What has the search for consciousness looked like, and what can we

infer from this pattern about our own human nature?

Willa Kopp-DeVol

Senior Project Advisor: John Fisher

Consciousness is inherently intrinsic, something that every human experiences and knows
intimately. Understanding the nature of experience is critical for understanding ourselves. In this
paper, I discuss and explore several theories of consciousness, and connect implications of this
search to human nature. Each theory and philosophy attempts to solve the ‘hard problem’,
drawing upon different studies, thought experiments and previous philosophies. The sources
consist mostly of philosophical entries and essays, articles and books. Philosophy is an
undiscoverable subject. All ideas discussed are the product of hard-working human brains
processing the reality that they observe. More research needs to be done in neuroscience and
brain-mapping for us to fully understand consciousness and the brain in their entirety. However,
there will always be unanswered questions, philosophical ponderings, and curiosities that are
important to kindle and accept as our species strives to understand ourselves and the world.

12th Grade Humanities

If you look up through falling snow, watching the world softly but quickly moving all

around your field of view, a feeling so intensely human may start to stack itself within you. The

feeling, ineffable and indescribable, allows the brain to understand the world in a way that it

usually does not, and shows what you are habitually blind to. A reality so basic and yet complex

that only the disorientation of snowfall, swimming in a vast ocean, or staring up at the

tremendous arms of our galaxy, reveals it. Often a question arises, one that relates to me, the

observer of this incredible reality. Why does this experience ​feel​ like something, and why am I

aware in the first place? Why is there an observer to this reality at all? Is my experience simply

the sensory input that this lump of matter, my brain, constructs? Or is it something more,

something only subjective and personal and phenomenal?

Consciousness, for the sake of this paper, will be defined in the words of Thomas Nagel:

“… an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that

organism—something it is like ​for​ the organism” (436). These mental states can only occur if the

object, person, or organism has intrinsic, subjective experience.

In 1995, a man named David Chalmers coined the term ‘the hard problem’ of

consciousness, which is essentially the question of why we have conscious states at all, and why

there is something that it is like to be me (Weisberg). Although not until recently titled the ‘hard

problem’ (before, it was often categorized as the mind-body problem), the ‘hard problem’ has

been the center of many debates, discussions, and research for millennia. Each theory or method

attempts to solve, explain, or even deny this hard problem. Yet somehow we still find ourselves

asking the same questions as if no answer ever truly satisfies the curiosity. This is often called

1
the explanatory gap. “There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical

world and consciousness” (Weisburg). Many theories have been produced to try and draw this

gap to a close and solve the ‘hard problem’, for humans have always tried to understand the

nature of ourselves and the world that we see.

Part II: Timeline

In Western philosophy, Plato often pondered the soul and mind in his works, and his

student Aristotle was one of the first to formally question perception (Gennaro), believing that,

literal or no, the sense organs1 become the thing they are perceiving (Shields). Although both

their philosophies and their understanding of the world were different, ancient philosophers had

the same experience of being, the same wonder of the mind, and the same questions of who/what

they ​really ​were.

As the world evolved through the middle ages, the question was debated in the

background. It was not until the early 1600s that consciousness was brought to a center stage by

philosopher René Descartes. He defined his ideas on consciousness in the form of substance

dualism, proposing that the mind and body were separate substances. His ideas were

metaphysical, relating to the soul. Descartes also believed “the notion that there is some

privileged place in the brain where everything comes together to produce conscious experience

… ” (Gennaro). This is often now called the Cartesian theater.

Around the same time, the scientific revolution was underway; extremely influential

humans such as Galileo Galilei and Issac Newton were turning modern thought away from the

1
​Eyes, skin, ears, etc.

2
contemplative and philosophical thinking that had dominated for nearly 2,000 years. They

focused on describing the world around us with laws and mathematics, and through observation,

not logic or intuition. For the qualitative properties of reality, such as the feeling of looking at

oneself in the mirror or tasting an orange2, the scientists attributed to the soul, and did not spend

much time trying to categorize or understand these aspects of reality.

Philosophy, however, continued to explore what science did not, and in contrast to

dualism, a theory called monism was being popularized by G.W. Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza.

