
requirements and to rapidly reprioritize support.
12-28. The concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution is key
to supporting reconnaissance fire (see Chapter 7) and strike operations (see
Chapter 3). The OPFOR uses reconnaissance fire to attack specific enemy
systems in order to destroy or degrade the combat potential of the enemy
force. It employs a strike to destroy an enemy formation after setting the
conditions for its destruction. The OPFOR uses a series of caches and short-
duration storage facilities to sustain fire support and maneuver forces during
these operations.
12-29. This concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution is
particularly important for supporting the deployment of special-purpose
forces (SPF). Generally, SPF deployed into the enemy’s strategic depth or
against his LOCs are inserted with the munitions and supplies their missions
require. Since SPF units are expected to sustain themselves for the duration
of their missions, the OPFOR relies on the careful planning and stockage of
supply caches to sustain these forces.
SUPPORT FORWARD
12-30. Logistics units are organized and deployed to support forward. The
guiding principle is that a combat force should retain its organic support
resources (such as trucks, recovery equipment, and ambulances) to support
its subordinate units. It should not have to use its own resources to go to
support areas to pick up supplies or to evacuate resources that can no longer
contribute to combat power.
SUSTAINMENT FROM OTHER SOURCES

12-31. Finally, the logistics system may have to rely on sustainment from
other than military sources. Supplies may be procured or obtained from social
groups, consumer cooperatives, government farms, or individual citizens, and
by coercion or foraging in the AOR. Captured enemy supplies and equipment
are another source of outside sustainment.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
COMMAND AND CONTROL

12-32. The General Staff may keep some national-level logistics units its
direct control. However, it normally allocates some national-level assets, as
well as logistics assets of operational-level commands in the administrative
force structure, to provide logistics support to an OSC.1 In some cases, these
allocated assets may remain under the command of their original parent
headquarters but become associated with an OSC in a supporting
relationship. In other cases, they actually come under the command of the
OSC in a constituent or dedicated status. (See Chapter 2 for a more detailed
explanation of the various command and support relationships.)
OPERATIONAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

12-33. At all levels of command, including the OSC, the resources section of
the primary staff is the principal office for the logistics integration of supply,
maintenance, transportation, and services. The resources officer heads this
section, with two subsections headed by secondary staff officers who support
him: the chief of logistics and the chief of administration. See Figure 12-1.
RESOURCES
OFFICER
CHIEF CHIEF
OF OF
LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATION
LOGISTICS ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBSECTION SUBSECTION
Figure 12-1. Resources Section
Resources Officer
12-34. The resources officer is responsible for the requisition, acquisition,
distribution, and care of all of the command’s resources, both human and
materiel. He ensures the commander’s logistics and administrative
requirements are met and executes staff supervision over the command’s
logistics and administrative procedures. One additional major task of the
resources officer is to free the commander from the need to bring his
influence to bear on priority logistics and administrative functions. He is also
the officer in charge of the sustainment command post (CP).
1
Unless otherwise specified, references to OSC in this chapter could also apply to a field group.
12-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Chief of Logistics
12-35. The chief of logistics is responsible for managing the order, receipt,
and distribution of supplies to sustain the command. He is responsible for the
condition and combat readiness of armaments and related combat equipment
and instruments. He is also responsible for their supply, proper utilization,
repair, and evacuation. He oversees the supply and maintenance of the
command’s combat and technical equipment. These responsibilities
encompass the essential wartime tasks of organizing and controlling the
command’s recovery, repair, and replacement system. During combat, he
keeps the commander informed on the status of the command’s equipment.
Chief of Administration
12-36. The chief of administration supervises all personnel actions and
transactions in the command. His subsection maintains daily strength
reports; records changes in table of organization and equipment of units in
the administrative force structure; assigns personnel; requests replacements;
records losses; administers awards and decorations; and collects, records, and
disposes of war booty.
INTEGRATED SUPPORT COMMAND

12-37. The integrated support command (ISC) is the aggregate of combat
service support units (and perhaps some combat support units) allocated from
the administrative force structure to an OSC in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship and not suballocated in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship to a subordinate headquarters within the OSC.
Normally, the OSC further allocates part of its combat service support units
to its tactical-level subordinates and some, as an integrated support group
(ISG), to support its IFC. The rest remain in the ISC at OSC level to provide
overall support of the OSC. For organizational efficiency, other combat
service support units may be grouped in this ISC, although they may support
only one of the major units of the OSC. An ISC has six major functions:
• Materiel support (supply and services).
• Maintenance.
• Transportation.
• Medical support.
• Personnel support.
Sometimes, an ISC might also include units performing combat support tasks
(such as chemical defense, IW, or law enforcement) that support the OSC.
ISC Headquarters
12-38. The ISC headquarters is composed of the ISC commander and his
command group, an operations section, and a resources section. (See Figure
12-2.) The operations section provides the control, coordination,
communications, and IW support for the ISC headquarters. Located within
the operations section is the support operations coordination center (SOCC).
The SOCC is the staff element responsible for the planning and coordination
of support for the OSC. In addition to the SOCC, the operations section has
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
subsections for future operations and airspace operations. The resources

section consists of logistics and administrative subsections which,
respectively, execute staff supervision over the ISC’s logistics and personnel
support procedures. The ISC headquarters includes liaison teams from
subordinate units of the ISC and from other OSC subordinates to which the
ISC provides support. These liaison teams work together with the SOCC to
ensure the necessary coordination of support for combat operations.
ISC
COMMANDER
COMMAND GROUP
ISC DEPUTY
COMMANDER
ISC CHIEF
OF
STAFF
OPERATIONS RESOURCES
SECTION SECTION
SOCC
Figure 12-2. ISC Headquarters
12-39. The ISC commander and his staff are the OSC logisticians. The ISC
commander advises the OSC commander, resources officer, and the rest of
the OSC staff on logistics matters. The ISC commander normally receives
guidance and direction from the OSC commander. The overall responsibility
for logistics planning belongs to the OSC resources officer. The OSC
commander tasks the ISC commander to evaluate the logistics supportability
of future operation plans or courses of action. The ISC commander tasks and
provides guidance to the ISC staff. The ISC staff gives the alternatives and
preferred solutions to the ISC commander for a decision. If necessary, the ISC
headquarters can assume the functions of the OSC’s sustainment CP, should
that CP containing the OSC resources officer be incapacitated.
Task Organization
12-40. The units allocated to an OSC and its ISC vary according to the
mission of that OSC and the support requirements of other operational-level
commands. The OSC resources officer (in consultation with his chiefs of
logistics and administration and the ISC commander) determines the proper
task organization of logistics and administrative support assets allocated to
12-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
the OSC. He suballocates some assets to the IFC and to other OSC
subordinates based on support mission requirements. The remainder he
places under the ISC commander. Figure 12-3 shows a typical OSC
organization, with an example of the types of combat service support and
combat support units that might appear in an OSC ISC.
OSC
TACTICAL-
IFC ISC LEVEL
SUBORDINATES
ISC
ISG HEADQUARTERS
MATERIEL HEAVY
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT BATTALION
BRIGADE TRANSPORT
BRIGADE
CHEMICAL TRAFFIC
SMOKE
DEFENSE CONTROL
BATTALION BRIGADE
BATTALION
INFORMATION PERSONNEL
MEDICAL
WARFARE SUPPORT
BATTALION BATTALION
BRIGADE
Figure 12-3. Task Organization, with ISC Example
12-41. The number and type of units in the ISC and ISG will vary according
to the number and size of supported units in the OSC and its IFC,
respectively. For example, an ISC supporting an OSC composed mainly of
tank and mechanized infantry units will differ from an ISC supporting an
OSC composed mainly of infantry or motorized infantry units. When the
logistics units are no longer required for ISC or ISG functions, the primary or
area support units will revert to control of their original parent units in the
administrative force structure or otherwise will be assigned to other
operational-level commands, as appropriate.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
INTEGRATED SUPPORT GROUP

12-42. The integrated support group (ISG) is a compilation of units
performing logistics tasks that support the IFC in a constituent or dedicated
command relationship. For organizational efficiency, various units
performing other combat support and combat service support tasks might be
grouped into the ISG, even though they may support only one of the major
units or components of the IFC.
12-43. There is no standard ISG organizational structure. The number, type,
and mix of subordinate units vary based on the operational support situation.
In essence, the ISG is tailored to the mission and the task organization of the
IFC. An ISG can have many of the same types of units as shown in Figure 12-
3 for one example of ISC subordinates, but tailored in size and functions to
support the IFC.
MATERIEL SUPPORT
12-44. The OPFOR materiel support system comprises a mix of very modern
and less modern capabilities that vary depending on the priority of the
supported units. Generally, high-priority or elite units enjoy the benefits of a
robust materiel support system that affords a higher degree of flexibility and
responsiveness to rapid changes in plans. For such units, the system may be
fully automated to track requirements and control the issue of supplies. Less
capable units (including reserve and militia forces) typically have little or no
automation support. Both types of materiel support system are based on
allocating supplies and services to units in order to accomplish mission
objectives. However, the aim of the OPFOR is to continue the upgrade of its
less capable units to a robust supply system capable of sustaining the force in
all environments.
SUPPLY
12-45. Supply includes actions to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue
the materiel required to equip and sustain the force from deployment through
combat operations and recovery into State territory. The allocation of
supplies is based on the unit mission, supply reports, and the availability of
supplies.
SERVICES
12-46. The OPFOR concept of services includes all troops, installations, and
duty positions that perform logistics support for combat arms units. Such
services are not specific to the ground forces, but support other Armed Forces
components as well.
METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION
12-47. During peacetime, the OPFOR operates under the “pull system” of
supply. For example, units in the field may request materiel from a depot
where they must pick it up and deliver it to the field. During wartime,
however, the OPFOR operates under the forward distribution or “push
system” principle, in which the higher echelon directly supplies and services
the next-lower echelon. Supplies and services are delivered directly to
12-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate units using the organic transportation assets of the higher

headquarters. Lower-priority units may have to rely on area support or even
supply point distribution.
12-48. The three methods by which supplying units distribute supplies to
using units are supply point distribution, unit distribution, and throughput.
In supply point distribution, the supplying unit issues supplies from a
supply point to a receiving unit. The receiving unit must go to the supply
point and use its own transportation to move supplies to where they are
needed.
12-49. In unit distribution, the supplying unit issue supplies and delivers
supplies to the receiving unit’s area in transportation assets the supplying
unit has arranged. Throughput is a method of distribution in which
shipments bypass intermediate supply points or logistics sites. Throughput
eliminates the need for double handling, uses transportation assets more
efficiently, and is more responsive to the user’s needs.
MAINTENANCE
12-50. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep materiel and equipment
in a serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade its
capability. Since supplies are limited, the OPFOR stresses preventive
maintenance, technical inspections, and proper operating methods to extend
the life cycle of equipment. The maintenance system is designed to repair
vehicles and equipment in the battle zone or as close to it as possible. Repair
facilities and units move near the scene of combat rather than waiting for
damaged equipment to be evacuated to them. Fixed and mobile repair units
extend repair capabilities into the battle zone and provide service to the
customer unit. During wartime, the types of repair performed at each level
depend on the situation. Generally, they are of a lesser degree than in
peacetime. The OPFOR classifies three categories of repair: routine, medium,
or capital.
12-51. Routine repairssuch as replacements, adjustments, or repair of
individual componentsrequire a short time to fix. Generally, maintenance
personnel do not disassemble major components as part of routine repair.
Medium repairs include the minor overhaul of equipment and the repair of
individual components requiring a short time to fix. Capital repairs are
conducted at depot level and involve the major overhaul and/or assembly of
equipment.
TRANSPORTATION
12-52. Transportation is a critical function that cannot be looked at in
isolation; it is the one function that ties sustainment and all other battlefield
operations together. The OPFOR envisions an environment characterized by
dynamic, nonlinear operations; wide dispersion of forces; the need to
concentrate rapidly for battle and disperse quickly; and the need to conduct a
wide range of operations simultaneously.
12-53. Military logistics planners base their estimates on the use of all
movement resources available. These estimates include tactical combat
12-12
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
vehicles as well as civilian transportation assets mobilized to move supplies,

equipment, and personnel. For example, during mobilization, civilian
trucking and bus companies may be organized as militia truck units to
provide transportation of cargo and personnel within the State or occupied
territory. The mobility of logistics units must match that of the supported
force. If the logistics support units fail to achieve this, they may jeopardize
the overall success of the operation. Traffic management at the operational
level is the responsibility of the military transportation center (MTC). The
MTC is subordinate to the OSC chief of logistics and is responsible for
managing OSC transportation requirements, using military and civilian
resources.
MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES
12-54. The principles of movement apply to all military transportation
services and remain constant throughout peace and war. Additionally, they
apply regardless of the planning level. During wartime, civilian personnel,
transportation assets (including farm animals, vehicles, aircraft, and water
vessels), and materiel-handling equipment are mobilized to support the war
effort.
Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution

12-55. Movement control is centralized at the highest level at which
commanders charged with providing total logistics support and monitoring
the transportation system and infrastructure can exercise it. This requires a
focal point for transportation movement planning and resource allocation at
all levels. That focal point, whether an individual (the resources officer or
chief of logistics) or unit, must be constantly aware of requirements and
capabilities. Decentralized execution enhances the flexibility of lower-level
commanders to meet local requirements and to rapidly reprioritize support.
Regulated Movement
12-56. All movement is regulated according to command priorities.
Movements are not validated, approved, or initiated if any part of the
transportation system cannot meet the requirement. Regulating
transportation assets and LOCs is required to prevent congestion, confusion,
and conflict of movements. Unregulated use of the transportation system can
severely hamper the movement of critical cargo and personnel supporting the
operation or the overall strategic campaign. Therefore, traffic in the AOR is
programmed to provide fluid movement throughout the transportation
network.
12-57. The OPFOR employs a system of measures organized and executed for
the purpose of ensuring convoy and traffic regulation as well as maintaining
general order in areas where troops are deployed. A traffic control brigade is
responsible for traffic control and law enforcement at the operational level. It
is responsible for directing military traffic along convoy routes and ensuring
that the proper convoy speed and spacing are maintained. The State’s
Internal Security Forces support movement control through protection of
supply routes of movement in the State’s homeland and of key transportation
nodes and centers.
12-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
12-58. A movement program is a directive that allocates the available

transport mode capability to satisfy the movement requirements in
accordance with the commander’s priorities. The program normally contains
detailed information concerning origins, destinations, weights, and cube of
cargo, and/or types and number of personnel to be moved.
Fluid and Flexible Movement

12-59. The transportation system is designed to provide an uninterrupted
flow of traffic that adjusts rapidly to changing situations. It is flexible enough
to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield and reallocate resources
as necessary. Adjustments must be made to meet the variations in combat
intensity. For example, when units are in the offense, the transportation
system expands to maintain the tempo of the operation. Conversely, when
units are in the defense, the system is contracted, the mode changes, and
differing cargo priorities may be necessary. Changes in the operational
environment necessitate adjustments to operate in varying conditions and
operational and/or tactical situations that may dictate the types of convoys
and controls established for movement.
12-60. The availability and use of road and rail networks, airfields, inland
waterways, ports, and beaches not only allow the transportation system to
meet operational and tactical changes, but also provide redundancy within
the overall transportation network. For example, if a portion of a road
network is destroyed or rendered unusable, the mode could change to rail or
inland waterway.
Maximum Use of Carrying Capacity

12-61. The principle of making maximum use of carrying capacity involves
more than just loading each transportation asset to its optimum carrying
capacity. Transport capability that is not used in one day cannot be stored to
provide an increase in capability for subsequent days. Similarly, a situation
allowing fully-loaded transport to sit idle is just as much a loss of carrying
capacity as is a partially-loaded vehicle moving through the system. While
allowing for sufficient equipment, maintenance, and personnel rest, planners
should keep transportation assets loaded and moving as much as the
situation permits.
TRANSPORTATION MODES
12-62. Transportation operations may include motor vehicles, rail, aircraft,
and waterway (coastal and inland) transport vessels. The OPFOR generally
uses motor vehicles to move large quantities of general cargo, petroleum
products, and personnel throughout the AOR. However, waterway transport
vessels may be used to move large quantities of supplies and personnel along
coastal or inland waterways to remote areas that are not accessible to motor
vehicles.
12-63. As requirements for transportation fluctuate, each mode must be
properly used to accomplish the commander’s objective. For example, air
transport is employed if reaction speed is the priority. Motor transport is
considered the most flexible surface mode. It provides door-to-door delivery
service and an interface with all other transportation modes.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
12-64. Motor transport becomes essential as supplies are moved forward from
railheads, field depots, or supply points to combat units. After the relocation
of supplies from national-level depots, the OPFOR distributes them within
OSCs primarily by truck. Within an OSC, the heaviest truck transport
requirements are primarily above the division level.2
SUPPLY AND EVACUATION ROUTES

12-65. Within their AORs, OSCs establish and improve supply and
evacuation routes, using the network of military roads, and maintain them in
passable condition. Staff responsibility for this is shared by the OSC
resources officer and the chief of infrastructure management at that level.
Engineer units at OSC level may form road and bridge construction and
repair groups to prepare and maintain these and other movement routes. At
national level, the Strategic Integration Directorate (SID) also organizes civil
engineering and construction efforts required to sustain military actions.
During wartime, civil engineering units from the Ministry of the Interior, as
directed by the SID, may be employed at the national and/or OSC levels.
Employed on an area basis, these units are responsible for the upkeep of
supply and evacuation routes and for repair of battle-damaged roads and
bridges. The OSC chief of infrastructure management must coordinate and
prioritize the route construction and maintenance functions of both civil and
combat engineers within his AOR.
PERSONNEL
12-66. The MOD establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes
procedures for personnel readiness issues as they apply to all members and
components (standing forces, reserve, and militia) of the armed services. The
Manpower and Readiness Department under the MOD Chief of Logistics is
responsible for the administration and management of the personnel support
system.
12-67. During peacetime, the State may be unable to fully man the military
with critical professional and technical specialists to maintain an elaborate
support structure. Thus, the OPFOR may experience a shortage of doctors,
engineers, computer programmers, electronic technicians, and other support
professionals. Once the country has been mobilized, however, these critical
professionals are detailed into the military structure to augment existing
professionals.
12-68. The State considers people as one of the assets most critical to the
success of any military operation. Thorough planning and efficient personnel
support directly influence mission readiness. Therefore, the MOD requires
each of the armed services to resource personnel requirements in a timely
manner to support operational requirements. The State views “personnel
support” as all activities associated with assignment of personnel against
authorized billets and validated individual augmentation requirements, as
well as those administrative activities associated with personnel programs
within a command.
2
Throughout this chapter, references to division- and brigade-level logistics support may also apply to a division tac-
tical group (DTG) and brigade tactical group (BTG), unless specifically stated otherwise.
12-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
PERSONNEL SUPPORT
12-69. Units may maintain strength by piecemeal replacement of casualties
during combat, particularly when lightly wounded personnel and damaged
equipment can return to parent units quickly. Once casualties are sufficient
to threaten total loss of combat effectiveness, the unit withdraws from
contact and reconstitutes. Timely replacement of ineffective units is vital to
maintaining momentum. The commander may choose to withdraw heavily
attritted units and consolidate them to form a smaller number of combat-
effective units.
12-70. The OSC chief of administration is responsible for all personnel
actions and transactions in the command. The personnel support battalion
provides the personnel to operate the personnel operations center. That
center’s major functions include providing personnel and administrative
support, finance support, and legal support.
REPLACEMENT
12-71. Replacement operations are based on unit strength reports and
include the coordinated support and delivery of replacements and soldiers
returning from medical facilities. The unit strength report is used to assess a
unit’s combat power, plan for future operations, and assign replacements on
the battlefield.
Individual Replacements
12-72. The OPFOR can use the system of individual replacements in both
peacetime and wartime. The sources of replacement personnel are school
graduates, reserve assignments, medical returnees, and normal assignments.
Incremental Replacements
12-73. The OPFOR may incrementally replace entire small units such as
weapons crews, squads, and platoons. Replacements can be obtained from
training units or reserve forces.
Composite Unit Formations

12-74. Composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations. Composite units may be constituted up to OSC level.
Whole-Unit Replacement
12-75. The OPFOR uses whole-unit replacement when massive losses occur
as a result of a combat action. Company-level and above units are brought
forward from reserve forces to replace combat forces rendered ineffective.
Replacement Training
12-76. OPFOR planners realize that personnel replacement requirements
may necessitate any of the aforementioned procedures. Individual and unit
replacement exercises are held semiannually to maintain established
proficiency standards for personnel units. During these and other training
exercises, troops are moved by various modes of transportation such as motor
vehicles, waterway, aircraft, or rail.
12-16
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
MEDICAL SUPPORT
12-77. The basic principle of combat medical support is multistage
evacuation with minimum treatment by medical personnel at each unit level.
They treat the lightly wounded who can return to combat and those
casualties who would not survive further evacuation without immediate
medical attention.
12-78. The OPFOR divides the range of medical treatment into three
categories. The first category of procedures includes only mandatory
lifesaving measures. The second category includes procedures to prevent
severe complications of wounds or injuries. The final category of treatment
includes procedures accomplished only when there is a low casualty load and
reduced enemy activity.
12-79. In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical support system,
OPFOR doctrine emphasizes the importance of self-help and mutual aid
among individual soldiers. This concept extends beyond the battlefield to
casualty collection points and unit aid stations. Self-help and mutual aid
reduces the demands made on medical personnel, particularly when there is
a sudden and massive influx of casualties. Each soldier is required to attend
a first-aid training session.
MEDICAL LOGISTICS
12-80. The medical logistics system operates on a “pull system.” Personnel in
the field request medical materiel (including repair parts for medical
equipment) from a medical depot where it must be picked up and delivered to
the field. Normally, medical supplies are transported from the support zone
to the battle zone on cargo-carrying transport vehicles, water vessels, or
aircraft. However, ground ambulances returning to the battle zone may assist
in transporting medical supplies. A medical equipment maintenance unit at
the medical depot provides all medical equipment maintenance.
Level Available Care
Platoon Platoon medic (corpsman) provides basic first aid.
Company Company medic (paramedic) provides advanced first aid, pain relief, intravenous fluids,
and treatment of most common illnesses.
Battalion Medical assistant (physician’s assistant) provides limited medical intervention, minor sur-
gery, and treatment of most common illnesses; limited inpatient capability.
Brigade, BTG, Medical officers (physicians) provide trauma stabilization and minor surgical intervention.
and Division
DTG or Higher A field hospital provides major surgery and extended care.
OSC or Theater Central Military Hospital and major civilian hospitals provide definitive care in fixed facili-
Support Zone ties.
Figure 12-4. Levels of Medical Care
12-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
CASUALTY HANDLING
12-81. The OPFOR has shown success in handling combat casualties. This
success stems from emphasis placed on trauma training and close
coordination with the civilian medical sector. Evacuation is based on a
higher-to-lower method. The next-higher echelon provides transportation for
casualties. Each level has specific responsibilities for the care of the sick and
wounded. (See Figure 12-4.) Besides treating the wounded, medical personnel
handle virtually all of their own administration, especially at lower levels. As
casualties move through the combat evacuation system, medical personnel at
each level make effective use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the
wounded (triage). Helicopters are used for all military and civilian search and
rescue missions, medical evacuations, and domestic disaster relief flights.
During wartime situations, most casualties arrive at a hospital within 6 to 12
hours after being wounded. The evacuation time is reduced to 2 hours during
peacetime.
MEDICAL FACILITIES
12-82. A field hospital is the first level in the evacuation system capable of
conducting major surgery and giving extended care. It is mobile and capable
of deployment near the battle zone. It constitutes the largest and most
extensive military facility with this capability.
12-83. The best medical facility is the Central Army Hospital. During
peacetime, military personnel receive treatment at this hospital, which also
is designated as one of the emergency medical care facilities for foreign
diplomats, their families, and tourists. The State also has designated some of
its major university hospitals as such emergency medical care facilities. This
ensures consistent high-quality medical staffing, care and treatment. A
majority of medical facilities or clinics in the outlying areas has sufficient
numbers of trained personnel, supplies, and reliable electric power and
water. The facilities also contain high-quality, sophisticated, domestic and
imported medical equipment. The pharmacies are stocked with high-quality,
domestic, and foreign-produced pharmaceuticals. During wartime conditions,
military personnel are treated at all of the major civilian hospitals in addition
to field hospitals.
NBC TREATMENT
12-84. Treating nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) casualties is a
standard OPFOR trauma protocol. The NBC medical plan is based on three
assumptions:
• Mass casualties will occur.
• Casualties will be similar to those that medical personnel have been
trained to treat.
• Medical personnel are able to treat the casualties in a decontaminated
environment.
The Central Army Hospital can be converted into a chemical decontamina-
tion center within 2 to 6 hours. Most of the remaining major hospitals require
up to 30 days to convert to a decontamination center.
12-18
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
BLOOD MANAGEMENT
12-85. The Ministry of Health maintains a Blood Management Office to
oversee the collection, processing, storage, and distribution of blood (to
include liquid blood and blood components) to alleviate the effects of a
natural disaster or war. Blood management services are provided to support
both civilian and military establishments. The main source of blood to
support wartime casualty requirements comes from the collection and
processing of blood from the civilian populace during peacetime. The blood is
generally stored in pre-positioned underground structures throughout the
country.
SUPPORT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

12-86. During both offense and defense, OPFOR logistics units operate from
locations that are protected, concealed, and serviced by good road networks.
Commanders emphasize that logistics units make maximum use of urban
areas to conduct logistics operations. The dispersion of logistics sites is
consistent with support requirements, control, and local security.
12-87. Logisticians must be continuously informed of operation plans and
probable changes to those plans. They coordinate logistics preparations with
deception plans to avoid giving away the element of surprise. Commanders
emphasize passive security measures during the sustainment of combat
operations. Logistics unit commanders anticipate that at least 50 percent or
more of their work will be done in darkness or under other limited visibility
conditions. Therefore, noise and light discipline is a necessity when operating
under these conditions.
OFFENSE
12-88. The logistics objective in supporting offensive operations is to
maintain the momentum of operations by supporting in the battle zone or as
close to it as possible. Both the battle zone and the support zone can move as
the offensive operation progresses.
12-89. Planners must consider the nature of offensive operations as it affects
logistics activities. For example, high fuel consumption may dictate making
provisions to position substantial quantities in or near the battle zone
without signaling the OPFOR’s intention to attack to the enemy. Responsive
support is critical and is made more difficult by lengthening of supply lines
and by critical requirements for user resupply vehicles to stay close to their
respective units. Planning, coordination, communication, and above all
flexibility are key factors to consider. Therefore, planners develop logistics
plans flexible enough to meet the changing priorities of a fluid battlefield.
12-90. In considering the attack, materiel support units ensure that all
support equipment is ready and that supplies are best located for support.
They also ensure that sufficient transportation is available to support
maneuver and logistics plans. Normally, ammunition and fuel are the most
important supplies in the offense. However, consideration must be given to
all supplies, as well as other support procedures, specifically medical and
maintenance.
12-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
12-91. The following are examples of some specific considerations for

planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting offensive
operations:
• Maintenance units should pre-plan maintenance collection points along
movement routes, in order to reduce recovery requirements.
• Supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition are positioned in the
battle zone or as close to it as possible.
• Arrangements are made in advance for aerial resupply of critical items
in order to maintain the operational tempo.
• Planners arrange to throughput obstacle-breaching and bridging mate-
rial if required.
• Planners must consider potential bypassed enemy units; they must
have the latest intelligence on the enemy situation.
DEFENSE
12-92. The logistics objective in supporting defensive operations is to sustain
the attrition of enemy attacking forces through support from dispersed sites
located in the support zone. An OSC support zone may be dispersed within
the support zones of subordinate divisions or brigades, or the OSC may have
a separate support zone site of its own.
12-93. During defensive operations, supply activity is greatest in the
preparation stage. Supplies generally are stockpiled or pre-positioned in
initial and subsequent defensive positions. Critical supplies such as
ammunition and barrier material should be as mobile as possible to ensure
continuous support as combat power is shifted in response to enemy attacks.
12-94. To support stay-behind operations, supply stockage levels may be two
to three times higher than normal amounts. This ensures a redundancy of
caches and needed equipment that cannot be readily resupplied. Stay-behind
forces may require unique maintenance support arrangements to ensure that
equipment remains operational.
12-95. Logistics units position themselves in relatively secure positions far
enough from maneuver and fire support units to be out of the flow of the
battle. However, they should not be so far removed as to render the logistics
effort less effective.
12-96. The following are examples of some specific considerations for
planners to use during the development of logistics plans supporting
defensive operations:
• Maintenance units should position maintenance teams in the battle
zone to return the maximum number of weapons systems to the battle
as soon as possible.
• Emphasis is on keeping supply and evacuation routes open.
• Nonessential logistics units and operations move into the depth of the
support zone as early as possible.
• In a maneuver defense, supply points consisting of fuel and ammunition
are positioned as far forward as possible and in successive battle posi-
tions.
12-20
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 12
SUPPORT ZONE SECURITY

