Published in British Journal of Social Psychology 43, issue 4, 605-623, 2010 1

which should be used for any reference to this work

The Mozart effect: Tracking the evolution of a scientific

legend

Adrian Bangerter1* and Chip Heath2

1
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, USA
2
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, USA

Theories of the diffusion of ideas in social psychology converge on the assumption

that shared beliefs (e.g., social representations, rumours and legends) propagate
because they address the needs or concerns of social groups. But little empirical
research exists demonstrating this link. We report three media studies of the diffu-
sion of a scientific legend as a particular kind of shared belief. We studied the Mozart
effect (ME), the idea that listening to classical music enhances intelligence. Study 1
showed that the ME elicited more persistent media attention than other science
reports and this attention increased when the ME was manifested in events outside of
science. Study 2 suggested that diffusion of the ME may have responded to varying
levels of collective anxiety. Study 3 demonstrated how the content of the ME evolved
during diffusion. The results provide evidence for the functionality of diffusion of ideas
and initial elements for a model of the emergence and evolution of scientific legends.

Social psychology and the diffusion of ideas

The problem of how ideas spread within and between social groups is an important
element of understanding culture, social stability and social change, but it has re-
mained an underexplored topic in social psychology. This is partly due to mainstream
social psychology’s emphasis on experimental research. Experimental social psy-
chology has contributed much to the understanding of behavioural and attitude
change in individuals, but the processes involved in the diffusion of ideas often occur
on a time scale that precludes experimental study.
Not that there is no interest in how ideas spread. Indeed, some approaches advocate
the study of ideas and their spread as a central focus of social psychology (e.g., Bartlett,
1932; Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Moscovici, 1984; Sperber, 1990). Moreover, they converge
on key assumptions. In particular, many of them assume that the spread of ideas is
functional, in that they spread because they fulfil a motivational need of an individual
or a group. For example, social representations are postulated to help laypersons sym-
bolically cope with unfamiliar and potentially menacing scientific and technological
innovations (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002), or rumours are assumed to spread

*Correspondence should be addressed to Adrian Bangerter, Groupe de Psychologie Appliquée, Université de Neuchâtel, Fbg.
de l’Hôpital 106, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland (e-mail: adrian.bangerter@unine.ch).
 2

in response to uncertainty and anxiety (Allport & Postman, 1947). But critics (Jost &
Ignatow, 2001) have noted that these assumptions have remained largely untested.
Here, we provide evidence for functional claims in social representations by investi-
gating a particular class of representation, a scientific legend. Scientific legends are
widespread beliefs (Fraser & Gaskell, 1990) derived from science that diffuse and
stabilize in lay culture (Moscovici, 1992). They are a particularly interesting class of
social representation because their origins can be located specifically enough to study
the entire life-cycle of their evolution and diffusion. We studied the Mozart effect (ME),
the idea that exposure to classical music (especially the music of Mozart) improves
intelligence. Originally based on controversial scientific results, it has enjoyed wide-
spread popularity because it promises a potential solution to a perplexing social and
parental concern: how to ensure the intellectual development and growth of children.
Our findings suggest that ideas may indeed diffuse and evolve to meet the functional
needs of social groups.

Theories of the diffusion of ideas

In this section, we review three major theoretical approaches to the diffusion of ideas.
We then highlight converging theoretical predictions about the functional nature of
social ideas and define ‘scientific legends’.

Social representations: Popularization of science

Social representations theory (see Deaux & Philogène, 2001; Farr & Moscovici, 1984;
Flick, 1998a) emphasizes the social processes by which expert knowledge, especially
science and technology, is transformed into common sense. Scientific research and
technological innovations are diffused in the media or introduced into everyday
routines. These ideas and technologies are often confusing to the lay public. Moreover,
they may challenge existing social practices, beliefs or ideologies, thus threatening
social identity and creating resistance (Bauer, 1995; Biotechnology and the European
Public Concerted Action group, 1997).
Social representations arise through the efforts of groups to ‘cope’ symbolically with
these unfamiliar ideas and practices (Wagner et al., 2002). They result from the
assimilation of scientific knowledge into pre-existing schemes of thought. For
example, psychoanalysis is assimilated to the religious rite of confession (Moscovici,
1961), madness is anchored in folk theories of organic illness (Jodelet, 1991), AIDS is
conceptualized as a divine punishment for homosexuality (Markovà & Wilkie, 1987),
genes are thought to be injected into genetically modified food and to be ‘contagious’
to humans (Wagner et al., 2002), and sex-role stereotypes from everyday interaction
are used to interpret the mating behaviour of animals (Green Staerklé & Clémence,
2002) or the interaction between sperm and ovum during conception (Bangerter,
2000; Wagner, Elejabarrieta, & Lahnsteiner, 1995).
In summary, social representations may allow lay communities to cope with the
unfamiliar discourse of science and technology by anchoring it in more familiar con-
cepts from everyday life. But the idea that social representations function to reduce
uncertainty and threat to social identity has been criticized for lack of evidence. Jost
and Ignatow (2001) argue that the descriptive approach taken in most such work,
focusing on the content of social representations, does not constitute support for
claims about their functions, writing that ‘at present, the most interesting functional
claims are untested’ (p. 197).
 3

