M. A. G.

Osmani
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Major General

M. A. G. Osmani

Native name মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গণি ওসমানী

Nickname(s) Bongobir (বঙ্গবীর)

Born 1 September 1918

Sunamganj, Sylhet, Assam Province, British India

Died 16 February 1984 (aged 65)

London, United Kingdom

Buried Shah Jalal Dargah Cemetery

Sylhet, Bangladesh

 British India
Allegiance
 Pakistan

 Bangladesh
 Service/branch  British Indian Army

 Pakistan Army

 Bangladesh Army

Years of service  British Indian Army (1940–1947)

 Pakistan Army (1947–1967)

 Bangladesh Army (1971–1972)

Rank   British Indian Army (1940–1947)

 Lieutenant Colonel

  Pakistan Army (1947–1967)

 Colonel

  Bangladesh Army (1971–1972)

   Major General

Commands held 1st East Bengal Regiment

5/14th Punjab Regiment

East Pakistan Rifles

Military Operations Directorate of the General

Headquarters (Pakistan Army)

Battles/wars World War II

Bangladesh War of Independence

Muhammad Ataul Goni Osmani (Bengali: মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গণি ওসমানী; 1 September

1918 – 16 February 1984), also known as Bongobir (the Hero of Bengal), was a
Bengali military leader. He served as Commander-in-chief of Bangladesh Forces during
the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence. Osmani's career spanned five decades,
beginning with service in the British Indian Army in 1939. He fought in Burma during
World War II, and served in the Pakistan Army until 1967. Osmani was appointed head
of the Bengali armed resistance in 1971 by the Provisional Government of Bangladesh,
and he is regarded as the founder of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. Osmani retired
from the Army in 1972.
Osmani entered politics in independent Bangladesh, serving as a member of
parliament and cabinet minister in the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He
resigned from the government after opposing the creation of BAKSAL.
 Contents

 1Early life
 2Military career
o 2.1British Indian Army (1941–1947)
o 2.2Pakistan Army
o 2.3GHQ Pakistan
o 2.4Retirement and continued influence
 3Political activity
o 3.1Awami League candidate
 4Bangladesh War of Independence
o 4.1Operation Searchlight
o 4.2Meetings at Teliapara
o 4.3Early activities as commander-in-chief
o 4.4Indian involvement
o 4.5Rebuilding the Mukti Bahini
 5Strategy
o 5.1July–September 1971
o 5.2Action and reaction (June–September)
o 5.3Monsoon Offensive
 6Leadership style
o 6.1Controversies
 7Bangladesh Army general
o 7.1Sector commander conference (2–11 January 1972)
o 7.2Disturbance at Pilkhana
 8Cabinet minister
o 8.1Army chief of staff
o 8.2Cadet college crisis
o 8.3Khwaja Wasiuddin
 9Presidential defense advisor
 10Death
 11Legacy
 12See also
 13References
 14External links

Early life[edit]
Osmani was born to a landowning family in Sunamganj, Assam Province, British India,
on 1 September 1918. He was a descendant of Shah Nizamuddin Osmani, a 14th-
century associate of Shah Jalal. His ancestral village is in Dayamir Union within Osmani
Nagar Upazila of Sylhet District.
Osmani attended Cotton School in Sylhet, matriculating at Sylhet Government Pilot
High School in 1934. He studied English and Persian.[1] He won the Pritoria Prize for
excellence in English.[2] Osmani studied geography at Aligarh Muslim University, and
graduated in 1938. He enrolled as a cadet at the Indian Military Academy the following
year.