12-97. The OPFOR expects any enemy to make an effort to conduct
reconnaissance, espionage, and diversionary action in its operational support
zone. These enemy actions can be particularly effective in areas where the
local population is not sympathetic to the OPFOR’s cause. In addition to
these threats, the OPFOR anticipates attacks on its support zone by airborne
and heliborne forces as well as larger-scale attacks by enemy operational
maneuver forces.
12-98. The OPFOR uses a security force to counter any threats in its support
zone. Each OSC deploys a considerable counterintelligence effort. It can
assign up to an entire division for security tasks. The security force is
equipped and trained for conventional as well as unconventional warfare. As
airborne and amphibious threats grow, there is increasing stress on
deploying antilanding reserves, including, or even based on, heliborne units
to provide a rapid reaction.
MISSION SUPPORT SITES

12-99. A mission support site (MSS) is a temporary base used by units that
are operating at a considerable distance from their support zone, during an
extended mission. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support,
ammunition, or demolitions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary
movement of supplies and allows a force to move more rapidly. When
selecting an MSS, consideration is given to cover and concealment, proximity
to the objective, proximity to supply routes, and the presence of enemy
security forces in the area. Security dictates that drop zones or landing zones
be a considerable distance from an MSS, cache, or support zonealthough
this may increase transportation problems.
POST-COMBAT SUPPORT
12-100. Strategic and operational logisticians are not only focused on
supporting units in combat. They are also focused on other post-combat
support requirements such as personnel replacement, weapon systems
replacement, reconstitution, and receiving and preparing reinforcements.
(For information on personnel replacement, see the Personnel Support
section of this chapter.)
WEAPON SYSTEMS REPLACEMENT

12-101. Weapon systems replacement is simply a procedure for providing a
weapon system to a combat unit. It involves processing the vehicle or
equipment from a storage or transportation configuration to a ready-to-fight
condition. It also involves the integration of a completely trained crew with
the weapon system.
RECONSTITUTION
12-102. Reconstitution is performed in support of all combat operations.
Although it is mainly a command and operations function, the actual
refitting, supply, personnel fill, and medical actions are conducted by logistics
12-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
units. There are two methods for conducting reconstitution: reorganization

and regeneration.
Reorganization
12-103. Reorganization is action taken to shift resources internally within a
degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness. Reorganization is
normally done at unit level and requires only limited external support such
as supply replenishment, maintenance assistance, and limited personnel
replacement. When continuity of the mission is of paramount importance,
composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat
operations.
Regeneration
12-104. Regeneration is action taken to rebuild a unit through large-scale
replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Additionally, it is action
taken to restore C2 and conduct mission-essential training. Overall, the effort
is directed at restoring the unit’s cohesion, discipline, and fighting
effectiveness.
PREPARING REINFORCEMENTS
12-105. OPFOR strategic and operational logisticians prepare contingency
plans for the mobilization and reception of reserve forces. Once the unit
personnel and equipment are mobilized, they are sustained, configured, and
transported to their respective OSC. Normally, strategic-level logistics units
provide this type of support. Once units arrive at the OSC level, the OSC
assumes responsibility for their further sustainment and transport.
12-22
Chapter 13
Airborne, Special-Purpose Forces, and Amphibious

Operations
The OPFOR views airborne and special-purpose forces (SPF) as means to
carry the battle into the enemy’s depth. The General Staff uses these
highly mobile forces against strategic objectives or for regional power
projection. It may also allocate such forces down to the operational and
tactical levels. It has the capability to conduct amphibious operations,
which sometimes occur in conjunction with airborne or SPF operations in
a coastal area. Insertion of any or all these forces into enemy rear areas
can disrupt the stability and cohesion of his defense.
AIRBORNE AND HELIBORNE OPERATIONS

13-1. Airborne and heliborne forces have the capability to surprise the enemy,
rapidly envelop key objectives, or exploit targets weakened by the effects of
deep fires. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially critical given the fluid-
ity and rapid tempo that characterizes the modern battlefield. The OPFOR
expects to capitalize on the added vertical dimension that airborne and heli-
borne forces provide when working in concert with ground maneuver forces.
13-2. The OPFOR also uses airborne forces as a means of projecting power in
its region. Significant portions of invasion forces could consist of airborne
units, which are well suited for such roles. They train for operations in a
variety of geographical environments. They also train specifically to establish,
defend, and expand an airhead. Their equipment is air-transportable.
13-3. Airborne forces are particularly valuable as a means to control access
into the region by extraregional forces. The early seizure of ports and airfields
critical to enemy deployment can be an essential ingredient in the conduct of
access-control operations. Airborne and heliborne forces are especially suited
for operations conducted during the transition from regional to adaptive
operations. Their unique capabilities also render them especially useful in
support of adaptive operations. They can serve as fixing, assault, exploitation,
or deception forces when the rapid positioning of such forces in support of of-
fensive operations is critical.
13-4. Airborne landings require many valuable assets. Therefore, only after
careful consideration would a commander make the decision to use airborne
forces. If other units are capable of fulfilling a given mission, they execute it
instead of airborne units. Heliborne landings also require valuable assets but
are often more economical than airborne landings.
13-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
COMMAND AND CONTROL

13-5. Administratively, airborne forces are part of the Army. During wartime,
to allow flexibility in employment, they are directly subordinate to the
Supreme High Command (SHC), with control exercised by the General Staff.
When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some airborne units to each theater. A theater
commander with dedicated airborne assets could further dedicate airborne units
to an operational-strategic command (OSC) or, dependent upon the mission, he
could also place airborne units in support of an OSC. A theater commander
with constituent airborne assets can allocate them to an OSC in a constituent,
dedicated, or supporting relationship. These command and support relation-
ships ensure that airborne objectives support the overall mission of the theater or
OSC to which the airborne units are allocated. Even in a supporting relationship,
the commander of the theater or OSC receiving the airborne unit(s) establishes
those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment.
13-6. The landing force commander is the commander of the airborne or
ground force unit forming the basis for the airborne or heliborne landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning troops for loading. He shares
with the aviation commander the decision to proceed with the landing, based
on the assessment of the situation at the drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ).
After the landing, the landing force commander is solely responsible for con-
ducting the operation, until linkup with ground maneuver forces. While the
landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval of
the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
MISSIONS
13-7. The OPFOR categorizes airborne or heliborne missions based on the
depth and importance of the objective, the size of forces involved, and the
level of command of the controlling commander. The three categories of
missions are strategic, operational, and tactical. The location of enemy
forces, the level of the controlling headquarters, the significance of the target,
weapons systems capabilities, and geography also determine the scope of the
operation. Many factors can affect the decision of where to insert an airborne
or heliborne force, including
• The size of the force.
• Anticipated enemy resistance.
• The air situation (presence or absence of air superiority).
• The potential for reinforcement of the force.
• The position and projected rate of advance of friendly forces designated
for linkup.
Strategic Missions
13-8. In wartime, the SHC establishes strategic missions, which the General
Staff controls. The outcome of a strategic mission should have significant im-
pact on the war or strategic campaign. The use of airborne forces in a regional
power-projection role is also a strategic mission.
13-2
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
13-9. Airborne forces conduct strategic missions against deep targets. Forces
from other arms and services can also participate, but typically would not
arrive in the target area until a later time. Depending on the depth of the
airborne mission, linkup with ground forces may not occur for several days.
Since troops on the ground receive supplies by airdrop or airlift, the operation
requires substantial air combat and transport support.
13-10. Objectives of strategic missions could be national capitals or other
administrative-political centers, industrial or economic centers, ports or
maritime straits, or airfields. Strategic missions also may establish a new
theater or neutralize one member of an enemy coalition.
Operational Missions
13-11. An OSC does not necessarily include airborne forces in its task or-
ganization. However, the SHC or General Staff may allocate such forces to an
OSC for a given operation, in a constituent, dedicated, or supporting role.
Operational objectives could include
• Headquarters or command posts.
• Communications facilities.
• Enemy precision and nuclear weapons.
• Logistics facilities.
• Airfields.
• Ports.
• Bridges and other water- or gap-crossing sites.
• Lines of communications (LOCs).
An airborne force of brigade size is the most common force used to accomplish
operational missions. Typical missions can include deception operations,
blocking a withdrawing enemy, or enveloping enemy defensive positions.
Tactical Missions
13-12. While recognizing the need to limit the use of airborne forces to primar-
ily strategic and operational missions, the OPFOR also recognizes the need for
the capability to insert troops to perform tactical missions. A tactical airborne
mission could have the same types of objectives as an operational mission. On
occasion, airborne troops may be allocated for such missions, but the force is
more likely to consist of infantry troops. In either case, the units involved
would normally rely on helicopters for tactical insertions, rather than fixed-
wing aircraft. The primary function of these tactical airborne or heliborne
landings is to cooperate with ground maneuver forces in reaching operational
or tactical objectives. In other situations, heliborne insertions can serve as a
rapid means for positioning or repositioning forces on the battlefield.
13-13. Heliborne units can perform reconnaissance missions when inserted
into the disruption zone or the enemy rear area. They may perform tactical
security missions, or cover, delay, or defend against an enemy approach to a
vulnerable flank. Heliborne units can also serve in an antilanding reserve,
providing rapid reaction to the threat of enemy airborne or amphibious landings.
Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deception activities are examples of other
13-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
missions suited to heliborne operations. Heliborne units can also lay and clear
mines in the enemy rear.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION

13-14. Planning considerations for airborne and heliborne operations include
the mission, troops and support available, terrain, the depth of the operation,
flight routes, air superiority, DZs or LZs, surprise, security, and the enemy
situation. Deception operations are planned to mislead the enemy as to the
true purpose and location of air activity. Given routine readiness conditions,
the time required to prepare transport aviation and to plan a battalion-size
or larger airborne mission is, as a minimum, approximately 24 hours. This
planning time includes
• Notification of alert and moving out: 2 hours.
• Preparation of aviation units: 18 hours.
• Embarking troops and equipment and final aircraft preparation: 4 hours.
When exercising a preplanned contingency or starting from an increased
readiness condition, the preparation time is reduced by 5 to 8 hours.
13-15. The time required to plan for a battalion-size heliborne assault is similar.
Troop embarkation times can be reduced if few or no vehicles accompany the
force. The force selected to conduct a heliborne assault may require training,
and this adds at least one day to the preparation time. To avoid this delay, the
OPFOR trains selected infantry battalions for heliborne employment.
13-16. Preparation for an airborne or heliborne landing includes the following:
• Determining the composition, strength, and capabilities of the enemy
forces in the area of the DZ or LZ (or those near enough to interfere
with the landing operations and subsequent attack of the objective).
• Determining the nature of the terrain and condition of the road network.
• Locating natural and manmade obstacles that would interfere with air
drop of troops and equipment.
• Selecting suitable primary and alternate DZ or LZs.
13-17. Aerial reconnaissance, clandestine agents, sympathizers, maps, signals

reconnaissance, long-range patrols, or air-dropped reconnaissance teams all
provide intelligence information for an airborne operation. Reconnaissance of
the DZ or LZ, by both air assets and SPF, continues throughout the planning
and execution stages of the operation. If enemy troops are located in the area,
they are attacked and neutralized by aviation, artillery, or SPF. Reconnais-
sance takes place when the airborne or heliborne operation is first conceived,
when troops embark, and while aircraft are en route to the DZ or LZ. Enemy
armor, artillery, and air threats are of major concern. Reconnaissance activi-
ties also occur outside the projected objective area, as a deception measure.
13-18. Airborne and heliborne operations require extensive coordination between
the committed landing force and the controlling headquarters, supporting avia-
tion, and ground maneuver forces. The following principles contribute to success:
• Surprise should be used to advantage. Extensive security measures are
necessary in all phases of the operation to prevent early detection and
13-4
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
to minimize enemy reaction time. Night airborne operations are a pri-

mary means of achieving surprise. False insertions aid deception and
surprise when conducting heliborne operations.
• Landings should be in undefended areas or in areas where enemy
defenses have been effectively neutralized.
• There must be effective air cover for the en route formation. Suppres-
sion of enemy ground-based air defense weapons along the flight route
is imperative.
• Airborne assaults receive fire support from aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles (SSMs), and artillery, as the latter comes within
supporting range of airborne forces.
• Artillery fires are essential to the support of heliborne forces.
• Attack helicopters escort lift helicopters to prepare the LZ before the
landing of troops and to provide fire support once the landing force
is on the ground.
13-19. A typical DZ is three by four km; a typical LZ may be smaller. An air-

borne brigade normally receives one primary and at least one alternate DZ.
Within a brigade DZ, each airborne battalion has a designated, individual DZ.
The landing force commander designates alternate zones for emergency use.
Follow-on forces normally use the zones used by the initial wave. Heliborne
forces use one or more LZs depending upon the situation and size of the land-
ing force. The landing force commander designates at least one alternate LZ.
CONDUCT
13-20. The use of airborne forces in an operation depends upon whether it would
enhance the likelihood of surprise, deep penetration, and rapid exploitation. Also
essential is a favorable forces analysis in the DZ or LZ and the objective area.
These criteria, together with the achievement of at least temporary local air su-
periority and the availability of airborne and airlift assets, constitute the main
elements in a planner’s decision to conduct an airborne or heliborne operation.
Air Movement
13-21. The Air Force allocates the transport aviation units required for
deployment. Either transport aircraft or lift helicopters or a combination of
the two can air-land airborne units or insert airborne battalions. Lift helicop-
ters from army aviation can support heliborne landings. Aircraft of civil avia-
tion can augment military capabilities. Civil fleet equipment consists of some
medium- and long-range passenger transports and a number of short-range
transports and helicopters. Staging bases and associated airfields are located
at distances that protect aircraft and troop concentrations from enemy tactical
aircraft and short-range SSMs. Airfields and equipment are camouflaged and
concealed against aerial observation, and aircraft are placed in revetted positions.
13-22. The OPFOR considers the air movement phase of an airborne or heliborne
operation to be its most vulnerable phase. The OPFOR emphasizes the necessity
of creating a threat-free flight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ.
All along the flight path, fire support assets target enemy air defenses. Fighters
escort transport aircraft during an airborne operation to protect them from
13-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
enemy fighters and ground fires. Attack helicopters can escort lift helicopters
during a heliborne operation to protect them from ground fires.
13-23. Passive defense measures taken during the air movement phase in-
clude conducting movement during hours of darkness, using more than one
flight route, maintaining radio silence, and flying at low altitudes. The
OPFOR can use electronic warfare measures during air movement, including
escort jammers, which suppress enemy air defense and surveillance systems.
Air Drop or Heliborne Landing

13-24. Airborne forces normally conduct combat air drops at an altitude of
from 150 to 300 m. They emphasize the necessity of dropping at low altitude
to minimize the amount of time individuals are in the air. Low-altitude drops
also increase the likelihood that a unit’s personnel and equipment would land
close together.
13-25. Forces inserted by helicopter have the advantage of arriving on the LZ
as organized units. To minimize their vulnerability to ground fires, helicopters
remain on the ground in the LZ only long enough to disembark troops. If the
LZ is under effective enemy fire, the landing force commander, after consult-
ing the aviation commander, may divert the force to an alternate LZ.
Drop Zone or Landing Zone Procedures

13-26. The air drop or landing and reorganization phase is the second most
vulnerable period in an operation, following the air movement phase. The
airborne or heliborne force must clear the DZ or LZ quickly, before the enemy
arrives to counter it.
13-27. If the airborne force is dropped or landed during daylight hours,
personnel either move directly to their predesignated attack positions or, if
the DZ or LZ is not on the objective, first assemble in battalion assembly
areas. If the drop or landing occurs at night, personnel may first assemble as
companies and then move to battalion assembly areas, before occupying pre-
designated attack positions.
13-28. If the DZ is under strong enemy attack, personnel assemble and
move immediately to the perimeter to establish defensive battle positions.
Personnel use any available light armored vehicles to reinforce battle po-
sitions, and do not sort out the vehicles until after repelling the enemy attack.
13-29. If the DZ is not on the objective and units assemble first, they try to
avoid combat with enemy ground force units and hide from an air threat. If
required to actively defend against an air attack, at least one entire platoon
per company or one company per battalion is responsible for the mission. For
a planned follow-on air landing, the initial landing force leaves a rear detach-
ment at the DZ. This detachment provides security on the DZ for the landing
of the follow-on force.
13-30. The heliborne force lands on its objective if possible. If it is not on the
objective, the LZ should be as close as possible but outside of the direct fire
range of enemy forces at the objective. Once on the ground, the heliborne land-
ing force organizes rapidly in an assembly area.
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Movement to Objective
13-31. Speed and security are the primary concerns during movement to the
objective. If the landing force is moving at night, it can use established road
networks to reach the objective before dawn. If movement is during the day,
the unit moves cross-country using terrain features to provide concealment
when possible. During movement, the landing force maintains radio silence
until making contact with the enemy, with only the landing force commander
transmitting messages.
13-32. Since the information received before departure is perishable,
reconnaissance missions during the ground movement phase are ex-
tremely important. For airborne forces, these missions are performed by
reconnaissance teams from the brigade and/or battalion level. These teams
may have engineer or chemical defense personnel attached.
13-33. Rapid execution is especially important to the heliborne force. The force
departs the assembly area with reconnaissance in the lead and on the flanks.
The landing force attacks the target as quickly as possible in order to gain
surprise and maintain momentum.
Offense
13-34. Once on the ground, offensive tactics of airborne forces are similar to
those of similarly equipped infantry forces. Before the attack, the airborne
force deploys its fire support units to provide maximum support. Airborne
forces at the final objective attack to destroy the enemy or to seize control of
the enemy-held area or facility. A heliborne force can be augmented with
combat engineers, antitank weapons, artillery, and chemical defense troops.
The force usually attempts to attack its objective from several directions at
once. A heliborne force is generally assigned an objective less heavily defended
than that assigned to an airborne force.
Defense
13-35. Once the landing force has seized an objective, it must defend that
objective until the arrival of friendly ground maneuver forces. Usually, the
landing force establishes a perimeter defense. In some cases, the terrain and
the enemy’s situation may permit establishing a defense in depth, with a
small, mobile reserve. A number of factors influence the capability to remain
on the objective: days of supply on hand, a secure air resupply corridor, the
availability of air support, and the enemy’s ability to respond to the landing.
Heliborne forces, especially those drawn from the regular ground forces, have
little sustainability, and their ability to remain on the objective is limited.
Linkup with a ground maneuver force should occur as quickly as possible.
Linkup
13-36. Airborne or heliborne units either await a linkup with friendly forces
or, when necessary, fight their way back to friendly lines. The rule of thumb is
that the probability of overall success is greater the sooner the linkup occurs.
To accomplish linkup, the unit sends a reconnaissance patrol to meet the
approaching ground maneuver force units. The reconnaissance patrol provides
information on the best approaches into the area, the security situation on the
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
objective, and the enemy situation. A linkup with ground maneuver forces
normally completes the mission of an airborne or heliborne force. Once linkup
occurs, control of the landing force unit returns to the parent headquarters.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES OPERATIONS

13-37. The OPFOR maintains a broad array of SPF. One of the six service
components, the SPF Command, provides the capability to attack both
regional and extraregional enemies throughout their strategic depth. In
addition to conducting direct action, this command fields strategic recon-
naissance forces with which it is able to support national intelligence re-
quirements. It also has a capability to support operations of terrorists and
other irregular forces. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and com-
mando units. Its units provide a balanced capability including some tactical
transport for use in inserting SPF or commando units.
13-38. In addition to the SPF Command, four of the other five service
components have their own SPF. The Army, Naval, and Air Force SPF are
intended primarily for use at the operational level and enable each service to
conduct reconnaissance and direct action to the opponent’s operational depth.
The Internal Security Forces also have their own highly-trained SPF units,
equipped to conduct direct-action missions in the enemy’s rear. All of these
SPF organizations provide the OPFOR a flexible and capable means of sup-
port to regional, transition, and adaptive operations.
13-39. The Air Force fields light transport aircraft for insertion of its own SPF
or those belonging to other service components, within the region. The Navy’s
submarine force may also insert SPF for reconnaissance or direct action out-
side the region.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

13-40. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and commando units.
(Command and control for the SPF Command’s commando units is discussed
under the subsection on Commandos later in this chapter.) The Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Internal Security Forces also have their own SPF. Any of these
various types of SPF units may remain under the command and control of
their respective service headquarters or may be suballocated to operational- or
even tactical-level commands during task organization.
Administrative Force Structure

13-41. The SPF Command is one of the six service components subordinate to
the SHC and is thus under the control of the General Staff. The General Staff
normally reserves some SPF brigades under its own control for strategic-level
missions as directed by its Intelligence Directorate. Likewise, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force could maintain some of their own SPF directly subordinate to
the service headquarters, although most of them are intended for use at the
operational level and thus can be subordinate to operational-level commands,
even in the administrative force structure.
13-42. In peacetime and in garrisons within the State, SPF of both the SPF
Command and other services are organized administratively into SPF companies,
battalions, and brigades. These organizations facilitate peacetime administrative
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control and training. However, even these administrative organizations do not

have a fixed structure. Each consists of a varying number of small SPF teams
normally composed of 5 to 12 men each. The number of teams contained in
each administrative organization depends on the team size required for spe-
cific missions that are envisioned for it. Every SPF operation is unique and
unlike any other, and thus requires forces organized not in a standard fashion
but rather adapted into a task organization based on the mission.
Task Organization
13-43. When the OPFOR establishes more than one theater headquarters, the
General Staff may allocate some SPF units to each theater. From those SPF
assets allocated to him in a constituent or dedicated relationship, the theater
commander can suballocate some or all of them to a subordinate OSC.
13-44. The General Staff (or a theater commander with constituent or
dedicated SPF) can allocate SPF units to an OSC in a constituent or
dedicated relationship or place them in support of an OSC. These command
and support relationships ensure that SPF objectives support the overall
mission of the OSC to which the SPF units are allocated. Even in a sup-
porting relationship, the commander of the OSC receiving the SPF unit(s)
establishes those units’ objectives, priorities, and time of deployment. The
OSC commander may employ the SPF assets allocated to him as constitu-
ent or dedicated as part of his integrated fires command (IFC), or he may
suballocate them to his tactical-level subordinates. Even SPF units allocated
to an OSC may conduct strategic missions, if required.
13-45. The SPF units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Internal Security
Forces may remain under the control of their respective services (or be allo-
cated to a joint theater command). However, they are more likely to appear in
the task organization of an OSC. In that case, the OSC commander may
choose to suballocate them to tactical-level subordinates. If necessary, SPF
units from any of these service components could become part of joint SPF op-
erations in support of national-level requirements. In that case, they could
temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or the General Staff.
13-46. Regardless of the parent administrative organization, SPF normally in-
filtrate and operate as small teams. When deployed, these teams may operate
individually, or they may be task organized into detachments. The terms team
and detachment indicate the temporary nature of the groupings. In the course
of an operation, teams can leave a detachment and join it again. Each team
may in turn break up into smaller teams (of as few as two men) or, conversely,
come together with other teams to form a larger team (of perhaps up to 30
men), depending on the mission. At a designated time, several teams can join
up and form a detachment (for example, to conduct a raid), which can at any
moment split up again. This whole process can be planned before the opera-
tion begins, or it can evolve during the course of the operation.
13-47. When deployed outside the State, each SPF team or detachment is in
direct communication with a higher headquarters. The controlling headquar-
ters is at the very least an OSC, and some SPF units receive orders directly
from the General Staff or theater headquarters. Thus, the chain of command
during operations is simple and flexible.
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SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
13-48. SPF are a major source of human intelligence (HUMINT), placing
“eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. They
gather information to satisfy strategic and operational intelligence requirements
at extended distances (sometimes more than 100 km) or close to tactical recon-
naissance, in nonlinear and noncontiguous situations. Their priorities include
• NBC delivery systems.
• Headquarters and other command and control (C2) installations.
• Reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RISTA) systems and centers.
• Rail, road, and air movement routes.
• Airfields and ports.
• Logistics facilities.
• Air defense systems.
Once SPF teams locate such targets, they may simply monitor and report on
activity there, or they may conduct direct action or diversionary measures.
13-49. The SPF can train and employ affiliated forces and civilians to perform
HUMINT activities. They may also operate in conjunction with HUMINT
agents controlled by the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.
DIRECT ACTION
13-50. Direct action involves an overt, covert, or clandestine attack by armed
individuals or groups to damage or destroy high-value targets or to kill or seize a
person or persons. Examples of direct-action missions for SPF units are assas-
sination, abduction, hostage taking, sabotage, capture, ambushes, raids, rescue
of hostages (civilian and military), and rescue of downed pilots and aircrews. Im-
plementation of direct-action missions depends on the size of the enemy’s defenses,
the element of surprise, and the assets available to the SPF unit commander.
13-51. The term diversionary measures refers to direct actions of groups or
individuals operating in the enemy’s rear area. These measures include the
destruction or degradation of key military objectives and the disruption of C2,
communications, junctions, transport, and LOCs. They could include misdi-
recting military road movement by moving road markers and generating false
communications. They also involve killing personnel, spreading disinformation,
destroying military hardware, and other actions to weaken the morale and will
of the enemy by creating confusion and panic. Diversionary measures may
contribute to the conduct of information warfare.
MISSIONS
13-52. While SPF belonging to other service components are designed for use
at the operational level, forces from the SPF Command provide a regional and
global strategic capability. Collectively, all these SPF assets can engage the
enemy simultaneously to his operational and even strategic depth. They are
prepared to attack enemy forces anywhere in the region, at overseas bases, at
home stations, and even in military communities. They can attack his airfields,
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
seaports, transportation infrastructures, and LOCs. Targets include not only

enemy military forces, but also government agency heads, contractors, and
private firms involved in transporting troops and materiel into the region or
supporting enemy forces in any manner.
13-53. SPF are likely to be used against key political, economic, or population
centers or tangible targets whose destruction affects intangible centers of
gravity, rather than against military targets for purely military objectives.
These efforts often place noncombatants at risk and aim to apply diplomatic-
political, economic, and psychological pressure. The goal is to present the
enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield. Attacking such targets can
not only deny the enemy sanctuary, but also weaken his national will, par-
ticularly if the OPFOR can attack targets in the enemy’s homeland.
13-54. SPF are capable of conducting the following basic missions:
• Neutralize weapons of mass destruction and precision weapons.
• Attack air defense facilities and airfields.
• Disrupt LOCs.
• Attack C2 and RISTA facilities.
• Exploit surprise to disrupt defensive actions.
• Undermine morale and spread panic.
• Disrupt enemy power supplies and transportation networks (power
utilities, POL transfer and storage sites, and internal transportation).
• Conduct reconnaissance for future ground force operations or for
airborne and/or amphibious landings.
• Organize local irregular forces.
• Prevent efficient movement of enemy reserves.
• Assassinate important political and military figures.
• Provide terminal guidance for attacking aircraft, missiles, and precision
weapons.
In addition to these basic missions, SPF may have specific missions in
peacetime, transition to war, and wartime.
Peacetime Missions
13-55. During peacetime, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
carefully coordinates reconnaissance programs geared to meet the intelligence
requirements of the State and of the OPFOR in war. Aside from SPF troops, it
maintains agent networks in the target country to support SPF operations.
Some of these agents actively engage in subversion; others are “sleepers,”
prepared to act on call in time of war. The SPF Command trains agents to
operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors, and saboteurs. The
agents establish residence near military targets such as airports, missile
bases, arsenals, communications centers, logistics centers and depots, and
routes used for troop movements. Just before the beginning of hostilities, SPF
teams link up with agents already operating in the target area.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-56. Clandestine SPF sabotage agents do little intelligence collection. Their job
is to assimilate into the local culture, establish residences near transport and power
facilities, and when ordered, emplace explosive charges in preselected targets.
13-57. Another important task for clandestine SPF sabotage agents in
peacetime is to acquire houses and plots of land to prepare safe areas where
sabotage teams (civilian and military) can find refuge after landing behind
enemy lines in times of hostilities. These places are usually in the countryside,
in forested areas near the sea, or in the mountains.
13-58. Agents provide incoming sabotage and assassination teams with safe
areas, motor transport, fuel, and supplies. They then guide the teams to their
objective. Both intelligence and sabotage agents can come under the control of a
theater or OSC chief of reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance can transfer
agents from one category to the other at any time or order them to fulfill both roles.
Transition to War
13-59. Before hostilities begin, SPF conduct clandestine operations in the target
area. This increases the probability of destroying key targets well before enemy
force protection measures tighten. This is the most critical period because
clandestine agents or teams can efficiently use the enemy’s lack of awareness
as an opportunity to disorganize and disrupt troops and the local population.
Since the SPF often use terror tactics, direct action during this transition period
still allows plausible deniability. Missions generally include the following:
• Conduct strategic and operational reconnaissance.
• Train and assist insurgents operating in foreign countries.
• Organize local irregular forces.
• Weaken the target country’s military capabilities or will to fight
through either subversion or direct action.
• Assassinate key military and political figures.
• Sabotage enemy mobilization and deployment.
13-60. The General Staff directs the planning of SPF wartime missions, which
form an integral part of combined arms operations. Intended to support
theater-level campaigns as well as OSC-level operations, SPF are capable of
operating throughout enemy territory.
Wartime Missions
13-61. SPF play an important role in support of both the offense and defense.
They may perform their missions separately, in support of strategic objec-
tives, or in support of a theater-level campaign or an OSC-level operation.
Missions generally include some of the following:
• Conduct deep reconnaissance operations.
• Conduct direct action along strategic or operational axes, including
ambushes and raids.
• Destroy critical air defense systems and associated radars.
• Support follow-on conventional military operations.
• Assist local irregular forces to prepare for offensive operations.
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
• Provide communications, liaison, and support to stay-behind partisan

operations in the defense.
13-62. The OPFOR conducts SPF operations in the enemy’s operational and
strategic depth to undermine his morale and to spread panic among the
civilian population and the political leadership. Refugees can hamper enemy
deployment, defensive maneuver, and logistics.
13-63. SPF allocated to an OSC often become part of the disruption force,
frequently operating in enemy-held territory before the beginning of an
operation or battle. They may become part of an OSC’s IFC, to assist in
locating and destroying key enemy formations or systems (see Chapter 2).
13-64. Regional Operations. In operations against the State’s regional
neighbors, Army SPF inserted in advance can support the ground forces
at the operational level and conduct reconnaissance and direct action to
the opponent’s operational depth. Naval and Air Force SPF can carry out
reconnaissance in support of landings or conduct raids against critical
targets. The SPF Command uses its assets to conduct missions throughout
the strategic depth of current regional opponents and to detect indicators of
possible outside intervention in the regional conflict. The SPF can also
support terrorist and insurgent operations in the region.
13-65. Transition Operations. During transition operations, when an
extraregional force begins to intervene, the SPF Command can use its re-
gional and global intelligence-gathering capabilities to the enemy’s strategic
depth. It can use SPF teams to conduct direct-action attacks against ports,
LOCs, and early-entry forces. The SPF can use terror tactics and are well
equipped, armed, and motivated for such missions. The SPF can also support
insurgent and terrorist operations to delay or disrupt the extraregional force’s
mobilization and deployment.
13-66. During transition operations, Army SPF conduct raids against enemy
logistics sites, LOCs, and vulnerable military targets in the region. The Navy
and Air Force can also insert Naval and Air Force SPF to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The SPF Command can
conduct attacks to the enemy’s strategic depth, to divert enemy resources to
protect politically or ecologically sensitive targets and to undermine the
enemy’s will to enter or continue the fight. Although these attacks are
characteristically part of transition operations, they are also conducted
during regional and adaptive operations if required.
13-67. Adaptive Operations. During adaptive operations, substantial gaps
may exist between the positions of dispersed OPFOR units. In these gaps, the
OPFOR may use SPF to destroy key systems, cause politically unacceptable
casualties, harass the enemy, and maintain contact.
13-68. Air Force SPF provide air base security in State territory or other areas
occupied by the OPFOR. They can conduct raids against enemy air bases and
installations within the region. They may also take part in joint SPF opera-
tions coordinated by the SPF Command as part of strategic operations. The
Navy could use its submarine force to insert SPF for direct action against a
high-payoff target outside the region.
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-69. During adaptive operations, the OPFOR may increase the level of
SPF actions in the enemy rear area. The national-level SPF Command provides
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. Strategic reconnaissance by SPF in support of national
intelligence requirements is an essential element of access-control operations.
In addition to its own direct action against enemy forces and installations, the
SPF Command can also support operations of irregular forces.
13-70. The OPFOR has trained SPF as alternate means of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions packages it may develop for them.
This provides a worldwide strategic means of NBC delivery that is not limited
to the range of the missiles of the Strategic Forces.

