Neohelicon

DOI 10.1007/s11059-014-0244-y

Facts, fiction, cognition

Françoise Lavocat

 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary 2014

Abstract This article analyzes some aspects of the interdisciplinary convergences

between cognitive sciences (psychology and neurosciences) and literary theory,
with a stress on the blurring of the boundaries that separate fact from fiction in the
1990 until now. The focus falls on the misleading uses of metaphor as ‘‘transpor-
tation’’ and ‘‘simulation,’’ which led some psychologists and neuroscience spe-
cialists to overstate the powers of fiction, while also erasing the specificity of fiction.
Finally, it shows how some literary theorists who embraced the simulation thesis
were forced to invent a pseudo-simulation, a counter simulation or an anti-simu-
lation to reassert the distinctive features of fiction.

Keywords Fact and fiction
Interdisciplinarity
Neurosciences
Cognitives

sciences
Simulation
Transportation

The cognitive turn in contemporary culture1 seems to further blur the distinction
between fact and fiction, a blurring which is apparently generalized in various fields of
art and thought. The idea that we only have access to a truncated version of the real
world, altered by our cognitive apparatus, is largely shared. In The Tale–Tellers (Huston
2009), Nancy Huston proposes an anthropology of generalised illusion, drawing
together cognitive science and the widespread notion of storytelling. Furthermore,

1
Concerning the ‘‘cognitive turn,’’ there is a large amount of bibliography. See, for instance, Jackson
(2000), the special issue of Poetics Today (2003), entitled ‘‘The cognitive turn? A debate on
interdisciplinarity’’, and the recent issue of the Revue d’Histoire des sciences de l’homme, 25, 2011/2,
‘‘Les sciences de l’homme à l’âge du neurone’’.

F. Lavocat (&)
Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3, Paris, France
e-mail: francoise.lavocat@univ-paris3.fr

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innumerable works of fiction, such as The Matrix (1999),2 can be seen to develop the
philosophical tale of brains in a vat, which was first introduced by Putnam (1981).
In the field of literary theory, the influence of cognitive science is said to set
apart—if not to invalidate—the difference between factual and fictional narrative.3
Jérôme Pelletier explains cognitivists’ lack of interest in this question by the fact
that the neuronal processes involved in reading fictional and factual narratives are
the same (Pelletier 2011, p. 211). A significant amount of research in cognitive
science focuses on the neuronal competences necessary for the understanding of
narratives, leaving aside the referential status of the relevant texts.4 This is one the
many reasons why Sabine Gross criticises this literature in a much celebrated and
controversial article (Gross 1997).5
Nonetheless, one has to put things into perspective: in the domains of psychology
and neuroscience there is a number of studies that concern themselves with
surveying the border between reality and imagination. This is the case with studies
in developmental psychology, which have emerged mainly from the eighties
onwards.6 One can also find a considerable amount of research concerning the
neuronal handling of external perceptive stimuli as opposed to stimuli which are
self-generated, hence imaginary (see e.g., Turner et al. 2008; Simons et al. 2008).
Other studies do confirm differences between fact and fiction. Through a
questionnaire-based experiment Malcolm Hayward has shown that the distinction
between factual and fictional narratives is quickly made by the subjects upon
reading the first five words of a (non-ambiguous) sentence (Hayward 1994).
It is not my purpose to further analyse this research here. Rather, I shall concentrate
on a number of studies, which borrow the distinction between fact and fiction, or
consider it in the guise of a continuum. Whether they pertain to the domain of
psychology, neuroscience, or literary theory, they all share the use of metaphors of
transport and simulation, which I shall discuss as problematic interdisciplinary tools.
The question at hand is whether an interdisciplinary convergence has occurred
and, if so, to what extent can it explain the central issue of the difference between
fact and fiction.