Military career[edit]
When he joined the British Indian Army, Osmani was a member of the 4th Urban
Infantry from 1939 to 1940.[2] On 5 October 1940, he received an emergency
commission as a second lieutenant in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC).
[3]
 Osmani was initially attached to the 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington Regiment,
which was tasked with a New Delhi depot. [4] After he completed the Short Mechanical
Transport Course (November 1940 - February 1941) and Junior Tactical Course
(February - April 1941), he was attached to a mechanical transport battalion of the XV
Corps and posted to Burma during World War II.[5]
British Indian Army (1941–1947)[edit]
Osmani was promoted to the ranks of war-substantive lieutenant and temporary captain
on 17 February 1941.[6] He received a battlefield promotion to acting major on 23
February 1942, with further promotions to war-substantive captain (temporary major) on
23 May.[6] Between 1941 and 1945, he held the posts of platoon commander, battalion
adjutant, company 2IC and battalion commander. From November 1944 to February
1945, Osmani was a grade-two general staff officer at his formation headquarters,
completing the Senior Officers Course after the war.[7]
He was attached to British Indian Army HQ Bihar and Orissa Area from May to July
1946. On 13 July 1946, Osmani was granted a regular commission in the British Indian
Army, with a promotion to substantive captain on 5 October 1946. [8] He subsequently
completed the Senior Officers Course in February 1947, and was promoted to
local lieutenant colonel.[9] He was posted to British Indian Army GHQ in Simla in the
Quartermaster General and Ordnance Branches until August 1947. From August to 6
October 1947 he served as GSO-2 at the HQ of Claude Auchinleck in New Delhi.
Although Osmani had passed the Indian Civil Service examination, he declined a
foreign-service position in 1947 to remain with the Pakistan Army. [9] He witnessed the
end of the British Indian Army, representing Pakistan during the division of army assets
between India and Pakistan.[10]
Pakistan Army[edit]
After the 1947 birth of India and Pakistan in 1947, Osmani joined the Pakistan Army on
7 October 1947. He was promoted to acting lieutenant colonel on 7 January 1948. He
was assigned to general-staff headquarters as GSO-1, Coordination, Planning and
Personnel.[7]
Osmani attended the Long Term Staff Course at the Quetta Staff College and served
with Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan and A. A. K. Niazi, all of whom led the Pakistan Army
against his Bangladesh forces in 1971. After completing the course, Osmani joined the
staff of army chief of staff Reginald Hutton in January 1949 and (as chair of a committee
tasked by Douglas Gracey to evaluate army enlistment standards) recommended the
establishment of cadet colleges in East Pakistan.[9] He later became an
assistant adjutant general.
Infantry[edit]
After serving as a staff officer for eight years, Osmani joined the Pakistan Army infantry.
With a rank of major and after induction training, he joined the 5/14 Punjab. He was
posted as 2IC and company commander of the 5th Punjab Battalion of the 14th Punjab
Regiment, part of a brigade commanded by Ayub Khan, in 1950. Osmani became
commander of the 105th Brigade Training Team in January 1951 and commander of the
5/14 Punjab in May, followed by a four-month tour of duty in Kashmir and Waziristan.[7][11]
Osmani disagreed with Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Gen. Ayub
Khan[12] over the treatment of Ishfakul Majid, the senior Bengali army officer in who was
falsely accused in the Rawalpindi conspiracy and forced to resign.[13] In August 1951
Osmany left 5/14 Punjab and was posted as third CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment,
the first Bengali to hold the post, in October.[14]
East Pakistan (1950–1956)[edit]
Osmani became the CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment, stationed in Jessore as part
of the 107th Brigade, on 8 November 1951. He chose Bengali songs for regimental
marching and its band ("Chol Chol Chol", "Gram Chara oi ranga matir poth"
by Rabindranath Tagore and Dhono Dhanne Pushpe Bhora by D.L. Roy), and
the Brotochari (introduced by Shodoy Dutt) became the regimental dance. [15] Osmani
ordered his NCOs to submit daily situation reports in Bangla. [16] This display of Bengali
culture was frowned on by his Punjabi superiors, [17] who disliked the adoption of what
they saw as Hindu culture.[18] Osmani was commandant of the East Bengal Regimental
Center in Chittagong from February 1953 to January 1955.
He commanded the 107th Brigade in Jessore from April to October 1953 (when he was
promoted to major), rejoining 1 EBR as CO until February 1954. After Osmani
completed the GHQ law course and left the EBRC, he became an additional
commandant (later deputy director) of the East Pakistan Rifles under the provincial
government of East Bengal in March 1955.[16] In the EPR, he expanded the recruitment
of non-Bengali minority groups and ended recruiting from West Pakistan. [19]
GHQ Pakistan[edit]
Osmani was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became a senior advisor
at CENTO headquarters in Baghdad as part of the Pakistan military delegation from