Monism, and its many branches, holds that the mind and body are one; there is no dualism.

Spinoza specifically believed that “both mind and matter [are] simply aspects (or attributes) of

the eternal, infinite and unique substance[:] God Himself” (Goff et al). Mental and physical were

one and the same, and Leibniz and Spinoza’s theories focused on joining the two.

In the 1800s, a subsection of monism called panpsychism was popularized, with figures

such as Bertrand Russell philosophizing that substances were not necessarily physical or mental,

but that a more neutral, underlying quality existed. This would come to be known as neutral

monism (Weisberg). Modern theories of panpsychism take a different light, maintaining that

along with the objective, reality also has an intrinsic, mind-like quality. Reality is a two-sided

coin.

In 1859, a man named Charles Darwin published ​On the Origin of Species​, which held

enormous implications for humankind and how we came to be. Many theories of consciousness

branched from these implications. For example, it brought up questions pertaining to

consciousness as an evolutionary advantage (McBrayer 11). It also had a hand in arguing for

2
These qualitative experiences are often defined as individual ‘qualia’ (Kind).

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materialism3, with the argument that as the brain evolved, so did consciousness.

In the early to mid-1900s, a compelling scientific method and psychology morphed into a

theory of mind. This was called behaviorism, and was particularly inviting because of the

rigidness of it. It was, in essence, the science of connecting behavior to the brain. To give an

example, psychologist John Watson ran an experiment on a nine-month-old child, where he

essentially conditioned Little Albert into having a fear-based response to white, fluffy objects

(Plucker).

Watson emphasized the importance of the scientific method in psychology, wanting to

move away from the theories proven by speculation and introspection. He also hugely influenced

the nature vs. nurture debate4, showing that environment (ie. nurture) was responsible for much

behavior.

Influenced by Watson, another behavioral psychologist named B.F. Skinner also made a

large impact on behaviorism. He studied animal learning and conditioning, using rats as his main

test subjects (Skinner).

As the method progressed and experiments were conducted, it became increasingly

apparent that certain brain phenomena were connected with behavior. Many humans of the time

took this a step further and concluded that ​all ​behavior could be traced back to a muscle twitch, a

brain firing, or some physical process (Jaynes 15).

However, the ‘hard problem’ still remained, for no matter how connected the brain and

behavior seemed, there was still the ​experience​ of living that was being ignored. Conditioning

behavior and understanding the effects of an organism's environment does not tell you what it is

3
​Materialism is often paired with physicalism philosophies: consciousness is purely material or physical.
4
​A long debated topic that questions whether a person’s behavior is influenced by genetics or the environment
(Sherry).

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like to be them, or to know what, or if, they are experiencing.

Just before the turn of the 21st century, David Chalmers coined the term ‘the hard

problem’ of consciousness, which he describes as “how physical processes in the brain give rise

to the subjective experience of the mind and of the world” (Chalmers 00:07 - 00:20). Although

he believes that it is the brain that processes, thinks, etc., he is highlighting the explanatory gap

between the physical and personal experience.

In the past several decades since the 1980s, the field of neurophysiology has grown in

both popularity and ability, with new technology and techniques revealing things about our

brains that have never before been seen or understood. Many are now taking a more

interdisciplinary take on the traditional ‘science ​or​ philosophy’, which has resulted in many

journals, consciousness science conferences, meetings, etc., whose purpose is to discuss and

share information about the brain and consciousness. Philosophy is still an important part of

these, but it is working in a more integrated way rather than individually taking these questions

on.

Part III: Research and Analysis

Part 3.1 - Physicalism, Behaviorism, and Eliminativism

Many modern thinkers often constitute consciousness, experience, or phenomenality to

the physical and to the brain. As a result, and along with the long list of theories of

consciousness, there also exists a list of theories that dispute the very notion. Understanding the

nature of consciousness is important, and cannot be dismissed easily.

An eliminative argument against consciousness is often that consciousness is an illusion

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that we have fallen prey to. It only seems as though we are experiencing conscious states, but it

is not what is ​actually happening.​ However, this argument does not hold up, for it does not

matter if your brain only simulates consciousness or if it is really there; they are one and the

same. For example: “Suppose you’re hypnotized to feel intense pain. Someone may say that

you’re not really in pain, that the pain is illusory, because you haven’t really suffered any bodily

damage. But to seem to feel pain is to be in pain” (Strawson). What reality seems like and what it

is are identical.