Rumours and legends

The literature on rumours and legends is spread over several disciplines, but converges
on core ideas. In general, legends have a somewhat more complex plot structure than
rumours, but researchers in both the area of rumours and legends often analyse the
same kinds of stories (Allport & Postman, 1947; Brunvand, 1981; Rosnow & Fine,
1976), so for our purposes we emphasize commonalities among the two literatures.
In psychology, Allport and Postman’s (1947) classic study of rumour identifies
importance of information and ambiguity as two important factors determining the
spread of rumour. Rumours function (p. vii) to ‘alleviate intellectual uncertainty
and personal anxiety’. They do so by relieving, justifying and explaining underlying
emotional tension (p. 36). Rumours are presented as truth, despite the fact that the
evidence that backs them up has grown vague through retelling. But Allport and
Postman’s experimental studies were limited to describing transformations of content
in retellings (see also Bartlett, 1932), and their functional speculations about rumours
and anxiety were not tested.
Subsequently, scholars in psychology, sociology and folklore studies have echoed
the belief that rumours and urban legends arise and propagate in response to pre-
existing concerns or anxieties (Brunvand, 1981; Dégh, 1994, 2001; Festinger, 1957;
Fine, 1980; Glassner, 1999; Koenig, 1985; Rosnow & Fine, 1976; Shibutani, 1966;
Showalter, 1997). But this hypothesis has rarely been subjected to empirical test—
typical studies postulate some concern or anxiety that may drive a particular rumour
without attempting to measure the amount of concern in a population, or the relation-
ship between concern and how the rumour spreads. Indeed, other than a few studies
that have shown that people who are more dispositionally anxious are more likely to
spread rumours (see, e.g., Anthony, 1973), we know of no research that has measured
anxiety levels in a population and then examined whether rumours are more success-
ful in circumstances where anxiety is high.

Evolutionary approaches
Evolutionary approaches borrow analogies from the natural sciences, arguing that the
diffusion of ideas is analogous to the spread of a virus or the replication of a gene. The
theory of memetics (Blackmore, 1999; Dawkins, 1976; Lynch, 1996) proposes that
contagious ideas, or ‘memes’, proliferate by inducing their hosts (brains) to propagate
them in a variety of ways. An example is the chain letter (Goodenough & Dawkins,
1994) that promises good luck to recipients if they send copies of the letter to others,
and bad luck if they do not. Another evolutionary approach (Sperber, 1990) proposes
using an epidemiological strategy to understand how beliefs propagate and stabilize
as part of culture. However, both the memetics approach and the epidemiological
approach have fostered little empirical research.

Convergence between theories

Previous work in several different theoretical traditions has assumed that the spread of
ideas fulfils some psychological or social function. Ideas seem to propagate best when
there is a good fit between them and their social environment. Work on social repre-
sentations assumes that people need to cope with the unfamiliar ideas and practices
introduced by science; work on rumours and urban legends has typically assumed that
people pass along rumours or legends to allay widespread anxieties or apprehensions;
and evolutionary approaches assume that memes adapt to fit the psychological en-
vironment of their hosts. However, we have been unable to locate any studies that
 4

have systematically measured some property of the social or psychological environ-

ment and then related it to the diffusion of an idea. Thus, despite strong convergence
in theoretical predictions, the approaches above are in the uncomfortable position of
being unable to provide much systematic evidence for a key assumption (Jost &
Ignatow, 2001).

Scientific legends
We define a ‘scientific legend’ as a widespread belief (Fraser & Gaskell, 1990) that
propagates in society, originally arising from scientific study, but that has been trans-
formed to deviate in essential ways from the understanding of scientists. Moscovici
(1992) suggests that one of the main functions of such beliefs is to circumvent an
‘interdict of knowing’ (p. 4) that separates science from lay culture.1 Although scien-
tific knowledge and research is undoubtedly affected by cultural beliefs (Flick, 1998b),
we focused in the present study on how knowledge moves from science to lay culture.
Modern culture seems to be replete with beliefs originally derived from scientific
studies (Moscovici, 1992). Examples include various factoids (e.g., the idea that two
arbitrarily chosen people in the world are separated from each other by only six
degrees of separation, or that Eskimos have hundreds of different words for snow, or
that we only use 10% of our brain). Other beliefs are richer in content, such as the idea
that the left brain hemisphere is analytical and logical, whereas the right hemisphere is
intuitive and holistic.
We propose that scientific legends are in many ways analogous to other shared
beliefs such as rumours and legends. One common aspect seems to be their functional
nature. Another is the fact that, in a generally sceptical society, these beliefs have
developed informational credentials (Fragale & Heath, 2004) that apparently guarantee
their veridicality or accuracy. These may include appeals to authority, pseudo-
references to proximal sources (e.g., ‘a friend of a friend’) or specific details that
increase plausibility. In the case of scientific legends, there is often a formulaic refer-
ence to ‘scientists’ or ‘scientific studies’. As an example, consider the following clause
(in italics) appended to a description of the ME: ‘According to studies conducted in
the West, babies who hear Cosi Fan Tutte or the Mass In C Minor during gestation are
likely to come out of the womb smarter than their peers ...’ (South China Morning
Post, August 25, 2000). Such devices exploit the epistemic authority of science in
modern society to lend credibility to the legend.
Scientific legends are particularly interesting because they offer two points of com-
parison that allow us to understand more precisely how ideas evolve as they diffuse.
They offer a normative comparison because they allow us to contrast understandings
of expert scientists and the lay public, and they offer a specific temporal comparison
because we can often locate the original study upon which a scientific legend is based.
Thus, although the ME is surely related to ancient, deep-seated cultural ideas about the
beneficial powers of music, it is a more circumscribed phenomenon whose central
attributes (e.g., the label ‘Mozart effect’, the often-cited references to a specific study)
1
Moscovici and other authors (Bruer, 1999; Kagan, 1998) have used the term ‘myth’ to label similar concepts; in this
usage, the term often has the connotation of an untrue belief. In folklore studies, the discipline that most often studies this
kind of widespread belief, myths and legends both describe narratives that people tell as true, but myths are sacred stories
set in a remote past peopled by non-human characters and embodying foundational beliefs, whereas legends are set in the
world of today and involve humans (Dundes, 1984, p. 9). Thus we find ‘legend’ more appropriate than ‘myth’, although
both terms suggest narrative form. We note that many examples of widespread beliefs about science, including the ME,
contain both narrative (‘In a scientific study, researchers found that playing Mozart to children enhanced their intelligence’)
and factual (‘playing Mozart makes kids smarter’) components.
 5