December 1955 to May 1956. He was promoted to acting colonel in May 1956, joining
the Pakistan Army GHQ at Rawalpindi as deputy director for military operations
(DDMO).[7] In August and September 1957 he served as an acting brigadier, serving as
DDMO until May 1966. Osmani received the permanent rank of colonel in 1961, and
received advanced weapons training in the United States three years later. He served
under Gul Hassan Khan in 1964, who felt that Osmani had been passed over for
promotion. Khan allowed him to focus on the Bengal regiments. [20]
By 1958 Osmani was deputy director of the general staff and then deputy director of
military operations under Yahya Khan, a position he held until his retirement eight years
later. Although he reached the rank of colonel in the first decade of his career, during
the next decade he did not receive a promotion. During Osmani's tenure as DDMO in
the General Staff Branch, he was a Pakistan Army advisor at CENTO, SEATO and
Pakistan Air Defense Committee meetings.[21]
Bengali recruitment bottleneck[edit]
Pakistan mustered six infantry divisions and one armored brigade after the division of
the British Indian army in 1947. These formations were neither fully equipped nor
staffed. The number of Bengali officers and soldiers in the Pakistan armed forces was
small, due to the British preference for recruiting from the martial races and the
departure of many non-Muslim Bengali personnel for the Indian Army. The Pakistan
Army raised two battalions of the East Bengal Regiment from 1947 to 1950, and Punjab
regiments were inherited from the British Indian Army. The Azad Kashmir Regiment was
created soon after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947.
When Osmani joined GHQ in 1956, three East Bengal regiments and the East Bengal
Regimental Centre (EBRC) were part of the Pakistan Army. Over the next nine years
the number of Punjab regiments grew (reorganized in 1956) reached almost 50,
the Frontier Force and Baluch Regiments grew. Many senior army officers believed in
the martial-race theory, and considered Bengalis poor military material. [22][23] Bengali
recruits, generally smaller in stature than West Pakistanis, often failed to meet minimum
physical requirements (which were based on average West Pakistani physical
characteristics).[22] Many Pakistani officers favored mixed regiments over Bengali ones
and some officers felt that increasing the number of Bengali formations threatened Army
unity.[24]
Role in 1965 war[edit]
Osmani was sidelined by the Pakistani generals, despite his service as DDMO during
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Instead he devoted himself to the East Bengal
regiments. He complained that the Pakistani press suppressed the contributions of his
1st Bengal unit, which was posted in Kasur during the war.[25] Successive Bengali and
non-Bengali COs of the 1 EBR built on Osmani's foundation, and under the command of
A. T. K. Haque its battalion received 17 awards for gallantry (including two Sitara-e-
Jurats and nine Tamgha-i-Jurats)—the largest number of awards of any Pakistan unit in
the war. When Osmani visited the unit and recommended a Nishan-e-Haider for a
member, he was reportedly furious when the battalion CO disregarded his
recommendation.[26] He organized Bengal regimental reunions, seizing every opportunity
to enhance the reputation of Bengali units.
After the war, Osmani chaired the committee tasked with determining future army-
reserve and logistical requirements and was president of the Army Sports Control Board
from July 1965 to April 1966. On 16 May 1966, he went on leave prior to retirement
(LPR). Osmani's successor as DDMO was Rao Farman Ali, who played a controversial
role in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Ali was reportedly horrified at Osmani's treatment by
the army; his office was run-down, Osmani was kept out of the loop and office
employees treated him with disdain. According to Ali, Osmani was not promoted
because he was Bengali and deemed untrustworthy by the high command. [27]
Retirement and continued influence[edit]
Osmani retired from the Pakistan Armed Forces on 16 February 1967. Although he had
failed to increase the number of Bengal regiments, the Pakistani high command (at the
recommendation of Maj. Gen. Khwaja Wasiuddin) put the existing regiments through a
battery of exercises in West Pakistan to test their adaptability and combat readiness.
The evaluator of the exercises said the Bengali units performed well, their pride in
representing East Pakistan a component of their success, and opposed their
replacement with mixed regiments.
The Pakistani high command did not increase the number of Bengali units until 1969,
when (after a pledge by Yahya Khan) the number of Bengal regiments were increased
to 10 and all new units were ordered to ensure a minimum 25-percent annual Bengali
representation among their recruits. [28] Osmani, known as "Papa Tiger", was revered by
the Bengali troops because of his efforts on their behalf. Although he was not the senior
Bengali officer (Ishfakul Majid, commissioned out of Sandhurst in 1924, was older) and
did not reach the highest Bengali rank in the Pakistani army (as did Lt. General Khwaja
Wasiuddin), Osmani, Wasiuddin and M. H. Mozumdar were patrons of the Bengali
troops.[29]

