International School Alliance of Educators vs.

Quisumbing
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000
Facts
Private respondent International School, Inc., hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires.
The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-
hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June
1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members” of the School, contested
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise
prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over
the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano,
issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School.
Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in the
Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not the point-of-hire classification employed by the International
School, Inc. is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
hires constitutes racial discrimination.
Ruling
 Yes. The Court ruled that the point-of-hire classification employed by the
International School, Inc. is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to “give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities.” The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, “in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.”
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise
proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation—all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis
of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this
principle as part of its national laws.
Therefore, the Court ruled that point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign hires contravenes public policy.
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (NUBE) vs. Confesor
G.R. No. 114974
June 16, 2004
Facts
Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new collective bargaining
agreement between the bank and the Union, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested
to the Bank’s Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito
Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank
acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno (head of the negotiating team for the bank) suggested to
Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank
Employees, the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the
Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.
There was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged Unfair Labor
Practice. Bank alleged that the Union violated its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a
notice of strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Considering that
the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed.
Union alleged unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Union’s
choice of negotiator. It argued that, Diokno’s suggestion that the negotiation be limited as
a “family affair” was tantamount to suggesting that Federation President Jose Umali, Jr.
be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury
to the public interest need not be present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The
Union also contended that the Bank merely went through the motions of collective
bargaining without the intent to reach an agreement.
Issue
whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against
the Bank arising from the latter’s alleged “interference” with its choice of negotiator.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the Union was not able to substantiate its claim of unfair
labor practice against the Bank arising from the latter’s alleged “interference” with its
choice of negotiator.
Under the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 87 FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE to which
the Philippines is a signatory, “workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever,
shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, to job organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.”
Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions
and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom to organize their administration
and activities and to formulate their programs. Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98
pertaining to the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining which was incorporated in
the Labor Code, particularly in Article 243 thereof.
Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an
employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily
includes the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the
selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a
representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said
act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right
to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with
Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.
In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged
suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel. The
circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made
by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the
Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the
right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially
considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation
and simultaneously with Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded
from its negotiating panel.
Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949
December 1, 1994
Facts
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private
respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in
the name of petitioner. Said lot is contiguous to two other lots which are registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent of the sellers. Later, Licup
assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the
land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of lot
to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment
of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint —
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr.
Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.
 The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into
the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf
and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
Issue
Whether or not the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations
regarding selling a lot to a private entity
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity.
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the
Vatican City. The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations”.
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In this case,
Petitioner did not sell lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for
the purpose of the donation.
The issue of petitioner’s non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private
respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently
established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines’ foreign relations, the
Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified
that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic
of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges
and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of
the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or
diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts. Where the
plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the
courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting the country’s foreign relations.
Mijares vs. Ranada
G.R. No. 139325
April 12, 2005
Facts
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court,
District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of
police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as
basis for the US District Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by
aliens for tortious violations of international law. The US Court rendered Final Judgment
awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90).
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, City of Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. On 5 February 1998,
the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of
the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a
monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7,
pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the
petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not
capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. They also point out that to
require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction
ordained by the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the foreign judgement can be recognized in the Philippines.
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the foreign judgement can be recognized in the
Philippines.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do
not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country
merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted
practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in
conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the
property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in
foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of
the forum.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as
it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is
the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign
judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an
estate and is based on the US District Court’s Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may,
for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as
subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of “all other actions not
involving property.” Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III
G.R. No. 173034
October 9, 2007
Facts
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of
the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive
Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The “Milk Code,” Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR)which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement. Named as respondents
are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of
said executive agency.
 Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk
Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the
DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international
instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents’ position that
said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the
DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by
respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only
provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and
child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health
and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and
nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain
specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The
international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes
are the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Issue
Whether or not the pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents
are part of the law of the land.

Ruling
No. The Court ruled that the pertinent international instruments adverted to by
respondents are part of the law of the land.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law
must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
While the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) and
World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate, the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) which was adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, but the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope
of the ICMBS.
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, whereby the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, embodies the incorporation method. “Generally accepted principles of
international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are
binding on all states.
An international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the
WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced
or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven
that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in
nature. Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions
are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
G.R. No. 183591
October 14, 2008
Facts
With the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo asked Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the
government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held
in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.)
rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). In its body, it grants the authority
and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. The sharing
between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent
of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
 With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority
between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described
as associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation
and finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information.
They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws.
Issue
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the international law.
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 was contrary to law
and Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the
international law. In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually
been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized
UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting
them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed
to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part
of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been
recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the internal and
external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external
which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of
self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing
states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an
actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination.
International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases,
recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the
sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was
discussed above as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories
and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the
indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State,
through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to
the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.
Minucher vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003

Facts
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise also known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against
petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian. The criminal charge followed a
“buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to
have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. On 08 January 1988, a decision was rendered acquitting the two accused. On
03 August 1988, Minucher filed a civil case for damages on account of what he claimed
to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims alleged that he had acted in the discharge of his
official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul
Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
 Only “diplomatic agents,” under the terms of the Convention, are vested with
blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines
“diplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus
impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. The main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. However, the doctrine of
immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
In this case, the job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law
enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance
activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation,
and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Southeast Asian Fisheries Dev't. Center vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 82631
February 23, 1995
Facts
On February 14,1992, this Court, in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA
283 (1992), held that NLRC had no jurisdiction over petitioner, the latter being "an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agencies of the
Philippine Government." By reason of this Court's pronouncement in the aforementioned
case, petitioner filed a supplemental petition on May 16, 1992, raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of NLRC to hear and decide the case.
In opposition to the supplemental petition, private respondent Yong argued that
petitioner was precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction in view of the latter's
failure to do so before the Labor Arbiter or even before the Commission.
Issue
Whether or not the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center enjoys diplomatic
immunity.
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) enjoys diplomatic immunity.
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru
which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control
its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on
behalf of its member-states. SEAFDEC as an international agency, enjoys diplomatic
immunity.
The general rule is that estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal
that has none over the cause of action. With respect to foreign states and international
organizations, the immunity from suit or the jurisdiction of local courts can only be
waived expressly by said entities and not by the employees or agents.
World Health Organization vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-35131
November 29, 1972
Facts
Petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the
World Health Organization (WHO) from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office
in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services, is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the
Philippine Government and the World Health Organization. Such diplomatic immunity
carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability,
inviolability of the official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption
from taxation and customs duties.
 When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates
entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were
accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable
goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers,
Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of
Verstuyft.
Issue
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from
search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that
petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the
Host Agreement.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
The Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations for consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency
concerned to determine in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged,
and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty
commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the
force and effect of law.
Estrada vs. Desierto
G.R. Nos. 146710-15
March 2, 2001
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

Facts
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of
his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis “Chavit” Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on
air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage.
The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot
away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas.
Due to the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A
10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy
Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. January 19, 2001, the fall
from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of
Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP
Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar
stunning announcement.
On January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared
in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman
were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A.
Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000
for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-
001755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080;
and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000
for plunder, graft and corruption.
And on February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and
only if legally warranted."
 Through another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in
an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner already resigned as the President and cannot enjoy
immunity from suit
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner already resigned as a President and cannot
enjoy immunity from suit.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001
after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test,
the Court hold that petitioner resigned as President. Under any circumstance, however,
the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared
before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the
presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared
after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s resignation
from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will,
especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.
 On the alleged immunity, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent
the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him
and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under
the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that
would be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve
if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative
proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid
prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases
at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed
against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-
1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for
the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by
the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.