Even if consciousness was a grand illusion, we would still question why the illusion was

there at all, and how. The problem does not go away, it is simply redefined.

In the 20th century, particularly from 1920-1960, a huge influx in the popularity of

behaviorism came into play. Behaviorism was often considered a theory, but in actuality, it was

more of a method of science. This field was largely influenced by B.F. Skinner and other

prominent behavioral psychologists of the time (Gennaro 4), such as John B. Watson.

Experiments were being done to test and understand animal behavior and learning, to find out

more about the animal kingdom and our place in it (or above it). The studies of behaviorism

showed that the mind was reliant on or at least was related in part to the brain. As we saw more

and more properties that we previously attributed to the soul, being able to be broken down into

simple phenomena, consciousness philosophy seemed to be being pushed from the spotlight of

common knowledge and sense. How promising the notion that there would be no more

philosophizing on the nature of consciousness; we could be reduced to chemical releases and

muscle twitches (Jaynes 15). The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness would be solved because

6
there was no ‘hard problem’ to begin with.

However, behaviorism was more of a way of study than a theory, and did not explain

what the ‘hard problem’ sought to answer. A thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson

outlines the problem of consciousness being purely physical:

Mary is kept in a black and white room from birth during which time she becomes a

brilliant neuroscientist and an expert on color perception. Mary never sees red for

example, but she learns all of the physical facts and everything neurophysiologically

about human color vision. Eventually she is released from the room and sees red for the

first time. Jackson argues that it is clear that Mary comes to learn something new;

namely, to use Nagel’s famous phrase, what it is like to experience red. This is a new

piece of knowledge and hence she must have come to know some non-physical fact ….

(Gennaro)

This thought experiment shows that there is something that physicalism is not accounting for,

something that only a first-person point of view can reveal. She learns a fact: what the color red

is like, which means that “there are facts about color in addition to all the physical facts about

color (since Mary already knew all the physical facts about color)” (Kind). If physicalism were

true, Mary would learn nothing more about the color red, for she would already know everything

there is to know. Essentially, our understanding of the world is not only reliant on physical facts,

but phenomenal ones as well.

Similarly, if we were to map the entire human brain, in perfect detail, we would still not

7
know what it is like to be the brain.

Even if we had a complete wiring diagram of the nervous system, we still would not be

able to answer our basic question. Though we knew the connections of every tickling

thread of every single axon and dendrite in every species that ever existed, together with

all its neurotransmitters and how they varied in its billions of synapses of every brain that

ever existed, we could still never — not ever — from a knowledge of the brain alone

know if that brain contained a consciousness like our own. (Jaynes 18)

Understanding how something is from the outside is not adequate. Thomas Nagel brings up a

compelling argument in his essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat”. He explains that if we dissected,

mapped, and ​knew t​ he brain and body of a bat, we would still not know what it is like to be that

bat, and although we could imagine, that is not sufficient in understanding a life beyond

ourselves.

Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is

therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms,

which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that

one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected

high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's

feet in an attic. Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what

it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to

know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. (Nagel 439)

Once again, there is a missing factor, the intrinsic nature of ​being​, that science, language, and

8
human understanding as we know, has no way to legitimately comprehend. Yet we are reminded

that by understanding this state of being, we can understand ourselves, who we are, and what life

is at its most basic.

Simply stating that there is no consciousness is not a satisfying answer, for it only

sidesteps the ‘hard problem’ instead of answering or discrediting it. So if we are conscious, and

this state of awareness is real, what could explain it?

Part 3.2 - Dualism

In the early to mid-1600s, when Galileo was first gazing through a refracting telescope at

the stars, a dominant theory of consciousness was dualism. Dualism meaning literally two states

or qualities, was the distinction between mind (or consciousness) and body. There are two main

types of dualism: substance dualism, and a more modern branch of the original theory: property

dualism. The original substance dualism was very much bound together with the theological

views of the time, surrounding soul and hard written beliefs in God. These dualists believed that

our consciousness is separate from the body and brain, consisting of an entirely new substance.