Political activity[edit]
Osmani was not directly involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Those involved
sought his opinion through Khandker Nazmul Huda (Accused No. 27, sub-sector
commander of the BDF in 1971 and a Bangladesh Army colonel in 1975), and Osmani
recommended a political solution for the discrimination faced by Bengalis in Pakistan.
[30]
 He had been questioned in 1958, before the trials began, on issues related to the
case.[31]
Awami League candidate[edit]
After his retirement Osmani entered East Pakistani politics, joining Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman's All Pakistan Awami Muslim League in 1970. As an Awami League candidate,
he was elected to the national assembly from the Balaganj-Fenchuganj Upazila area of
Sylhet. Osmani did not serve as a Pakistani MNA, because after the beginning of
the Bangladesh War of Independence he joined its provisional government.

Bangladesh War of Independence[edit]

Pakistani and Bengali units on 25 March 1971, during Operation Searchlight; some unit locations are not
shown.

Osmani and Ishfakul Majid formed part of the military advisory team for the Awami
League leadership in 1971. As the political crisis deepened in March, many Bengali
officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces looked to Bengali politicians for guidance and
Osmani coordinated the clandestine meetings. Bengali military officers, alarmed by the
buildup of Pakistani forces and concerned about their own safety, [32][33][34] maintained
contact with Rahman;[35] some maintained contact with Awami League leaders through
Osmani, who reportedly agreed to coordinate the activities of Bengali units. [36] Toeing the
party line, he advised the officers (including M. R. Mazunder, Chittagong martial-law
administrator and Rezaul Jalil, CO of the 1st EBR) against "rash" actions. [34]
Operation Searchlight[edit]
Before the crackdown the student and youth wings of the Awami League set up training
camps and trained volunteers with Bengali helpers and student cadets. The league
leadership declared independence on 7 March 1971. Bengali ex-servicemen held rallies
supporting independence; officers and troops kept abreast of the political situation in
East Pakistan, which was becoming uncertain and confrontational. Majid and Osmani
reportedly designed a military plan of action: [37] capture the Dhaka airport and Chittagong
seaport, sealing off the province. The EPR and police would capture Dhaka, aided by
Awami League volunteers, and cantonments would be neutralized by Bengali soldiers.
Bengali officers advised sabotaging the fuel dumps at Narayanganj and Chittagong to
ground Pakistani air power and cripple armed-force mobility.
The Awami League leadership, attempting a political solution, [37] did not endorse action
or preparation for conflict by Bengali soldiers before the crackdown. Warnings by
Bengali officers that the Pakistan Army was preparing to strike were ignored, and junior
Bengali officers were told by their superiors to be prudent and avoid political issues.
The Pakistan Army caught the Bengali political leadership and soldiers by surprise.
Resistance to Operation Searchlight was spontaneous and disorganized, and nearly all
the Awami League leadership fled to Calcutta. Bengali soldiers were largely unaware of
the larger situation; many units performed routine duties as late as 31 March, rebelling
only under Pakistani attack. A general amnesty for Bengali troops suggested by
Pakistani generals on 31 March was ignored.[38] Group Captain A.K. Khandkar witnessed
the departure of Yahia and warned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Pakistani troop
movements.[39][40][41] His 26 March declaration of independence was largely unnoticed. [42] No
countrywide communication reached Bengali soldiers to begin the uprising; they
rebelled when they were attacked or heard news of the Pakistani attack.
Osmani was at the home of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when Bengali officers informed
Awami League leaders of Yahia Khan's departure and the army movements. [43] After
Rahman refused to go into hiding, Osmani hid in Dhaka until 29 March, shaved off his
mustache (he was known as "the man attached to a mustache") [44] and left for the Indian
border. He went to Jingira, then by boat to Daudkandi (where suspicious residents
detained him before the brother of the local member of parliament helped free him).
[45]
 Osmani walked and crossed the Gomoti by boat (with the help of a Bengali army
signal corps officer),[46] reaching India by 2 April 1971.
Meetings at Teliapara[edit]
Osmani arrived at Teliapara, where the 2nd and 4th East Bengal Regiments (EBR)
established a temporary base with a member of the BSF on 2 April 1971. He held a
meeting of Bengali officers on 4 April, attended by M. A. Rab, 2 EBR CO K. M.
Shafiullah, 4 EBR CO Khaled Musharraf, 8 EBR CO Ziaur Rahman, Salahuddin Reza,
Qazi Nurujjaman and Shafat Jamil. Osmani proposed that the 2nd and 4th EBR
occupy Comilla, and asked Jaman to formulate a fireplan. After objections by other
officers that the battalions would incur crippling losses, the proposal was dropped. [47] Zia
proposed that all available forces surround Chittagong, to hold the area as long as
possible; this idea was also dropped as impractical. [48] The commanders agreed to send
two companies (one each from 2 and 4 EBR) to aid the 8th EBR under Ziaur Rahman.
Five sector commanders were appointed by Osmani: Ziaur Rahman (Chittagong
area), Khaled Musharraf (Comilla), K M Shafiullah (Sylhet), Abu Osman Chowdhury
(Kushtia-Jessore) and Salahuddin Reza (Mymensingh area).[49] On 7 April, he instructed
Q. N. Jaman to oversee operations in Sylhet.[50] The officers agreed that a government in
exile should be formed, with the Bengali forces under its authority.
Osmani toured Mukti Bahini positions in Sylhet, and on 9 April he visited Aziz with 2
EBR Charlie Company near Sylhet.[51] That day another conference took place, attended
by Director General Rustomji of the BSF and Bengali officers. At the meeting Osmani
was elected commander of Bengali forces, [52] and an agreement was reached with Indian
officers on logistical assistance. The need to form a Government in exile was agreed, to
distinguish the struggle from a mere military revolt. [48] The conference abruptly adjourned
when Osmani left after he heard that five PAF jets were inbound.[53][54] The following day,
three more sector commanders were appointed: Nazmul Huq (Rajshahi-Pabna) and
captains for Rangpur-Dinajpur and Barisal. [55] The Pakistan Army appointed A. A. K.
Niazi GOC for East Pakistan the same day. On 12 April, the Bengali government in exile
at Agartola appointed Osmani commander of the Mukti Bahini. With the formation of the
Bangladesh government on 17 April 1971, he was reinstated to active duty and
appointed commander-in-chief.
Early activities as commander-in-chief[edit]