13-71. An IFC may include an SPF unit as one of its many components (see
Chapters 2 and 7). At OSC level, the SPF component provides the OPFOR
the ability to attack both regional and extraregional enemies throughout
their strategic depth. They conduct operations to achieve strategic military,
political, economic, and/or psychological objectives or to achieve tactical or
operational goals in support of strategic objectives. Such operations may have
either long-range or immediate impact on the enemy.
COMMANDOS
13-72. The SPF Command also includes elite commando units. Like SPF units,
commandos normally operate in territory not controlled by the State. Normally,
personnel selected for commando units come from soldiers who have already
served 3 to 7 years in other combat arms. In addition to proficiency in various
infantry-type tactics, they receive training for more specialized commando mis-
sions, with emphasis on infiltrating and fighting in complex terrain and at night.
Command and Control

13-73. In the administrative force structure, commando battalions are
subordinate to the SPF Command. For administrative purposes, these battal-
ions may be grouped under a commando brigade headquarters. However,
commandos are employed as battalions, companies, platoons, and squads or as
small teams, depending on the type of mission. Commandos are elite units,
specially trained for missions in enemy territory. When assigned such mis-
sions, the commando units may disperse into small teams (typically 5 to 12
men). These small teams are harder to detect during infiltration and provide
the ability to attack many targets simultaneously to achieve maximum effect.
However, based on factors such as the enemy situation and the size of the tar-
get, the individual teams may come together temporarily to form commando
detachments. If necessary, they can re-form into platoon- to company-size
units to perform attacks against critical military and civilian targets.
13-74. Commando units can be allocated in a constituent or dedicated status
to be task organized as part of an OSC or of a division or brigade tactical group
(DTG or BTG) based on a regular ground forces organization. Even is such cases,
however, the reason for incorporating a commando unit into such an organization
normally would be to perform specialized commando missions that contribute to
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________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the overall mission for which that task organization was created. In other cases,
commando units may be allocated in a supporting relationship, while remaining
under the command of their parent commando unit or the SPF Command.
Infantry-Type Missions
13-75. Sometimes, particularly in defensive situations, commandos may be
called on to perform regular infantry missions, filling gaps between dispersed
regular forces. In this case, commandos would typically fight as companies or
battalions, using tactics similar to those of regular infantry units.
Commando Missions
13-76. Commando units generally conduct various types of reconnaissance
and combat missions in the disruption zone or deep in enemy territory, during
larger operations or tactical actions that are either offensive or defensive. The
reconnaissance missions include actions such as surveillance, monitoring, and
searches. Commando units are expected to conduct reconnaissance within the
context of any combat mission. Conversely, when employed as reconnaissance
forces, the commando units’ activities are not limited to reconnaissance. They are
also tasked with assaulting and destroying military or civilian targets.
13-77. Commandos provide the OPFOR with flexible, lethal forces capable of
employment in a variety of roles. Typical missions that are assigned to the
commandos include but are not limited to
• Collecting information on deployment of enemy forces and reserve unit
movement.
• Collecting information on logistics facilities and seaports.
• Collecting information on enemy aircraft operating from forward airfields.
• Conducting reconnaissance of terrain and enemy forces, in support of
the offense.
• Locating and destroying enemy weapons of mass destruction.
• Conducting team- or platoon-size raids and ambushes and destroying
critical military or civilian targets in enemy territory.
• Conducing larger-scale (company- or battalion-size) raids and ambushes
in the disruption zone or in enemy territory.
• Clearing LOCs for use by supported regular ground force units during
the offense or defense.
• Clearing or emplacing obstacles.
• Conducting surprise attacks on enemy forces and create disturbances
after infiltrating into enemy territory.
• Acting as a disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, or security force.
• Acting as an antilanding reserve.
13-78. Offense. Commandos are employed as infiltration units during the of-
fense. Following overland, airborne, seaborne, or waterborne infiltration,
commandosoperating independentlymay perform various reconnaissance
and combat missions described above. However, they may also act in conjunction
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
with regular ground forces. In the latter role, commandos can conduct the
following missions to ensure the success of the overall offensive action:
13-79. Commandos can act as a disruption force, or as part of such a force. In
addition to reconnaissance missions, they can be tasked with creating con-
fusion in the disruption zone or in enemy territory by
• Removing or emplacing obstacles.
• Raiding and destroying headquarters, LOCs, and tactical missile firing
locations.
• Occupying key terrain features (in advance of regular ground forces).
• Occupying ambush positions on enemy withdrawal routes.
13-80. Commandos can act as a fixing force. In this role, they can set up
ambushes or emplace obstacles to prevent further enemy forces from coming
to the aid of the target the regular forces’ attack. They can occupy key terrain
features that control choke points that hinder enemy reserve unit movements.
Such choke points may be valleys, bridges, and crossroads that are critical for
the enemy movement.
13-81. Commandos can act as part of an assault force. In this role, they can
conduct raids and surprise attacks against C2 sites, logistics elements, fire
support units (to include attack helicopter units), and other high-priority civilian
and military targets. They also conduct attacks against other objectives or seize
terrain that hinders enemy reserve unit movements or hampers his withdrawal.
13-82. As part of an exploitation force, commandos may attack a withdrawing
enemy force from his flank and rear. Commando units can be air-inserted
ahead of the withdrawing enemy force to establish ambush positions along the
enemy’s withdrawal route.
13-83. Defense. During a defensive operation conducted by an OSC, commando
units allocated to the OSC can support the action primarily in reconnaissance
and security roles. Commando units can conduct reconnaissance in the OSC
disruption zone or deep in enemy territory. They may also act as a security
force in the OSC support zone. When acting as a security force, commandos
are normally employed as companies or battalions. The commando unit can be
augmented with vehicles and/or additional forces (such as tank or mechanized
units, fire support, or aviation) to act as an assault force in limited-objective
attacks against enemy airborne, air assault, or special operations forces units.
13-84. A commando battalion or company is seldom used as a combat force in
the battle zone because of organization, equipment, and limited firepower.
However, if the defensive mission is more important than reconnaissance or
security, it may act as a combat force, using regular infantry or motorized
infantry tactics. Commando units may fill gaps between the battle positions of
regular forces. When performing such infantry-type missions, commandos are
normally employed as companies or battalions.
13-85. When OSC maneuver forces are forced to withdraw from an area, com-
mando units can remain deployed in the OSC’s original disruption zone and
battle zone to perform reconnaissance, raids, and ambushes. The stay-behind
commandos attempt to maneuver in small teams to conduct reconnaissance
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sance and limited-objective attacks against enemy targets such as C2 sites,

isolated combat units, LOCs, and logistics units.
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
13-86. The Navy has a limited amphibious capability that allows it to insert
either naval infantry or regular ground forces or SPF from the sea. It also
fields a submarine force that could insert naval infantry to conduct raids
against critical installations within the region. The Navy also fields its own
Naval SPF that are able to conduct reconnaissance in support of landings or
raids against critical targets. Thus, amphibious operations can play an impor-
tant role in regional, transition, or adaptive operations.
MISSIONS
13-87. Amphibious landings can be either operational or tactical in scale. However,
either type can influence the outcome of a larger operation or strategic campaign.
Operational Missions
13-88. Amphibious operations can occur when the objectives are of critical
value and the enemy surface warfare capability allows. Although these opera-
tions may be conducted independently of SPF or regular ground forces, they
may have air, naval gunfire, and missile support. Thus, it is possible for an
operational amphibious landing to have major strategic consequences.
13-89. These operational missions may have the following objectives:
• Conduct operations in concert with ground forces to envelop and
destroy enemy positions in a coastal area.
• Seize or destroy ports, islands, peninsulas, and/or straits, radar sites,
and other important objectives in coastal areas.
• Interdict enemy LOCs within the coastal areas.
• Conduct combined operations with or in support of airborne and SPF
units landed deep within enemy territory.
• Contribute to deception operations with amphibious landings mounted as
a feint to mislead the enemy about the direction of the OPFOR main effort.
• Block the approach routes of enemy reserves or counterattack forces
that might influence the outcome of the main operation or campaign.
• Establish coastal defenses on occupied coasts as other OPFOR forces
move deeper into enemy territory.
These objectives can be accomplished by conducting an unopposed, surreptitious
insertion of amphibious forces within striking distance of a lightly defended target.
Tactical Missions
13-90. Tactical amphibious landings probably are the most frequent form of
OPFOR amphibious operation. Their purpose is to attack the rear area or
flank of any enemy force along a coastline or to seize islands, naval bases,
coastal airfields, ports, and other objectives on an enemy-held coastline. This
diverts enemy attention and resources away from the decisive area of the
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FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
battlefield. The amphibious landing force can be up to a detachment, operat-

ing independently or with ground force units.
13-91. In an offensive operation, tactical amphibious landing forces can seize
bridges or road junctions near the coast and hold them until the arrival of the
main land forces. Such landings can stop or delay enemy reinforcements or cut
off his line of retreat. They may also help to maintain the tempo of the OPFOR
ground forces’ advance, or they can be for deceptive purposes. Thus, landings that
are tactical in scale may nevertheless have important operational repercussions.
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Missions

13-92. Reconnaissance and sabotage amphibious landings are in a special
category. Seaborne raids may perform the multiple functions of
• Conducting reconnaissance.
• Damaging or destroying high-value installations located near a coast.
• Disrupting the enemy’s C2 and/or logistics.
• Tying down substantial numbers of enemy troops in the defense of
long, vulnerable coastlines.
Sea-delivered SPF teams may also perform deep reconnaissance and sabotage
tasks of operational or strategic importance.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

13-93. In the administrative force structure, naval infantry forces are part of the
Navy. However, they may conduct amphibious landings in support of an OSC or
theater command as part of joint and combined arms operations. The SHC or
theater command may allocate naval infantry units to an OSC in a given operation.
13-94. Some amphibious landings are conducted by naval infantry delivered
by naval transport, without support from or coordinated action with other ser-
vices of the Armed Forces. In this case, a naval commander could exercise
overall C2 of the amphibious operation.
13-95. However, most landings by naval infantry are part of a larger joint
operation or campaign in which they operate in conjunction with forces of other
services. When sufficient naval infantry forces are not available, the amphibious
landing force may consist of ground forces or SPF units that are transported by
naval vessels. In these cases, the OSC or theater commander normally organizes
and controls the amphibious operation, with expert advice from the chief of littoral
warfare on his functional staff. The OSC or theater commander coordinates the
joint actions of the naval and/or ground forces conducting the landing with support-
ing actions by airborne, SPF, Air Force, and air defense forces. The commander of
the naval transport unit and the commander of the transported unit usually share
responsibility for overall control during loading, transport, and landing.
13-96. The landing force commander is the commander of the naval infantry,
ground force, or SPF unit forming the basis for the amphibious landing force.
He is responsible for preparing and positioning his troops for embarkation on
naval craft that will transport them to the shore. He must coordinate with the
commander of the naval unit providing transport. After the landing, the land-
ing force commander is solely responsible for conducting the operation. While
13-18
________________________________________________________________________________Chapter 13
the landing force commander can plan the scheme of maneuver, final approval
of the plan comes from the OSC or theater commander.
CONDUCT
13-97. The preference for smaller-scale landings reflects the limited and
subordinate role amphibious landings play in OPFOR thinking. Also, the
OPFOR does not use its naval infantry in exactly the same way as other
countries use their marines. For the latter, the seizure of a beachhead is
often merely a prelude to extended action ashore. The OPFOR, by contrast,
generally intends to use its specialized naval infantry troops only to secure a
beachhead (and perhaps to raid inland). Any buildup of effort is by ordinary
infantry or mechanized infantry units, with supporting artillery and staying
power. The OPFOR withdraws naval infantry from combat as soon as possible
to keep it available to ensure the success of subsequent landings. This, along
with coastal defense, is the primary role of OPFOR naval infantry.
Joint Forces and Combined Arms

13-98. An amphibious landing usually takes on a joint and combined arms
character. Its success normally requires at least temporary local air and naval
superiority. (The exception would be small-scale raids conducted under condi-
tions of limited visibility.) Against all but the weakest of enemy defenses, a
heavy fire preparation is also necessary to suppress the enemy. Naturally,
much fire is air-delivered, including using fires of accompanying helicopters.
Also, the main ground forces’ long-range artillery and/or naval gunfire may be
able to provide support for shallow landings.
13-99. An airborne or heliborne landing normally precedes or accompanies
any important amphibious landing. If the amphibious landing is to be small in
scale and shallow, a heliborne force may suffice. However, a major deep
landing probably requires the aid of an airborne drop. These air-delivered
forces may either seize a beachhead or port, interdict the approach of enemy
reserves, or attack important targets.
13-100. For successful amphibious and supporting air landings, the OPFOR
must have an accurate picture of what enemy land, air, and naval forces are in
range to intervene. Intensive intelligence-gathering always precedes the landing.
13-101. In a landing conducted jointly with sea-delivered ground forces, naval
infantry units constitute the assault force. They have responsibility for
breaching antilanding obstacles in the water and on the shore, for seizing a
beachhead, and for securing the approach of the exploitation force to the landing
area. Once ashore, naval infantry units employ standard OPFOR tactics as they
fight their way forward to link up with air-landed troops. Their immediate mis-
sion is to provide protection for the landing and deployment of exploitation forces.
13-102. After the naval infantry secures a beachhead, infantry or mechanized
infantry units can land and take over the battle. They normally replace,
rather than reinforce, the assault force, even if the latter has taken only light
casualties. Thus, the naval infantry remains available to spearhead additional
landings. Once that is accomplished, the assault force assists the exploitation
force in achieving the overall objective of the landing.
13-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
13-103. As pointed out, the OPFOR expects to commit infantry or mechanized

infantry units through a secure beachhead to perform combat missions inland.
However, these units may share in the assault landing role as well. If so, the
OPFOR recognizes the need for at least a degree of special training. The
ground force units may have attached naval infantry personnel to help over-
come the special problems of an assault landing.
Regional Operations
13-104. Against a regional opponent, the OPFOR may be able to conduct
amphibious landings as operational-level missions. In this case, a landing
force of battalion or even brigade size, once landed, could conduct large-scale
operations employing fixing, assault, and exploitation forces, as described in
Chapter 3.
13-105. The OPFOR’s naval infantry forces may be capable of forcible entry
against regional opponents. Amphibious operations may entail the landing of
a naval infantry battalion or brigade as the assault force. The exploitation
force, consisting primarily of infantry or mechanized infantry troops, follows
to exploit the opportunity created by the assault force.
13-106. Even in regional operations, larger-scale amphibious landings are
risky. Therefore, the OPFOR normally would not attempt them outside the
range of land-based air cover and support. Linkup with a ground maneuver
force should occur as quickly as possible.
Transition Operations
13-107. When an extraregional enemy has only early-entry forces deployed,
OPFOR naval infantry forces may still be capable of forcible entry. Their in-
sertion can complete the envelopment of a small enemy force. It could also
help control further enemy deployment from the sea.
Adaptive Operations
13-108. The OPFOR does not have the capability to conduct opposed amphibious
operations against a fully deployed extraregional force. It does, however, have
the capability to transport up to a regular infantry or naval infantry battalion
by sea, with limited amounts of supplies and heavy weapons. The unit is then
landed unopposed at a predetermined site, away from the enemy’s main
forces. In some cases, SPF or airborne troops may be inserted in lieu of using
conventional infantry or naval infantry.
13-109. During adaptive operations, amphibious operations typically comprise
small-scale landings conducted in detachment strength. These operations
include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance, and assaults, with detachment-
strength actions being the norm. The raids and ambushes in this case would
be small-scale actions conducted in a manner similar to those described for
SPF earlier in this chapter, against isolated small enemy forces. Because of
the extraregional force’s modern RISTA means, only shorter-range landings
conducted during hours of darkness have a chance of achieving the surprise
that is critical to success. Normally, linkup with friendly forces is planned to
occur within hours after the landing.
13-20
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with joint definitions, and other
selected terms. Terms with specific OPFOR-related definitions for which
FM 7-100.1 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) and followed by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page
where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the document listed.
AA antiaircraft
*access limitation .................................................................................................. ¶1-61
*adaptive operations .................................................................................................... ¶1-6
ADCSINT Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ADD area distribution depot
ADTDL Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library (now the General
Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library)
*administrative force structure .......................................................................................... ¶2-23
AFCS automated fire control system
*affiliated .................................................................................................. ¶2-14
AFL affiliated
AIRCP airborne command post
*air parity ...................................................................¶8-67 (see also FM 1-02)
*air superiority .................................................................... ¶8-65 (see also JP 1-02)
*air supremacy .................................................................... ¶8-64 (see also JP 1-02)
AKO Army Knowledge Online
ALR antilanding reserve
ALTCP alternate command post
*annihilation .................................................................................................. ¶7-10
*antilanding reserve .................................................................................................. ¶4-64
*antitank reserve .................................................................................................. ¶4-63
AOR area of responsibility
AOS airspace operations subsection
AP antipersonnel
APC armored personnel carrier
APOD aerial port of debarkation
Glossary-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
APOE aerial port of embarkation ......................................................¶1-60

*area defense ................................................................ ¶4-112 (see also FM 1-02)
*area of responsibility ................................................................... ¶2-68 (see also JP 1-02)
ARM antiradiation missile
ASP aviation support plan
AT antitank
*assault force ..................................................................................................¶3-53
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATR antitank reserve
*attack ..................................................................................................¶3-69
*attack zone ............................................................................... ¶2-79, 3-43, 4-42
AUXCP auxiliary command post
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
*axis ........................................................................................ ¶3-45, 4-42
*battle line ..................................................................................................¶2-71
*battle position .................................................................. ¶4-44 (see also FM 1-02)
*battle zone ............................................................................... ¶2-76, 3-37, 4-39
*brigade tactical group ..................................................................................................¶2-45
BTG brigade tactical group
C2 command and control
C 2W command and control warfare
C 3D camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception
CAO chief of airspace operations
CDR commander
CGS Chief of the General Staff
COE contemporary operational environment
*combat system ................................................................................................¶1-114
*command and control ....................................................................................................¶2-3
*complex battle position ..................................................................................................¶4-46
*complex terrain ....................................................................................................p. ix
*computer warfare ..................................................................................................¶5-28
*constituent ..................................................................................................¶2-11
*contact force ..................................................................................................¶4-98
*contemporary operational environment ...........................................................................p. vi
Glossary-2
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*contemporary OPFOR .................................................................................................. p. xiii

COP command observation post
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
*counterattack .................................................................. ¶3-103 (see also JP 1-02)
*counterattack force .................................................................................................. ¶4-59
CP command post
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CTC combat training center
DAS direct air support
DC deputy commander
DCP deception command post
DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
*decentralized defense .................................................................................................. ¶4-85
*deception force .........................................................................................¶3-56, 4-66
DED dedicated
*dedicated .................................................................................................. ¶2-12
*defense information infrastructure ................................................................................... ¶5-6
*defensive information warfare .......................................................................................... ¶5-61
*defensive maneuver .................................................................................................. ¶4-98
*demolition .................................................................................................. ¶7-11
*destruction .................................................................................................... ¶7-9
DII defense information infrastructure
*direct air support .................................................................................................. ¶8-49
*dispersed attack .................................................................................................. ¶3-80
*disruption force .........................................................................................¶3-50, 4-52
*disruption zone ................................................................................¶2-75, 3-31, 4-35
*division tactical group .................................................................................................. ¶2-45
DOD Department of Defense
DOS denial of service
DTG divisional tactical group
DZ drop zone
ECM electronic countermeasures
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures
Glossary-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
*electronic warfare ................................................................... ¶5-24 (see also JP 1-02)

*enemy ...................................................................................................p. xii
EO electro-optical
EW electronic warfare
*exploitation force ..................................................................................................¶3-54
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FCP forward command post
FG field group
*field group ..................................................................................................¶2-33
*fixing force ..................................................................................................¶3-51
FM field manual
FSCC fire support coordination center
*functional forces ..................................................................................................¶3-46
*functional staff ................................................................................................¶2-109
GII global information infrastructure
GPS global positioning system
*harassment ..................................................................................................¶7-13
HE high-explosive
HF high-frequency
HPT high-payoff target
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high-value target
IA information attack
IADS integrated air defense system
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IFC integrated fires command
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
INFO information
*information attack ..................................................................................................¶5-48
*information warfare .................................................................. p. 5-1 (see also FM 1-02)
*integrated attack ..................................................................................................¶3-72
*integrated defense ..................................................................................................¶4-83
Glossary-4
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
*integrated fires command .................................................................................................. ¶2-47

*integrated support command .................................................................................¶2-61, 12-42
*integrated support group ................................................................................................ ¶12-42
INTEL intelligence
IR infrared
ISC integrated support command
ISG integrated support group
IT information technology
IW information warfare
JP joint publication
*kill zone ................................................................................¶2-80, 3-44, 4-43
km kilometer(s)
LAN local area network
*limited-objective attack .................................................................................................. ¶3-89
*limit of responsibility .................................................................................................. ¶2-68
LOC line of communications
*local air superiority .................................................................................................. ¶8-66
LOR limit of responsibility
LZ landing zone
m meter(s)
*main defense force .................................................................................................. ¶4-56
*maneuver defense .................................................................................................. ¶4-89
*maneuver reserve .................................................................................................. ¶4-61
MCP main command post
*military strategic campaign plan ..................................................................................... ¶1-22
*military strategy .................................................................... ¶1-81 (see also JP 1-02)
mm millimeter(s)
MOD Ministry of Defense
MRL multiple rocket launcher
MSD movement support detachment
MSS mission support site
MTC military transportation center
*national information infrastructure .................................................................................. ¶5-5
*national security strategy .................................................................................................... ¶1-1
Glossary-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
*national strategic campaign ...............................................................................................¶1-15

*national strategic campaign plan .....................................................................................¶1-18
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA national command authority
NCO noncommissioned officer
*neutralization ..................................................................................................¶7-12
NGO nongovernmental organization
NII national information infrastructure
NOE nap-of-the-earth
OBJ objective
objective ............................................. ¶3-45 (see also FM 1-02 and JP 1-02)
OD obstacle detachment
ODCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OE operational environment
*offensive information warfare ...........................................................................................¶5-58
operational art .................................................................. ¶1-84? (see also JP 1-02)
operational environment ....................................................................................p. vi (JP 1-02)
*operational exclusion ..................................................................................................¶1-59
*operational shielding ................................................................................................ ¶1-63?
*operational-strategic command ....................................................................................... ¶2-36?
OPFOR opposing force
*opposing force (OPFOR) ...................................................................................................p. xii
OSC operational-strategic command
OTID OPFOR and Threat Integration Directorate
paramilitary forces .............................................................................................. JP 1-02
*perception management ..................................................................................................¶5-44
*personnel support ................................................................................................¶12-68
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
*precision weapon ..................................................................................................¶7-40
*protected force ..................................................................................................¶4-57
*protection and security measures ....................................................................................¶5-38
PSYWAR psychological warfare
PVO private volunteer organization
PWP plasticized white phosphorus
Glossary-6
_________________________________________________________________________________ Glossary
QRF quick reaction force

RCS radar cross section
*reconnaissance fire .................................................................................................. ¶7-60
*regional operations .................................................................................................... ¶1-6
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
ROE rules of engagement
RPV remotely-piloted vehicle
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic-aperture radar
SATCOM satellite communication(s)
SCP strategic campaign plan
*security force .........................................................................................¶3-55, 4-58
SHC Supreme High Command
SHF super-high-frequency
*shielding force .................................................................................................. ¶4-98
SID Strategic Integration Department
*simple battle position .................................................................................................. ¶4-45
SIW strategic information warfare
SIWP strategic information warfare plan
SIWPO Strategic Information Warfare Planning Office
SLAR side-looking airborne radar
SOCC support operations coordination center
*sophisticated ambush .................................................................................................. ¶3-93
SPF Special-Purpose Forces
SPOD sea port of debarkation
SPOE sea port of embarkation
spoiling attack .................................................................... ¶3-98 (see also JP 1-02)
SPT supporting
SSM surface-to-surface missile
*strategic information warfare............................................................................................ ¶5-53
*strategic operations ...........................................................................................¶1-6, 1-27
*strategic preclusion .................................................................................................. ¶1-57
*strike ................................................................................................ ¶3-110
*supporting .................................................................................................. ¶2-13
Glossary-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
*support line ..................................................................................................¶2-71

*support zone ............................................................................... ¶2-78, 3-42, 4-41
SUSCP sustainment command post
*system ................................................................................................¶1-107
*systems warfare ................................................................................................¶1-108
*tactical group ..................................................................................................¶2-44
TBM theater ballistic missile
TECH technical
*theater ................................................................... ¶2-19 (see also JP 1-02)
*threat ...................................................................................................p. xii
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TO&E table of organization and equipment
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
*transition operations ....................................................................................................¶1-6
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra-high-frequency
VEESS vehicle engine exhaust smoke system
VHF very-high-frequency
WAN wide area network
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorus
Glossary-8
Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old
number.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.us.army.mil and
http://www.adtdl.army.mil
FM 7-100. Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy. 1 May 2003.