This substance interacts closely with the body to inform and influence it, but it does not die when

the body does; it can be detached and hence analogous to the soul. In fact, during this time, the

terms soul and consciousness were relatively interchangeable.

Réne Descartes, a philosopher who brought substance dualism into the light, believed the

pineal gland, located in the center of the human brain, was the tie to the soul, which then was

able to communicate back and forth with the body. “[If we decide to] move the body in any

manner, this volition causes the gland to impel the spirits towards the muscles which bring about

9
this effect” (qtd. in Calef). The brain was not the one directing the play, it was in fact the soul, a

substance entirely different from the physical.

Needless to say, as advancements progressed and we learned more about biology,

evolution, and the laws of nature, this theory became less popular. For one, it became apparent

that injuries to the brain were correlated with injuries to conscious states (Genarro). Such as seen

in the split-brain research done by Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and Michael Gazzaniga,

severing the corpus callosum (responsible for communication between the two sides of the brain)

of a human brain reveals the individual roles that each hemisphere play in behavior, thinking,

and consciousness (Gazzaniga 654). If surgery and alterations to the brain affect the personality

and abilities of the person, consciousness seems to be rooted to the brain, not a non-physical

substance that is entirely apart from it.

Another argument against substance dualism goes as follows: if consciousness is a

non-physical substance but still able to interact with the brain and body, this violates the first law

of thermodynamics. Also called the conservation of energy principle, this law states that energy

can neither be created nor destroyed. If the brain is influenced by a non-physical consciousness,

energy needs to be transferred from one to the other. And energy flows in the physical realm. In

Rocco Gennaro’s “Consciousness” article, he asserts, “… when mental events cause physical

events, energy would literally come into the physical world.” This is not possible in the reality

that we have meticulously observed, and so substance dualism seems to fall behind.

A new theory emerged, one that fit better with new understandings and arguments,

dubbed property dualism. Although still different from the brain, consciousness to a property

dualist is non-physical, but only because it is a property. For example, just as the boiling point of

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iron, say, is a property of the metal but not its own physical substance, consciousness would be a

property of the brain/body. It occurs because of the brain, so it is not entirely separate from it,

but, unlike materialist or physicalist theories, consciousness is not the brain. “… conscious

properties, such as the color qualia involved in a conscious experience of a visual perception,

cannot be explained in purely physical terms and, thus, are not themselves to be identified with

any brain state or process” (Gennaro).

Property dualism holds that consciousness is a non-reducible property of the brain,

meaning that it cannot be broken down into any simpler parts. For instance, “we move toward a

more objective understanding of heat when we understand it as molecular energy rather than as

warmth” (Calef), but we cannot follow a similar line of logic when we try to understand

consciousness as something more fundamental. How consciousness appears is exactly what

consciousness ​is​: the appearance; how it is to the individual viewer.

So consciousness in this regard is still apart from the brain, but is a non-physical product

of it. However, even property dualists still argue that consciousness is a non-physical thing

casually interacting with the brain and body, the conservation of energy law still denies that this

could be true, and so dualism is false.

Another argument that criticizes the heart of dualism: the theological beliefs, brings up

the phenomenon of human development. “No one seriously supposes that newly fertilized ova

are imbued with minds or that the original cell in the primordial sea was conscious. But from

those entirely physical origins, nothing non-physical was later added” (Calef). We are still fully

physical beings later in life. The question would be then, where does the non-physical substance

come in, and how? Dualists may argue that consciousness or the soul was placed in a fetus at a

11
certain point in the development by something “other”, namely God. This argument has no basis

in scientific observation, and so often has little value when considering the heart of

consciousness in philosophy or otherwise.

Part 3.3 - Emergence as Consciousness

If dualism can be disputed, perhaps a similar, yet more scientific theory—the theory of

consciousness as an emergent phenomenon—can take its place. This theory is similar to property

dualism, but it is more modern and founded in observation. Emergence is a law of physics, and is

the reverse of reductionism. Emergence can be observed when “some macro property or

behavior arises spontaneously from many interacting micro parts” (Rennie). Starling birds are a

perfect example of this. Watching from below, you will see a large flock of birds all moving in

relative synchronicity, forming strange amorphous patterns as they move across the sky. Each

bird plays a part in the flight, no single one is directing the group, and yet witnessed from a

larger perspective, they are​ something more​, something larger than themselves.