Operation Searchlight: Pakistan army operation 10 April  - 19 June. Not to scale; some troop movements and
locations are indicative only.

Osmani took command of the Mukhti Bahini after 17 April 1971. Since the Bengali
forces were geographically isolated and lacked command staffs and a communications
network, real-time command was impossible. Osmani allowed the sector commanders
to fight as they saw fit, while he toured the sectors and met with Indian officials in New
Delhi and Kolkata concerning weapons and communications. Although India did not
offer material aid, it helped design Mukhti Bahini structure and expressed the possibility
of future Indian intervention.
The Bengalis put up an unexpectedly stiff resistance, derailing the initial Pakistani
estimate of pacifying East Pakistan by 10 April. Their initial success was unsustainable.
They began experiencing a lack of trained men, officers, coordination, a central
command structure and supplies (despite some aid from the BSF) although most of the
country was still free of Pakistani control. The Pakistani Army airlifted its 9th and 16th
Infantry Divisions to Bangladesh by 10 April, and was poised to seize the initiative. Amir
Abdullah Khan Niazi, after a briefing by the departing East Pakistan GOC, implemented
a strategy[56] to clear all large cities of insurgents and secure Chittagong; to control and
open all river, road and rail networks; to drive the insurgents away from the country's
interior, and to launch combing operations across Bangladesh to wipe out the
insurgency.
Bengali field commanders adopted a strategy of "holding as much area for as long as
possible".[57] The Bengali political leadership hoped to keep the Pakistanis confined to
the cities, while the government in exile sought diplomatic recognition and the
resistance prepared for guerrilla warfare[58] and awaited expected Indian military
intervention.[59]
Indian involvement[edit]
The Pakistan opposed military action against civilians in East Pakistan out of concern
for an Indian attack.[60] After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April and requested additional aid. [61] BSF was offering
limited aid to the resistance.[62] The case for intervention was based on the fact that until
10 April, most of Bangladesh was outside Pakistani control; troops were confined to a
few cities and faced stiff resistance.[63][64] The eastern Indian naval contingent (one aircraft
carrier and several warships)[65] was stronger than Pakistan's, and could have blockaded
Bangladesh. Pakistani forces, flying in reinforcements from West Pakistan from 26
March to 2 May,[66] depended on supply depots in Dhaka, Chittagong and Narayanganj
for fuel and ammunition. the Indian army's adequacy and suitability, [67] logistics, the
possibility of a war lasting into monsoon season [68] and India's international appearance
as an aggressor.
Although some Bengali leaders and Indian officers expected prompt Indian military
intervention,[69] Sam Manekshaw explained to the Indian cabinet that the army's Eastern
Command would not be ready until 15 November at the earliest. [62][70] The Indian
government chose involvement over intervention; Eastern Command took over East
Pakistan operations on 29 April, and on 15 May it launched Operation Jackpot to arm,
train, equip, supply and advise the Mukti Bahini. An Indian diplomat told Osmani that an
expectation of Indian armed intervention in April was unrealistic. [69]
Rebuilding the Mukti Bahini[edit]
Kaiser Jeep wagon used by Osmani to visit the front during the war