FM 7-100.2. Opposing Force Tactics. TBP.
FM 7-100.3. Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and
Tactics. TPB.
FM 7-100.4. Opposing Force Organization Guide. TBP.
FM 7-100.5. Opposing Force: Worldwide Equipment Guide. TBP.
Bibliography-1
Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page
reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶).
A adaptive operations, 1-6, 1-13, logistics and administrative

1-47–1-53, 1-88–1-91 support, 2-26, 12-8, 12-20–
abduction, 13-50
airborne forces, 13-3 12-21, 12-32, 12-36–
access-control operations, pp. x, 12-37, 12-41
xix, ¶1-36, 1-55–1-62, 1-65, 1-74, air defense, 9-153, 9-193–
9-196 naval infantry, 13-93
1-104, 2-34, 2-57, 3-5, 3-8, 3-10,
4-13, 4-15, 4-23, 4-116, 5-81, amphibious landings, 13-86, smoke units, 11-71
5-89, 6-48, 7-76, 8-44, 8-71, 13-108–13-109 SPF, 13-41–13-42
9-82, 10-16, 10-68, 10-70, 13-3, aviation, 8-73–8-77 administrative subsection, ISC
13-69, 13-107 staff, 12-38
defensive operations, 4-13–
access limitation, p. xix, 4-18, 4-25, 4-28, 4-69, advanced munitions, 7-42, 7-59
¶1-61–1-62, 4-13, 5-89, 4-76, 4-113
7-77, 9-191, 11-96 adversary. See enemy; opposing
engineer support, 10-59, force; threat.
operational exclusion, 1-59– 10-64–10-75
1-60 aerial ports of debarkation
fire support, 7-72, 7-79–7-81 (enemy), as targets, 1-62, 1-104,
strategic preclusion, 1-6, 1-12, 6-48, 7-77, 10-58, 11-96. See
1-30–1-31, 1-35–1-36, 1-40, heliborne forces, 13-3
also airfields; ports.
1-57–1-58, 3-5, 3-9, 4-5, IW support of, 5-86–5-90
5-79, 5-84, 9-191 aerial ports of embarkation
logistics, 12-14
(enemy), as targets, 1-60. See
actor(s), pp. xivxv. See also NBC use, 11-97–11-98 also airfields; ports.
nation-state; non-state; third-
offensive operations, 3-14– aerial reconnaissance, 6-26, 6-34,
party actors.
3-16, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, 3-89, 6-37, 6-42, 8-3–8-4, 8-10–8-11,
adaptive, 3-95, 4-17, 4-69, 4-113 8-21, 8-35, 8-38, 8-45–8-47, 8-59,
approaches, pp. x, xvi, ¶1-43, paramilitary forces, 1-100, 8-69, 9-112, 10-29, 13-17
1-38, 1-50, 1-82–1-83, 2-98, 1-104, 4-18 aerial resupply. See aviation.
2-100, 3-66, 4-6, 4-14, 4-18,
reconnaissance, 6-50–6-51 affiliated forces, 1-73, 1-78, 2-14,
4-81, 8-73, 9-3–9-4, 9-95,
9-195, 10-73, 11-13, 11-98, sanctuary-based. See 2-44, 2-135, 3-14, 3-22, 3-32,
12-59. See also flexibility; sanctuary. 3-59, 3-95, 4-18, 4-25, 4-37,
initiative; opportunity. SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-67– 4-52–4-53, 4-104, 4-119, 5-69,
13-70 5-72, 6-1, 9-2, 9-52–9-53, 9-61,
operations. See adaptive 9-76, 9-144, 11-8, 11-30, 11-55,
operations. administrative force structure, 13-49. See also criminal orga-
principles, 1-54–1-78 2-23–2-29, 2-34, 2-37–2-38, nizations; drug organizations;
2-40–2-43, 2-61 insurgent forces; mercenaries;
strategy, 1-53
airborne forces, 13-5 partisan forces; terrorists.
tactics, 1-53
air defense, 9-79 agents,
use of conventional forces,
pp. x, xix, ¶1-6 allocation to IFC, 2-56 biological. See main entry.
use of technology, p. ix allocation to OSC, 2-37–2-42 chemical. See main entry.
aviation, 8-1–8-2 intelligence and sabotage,
chemical defense units, 11-61 6-7, 13-17, 13-55–13-59
commando units, 13-73
fire support, 7-35
Index-0
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
air armies, 2-54 airborne jamming, 8-4, 8-52. See air defense, pp. 9-1–9-34
air army CP, 8-13 also heliborne jamming. air defense ambush, 1-76,
national-level air armies, 8-1, airborne landing, p. 13-1, ¶13-1– 4-53, 9-31, 9-61, 9-65, 9-69,
8-3–8-4, 11-30 13-36 9-77, 9-91, 9-145, 9-157,
airborne landing force, 2-221, 9-161, 9-168–9-177, 9-194–
theater air armies, 2-25, 8-1,
13-6 9-195
8-5–8-7, 8-13, 8-23–8-24,
11-30 air defense protection for, 9-5 air defense and NBC warning
communications net,
airborne assault. See airborne air-landing, 13-21
2-222, 9-47, 9-120, 11-66,
landing. air movement, 13-18, 13-21– 11-68
airborne command post, 2-183, 13-23
Air Defense Forces, Air Force,
2-193, 4-50 annex in operation plan, 2-167 9-39, 9-68, 9-79, 9-81–
airborne forces, 2-26, 3-6, 11-29, departure area, 13-22 9-83, 9-129, 9-160
11-45, p. 13-1, ¶13-1–13-36
drop zone. See main entry. air defense jamming, 8-39–
access-control, 13-3 8-40, 9-7, 9-96–9-99, 9-173
embarking troops, 13-14–
airborne landing. See main 13-15, 13-17 air defense plan, 9-37, 9-164
entry.
fire support, 13-17–13-19 air defense sectors, 9-28–
air transport, 13-9 9-31, 9-195
landing force commander,
allocated to OSC, p. 13-1, 13-6, 13-19, 13-31 air defense umbrella, 8-10,
¶13-5, 13-11 9-20, 9-22, 9-24, 9-85,
landing zone. See main entry.
allocated to theater HQ, 13-5 9-134–9-137
linkup with ground maneuver
as deception force, 13-3 force, 13-6, 13-7, 13-9, air observers, 9-67, 9-113,
as assault force, 13-3 13-35–13-36 9-121–9-123, 9-140,
9-165, 9-174
as exploitation force, 13-3 movement to objective,
13-31–13-32 air surveillance, 9-23, 9-88,
as fixing force, 13-3 9-109, 9-112–9-113, 9-118,
assembly area, 13-27 objective area, 13-20, 13-27, 9-120, 9-134, 9-136, 9-165–
13-29, 13-34–13-36 9-167, 9-183–9-184
command and control, 13-5–
13-6 participation of other arms, all-arms air defense, 9-1–9-4,
13-9 9-12, 9-15, 9-19, 9-56, 9-73,
envelopment, 13-1, 13-11
planning, 13-14–13-19 9-78, 9-84, 9-89, 9-93–9-95,
establishing a new theater,
preparation of DZ, 13-16– 9-165, 9-182, 9-195
13-10
13-17 antiaircraft guns, 9-73, 9-83,
expanding an airhead, 13-2
reconnaissance of objective, 9-86–9-88, 9-90, 9-92, 9-96,
in adaptive operations, 13-3 9-98, 9-108, 9-119, 9-131,
13-32
in regional operations, 13-2 9-133–9-134, 9-161, 9-169,
SPF support, 13-53, 13-64
in transition operations, 13-3 9-171, 9-175
supported by amphibious
operational missions, 13-11 antiaircraft machineguns,
landing, 13-89
9-93, 9-161, 9-165
reconnaissance, 6-41 airborne operations. See airborne
area coverage, 9-83, 9-87,
regional force projection, landing.
9-127, 9-130, 9-132, 9-135–
p. 13-1, ¶13-2, 13-8 aircraft. See attack helicopters; 9-136, 9-143, 9-146, 9-155
strategic missions, 13-7–13-10 bombers; electronic warfare
Army air defense, 9-79, 9-84
strategic objectives, p. 13-1, aircraft; fighter aircraft; ground-
attack aircraft; helicopters; aviation. See counterair.
¶13-10
interceptors; reconnaissance basing area (Phase I), 9-48–
support of amphibious aircraft; tanker; transport 9-49, 9-58, 9-63, 9-65
landing, 13-95, 13-99– aircraft; transport helicopters.
13-100, 13-108 command and control, 9-22–
9-47
tactical missions, 13-12–13-13
control measures, 9-45
use in heliborne landing, 13-6
Index-1
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
air defense (continued) in transition operations, 3-13, target acquisition, 9-34, 9-88,
coordination with other arms, 9-153, 9-191–9-192 9-97, 9-109, 9-112, 9-114–
9-19–9-20 jammers. See main entry. 9-115, 9-118
corridors, 8-26, 9-45 maneuver and dispersal target area (Phase III), 9-48,
techniques, 9-102, 9-105– 9-70, 9-73–9-74
counterair, 8-37, 8-43–8-44,
9-2, 9-56, 9-73, 9-81, 9-189 9-107, 9-148 theater-level, 9-29, 9-79
defense of high-value/key missile defense, 2-112, 6-32, UAVs, air defense against, 9-5,
assets, 8-44, 9-81, 9-99, 9-41, 9-83, 9-86, 9-101 9-41, 9-125, 9-179–9-187
9-128, 9-131, 9-134, 9-154– national-level assets, 9-63, zones of responsibility, 9-39–
9-155, 9-157, 9-159, 9-170, 9-79, 9-81–9-83, 9-115– 9-44, 9-161
9-189 9-118, 9-129, 9-134, 9-156 air dominance. See airspace
early warning, 9-21, 9-26, 9-67, nonlethal air defense assets, dominance.
9-83, 9-88, 9-109, 9-112– 9-96–9-101 air drop. See airborne landing.
9-114, 9-116–9-118, 9-121, offensive component, 9-6, airfields,
9-146, 9-184, 9-195 9-193
defense of, 9-99, 9-128, 9-154,
fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116 operational-level assets, 10-12, 13-21, 13-68
flight area (Phase II), 9-48, 9-20, 9-63, 9-79, 9-84–
enemy, as targets, 4-127, 6-20,
9-65–9-67, 9-134 9-85, 9-115–9-118, 9-130–
8-71, 9-48–9-49, 9-51, 9-55–
force protection, 2-112 9-131, 9-161
9-57, 9-59, 9-61–9-62, 9-67,
goal(s), 9-1, 9-5–9-21, 9-71, passive air defense measures, 9-125, 9-160, 9-193, 11-4,
9-136 9-30, 9-100, 9-102–9-108, 11-56, 13-3, 13-10, 13-11,
9-148, 9-159, 9-187, 9-195 13-48, 13-52, 13-54–13-55,
ground-based, 8-37, 9-40,
9-42–9-45, 9-189, 9-195 planning, 9-50–9-55, 9-66, 9-72 13-68, 13-77, 13-90
in adaptive operations, 9-153, phases, 9-48–9-77 Air Force, p. 8-1. See also aircraft;
9-193–9-196 point protection, 9-83, 9-87, aviation.
in antilanding reserve, 4-64 9-127, 9-133, 9-144, air armies. See main entry.
9-154–9-155 Air Defense Forces, 9-39,
in battle zone, 9-65, 9-70,
9-134, 9-145–9-147, principles, 9-11–9-21 9-68, 9-79, 9-81–9-83,
9-156–9-158 radars, See main entry. 9-129, 9-160
in complex battle position, 4-47 reconnaissance, 9-109– Air Force SPF. See Special-
9-126. See also air Purpose Forces.
in defensive operations, 9-34,
9-152–9-161 surveillance. in IFC, 2-54, 2-577-16, 8-8
in disruption zone, 3-34, 4-53, reserve (radars), 9-85, 9-117 in OSC, 2-40, 8-3, 8-8, 8-15
9-49, 9-57, 9-65–9-66, roving air defense units, in transition operations, 3-13
9-69–9-70, 9-74, 9-144– 9-161, 9-178 mixed aviation units, 8-2, 8-4,
9-146, 9-155–9-156 self-defense, 9-44, 9-86, 9-88 8-11
in maneuver reserve, 4-111 small arms, 9-93, 9-161, 9-165 national-level air armies,
in offensive operations, surface-to-air missiles. See 2-26, 8-2–8-4
9-141–9-151 main entry. organization, 8-1–8-8
in OSC, 9-27, 9-32, 9-79, support of airborne landing, 9-5 task organization, 8-2, 8-4,
9-85, 9-97 8-7, 8-9, 8-15
support of amphibious
in regional operations, 9-27, landing, 13-95 technological overmatch,
9-81–9-82, 9-189–9-190 p. 8-1, ¶8-37
support of IW, 5-27
in sophisticated ambush, 3-97 theater air armies. See air
tactical-level assets, 9-20,
in support zone, 9-70, 9-85, 9-69, 9-72–9-73, 9-79, armies.
9-134, 9-148, 9-159 9-89–9-95, 9-115, 9-132– transport for airborne landing,
in tactical groups, 9-32 9-133, 9-146, 9-156, 9-161 13-21
integrated air defense
system. See main entry.
Index-2
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
air parity, 8-67 air defense ambush. See air naval infantry, 13-86, 13-93–
local, 3-75, 8-72 defense. 13-97, 13-101–13-103,
ambushing force(s), 2-150, 13-105, 13-107–13-108
regional, 8-72
4-53, 4-117 naval SPF support, 13-86
airspace control net, 2-220, 9-38
reconnaissance, 6-11–6-12 naval transport, 13-86,
airspace deconfliction, 8-20–8-21.
sophisticated ambush. See 13-94–13-96
See also airspace management.
main entry. operational missions, 13-88–
airspace dominance, 8-62–8-67.
amphibious landing, p. 13-1, 13-89, 13-104
See also air parity; air
superiority; air supremacy; local ¶13-86–13-109 raids, 13-86, 13-92, 13-97–
air superiority. airborne support, 13-95, 13-98, 13-109
airspace management, 7-4, 8-56, 13-99–13-100, 13-108 reconnaissance, 13-92, 13-109
9-36–9-46 air defense support, 13-95 sabotage, 13-92
air defense control measures, air support, 13-88, 13-95, SPF conducting, 13-86,
9-45 13-98 13-88, 13-92, 13-95–
staff responsibility, 9-37–9-38 ambush, 13-109 13-96, 13-108
zones of responsibility, 9-39– amphibious landing force, SPF support, 13-54, 13-64,
9-44 13-90–13-91, 13-95–13-96, 13-95
airspace operations subsection, 13-104 SSM support, 13-88
ISC staff, 12-38 artillery support, 13-98 tactical missions, 13-90–13-91
OSC staff, 2-54, 2-95, 2-99, assault force, 13-101–13-102, amphibious operations. See
8-20–8-23, 8-26–8-27, 8-31 13-104–13-105 amphibious landing.
air superiority, 6-26, 6-28, 8-43, coastal defense, 13-89, 13-97 annihilation (target damage
8-65, 8-71–8-72, 9-8, 9-42– command and control, 13-93– criteria), 7-9–7-10
9-43, 9-84, 13-7, 13-14 13-96 antiaircraft guns. See air defense.
local, 8-57, 8-66, 8-71, 13-20, detachment, 13-109 antiarmor ambush, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
13-98 envelopment, 13-107 antihelicopter mines. See mines.
regional, p. 8-1, ¶8-68–8-72 exploitation force, 13-101– antilanding defense, 4-62, 9-160–
air support, 2-54. See also 13-102, 13-104–13-105 9-161, 10-38
aviation. fixing force, 13-104 antilanding reserve, 4-53, 4-58, 4-64,
air supremacy, 8-64, 9-28. forcible entry, 13-105, 13-107 12-98, 13-13, 13-77, 13-83
air surveillance. See air defense. ground forces, 13-86, 13-88, antiradiation missiles, 7-42
air-to-surface missiles, 7-42 13-95–13-97, 13-101– antitank. See also antiarmor.
alliances. See coalitions. 13-103, 13-105 antitank capability, 1-52
allied forces. See coalitions; heliborne support, 13-98–13-99 antitank guided missiles, 9-61,
multinational forces and in adaptive operations, 9-93, 9-165
operations. 13-108–13-109 antitank reserve, 4-63, 10-17
all means available/necessary, in regional operations, area coverage. See air defense.
1-29, 1-32, 1-68, 1-94, 4-18, 13-104–13-106
area defense, 4-88, 4-112–4-131,
5-89, 11-97, 12-1 in support of airborne landing, 9-157
alternate command post, 2-194, 13-89
within maneuver defense, 4-91
2-216 in support of SPF, 13-88
area(s) of responsibility, 1-26,
ambiguity, 2-154 in transition operations, 13-107 2-68–2-80
ambush, 1-76, 2-146, 3-6, 4-25, landing force commander, defensive operations, 4-32, 4-34
4-105, 4-120, 4-123, 4-125, 9-8, 13-96
9-56, 9-62, 9-64, 9-194, 13-13, linear AOR, 2-68
linkup with ground maneuver
13-50, 13-61, 13-77, 13-79– nonlinear AOR, 2-68
force, 13-106, 13-109
13-80, 13-82, 13-85, 13-109 offensive operations, 3-28–3-30
naval fire support, 13-88, 13-98
area support. See logistics.
Index-3
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Armed Forces, 2-16. See also chemical munitions, 7-45, attack; integrated attack;
service component(s). For 11-8, 11-26 limited-objective attack.
individual services, see Air counterreconnaissance, 8-48 attack helicopters, 8-9, 8-33–8-34
Force; Army; Internal Security
in disruption force, 4-53, 4-103 as assault force, 8-51
Forces; Navy; Special-Purpose
Forces; Strategic Forces. in exploitation force, 3-87, 3-117 as counterattack force, 8-51
armies (operational-level in IFC, 2-47, 2-52–2-53, 7-16 as deception force, 8-51
command), 2-23, 2-37, 11-71 nuclear munitions, 7-46, 11-30 as disruption force, 8-51
armor(ed) forces, 3-6, 3-79, 3-88, precision munitions, 7-42 as exploitation force, 3-79,
3-109, 3-118, 6-43, 11-47 preparation of DZ/LZ, 13-17 3-109, 3-118, 8-51
Army (ground forces), reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61 as fixing force, 8-51
airborne forces, 2-26, 13-5 remote minelaying, 10-40, as reserve, 8-51, 8-61
air defense, 9-79, 9-84, 10-42–10-43 (enemy) as targets, 9-74–
amphibious landing, 13-86, smoke delivery, 11-74, 11-77, 9-75, 9-94, 9-110, 9-122,
13-88, 13-95–13-97, 11-79, 11-90 9-196, 13-81
13-101–13-103, 13-105 support of airborne or escort transport helicopters,
army aviation, p. 8-1, ¶8-1, helborne landing, 13-17– 13-18, 13-22
8-9–8-12 13-18, 13-34 in theater IFC, 8-10–8-11
Army service component support of amphibious attack to destroy, 3-18
headquarters, 2-26 landing, 13-98 attack to expel, 3-20
Army SPF. See Special- support of IW, 5-27, 5-35–5-36 attack to seize, 3-19, 3-40
Purpose Forces. suppression of enemy air attack zone, 2-69, 2-79
army aviation, p. 8-1, ¶8-1, 8-9– defense, 8-58
8-12. See also aviation; defensive operations, 4-34,
target acquisition, 2-52, 6-29, 4-42
helicopters. 6-38, 7-1, 7-26, 7-47
army aviation CP, 8-14 offensive operations, 3-29,
assassination, 13-50, 13-54, 3-43, 3-77
army aviation tactical groups, 13-58–13-59
8-11 automated fire control system,
assault force, 3-46, 3-53, 3-78, 2-47, 2-53, 2-188, 7-16
combat search and rescue, 8-53 3-87, 3-108, 3-117, 4-59, 8-51,
automation, 2-8, 2-159, 2-174,
direct air support, 8-10 9-147, 11-40, 13-3, 13-77,
6-13, 12-44
13-81, 13-83, 13-101–13-102,
heliborne landings, 8-10, 13-21 auxiliary command post, 2-195,
13-104–13-105
in IFC, 2-54, 7-16 2-216, 4-50
assembly area,
in OSC, 8-9, 8-12, 8-16 aviation, 2-47, 2-54, 7-1–7-2,
engineer preparation, 10-12,
in tactical groups, 8-12 pp. 8-1–8-14. See also Air
10-15–10-16, 10-32–10-33
Force; army aviation.
organization, 8-1, 8-9–8-12 for airborne landing, 13-27
aerial minelaying, 10-40,
task organization, 8-11–8-12, for heliborne landing, 13-30, 10-42, 10-46
8-16 13-33
aerial reconnaissance. See
support of defense, 8-51 for reserve, 9-158 main entry.
support of offense, 8-51 smoke camouflage, 11-82 aerial resupply, 12-91, 13-9,
theater-level, 8-8–8-11 assigned forces. See constituent 13-35.
army groups, 2-23, 2-37, 11-71 forces. air defense role, 9-2. See
artillery, 7-2, 7-38. See also fire asymmetric. See adaptive. counterair.
support. attached forces. See constituent air support requests, 8-24–
air defense role, 9-2, 9-56, forces. 8-25, 8-28–8-31
9-63, 9-74, 9-76, 9-93– attack, 3-69–3-88. See also attack allocation (sorties), 8-18–
9-94, 9-185, 9-196 to destroy; attack to expel; 8-19, 8-26–8-27, 8-49
biological munitions, 11-55 attack to seize; dispersed all-weather capability, 8-35–
8-36
Index-4
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
aviation (continued) suppression of enemy air defensive operations, 4-34,

aviation support plan, 8-25– defense, 8-21 4-39–4-40, 4-56–4-57, 4-83,
8-26 surge effort, 8-44 4-91, 4-106, 4-109, 4-129
civil aviation, 13-21 survivability, 8-44, 8-74–8-75 logistics, 12-50, 12-89, 12-96
combat service support, targeting, 8-25 main CP, 2-186
8-52–8-53 aviation tactical groups, 8-4 multiple battle zones, 3-41, 4-39
combat support, 8-52–8-53 axis, 2-74 noncontiguous, 2-77
command and control, 8-13– in defensive operations, 4-42 offensive operations, 3-29,
8-32 3-37–3-42, 9-145–9-147,
offensive operations, 3-28–
coordination with ground 12-88
3-29, 3-45
forces, 8-56 biological, 11-49–11-58. See also
corridors, 8-26, 8-57, 9-45, NBC.
B
13-22, 13-35 agents, 11-51–11-52
ballistic missiles. See long-range
counterair, 8-37, 8-43–8-44, delivery, 11-53–11-55
missiles; surface-to-surface
9-2, 9-56, 9-73, 9-81, 9-189 munitions, 11-3, 11-54
missiles.
counterreconnaissance, 8-48 plausible deniability, 11-58
barriers, 4-126, 10-55–10-56,
decoy air raids, 8-60 12-93. See obstacles. release, 11-57–11-58
direct air support, 8-10, 8-25, basing area. See air defense. targets, 11-56
8-35–8-36, 8-49
battle damage assessment, 6-29, weapons, p. 12-1, ¶11-51–
ground attack. See main 10-28 11-52
entry.
battle drills, 3-26 bomb(s), air-delivered, 7-42,
immediate missions, 8-31 11-36, 11-74, 11-77
battlefield geometry, 2-63–2-67.
in adaptive operations, 8-73– See also linear; nonlinear. bombers (aircraft), 8-2–8-4, 8-6,
8-77 8-36, 10-46
battlefield organization. See
in IFC, 2-47, 2-54, 8-7–8-8 organization of battlefield booby traps, 10-75
in regional operations, 7-73, (command and control; offense; Border Guard Forces, 2-105
8-43, 8-68–8-70 defense).
branches and sequels,
interdiction, 8-50 battlefield surveillance radar(s),
to military strategic campaign
in transition operations, 8-68– 6-38
plan, 1-50
8-70 battle line, 2-71, 3-38
to national security strategy,
NBC delivery, 11-3, 11-8, 11- battle plan, 2-148 (Figure 2-16) 1-8, 1-12
26, 11-30, 11-55 battle position(s), 2-74, 4-44–4-47, to national strategic campaign
night capability, 8-33–8-36 4-104, 4-106, 4-108–4-109, plan, 1-8, 1-12
on-call missions, 8-30 4-114, 4-122–4-123, 4-129–4-131,
to operation plan, 2-5, 2-98,
10-14–10-14, 10-16, 10-30,
precision munitions, 7-42 2-133–2-134
10-38, 10-55, 10-69, 13-28
preplanned missions, 8-29, 8-43 bridge. See engineer.
complex battle position(s),
readiness categories, 8-32 4-28, 4-46–4-47, 4-112– brigade(s), 2-23, 2-42–2-43, 7-28,
reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61 4-113, 4-129–4-130, 10-34 9-132, 10-6. See also brigade
tactical group(s).
reserve, 8-26 simple battle position(s), 4-45
brigade tactical group(s), 2-41,
smoke delivery, 11-74, 11-77, battle zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-76–2-77
7-28, 7-63, 8-9, 8-12, 9-32,
11-79 air defense of, 9-65, 9-70, 9-132, 9-157, 10-6, 13-74
support of airborne or 9-134, 9-145–9-147,
bunkers, 2-181, 12-12–12-13
helborne landing, 13-17– 9-156–9-158
13-18 close combat, 3-40
support of amphibious landing, engineer support, 10-56
13-88, 13-95, 13-98
FG or OSC, 2-77
support of IW, 5-27, 5-35–5-36
Index-5
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
chemical, 11-7–11-28. See also chemical reconnaissance

C NBC. units, 6-39, 6-43, 11-61–
chemical agents. See main 11-63, 11-65, 13-32,
C3D (camouflage, concealment,
entry. 13-34. See also NBC
cover, and deception). See also
reconnaissance.
the separate parts. 2-78, 2-233, chemical defense. See main
3-42, 4-25, 4-28, 4-41, 4-47, entry. decontamination, 11-1, 11-7,
4-68, 4-111, 5-39, 5-42–5-43, 11-59, 11-62–11-63, 11-65,
chemical munitions. See main
6-14–6-15, 8-60, 9-12, 9-102– 12-84
entry.
9-104, 9-144, 9-148, 9-157– chemical munitions,
chemical weapons, 11-20–
9-159, 9-162, 10-15, 10-18, artillery-delivered, 7-46, 9-59,
11-22, 11-95, 11-97. See
10-20, 10-31, 10-62, 10-69, 11-3
also chemical munitions.
10-75, 11-60, 11-81, 12-87
chemical weapons plan, 11-21 fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
caches, 3-60, 4-28, 4-47, 4-73,
defensive chemical warfare, handling of, 11-62
9-51, 10-34, 10-63, 12-14,
12-28–12-29, 12-94, 12-99 11-7, 11-28 SSMs, 9-193, 11-3
camouflage, 2-127, 2-203, 5-43, delivery means, 11-8, 11-26 chief of administration,
7-74, 9-30, 9-58, 9-102–9-104, offensive chemical warfare, ISC staff, 12-40
9-156, 9-172, 10-20, 10-24, 11-7, 11-23–11-27 OSC staff, 2-108, 12-33,
10-30, 11-81–11-86, 11-89, release, 11-20–11-22, 11-38 12-36, 12-70
11-94, 12-12–12-14, 13-21.
3
See also C D. targets, 11-26–11-28 chief of airspace operations,
canalizing the enemy, 4-116, chemical agents, 11-9–11-19 ISC staff, 12-38
4-121, p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, blister, 11-9 OSC staff, 2-99, 2-220,
10-68, 11-28 blood, 11-9 2-224, 8-20, 8-23–8-25,
cannon artillery. See artillery. 8-56, 9-38, 9-46
choking, 11-9
casualties, chief of communications, OSC
household chemicals, 11-13,
staff, 2-104, 2-208
casualty evacuation/handling. 11-19, 11-97
See medical support. chief of current operations, OSC
incapacitants, 11-9
staff, 2-97, 10-4
casualty evacuation routes irritants, 11-9
and means (enemy), as chief of force protection, OSC
lethal, 11-9 staff, 2-112, 2-222, 5-71, 10-4,
targets, 3-35, 3-114, 4-127
nerve, 11-9 11-6, 11-67–11-69
causing politically unacceptable
(enemy) casualties, 1-33, nonpersistent, 11-10, 11-12, chief of future operations, OSC
1-67–1-68, 1-100, 3-10– 11-24, 11-26 staff, 2-98
3-11, 3-16, 3-40, 3-82, nonlethal, 11-9 chief of information warfare,
3-93, 4-92, 4-113–4-114, persistent, 9-63, 11-10–11-11, General Staff, 5-55, 5-67
6-49, 8-44, p. 11-1, 11-11– 11-25–11-28 OSC staff, 2-103, 2-225,
11-12, 11-28, 13-67
toxic industrial chemicals, 5-66, 5-67, 5-69–5-71,
caves, 10-69, 12-14. See also 11-13–11-18 5-73, 5-78, 10-4
underground facilities.
chemical defense, 11-59, 11-61– chief of infrastructure management,
cellular telephones, p. viii, ¶5-14, 11-62, 11-65, 11-67, 11-71, OSC staff, 2-116, 10-4, 12-65
5-21 11-77. See also NBC defense; chief of integrated fires, OSC staff,
centralized planning, 2-2, 2-4, NBC protection. 2-111, 5-71, 7-15
2-22, 2-207, 2-229, 7-80, chemical defense reserve, chief of littoral warfare, OSC staff,
12-27–12-29, 12-55. See also 4-65, 11-61 2-117, 13-95
command and control,
chemical defense units, in chief of logistics,
centralized control.
OSC. 2-61, 2-112, 6-39,
chaff, 11-73 ISC staff, 12-40
11-6, 12-37
change the nature of conflict, OSC staff, 2-107, 12-33,
chemical protection
1-45, 1-73–1-76, 2-62, 4-8, 12-35, 12-53, 12-55
equipment, 11-7, 11-61
4-10, 10-70 Ministry of Defense, 12-3, 12-66
Index-6
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
chief of population management, coalition(s), automation, 2-8, 2-159, 2-174

