Memorandum of Arguments For The Petitioner

TC–71_P
LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2018
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
IN THE MATTER OF
W.P. No. ___/2018

FATIMA GHANSARI.....................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
UNION OF INDICA.......................................................................................RESPONDENT
CLUBBED WITH
W.P. No. ___/2017

Dr. R.M. SWAIN...............................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
STATE OF DEHRI.........................................................................................RESPONDENT
PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

PETITIONER TC-71_P
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HEADINGS PAGE NO.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS 10-11
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13-14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 15-29
I. WHETHER LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% 15-18
RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?
II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% 18-21
RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF
SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO,
DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN
THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% 21-23
RESERVATION FOR WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS
SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
COMMUNITY?
IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON 23-25
GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE MOTIVE OF ANY
FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF
COMMUNAL POLITICS?
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO 25-28
ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
UU-LCD-NMCC-2018 Page 1 of 31
PETITIONER TC-71_P
THE CONSTITUTION?
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLE 28-29
BLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO
MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
PRAYER 30
PETITIONER TC-71_P
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Co. Company
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honorable
Ltd. Limited
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
No. Number
Ors. Others
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Raj Rajasthan
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Supp Supplementary
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
PETITIONER TC-71_P
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Sr. No. Title Citation Page(s)
1. Acharya Maharishi NarendraPrasadji v. 25

AIR 1974 SC 2098
State of Gujarat
AIR 2005 SC 4217
2. Ajit Kumar Nag v. GM Indian Oil Ltd 16
1997 (3) Bombay CR
3. AnnadPathwardhan v. Union of India 19
438
AIR 1970 SC 1228
4. ArunGhosh v. State of West Bengal 21
AIR 2003 SC 3176
5. Aruna Roy v. Union of India 26
AIR 1950 SC 129
6. BrijBhushan v. State of Delhi 18
AIR 1966 SC 1387
7. BrijBhushan v. State of Mysore 20
CW PIL No. 95 of 2018
8. CW PIL No. 95 of 2018 v. Unknown (HP High Court, 27
31/07/2018).
AIR 1951 SC 118, 119
9. ChintamanRao v. State of MP 25
10. Collector and District Magistrate v. S. 23

AIR 2008 SC 2096
Sultan
WP No. 463 of 2012
11. Common Causes v. Union of India 22
(Supreme Court,
14/05/2015)
12. D.A.V College Jullender’s v. State of 24

AIR 1971 SC 1737
Punjab
13. Distt. Registrar and Collector v. Canara 16

AIR 2005 SC 186
Bank
AIR 1954 SC 224, 227
14. Dwarka Prasad v. State of UP
PETITIONER TC-71_P
AIR 1974 SC 555

15. E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 17
AIR 1971 SC 1643
16. GolakNath v. State of Punjab 22
AIR 2007 SC 861
17. I.R Colheo v. State of Tamil Nadu 15
AIR 1975 SC 2299
18. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 15
19. Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. 29

(2010) 8 SCC 281
RK Jain
Writ Petition (civil)
20. Islamic Academy Of Education v. State 25
No. 350 of 1993
Of Karnataka
(Supreme Court,
14/08/2003)
21. KavanapparaKottarathiKochuni v. State 19

AIR 1960 SC 1080
of Madras and Kerala
22. KeshavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala 25

AIR 1973 SC 1461
AIR 1993 SC 171
23. LIC of India v. Manu Bhai Shah 26
24. MRF Ltd V. Inspector Kerala 26

(1998) 8 SCC 227
Government
SLP No. 9126 of 2010
25. ManojMishra v. Union of India 27
(Supreme Court,
09/03/2013)
AIR 1971 SC 2486
26. MadhuLimaye v. State of Bihar 22
1957 Cri LJ 703
27. Mohd. Abdul GhaniHamid v. The State 23
AIR 2012 SC 3565,
28. Mohd. AjmalKasab v. State of 22
3662
Maharashtra
Case No. 315 of 2015
29. MrAvinash Kumar v. GNCTD 29
(Central Information
PETITIONER TC-71_P
Commission,
06/08/2015)
(2005)11 SCC 600
30. NCT of Delhi v. NavjotSandhu 24
AIR 2012 SC 1310
31. NK Bajpai v. Union of India 22
AIR 1974 SC 1232
32. Naraindas v. State of MP 16
AIR 1963 SC 812
33. O.K.Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph 23
Writ petition
34. Priyanka Sharma v. State (Panchayti Raj 16
no.11119/2012
Department)
(Rajasthan High
Court, 15/03/2013)
(2013) 1 SCC 218
35. RK Anand v. Delhi High Court 24
36. RK Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court 24