can be traced to a certain point in time. In typical research on rumours and urban
legends (e.g., Brunvand, 1981) it is difficult to isolate the ‘original’ version of a rumour
or legend. By studying diffusion of a scientific legend, we can find its original version
(the original scientific study) and can watch as it diffuses and evolves in the environ-
ment. Scientific legends thus provide a unique opportunity to view the entire life-
course of a social representation. In what follows, we describe the evolution of the ME
in science and lay culture before presenting our studies.

The Mozart effect in science and lay culture

Science
In 1993, a scientific report entitled ‘Music and spatial task performance’ was published
in Nature. College students who listened to a Mozart sonata for 10 minutes increased
their performance on a subsequent spatial intelligence test by 8–9 IQ points in compari-
son to control conditions where they either listened to relaxation instructions or sat in
silence for identical periods of time (Rauscher, Shaw, & Ky, 1993). This finding became
known as the ‘Mozart effect’. These results inspired further research, with mixed
results (e.g., Steele, Bass, & Crook, 1999). In 1999, a meta-analysis of 16 such studies
came to the conclusion that the overall effect size was negligible (Chabris, 1999).
The first author of the original report also led studies showing that music training in
the form of piano keyboard lessons led to long-term enhancement of spatial reasoning
in preschoolers (Rauscher, Shaw, Levine, Ky, & Wright, 1994; Rauscher et al., 1997),
and even that rats exposed to Mozart’s music demonstrated better maze navigation
performance (Rauscher, Robinson, & Jens, 1998). These results do not bear directly on
the ME in its narrow sense, but they have been cited as support for the more general
thesis that ‘musical experience may improve skills in ... spatial domains’ (Rauscher
et al., 1998, p. 427). As shown by the meta-analysis, the ME has not fared well as a
scientific theory. We now turn to its impact in lay culture, which has been nothing
short of phenomenal.

Lay culture: The Mozart effect as a scientific legend

The ME is omnipresent in US culture, where the media and various interest groups
quickly saw in it a new, easy technique for enhancing intelligence. It has been cited in
public debate ranging from arts education funding to the impact of early stimulation on
intellectual development (Bruer, 1999). In 1998, the state of Georgia passed a bill to
distribute free classical music CDs to new mothers. In an interview, the governor of
Georgia and initiator of the bill said: ‘As you know, the brain has two lobes. The studies
show that music engages both hemispheres of the brain—its creativity and emotion
engage the right lobe, while rhythm and pitch engage the left. So people who receive
musical exposure at a young age develop a bundle of nerves that connects those two
halves’. (Baltimore Sun, July 6, 1998)
Several other US states adopted this trend. The state of Florida passed a bill requiring
state-funded day-care centres to play classical music every day (State of Florida Senate
Bill 660, May 21, 1998). Books (Campbell, 1997, 2000), toys and CD collections have
been marketed claiming beneficial effects of classical music. And in surveys we have
conducted in California and Arizona (total N = 496), over 80% of respondents report
some familiarity with the ME.
The ME has diffused abroad, and appears in dozens of countries around the world. In
1996, the BBC’s Megalab series tested over 8,000 students for an improvement in
spatial intelligence after listening to either Mozart or rock music. In its spread, the ME
 6

has adapted to local frames of reference: an Indian newspaper describes the ME as

‘music curry for the soul’ (Times of India, March 2, 2001). Other manifestations seem
comical: playing Mozart to prison inmates (Houston Chronicle, May 2, 1999) or even
to roses during their germination (Korea Herald, May 22, 1999).
All evidence suggests that the ME has become a scientific legend. It seems to be a
circumscribed manifestation of a widespread, older belief that has been labelled ‘infant
determinism’ (Kagan, 1998), the idea that a critical period early in development has
irreversible consequences for the rest of a child’s life. It is probably also anchored in
older beliefs in the beneficial powers of music (e.g., soothing ‘the savage breast’).