OSC staff, 2-115, 5-71 involving the State, p. vii, aviation, 8-13–8-32
chief of reconnaissance, ¶1-21, 1-23 C2 helicopters, 8-11, 8-52.
OSC staff, 2-102, 2-190, involving the United States, See also airborne CP.
2-219, 2-224, 6-25, 6-44, p. vii C2 nodes (enemy), as targets,
11-6, 11-67, 13-58 vulnerability of, p. vii, ¶5-77, 1-100, 1-115, 1-118, 3-2,
theater staff, 13-58 5-85, 6-22, 13-10 3-18, 3-35, 3-52, 3-71, 3-73–
chief of special-purpose coastal defense, 13-89, 13-97 3-74, 3-83, 3-88, 3-91, 3-114,
operations, OSC staff, 2-113 4-127, 5-24–5-26, 5-52,
COE. See contemporary
5-56–5-58, 5-60, 5-82, 5-86,
chief of staff, OSC, 2-84, operational environment.
5-89, 6-16, 6-33, 6-46, 6-50,
2-87–2-88, 2-143, 2-161– collateral damage, avoidance of, 7-12–7-13, 7-40, 7-57, 7-66,
2-162, 2-177, 2-186–2-187, 1-63, 8-75 7-77, 8-65, 9-5–9-6, 9-56,
2-219, 2-221–2-222, 11-67–
combat forces, 1-114, 2-130, 3-2 9-125, 11-4, 11-26–11-27,
11-69
combat order, 2-171 11-39, 11-46, 11-56, 11-96,
Chief of the General Staff, 1-24, 1-85, 13-11, 13-48, 13-51, 13-54–
2-16–2-18, 2-20, 2-148, 5-55 combat power. See preservation. 13-55, 13-81, 13-85, 13-92
chief of weapons of mass combat search and rescue, 8-53, centralized control. See
destruction, OSC staff, 2-114, 12-81, 13-50 control; centralized
11-5 combat service support, 2-60–2-61, planning.
civil affairs, 2-115 8-52–8-53, 12-37, 12-40, 12-42. command group. See main
See also logistics. entry.
civilians on the battlefield, p. xv,
¶4-10. combat support forces, 1-114, command posts. See main
2-60–2-61, 2-130, 3-2, 8-52– entry.
as shields, p. viii, ¶1-63, 1-75,
8-53, 12-37, 12-40, 12-42
7-81, 8-75 commandos, 13-73–13-74
combat system, 1-89, 1-109,
as source of information, 1-99, concept, 2-1–2-2
1-112–1-115, 1-120, 2-75,
3-59, 6-1, 9-185, 13-17
2-130, 2-133, 2-152, 3-2, 3-9, decentralized control. See
as source of logistics, 12-31 3-18, 3-23, 3-74, 3-98, p. 4-1, control; decentralized
as targets, 1-29, 1-73, 7-76, ¶4-33, 4-35, 4-39, 4-54, 4-67, planning.
11-14, 11-24, 11-56, 11-92– 4-70, 4-86, 4-89, 4-92–4-93, decision making. See main
11-93, 11-98, 13-52–13-54, 4-103, 4-112–4-114, 4-121, entry.
13-59, 13-73, 13-76–13-77, 4-127–4-128, 5-57, 7-2, 7-5–
engineer, 10-3–10-9
13-81 7-6, 7-8, 7-57, 7-62, 7-75–7-76,
p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, 10-68. fire support, 7-14–7-25
contractors. See main entry.
See also disaggregation; heliborne forces, 13-6
humanitarian relief organi-
system; systems warfare. logistics, 12-32–12-43
zations. See main entry.
combined arms operations, 1-37, organization of battlefield.
internally displaced persons,
p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-36, 2-160, 3-13, See main entry.
pp. viii, xv
3-72, 3-81, 4-18, 4-82–4-83,
media. See main entry. organization of forces. See
9-2–9-3, 9-9, 9-23, 9-37, 9-141,
main entry.
refugees, pp. viii, xv, ¶11-24, 10-60–10-61, 13-60, 13-93,
13-62 13-98–13-103 planning. See main entry.
support of IW, 5-35, 5-72 command, 2-1, 2-3, 2-191. See preparation, 2-161–2-172
sympathizers (of OPFOR), also command and control. principles, 2-3–2-6
9-52, 9-64, 9-123, 11-8, command and control, pp. 2-1–2-50. process, 2-119–2-178
11-52, 11-55, 13-17 See also command; control. SPF, 13-40–13-47
transnational corporations, adaptability, 2-141–2-142 staff. See main entry.
pp. ix, xv airborne forces, 13-5–13-6 structures, 2-7–2-118
close combat, 3-40 air defense, 9-22–9-47 survivability. See main entry.
close support fire, 7-59, 7-63 amphibious landing, 13-93– systems, 2-204–2-223
cluster bombs, 7-42 13-96
Index-7
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
command and support relation- command observation post, 7-54 complex battle position(s). See
ships, 2-10–2-14, 3-104, 7-69. command post(s), 2-179–2-203. battle position(s).
See also affiliated; constituent; See also airborne CP; alternate CP; complex terrain, pp. viii–ix, ¶1-52,
dedicated; supporting. auxiliary CP; deception CP; forward 1-63, 1-69, 1-75, 1-77, 2-75,
commander’s reconnaissance, 7-31 CP; IFC CP; sustainment CP 2-146, 2-194, 3-6, 3-51, 3-74,
command group, communications group, 2-180 3-82, 3-84, 3-97, 3-112–3-113,
4-9–4-10, 4-26, 4-28, 4-40,
IFC, 2-50 control group, 2-180
4-45–4-47, 4-70, 4-87, 4-117–
ISC, 12-38 engineer preparation, 2-202, 4-118, 4-129, 4-72, 4-114,
OSC, 2-81–2-88 10-12–10-13, 10-30– 4-117, 9-51, 9-58, 9-171, 13-72
10-31, 10-35, 10-69
command net, 2-215, 11-66, 11-68 computer warfare, 5-21–5-22,
location(s) of, 2-166, 2-200– 5-28–5-30, 5-65. See also
commando(s), 13-37, 13-40,
2-201 information warfare.
13-72–13-85
movement, 2-197–2-199 concealment, 5-43, 5-61, 5-63,
administrative force structure,
13-73 security, 2-202–2-203 9-104, 10-20, 10-23–10-24,
support group, 2-180 10-34, 11-89, 12-12, 12-14,
allocated to DTG/BGT, 13-74 12-86, 13-21. See also C3D.
allocated to OSC, 13-74, 13-83 communications, 2-207–2-227
constituent forces, 2-11, 2-47,
ambushes, 13-77, 13-79– cellular telephones, p. viii, 2-52, 2-61, 2-103, 2-135, 6-35,
13-80, 13-82, 13-85 ¶2-104, 2-209, 5-14, 5-21, 7-16, 7-20, 7-22, 7-24–7-25,
7-80 7-35, 7-59, 8-8, 8-19, 9-38,
as antilanding reserve, 13-77,
13-83 commercial, 2-209, 2-211 9-151, 10-2–10-4, 10-6, 10-9,
communications group, in 10-27, 10-48, 12-32, 12-37,
as assault force, 13-77,
CP, 2-180, 2-211 12-42, 13-5, 13-11, 13-43, 13-74
13-81, 13-83
communications plan, 2-101, contact force, 4-98–4-100, 4-108
as disruption force, 13-79
2-104, 2-170, 2-208 contemporary operational
as exploitation force, 13-82
communications security, environment, pp. vi–xi. See
as fixing force, 13-80 also operational environment.
2-207, 5-41
as security force, 13-83 adaptability, pp. xi, xviii
communications subsection,
as stay-behind force, 13-85 OSC staff, 2-100, 2-104–2-105 combat development, p. xi
command and control, 13-73– courier, ¶2-104. 2-213, 7-80 complexity of, pp. viii, xi, xiv
13-74
digital, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-214 constantly changing nature
commando detachments, 13-73 of, p. xi
encryption, 2-209
commando missions, 13-76– critical variables, pp. vii–xi
Internet, 2-209
13-85
Intranet, 2-209 learning and adapting, p. xviii
commando teams, 13-73,
local area network, 2-209 overall (strategic), p. xi
13-77, 13-85
microwave, 2-209 real-world, p. x
in defense, 13-83–13-85
nets, 2-214–2-225, 7-25 training environments,
in disruption zone, 13-76–
pp. xi, xiii
13-77, 13-79, 13-83 non-electronic, 2-212
contemporary opposing force,
infantry-type missions/tactics, radio, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-214,
pp. xiii–xix. See also opposing
13-72, 13-75, 13-84 9-47
force.
infiltration/insertion, 13-72– satellite, p. viii, ¶2-104, 2-209,
adaptability, pp. xi, xviii-xix,
13-73, 13-77–13-78, 13-82 2-214, 5-14, 5-16
¶1-47
in offense, 13-78–13-82 survivability. See main entry.
applicability, p. v
raids, 13-77, 13-79, 13-81, wide area network, 2-209
baseline, pp. xvi–xviii
13-85 wire, ¶2-104, 2-209, 2-211,
combat developments,
reconnaissance, 13-76– 2-214, 7-80, 9-47
pp. xii–xiii
13-79, 13-83–13-85 wireless, 5-14, 5-16
task organization, 13-74 vulnerability, 2-1, 7-80
Index-8
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
contemporary opposing force conventional patterns of criminal organizations, p. xv