The power of fiction according to psychologists and specialists in neuroscience

These two metaphors, of transport and simulation, which are commonly used to
define fiction, emerge during the nineties. ‘‘Transport’’ is introduced by Gerrig (1993),
Gerrig and Rapp (2004). Comparing it with a real journey, he describes it as follows:
2
The philosophical relevance of The Matrix was widely commented upon. See, for instance, Irwin
(2002), Yeffeth (2003), Grau (2005).
3
For a literary–theoretical discussion about the borders of fiction, see Pavel (1983, 1986), and Ryan
(2001). For an interdisciplinary approach, see Skalin (2005).
4
See, for instance, Mar (2004).
5
‘‘Fictionality is a crucial category for literature; but judging from the conspicuous omission or slighting
of fictionality in most cognitive studies of reading (for instance, Gerrig 1993), who conflates ‘‘narrative’’
and ‘‘fictional,’’ cognitivism is not ready to cope with this complex issue and our response to it’’ (1997,
p. 276, footnote 4).
6
See, for instance, Harris et al. (1991), Skolnik and Bloom (2006), Sharon and Wolley (2004).

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• Someone (‘‘the traveller’’) is transported by some means of transportation as a

result of performing certain actions.
• The traveller goes some distance from his or her world of origin, which makes
some aspects of the world of origin inaccessible.
• The traveller returns to the world of origin somewhat changed by the journey
(Gerrig and Rapp 2004, p. 267).
This definition focuses on two phenomena: the separation of the readers from
their real environment and the influence of their reading experience on them. The
two parameters are considered as constitutive elements of the relationship with what
Gerrig calls narrative worlds, avoiding the term ‘‘fiction.’’ To date, it is these
parameters that are measured and tested by specialists both in psychology and in
neuroscience. The metaphor of simulation is borrowed from informatics. It seems to
have been used as a definition of fiction for the first time by psychologist of
emotions Keith Oatley, who stated in 1992 ‘‘that ‘fiction’ runs on minds just as
computer simulations run on computers’’ (Oatley 1999, p. 105).
This comparison appeared in a scientific context influenced by the discovery of
the so-called ‘‘mirror-neurons’’ in apes in 1988 and in human beings in 1996 (see
Pelletier 2005). The research conducted by Jeannerod into what were then called
‘‘mirror neurons’’ clearly shows that the same neuronal network is simultaneously
activated by an action whether it is actually undertaken, perceived or only imagined:
the sensation of effort being independent from the execution of an actual physical
movement (Jeannerod 1997, 2001).7 From the perspective of our problematic (i.e.,
the difference between fact and fiction), theories of the simulation of action, such as
those used in this kind of research, reinforce a maximalist conception of the effect of
fiction, while invalidating the notion of a division between sensory experience and
mental representation, and therefore of a possible cognitive distinction between
factual and fictional data.
It is my hypothesis that metaphors, such as those of simulation and transportation,
have been powerful tools for interdisciplinary convergence between the domains of
psychology, neuroscience and humanities. One of the reasons for their success might
be that they represent an encounter between contemporary imagination, which is
deeply influenced by informatics and globalized circulation, and the earliest theories
of fiction. For instance, these metaphors triggered a renewal of Aristotelian
approaches by theorists of fiction such as Schaeffer (1999), as well as, more
surprisingly, by psychologists and specialists in neuroscience with an interest in
fiction. Keith Oatley explicitly sets simulation, mimesis and catharsis on a par
(Oatley 1992, 1999), while Marie-Noelle Metz-Lutz uses neuro-imaging in order to
identify the physiological traces of Aristotelian catharsis (Metz-Lutz et al. 2010).
The metaphors of transport and simulation are consistent with ancient,
ambivalent conceptions of fiction.
In 1999, philosopher Jean-Marie Schaeffer found that neurosciences and the
discovery of mirror-neurons supported a prominently positivist conception of
mimesis and fiction, which he considers indispensible for the acquisition of
7
For a critical review of this theory, both from a neuroscience and a philosophical approach, see
Declerck (2010).