Research questions
We present here three empirical studies. Our first study concerned the genesis and
evolution of the ME. Many scientific articles receive attention in popular culture, but
not all of these become scientific legends. How successful was the ME in relation to
other scientific articles? And how did interest in the ME evolve over time? These
questions were addressed in Study 1.
In Study 2, we sought to account for the diffusion of the ME. Why was it so
successful compared to other scientific studies? Many approaches to diffusion suggest
that shared concerns or anxieties in a community are an important factor influencing
the spread of an idea. Guided by this assumption, we showed that widespread public
concern in the US about early childhood development may have created a demand for
information that helped the ME to thrive.
In Study 3, we looked at how the content of the original ME idea evolved over time.
A central focus of social representations theory is that popularization of science makes
unfamiliar ideas familiar by anchoring them in shared frameworks and beliefs, thereby
transforming their content. The ME has been discussed in hundreds of newspaper
articles since its appearance. How do these depictions differ in content from the
original scientific findings, and do they converge over time on a core version?
All three studies involve media analyses of daily newspapers using a commercially
available database, Dow Jones Interactive, which supports full-text searches of thou-
sands of English-language periodicals around the world.2 We used media analyses
because many scholars have emphasized the role of the mass media in the diffusion of
legends and social representations in popular culture (Dégh, 1994; Flick, 1998a). The
term ‘popular culture’ is, of course, a gloss for a number of different groups (e.g.,
publishers, legislators, advertisers, educators, interest groups), but we did not analyse
their relations in detail, nor did we answer questions about the patterns of influence
between these groups (e.g., agenda-setting; McCombs, 1981). Because we were inter-
ested in the diffusion and reconstruction of scientific findings in popular culture,
newspapers were a convenient and face valid way of tracing such ideas.

STUDY 1: Media interest in the Mozart effect

In Study 1, we tracked media interest in the ME on two levels. First, we compared the
impact of the ME report to that of other scientific reports (Study 1a). Secondly, we
analysed media interest in the ME over time (Study 1b). We discuss both studies
together.
2
Soon after submission of this article, Dow Jones Interactive was replaced by the Factiva database run by the same
company.
 7

Study 1a: Comparing the ME to other journal articles

Method
For the first part of our analysis, we compared the long-term impact of the original ME
report, ‘Musical and spatial task performance’ (MSTP; Rauscher et al., 1993), with that
of other scientific reports. We searched all articles of the top 50 US newspapers by
circulation for citations of reports published in Nature within a month on either side
of MSTP. We used the key phrase ‘journal Nature’ to locate mentions of Nature
reports, and catalogued all such citations. We traced the reference of those reports for
which an author was mentioned. This resulted in a sample of 22 articles from various
scientific disciplines (e.g., astronomy, vulcanology, neurobiology).
We then computed the media impact of each of these reports in the top 50 news-
papers for a period of eight years after its publication in Nature by searching for
articles that contained the last name of the first author and two key words from the
report title. We then went through each article and eliminated spurious hits that did
not mention the report in question. We searched for MSTP in the same way. The 10
most cited reports are shown in Table 1, along with MSTP.

Results
On average, citation rates for MSTP were 11.4 times higher than for the other reports,
t(9) = 38.1, p < .001. Table 1 also shows the number of times each report was cited in
1993, the year of publication. MSTP was cited seven times in 1993, not significantly
more often than the average of other reports (5.8 times), t(9) = 1, n.s. However,
citations in 1993 are only 9% of the total number of MSTP citations, whereas they make
up 90% of citations on average for the other reports, t(9) = 6.5, p < .001.

Study 1b: Tracking the diffusion of the ME over time

Method
Although MSTP received a lot of attention as a scientific report, the ME evolved beyond
any link to a specific scientific report and we wanted to trace the diffusion of this
broader idea. So, we enlarged our search criteria because many later articles on the ME
did not mention MSTP explicitly. Our enlarged search included three search phrases:
‘Mozart effect’, ‘Mozart and Rauscher’ and ‘Mozart and spatial and intelligence’. We
searched the database (top 50 US newspapers) starting on the day of publication of
MSTP (October 14, 1993) until July 13, 2002 (eight years and three quarters), and
found 478 articles containing at least one of the search phrases. We corrected for the
number of articles in the database to yield a count per million articles for each quarter.