(2009) 8 SCC 106
AIR 1993 SC 1267
37. RaghunathRao v. Union of India 21
38. RaichurmathamPrabhakar v. 16
AIR 2004 SC 3625
RawatmalDugar
AIR 2005 SC 3593
39. RakeshViz v Raminder Pal Singh Sethi 21
WP No. 661 of 2014
40. Ram Kishun Prasad v. State of Bihar 17
(Patna High Court,
13/02/2015)
Writ No. 11483 of 2011
41. Ram Vishun Singh v. State of Bihar 23
(Bihar High Court,
10/11/2014)
42. RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home 24

(2012) 5 SCC 1
Secretary, Union of India
AIR 1950 SC 124
43. RomeshThaper v. State of Madras 21
PETITIONER TC-71_P
(1994) SCC 1
44. S.R Boomai v. Union of India 24
AIR 2012 SC 3829,
45. Sahara India Real Estate Ltd. v. 26
3838
Securities & Exchange Board
AIR 1965 SC 845
46. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 17
(2012) 8 SCC 450
47. Sanjeev Nanda v. Union of India 19
AIR 1973 SC 1091
48. Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration 20
AIR 1984 SC 1064,
49. Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. 23
1071
Ltd
AIR 1951 SC 458
50. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India 17
AIR 1987 SC 877, 895
51. SheoNandanPaswan v. State of Bihar 16
AIR 1999 SC 1160
52. Secretary HSEB vs. Suresh 15
Writ petition
53. SonalChauhan v. State (Panchayti Raj 16
no.13635/2012
Department)
(Rajasthan High
Court, 15/03/2013)
54. St. Stephen's College v. The University Of 24

AIR 1992 SC 1630
Delhi
AIR 1974 SC 1389
55. St. Xavier College v. State of Gujarat 20
AIR 2015 SC 255
56. State of Bhopal v. Arif 19
AIR 2012 SC 1040,
57. State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh 19
1047
(2004) 4 SCC 684, 692
58. State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai 26
59. State of Kerala v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia 20

AIR 2004 SC 2081
PETITIONER TC-71_P
AIR 2011 SC 3470

60. State of Tamil Nadu v. Shyam 21
61. State of West Bengal v. Committee for 28

AIR 2010 SC 1476
Protection of democratic Rights
62. Suptd. Central Prison v. Ram 24

AIR 1960 SC 633
ManoharLohia
63. The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. 26

1975 SCR (1) 173
State Of Gujarat &Anr
(2012) 1 SCC 718
64. Union of India v. LSN Murthy 20
BOOKS
1. Jain MP, Constitutional Law, (8th Edition, 2017).

2. Basu DD, Shorter Constitution of India, Volume I-II, (4th Edition, 2012).
3. Tope TK, Indian Constitution, (2nd Edition, 2013).
STATUTES
1. Constitution of India 1950

2. The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014.
3. Evidence Act, 1872
IMPORTANT DEFINITION
1. Petitioners for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for MRS. FATIMA
GHANSARI AND ORS.
2. Respondent for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for UNION OF
INDIA.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
I. W.P. No. ___/2018.
The Petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
Indica.
II. W.P. No. ___/2017.
The Petitioner has approached the High Court of Dehri under Article 226 of the
Constitution. But the Hon’ble Supreme Court clubbed this petition under Article 139A of
the Constitution of Indica.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The Republic of Indica, got its independence from British Rule in 1947, is an independent
“Union of State”. The Constitutional and Legal framework of Indica is parimateria to the
Republic of India. As the Constitution of Indica provides Equality of Gender, concerns were
raised for Women Empowerment to have at least 33% seats reservation in both houses of
Parliament. In 2006, the law prescribing 33% reservation for women in the Parliament was
passed and received the assent of President on 1st July 2006.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO DISPUTE
I.
Year 2015 Women Representation in both the houses of Parliament have
increased and the Women Laden Parliament by a Constitutional
Amendment have inserted a new provision to Article 19(2).
27th December Dr. RN Swain filed a PIL in the High Court of the State of Dehri to
2017 declare 33% reservation as unconstitutional.
II.
26th December Mrs. Fatima Ghansari brought a motion in the house of Parliament
2017 for repealing the law of 33% reservation to women.
1st May 2018 Mrs. Fatima again tried to reintroduce the motion but the Speaker
of the house refused to entertain it, and on the same day, she
received anonymous phone calls and the caller threatened her of
due consequences if she continue to insist upon her stand to repeal
the law of 2006. However aggrieved by the incident, filed a petition
in the Supreme Court of Indica praying for declaring the
reservation law as Unconstitutional.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
III.
25th February Mrs. GarimaDhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. MannatRaichandani
2018 were arrested by the Intelligence Agency of Indica on the ground of
spying for and producing vital state secrets to enemy country.
10th May 2018 Members of Parliament of Wrongrace Party jointly introduced the
motion in the Lower House for repealing the law but the same was
rejected by the speaker.
MATTER BEFORE SUPREME COURT
Supreme Court of Indica has clubbed both the petitions filed before it and the petition before
the High Court of Dehri under Article 139A of the Constitution and has scheduled them for
the final hearing.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)
ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?
II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)
SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO
THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE
CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY COMMUNITY?
IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT IT

SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME THE
TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION

ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
PETITIONER TC-71_P
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?
The Counsel on behalf of Petitioners humbly submits before the Honourable Supreme Court
of Indica that the law providing for 33% reservation to the women in the Parliament and
amendment to Article 19(2) are arbitrary and violative to the concept of equality under
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica. The concept of equality has been considered as one
of the most essential postulate of democratic society with “Rule of Law” as grundnorm of
that equality.
II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33%

RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
of Indica that legislating the law providing 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and
amendment to Article 19(2) smacks of some ulterior religious motives and also violate the
secular principles as most of the women members of majority party started utilizing the law
which was amended in the year 2015, for delivering venomous and hate speeches on religious
lines.

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE 19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
COMMUNITY?
of Indica the law providing for 33% reservation for women in the parliament and the
amendment to Article 19(2) is suppressing the Rights of Minority Community as most of the
women members of majority party started utilizing the law which was amended in the year
2015, for delivering venomous and hate speeches on religious lines.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT

IT SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS
BECOME THE TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
of Indica that law of 33% reservation for women in the Parliament can be struck down as it
serves the tool of communal politics and foreign power. The Intelligence Agency of Indica on
the ground of spying for and providing vital State secrets to enemy country, arrested Mrs.
Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. MannatRaiChandani. The Intelligence Agency
claims to have credible evidences against these ladies for doing the above said act.

of Indica the amendment to Article 19(2) passed by the women laden Parliament1 is violative
of the concept of equality, religious efficacy and secular principles of the state polity. Thus, it
violates the basic structure of the constitution itself.
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS

PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
of Indica that the protection of Whistle Blowers Protections Act extends to Mrs. Fatima
Ghansari, as she is one of the members of the Lower House of the Parliament and she was the
only one who has protested to repeal the law providing 33% reservation to women alleging
that this law has become a tool in the hands of the ruling party which is using it to achieve
their own hidden Agenda and objective. It is due to this only that she received anonymous
calls threatened her for the dire consequences if she continues to insist upon her stand to
repeal the law of 2006.
1
Moot Proposition, ¶ 11.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
ARGUMENT ADVANCED

WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE
19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that the
law providing for 33% reservation to the women in the Parliament and
amendment to Article 19(2) are arbitrary and violative to the concept of equality
under Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica.2
1. THAT 33% RESERVATION TO THE WOMEN IN THE
PARLIAMENT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY.
It is most humbly pleaded before this Court that 33%reservation to the women
in the Parliament is violative of Equality clause under Article 14 of the
Constitution of Indica.
The concept of equality has been held basic to the rule of law and is regarded
as the most fundamental postulate of republicanism. The Supreme Court3 has
held that the right to equality conferred by Article 14 is a basic structure of the
constitution and an essential feature of democracy or rule of law. It has been
held to be “a right which more than any other is basic postulate of our
Constitution”.
Equality clause embodied under Article 14 does not speak of mere formal
equality before law but also embodies the concept of real and substantive
equality which strikes at the inequalities arising on account of vast social and
economic differentiation4 and is thus consequently an essential ingredient of
social and economic justice.5 The essence of principle behind Article 14 is a
basic structure. In fact the essence is more important than equality in abstract
or formal sense.6
Article 15(3) of the Constitution of Indica permits the State to make special
provision in favour of women but the aforesaid article doesn’t speak about
2
3
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299.
4
5
Secretary HSEB vs. Suresh, AIR 1999 SC 1160.
6
I.R Colheo v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
reservation but special provision for women. In the present case a 33%
reservation has been given to the women in the Parliament. Article 15(3)
provides special provision as intended by the framers of the constitution.7 If
the intention of the framers would have been to provide reservation to women
then the word reservation used as special provision. Thus Reservation in
favour of women under Article 15(3) becomes illegal and unconstitutional as
discrimination on the ground of sex is prohibited under Article 15(1) and 16
(2) of the constitution.8 As Bhagwati, J., observed:9 “The law always frowns
on uncanalised and unfetterd discretion conferred on any instrumentality of the
state”.10 Where power granted is open to use disproportionate to purpose to be
achieved, in the absence of guidelines or principles or norms which are
essential for the exercise of such power, there it is invalid.11
The Supreme Court has laid down the applicable principle in the following
words:12 “If power conferred by the statute is vagrant and unconfined or no
standards are laid down by the statute to guide the exercise of such power, it
would be violative of equality clause, because it would permit arbitrary
exercise of powers, which is the antithesis of equality before law”.13
“Appointment of few under privileged persons in public offices in the name of
reservation does not serve or uplift the entire class of such population. The
purpose of assimilation of such population with the mainstream of the society
is not fruitfully achieved by reservation of some posts or in offices. It is a
taboo on the person concerned because it implies that the person is incapable
or is deficient to stand on his own merits”. “Reservation for women in public
employment or in public offices is the best (or should it be called the worst)
way to ridicule the entire gender of women. Although the beneficiaries of such
reservation may be very few, affluent or well connected. The hard work and
the efforts the women put in for excellence in whatever field they pursue with
7
SonalChauhan v. State (Panchayti Raj Department), Writ petition no.13635/2012 (Rajasthan High Court,
15/03/2013).
8
Priyanka Sharma v. State (Panchayti Raj Department), Writ petition no.11119/2012 (Rajasthan High Court,
15/03/2013).
9
SheoNandanPaswan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877, 895.
10
Ajit Kumar Nag v. GM Indian Oil Ltd., AIR 2005 SC 4217.
11
Distt.Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186.
12
Naraindas v. State of MP, AIR 1974 SC 1232.
13
RaichurmathamPrabhakar v. RawatmalDugar, AIR 2004 SC 3625.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
the raising is totally laughed away in the name of reservation in public