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 F. Lavocat

knowledge and life in society. Some psychologists share this enthusiastic view of
fiction. Keith Oatley declares that fiction is ‘‘twice as True as Fact’’ (Oatley 1999,
p. 101). He defines it as ‘‘that mode of thought about what is possible for human
beings, in which protagonists, on meeting vicissitudes, experience emotions’’
(Oatley 1999, p. 103). Citing Aristotle as well as Sidney, Shakespeare, Coleridge
and Henry James, he claims that the conception of fiction as simulation can promote
memorization, life in society, the reparation of trauma, self-understanding and the
capacity to share cultural objects. The benefits of narrativity are not distinguished
from those of fictionality. Numerous ramifications of this approach can be found in
the work of Zunshine (2006). The simulation of fictional characters’ emotions
exercises cognitive competences in relation to the theory of the mind and hence the
capacity to guess others’ intentions; reading fiction sharpens the child’s compe-
tences, competences which are necessary for his/her relationships with others and
for life in society, for the benefit of the species.8
In this conceptual framework, simulation, empathy, emotion and theory of mind9
are closely bound together in a definition of fiction as communication, therapy,
education, sensibility, openness to the others. What about, then, the distinction
between fact and fiction? According to most of the psychologists (Oatley for
instance), fiction as literary narrative entails the same depth of emotional response
as factual narrative does. Poetical devices produce a defamiliarization which
enables simulation; characters involved in a dramatic plot generate high levels of
empathy. Factual accounts hardly have the same properties, even if memories
possibly could.
However, there is also an antithesis of this extremely positive approach to the
notion of fiction-simulation, which is possibly inherited from the old platonic charge
against simulacra.
Indeed, the aim of psychological research based upon the metaphor of
transportation is to measure the fiction’s capacity to hold the spirits. According to
Gerrig (1993), Gerrig and Rapp (2004), this potency is so strong that Coleridge’s
‘‘willing suspension of disbelief,’’ which allows the reader to enter in the fictional
world, has to be replaced by a ‘‘willing construction of disbelief’’: advice to help the
reader exit the fictional world. Liberating oneself from the influence of fiction
requires effort, or even work. Gerrig claims that regular readers of novels share
some erroneous ideas about life; they believe in personality consistency, which
exists only in characters; they are optimistic about the range of possibilities and
consider causal relationships as flexible: these hypotheses, at the end of the article
(Gerrig and Rapp 2004), are not validated by experiments. One might wonder about
the presuppositions underlying this romantic conception of fiction. Melanie Green
and her collaborators (Green and Brock 2000), who have determined (through the
use of a questionnaire) a scale of immersion, also want to demonstrate the close
relationship between transport and modification of beliefs. Her results, which are
consistent with those of Gerrig, suggest that whatever the instructions given to

8
Several recent books emphasise the usefulness of fiction, envisioned as a kind of training for real life
(see, for example, Zunshine (2006, 2010), Vermeule (2010).
9
‘‘Theory of mind’’ refers to one’s ability to attribute mental states to someone else.

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groups of readers, the ‘‘transport’’ is correlated with a change in their beliefs. The
literary quality of the text encourages both (immersion and modification of beliefs).
The authors insist that labelling the texts as factual or fictional had no influence
on the transportation and did not prevent the modification of the reader’s beliefs.
Green and Brock emphasize the audience’s vulnerability to possible manipulations
(Green and Brock 2000, p. 718) and referred to censors who for centuries feared
(apparently, according to her, rightfully so) the powers of fiction (Green et al. 2004).
Thus, it is not the boundaries of fiction that are primarily of concern to the
researchers, but rather how fiction models beliefs and lives in fascinating and
disturbing ways. This also implies that the distinction between fact and fiction is
blurred.
However, there are studies that contradict this consensual emphasis on fiction’s
power of suggestion. Those comparing the effects of historical films and
documentaries, such as LaMarre and Landreville (2009), for example, unambig-
uously conclude that factual narrative is superior in terms of emotion and learning
procured. In this experiment, the choice of an extreme and contemporary topic (the
Rwandan genocide) may have driven the results. The authors emphasise in their
conclusion, however, the argument of storytelling, the quality of the narrative,
which transcend the difference between fact and fiction (hypothesis not tested by
experience). Studies guided by the theories of storytelling generally conclude that
there is no privilege of fiction. Thus, according to the perspectives adopted, but also
the material experienced, results are quite different, although the idea of the
continuum prevails.
But if psychological research leads to diverse results, what about neuroscience?
Does it bring newer and more certain outcomes about this issue?
I would like to mention two recent studies which are clear instances of the trend
inspired by the metaphor of transportation (as interpreted by Gerrig and Green). The
first focuses on film (Hasson et al. 2008). It aims to determine the degree of
similarity of neuronal responses between different audiences. Participants watched
short excerpts of films and documentaries. The authors argue that this similarity
(ISC ‘‘inter-subject correlation of brain activity’’ 2008, p. 21) indicates the ability of
film to control the brain. It is precisely this control, according to them, that gives
pleasure: the theme of suggestion recurs. The difference between fact and fiction is
part of the classification which the authors undertook. The results of the experiment
show that the documentary (called ‘‘real life’’), causes little ISC (5 %), while the
film, according to its degree of artistic development, generates a very high
proportion of identical neuronal responses (45 and 60 %) to what the authors call
the ‘‘art film’’ and ‘‘Hollywood movie’’—in this case The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly and a Hitchcock movie.
Bias produced by the choice of examples and the fuzziness of the criteria taints
the credibility of the results. Finally, the relationship discerned between similarity of
neuronal responses, mind control, style effect, absorption in fiction and aesthetic
pleasure remains highly hypothetical.
The second study, led by Metz-Lutz and collaborators, focuses on theatre (Metz-
Lutz et al. 2010). The authors chose this medium to explore their radical
interpretation of the theory of transportation. Their argument is the following: in