Results
Figure 1 depicts media interest in the ME over time, along with prominent events in
the genesis of the ME as a scientific legend.
Several features are worth noting. First, public events relating to the ME were
accompanied by spikes in media interest. Secondly, there are qualitatively different
phases in interest. Initial interest was ephemeral and tightly bound to the publication
of scientific results (e.g., until 1997.3). A stable shift in media interest only occurred
with events such as the publication of a pop psychology book on the ME (Campbell,
1997) or legislative action (the Georgia and Florida bills); these are all non-scientific
8
 9

Figure 1. Media interest in the Mozart Effect by year and by quarter (expressed as number of articles
per million articles). Relevant events are graphed by the quarter of their occurrence.

events. The biggest single spike of interest in the ME was generated by the publication
of the meta-analysis refuting the ME (Chabris, 1999), which coincided with the release
of a book by one of the authors of MSTP (Shaw, 1999) and a book debunking the
widespread belief that early experience is crucial for development (Bruer, 1999). After
that, there was a gradual decline of interest until the present, with the exception of
2000.4, when another pop psychology book was published (Campbell, 2000).

Discussion of Studies 1a and 1b

Media interest in MSTP surpassed interest in other reports by an order of magnitude.
Moreover, media interest in MSTP persisted over time whereas the other reports were
cited only during a couple of months following publication. The success of MSTP is all
the more remarkable as some of the other reports had a substantial a priori potential
for eliciting interest. Consider the report authored by Carl Sagan, a well-known astron-
omer, or the report on gender differences in reports of the number of sexual partners,
which could have been the subject of a potentially lurid newspaper article. Why was
MSTP so much more successful than these reports?
The data on the evolution of the ME shed some light on this question. In the first few
years after publication of MSTP, media interest remained low, and increased only
ephemerally in reaction to subsequent scientific reports. It was only when the ME
manifested itself in events outside of science that media interest picked up, increasing
in magnitude by a factor of more than 20. Thus, one can clearly distinguish two
qualitatively different phases: one of transitory media interest, where articles on the
ME derived from scientific reports, and one of stable interest, where articles on
the ME derived from events outside of science. There was also a third phase where
media interest progressively declined. This was associated with the various critical
publications.
Taken together, the results of Studies 1a and 1b show some conditions under which
scientific legends might emerge. Study 1a showed that MSTP elicited greater and more
persistent media interest than other reports. Study 1b further showed that a stable shift
in media interest occurred after the ME manifested itself in events outside of the
sphere of science. In the ME’s initial phase of existence, interest was transitory and did
 10

not differ radically from other scientific reports. The question remains, however, why
the ME took hold in popular culture. This is addressed in Study 2.

STUDY 2: Diffusion of the ME and anxiety about early childhood

education
Previous research has repeatedly postulated that ideas spread more widely when they
tap anxiety in a population. But this explanation has to our knowledge never been
subjected to a systematic empirical test. By this we mean that varying rates of anxiety
in different populations have never been shown to correspond to varying rates of
diffusion in those populations.
We surmised that the ME was so successful because it related to a cultural pre-
occupation with early childhood education that is particularly prevalent in the US. This
can be partly attributed to the widespread belief that the first years of life are crucial
for development (Bruer, 1999; Kagan, 1998). Moreover, there is a generalized self-
consciousness in the US about performance of US pupils on basic maths and science
tests (e.g., ‘American students still lag behind’, Seattle Times, December 6, 2000). The
US media abounds with humorous portrayals of the anxieties parents experience about
the intellectual development of their children (e.g., ‘Obsessive Mom’, ‘Mommy Guilt,’
Dallas Morning News, October 23, 2000). As an anecdote, we note that a kindergarten
near the Stanford University campus is called ‘Knowledge Beginnings’. It is not labelled
as a kindergarten, but as a ‘childhood development center’, and it advertises itself as
‘preparing children for the new millennium’. A comparable institution in Switzerland
(the kindergarten sponsored by the University of Neuchâtel) is called ‘Vanilla-
Strawberry’ and makes no claims to preparing its charges for anything. We are not
suggesting that this preoccupation is unique to the US, but rather that it is a prominent
theme in US society.
This informal cultural diagnosis suggests that interest in the ME should be stronger in
regions of the US where the quality of primary education is problematic. Such a
situation may attract media attention and generate collective anxiety. We assumed that
the ME suggested a way for parents and educators to solve the problem of enhancing
children’s intellectual development, or at least a way of taking such a task into their
own hands, which may be an effective means of controlling the anxiety and feelings of
helplessness generated by a deficient public education system. One columnist humor-
ously describes the piano lessons she initiated for her children after hearing of the ME:
‘After a few lessons, I stopped feeling guilty that I’d never played Mozart to help their
little developing brains’ (Denver Post, May 7, 2000).
Thus, we predicted that the ME would spread more in regions with problematic
primary education. The various US states provide a natural source of regional variation
on this dimension. Education in the US is funded primarily at the state and community
level, and different states vary substantially in how effective they are at educating their
children, in many cases because of local idiosyncrasies in educational bureaucracy
(Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, & Williamson, 2000). We therefore sought to predict
media interest in the ME from state-level measures of educational problems.