employment and public offices.”14
2. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS ARBITRARY AND
VIOLATIVE OF EQUALITY CLAUSE.
It is most humbly pleaded before this Court that the amendment to Article
19(2) is arbitrary and violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the
Constitution of Indica.15
The Supreme Court by 6:5 majority overruled its earlier decision in Shankari
Prasad v. Union of India16 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 17
and held
that Parliament no power to amend the Fundamental Rights.18The Supreme
Court has also observed that, “…. Our Constitution envisages a society
governed by Rule of Law. Any guidelines which are denial of equality before
law, is the antithesis to Rule of Law.”19
The Supreme Court has given a dynamic connotation to the equalizing
principle contained in Article 14. The court declared this equalizing principle
contained in Article 14 as a “founding Faith” a way of life and for that reason
it must not be subjected to “narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach”.
Justice Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer propounded the new concept of equality
from a positivistic point of view and observed that-
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it
cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined” with traditional and doctrinaire
limits”. From a positivistic point of view equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.
In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of
law in a republic while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute
monarch. While an act is arbitrary it is the implicit in that it is unequal both
according to the political logic and constitutional law and therefore is violative
of Article 14.20
14
Ram Vishun Singh v. State of Bihar, Writ No. 11483 of 2011 (Bihar High Court, 10/11/2014).
15
16
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458.
17
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845.
18
19
Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1064, 1071.
20
E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
Article 13(2) clearly prohibits the making of any law by the state which takes
away or abridges rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.21 In the event
of such law being enacted the same shall be void to the extent of
contravention. 22
II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33%
RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR
PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica that
legislating the law providing 33% reservation to women in the Parliament and
amendment to Article 19(2) smacks of some ulterior religious motives and also
violate the secular principles.23
1. THAT THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN
AND AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES AND ALSO VIOLATES THE SECULAR
PRINCIPLE.
It is most humbly pleaded before this court that the law providing for 33%
reservation to women in the Parliament smacks ulterior religious motives as
most of the women members of majority party started utilizing the law which
was amended in the year 2015, for delivering venomous and hate speeches on
religious lines.
The A. P High court24 observed that the object of delivering such hatred
speeches which are highly inflammatory is to spread and foment communal
hatred. These speeches are capable of creating ill felling between various
classes and communities and are calculated to undermine the security of the
State.25
The Supreme Court stated that, “Whenever the authorities concerned finds out
that speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred
resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foothold, undermining and affecting
21
State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, AIR 2012 SC 1040, 1047.
22
State of Tamil Nadu v. Shyam, AIR 2011 SC 3470.
23
24
Mohd.Abdul GhaniHamid v.The State, 1957 Cri LJ 703.
25
PETITIONER TC-71_P
communal harmony, prohibitory orders26 need necessarily to be passed, to