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order to participate in the theatrical fiction, the viewer must go beyond the very
diverse and very intense sensorial inputs supplied by the performing arts. The
authors liken this shift, this change of perspective, this sensory disconnection to a
metaphor.
In their conclusion, the authors note the activation of areas related to verbal
processes in reading comprehension and aesthetic judgments (zones B 45 and B 47),
to understanding metaphors, and to the integration of sensory data and the theory of
mind, in conjunction with the events which can trigger the emotion. They called
‘‘theatrical or textual events,’’ moments in the text or in the staging primarily
identified by the director of the play as particularly moving.
They also note the non-activation of medial cortical areas related to the construction
of coherence of the narrative, self-referential processes, exchange and social cognition.
They propose having seen the indication of a ‘‘transportation’’ or an adherence to the
fiction in the activation of areas 45 and 47, and the viewer’s disconnection of the sensory
data in relation to the real world in the non-activation of medial cortical areas. Finally,
the electrocardiogram showed a decrease in dynamic heart rate variability correlated
with this non-activation of medial cortical areas, itself correlated with theatrical and
textual events.
The proposed interpretation is that adherence to fiction provokes a state of
consciousness that is similar to hypnosis or meditation. The ‘‘transportation’’ is then
defined as an altered state of awareness, which is considered by the authors
tantamount to the ‘‘willing suspension of disbelief’’ suggested by Coleridge. In
addition, the change in heart rate might suggest an emotional regulation: that is the
catharsis.
This demonstration raises some questions. The authors first described the
fictional immersion as a metaphor; then, as the area used to understand the
metaphors (among others) was activated, their interpretation is validated in a
circular way. The setting of the experience is also far from the actual conditions of a
theatrical representation: at the beginning of the experience, the participants see for
a few minutes an actor performing an excerpt from a contemporary play monologue;
then, the performance is videotaped and participants only see a film on a screen in
the MRI scanner. Finally, the finding of a decrease in heart rate variability during a
captivating performance contrasts sharply with other theories, when the emotion is
precisely the main operator of the ‘‘transportation.’’
Also in the field of neurosciences, Anna Abraham’s work (Abraham et al. 2008;
Abraham and von Cramon 2009) leads to outcomes which are partly consistent with
the Metz-Lutz results. Her team presented to the participants simple scenarios
involving real people and fictional characters (George W. Bush, Cinderella). The
participants were asked to state if these scenarios were possible or impossible. Their
answers activated both some common brain areas and some different ones: the
scenarios with real people generated responses in a zone (B 10), whose functions
are, among others, episodic memory (also called autobiographic memory) and self-
referential processes, judgments, assessments and ‘‘cognitive branching.’’ The
sentences with fictional characters activated areas 45 B and 47 B, which are mainly
related to semantic memory.