Method
There were 34 US states sufficiently represented in the database for our analyses. The
other states had no newspapers in the database with complete textual content. For
each of these 34 states, we computed a measure of media interest in the ME (i.e., the
 11

total count of ME articles per million articles over a period of eight years from October
14, 1993 to October 13, 2001). This count was obtained by dividing the total number
of articles on the ME in state newspapers by the total number of articles in those
newspapers and multiplying the result by one million. To get the most representative
measure, we used all the state newspapers that were available in the database for each
state—from one to five different newspapers per state.
We used measures of educational performance and spending in these states as proxy
variables for educational problems. We collected data on the following indexes:
(1) National test scores from fourth and eighth-grade reading and maths tests in 1990 and 1992
(Grissmer et al., 2000).
(2) Spending per pupil in 1990 (Grissmer et al., 2000).
These variables consistently loaded together in a factor analysis, and demonstrated
high multicollinearity in a regression, so we averaged ranks on each variable into a
single composite (Cronbach’s α = .92).
(3) 1990 teacher salary (Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/statab/www/ranks.html). We
divided teacher salaries in each state by per capita income in that state to control for state-level
differences in income.
We assumed that the lower a state ranks on these variables, the greater the level of
collective anxiety with primary education in that state. We also collected data on state
gross domestic product (GDP) and population. These variables were used to control
for some potential confounds: states that are larger and wealthier may organize their
educational system differently. The proxy and control variables were entered as predic-
tors into four different ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression equations, with the state
rank on count of ME articles per million articles as a dependent variable.

Results
Both proxy variables for educational concern emerged as significant predictors of
media interest (see Table 2).
 12

Regression 1 suggests that interest in the ME cannot be explained by the control

variables. Regressions 2 and 3 show that the proxy variables were significant predic-
tors when entered separately. The most complete regression (4), shows that states
with lower teacher salaries (β = .61, p < .01) and low national test scores and per pupil
spending (β = .41, p < .05) exhibit more interest in the ME.

Discussion
Measures of academic performance and spending on education predicted interest in
the ME by state. If these are appropriate proxy variables for anxiety about childhood
education, then we have shown that such anxiety is significantly related to the diffu-
sion of the ME. Collective anxieties about childhood education in states with low
elementary school funding and performance may have created a desire to take some
kind of action to alleviate the anxiety. The ME suggests simple actions that parents can
take to remove the anxiety of raising their children in a state that is experiencing
problems in childhood education. To our knowledge, these results are unique in
systematically relating varying rates of propagation with varying levels of concern
across a population. And they support the idea that scientific legends propagate in the
way that rumours and legends have been predicted to propagate.
However, although our analysis shows that interest in the ME is higher in states that
are experiencing problems in childhood education, it does not directly demonstrate
the role of anxiety in mediating this interest. As a result, the analysis is subject to
alternate interpretations, which although possible, we believe are less likely. Perhaps,
for example, states with low teacher salaries, pupil funding and test scores are filled
with people who are uneducated and thus easier to sway with seemingly miraculous
‘scientific’ claims about the ME. But our control variables make this interpretation less
likely: if a state is filled with uneducated people, we would expect average wages to be
low, so this effect should be largely captured by our GDP variable. Or perhaps states
with lower teacher salaries have made a conscious decision that childhood education
is unimportant. In this case, our regression results would actually suggest that states
with less interest and anxiety about childhood education are more interested in the ME.
But even if a state has decided to be frugal in its financial expenditures, its interest in the
ME is hard to explain without assuming some mediating role of anxiety: why should
people be interested in a solution—even a frugal one—if they do not perceive there is a
problem? The analysis in Study 3 supports the interpretation that the ME was seen as a
solution to a problem by showing that its content evolved over time in a way that made it
seem more suitable as a solution to the problem of childhood intellectual development.
If people are more interested in the ME when they are less concerned about childhood
education, then it is difficult to explain this child-focused evolution in content.
We note one other caveat: even if anxiety does increase the spread of the ME, this
may not support theories that assume other kinds of rumours and legends propagate
because of anxiety. The ME is unusual because it apparently offers a specific ‘solution’
to a pressing social problem, whereas many rumours and legends simply inform people
of a problem without offering a solution. Finding that solutions propagate in response
to anxiety is not the same as finding that problems do so.

STUDY 3: How the ME evolved during diffusion

In this study, we analysed how the content of the ME changed over time. As a point of
comparison, recall the original scientific report (MSTP), which showed that listening to
 13

Mozart for 10 minutes resulted in a temporary increase of spatial task performance

equivalent to 8–9 IQ points in college students. These limitations on the scope of the
findings (duration, task domain, effect magnitude, participant population) have all
been dropped in various articles. Our analysis focuses on what is perhaps the
most striking overgeneralization: the shift in population from college students to
children to newborns, as illustrated in the following (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
July 8, 2001): ‘There have been numerous studies on the “Mozart effect” and how it
helps elementary students, high school students and even infants increase mental
performance’. Contrary to this quote, none of these three populations have been
the subject of scientific studies on the ME. To see whether this example illustrated
a more general trend, we compared associations between the ME and college
students, children and babies over time, using the articles sampled in the second part
of Study 1b.

Method
The 478 articles in the Study 1b sample were analysed by year. For each year, the
percentage of the total number of articles referring to college students, children and
babies was computed. For college students, we used the search terms ‘college stu-
dent’, ‘undergraduate’ and ‘student’. We eliminated spurious references to students
other than college students (i.e., cases where it was clear that college students were
not being referred to). For children, we used the search terms ‘child’ or ‘children’. For
babies, we used the search terms ‘baby’, ‘newborn’ and ‘infant’.