(continued) operation, pp. x, xviii–xix, ¶1-6, affiliated with State, 1-95, 1-99,
composite example of threat 1-14, 1-34, 1-38, 1-40, 1-42– 1-100, 1-105–1-106, 2-14,
capabilities, pp. xi, xiii, xv, 1-44, 1-47, 1-61, 1-74, 1-87, 4-53, 9-52, 9-64
xviii p. 3-1, ¶3-5, 4-5–4-6, 5-19,
critical variables of COE, pp. vii–xi
12-98, 13-61
doctrine evolving, p. xix cruise missiles,
convoys,
flexibility. See main entry. air defense against, 9-5, 9-83,
enemy, as targets, 11-56.
initiative. See main entry. 9-86, 9-101
See also lines of
learning and adapting, communication. air-launched, 7-42, 8-3
pp. xviii-xix NBC delivery, 7-44, 11-3
OPFOR, 12-57, 12-59
paramilitary, pp. xiii, xv, xvii, reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61
core states, p. xiv
¶1-92, 1-93–1-106, 2-14
corner reflectors. See radar corner sea-launched, 7-23
thinking, p. xviii
reflectors. current operations subsection,
training tool, p. xvii 2-95, 2-97
corps, 2-23, 2-37, 11-71
unpredictability, pp. xiii, xix cyber attack. See information
corridors. See air defense; aviation.
contiguous AORs/force attack.
counterair missions. See aviation.
deployment/zones, 2-73
counterattack, 3-14–3-15, 3-103–
contingencies, 4-61, 4-111, 4-131, D
3-109, 4-17, 4-62, 4-71, 4-75,
7-47, 7-68, 9-35, 9-52–9-54,
4-92–4-93, 4-96, 4-111, 4-115, decentralized attack. See
9-158
4-121, 7-70, 9-8, 9-154, 9-157, dispersed attack.
contingency plans, 10-67, 11-48, 11-89 decentralized control. See control.
to military SCP, 1-25, 2-39, counterattack force, 3-9, 3-104, decentralized defense, 4-16, 4-49,
9-50–9-52 3-106, 4-49, 4-61, 4-71, 8-51, 4-85–4-87, 4-90
to national SCP, 1-8, 1-16– 10-18
decentralized execution, 2-2, 2-5,
1-18, 1-88–1-90 counterattack plan, 2-170 2-229, 3-66, 4-81. 4-117, 10-64,
to operation order, 2-98, 2-139, counterbattery fire, 7-67, 7-72 12-27–12-29, 12-55
2-169, 2-176, 7-74, 9-64
counterfire, 7-66 deception, 1-77, 2-228, 3-34, 3-74,
contractors, as targets, 7-77, 9-64, 3-83, 3-97, 3-112–3-113, 4-68,
counterintelligence, 2-115
9-194, 11-96, 13-52 4-113, 4-119, 4-121, 5-12–5-13,
countermobility support, 4-69–
control, 2-1, 2-3, 2-186, 7-15, 10-3. 5-22, 5-24, 5-27, 5-31–5-34, 5-43,
4-71, 4-87, p. 10-1, ¶10-4,
See also command and control. 5-60, 5-71, 5-76, 5-79, 5-81, 6-15,
10-7–10-8, 10-10, 10-36–
centralized control, 7-14, 7-61, 7-78, 8-40–8-41, 9-30, 9-100,
10-58, 10-60, 10-66, 10-68
7-80, 8-9, 8-17–8-19, 8-49, 9-102–9-104, 9-168, 10-20–
countermortar/counterbattery 10-24, 10-74, 11-81, 11-87, 11-89,
8-76, 9-20, 9-27, 9-34, 9-39,
radar(s), 6-38 13-11, 13-13–13-14, 13-17–
9-79, 12-4. See also
centralized planning. counteroffensive operations, 3-14 13-18, 13-89, 13-91. See also
3
counterpenetration, 4-62, 4-71 C D; information warfare.
decentralized control, 7-14,
8-19, 9-35, 9-153 counterreconnaissance, 2-112, deception CP, 2-196
control access into region. See 3-31, 3-55, 3-97, 3-101, 3-105, deception force, 3-46, 3-56,
access-control operations. 3-107, 3-113–3-114, 4-25, 4-62, 4-66, 8-51, 13-3
4-53, 4-55, 4-58, 4-119, 5-39, deception jamming, 5-25,
control group, in CP, 2-180
6-51, 8-48, 9-156 8-40
control tempo. See tempo.
counterreconnaissance plan, 8-48 deception nets, 2-225
conventional forces, 1-38, 4-18
counterterrorism, 2-112 deception plan, 2-103, 4-55,
conventional munitions, 2-55–2-56,
course-corrected munitions, 7-59, 5-69, 10-24, 10-74, 12-87
3-13, 5-35, 7-40, 11-25
7-64 deception position(s), 4-71,
conventional operations. See
cover, 10-24, 11-89. See also C3D. 5-43, 9-77, 9-103–9-104,
conventional patterns of
creative means. See adaptive 9-173, 10-16, 10-21–10-22,
operation.
approaches. 10-69, 10-74
Index-9
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
decision making, 2-129–2-142 integrated defense, 4-83– detachments, 2-221, 3-27, 6-43,
influenced by systems 4-84, 4-90, 9-153 8-11, 13-73, 13-46–13-47,
warfare, 1-116 in transition operations, 1-45, 13-90, 13-109
decisive operations, 2-76 4-6–4-12, 4-25, 4-28, 4-83, diplomatic-political means, p. xvii,
4-90, 4-103, 4-113, 4-118 ¶5-46. See also national power,
decontamination. See chemical
linear, 4-34 instruments of.
defense; NBC protection.
maneuver defense. See main direct action. See Special-
decoy, 1-77, 5-25, 5-32, 5-43, 7-74,
entry. Purpose Forces.
9-102–9-104, 9-187, 10-16, 10-20–
10-22, 10-74, 11-87, 11-94, 12-12. nonlinear, 4-34 direct air support, 8-10, 8-25, 8-35–
See also deception. 8-36, 8-49
organization of battlefield,
dedicated forces, 1-97, 2-12, 2-47, 4-24, 4-30, 4-32–4-47, directed energy weapons, 5-37
2-52, 2-61, 2-135, 6-35, 7-16, 4-67, 9-154 disaggregation (of enemy combat
7-20, 7-22, 7-24–7-25, 7-35, 7-59, organization of forces, 4-24, system), 1-89, 1-109, 1-112,
8-8, 8-19, 9-38, 10-3–10-4, 10-9, 4-30, 4-48–4-67 2-75, 2-133, 4-39, 4-54, 4-67,
10-48, 12-32, 12-37, 12-42, 13-5, 4-92, 4-114, 4-121, 7-75,
planned defense, 4-26
13-11, 13-43–13-44, 13-74 p. 10-1, ¶10-16, 10-60, 10-68
planning, 4-24–4-66
defense information infrastructure, disaster management, 2-23, 12-81
5-4, 5-6–5-7, 5-11 preparing for, 4-67-4-75
disinformation, 5-44, 5-60, 13-51
defensive information warfare, purpose, 4-19–4-23
dispersed attack, 3-80–3-88
2-112, 5-61–5-63 situational defense, 4-27–4-31,
dispersal/dispersion, 1-63, 1-69,
defensive lines, 4-95–4-99, 4-101– 4-111, 10-40
1-75–1-77, p. 2-1, ¶2-78, 2-150,
4-102, 4-108, 4-110, 10-56 strategic defense, 1-87 2-181, 2-194, 2-204, 3-14, 3-27,
defensive maneuver, 4-98–4-102 transition to defense, 3-63, 4-28 3-52, 3-80, 3-83. 4-16, 7-65, 7-74,
defensive operations, pp. 4-1–4-28 defensive position(s). See battle 7-78, 8-44, 8-74, 9-25, 9-30, 9-58,
position(s). 9-102, 9-104–9-107, 9-112,
air defense in, 9-34, 9-152–
9-144, 9-148, 9-159, 9-193,
9-161 deliberate defense. See planned 10-64, 11-60, 11-94, 12-13–12-
antilanding defense, 4-53, 4-58, defense. 14, 12-52, 12-86, 12-92, 13-67,
4-64, 9-160–9-161, 10-38, deliberate offense. See planned 13-73, 13-75. See also
12-98, 13-13, 13-77, 13-88 offense. dispersed attack.
area defense. See main demographics. See sociological displaced persons. See internally
entry. demographics. displaced persons.
commandos in, 13-83–13-85 demolition, disproportionate effects, 2-66,
consolidating gains, 3-63 engineer task, 10-36, 10-61 2-133, 9-168
decentralized defense, 4-16, target damage criteria (fire disproportionate interests, 1-68
4-49, 4-85–4-87, 4-90 support), 7-9, 7-11 disruption force,
defense to deny, 4-23 demonstration (operation), 2-146, defensive operations, 4-36,
defense to destroy, 4-21 3-41, 3-53, 3-56 4-39–4-40, 4-50–4-55,
defense to preserve, 4-22 depot(s), 12-10–12-14, 12-47, 12-64. 4-98, 4-103–4-106, 4-119–
See also logistics; storage. 4-128, 4-130
engineer support. See main
entry. ammunition, 12-11 disruption force commander,
3-49, 4-51
executing of, 4-76–4-81 area distribution, 12-11
fire support, p. 7-1, ¶7-70 maintenance, 12-11
3-35, 3-46, 3-48, 3-50,
in adaptive operations, 1-52, medical, 12-11, 12-80 3-76, 3-85, 3-106, 3-115,
4-13–4-18, 4-25, 4-28, deputy commander, 9-146
4-76, 4-113 of OSC, 2-51, 2-86, 2-188 use of attack helicopters, 8-51
in regional operations, 4-2–4-5, of theater, 7-17 use of commandos, 13-79
4-83
destruction (target damage use of SPF, 3-32, 4-37, 4-52–
criteria), 7-9 4-53, 9-144, 13-63
Index-10
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
disruption zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-75, drop zone, 12-99, 13-6, 13-14, engineer reserve, 4-65, 10-9,
3-32, 3-36, 4-37 13-16–13-17, 13-19–13-20, 10-64
air defense, 3-34, 4-53, 9-49, 13-22, 13-26–13-29 fortifications. See main entry.
9-57, 9-65–9-66, 9-69– drug organizations, p. xv in adaptive operations, 10-59,
9-70, 9-74, 9-144–9-146, affiliated with State, 1-95 10-64–10-75
9-155–9-156
in IFC, 10-3
commandos, 13-76–13-77,
E in ISC, 10-3
13-79, 13-83
early-entry forces, enemy (U.S.), in OSC, 10-3
defensive operations, 4-34–
p. x, ¶3-10 in regional operations, 10-59–
4-38, 4-52, 4-71, 4-91–
4-92, 4-103–4-105, 4-108, early warning. See air defense. 10-61
4-114, 4-119–4-120, economics, pp. viii, xvii. See also in transition operations, 10-59,
4-122, 4-124–4-125, national power, instruments of. 10-61–10-63
4-130, 9-155–9-156 electronic counter-countermeasures, missions, 10-10–10-24
division and DTG disruption 8-33, 9-120 mobility support. See main
zones, 3-32 electronic countermeasures, 5-25, entry.
engineer support, 10-56 8-33 movement support detach-
FG disruption zone, 3-32, 4-37 electronic warfare, 5-22, 5-24– ment. See main entry.
heliborne units, 13-13 5-27, 5-80, 5-86, 9-7. See also obstacle(s). See main entry.
jammers/jamming; signals
offensive operations, 3-29, obstacle-clearing detach-
reconnaissance.
3-31–3-36, 9-144–9-146 ment. See main entry.
antilanding reserve, 4-64
OSC disruption zone, 3-32, obstacle detachment. See
4-37 EW aircraft, 8-3, 8-6, 8-38– main entry.
8-40, 8-52, 13-23
theater disruption zone, 3-32 plan, 2-170
fixing force, 3-77, 3-86, 3-116
diversionary measures, SPF, preparation of CPs. See
2-58, 13-49, 13-51 lethal EW, 5-25 command post(s).
division(s), 2-23, 2-31, 2-41, 7-22, nonlethal EW, 5-25, 5-71 preparation of positions,
7-28, 9-132. See also division end state, 2-138 9-104, 10-12–10-13, 10-23,
tactical group(s). enemy, 10-31, 10-34–10-35, 10-55,
as operational-level 10-63, 10-69
of the State, p. xii. See also
command, 2-31 United States; threats to reconnaissance, 6-40, 6-43,
as tactical-level command, the State. 10-9–10-10, 10-12–10-13,
2-43–2-46 10-18, 10-25–10-30, 10-66–
of the United States, p. xii
10-67, 10-72, 13-32
division headquarters, 2-46 engineer support, pp. 10-1–10-15
road construction, 10-1–10-2,
IFC, 7-8 and antitank reserve, 4-63 10-9, 10-12–10-13, 12-65
division tactical group(s), 2-31, bridging/bridge construction, shared responsibility with
2-41, 2-45–2-46, 7-22, 7-28, 10-1, 10-9, 10-64, 12-65, other branches, 10-2, 10-32,
8-9, 8-12, 9-32, 9-132, 9-157 12-91. See also water 10-35, 10-65, 10-69
as operational-level obstacle-crossing.
special-category engineers,
command, 2-31, 2-46 civilian engineers, 10-2, 10-65, 10-1
as tactical-level command, 10-69, 12-65, 12-67
support of air defense, 9-2,
2-43–2-46 combat engineers, 10-1–10-2, 9-77
commando units, 13-74 12-65
support of defense, 4-45,
DTG headquarters, 2-46 command and control, 10-3– 4-47, 4-69–4-71, 4-125,
IFC, 7-8, 7-35 10-9 10-14–10-19, 10-23–
SPF units, 2-59, 13-40, 13-44– countermobility support. See 10-24, 10-30, 10-34–
13-45 main entry. 10-35, 10-54–10-56
drones, 6-29, 8-11. See also demolition(s), 10-36, 10-61
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Index-11
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
engineer support (continued) fighter aircraft, 8-2–8-4, 8-6, 8-36, naval fire support, 7-23–7-25,
support of IW, 5-27, 10-8, 9-40–9-43, 9-73, 9-134, 13-22. 13-88
10-10, 10-12, 10-16, See also interceptors. planning, 7-26–7-46, 7-80,
10-18, 10-20–10-24, fighting force structure (wartime), 11-94
10-66, 10-70, 10-74 2-23, 2-27–2-28, 2-35, 9-79, principles of, 7-4
support of offense, 3-87, 12-20–12-21
reconnaissance fire(s). See
3-117, 10-11–10-13, 10-22, fire support, pp. 7-1–7-17. See main entry.
10-28–10-29, 10-32–10-33, also artillery; aviation; long-
support of defense, p. 7-1,
10-51–10-53 range fires; surface-to-surface
¶7-70
survivability measures. See missiles.
support of offense, p. 7-1,
main entry. chief of integrated fires, 2-111,
¶7-69
task organization, 10-1, 10-5– 5-71, 7-15
target acquisition, 2-52, 6-29,
10-9, 10-25, 10-48–10-49, close support fire, 7-59, 7-63
6-38, 7-1, 7-26, 7-47
10-64 command and control, 7-14–
targeting, 7-47–7-56
water obstacle crossing. See 7-25
main entry. firing line(s), 4-109
counterbattery fire, 7-67, 7-72
water purification and supply. fixing, 3-33–3-34, 3-37, 3-40,
counterfire, 7-66
See main entries. 3-51–3-52, 3-74, 3-83, 10-61
fire and decoy TTP, 7-78, 7-81
engineer units, enemy (U.S), as fixing force, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51–3-52,
fire requests, 7-22 3-77, 3-86, 3-107, 3-116, 4-59,
targets, 2-75
fire superiority, 7-29, 7-46, 8-51, 9-147, 11-40, 13-3, 13-80,
envelopment, p. 3-1, ¶3-74, 13-1,
11-42 13-104
13-11, 13-107
fire support coordination fixing force commander, 3-48
equipment. See technology.
center, 2-51, 7-21, 7-25 flagship systems. See key
evacuation,
fire support coordination systems.
of casualties, 12-77, 12-81 measures, 7-38 flexibility, pp. xvii–xviii, ¶2-2, 2-5,
of equipment, 2-107, 12-35, fire support plan, 2-170, 4-40, 2-22, 2-26, 2-41, 2-54, 2-62, 2-71,
12-91 4-75, 5-71, p. 7-1, ¶7-21, 2-141, 2-174–2-176, 2-207, 3-30,
supply and evacuation routes, 7-26, 7-28, 7-34, 7-38, 7-45, 4-18, 6-6, 6-17, 7-4, 7-14, 7-35,
12-65, 12-96 7-62, 8-49, 10-18, 10-55, 7-68, 9-26–9-27, 9-34–9-35,
exploitation, 3-70 10-68, 11-21, 11-38 9-136, 10-6, 11-2, 12-21, 12-27,
fire support of airborne or 12-44, 12-55, 12-59, 12-89, 13-5,
exploitation force, 3-46, 3-48, 3-54,
heliborne landing, 13-17– 13-38, 13-47, 13-77
3-79, 3-88, 3-109, 3-118, 4-59,
7-69, 8-51, 9-147, 11-40, 11-43, 13-18 flight area. See air defense.
11-45–11-47, 11-82, 13-3, 13-82, fire support to a strike, 7-58– fluid battlefield, 2-7, 2-83, 2-193,
13-101–13-102, 13-104–13-105 7-59 2-212, 3-24, 4-27, 6-7, 6-13, 9-18,
external organizations, p. ix IFC. See integrated fires 9-26, 9-35, 9-136, 10-40, 11-43,
command main entry. 12-52, 12-59, 12-89, 13-1
extraregional power. See United
States. in adaptive operations, 7-72, foraging, 12-31
7-79–7-81 force commander, 3-48–3-49,
in regional operations, 7-73– 4-49, 4-51, 4-58
F
7-74 force projection,
failed or failing state(s), p. xiv
integrated, p. 7-1. See also global, 1-78, 13-52–13-53,
feint, 2-146, 3-56, 13-89
integrated fires command. 13-66, 13-69–13-70
field groups, 2-30, 2-2-332-35
interdiction fire, 7-59, 7-74–7-65 out-of-theater operations
FG commander, 1-85, 2-148, (beyond the region), 1-56,
in transition operations, 7-75–
3-32 1-59, 1-106, 3-13, 5-30,
7-78
FG headquarters, 2-34–2-35, 11-55, 13-39, 13-66, 13-68
IW element, 7-3, 7-47
2-224
methods of fire, 7-57–7-67
Index-12
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
force projection (continued) Chief of the General Staff, as security force, 13-13
regional, p. 13-1, ¶13-2, 13-8, 1-24, 1-85, 2-16–2-18, command and control, 13-6
13-39, 13-47, 13-52, 13-66, 2-20, 2-148, 5-55
envelopment, 13-1, 13-11
13-68–13-69 control of airborne forces,
heliborne landing. See main
vulnerability of U.S. force p. 13-1, ¶13-5, 13-8, 13-11
entry.
projection. See United control of SPF, p. 13-1, ¶13-5,
in adaptive operations, 13-3
States. 13-41, 13-43–13-45, 13-47–
13-48, 13-55, 13-60 in transition operations, 13-3
force protection, 2-112, 2-170, 3-55,
4-58, 4-70, 4-119, 5-39, 11-66. executive agent for NCA, 2-16 raids, 13-13
See also chief of force protection. functional directorates, 2-16– reconnaissance, 13-13
forces analysis, 2-152, 2-166, 13-20 2-18 sabotage, 13-13
force structure. See administrative Intelligence Directorate, support of amphibious
force structure; fighting force 2-18, 5-55, 6-23, 6-29, landing, 13-98–13-99
structure (wartime); task 13-41, 13-49, 13-55 tactical airborne missions, 13-12
organization. Operations Directorate, 1-22, heliborne jamming, 8-4, 8-11,
forcible entry, 13-105, 13-107 1-25, 2-17–2-18, 2-148, 5-55 8-33, 8-39–8-40, 8-52. See also
fortifications, 1-63, 2-186, 4-47, Organization and Mobilization electronic warfare.
10-10, 10-15–10-16, 10-18, Directorate, 2-18, 12-8 heliborne landing, 8-52–8-53,
10-31–10-35, 10-63 global information infrastructure, 11-29, 13-1–13-36
forward arming and refueling points, 5-4, 5-7, 5-11 air defense for, 9-5
enemy, as targets, 4-127, 6-20, global positioning system, 5-14 air movement, 13-18, 13-21–
9-49, 9-57, 9-125 GPS jammers, 5-25, 5-89, 6-25, 13-23
OPFOR, 8-53 9-7, 9-83, 9-96, 9-101 assembly area, 13-30, 13-33
forward command post, 2-87, ground forces. See Army. aviation commander, 13-6,
2-183, 2-189–2-191, 2-215, ground-attack aircraft/aviation, 2-54, 13-25
3-48, 4-50, 8-22, 9-46 4-40, 8-4, 8-58, 8-69, 10-46 combat search and rescue,
frontal attack, p. 3-1 ground reconnaissance. See 12-81
fuel-air explosives, p. 11-1 reconnaissance. departure area, 13-22
functional forces, 3-46, 4-49 guerrillas, p. xv embarking troops, 13-14–
defensive operations, 4-48–4-51 13-15, 13-17
functional force commander, H fire support, 13-17–13-18
3-48–3-49, 4-49, 4-51, 4-58 hackers/hacking, 5-10, 5-17, 5-28, heliborne landing force,
offensive operations, 3-46–3-49 5-48 2-221, 3-6, 12-98, 13-6,
future operations subsection, harassment (target damage 13-30–13-31
ISC staff, 12-38 criteria), 7-9, 7-13 landing force commander,
hasty defense. See situational 13-6, 13-19, 13-25, 13-31
OSC staff, 2-95, 2-98
defense. landing zone. See main entry.
hasty offense. See situational linkup with ground maneuver
G
offense. force, 13-6, 13-35–13-36
gap crossing, 10-10–10-11, 10-13.
heliborne assault. See heliborne movement to objective,
See also water obstacle
landing. 13-31–13-32
crossing.
heliborne forces, 13-1–13-36 objective area, 13-27, 13-30,
General Staff, 1-22, 1-24–1-25,
ambushes, 13-13 13-34–13-36
2-16–2-20, 2-22, 2-25, 2-34,
2-36, 2-122, 2-141, 2-147–2-148, as antilanding reserve, 13-13 planning, 13-14–13-19
2-174, 2-224, 5-54–5-55, 6-23, as assault force, 13-3 reconnaissance of objective,
6-35, 9-50, 12-4, 12-7, 12-32 13-33
as deception force, 13-3, 13-13
Chief of Information Warfare, heliborne operations. See
as exploitation force, 13-3
5-55, 5-67 heliborne landing.
as fixing force, 13-3
Index-13
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
helicopters, 6-28, 6-37, p. 8-1, ¶8-2, 13-50, 13-92. See also key information infrastructure, 5-3–5-7
8-4, 8-6, 8-9–8-11, 8-19, 8-25, systems. defense information infra-
8-33–8-34, 8-36, 8-48–8-49, 8-51– high-visibility systems. See key structure, 5-4, 5-6–5-7, 5-11
8-55, 8-61, 8-70, 8-74–8-75 systems. enemy, as target of IW, 5-20,
air ambulance, 8-4, 12-81 homeland. See United States. 5-24, 5-28, 5-35, 5-50,
armed helicopters, 8-33– hostage rescue, 13-50 5-52, 7-79
8-34, 8-52 global information infra-
hostage-taking, 13-50
attack helicopters. See main structure, 5-4, 5-7, 5-11
human intelligence, p. viii, ¶6-7,
entry. national information infra-
6-24, 9-123, 13-48–13-49
aviation component, IFC, 2-54 structure, 5-4–5-5, 5-7, 5-11
2
humanitarian relief organization(s),
C helicopters, 8-11, 8-52 pp. ix, xv. See also of the State, 5-38, 5-61, 5-71
gunships. See helicopters, nongovernmental/private information requirements,
armed. volunteer organizations. operational, 2-123
heavy-lift, 8-6, 8-11, 8-53. hybridization, p. ix strategic, 2-112
See also helicopters, lift;
tactical, 2-124–2-128
transport helicopters.
I information section, OSC staff,
heliborne jamming. See main
identification, friend or foe, 9-45 2-96
entry.
imagery. See reconnaissance. information security, 2-233, 5-39–
heliborne landing. See main
infantry, 3-6, 3-55, 3-78, 3-87, 3-117, 5-41, 5-69
entry.
4-58, 8-48, 8-61, 9-2, 9-62, 9-144, information superiority. See
lift helicopters, 8-52, 8-55,
11-77, 13-12, 13-15, 13-97, United States, information
8-61. See also helicopters,
13-102–13-103, 13-105. See dominance.
heavy-lift; medium-lift;
also mechanized infantry; naval information technology, 2-153,
transport helicopters.
infantry. p. 5-1, ¶5-2, 5-14–5-15
medium-lift, 8-6, 8-11, 8-53.
infiltration, p. 3-1, ¶3-6, 3-22, 3-78, information warfare, pp. 5-1–5-18
See also helicopters, lift;
3-87, 3-117, 4-25, 6-12, 6-35,
transport helicopters. as element of fire support, 7-3
9-52, 9-58, 9-62, 9-67, 10-27,
minelaying, 8-52, 10-40, 10-47 10-70, 10-72–10-73, 13-72– chief of IW. See main entry.
night capability, 8-34, 8-70 13-73, 13-77–13-78, 13-82 computer warfare. See main
reconnaissance helicopters, information, pp. viii, xvii, ¶5-1–5-21. entry.
8-10–8-11, 11-65 See also information attack; deception. See main entry.
smoke delivery, 11-77, 11-79 information campaign(s); deception plan. See deception.
information environment;
tactical airborne landings, defensive IW, 2-112, 5-61–
information infrastructure;
13-12 5-63
information warfare; media;
transport helicopters, 6-28, Ministry of Public Information denial-of-service attacks,
8-4, 8-6, 8-9, 8-11, 8-52– 5-50–5-51
informational means. See national
8-53, 13-21–13-22. See electronic warfare. See main
power, instruments of.
also helicopters, heavy-lift; entry.
lift; medium-lift. information attack, 1-58, 1-71, 5-22,
5-48–5-50, 5-80, 5-86, 5-90 elements of IW, 5-22–5-50
hide position(s), 9-58–9-60, 9-174,
9-177, 9-193 information campaign(s), 1-58, engineer support. See main
5-80, 5-84, 5-86 entry.
high-payoff targets, 7-21, 7-49–
7-50, 7-61, p. 8-1, ¶9-6, 13-68. information dominance. See in adaptive operations, 5-86–
See also key systems. United States. 5-90
high-priority targets, 6-12, 6-29, information environment, p. 5-1, information attack. See main
7-55, 9-39, 11-60, 13-81. See ¶5-1–5-4, 5-7, 5-14, 5-18, 5-62 entry.
also key systems. information campaign(s),
high-value targets, 5-37, 6-12, 1-58, 5-80, 5-84, 5-86
6-16, 7-43, 7-48–7-49, 7-60, in regional operations, 5-79–
5-80
Index-14
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
information warfare (continued) theater IW campaign, 2-137, integrated fires command, 2-40,
in strategic operations, 1-29, 5-55 2-47–2-60, 7-8, 7-14, 7-16–7-20,
5-75–5-78 theater-level IW assets, 10-3, 12-37, 12-40–12-43
in transition operations, 5-81– 2-101, 2-103, 5-68–5-69 artillery component, 2-47,
5-85, 10-62 tools, 5-51, 5-21 2-52–2-53
IW plan, p. 2-1, ¶2-101, 2-102, infrastructure, as alternate command
2-103, 2-170, 2-225, 3-56, structure for OSC, 7-18
information infrastructure,
3-94, 4-66, 4-71, 5-22, 5-36, See main entry. aviation component, 2-47,
5-55, 5-64, 5-66, 5-68–5-70, 2-54, 8-7–8-8
infrastructure (enemy), as
5-72, 7-77, 7-81, 10-68, fire support coordination
target, 3-79, 3-109, 5-20,
10-71, 11-96, 11-98 center, 2-51, 7-21, 7-25
5-24, 5-28, 5-35, 5-50,
IW planning, 5-64–5-66, 5-72 5-52, 7-76, 7-79, 8-71 IFC commander, 2-50–2-51,
IW subsection, OSC staff, initiative, 2-86, 2-217, 7-28, 7-31–
2-100, 2-103, 5-69 7-33, 7-50, 7-53, 7-61–
of commanders, p. xix, ¶2-2,
IW units, 2-61, 12-37 7-62, 8-13–8-16, 11-38
2-5, 2-83, 2-159, 3-66, 4-81,
military IW plan, 5-54–5-55, 4-86, 6-11, 9-18, 9-26, 9-35 IFC CP, 2-47, 2-188, 2-194,
5-67 2-215, 3-48, 4-51, 7-16,
seized, regained, or retained
8-13–8-14, 8-22
national-level IW assets, against enemy, 1-45, 1-51,
2-101, 2-103, 5-68–5-69 4-59, 4-113, 11-42, p. 12-1 IFC headquarters, 2-50–2-51,
7-80
NCA responsibility for, 5-54 instruments of national power.
See national power. in division/DTG, 7-8, 7-35
nonmilitary, 5-72
insurgent forces, p. xv, ¶1-95, in OSC, 2-40, 2-47–2-60, 7-8,
objectives, 5-3
1-101–1-104 7-16–7-20
offensive IW, 1-71, 5-58–5-60
affiliated with State, 1-99, integrated support group. See
operational-level IW, 5-56– main entry.
1-101–1-104, 2-14, 4-53,
5-63, 5-66
9-52, 9-56, 9-61, 9-64, maneuver forces, 2-47
operational shielding, 1-63 9-194, 11-8, 11-55 missile component, 2-47,
perception management. See as source of information/ 2-55–2-56, 7-16
main entry. intelligence, 1-102–1-103 planning, 7-33–7-37
physical destruction, 5-22, 5-25, as threat to State, 1-17, 3-55, reconnaissance fire, 7-60
5-27, 5-35–5-37, 5-60, 5-76, 4-58
5-86, 5-90 SPF component, 2-57–2-59,
SPF support of. See Special- 13-44, 13-63, 13-71
protection and security Purpose Forces.
measures, 5-22, 5-27, 5-38– support to a strike, 7-59
State-supported, 1-29, 1-100
5-43, 5-65, 5-69, 5-71, 5-76, task organization, 2-47, 2-49,
5-80–5-81, 5-83. See also support of IW, 5-35 2-52, 2-54–2-55, 7-16, 7-19
information security; integrated air defense system, theater IFC, 7-17, 7-24, 7-28,
operations security. 9-10, 9-19, 9-22–9-26, 9-28, 8-7, 8-10–8-11, 8-13–8-14
RISTA and IW section, IFC 9-32–9-33, 9-72, 9-115, 9-152–
integrated fires net, 2-217
staff, 2-51, 5-71 9-153, 9-182
integrated fires subsection, OSC
staff responsibilities, 2-51, national-level, 9-27, 9-72
staff, 7-22
2-101, 5-67–5-71, 12-38 operational-level, 9-32, 9-72
integrated support group, IFC,
strategic IW, 2-101, 2-137, sector-level, 9-28–9-31, 9-195 2-60–2-61, 12-37, 12-41–12-43
5-53–5-55, 5-67, 5-78 tactical-level, 9-33 integrated support command,
support of defense, 4-24, integrated attack, 3-72–3-79 2-40, 2-61, 10-3, 12-37–12-41
4-87, 4-113
integrated defense, 4-83–4-84, ISC commander, 12-38–12-40
support of offense, 3-20–3-21, 4-90, 9-153 ISC headquarters, 12-38–12-39
3-54, 3-67, 3-74, 3-80, 3-83,
3-94, 3-96, 3-112 support operations coordination
center, ISC staff, 12-38
targets, 5-20, 5-52
Index-15
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
intelligence. See also special police, 2-105, 4-53 9-127, 10-57, 11-96, 12-28,
reconnaissance. Special-Purpose Forces. See 13-51, 13-53, 13-59, 13-63–13-
human intelligence. See main main entry. 64, 13-67, 13-77, 13-86, 13-99.
entry. See also combat system; high-
Internet, 2-209, 5-14, 5-17, 5-21,
priority targets; high-value
sources of information, 1-99, 5-28, 5-30, 5-48, 5-51
targets; systems warfare.
1-102–1-103, 3-59, 6-1, Intranet, 2-209
9-185, 13-17, 13-55 kidnapping. See abduction.
invaded territory. See occupied
intelligence and information kill zone, 2-69, 2-71, 2-80
territory.
section, OSC staff, 2-100– defensive operations, 4-34,
irregular forces, 1-93–1-106, p. 3-1,
2-105, 5-68 4-36, 4-40, 4-43, 4-64,
¶3-6. See also paramilitary forces.
Intelligence Directorate. See 7-70, 11-28
as source of information, 3-59
General Staff. offensive operations, 3-29,
SPF support of. See Special- 3-31, 3-44, 3-116, 4-119
intelligence net, 2-219
Purpose Forces.
intelligence officer, reconnaissance fire, 7-61
General Staff, 2-18, 5-55
J
OSC, 2-84, 2-100–2-101, 2-208, L
jammers/jamming,
5-67–5-69, 5-73, 5-78 landing force commander, 13-6,
airborne, 8-4, 8-52 13-19, 13-25, 13-31, 13-96
interagency operations, 1-37, p. 2-1,
¶2-9–2-10, 2-29, 2-33, 2-36, air defense, 8-39–8-40, 9-7, landing zone, 12-99, 13-6, 13-14,
2-38, 2-40, 2-105, 2-160, 4-18, 9-96–9-99, 9-173 13-16–13-20, 13-22, 13-25–
10-60–10-61 deception, 5-25, 8-40 13-27, 13-30
intercept and direction finding. electronic (EW), 5-25, 5-36, lasers, high-power, 5-37
See radar intercept and 9-97, 9-186 law enforcement units, 2-61, 12-37,
direction finding; radio intercept escort jammers, 13-23 12-57. See also police.
and direction finding; signals
GPS, 5-25, 5-89, 6-25, 9-7, liaison teams,
reconnaissance.
9-83, 9-96, 9-101 in IFC HQ, 2-51, 2-188, 7-25
interceptors (aircraft), 8-3, 8-6,
8-37, 8-43, 9-68, 9-73, 9-81, heliborne, 8-4, 8-11, 8-33, in ISC HQ, 12-38
9-134. See also fighter aircraft. 8-39–8-40, 8-52
in main CP, 2-187, 9-46
interdiction fire, 3-16, 7-59, 7-64– radar jamming. See air
in OSC HQ, 2-83, 2-110, 2-112,
7-65 defense jamming.
2-114–2-115, 2-117–2-118,
interdiction missions (aviation), 8-50 joint operations, 1-37, p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-213, 2-220, 8-20, 8-26,
2-29, 2-33, 2-36, 2-40, 2-105, 8-56, 9-38, 9-46, 10-4,
internally displaced persons, 2-160, 3-13–3-14, 3-72, 3-81, 11-5–11-6
pp. viii, xv 4-18, 4-82–4-83, 8-8, 9-2, 9-37–
limited-objective attack, 3-10, 3-15,
Internal Security Forces, 1-94, 2-26, 9-38, 10-60–10-61, 13-45, 13-93,
3-89–3-109, 4-17, 4-40, 4-80,
2-105 13-95, 13-98–13-103
4-113, 4-126, 9-8, 13-83, 13-85.
allocated to OSC, 1-97, 1-100, joint SPF operations, 6-23, 13-45, See also counterattack; sophis-
2-112, 2-115 13-68 ticated ambush; spoiling attack.
as security force, 3-55, 4-58 limit of responsibility, 2-68, 2-72,
as source of information, 1-99 K 2-143, 3-36, 4-107
Border Guard Forces, 2-105 key systems (enemy), as targets, linear,
in adaptive operations, 1-100 1-33, 1-72, 1-76, 2-80, 3-11–3-12, battlefield, 2-63, 9-116
3-16, 3-18, 3-20, 3-24, 3-33–
in regional operations, 1-98, 4-4 operations, 2-62–2-64, 2-66–
3-34, 3-44, 3-81–3-83, 3-89–
in transition operations, 1-99 2-67, 2-73, 3-31, 3-36, 4-34
3-90, 3-93, 3-96, 3-98, 3-110,
movement control, 12-57–12-59 3-112, 3-114, 4-25, 4-43, 4-89, zones, 2-69, 3-29, 3-31, 4-34
paramilitary, 1-92, 1-95 4-113, 4-115, 4-121, p. 5-1, ¶5-71, lines of communications,
5-82, 6-8, 6-20, 6-49, p. 7-1, defense of, 9-99, 9-128,
resubordinated to SHC, 1-94,
¶7-2, 7-6, 7-8, 7-35, 7-60, 7-77, p. 12-1, 12-57, 13-77
1-97
8-3, 9-6. 9-529-53, 9-90–9-91,
Index-16
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
lines of communications logistics forces, 1-114, 2-130, transportation. See main

(continued) 9-128, 12-18–12-21 entry.
enemy, as targets, 1-60, logistics forces or sites long-range fires, 1-29, 1-77, 2-102,
1-104, 1-118, 3-13, 3-35, (enemy), as targets, 3-31, 3-34, 3-118, 4-36, 4-40,
4-127, 5-56, 7-76, 9-51, 9-62, 1-100, 1-115, 1-118, 3-2, 4-64, 4-105, 4-119, 4-123, 7-14,
9-125, 11-23, 12-29, 13-11, 3-13, 3-18, 3-35, 3-52, 3-71, 7-23, 7-64–7-65, 9-63, 13-98
13-48, 13-51–13-52, 13-54– 3-73–3-74, 3-79, 3-82, 3-88, long-range missiles, 1-59, 2-55–
13-55, 13-65, 13-85, 13-89 3-91, 3-114, 4-127, 5-56, 2-56, 3-13, 3-82, 7-44, 7-73, 9-63,
regulation of, 12-56 5-89, 6-46, 7-13, 7-66, 7-77, 9-81, 11-8, 11-26. See also
11-4, 11-27, 11-56, 11-56, surface-to-surface missiles.
local air superiority, 8-57, 8-66,
11-96, 13-11, 13-48, 13-52,
8-71, 13-20, 13-98 long-range rockets, 2-55–2-56,
13-54–13-55, 13-66, 13-77,
local area network, 2-209 7-44, 7-73, 9-63, 9-81, 11-8,
13-81, 13-85, 13-92
11-55
logistics, pp. 12-1–12-22. See also logistics plan, 2-166, 2-170,
combat service support; 12-27, 12-90–12-91
integrated support command; M
logistics subsection, ISC staff,
integrated support group. main command post, 2-87, 2-96,
12-38, 12-40
administrative force structure, 2-183, 2-186–2-187, 2-215,
maintenance. See main entry.
2-26, 12-8, 12-20–12-21, 2-222–2-224, 6-41, 8-13–8-14,
12-36–12-37, 12-41 materiel support. See main 9-46, 9-154
entry.
area support, 2-27, 12-20, main defense force, 3-106, 4-39–
12-24, 12-41, 12-47 medical support. See main 4-40, 4-49, 4-56, 4-98, 4-106–
entry. 4-110, 4-129–4-130, 9-157, 10-24
automation of, 12-44
mission support sites, 12-99 main defense force commander,
caches. See main entry.
personnel. See main entry. 4-49
centralized planning, 12-27–
12-29, 12-55 post-combat support, maintenance, 2-107, 12-10–12-11,
12-100–12-105 12-20, 12-35, 12-37, 12-50–12-51
chief of administration. See
main entry. primary support, 12-23, 12-41 maintenance collection
procurement, 12-3 points, 12-91
chief of logistics. See main
entry. resources officer, OSC staff. maintenance depots, 12-11
civilian resources, 12-1, 12-4, See main entry. maintenance units, 12-23–
12-10, 12-17, 12-53–12-54 services. See main entry. 12-24, 12-91, 12-96
command and control, 12-32– stockpiles. See main entry. medical equipment, 12-80
12-43 strategic-level, p. 12-1, ¶12-1– repair, 2-107, 12-35, 12-50–
decentralized execution, 12-21, 12-25, 12-32 12-51
4-117, 12-27–12-29, 12-55 support areas, 12-11, 12-30 replacement of equipment,
depot(s). See main entry. 2-107, 12-35, 12-101–12-102
support forward, 12-30
depot support, 2-27, 12-20, signal equipment, 2-104
support of defense, 4-73,
12-25 12-92–12-95 maneuver defense, 4-59, 4-88–
fighting force structure, 12-21 4-111, 9-157, 12-96
support of offense, 3-60,
foraging, 12-31 12-88–12-91 within area defense, 4-118,
4-124, 4-126
heliborne resupply, 8-52 supply. See materiel support;
supply. maneuver reserve, 3-99, 3-106,
4-58, 4-61–4-62, 4-75, 4-111,
in OSC, 12-4, 12-18–12-19, support zone security. See
4-131, 4-131, 8-51, 8-61
12-21, 12-32–12-43 main entry.
Manpower and Readiness
integrated support command. sustainment from other
Department, Logistics
See main entry. sources, 12-31
Directorate, MOD, 12-66
integrated support group. See tactical-level, p. 12-1
maritime forces, 2-40. See also
main entry. task organization, 12-18– Navy, naval infantry.
12-21, 12-40–12-41, 12-43
Index-17
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
marshalling areas (enemy), as mercenaries, p. xv, ¶2-14 antitank, 10-38, 10-45–10-46

targets, 9-49, 9-160 meteorological. See weather. controlled, 10-40
massing, method (concept of operations), decoy, 10-38
of fires, 1-69, 1-76, 3-22, 2-137 mixed, 10-38
3-110, 7-18, 7-41, 7-68, military art, 1-79–1-92 nuisance, 10-68
9-8, 9-112, 11-35, 11-39
military capabilities, pp. x, xvii. protective, 10-40
of forces, 1-69, 1-76, 3-22, See also national power,
3-83, 12-52 minelaying, 4-71, 10-6, 10-9,
instruments of; State, military
10-39–10-40, 10-49, 10-56,
materiel support, 12-37, 12-44– capabilities.
10-61, 13-13. See also
12-49. See also depots; military districts, 2-23, 2-37, 12-8 countermobility support;
logistics; services; stockpiles;
military information warfare plan, mine(s); obstacle detachment.
storage; supply.
5-54–5-55, 5-67 aircraft-delivered, 10-40,
distribution, 12-15–12-17,
military power. See military 10-42, 10-46
12-47–12-49
capabilities. artillery-delivered, 10-40,
forward distribution, 12-47
military regions, 2-23, 2-37, 12-8 10-42–10-43
planning factors, 2-151, 12-9
military strategic campaign plan, ground vehicles, 10-42, 10-44
pull system, 12-47, 12-80 1-22–1-26, 2-17–2-18, 2-144, helicopters, 8-52, 10-40, 10-47
push system, 12-47 2-147–2-148, 2-165, 3-89, 5-55
manual, 10-40, 10-42
mechanized infantry, 3-6, 6-12, branches and sequels, 1-50, 2-5
man-portable remote mine
6-43, 11-47, 13-97, 13-102– contingency plans, 1-25, 2-39, dispensers, 10-42, 10-45
13-103, 13-105 9-50–9-52
mechanical, 10-40, 10-50,
media, pp. viii–ix, ¶4-10, 5-44, designates operational-level 10-64
5-46, 5-51, 5-60, 5-76–5-77, AORs, 2-17, 2-32
5-88, 7-77, 7-81, 11-96, 11-98. remotely-delivered, 10-37,
military strategy, 1-79, 1-81–1-83 10-40–10-47, 10-57. See
medical support, 12-37, 12-77–12-85
military transportation center, 12-53 also mine(s), scatterable.
ambulance, air, 8-4, 12-81
militia forces (reserve component), Minister of National Security, 1-3
ambulance, ground, 12-80 2-24, 4-11, 4-18, 12-8, 12-44, Ministry of Defense, 1-2, 1-19,
blood management, 12-85 12-53, 12-66 1-22, 1-25, 2-16, 2-44, 5-54,
casualty collection points, mine(s), 10-37–10-47. See also 12-3, 12-11, 12-66, 12-68
12-79 minefields; minelaying. Ministry of Health, 12-85
casualty evacuation/handling, antihelicopter, 9-74–9-75, Ministry of Public Information, 1-2,
12-77, 12-81 9-94, 9-169, 9-196 2-115, 5-47, 5-71, 5-78
hospitals, 12-1, 12-4, 12-82– antipersonnel, 10-38, 10-43, Ministry of the Interior, 2-44, 2-115
12-84 10-45–10-46, 10-75
civil engineering, 12-65
civilian medical personnel antitank, 10-38, 10-40, 10-43,
internal security forces. See
(mobilized), 12-4, 12-67 10-45–10-46
main entry.
medical depot, 12-11, 12-80 chemical, 11-8
misinformation. See
medical equipment scatterable, 9-59, 10-40, 10-42. disinformation.
maintenance, 12-80 See also minelaying,
missile defense, 2-112, 6-32,
medical supplies, 12-80 remotely-delivered.
9-41, 9-83, 9-86, 9-101
mutual aid, 12-79 mineclearing, 10-6, 10-9, 10-11,
missiles. See antitank guided
10-73, 13-13
NBC casualty treatment, missiles; integrated fires
11-63, 12-84 minefields, 10-9, 10-38–10-47, command, long-range missiles;
10-56, 10-68–10-69. See also surface-to-air missiles; surface-
self-help, 12-79
mine(s); minelaying. to-surface missiles; tactical
treatment categories, 12-78
antilanding, 10-38 ballistic missiles.
underground medical facilities,
antipersonnel, 10-38, 10-45– mission support sites. See
12-13–12-14, 12-85
10-46 logistics.
unit aid stations, 12-79
Index-18
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
mission-type orders, 2-141, 2-163, N nature and stability of the state,