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In conclusion, the authors propose that the difference between fact and fiction lies
in the way in which information is coded. Our access to it is probably also different.
What is decisive, according to their hypothesis, is the relevance of the information
for us. It is the degree of ‘‘self relevance’’ that allows us to identify information as
real or fictional.
Anna Abraham and collaborators find that real entities, about which we have
more information and which affect us more closely, are much more interesting than
fictional figures. Certainly, as noted by the authors themself, a fictional character
(belonging to the religious scenarios and video games that she investigated) may be
subject to emotional investments. Therefore, the boundary between reality and
fiction, in terms of reception, is unclear. This research, however, illuminates the
privilege enjoyed by the reference to reality in our cognitive system. This is the
factual information that mobilises neural networks related to the relationship with
oneself and others (empathy, emotions) much more intensely than fiction. Note also
that both Metz-Lutz and Abraham (and collaborators) find that fiction activates
areas 45 B and B 47 but interpret this differently. The non-activation of areas related
to self-reference is understood by Metz-Lutz as evidence of an intense absorption in
fiction; Abraham sees it as an evidence of the association of fiction mostly with
semantic processes.
Therefore, the literary theorists who want to support their conception of the
distinction between fact and fiction using recent discoveries in psychology and
cognitive sciences, could in fact develop the very opposite thesis. If the theorist
wishes to strengthen a ‘‘segregationist’’ thesis, in the terminology of Pavel (1986),
or differentialist, in mine (Lavocat 2010), they may argue that children learn to
distinguish between real and fictional creatures between the ages of 3 and 5 years
(Harris et al. 1991; Skolnik and Bloom 2006); that the ability to discriminate
between reality and fantasy is crucial, as the inability to do so is a symptom of
psychosis (Simons et al. 2008); and also that readers easily recognize the style of
fictional and factual writing, using statements of five words (Hayward 1994).
But theorists can also rely on the same disciplines to emphasise that our
relationship with the world is largely based on lure and simulation; that readers
often make mistakes or even pay no attention to the status of the texts; that the
boundary between fact and fiction is so thin that our beliefs are largely shaped by
fiction (Gerrig 1993; Green and Brock 2000; Gerrig and Rapp 2004).
Finally, most studies show that fictions affect us more than factual representa-
tions (Oatley 1999), by enabling both empathy and theory of mind (Zunshine 2010).
But other studies show that factual texts entail more emotions (LaMarre and
Landreville 2009), and self-relevance (Abraham et al. 2008; Abraham and von
Cramon 2009), and therefore also mobilize these skills even more.

Theories of fiction and cognitive science

How have literary critics applied cognitive science to fiction over the past few
years? I will briefly sketch out here a few possible approaches, based exclusively on
recent work by Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Gregory Currie, and Jerome Pelletier.

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All of these studies are based on simulation theory.