Results
Results are shown in Figure 2 as the percentage of total ME articles per year mention-
ing each population type. The original population studied, college students, showed a
steadily decreasing trend in percentage of mentions from 80% in 1994 to around 30%
after 2000. We calculated the correlation between percentage and year, and it was
significantly negative (r = −.79, p < .05). The percentage of total articles mentioning
children increased rapidly from 1994 to 1995 and fluctuated at around 80% after that
(r = .68, p < .05). The percentage of total articles mentioning babies increased steadily
from 0 in 1995 to 55% in 1999 and fluctuated around that level afterwards (r = .87,
p < .01).

Discussion
Over time, the association between the ME and its original population, college stu-
dents, decreased, whereas associations with children and babies increased. The latter
two associations compose successively more extreme examples of the evolution of the
original scientific finding. The association with children, which rapidly increases then
stabilizes, is at least partially due to the research showing that keyboard lessons
increase spatial reasoning performance in preschool children (Rauscher et al., 1997).
This can be considered a distortion of the original finding because the ME in its
‘narrow’ sense (i.e., that listening to classical music improves performance) has never
been tested on children. This fact is confused in some articles, one of which states that
MSTP showed that ‘listening to brief snatches of Mozart appeared to have a short-term
effect on the spatial intelligence of preschoolers’ (Newsday, December 17, 1995,
 14

Figure 2. Trends in association of the Mozart Effect with college students, children and babies by
year. Percentages of the total number of newspaper articles mentioning these populations are shown.

added italics). However, if we adapt a ‘broader’, more lenient definition of the ME,
then both college students and children are populations that have been associated with
the ME in scientific research. Interestingly, however, the legend selected only the latter
population as it evolved, an effect consistent with Study 2’s test of motivational factors
in diffusion.
The most striking finding is the increasing association of the ME with infants. There
is no scientific research whatsoever linking music and intelligence in infants, and yet,
from 1997 onwards, more articles mentioned infants than college students. It should
be noted that not all articles that mention infants or children erroneously report
scientific research on these populations. Nevertheless, the presence of a given popu-
lation in an article on the ME is a good indicator of where people perceive the ME to be
most relevant.
All these transformations can be described as ‘mutations’ that are consistent with the
culturally prevalent myth of infant determinism (Kagan, 1998) and related concern for
early childhood development (Bruer, 1999). Thus, these results extend the findings of
Studies 1 and 2 by showing that ideas adapt to the psychological environment of their
hosts.
Interestingly, the period in which media interest in the ME shifted in magnitude (Fig.
1, 97.4–98.4) was slightly lagged in relation to the transformations of content in Figure
2 (which were most marked between 1994 and 1997). In other words, sustained media
interest seemed to increase only after the contents were transformed. It is tempting
to speculate whether such transformation is a precondition for large-scale diffusion.
Moscovici (1984) suggested that unfamiliar ideas might have to be anchored in existing
frames of belief in order to be communicable. Here, an analogous phenomenon may
have occurred: the ME might have diffused widely only after mutations increased its
relevance to ambient concerns.
 15

GENERAL DISCUSSION

We conducted three studies of the Mozart effect to demonstrate its evolution as a

scientific legend. Study 1 showed that the ME elicited far more interest than compar-
able reports and that it persisted for longer. However, much of this impact was
delayed. A substantial shift in media interest coincided with ME-related events outside
of science.
Study 2 showed that the ME was discussed more often in US states where the quality
of primary education was more problematic, and hence where concern with elemen-
tary education was presumably higher. Thus, the propagation of the ME was related
to the psychological environment of different host populations. These results are
consistent with long-standing speculation in social representations, legend and rumour
research, as well as evolutionary theories of the diffusion of ideas.
Study 3 demonstrated that the ME mutated over time. Newspaper articles
overextended the scientific findings to new, untested populations. The direction of
this mutation is consistent with the myth of infant determinism. This supports
Moscovici’s (1984) suggestion that, in order to be communicable, ideas have to be
adapted to existing frames of reference. Scientific knowledge must be transformed
before it can circulate widely, and a scientific legend is the end result of such a
transformation.
To our knowledge, the present research is unique as a comprehensive analysis of the
emergence and evolution of a scientific legend. Below, we consider some implications
of our study for research on the diffusion of ideas.
The present research was based on automatic media analyses, which have the
advantage of being comprehensive and objective. But these analyses must be comple-
mented by more detailed research. Long-standing speculations about functional rela-
tionships between ideas and ambient anxieties must be studied more systematically
(Jost & Ignatow, 2001). Media analyses are good field studies, but they could be
combined with experimental studies manipulating variables like idea content or
anxiety levels to see how they affect individuals’ propensity to transmit beliefs (Heath,
Bell, & Sternberg, 2001).
To conclude, we return to our initial discussion of the functionality of diffusion
of ideas and speculate on some characteristics of what we call a ‘life-cycle model’ of
the diffusion of ideas. Consider the curve of media interest shown in Figure 1. We
suggested that it embodies three phases: emergence, growth and decline. These
phases reflect the evolution of the functionality of the ME for its host population, but
they might extend beyond the ME to characterize the evolution of other scientific
legends or even other categories of beliefs.
The emergence phase constitutes the initial appearance of a scientific finding. In this
phase media interest is ephemeral and it may be limited to science and technology
sections of newspapers. On the other hand, reporting is likely to be most accurate. As
Table 1 shows, most scientific findings do not get farther than this phase.
The growth phase begins when a scientific finding is more widely propagated
because it generates interest outside of science. This interest may be reflected by the
finding’s appearance in more general news articles, or by embodiment in material
artifacts and actions (CDs, toys, legislation and the like). A precondition for the growth
phase seems to be a transformation of the finding into a form that is easier to under-
stand and communicate to laypeople. This phenomenon is not limited to the ME.
Consider the belief that consumption of red wine protects against cardiovascular
 16