2-174 p. vii
National Command Authority,
mobility support, 4-125, p. 10-1, 1-2–1-4, 1-15–1-17, 1-24, 1-27, Navy, 2-26
¶10-4, 10-7–10-8, 10-10, 10-60– 1-33, 1-56, 1-59 amphibious capability, 13-86
10-61, 10-66, 10-70–10-73.
General Staff as executive in OSC, 2-40
See also mineclearing; obstacle
agent, 2-16 in transition operations, 3-13
clearing; route(s); water
obstacle crossing NBC release authority, 7-44, local naval superiority, 13-98
11-21, 11-37–11-39, 11-57
mobility and countermobility naval infantry, 2-40, 13-86,
assets (enemy), as targets, responsible for long-range 13-93–13-97, 13-101–13-103,
3-35, 4-35, 4-127, 10-57–10-58 rockets and missiles, 2-56 13-105, 13-107–13-108
mobilization, responsible for national SCP, naval fire support, 7-23–7-25,
2-15, 2-38, 2-148 13-88, 13-98
of civilian resources, 12-1,
12-4, 12-8, 12-53–12-54, staff responsibility for naval fire support net, 7-25
12-66–12-67 strategic IW, 5-54
Naval SPF. See Special-
of reserves, 2-27–2-28, 4-11, national information infrastructure, Purpose Forces.
4-18, 4-22, 12-8, 12-53, 5-4–5-5, 5-7, 5-11
naval transport, 13-86,
12-66, 12-105 national power, instruments of, 13-94–13-96
mockup. See deception and p. xvii, ¶1-1–1-3, 1-6, 1-10, 1-15–
1-16, 1-18, 1-20, 1-27, 1-30–1-32, submarines, 13-39, 13-68,
decoy. 13-86
1-40, 1-45, 1-49, 1-54, 1-57, 1-87,
modernization, pp. vi, xvii, ¶8-33– NBC, pp. 11-1–11-13. See
1-89, 1-107, 1-110–1-111, 4-7,
8-34, 9-80, 9-94 nuclear; biological; chemical;
4-13, p. 5-1, ¶5-8, 5-77, 5-83
mortars, 7-38, 7-42, 9-2, 9-58, weapons of mass destruction.
diplomatic-political, p. xvii,
9-60, 11-74, 11-79, 11-90 in adaptive operations,
¶1-1, 1-30, 1-32, 1-54, 1-87,
mountains, air defense in, 9-166 p. 5-1 11-97–11-98
movement. See also transportation. economic, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-30, in regional operations, 11-33,
movement control, 12-55– 1-32, 1-54, 1-87, p. 5-1 11-92–11-93, 11-95
12-59. See also traffic informational, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-30, in transition operations, 11-96
control/management. 1-32, 1-54, 1-87, p. 5-1 NBC attack, 7-45
movement program, 12-58 military, p. xvii, ¶1-1, 1-54, NBC defense, 2-112, 6-39,
movement route(s), 2-167, p. 5-1 11-6. See also NBC
10-10, 10-12–10-13, 10-25– national security strategy, p. xvi, protection/reconnaissance.
10-28, 10-34. See also ¶1-1–1-14, 1-79, 1-86–1-92, NBC environment, 2-127,
route(s). 12-2, 12-5 6-39, 10-10, 10-13, 10-19,
tactical movement, 9-149– national strategic campaign, 1-15, 11-1
9-151 2-18. See also strategic campaign. NBC medical treatment, 12-84
movement support detachment, national strategic campaign plan, NBC munitions, 2-55, 2-127,
10-9 1-18–1-21, 1-86, 2-15, 2-17, 11-3. See also biological/
multinational forces and operations, 2-38, 2-148, 5-55, 5-65, p. 11-1 chemical/nuclear munitions.
1-21, 1-23, 1-37, p. 2-1, ¶2-9, 2-10, branches and sequels, 1-8, 1-12 NBC observers, 11-67
2-33, 2-36, 2-38, 2-40, 2-105,
contingencies, 1-8, 1-16–1-18, NBC protection. See main
2-160, 4-18, 10-60–10-61
1-88–1-90 entry.
multiple rocket launcher, 5-35, 7-38,
national will, pp. ix–x NBC reconnaissance. See
9-58–9-59, 9-185, 10-42–10-43,
11-8, 11-26, 11-74, 11-79 of extraregional enemy. See main entry.
United States, national will. NBC weapons (OPFOR),
multiservice operations. See joint
operations. of regional enemy, 1-35, 3-2, 7-44–7-46, p. 11-1, ¶11-2–
3-20, 6-46 11-3, 11-5, 11-95. See also
of State. See State, national will. biological/chemical/nuclear
weapons.
nation-state(s), p. xiv
Index-19
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
NBC (continued) nonlethal means, 5-25, 5-71, 7-1, delivery means (OPFOR),
NBC weapons (enemy), 7-3–7-4, 9-96–9-108, 11-9 11-3, 11-30
2-127, 6-20, 6-22, 10-10, nonlinear, in regional operations, 11-33
10-16, 10-19, 11-1, 11-4, battlefield, 1-78, 2-63, 9-61, munitions, 7-46, 11-3, 11-30,
11-26–11-27, 11-29, 11-39, 9-116, 13-53 11-36
11-42, 11-46, 11-48, 11-56,
operations, 2-62–2-63, 2-65– nuclear attack, 11-34–11-41,
11-60, 13-11, 13-48, 13-54,
2-66, 2-73, 2-192, 2-206, 11-45
13-77
3-41, 4-34, 6-24, 12-52, offensive use, 11-39–11-47
retaliation in kind, 11-32– 13-48
11-33, 11-93 preemptive use (first use),
zones, 2-69, 3-29, 4-34 11-31–1-32, 11-42, 11-48
targets, 11-4, 11-26, 11-39–
nonmilitary means, 1-10–1-11, release, 11-22, 11-37–11-39,
11-41, 11-56
1-18, 1-21, 2-30 11-45
NBC protection, 11-59–11-69.
nonmilitary organizations, p. xvii response in kind, 11-32–
See also chemical defense;
NBC defense. as affiliated forces, 2-14 11-33, 11-93
air defense and NBC warning non-state actor(s), pp. vi, xv. weapons, p. 11-1, ¶11-3,
communications net, 2-222, affiliated with State, 2-14. See 11-31–11-32, 11-38, 11-48
9-47, 9-120, 11-66, 11-68 affiliated forces.
decontamination, 11-1, 11-7, civilians on the battlefield. O
11-59, 11-62–11-63, 11-65, See main entry. objective(s),
12-84 criminal organizations. See in offensive operations, 2-74,
detection and warning main entry. 3-28–3-29, 3-45
devices, 11-1, 11-64–11-69 drug organizations. See main subordinate unit missions,
NBC detection report, 11-67– entry. 2-135
11-68 guerrillas, p. xv obscurants, 10-20, 11-73. See
NBC reconnaissance. See humanitarian relief also smoke.
main entry. organizations, p. ix obstacle(s), 3-51, 4-40, 4-47,
NBC warning reports, 2-222, insurgent forces. See main 4-71, 4-125–4-126, 7-70,
11-62, 11-68–11-69 entry. 10-60, 10-68–10-69
protection equipment, 11-1, internally displaced persons, clearing, 10-9, 10-10–10-11,
11-59, 11-64 pp. viii, xv 10-19, 12-92, 13-77, 13-79,
NBC reconnaissance, 6-39, 6-43, media. See main entry. 13-101. See also obstacle-
8-10, 11-61–11-69. See also clearing detachment.
chemical reconnaissance units. mercenaries, p. xv, ¶2-14
creating, 10-90–10-11, 10-15–
neutralization (target damage refugees, p. viii, ¶13-62
10-16, 10-18, 10-21, 10-28,
criteria), 7-9, 7-12 rogue actors, p. xv 10-36, 10-49, 10-55–10-56,
night capability, 8-33–8-36, 8-70, subnational political 13-77, 13-79–13-80. See
9-194, 10-72, 13-18, 13-23, movements, p. xv also obstacle detachment.
13-27, 13-72 terrorists. See main entry. explosive obstacles. See
nonaligned states, p. vii third-party actors. See main mines.
noncombatants. See also civilians entry. natural (terrain), 10-38, 13-16
on the battlefield. transnational corporations, situational obstacles, 3-77,
noncontiguous, pp. ix, xv 3-86, 3-116
battle zones, 2-77 transnational political obstacle-clearing detachment, 10-9
defensive fronts, 4-17 movements, p. xv obstacle detachment, 4-63, 4-71,
nuclear, 11-29–11-48. See also NBC. 4-105, 4-123, 10-9, 10-17, 10-41,
operations, 2-73, 13-48
defensive use, 11-48 10-48–10-56
support zones, 2-78
delivery means (enemy), multiple ODs, 10-48
nongovernmental organizations,
6-43, 9-107, 11-4 with ATR, 4-64, 10-48, 10-50–
4-10, 5-46
10-51, 10-53–10-54
Index-20
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
obstacle plan, 4-71, 10-36, 10-54, operational environment, p. vi. Operations Directorate,
10-60, 10-68 See also contemporary General Staff, 1-22, 1-25,
occupied territory, 1-98–1-99, 4-4, operational environment; 2-17–2-18, 2-148, 5-55
5-87, 12-53, 13-68 information environment.
theater HQ, 2-148
offensive countermobility, 10-57– overall (strategic), p. xi
operations net, 2-216
10-58 specific, pp. vii, xi
operations officer, OSC staff,
offensive information warfare, total, pp. xi, xvii 2-96–2-96, 2-190, 2-216, 8-20,
5-58–5-60. See also operational exclusion, 1-59–1-60 9-38, 10-4–10-5, 10-8
information warfare.
operational shielding, 1-63, 8-75 operations section,
offensive operations, pp. 3-1–3-28.
operational-strategic command(s), FG staff, 2-148
See also attack; limited-objective
2-30, 2-36–2-42 IFC staff, 2-51, 7-25
attack; strike.
chief of staff. See main entry. ISC staff, 12-38
air defense in, 9-141–9-151
commander, 1-85, 2-83–2-85, OSC staff, 2-95–2-99, 2-148,
commandos in, 13-78–13-82
2-148, 2-189, 7-22, 7-31, 2-197, 5-69
engineer support. See main 7-50, 7-53, 7-62, 7-68, 8-15–
entry. operations security, 2-233, 5-39–
8-16, 8-25, 8-27, 8-76–8-77,
5-41
executing of, 3-63–3-67 9-46, 9-156, 9-158, 10-3,
10-5, 11-21, 11-38, 12-39, OPFOR. See contemporary
fire support, p. 7-1, ¶7-69
13-5–13-6, 13-44–13-45, opposing force; opposing force.
in adaptive operations, 3-14–
13-95–13-96 opportunity, window of, p. xix, ¶1-75,
3-16, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, 3-89,
command group 2-81–2-88 1-117, p. 2-1, ¶2-75, 2-100, 2-131,
3-95, 4-17, 4-69, 4-113
2-136, 2-145–2-146, 2-150,
in regional operations, 1-34, commando units, 13-74, 13-83
p. 3-1, ¶3-12, 3-15–3-16, 3-18,
1-87, 3-2–3-7, 3-18–3-19 deputy commander, 2-51, 3-23–3-24, 3-47, 3-53–3-54,
in transition operations, 1-45, 2-86, 2-188 3-57, 3-63, 3-66, 3-72, 3-78,
3-8–3-13, 3-18–3-20, 3-22 headquarters, 2-35, 2-36, 3-81–3-82, 3-84, 3-87, 3-90,
linear, 3-31, 3-36 2-81, 7-22, 7-28, 9-38 3-93, 3-96–3-97, 3-100, 3-103–
integrated fires command. 3-104, 3-113, 3-117, 4-14, 4-17,
nonlinear, 3-41
See main entry. 4-26–4-27, 4-33, 4-35, 4-59, 4-61,
organization of battlefield, 4-67, 4-70, 4-81, 4-84, 4-93,
3-21, 3-27–3-45, 3-58 integrated support command.
4-111–4-113, 4-115–4-116, 5-2,
See main entry.
organization of forces, 3-21, 5-74, 6-13, 6-50, 7-51, 7-57,
3-27, 3-46–3-58, 3-76– Internal Security Forces 7-79, 8-73, 8-76, 9-8, 9-147,
3-79, 3-85–3-88, 3-102, subordinate to, 1-97, 1-100 9-157, 10-67, 11-48, 13-59,
3-106–3-109, 3-115– joint command, 2-36, 2-40, 13-105
3-118, 9-142 8-8, 9-37 opposing force, pp. xii–xiv, xv–xix.
planned offense, 3-21, 3-23 staff. See main entry. See also contemporary
planning for, 3-21–3-57 task organization, 2-37, 2-39, opposing force.
preparing for, 3-58–3-62 2-148, 4-103, 13-11 Cold War, pp. xii–xiii
purpose, 3-17–3-20 operation plan, 2-30, 2-33, 2-72, contemporary, pp. xiii–xix
2-74, 2-95, 2-143, 2-147–2-148, threat-based, p. xiii
situational offense, 3-21,
2-165–2-167, 3-68, 4-52, 5-70,
3-24–3-27, 3-99 organic forces. See constituent
7-15, 7-33–7-34, 7-62, 9-37,
transition to defense, 3-63 forces.
10-11, 10-71, p. 11-1, ¶12-87
within defensive context, p. 3-1 organization. See also task
annexes, 2-167
organization.
operational art, 1-84–1-86 modification, 3-61, 3-65, 4-74,
operational-level, 2-30–2-42
operational directive, 2-95, 2-169– 4-76, 4-80
2-170, 3-26, 3-66, 4-29, 4-81, strategic-level, 2-15–2-29
organization of battlefield,
5-70 2-74, 2-148, 3-28, 4-32 tactical-level, 2-43–2-46
annexes to, 2-170, 2-208 organization of forces, 3-47,
4-48, 4-66
Index-21
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
organization of battlefield, 2-62– also information warfare; political (means/power). See

2-80, 2-134, 2-137, 2-148, media; psychological warfare. diplomatic-political means;
2-152, 2-166. See also personnel, 12-37, 12-66–12-76 national power, instruments of.
offensive operations; defensive political goals, for use of
personnel operations center,
operations.
12-70 long-range missiles and
organization of forces, 2-134, rockets, 2-56, 7-44
personnel support, 2-108,
2-152, 2-166, 7-26, 7-32. See
12-36–12-37, 12-66, SPF, 2-58
also offensive operations;
12-68–12-70 politically unacceptable casualties.
defensive operations.
replacement, 2-108, 12-36, See casualties.
out-of-theater operations. See
12-69, 12-71–12-76, 12-100 ports (as targets), 11-4, 13-3, 13-10,
force projection.
physical environment, p. viii. See 13-11, 13-48, 13-52, 13-65, 13-77,
also complex terrain; terrain; 13-89, 13-90, 13-99. See also
P urban environments; weather. aerial ports of debarkation;
paramilitary forces, pp. xiii, xv, xvii, planned defense, 4-26 aerial ports of embarkation; sea
¶1-92, 1-93–1-106, 2-14. See ports of debarkation; sea ports
planned offense, 3-21, 3-23
also criminal organizations; drug of embarkation.
organizations; guerrillas; insurgent planning, 2-143–2-160
potential adversary. See threat.
forces; internal security forces; airborne landing, 13-14–13-19
power projection. See force
irregular forces; mercenaries; air defense, 9-50–9-55, 9-66, projection.
private security organizations; 9-72
terrorists. precision munitions and fires
centralized planning. See (OPFOR), 1-29, 3-12–3-14, 3-31,
as affiliated forces, 2-14, p. 3-1, main entry. 3-77, 3-86, 3-110, 3-116, 4-47,
¶4-18
defensive operations, 4-24– 4-119–4-120, 5-25, 5-37, 5-52,
as source of information, 6-1 4-66 7-15, 7-40, 7-42–7-43, 7-46, 7-59,
in adaptive operations, 1-100, executive planning, 2-175 7-61, 7-72, 7-64, 8-44. See also
1-104, 4-18 precision weapons.
fire support, 7-26–7-46, 7-80,
in disruption force, 4-119 11-94 precision weapons,
in regional operations, 1-98, heliborne landing, 13-14–13-19 enemy (U.S.), 2-125, 3-35,
1-103, 4-4 4-127, 5-25, 6-16, 6-20,
IFC, 7-33–7-37 6-43, 6-47, 7-66, 9-101,
in transition operations, 1-99,
1-104, 3-13 IW, 5-64–5-66, 5-72 9-107, 10-10, 10-16, 10-19,
influenced by systems 11-4, 11-39, 11-48, 11-70,
non-state, 1-94
warfare, 1-122 13-11, 13-48, 13-54
of the State, p. xvii, ¶1-94–1-100
logistics, 2-166, 12-27–12-29, OPFOR, 3-118, 4-104, 5-35,
partisan forces, 9-56, 13-61 12-55 5-37, 7-9, 7-40–7-43,
patterned operations. See also p. 11-1, ¶11-2, 11-25, 13-54
conventional patterns of 3-57 preliminary instructions, 2-144,
operation. 2-159, 2-164
parallel planning, 2-157,
patternless operations, 1-69, 2-140 2-159, 2-175 preservation,
peer competitor (of United States), planning factors, 2-149– of combat power (military
pp. vi, xvi 2-151, 12-9 capability, military forces),
penetration, p. 3-1, ¶3-40, 3-78– 1-51, 1-63–1-64, 1-73, 3-89,
sequential planning, 2-175
3-79, 3-87, 6-10–6-11, 11-29, 4-11, 4-13–4-15, 4-17, 4-19,
11-47 SPF planning, 13-60 4-21–4-22, 4-57, 4-77–4-78,
perception management, p. viii, top-down, 7-28 4-85–4-86, 4-89, 4-92,
¶2-103, 2-115, 3-22, 4-25, 4-113, plausible deniability, 11-58, 13-59 4-112, 4-114, 7-74, 7-79–
5-12–5-13, 5-22, 5-44–5-47, 5-60, 7-80, 8-73, 9-8, 9-157,
point protection. See air defense.
5-65, 5-69, 5-71, 5-76, 5-79–5-81, 9-189, 10-31, 10-64, 11-94.
police, See also survivability
5-85, 5-87–5-88, 7-71, 7-76–
7-77, 11-92, 11-96, 11-98. See as source of information, 3-59 measures.
special police, 2-105, 4-53 of infrastructure, p. 12-1
Index-22
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
preservation (continued) radar intercept and direction in adaptive operations, 6-50–

of information infrastructure, finding, 6-25, 6-27, 6-36, 8-38, 6-51
5-38, 5-61, 5-71 9-97 in amphibious landing, 13-92,
of instruments of power, 1-6, radar jamming. See air defense 13-109
1-45, 1-49, 1-111, 4-7, jamming. in disruption force, 4-119
4-13, 5-83 radio(s). See communications. information requirements.
of regime, 1-48–1-49, 1-51, radio frequency weapons, 5-37 See main entry.
4-57, 4-77, 11-32 radio intercept and direction in IFC, 2-47, 2-49-2-50, 7-15–
principle(s), finding, 6-25, 6-36, 8-38, 9-97, 7-16, 7-19–7-20, 7-60
of air defense, 9-11–9-21 9-126 in regional operations, 6-46–
2
of C , 2-3–2-6 radio silence, 2-226–2-227, 8-60, 6-47
9-59, 9-120, 9-164, 13-23 in transition operations, 6-48–
of fire support, 7-4
raid(s), 1-76, 3-13, 4-96, 6-11–6-12, 6-49
of movement (transportation),
9-8, 9-56, 9-62, 9-64, 9-194, mechanized infantry, 6-12,
12-54–12-61
13-13, 13-46, 13-50, 13-61, 6-43
of operation versus an extra- 13-64, 13-66, 13-68, 13-77,
regional power, p. xviii, mission, 6-1
13-79, 13-81, 13-85–13-86,
¶1-54–1-78, 1-89, 10-59 13-92, 13-97–13-98, 13-109 NBC reconnaissance. See
of reconnaissance, 6-4–6-16 main entry.
raiding forces, 4-117
of systems warfare, 1-109 operational reconnaissance,
rear area security. See support
6-2, 6-21, 6-34–6-44, 8-45,
prisoners of war, 6-12 zone security.
13-48, 13-59
private volunteer organizations, reconnaissance, pp. 6-1–6-10.
principles, 6-4–6-16
4-10, 5-46 See also RISTA.
priorities, 6-17–6-21, 7-53
protected force, 4-57, 4-77 aerial reconnaissance. See
main entry. reconnaissance aircraft,
protection and security measures.
6-26–6-28, 6-37, 8-4, 8-46
See information warfare. affiliated forces, 4-25
reconnaissance ambush,
psychological effects, 9-6, 9-12, aggressiveness, 6-10–6-12
6-11–6-12
p. 11-1, ¶11-93, 13-53, 13-71 airborne forces, 6-41
reconnaissance attacks,
psychological warfare, 2-115, air defense, 9-109–9-126. 6-10–6-11, 6-43
5-12, 5-44–5-45, 5-71, 10-75. See also air surveillance.
See also information warfare; reconnaissance detachment,
chemical reconnaissance. 2-221, 6-43
perception management.
See chemical defense;
pursuit, 3-71 reconnaissance plan, 1-102,
NBC reconnaissance.
2-170, 3-23, 4-26, 6-5–6-6,
chief of reconnaissance, OSC 6-10, 6-14, 6-44, 7-54, 8-45
R staff. See main entry.
reconnaissance reserve,
radar(s), combined arms effort, 6-1, 6-43 6-17, 6-35
air defense, 9-83, 9-88, 9-108, commander’s reconnaissance, reconnaissance subsection,
9-113–9-121, 9-156, 9-183 7-31 OSC staff, 2-100, 2-102
battlefield surveillance, 6-38 commando units, 13-76– reconnaissance units, 6-1
countermortar/counterbattery, 13-79, 13-83–13-85
reconstitution of, 3-64, 4-79,
6-38 engineer reconnaissance. 6-9
limiting or eliminating radar See engineer support.
reporting procedures, 6-44,
emissions, 8-60, 9-108, ground reconnaissance, 3-59, 7-54, 11-66
9-120, 9-174–9-175 3-96, 6-5, 6-43–6-44, 13-17
route reconnaissance. See
side-looking airborne radar, heliborne reconnaissance, main entry.
6-27, 8-38 6-37, 8-10–8-11, 13-13
satellite reconnaissance,
synthetic aperture radar, 8-38 imagery, p. viii, ¶6-30–6-31, p. viii, ¶3-96, 6-7, 6-30–
radar corner reflectors, 5-25, 9-96, 8-38, 9-185, 10-29. See also 6-33, 9-185
9-100, 9-104, 10-23 satellite reconnaissance.
Index-23
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
reconnaissance (continued) NBC use, 11-33, 11-92– resources section,

signals reconnaissance. See 11-93, 11-95 in IFC staff, 2-51
main entry. paramilitary forces, 1-98, in ISC staff, 12-38
Special-Purpose Forces. See 1-103, 4-4
in OSC staff, 2-106–2-108,
main entry; see also primarily offensive, 1-34, 12-33
special reconnaissance. 1-87, 3-3
resupply. See logistics; supply.
special reconnaissance, reconnaissance, 6-46–6-47
RISTA (reconnaissance,
13-48–13-49 regional air superiority, p. 8-1, intelligence, surveillance, and
strategic reconnaissance, ¶8-68–8-72 target acquisition). See also the
6-2, 6-19, 6-22–6-33, 8-45, SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-64 separate parts.
13-37, 13-48, 13-55, 13-59,
regular forces (active component), component of combat system,
13-65, 13-69
2-24, 12-66 1-114–1-115, 1-118
support of IW, 5-27, 5-39
rehearsal(s), 2-171, 3-62, 4-62, enemy, as targets, 1-115,
tactical reconnaissance, 6-2, 4-64, 4-75, 8-51 1-118, 3-2, 3-35, 4-55, 4-68,
6-21, 6-43–6-44, 8-45, 13-48 4-127, 5-25, 5-56, 5-82,
reinforcements, 12-101, 12-105
tank units, 6-43 5-86, 5-89, 6-47, 6-50, 7-40,
relationship(s),regional and global,
terrain reconnaissance, 7-57, 7-66, 7-77, 9-5–9-6,
p. vii
9-109–9-110, 9-178 11-4, 11-96, 13-48, 13-54
religion, p. viii
reconnaissance fire(s), 3-112, in IFC, 2-47, 2-49, 2-51, 7-16,
remotely-piloted vehicles, 6-29. 7-19–7-20, 7-58
3-114, 4-52, 4-87, 4-96, 4-121,
See also unmanned aerial
4-130, 7-41, 7-59–7-62, 7-80, RISTA and IW section, ISC
vehicles.
9-8, 9-157, 12-28 staff, 2-51, 5-71
repair. See maintenance.
reconstitution, 3-64, 4-79, 6-9, sophisticated ambush, 3-93
12-69, 12-74, 12-100, 12-102– replacement,
road construction. See engineer
12-104 of equipment, 2-107, 12-35, support; route(s).
recovery. See evacuation. 12-101–12-102
rocket artillery, 10-40. See
refugees, pp. viii, xv, ¶11-24, 13-62 of personnel, 2-108, 12-36, multiple rocket launchers.
12-69, 12-71–12-76, 12-100
regional and global relationships, rogue actors, non-state, p. xv
p. vii reserve forces,
rogue state(s), p. xiv
regional operations, 1-6, 1-34– in organization of battlefield,
rotary-wing aircraft. See helicopters.
1-38, 1-87 3-46. 3-57, 4-47, 4-60–4-65,
4-71, 4-94, 4-104, 4-106, route(s). See also movement route(s).
air defense, 9-27, 9-81–9-82,
8-51, 8-61, 9-131, 9-158, route clearing, 10-11, 10-64
9-189–9-190
9-170, 9-193, 10-12–10-13, route preparation and
amphibious landings, 13-86, 10-54, 13-35. See also maintenance, 10-9–10-13,
13-104–13-106 antilanding reserve; 10-16–10-18, 10-34, 12-65
attacks to destroy, 3-18 antitank reserve; chemical
route reconnaissance, 8-10,
attacks to seize, 3-19 defense reserve; engineer
10-9, 10-25–10-27, 10-67
reserve; maneuver
aviation, 7-73, 8-43, 8-68– roving air defense units, 9-161,
reserve; reconnaissance
8-70 9-178
reserve; special reserves.
defensive operations, 4-2– rules of engagement, enemy. See
reserve component of Armed
4-5, 4-83 United States.
Forces, 2-24, 4-11, 12-44,
engineer support, 10-59– 12-66, 12-75, 12-105. See ruses, 2-146
10-61 also militia; mobilization of
fire support, 7-73–7-74 reserves.
S
heliborne forces, 13-2 resources officer, OSC staff,
2-106, 2-192, 2-218–2-219, sabotage, 6-11, 9-64, 9-194
IW support of, 5-79–5-80
12-27, 12-33–12-34, 12-39– by amphibious landing force,
offensive operations, 1-34, 12-40, 12-55, 12-65 13-92
1-87, 3-2–3-7, 3-18–3-19
by heliborne forces, 13-13
Index-24
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
sabotage (continued) service component headquarters, smoke barrels, 11-74, 11-83

by information attack, 5-49 2-24, 2-26, 2-37, 13-40–13-41, smoke bombs, 11-74, 11-77
13-45
by SPF teams/agents, 13-50, smoke drums, 11-74
13-55–13-59 services, 12-23–12-24, 12-37, 12-44,
smoke-generating trucks,
12-46–12-47. See logistics.
sanctuary, 1-75, 1-77–1-78, 2-186, 11-71, 11-74, 11-77,
4-17 shielding force, 4-98–4-100, 4-108 11-83–11-85
air defense of, 9-21, 9-154, side-looking airborne radar, 6-27, smoke grenades, 11-74–
9-156, 9-162–9-165 8-38 11-75, 11-83
denied to enemy, 1-29, 1-78, signal(s). See communications. smoke pots, 11-74, 11-77,
7-7, 9-61, 10-70, 11-93, signals reconnaissance, 3-55, 4-58, 11-83
11-97, 13-53 5-25, 6-25–6-27, 6-30, 6-33– smokescreens. See main
engineer preparation, 10-34 6-34, 6-36, 8-38, 8-46, 13-17. entry.
See also electronic warfare;
moral sanctuary, 1-75, 4-17, smoke units, 11-71
jamming; radar intercept and
7-81 spray tanks, 11-74, 11-77
direction finding; radio intercept
physical sanctuary, 1-75, 4-17 and direction finding. toxic smokes, 11-70, 11-72
sanctuary-based operations, signature reduction, 5-42, 5-63, vehicle engine exhaust
1-75, 3-10, 3-16, 4-11, 4-17, 9-30, 10-21, 12-12, 12-14 smoke systems, 11-74,
4-90, 6-50, 8-74, 10-62 11-76, 11-83
simultaneous battlefield/
support zone, 2-78 operations, 1-78, 9-61, 12-52, smokescreens, 9-103, 11-78
satellite. See communications; 13-52–13-53 blinding, 11-79–11-80
reconnaissance; space. single-round rocket launchers, camouflage, 11-81–11-86
scatterable mines. See mines. 9-58, 9-60
decoy, 11-87
sea ports of debarkation (enemy), situational awareness,
protective, 11-86
as targets, 1-61, 1-104, 6-48, enemy. See United States.
sociological demographics, p. viii,
7-77, 8-71, 10-58, 11-96. OPFOR, p. viii, ¶2-130, 3-23 ¶2-128
See also ports.
situational defense, 4-27–4-31, sophisticated ambush, 3-11, 3-31,
sea ports of embarkation (enemy), 4-111, 10-40 3-92–3-97, 4-119, 6-49
as targets, 1-60, 8-71. See situational obstacles, 3-77, 3-86, sound ranging, 6-38, 9-184.
also ports. 3-116
space,
search and rescue. See combat situational offense, 3-21, 3-24–
search and rescue. 3-27, 3-99 space-based assets (enemy),
5-1
sectors. See air defense. situational understanding. See
situational awareness. space-based assets
security force(s), 2-78, 11-67,
(OPFOR), 5-16
13-13, 13-83 smoke, 11-70–11-98
space defense, 2-112
defensive operations, 4-25, air-delivered, 11-74, 11-77,
4-41, 4-58, 12-98 11-79 special mission net, 2-221
offensive operations, 3-42, artillery-delivered, 11-74, special police, 2-105, 4-53
3-46, 3-55 11-77, 11-79, 11-90 Special-Purpose Forces, 1-59, 3-32,
security force commander, 4-58 camouflage smoke, 5-43 11-29, p. 13-1, ¶13-7–13-85
semiactive laser-guided delivery systems, 11-74–11-77 abduction, 13-50
projectiles, 7-42 administrative force structure,
in air defense ambush, 9-173
sensor-fuzed submunitions, 7-42 13-41–13-42
in antilanding reserve, 4-64
sequels, 2-5. See also branches air defense role, 9-2, 9-56,
in defense, 11-89–11-90 9-61–9-62, 9-67, 9-76,
and sequels.
in offense, 3-87, 3-117, 11-88 9-81, 9-123, 9-144, 9-185,
service component(s), Armed
neutral smoke, 11-70, 11-72 9-189, 9-194
Forces, 2-16
protective smoke, 11-86
signaling smoke, 11-91
Index-25
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
Special-Purpose Forces in strategic operations, 13-68 support of insurgent/irregular