Humans started to mull over this idea in its earliest forms in the late 1800s, and it

continued to evolve into what we often categorize it as now: a sum greater than its parts

(Goldstein 53). As we began to understand this law, we saw it everywhere, from snowflakes to

ocean waves to galaxies. Why not apply it to consciousness as well? In this way, billions of

neurons, when properly arranged, would result in consciousness, a sort of “lighting up” of

awareness, if you will. This solves the previously mentioned human development argument

against dualism by presenting consciousness as the emergent property when a certain amount of

cells divide to form a human being.

This theory is particularly compelling because it does not have to account for the “why”.

12
The “why” is simply how it is, such as in the case of H​2​O molecules becoming liquid water once

they reach a certain number. The average motion of micro-particles is temperature, and that is

simply how the universe works. It is a pointless question to ask “how does molecular kinetic

energy emerge to form heat?” because the answer is fundamental: it is how reality as we know it

works, no further explanation required.

However, Annika Harris, after explaining emergent phenomena in her book ​Conscious: A

Brief Guide to the Fundamental Mystery of the Mind​, goes on to dispute this answer by pointing

out a fundamental flaw in the argument. Physics, as we know it, does not account for the intrinsic

nature of objects. So, emergence, an observation of the physical, only describes the objective

nature of matter and how it appears to be from an outside perspective. “(Additionally, when

scientists assume they have bypassed the ‘hard problem’ by describing consciousness as an

emergent property … they are changing the subject.) All emergent phenomena—like ant

colonies, snowflakes, and waves—are still descriptions of matter and how it behaves as

witnessed from the outside” (70). The emergent property of the billions of neurons is simply the

lump of pink-grey matter that is floating about inside your skull-case right now, not internal

experience.

An interesting counter to this breakdown of the theory of consciousness as an emergent

phenomenon is that there is another type of emergence that is non-physical. That matter can be

described intrinsically as well, and a new law of emergence, one that deals with the subjective,

can be formed. The theory that there is an intrinsic nature of matter is modernly called

panpsychism.

13
Part 3.4 - Panpsychism

As we now know, sometimes the rigorous and inherently objective nature of math and

science fails in allowing us to comprehend the subjective. The beginning theories of

panpsychism were branches of monism, and stated that there was not such a harsh distinction

between in and out, reality and perceived reality. As time went on, though, a distinction was

continuously drawn, through scientific discoveries, societal beliefs, etc., and the worlds seemed

further and further apart. Modern panpsychism holds that matter—all matter—has intrinsic

qualities. From plants all the way down to atoms and subatomic particles, each physical thing has

subjective experience. This experience is entirely different from what we know ours to be; it is

simpler, unimaginable, but there, existing as the flip side of what is understandable from the

outside.

A main argument for this theory is the fact that modern physics does not tell us about the

inside of ourselves, the ‘what it’s like’. Philip Goff explains this in his article “Panpsychism is

crazy, but it’s also most probably true”: “… physical science doesn’t tell us what matter is, only

what it does. The job of physics is to provide us with mathematical models that allow us to

predict with great accuracy how matter will behave. … But it is one thing to know the behaviour

of an electron and quite another to know its intrinsic nature: how the electron is, in and of itself.”

We know that some matter—us, brains—have an intrinsic nature of experience. The theoretical

imperative to make then, is that all matter has some type of subjective nature.

It is not that each electron, for example, has a consciousness, but that because it exists,

there is something that ​it is like ​to be that electron. Our understanding only goes as far as the

14
physical, “outside” view, so we could not be sure if the electron was experiencing ​being​ an

electron, whatever that would be like.

There are a few objections to this theory, the most compelling being the problem of

combination. If all matter has an “internal world”, how does each bit of matter come together to

form the larger consciousness we know as our own? The binding/combination problem can be

formally described as the “problem of integrating the information processed by different regions

of the brain …” (Frith).

