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    6.1.2 Gasification Reactor

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    Shemzinho
    1) A HAZOP study involves systematically analyzing a process system using guide words to identify potential hazards, failures, and deviations at each stage. The process is broken down into sections and each section is analyzed. 2) For a gasification reactor, operating at a slight underpressure can help prevent gas emissions. Reactor designs should prevent gas leaks and uncontrolled gas flows. Rotary valves or double sluice lock hoppers are often used to prevent backfires. 3) Ash removal can cause dust emissions, so wet ash removal systems may be needed. Flares can incinerate producer gas during startup/shutdown to prevent venting.

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    6.1.2 Gasification Reactor

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    Shemzinho
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    1) A HAZOP study involves systematically analyzing a process system using guide words to identify potential hazards, failures, and deviations at each stage. The process is broken down into sections and each section is analyzed. 2) For a gasification reactor, operating at a slight underpressure can help prevent gas emissions. Reactor designs should prevent gas leaks and uncontrolled gas flows. Rotary valves or double sluice lock hoppers are often used to prevent backfires. 3) Ash removal can cause dust emissions, so wet ash removal systems may be needed. Flares can incinerate producer gas during startup/shutdown to prevent venting.

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    HAZOP

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    1) A HAZOP study involves systematically analyzing a process system using guide words to identify potential hazards, failures, and deviations at each stage. The process is broken down into sections and each section is analyzed. 2) For a gasification reactor, operating at a slight underpressure can help prevent gas emissions. Reactor designs should prevent gas leaks and uncontrolled gas flows. Rotary valves or double sluice lock hoppers are often used to prevent backfires. 3) Ash removal can cause dust emissions, so wet ash removal systems may be needed. Flares can incinerate producer gas during startup/shutdown to prevent venting.

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    95 views2 pages

    6.1.2 Gasification Reactor

    Uploaded by

    Shemzinho
    1) A HAZOP study involves systematically analyzing a process system using guide words to identify potential hazards, failures, and deviations at each stage. The process is broken down into sections and each section is analyzed. 2) For a gasification reactor, operating at a slight underpressure can help prevent gas emissions. Reactor designs should prevent gas leaks and uncontrolled gas flows. Rotary valves or double sluice lock hoppers are often used to prevent backfires. 3) Ash removal can cause dust emissions, so wet ash removal systems may be needed. Flares can incinerate producer gas during startup/shutdown to prevent venting.

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    HAZOP

    6.1.2 Gasification reactor

    Operation of a gasification reactor at ambient pressure or at a slight under-pressure will in general


    help to prevent gas emissions from the reactor. A reactor design that avoids both gas leaks and
    uncontrolled gas flow from or to the reactor is usually required for stable reactor operation and
    good producer gas quality. Rotary gate valves, double sluice lock hoppers or similar systems are
    often used to prevent backfire and producer gas flow from the gasification reactor into the biomass
    feeding line, thus also avoiding producer gas emissions in case of disturbances in the gas cleaning
    and/or utilising system. During reactor start-up and shutdown, the quality of the producer gas may
    not be adequate for gas engine utilisation. For these situations as well as for periods when the gas
    engine is temporarily unavailable, a flare or a similar device can be used to incinerate the producer
    gas (cf. chapter 5.3.2) in order to avoid atmospheric venting. Ash removal from the reactor can be a
    source of dust emissions. If carbon-rich ash is produced, additional measures will be required to
    prevent self-ignition of the ash upon contact with air. Wet ash removal systems may be useful for
    both targets. (https://www.osti.gov/etdeweb/servlets/purl/1000226)

    HAZOP is a rigorous and highly disciplined procedure to identify the gaps in operability and
    process risks that account for safety. The success lies in strength of the methodology to follow
    system process flow diagram (PFD) and piping and instrumentation diagram (P & ID). As a first
    step the PFD is broken down into sections with defined boundaries to ensure the analysis of each
    section in the process [6-7]. Having determined the possible deviations, the next step is to identify
    the subsequent cause-consequences and safeguards to prevent, control or mitigate the hazardous
    situation. A set of “guide words” is used at the design stage. When the plant alterations or
    extensions are to be made on an existing facility a similar procedure is helpful. For this
    purpose, a team of five to eight people with diverse skills and experience of process, engineering
    discipline, management and plant operation etc is formed [3]. The examination procedure starts
    with the full description of the process which includes P & ID and systematically questions through
    guide words, every part of it to discover deviations and determine whether these deviations
    can give rise to hazards. The potential problems are then noted for remedial action. The
    immediate solution to the problem may not be obvious and could need further consideration either
    by a team member or perhaps a specialist. All decisions taken are to be recorded

    The above stated recommendations, modified as per outcomes of the subsequent detailed
    analysis, have been accommodated and considered in the process and instrumentation diagram.
    The changes with reference to alarms, regulators, safety valves and regular inspection have
    eliminated the serious causes of accidents, explosion and hazard to the plant personnel, the
    public or environment.

    (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288452878_Assessment_of_operation_and_catastrophi
    c_risks_of_transport_Gasifier_pilot_plant)
    The systematic process implementation requires critical study of the plant. For the evaluation
    of credible unfavourable, and potentially hazards situations and subsequent consequences,
    process flow diagram (Fig. 2) was divided into following nodes: (1) Coal feeding system; (2)
    Gasification loop; and (3) Gas cleaning and cooling as per the requirement of the selected
    technique discussed in previous section. The guide words that are planned for the safety analysis are
    given in Table 2 [8].

    Node 1

    The portion of process flow diagram undertaken in this section was coal feeding system. Started
    from feed hopper the parameters that were observed to be investigated by expert team members
    were storage pressure and level of coal in the storage hopper. And it was reported that level
    indicator on hopper and high and low pressure switches and alarms on N2 supply line were missing
    in the available P & ID. After documenting the recommendations, pressure and flow rate in the
    feed line were analyzed. The reported possible causes of the failure and hazards were coal supply
    failure, high pressure in the gasifier, feed line plugging & failure of compressor that may result in
    back flow of the gasses, rupture of vessel, excess feed flow, rupture or leakage of line and
    nitrogen cut off respectively. Next parameter that was selected for safety analysis was
    temperature in the feed supply line. As a result of the high temperature, ignition of coal might
    be possible in the feed line or it may cause explosion. To avoid this potential hazards and
    operational failures, installation of high pressure alarm in the feed line, NRV, pressure gauge and
    pressure monitoring were recommended.

    Node 2

    Gasifier (riser), disengager and cyclone separator were discussed in this node. The first unit
    selected for safety analysis was gasifier by taking composition and pressure into account. After
    step by step analysis through guide words, parameters selected for examination were high
    moisture content, high sulphur content, high and low pressure respectively with potential
    consequences of external heating requirement, longer time to achieve steady state, formation
    of sulphur dioxide, reverse flow of gases from riser and feed line blockage (with low pressure in
    gasifier). Flow rate of gases was only parameter while discussing disengager and cyclone
    separator. The potential causes of the deviation were high and low pressure in the gasifier which
    causes the operation failure like drop in dust separation efficiency, more flow in loop seal and
    reduced flow through the loop seal, respectively.

    The advantage of HAZOP methodology is the systematic evaluation process: where it divides the
    system into several sections and analyse each section based on guide words. This process provides a
    complete review with consistency and standardisation, hence will result in better quality of review
    outcomes (http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38870/1/Thesis%20-%20BIOMASS%20SUPPLY%20CHAIN
    %20OPTIMISATION%20CONSIDERATION%20OF%20UNDERUTILISED%20BIOMASS.pdf)

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