(continued) in transition operations, 2-57, forces, 1-102, 1-104, 2-58,
Air Force SPF, 2-57, 6-23, 13-38, 13-65–13-66 9-194, 13-37, 13-54, 13-59,
13-38–13-42, 13-45, 13-61, 13-64–13-65, 13-69
insertion by air, 13-39, 13-66
13-52, 13-64, 13-66 support of IW, 5-35, 13-51
insertion by Navy, 13-39,
allocated to DTG or BTG, 13-66, 13-68 support of terrorism, 2-58,
2-59, 13-40, 13-44–13-45 13-37, 13-64–13-65
Internal Security Forces SPF,
allocated to OSC, p. 13-1, 6-23, 13-38, 13-40, 13-45 task organization, 13-40,
¶16-23, 13-38, 13-40– 13-42–13-47
joint SPF operations, 6-23,
3-41, 13-43–13-45, 13-47, terminal guidance for
13-45, 13-68
13-52, 13-60–13-61, 13-63, weapons, 13-54
13-71 logistics, 12-29
terror tactics, 13-59, 13-65
allocation to theater HQ, missions, 13-52–13-70
train affiliated forces, 13-49
13-43–13-45, 13-47 Naval SPF, 2-57, 6-23, 13-38–
13-42, 13-45, 13-52, 13-64, train and control agents,
ambushes, 13-50, 13-61
13-66, 13-86 13-49, 13-55
amphibious landings, 13-86,
NBC delivery, 11-3, 11-8, Special-Purpose Forces Command,
13-88, 13-92, 13-95–
11-30, 11-52, 11-55, 13-70 6-23, 13-37–13-38, 13-40-13-42,
13-96, 13-108
13-52
antilanding reserve, 4-64 planning, 13-60
air defense role, 9-2, 9-81
Army SPF, 2-26, 2-57, 6-23, raids, 3-13, 9-194, 13-46,
13-50, 13-61, 13-64, commando units, 13-37,
13-38, 13-40–13-42, 13-45,
13-66, 13-68, 13-86 13-72–13-74. See also
13-52, 13-64, 13-66
main entry.
assassination, 13-50, 13-54, reconnaissance, 2-58, 6-12,
6-23–6-24, 6-34–6-35, 13-17, control of joint SPF operations,
13-58–13-59
13-37–13-39, 13-48–13-49, 6-23, 13-45, 13-68
combat search and rescue,
13-54–13-55, 13-59, 13-61, direct action, 13-37
13-50
13-64–13-65, 13-69, 13-76– forces allocated to IFC, 2-27
command and control, 13-40– 13-79, 13-83–13-86. See
13-47 forces allocated to theater, 2-25
also special reconnaissance.
commandos. See main entry. forces centrally controlled at
sabotage, 13-50, 13-55–13-59
national level, 2-26, 6-23,
direct action, 2-58, 4-52, 4-64, security force, 3-55, 4-58 13-41
9-81, 9-185, 13-37–13-39,
special reconnaissance, in adaptive operations, 13-38,
13-48, 13-50–13-51, 13-59,
13-48–13-49 13-68–13-69
13-61, 13-64–13-65, 13-68–
13-69 SPF annex, operation plan, in regional operations, 13-38,
2-167 13-64
disruption force, 3-32, 4-37,
4-52–4-53, 9-144, 13-63 SPF Command. See main in strategic operations, 13-68
entry.
diversionary measures, 2-58, in transition operations, 13-38,
13-49, 13-51 SPF component of IFC, 2-57– 13-65
2-59, 13-44, 13-63, 13-71
exploitation force, 3-88 strategic reconnaissance,
SPF detachment, 13-46–13-47 13-37, 13-55, 13-59
force projection, p. 13-1,
¶13-39, 13-47, 13-52, SPF teams, 2-59, 13-42, support of irregular forces,
13-66, 13-70 13-46–13-47, 13-55, 13-70
13-58–13-59, 13-65, 13-92
hostage rescue, 13-50 tactical transport, 13-37
strategic objectives, 2-58,
hostage-taking, 13-50 trains and controls agents,
p. 13-1, ¶13-41, 13-44–
in adaptive operations, 2-57, 13-55
13-45, 13-52, 13-71
9-194, 13-38, 13-67–13-70 special reconnaissance, 13-48–
strategic operations, 1-29
infiltration, 9-62, 9-67 13-49
support of amphibious
in regional operations, 2-57, special reserves, 4-65
landing, 13-54, 13-64, 13-95
13-38, 13-64
Index-26
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
spin management. See perception threats to the State. See main Strategic Integration Department,
management. entry 1-3, 1-19
spoiling attack, 3-25, 3-98–3-102, views of the United States, organizes civil engineering
4-25, 4-115, 9-8 p. x support, 12-65
staff (OSC), 2-81, 2-89–2-118, 7-33 stay-behind forces, 3-32, 4-38, responsible for national SCP,
functional staff, 2-109–2-117, 4-52, 9-58, 9-62, 12-94, 13-61, 1-19, 2-148
2-188, 5-71, 10-4, 10-8, 13-85 responsible for strategic IW
11-5–11-6, 13-95 stockpiles (war stocks), 12-2, plan, 5-54–5-55
primary staff, 2-93–2-108 12-5–12-10, 12-14, 12-25. See strategic-level courses of action,
also storage. 1-6–1-14, 1-86. See also
secondary staff, 2-93–2-108
mobile reserves, 12-9, 12-93 adaptive operations, regional
staging areas/bases,
mobilization reserves, 12-8 operations, strategic
enemy, as targets, 6-48, operations, and transition
9-49, 13-52 national-level reserves, 12-6,
operations.
12-10, 12-64
for OPFOR airborne or strategic offense, 1-89
heliborne landings, 13-21 strategic reserves, 12-6–12-7,
12-10, 12-64 strategic operations, 1-6–1-7,
stalemate, 1-49, 4-78 1-12, 1-14, 1-23, 1-27–1-33
storage. See also depot(s);
State, p. xvi defensive actions, 1-30
stockpiles.
disproportionate interests, 1-68 during adaptive operations,
aboveground facilities, 12-10,
doctrine, pp. xvi, xix, ¶1-47 12-12 1-14, 1-31, 4-15, 4-78,
goals. See strategic goals. 4-85, 4-112
bunkers, 12-12–12-13
information infrastructure, during regional operations,
short-duration facilities,
5-38, 5-61, 5-71 1-30, 1-36
10-34, 12-14, 12-28
information technology, 5-15– during transition operations,
underground structures,
5-16 1-14, 1-31
12-10, 12-13, 12-85
logistics system, 12-1–12-4. IW support of, 1-29, 5-75–5-78
strategic campaign, 1-15–1-26,
See also logistics. 1-85, 3-1, 3-17, 4-3, 4-19, 5-8, means, 1-27, 1-30–1-32
military capabilities, p. xvi, 5-56, 7-17, 8-1, 8-3, 8-11, 8-68– target enemy strategic
¶1-6, 1-42, 1-47, 3-4, 3-6, 8-69, 9-50, p. 10-1, ¶11-22, 13-8. centers of gravity, 1-6,
4-2–4-3, 4-6, 4-12 strategic campaign plan. See 1-28, 1-32–1-33, 4-78
National Command Authority. military SCP; national SCP. timeframe, 1-7
See main entry. strategic centers of gravity, enemy strategic preclusion. See access-
national industrial base, 12-1 (U.S.), 1-6, 1-28, 1-32–1-33, control operations
national power, instruments 4-78, 5-12, 5-45, 5-77, 13-53 strategic reconnaissance. See
of, p. xvii. See main entry strategic environment, p. xi reconnaissance.
on national power. strategic defense, 1-87 strategy. See military strategy;
national security strategy. Strategic Forces, 2-26 national security strategy.
See main entry. strike, 3-110–3-118, 4-36, 4-113,
NBC delivery, 11-35
national will, pp. ix–x, ¶1-68, 4-121, 10-67
SSM units for IFC, 2-56
5-77, 5-80, 5-84 fire support to, 7-58–7-59,
support of air defense, 9-81
not a peer competitor of 7-69–7-70
United States, p. xvi strategic framework, pp. 1-1–1-26
in offense or defense, 3-110
regional power, p. xvi strategic goal(s), 1-4–1-5, 1-9, 1-15–
IFC CP control, 2-47
1-17, 1-48, 2-32, 2-58, 2-112,
strategic goal(s). See main logistics, 12-28
3-8, 3-17, 4-9, 4-19, 5-53–5-54,
entry.
5-65, 5-72, 5-75, 7-17, 8-62, 8-77 reconnaissance fire, 7-60, 7-62
strategy. See national
strategic information warfare. See submarines. See Navy.
security strategy.
information warfare. subnational political movements,
technology. See main entry.
p. xv
Index-27
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
subordinate forces. See medium-range, 9-43, 9-68, sympathizers (civilian, of OPFOR),

constituent forces; dedicated 9-73, 9-83, 9-86, 9-90, 9-52, 9-64, 9-123, 11-8, 11-52,
forces. 9-130–9-131, 9-133–9-134 11-55, 13-17
supply, 2-107, 12-20, 12-23–12-24, short-range, 9-73, 9-90, synthetic aperture radar, 8-38
12-35, 12-37, 12-44–12-45, 9-133–9-134 system, 1-107
12-47–12-49, 12-93. See also shoulder-fired, 9-61, 9-67, system of systems, 1-107, 1-114,
logistics; materiel support. 9-84, 9-86, 9-88, 9-90– 4-67, 7-5
supply (and evacuation) 9-92, 9-133, 9-144, 9-164,
systems warfare, 1-89, 1-107–
routes, 10-16, 12-65, 9-171, 9-194
1-122, 4-67
12-96, 12-99. surface-to-surface missiles, 1-59,
operational level, 1-113–1-119,
supply point(s), 12-1, 12-47– 5-35, 7-2, 7-38. See also
2-133, 3-91, 5-57, 7-2, 7-5–
12-48, 12-96 tactical ballistic missiles.
7-6, 7-57, 7-75, 10-57
support group, in CP, 2-180 air defense role, 9-2, 9-56
principle, 1-109
supporting relationship, 2-13, 2-83, as dedicated units, 2-12
strategic level, 1-110–1-112
2-135, 4-104, 7-18, 7-20, 7-24– conventional munitions, 2-55–
7-25, 7-35, 8-19, 9-38, 10-3– tactical level, 1-120
2-56
10-4, 10-48, 11-5–11-6, 12-32,
13-5, 13-11, 13-44, 13-74 T
in IFC, 2-47, 2-55–2-56, 7-16
support line, 2-71 tactical ballistic missiles, 9-131,
in regional operations, 2-56,
support net, 2-218 9-189, 9-193–9-194. See also
7-73
support operations coordination surface-to-surface missiles.
in transition operations, 2-56
center, ISC staff, 12-38 tactical group, 2-43–2-46, 6-21,
NBC munitions, 2-55, 7-44, 6-34, 6-43, 8-4, 8-11, 8-20. See
support zone, 2-69–2-71, 2-79
11-3, 11-30, 11-26, 12-1 also brigade tactical group;
air defense, 9-70, 9-85,
precision munitions, 7-42 division tactical group.
9-134, 9-148, 9-159
reconnaissance fire(s), 7-61 tanker (aircraft), 8-3
commando units, 13-83
support of airborne or target acquisition. See air
defensive operations, 4-34,
heliborne landing, 13-18 defense; artillery.
4-41, 4-57–4-58, 4-83,
12-92, 12-96 support of amphibious target area. See air defense.
landing, 13-88 target damage criteria, 7-9–7-13,
engineer support, 10-2, 10-47
surprise, 3-11, 7-4, 8-60, 9-11– 7-27, 7-47, 7-50, 7-57, 7-62, 7-68
offensive operations, 3-29,
9-14, 9-168, 9-174, 11-23, 11-39, target value analysis, 7-21, 7-47,
3-42, 3-55, 9-148, 12-88
11-44, 12-87, 13-14, 13-18, 8-76
noncontiguous, 2-78 13-33, 13-50, 13-54, 13-77,
task organization, 2-37, 2-39, 2-41,
support-zone security, 1-97–1-98, 13-81, 13-109
2-47, 2-49, 2-52, 2-54–2-55,
1-100, 12-2, 12-97–12-98, 13-83 survivability measures, 2-148, 2-210, 4-18, 4-59, 4-103,
suppression of enemy air defenses, command and control, 2-7, 5-68, 7-16, 7-19, 8-2, 8-4, 8-7,
8-21, 8-58, 11-4, 13-18, 13-22– 2-181-2-182, 2-188, 2-203, 8-9, 8-11–8-12, 8-15–8-16, 10-1,
13-23, 13-48, 13-54, 13-61 2-205, 2-228–2-233, 5-61 10-5–10-9, 10-25, 10-48–10-49,
Supreme High Command, 1-25, communications, 2-207, 10-64, 12-18–12-21, 12-40–
1-94, 1-97, 2-16, 2-20–2-22, 2-228–2-232 12-41, 12-43, 13-11, 13-40,
2-25, 2-31. 2-43–2-44, 2-56, 13-42–13-47, 13-74
engineer, 4-69-4-71, 4-87,
2-141, 2-174, 2-224, 8-3, 13-5, technological overmatch,
p. 10-1, ¶10-7–10-8,
13-8, 13-11, 13-41, 13-93
10-10, 10-31–10-35, by extraregional enemy (U.S.),
surface-to-air missiles, 9-34, 9-96, 10-61, 10-66, 10-69 pp. vi, ixx, xvi, 1-12, 4-6,
9-98, 9-108, 9-119, 9-137, 9-143, 4-9, 4-14–4-15, 4-85, 4-90,
sustainment. See logistics.
9-154, 9-161, 9-169 5-74, 5-85, 7-1, p. 8-1,
sustainment command post,
long-range, 9-68, 9-83, 9-86, ¶8-37, 8-71, 9-188, 11-50,
2-183, 2-192, 2-223, 12-34, 12-39
9-134 11-94
resources officer in charge,
2-106, 12-34
Index-28
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
technological overmatch 2-14, 4-53, 9-52, 9-61, 9-64, threat(s) to the State,
(continued) 9-194, 9-194, 11-8, 11-55 extraregional, p. xvi, ¶3-3, 4-6.
by the State, pp. ix, xvi, ¶3-4, SPF support of, 2-58, 13-37, See also United States.
3-75, 4-2–4-3, 7-1, 7-73, 13-64–13-65 insurgent, 1-17, 3-55, 4-58
p. 8-1, ¶8-68, 11-59 state-sponsored, p. xiv internal, 1-6, 3-3, 4-4
neutralization of, pp. vi, viii, support of IW, 5-35 regional, p. xvi, ¶1-6, 1-9,
¶1-69–1-72, 5-18–5-19
threat to State, 3-55, 4-58 1-11, 1-37
technology, p. ix
terror tactics, 1-73, 7-76, 9-61, threat(s), to the United States,
commercial off-the-shelf, 9-64, 13-59, 13-65 pp. xii–xiii
p. viii, ¶5-15, 5-17
theater(s), 1-24, 2-19–2-22, 2-33– throughput, 12-49, 12-91. See
global market, pp. vi, xviii 2-35, 6-5, 7-24, 8-1–8-2, 8-9– materiel support.
hybridization, p. ix 8-11, 8-20, 8-50, 13-10, 13-43, time, p. x, ¶1-48, 1-64–1-66, 1-69,
information technology, 2-153, 13-93 2-154, 2-157–2-158, 2-162, 3-5,
p. 5-1, ¶5-2, 5-14–5-15 establishing a new theater, 3-14, 3-23, 3-26, 4-5, 4-10–4-11,
modernization, pp. vi, xvii, 13-10 4-15, 4-69, 4-78, 4-85, 4-90, 4-92,
¶8-33–8-34 out-of-theater operations. See 4-116, 4-131, 6-13, 7-17, 7-61,
force projection. 7-51, 7-68, 10-63, 10-73. See
niche, p. ix, ¶3-11, 9-80,
also tempo.
9-195 theater air armies, 2-25, 8-1,
8-5–8-7, 8-13, 8-23–8-24, total war, 1-68, 12-1
technological overmatch. See
main entry. 11-30 toxic industrial chemicals, 11-13–
theater campaign, 1-85, 7-17, 11-18
technological surprise, 3-11
8-5, 8-10, 13-60–13-61 traffic control, 1-98–1-99, 2-96,
upgrades, p. ix, ¶12-50
theater campaign plan, 2-21, 12-57
vulnerability, 5-17
2-148 traffic management, 12-53, 12-56–
tempo, 12-57. See also movement
theater commander, 1-85,
control of, p. x, ¶1-45, 1-65– 2-33, 2-35, 2-56, 2-148, control; traffic control.
1-66, 1-69, 2-5, 3-4–3-5, 3-7– 2-184, 3-32, 6-37, 7-17, transition operations, 1-6–1-7,
3-9, 3-67, 3-90, 3-98, 3-103, 8-13–8-14, 8-23–8-24, 8-76– 1-13, 1-39–1-46, 1-88
4-8, 5-59, 5-89, 7-45, 7-77, 8-77, 9-49, 13-5–13-6, airborne/heliborne forces, 13-3
7-80, 8-71, 9-142, 10-16, 13-43–13-44, 13-95–13-96
10-37, 10-68, 10-70, 11-47, air defense, 3-13, 9-153,
theater CPs, 2-184, 2-195 9-191–9-192
12-59, 12-91, 13-1, 13-91
theater disruption zone, 3-32 amphibious landings, 13-86,
prolong the conflict, p. x,
¶1-66, 4-72 theater headquarters, 2-19– 13-107
2-22, 2-25, 2-37, 2-43–2-44, attacks to destroy, 3-18
terminally homing projectiles, 7-42
2-92, 2-141, 2-148, 2-174,
terrain, p. viii, ¶2-127, 2-131, p. 6-1, attack to expel, 3-20
2-184, 2-224, 5-55, 6-23,
¶6-3, 6-8, 6-40, 9-13, 9-74, 9-103– 8-5, 8-10–8-11, 8-14, 8-23– attacks to seize, 3-19
9-104, 9-142, 9-166, 10-10, 10-13, 8-25, 9-29, 13-5, 13-43, aviation, 8-68–8-70
10-15, 10-18, 10-23, 10-26–10-28, 13-45, 13-47 consolidate gains, 3-8–3-9
10-30–10-31, 10-34, 10-39,
theater IFC, 7-17, 7-24, 7-28, defensive operations, 1-45,
10-68–10-69, 11-23, 11-82, 11-85,
8-7, 8-10–8-11, 8-13–8-14. 3-9, 4-6–4-12, 4-25, 4-28,
11-87, 12-19, 13-16, 13-35, 13-77,
See integrated fires 4-83, 4-90, 4-103, 4-113,
13-80–13-81. See also complex
command. 4-118
terrain; physical environment;
urban environments. third-party actor(s), p. xv engineer support, 10-59,
terrain reconnaissance, 9-109– as shields, p. viii 10-61–10-63
9-111, 9-178 affiliated with State, 2-14 fire support, 7-75–7-78
terrorists, p. xv conducting IW, 5-9, 5-28, IW support of, 5-81–5-85,
affiliated with State, 1-95–1-96, 5-35, 5-46, 5-51 10-62
1-99, 1-100, 1-105–1-106, NBC use, 11-96
Index-29
FM 7-100.1 ________________________________________________________________________________
transition operations (continued) United States (as extraregional strategic centers of gravity,
offensive operations, 1-45, power), 1-6, 1-28, 1-32–1-33, 4-78,
3-8–3-13, 3-18–3-20, 3-22, aversion to heavy losses, 5-12, 5-45, 5-77, 13-53
4-7–4-8 1-67–1-68. See also sensitivity to domestic and
paramilitary forces, 1-99, casualties. world opinion, 1-67
1-104, 3-13 coalitions, vulnerability of, technology and warfighting
reconnaissance, 6-48–6-49 p. vii, ¶5-77, 5-85, 6-22, capability, p. ix. See also
13-10 technological overmatch.
SPF, 2-57, 13-38, 13-65–13-66
commitment, lack of, 1-66–1-67 threat(s) to, pp. xii–xiii
transition states, p. xiv
critical infrastructure, as views of, p. x
transmission security, 5-41
target, 5-5, 5-20, 5-35, unmanned aerial vehicles,
transnational corporations, pp. ix, 5-49, 5-53, 13-52
xv air defense against, 9-5, 9-41,
early-entry forces, p. x, ¶1-74, 9-125, 9-179–9-187
transnational political movements, 3-10, 4-12, 6-49, 8-44, 13-65,
p. xv attack roles, 8-41
13-107
transport aircraft, 8-3, 8-11, deception roles, 8-41
force projection, vulnerability
13-21–13-22, 13-37, 13-39 of, p. x, ¶1-55, 1-73, 4-5, logistics roles, 8-41
transport helicopters. See 4-10, 13-59, 13-65 reconnaissance, 3-96, 6-7,
helicopters. homeland, as target, 1-60, 6-26, 6-29, 6-37, 6-42, 8-41,
transportation, 12-37, 12-52–12-65. 9-191, 11-55, 13-52–13-53 9-180. See also drones;
See also movement; traffic remotely-piloted vehicles.
home stations, as targets,
control; traffic management. 1-60, 13-52 urban environments, pp. viii–ix,
air, 12-60, 12-62–12-63, ¶1-49, 1-75, 1-77, 4-72, 7-81,
information dominance, 1-71,
12-76, 12-80, 12-91 9-171, 11-14–11-15, 11-24,
p. 5-1, ¶5-18–5-19, 5-58,
11-56, 12-86. See also complex
civilian assets, 12-53–12-54 5-60, 5-82, 5-89–5-90,
terrain; physical environment;
coastal waterway, 12-60, 12-62 7-79–7-80
terrain.
convoys, 12-57, 12-59 intervention by, pp. vi, xvi,
xviii, ¶1-6, 1-47
inland waterway, 12-60, V
12-62, 12-76, 12-80 key systems (U.S.), as
targets. See main entry. variables, of COE. See critical
military transportation center, variables.
12-53 national will (U.S.), pp. ix–x,
¶1-28, 1-33, 1-51, 1-58, victory, p. x, ¶1-49, p. 2-1, p. 3-1
principles, of movement, 1-67, 1-78, 1-119, 3-27, views of the United States, p. x
12-54–12-61 3-69, 3-72–3-73, 3-81,
rail, 12-60, 12-62, 12-64, 12-76 3-96, 3-111, 4-15, 4-117,
W
road (motor vehicle), 12-60, 5-3, 5-19, 5-76–5-77, 5-89,
12-61–12-64, 12-76, 12-80 7-8, 9-61, 13-51, 13-53– warning order. See preliminary
13-54, 13-59, 13-62, 13-66 instructions.
units, 12-23–12-24
OPFOR principles of water obstacle crossing,
tunnels, 10-69, 12-13
operation versus an air defense of, 9-167, 9-170
turning movement, p. 3-1 extraregional power (U.S.),
engineer support, 10-5, 10-13,
p. xviii, ¶1-54–1-78, 1-89,
10-25–10-26, 10-28, 10-61,
U 10-59
10-71–10-72. See also gap
unconventional forces, 1-38, 4-18 rules of engagement (U.S), crossing.
1-61, 1-73
underground facilities, NBC use, 11-41
situational awareness (U.S),
medical, 12-13–12-14, 12-85 smoke use, 11-87
p. viii, ¶1-71, 3-23, 3-74,
shelters for aircraft, 8-44 3-83–3-84, 3-97, 3-113, water purification, 10-10, 11-63
storage, 12-10, 12-13, 12-85 4-26, 4-68, 5-31, 5-82, water supply, 10-10, 10-18, 10-25,
unit distribution, 12-49. See 5-90, 6-51, 7-79 10-30, 10-63
materiel support.
Index-30
____________________________________________________________________________________ Index
weapons of mass destruction,

1-59, p. 11-1
chief of WMD, OSC staff,
2-114, 11-5
in strategic operations, 1-29
offensive use, 2-114, 3-12,
3-13, 3-51, 6-19, 9-63,
11-5, 11-14
WMD conditions, 2-204, 3-55,
4-58, 4-65, 11-33, 11-59
WMD-like events, 11-98
weather, p. viii, ¶1-70, 2-127, p. 6-1,
¶6-3, 6-8, 6-38, 8-35–8-36, 9-17,
9-106, 9-172–9-173, 10-72,
11-12, 11-82, 11-85, 11-87.
See also physical environment.
wide area network, 2-209
window of opportunity. See
opportunity.
Z
zones. See attack zone; battle
zone; disruption zone; kill zone;
support zone; (air defense)
zones of responsibility.
Index-31
FM 7-100.1
27 DECEMBER 2004
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
SANDRA R. RILEY
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0432104
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with initial distribution number 115362, requirements for FM 7-100.1.
PIN: 082016-000

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FM 7-100.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Chapter 1 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK....................................................................................1-1

Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL...................................................................................2-1

*This publication supersedes FM 100-61, 26 January 1998.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................................................. 3-1

Chapter 4 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.................................................................................... 4-1

Chapter 5 INFORMATION WARFARE .................................................................................... 5-1

Chapter 6 RECONNAISSANCE ............................................................................................... 6-1

Chapter 7 FIRE SUPPORT....................................................................................................... 7-1

Chapter 12 LOGISTICS............................................................................................................ 12-1

Chapter 13 AIRBORNE, SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES, AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS .. 13-1

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Nature and Stability of the State

Regional and Global Relationships

INTERACTION AND LINKAGE OF VARIABLES

ADAPTIVE AND CHANGING

ENEMY, THREAT, AND OPFOR

Cold War OPFOR

of everythingit could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual de-

CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND OTHER ACTORS

REAL-WORLD AND TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

KEEPING THE COE AND THE OPFOR CONTEMPORARY

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

MINISTER MINISTER OF MINISTER OF MINISTER MINISTER

MINISTRY MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF MINISTRY MINISTRY

Figure 1-1. National Command Authority

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GOALS

FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

• Regional operationsstrategic-level course of action (including con-

Against Opponents Against Opponents

1-7. Strategic operations are a continuous process not limited to wartime or

Against Opponents’ Strategic Centers of Gravity

1 State achieves its strategic goals without combat, through strategic

Figure 1-3. Examples of Branches and Sequels in National Security Strategy

it could neutralize or eliminate the extraregional force, it could finally complete

Figure 1-4. Example of a Strategic Campaign

NATIONAL STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

MILITARY STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-30. Strategic operations occur continuously, from prior to the outbreak of

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION VERSUS AN EXTRAREGIONAL POWER

CONTROL ACCESS INTO REGION

EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING

CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES

NEUTRALIZE TECHNOLOGICAL OVERMATCH

1-70. Another way to operate on the margins of enemy technology is to ma-

CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

OPFOR MILITARY AND OPERATIONAL ART

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

THE ROLE OF PARAMILITARY AND IRREGULAR FORCES IN

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

the commander’s imagination. While performing these functions, the Inter-

of insurgent groups they have identified as having potential usefulness in

TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

APPLICATION AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

APPLICATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

1-115. The combat system is characterized by interaction and interdepend-