As we have seen, in the past few years the notion of simulation has become the
dominant paradigm when thinking about fiction. The idea of transportation,
however, is also omnipresent in studies of fiction. Thus Marie-Laure Ryan speaks of
a plane trip to embody the passage from one world to another (Ryan 1991, p. 32).
There is also the more moderate, aquatic version of ‘‘immersion,’’ especially in the
work of Jean-Marie Schaeffer (Schaeffer 1999), which has also become closely
associated with the concept of fictionality.
In any case, the theorists of fiction predominantly interpret simulation as the
scientific foundation of a fundamental and non-metaphorical indistinctness between
factual and fictional discourse (Pelletier 2008). This choice has undoubtedly
supported the proliferation of research on fictionality: simulation and associated
concepts (such as empathy and mind-reading) have indeed given substance and
considerable weight to the effects of fiction, anchored on human experience, the
relationship to others, and socializing. For that matter, stressing this particular
dimension is precisely a characteristic trait of contemporary theories of fiction,
absent from earlier formulations.10 Moreover, situating fiction within the broad
domain of simulation also allows differentiation between capacities related to the
comprehension of narrative and those pertaining specifically to functions of fiction.
Nevertheless, the advantages of simulation theory are offset by an obvious
shortcoming. Blurring the opposition between fact and fiction erases the specificity
of fiction, and hence the very subject of research. Any literary critic specialized in
fiction-simulation must grapple with the difficulty inherent in this paradox (defining
fictionality from a theoretical standpoint that denies the peculiar character of
fiction). What solutions, then, do they propose?
Essentially, the proposed strategies consist of limiting simulation, of setting apart
the specifics of fictional simulation, or even of splitting it up or duplicating it. These
conceptual manipulations in turn suggest the limits of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Schaeffer (2005) claims that the difference between fact and fiction does exist (in
a pragmatic approach borrowed from Searle); but working from the idea of
simulation and from a cognitive point of view, the distinction cannot be located in
the domain of mental capacity. However, he sustains that fiction is indeed a kind of
delusion, but an incomplete one, the proof of the matter being that fiction does not
bring about belief. This affirmation, repeated throughout Schaeffer’s oeuvre
(Schaeffer 1999, 2005, 2009), contradicts numerous studies in psychology which,
in Gerrig and Green’s wake, insist on the contrary.
Moreover, though the neuronal processes remain the same when faced with a
text, regardless of its factual or fictional nature, Schaeffer considers that our
treatment of the text is different. For him, the game of make-believe involves
different, that is to say ‘‘indirect’’ inferential processes (Schaeffer 2009). In
addition, though Schaeffer has often stated, following Searle, that there are no
internal markers of fictionality, he has recently softened his position. Thus, for
example, he has suggested that the linguistic anomalies characteristic of fictional

10
Characters which traditionally embody the fictional immersion are shown to be incapable of adapting
to the real world (Don Quixote), or unable to relate to others (Mme Bovary).

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texts (such as those identified by Hamburger 1954) may possibly perform the
function of leading to immersion (Schaeffer 2009). He also suggests that unlike
factual texts, fictional ones primarily aim to provoke immersion, an approach that
renders the reader inattentive to textual inconsistencies. By recognizing the murky
nature of the simulation process (Schaeffer 1999, 2009), Schaeffer certainly
demonstrates himself to be a most prudent researcher in this particular domain. In
any case, his proposition is efficient in marking a territory specific to fiction within
the framework of a simulation theory tending towards the opposite direction.
Gregory Currie also subscribes to the idea of a particular kind of simulation
where fiction is concerned, but suggests more of a tentative solution. He proposes
that the reader of fiction simulates the attitude of a reader confronted with writing of
a factual nature, who him/herself simulates the characters’ thoughts as, possibly,
actions. By means of such delegation, the empathy felt by the reader is cut off from
the real, in the sense that it does not prompt the reader to act. To use a metaphor
derived from computer science (picked up by both Schaeffer and Pelletier), the
simulation produced by fiction is ‘‘off line.’’ Much like Schaeffer, Currie considers
that fiction does not produce belief. Moreover, he insists on a crucial difference
where axiological engagement is concerned: the empathy we feel for fictional
characters would not be felt for real people in similar circumstances (1997).
In any case, philosophers and theorists of literature tend to reduce the ability of
fiction to shape beliefs and experience, a tendency notably emphasized by
psychologists.
Finally, the solution put forth by Jérôme Pelletier in 2011 illustrates again the
hiatus existing between disciplines. He maintains unawareness of the distinction
between fact and fiction within the framework provided by general simulation
theory; nevertheless, he denies that his approach is panfictionalist. Indeed, he posits
two capacities and two forms of immersion. He claims that narrative, whether
factual or fictional, requires immersion, while fiction entails spontaneous self-
detachment. Combining narrative and fictional capacities permits a kind of
reflexivity:11 Similarly to Currie, he assumes that in immersing themselves in
fiction, subjects simulate their beliefs in the story’s contents. (Pelletier 2011,
p. 235). The limitation of simulation is due to the detachment that fiction elicits.
Indeed, Pelletier considers that it is this very capacity that ‘‘allows the mind not to
confuse the experiences, content and information having as their principal function
the enrichment of our stock of knowledge about the real world’’ (Pelletier 2011,
p. 234).12
Pelletier’s theory recently evolved in a different way stressing more clearly the
difference between fact and fiction (Pelletier 2012). Taking into account the
research of Abraham, Metz-Lutz and Simons, Pelletier suggests that narration and
fiction work in opposite ways, involving, respectively, episodic memory and
semantic memory. In this view, it is narration, and not fiction that entails
11
According to Pelletier, immersion in a narrative entails ‘‘thinking about thinking’’ (‘‘pensée sur la
pensée,’’ 2011, p. 231).
12
‘‘En particulier, la compétence fictionnelle est cette capacité qui permet à l’esprit de ne pas confondre
les expériences, contenus ou informations dont la fonction principale est d’enrichir notre stock de
connaissance sur le monde réel’’ (my translation).