effectively avert such untoward happenings.”27
In another case, the Supreme Court observed that, “no right in an organized
society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one’s rights must be consistent with
others also. Where in a free plat of social or political forces it is not possible to
bring about communal harmony or such social or political right affects the
communal harmony, the state has to step in to set right the imbalance and
bring communal harmony”.28
In the instant case29, a sting operation by Zebra Post revealed that the members
of the ruling party in collusion with large media houses are running Hindu
agenda which is rigging the state towards religious extremism and destroying
the secular fabric of the state. In case of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu,30the
Supreme Court had held that courts could admit electronic records such as
print out, news report and compact discs as Prime facie evidence without prior
authentication from the court itself under Section 65B of Evidence act. On a
careful consideration of materials on record”.31Justice Alam wrote in the
judgment “we do not have the slightest doubt that the authenticity and
integrity of the sting recordings were never disputed or doubted”32 he added
that “he kept changing his stand in regard to the sting recordings in the fact
and circumstances of the case, therefore there was no requirement proof of the
recording”.33
Hate speech can be curtailed under Article 19(2) on the ground of public
order, incitement to offence and security of the state. The Supreme Court in
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi34 opined that public order was allied to public
safety and considered equivalent to state the interpretation was validated by
First Constitutional Amendment, when Public Order was inserted as a ground
of restriction in Article 19.
26
27
State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684, 692.
28
Acharya Maharishi NarendraPrasadji v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 2098.
29
30
NCT of Delhi v. NavjotSandhu, (2005)11 SCC 600.
31
Sanjeev Nanda v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 450.
32
RK Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2013) 1 SCC 218,
33
RK Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106.
34
BrijBhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
The Supreme Court has said that secularism has a positive meaning that is
developing understanding and respect towards different religions and such
activities can be challenged on that ground.35
Article 20 of ICCPR declares that any advocacy of National, racial and
religious hatred that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law. The freedom under Article 19(1)(a) must
however be exercised with circumspection and care must be taken not to
trench on the rights of other citizens or to jeopardize general public interest.36
The freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the
situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community
interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote,
conjectural or farfetched.37 It should have proximate and direct nexus with the
expression. The expression should be intrinsically dangerous to the public
interest. In other words the expression should be inseparably locked up with
the action contemplated like the equivalent of a spark in a powder keg.38
2. THAT THE AFORESAID LAW AND THE AMENDMENT
RESPECTIVELY CAN BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND FOR
VIOLATING SECULAR PRINCIPLES.
It is most humbly pleaded before this Court that the aforesaid law and the
amendment respectively can be challenged on the ground for violating secular
principles.
The Supreme Court has said that “although the words ‘secular state’ are not
expressly mentioned in the constitution but there can be no doubt that
constitution maker want to establish such a state and accordingly article 25 to
28 have been included in the constitution.39 It was also held that secularism is
the basic feature of the constitution.40
The Supreme has been interpreting the word “secular” in different way. At one
extreme was its interpretation in the Boomai’s case41 when it declared there
must be a wall between the state and the religion and the political party must
35
Aruna Roy v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 3176.
36
LIC of India v. Manu Bhai Shah, AIR 1993 SC 171.
37
ArunGhosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228.
38
AnnadPathwardhan v. Union of India, 1997 (3) Bombay CR 438.
39
St. Xavier College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
40
S.R Boomai v. Union of India, (1994) SCC 1.
41
Ibid
PETITIONER TC-71_P
not be linked to any religion, as otherwise the religion of such party is

perceived as the State religion.
WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO
ARTICLE 19(2) IS SUPPRESSING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
COMMUNITY?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court that the law
providing for 33% reservation for women in the parliament and the amendment to
Article 19(2) is suppressing the Rights of Minority Community.42
Almost all States have one or more minority groups within their national
territories, characterized by their own ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious
identity which differs from that of the majority population. Harmonious relation of
one minority with the other and between the minorities and majorities is a great
asset to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural diversity of global society. It is of
prime importance that each citizen has respect for individual group's identity.
Meeting the aspirations of national, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups
and ensuring the rights of persons belonging to minorities acknowledges the
dignity and equality of all individuals."... The promotion and protection of the
rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities contribute to the political and social stability of States in which they
live"43
The word ‘minority’ as we have been accustomed to use it for the purposes of
certain political safeguards, such as representation in the Legislature,
representation in the Services and so on. The word is used not merely to indicate
the minority in the technical sense of the word, it is also used to cover minorities
which are not minorities in the technical sense, but which are nonetheless
minorities in the cultural and linguistic sense.
The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court observed: ‘Though there was a
faint attempt to canvas the position that religious or linguistic minorities should be
minorities in relation to the entire population of the country, in our view, they are
to be determined only in relation to the particular legislation which is sought to be
42
43
Preamble of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
impugned, namely that if it is the State legislature these minorities have to be