This objection, however, does not hold up with our understanding of the brain now. The

brain, made up of billions of neurons, axons, dendrites, glial cells, etc., works like a well-oiled

machine, exchanging information in the language of chemicals and electricity. Each of these

cells form something greater5. The binding problem may be dismissed with the definition of

emergence. However, it is why consciousness emerges or is there at all that is the hard problem.

A more modern counter to panpsychism is that the theoretical imperative suggested by

Philip Goff is more a leap of faith, and does not hold up as a strong argument. The article “Why

Panpsychism Fails to Solve the Mystery of Consciousness” emphasizes this:

Even if we accept that basic physical entities must have some categorical nature …

consciousness is an unlikely candidate for this fundamental property. For, so far as our

evidence goes, it is a highly localised phenomenon that is specific not only to brains but

to particular states of brains …. It appears to be a specific state of certain highly complex

information-processing systems, not a basic feature of the Universe. (Frankish)

5
Also, split-brain research has shown that each hemisphere is conscious, and the brain does not have a problem
integrating the information processed by either one when the brain is fully intact.

15
We may be taking our understanding and applying it too far beyond ourselves. Not only this, but

panpsychism, by nature, cannot be tested. We would have to create or discover an entirely new

branch of ‘subjective physics’ to truly see if consciousness and experience are only attributes of

brains, or if matter itself has an inverse set of laws/existence. It is hard to know what the future

holds, for it may also be the case that “mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a

theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category” (Nagel 450), and

objective and subjective will be joined in a way we cannot understand yet. These possibilities are

often too large a leap for many to take.

Part IV: Where the search is going

Although eliminative theories of consciousness such as behaviorism have been

countered, a more modern view has emerged in the past couple of decades that rehash them in a

new light. We now know so much more about the brain and how it functions than we ever have,

and some propose a new ‘hard problem’, called the ‘real problem’ (Seth). How are we to know if

Mary would be uncertain what red is like, if we have never actually mapped the brain in its

entirety? It is all just speculation. As Patricia Churchland has argued (qtd. in Kind), “How can I

assess what Mary will know and understand if she knows everything there is to know about the

brain? Everything is a lot, and it means, in all likelihood, that Mary has a radically different and

deeper understanding of the brain than anything barely conceivable in our wildest flights of

fancy.”

Many of the arguments made in the past have become outdated or were founded in ideas

16
that are now seen as misunderstandings of reality. There is still much to discover; we should not

solidify conclusions yet. In this new wave of neuroscientific discovery and understanding, we

seem to be connecting some dots that may lead us to a new question entirely, leaving the old one

behind. This has happened before when Issac Newton’s theory replaced the common

understanding of celestial spheres, and the old idea was simply discarded. “It wasn’t that

Ptolemaic theorists had an inadequate account of the celestial sphere; rather, what was

discovered was that there ​was no celestial sphere​” (Kind).

Today there are many organizations, conventions, journals, and research facilities that are

taking this modern stance and diving into the questions that can be answered. For example, the

Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) meets annually to discuss and

share ideas about brain science, new studies, and other topics and problems that consciousness

brings in the modern age (Lau). Researchers are focused on the “real problem”, or the “mapping

problem” now, for mapping the brain and understanding it in greater detail is something

achievable, rather than the unknown world of speculative philosophy. That is not to say,

however, that philosophy, especially surrounding consciousness, is not extremely important to

keep alive. Philosophy has often been the catalyst for more scientific queries or laws which

would not have been possible if there were not people asking the hard questions to begin with.

By meticulously questioning reality, by discussing what we notice and find, we are bound to gain

a greater understanding of this incredibly complex and awesome reality that we have all found

ourselves experiencing.

Part 4.1: The dreadful miracle of the human condition

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 Our species often seems to be built for wonder. To look up at the canyon walls or the city

streets, to question, what made them so, where did they come from, and why? We question,

philosophize, theorize, test and observe. It is arguably what makes us human. When it comes to

ourselves, the answers we seek are often unsatisfactory or unavailable. And yet we still seek. We

search even when the quest is irrational or the answer nonexistent; we fight like hell to

understand the reality we experience.

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www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/​. Accessed 03 March 2020.

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