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 F. Lavocat

‘‘immersion,’’ ‘‘simulation,’’ ‘‘transportation,’’ while fiction, on the contrary would

provoke distance and disbelief. The emotions elicited by fiction are of a different
kind than those evoked by real events.13 He also supposes that in the evolution of
humankind, factual narration precedes fiction,14 and also that fiction and narration
met accidentally.15
In sum, all these three authors regard fictional immersion as either pseudo-
simulation or counter- or anti-stimulation.
My intention has by no means been to invalidate the research being conducted in
particular disciplines by imposing a different discipline as a model. I am neither
reprimanding psychologists for a naive approach to questions pertaining to literary
theory nor am I using the findings of experimental sciences as a yardstick to
measure the gains of literary theory.
However, I did want to clear up certain misrepresentations generated by the
interdisciplinary approach (which has been booming since the beginning of the
2000s in the disciplines concerned), the first being the reduction of one discipline’s
peculiar dynamics to its perception within another discipline. Indeed, there is no
unique doctrine of cognitive science (including psychology and neuroscience)
pertaining to the difference between fact and fiction, but rather a variety of
approaches and a certain conflict between points of view. Specialists of literature
and philosophy exclusively favour the simulation theory of action due to its
affinities with themes traditionally associated with fiction, such as illusion, thrall
and the simulacrum. Yet, having started to employ this theory, they went to some
lengths to limit and modify it by (until now) side-stepping experimental findings.
Indeed, the literal fashion in which the transportation metaphor has often been
adapted by psychologists and specialists in neuroscience has led to a speculation-
based, disproportionate interpretation of fiction’s powers. Paradoxically, fiction
theorists have considerably reduced these powers, all the while reinstating a
dividing line between fact and fiction, where mental processes and texts are
concerned.
Finally, neglecting the metaphorical origin of some key concepts also results in a
biased perspective. These metaphors—simulation and transportation—, have
doubtless had a heuristic value, as they enabled the crossing of disciplinary
borders. They have also led to excessive assumptions. For me, it is the cautious
users of the concept who have accomplished the most convincing work in the fields
of psychology, neuroscience and literary theory.
However, in my view, this comparative analysis of approaches in cognitive
science and literary theory, concerning the borders of fiction, does not have to lead
to excessively sceptic conclusions. Recent experiments in neuroscience have
convincingly pinpointed some characteristics in the cognitive treatment of fiction
underlying a mental process of disengagement of the self. (Abraham et al. 2008;

13
This assumption is consistent with Walton’s theory of ‘‘quasi emotions’’ (Walton 1990).
14
This is commonplace in cognitive sciences applied to the history of literature through an evolutionist
approach. See, for example, Turner (1997).
15
Oral communication on 27th March 2012, Seminar ‘‘Interpretation and Cognition,’’ Paris 3 Sorbonne
nouvelle.

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Abraham and von Cramon 2009; Metz-Lutz et al. 2010). These results have to be
taken into account by literary theorists (sometimes claiming that they rely on
cognitive science, as do Schaeffer and Currie) as far as they purport to be convinced
by the identity between fact and fiction (Huston 2009). On the other hand,
specialists in cognitive science could draw some benefits from considering the
works of philosophers and literary theorists. They may then better identify some of
the issues really at stake about the borders of fiction—to wit, what kind of
simulation actually entails exposure to fiction? Only a more intense and lucid
interdisciplinary dialogue will help to solve these kind of puzzling questions.

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