determined on the basis of the population of the State’.44
The eleven judge bench of the Supreme Court delivering the judgment in above
case held by majority that
• The form minority in Article 30(1) covers linguistic and religious
minorities.
• For the purpose of determining the ‘minority’ the unit will be the State and
not the whole of India. Minorities have to be considered State wise.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the rights of the minorities embodied
in those articles and has ensured that the ambit and scope of the minority rights is
not narrowed down. The broad approach has been to see that nothing is done to
impair the rights of the minorities in the matter of their educational institutions
and that the width and scope of the provisions of the Constitution45 dealing with
those rights are not circumscribed. The principle which can be discerned in the
various decisions of this Court is that the catholic approach which led to the
drafting of the provisions relating to minority rights should not be set at naught by
narrow judicial interpretation. The minorities are as much children of the soil as
the majority and the approach has been to ensure that nothing should be done, as
might deprive the minorities of a sense of belonging, of a feeling of security, of a
consciousness of equality and of the awareness that the conservation of their
religion, culture, language and script as also the protection of their educational
institutions is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution.46
Article 30(1) is a sort of guarantee or assurance to the linguistic and religious
minority institutions of their right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice. Secularism and equality being two of the basic features
of the Constitution, Article 30(1) ensures protection to the linguistic and religious
minorities; thereby preserving the secularism of the country. Furthermore, the
principles of equality must necessarily apply to the enjoyment of such rights.47
The human rights of minorities are explicitly set out in Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenants, The Convention of Elimination of all
44
D.A.V College Jullender’s v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1737.
45
46
The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State Of Gujarat &Anr,, 1975 SCR (1) 173.
47
Islamic Academy Of Education v. State Of Karnataka, Writ Petition (civil) No. 350 of 1993 (Supreme Court,
14/08/2003).
PETITIONER TC-71_P
forms of Racial Discrimination, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, The
Declaration on Rights of persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities and other widely adhered to international human rights
treaties and Declarations. The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of
minorities is to secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population
of which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living
peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at
the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the
majority, and satisfying the ensuring special needs. In order to attain that object,
two things were regarded as particularly necessary, and have formed the subject of
provisions in these treaties.
The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic
minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with the
other nationals of the State. The second is to ensure for the minority elements
suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and
their national characteristic. These two requirements are indeed closely
interlocked, for there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority
if the latter were deprived of its own institutions and were consequently compelled
to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being a minority.
The minorities require positive safeguards to preserve their minority interests
which are also termed as group rights. The safeguards and group rights have been
the part of our Constitution making.48
IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT
IT SERVE THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS
BECOME THE TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?
It is most humbly pleaded before this Honourable Supreme Court that law of 33%
reservation for women in the Parliament can be struck down as it serves the tool
of communal politics and foreign power.49
1. THAT THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND EVIDENCES BY THE
AGENCY ARE ADMISSIBLE IN COURT OF LAW.
The Intelligence Agency of Indica on the ground of spying for and providing
vital State secrets to enemy country, arrested Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini
48
St. Stephen's College v.The University Of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630.
49
PETITIONER TC-71_P
Paul and Mrs. Mannat RaiChandani. The Intelligence Agency claims to have
credible evidences against these ladies for doing the above said act. It is an
established fact that the reports of the Intelligence Agencies can be credible
proof and it can be admissible to support the commencement of the crime in
the court of law.50 The Supreme Court in so far the question of in suing a
direction from the Report of Intelligence Agency to establish the crime and the
extraordinary power of the court to administer the report, it is observed that it
becomes necessary to provide credibility and instill confidence in
investigation where the incident may have national or international
ramifications or where such investigation or report by the agency is necessary
for doing complete Justice and enforcing fundamental Rights.51
2. THAT A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN AS IT BECOMES A TOOL
OF COMMUNAL POLITICS.
It is pleaded before this Court that the law providing for 33% reservation can
be struck down as it become tool of communal politics52
An aggravated form of disturbance of peace which threatens the foundation of,
or threatens to overthrow, the state will fall within the scope of the phrase
‘security of the state’. The expression overthrowing the state is covered and
therefore making a speech tending to overthrow the state can be made
punishable.53
The Apex court in RomeshThaper case54 held that the concept of “Public
Order” was wider than the security of the state.
The expression “Public Order” is synonymous with the “public peace, safety
and tranquility”55. The test for determining whether an act affects law and
order or public order is to see whether the act leads to the disturbances of the
current life of community or whether the act affects merely an individual, the
tranquility of the society being undisturbed.56
50
Ram Kishun Prasad v. State of Bihar, WP No. 661 of 2014( Patna High Court, 13/02/2015).
51
State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of democratic Rights, AIR 2010 SC 1476.
52
53
Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1091.
54
RomeshThaper v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
55
Suptd.Central Prison v. Ram ManoharLohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
56
Collector and District Magistrate v. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
Public order implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in