disease. It has been labelled the ‘French paradox’, after the finding that the French
have lower levels of cardiovascular disease than Americans, despite a diet rich in fat.
The French paradox diffused widely in the US after a television show reported on the
subject. From a functional point of view, we might say that the widespread diffusion of
a scientific legend is not unlike the phase where an innovation is adopted by an
increasing number of users (Rogers, 1995). Thus, the growth phase may reflect the
‘discovery’ of the apparent usefulness of the ME. On the other hand, many social
theorists have contended that the very act of communicating creates and reinforces
social bonds (Dunbar, 1993). This factor may be particularly important in the case of
the ME, especially given its anxiety-alleviating function. The diffusion of the ME may
have been accelerated by the simple fact that it allowed people to talk about their
shared concerns with their children’s intellectual development.
The decline phase reflects diminishing media interest. Decline happens when the
finding has become so well-known that it is no longer of interest; it has become ‘old
news’, part of common knowledge. The erstwhile revolutionary finding has stabilized
as a part of culture (Sperber, 1990). In this phase it may be evoked in the media as a
cliché or even ridiculed: ‘Remember when a study came out suggesting that classical
music helps children think better, spawning a cottage industry of classical music
videotapes and CDs designed to help infants, and even fetuses, think better?’ (The
Plain Dealer, September 26, 2000). We find it ironic that, only a few years after
enthusiastically reporting the ME, media discourse switched to scepticism and incredu-
lous reminiscences (e.g., ‘remember when. . .’).3
What leads to the decline phase? In the case of the ME, a seemingly obvious answer
would be debunking by authoritative scientific research. The spike of media interest in
the last quarter of 1999 (see Fig. 1) coincides with the release of several scientific
publications related to the ME and directly challenging its truth. But debunking may
not have to occur for an idea to decline. Instead, decline may be an almost necessary
consequence of widespread diffusion. The more an idea diffuses, the more people
know about it; the idea loses the novelty that gives it value as social exchange and
therefore people may become less interested in communicating about it (e.g., Medalia
& Larsen, 1958). This observation would suggest that instead of being a central causal
factor precipitating the decline of an idea, debunking might just be one manifesta-
tion of the decline phase. The dynamics of decline suggested here resemble those
described by research on clichés, words or expressions that have become stereotyped
and meaningless by the very fact of their widespread use (Pickrel, 1985).
This kind of life-cycle model explicates the functional nature of widespread beliefs.
It specifies the trajectory of an idea between the uncertainty, unfamiliarity and novelty
that characterizes science and the mundane, cliché character of common sense. It
provides a more precise formulation of the often-cited observation that social represen-
tations function to ‘make the unfamiliar familiar’ (Moscovici, 1984). And it captures the
dynamic and regenerative character of ideas in modern society (Flick, 1998b). More-
over, it is consistent with well established findings on the diffusion of innovations
(Rogers, 1995) and could be adapted to encompass phenomena of resistance to new
technologies (Bauer, 1995; Wagner et al., 2002). Public attitudes towards scientific
findings may depend on their phase of diffusion. Attitudes in the emergence phase
3
We have observed this kind of rhetorical question for a number of other popular beliefs: ‘Remember the French
paradox?’ appeared in an article on health benefits of drinking tea (Omaha World-Herald, December 12, 1998);
‘Remember oat bran?’ appeared in an article on health benefits of oats (CNN Online, January 6, 1995). Such an appeal to
collective memory may be a rhetorical device often associated with beliefs in their decline phase.
 17

would be characterized by disbelief, rejection or curiosity. In the growth phase, these

might switch to enthusiasm or acceptance, to be followed by scepticism and ridicule
in the decline phase. A fully fledged version of this model could create a framework
for comparing legends in different stages of development and maybe even different
categories of belief.

Acknowledgements
The first author was supported by an Advanced Researchers Fellowship (No. 8210-061238) from
the Swiss National Science Foundation. Parts of this research were presented at the 6th Inter-
national Conference on Social Representations, August 2002, Stirling, Scotland, UK. We thank
two anonymous reviewers, members of the Culture Collaboratory of the Psychology Department
and seminar participants at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University for their
helpful comments on this work.

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