which citizens can peacefully pursue their normal avocation of life. 57 It thus
includes public safety. Public safety means the safety of the community from
the external and internal dangers. Thus creating internal disorder or rebellion
would affect public order and public safety.58 Anything that disturbs public
peace or tranquillity disturbs public order.59 Therefore the communal
disturbances with the sole object of causing unrest among the general public
would be the offence of disturbing the public order.
Though restriction can be imposed on utterances that have the tendency to lead
to disorder but it is necessary that there must be reasonable and proper nexus
or relationship between the restriction and the public order.
Those who deliberately use the religious sentiments to safeguard the vested
interest and those who make religious issues a barrier for the misconduct of
public and private life are the real masterminds behind the propagation of
communalism. “among leaders those religious leaders are communal who run
their religious communities like business and enterprises and institutions,
which raise the crisis of Hinduism, Islam or Christianity in danger the
movement they find that donation into their holy corporation began to dwindle
or their leadership has been challenged or their ideology has been questioned.
Thus “Communal” is not one man who is “a man of religion” but “one who
practices politics by linking it with religion.” 60
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court that the
amendment to Article 19(2) passed by the women laden Parliament61 is violative
of the concept of equality, religious efficacy and secular principles of the state
polity. Thus, it violates the basic structure of the constitution itself.
In the seminal Keshavananda Bharati case,62Sikri, C.J., mentioned the following
as the basic foundation and structure of the constitution i.e. Supremacy of the
Constitution; Separation of Powers; Equality before law; Secular Character of
57
State of Bhopal v. Arif,, AIR 2015 SC 255.
58
BrijBhushan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1387.
59
MadhuLimaye v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 2486.
60
Ram Ahuja, Social Problem in India, 104 (2nd ed., 1992).
61
62
KeshavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
Constitution63; Unity and Integrity of the state;64 Federal character of the

Constitution. In Keshavananda case, 7 of the 13 judges, observed that parliament
in the exercise of its amending power under Article 368 could not alter basic
structure or framework of constitution. The basic structure has been, thus, held to
be a limitation on amending power of parliament.
1. THAT AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS VIOLATIVE OF
EQUALITY CLAUSE.
It is most humbly pleaded before this Court that the amendment to Article
19(2) is violative of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus,
it is against the basic structure of the Constitution.65
The word “reasonableness” implies intelligent care and deliberations that is
the choice of the course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrary or
exclusively invades the right cannot be say to contain the quality of
reasonableness.66 The procedure and the manner and imposition of restriction
must also be fair and just.67
In the case of MRF Ltd V. Inspector Kerala Government 68 the following
principles of reasonableness of restriction imposed upon the fundamental
rights under Article 19 have been laid down on a conspectus of various
decisions of the Supreme Court;
• While considering the reasonableness of the restrictions, the court who
keep in mind the directive principle of state policy.
• Restriction must not be arbitrary or of excessive nature so as to go
beyond the requirement of the interest of general public.
• There must be direct and proximate nexus or reasonable connection
between the restriction and the objective sought to be achieved.69 If
there is a direct nexus between the restriction and object of that, than a
strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the act
naturally arise.70
63
State of Kerala v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, AIR 2004 SC 2081.
64
RaghunathRao v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1267.
65
66
Dwarka Prasad v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 224, 227.
67
ChintamanRao v. State of MP, AIR 1951 SC 118, 119.
68
MRF Ltd V. Inspector Kerala Government, (1998) 8 SCC 227.
69
O.K.Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
70
KavanapparaKottarathiKochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
While it is necessary to maintain and preserve Freedom of Speech and

Expression in a democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this
freedom for the maintenance of social order.71 No freedom can be absolute or
completely unrestricted.72 The state may make laws imposing reasonable
restriction on the exercise of such freedom.73 Exercise of legislative power in
this respect by the state can be subjected to judicial review, within a limited
ambit.74
2. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS VIOLATIVE OF
PART III AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE
13(2).
It is most humbly pleaded before this court that the amendment to Article
19(2) is violative of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the
Constitution and must be struck down under Article 13(2) and declared as
unconstitutional.
The Doctrine of basic structure, the Apex Court in I.R. Coelho v. State of
Tamil Nadu75, case said, contemplated that “there are certain parts or aspects
of the constitution including Art. 15 and 21 read with Art. 14 and 19, with
constitute the core values which if allowed to be abrogated would change
completely the nature of the constitution”. The Court said that the object of the
doctrine was to protect basic feature of the constitution76 as indicated by
synoptic view of right in Part III.
The Supreme Court held that any law or legislative amendment which takes
away or abridges the fundamental right conferred by Part III of the
Constitution would be void.77 It means that any law made in the contravention
of Part III is dead from the very beginning and cannot at all be taken notice of
or read for any purpose whatsoever.78
The Supreme Court by majority of 6:5 held that Parliament had no power to
amend Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the
71
RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
72
Sahara India Real Estate Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board, AIR 2012 SC 3829, 3838.
73
Mohd.AjmalKasab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3565, 3662.
74
NK Bajpai v. Union of India, AIR 2012 SC 1310.
75
IR Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
76
77
Union of India v. LSN Murthy, (2012) 1 SCC 718.
78
RakeshViz v Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, AIR 2005 SC 3593.
PETITIONER TC-71_P
fundamental rights. Subba Rao CJ supported the judgment on the reason that
the power to amend the constitution was a sovereign power and it did not
permit any implied limitation and amendment made in this exercise must not
be exercising the political influence.79
VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS
PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
It is most humbly pleaded before the Honourable Supreme Court that the
protection of Whistle Blowers Protections Act extends to Mrs. Fatima Ghansari,
as she is one of the members of the Lower House of the Parliament80.
The Supreme Court explained who Whistle Blower is: A Whistle Blower is a
person who raises a concern about the wrongdoing occurring in an organization or
body of people. Usually this person would be from that same organization the
Whistle Blower may make their allegations internally (to other persons in the
same accused organization) or externally (to regulators, law enforcement
agencies, to media or to group concerned with the issue).81
The Supreme Court further explained that one of the basic requirement of a person
being accepted as a Whistle Blower is that his primary motive for the activity
should be in furtherance of public good. In other words, the activity should be and
has to be undertaken in public interest, exposing illegal activities of a public
organization or authority.82
Whistle Blower Protection Act 2011 notified in 2014 provide a mechanism to
investigate alleged corruption and misuse of power by public servant. It encourage
anybody to question the wrong doing of any form of fraud corruption and
mismanagement. The act seeks to protect whistle blowers person making public
interest disclosure related to an act of corruption, misuse of power, or criminal
offence by public servant. This act is made due to demand by civil society after
several incidents of threat and harassment of whistle blower like Satyendra
Dubey, who was killed in 2003, for blowing whistle in a corruption case in
National Highway Authority of India’s Golden Quadrilateral Project.83
79
GolakNath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1643.
80
81
Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. RK Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281.
82
ManojMishra v. Union of India, SLP No. 9126 of 2010 (Supreme Court, 09/03/2013).
83
Mr Avinash Kumar v. GNCTD, Case No. 315 of 2015 (Central Information Commission, 06/08/2015).
PETITIONER TC-71_P
The Apex Court observed that if a person considering whether the information
disclosed by him is malafide or not but actually the disclosure is bonafide and was
made with the intention to public interest than the person disclosing the
information or facts can be considered as whistle blower, irrelevant of the source
of the information. Justice M.B Lokur finds it to be justified and is of the opinion
that the disclosure made by the whistle blower were intended to be in Public
Interest.84
It was observed that the Whistle Blower Act was established to make mechanism
to receive complaints relating to disclosure on any allegation corruption and wilful
misuse of power and discretion against the society at large and to provide
safeguard against victimization of person making such complaint on this matter.
Thus, Mrs. Fatima Ghansari must be protected under the Whistle Blowers
Protection Act, 2014 as in the event of the Whistle Blower apprehending any
threat to his/her life85 it would always be open for them to take recourse of the
remedies available under the Act.86
84
Common Causes v. Union of India, WP No. 463 of 2012 (Supreme Court, 14/05/2015).
85
86
CW PIL No. 95 of 2018 v. Unknown, CW PIL No. 95 of 2018 ( HP High Court, 31/07/2018).
PETITIONER TC-71_P
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of legal precedents, principles cited, provisions of the Constitution
and argument advanced, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honourable
Supreme Court, that it may graciously be pleased to adjudge and declare-
❖ THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE WOMEN IN THE

PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SHOULD BE
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
❖ THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTIONS ACT, 2014
SHOULD EXTEND TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI.
And pass any other order(s) as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good
conscience.
ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLE AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
For this act of kindness, the Petitioner faction shall be duty bound forever.
SD/-
(COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS)

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TC–71_P

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

W.P. No. ___/2018

W.P. No. ___/2017

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

HEADINGS PAGE NO.

Sr. No. Title Citation Page(s)

1. Acharya Maharishi NarendraPrasadji v. 25

10. Collector and District Magistrate v. S. 23

12. D.A.V College Jullender’s v. State of 24

13. Distt. Registrar and Collector v. Canara 16

AIR 1974 SC 555

19. Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. 29

21. KavanapparaKottarathiKochuni v. State 19

22. KeshavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala 25

24. MRF Ltd V. Inspector Kerala 26

36. RK Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court 24

42. RamlilaMaidan Incident v. Home 24

54. St. Stephen's College v. The University Of 24

59. State of Kerala v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia 20

AIR 2011 SC 3470

61. State of West Bengal v. Committee for 28

62. Suptd. Central Prison v. Ram 24

63. The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. 26

1. Jain MP, Constitutional Law, (8th Edition, 2017).

1. Constitution of India 1950

I. W.P. No. ___/2018.

II. W.P. No. ___/2017.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO DISPUTE

MATTER BEFORE SUPREME COURT

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO

III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT IT

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

II. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33%

III. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION FOR

IV. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2)

VI. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLE BLOWERS

I. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE

the raising is totally laughed away in the name of reservation in public

communal harmony, prohibitory orders26 need necessarily to be passed, to

not be linked to any religion, as otherwise the religion of such party is

impugned, namely that if it is the State legislature these minorities have to be

Public order implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in

Constitution63; Unity and Integrity of the state;64 Federal character of the

While it is necessary to maintain and preserve Freedom of Speech and

❖ THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO THE WOMEN IN THE

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST HUMBLE AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

(COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS)

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