From April to June Osmani toured to boost morale and gather information, meeting with
his Indian counterparts and setting up the Bangladeshi command structure. The Indian
Army launched Operation Jackpot; by mid-June Bengali soldiers were driven into India,
developing the infrastructure for a sustained, coordinated guerrilla campaign. Although
the Bengali high command had begun to rebuild and redeploy Mukti Bahini units in mid-
May,[71] in June and July, Mukti Bahini activity slacked off and the insurgency faltered.
[72]
 Running the war was difficult because of the shortage of trained officers. From 17,000
active-duty Bengali soldiers (Army and EPR) who faced Pakistan on 25 March 1971,
about 4,000 were taken prisoner.[73]
A sector coordinators' conference, chaired by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad, was held
by the government in exile from 10 to 15 July. Osmani was absent on the first day of the
conference, since he had resigned as commander-in-chief the previous day. [74] A group
of Bengali officers had discussed the creation of a war council, headed by Ziaur
Rahman with the sector commanders as members, and Osmani was expected to
become defence minister. The plan, presented by Q. N. Zaman [75] and supported by
Ziaur Rahman, was for a separate operational wing to run the war and lessen the
burden on Osmani. Osmani, possibly misinterpreting its intent, resigned, [74] but returned
to his post the following day. The conference defined the operational area, strength,
command structure and role of the Mukti Bahini. Osmani remained commander-in-chief
with M. A. Rab as chief of staff and A. K. Khandker as deputy chief of staff. Bangladesh
was divided into 11 combat sectors, with commanders selected (or reconfirmed) for
each. Of the eleven proposed sectors eight were organized and active by July, with
sectors five and eleven following in August. Sector 10 (east of Teknaf and Khagrachari)
was never activated,[76] and it was incorporated into sector one.
The Mukti Bahini was divided into regular forces and freedom fighters. The regular
forces consisted of defecting Bengali soldiers and retired Pakistan Army and EPR
personnel. They were organised into three battalions, later known as Z, K and S Force.
The shortage of trained regular troops meant that most of the forces were former EPR
troops or new recruits. Trained army, EPR and police personnel were formed into sector
troops: lightly armed conventional units commanded by army officers. [77] The freedom
fighters were primarily deployed within Bangladesh.
Strategy[edit]
Although Osmani made strategy decisions and liaised with Indian officers from July to
December 1971, he did not organize an operation like the Tet Offensive or lead a battle
similar to Dien Bien Phu as commander-in-chief. His strategy (a product of his military
career and the demands of the situation on the ground) influenced his leadership style,
and he relied on his background in the Southeast Asian sector during World War II.
On 15 May the Indian Army began to help build the liberation force, and an Indian
officer was appointed liaison between the Bangladesh government in exile and the
Indian Army. Khaled Musharraf and Osmani met at Teliapara in Sylhet District and
prepared a paper on war strategy.[78] Osmani's differed with the Indian Army on the size
of the Mukti Bahini; the Bangladesh government had hoped to raise a regular force of
30,000 soldiers and 100,000 guerrillas in 1971, which the Indians thought unrealistic. [79]
July–September 1971[edit]
Osmani was a conventional soldier with orthodox views, and his initial strategy reflected
his background. Uncertainty over the timing, scope and scale of Indian military
intervention was another influence. Osmani decided to raise a conventional force of
regular battalions and use them to free an area around Sylhet, organizing countrywide
guerrilla activity as a secondary effort. [79][80] The Bangladesh government in exile asked
Osmani to use the one abundant resource available (manpower), and he did not object
to the plan of sending thousands of guerrillas into Bangladesh with minimal training. It
was hoped that some of the guerrillas would attain expertise through experience. [81]
The Indian planners were concerned that a hastily raised force would lack the trained
leadership needed for an effective campaign. [82] They had envisioned a force of about
8,000 with at least three to four months of training, led by EBR and EPR personnel, [83] to
begin small-cell operations in Bangladesh by August 1971. [84]
Osmani's stubbornness irritated the Indians, who considered Khandkar easier to work
with.[85] Although they raised three additional battalions and three artillery batteries, they
insisted that the guerrillas be given due attention and Osmani did not object. He
disagreed with the Indians on the location of the free area; they suggested
Mymensingh, but Osmani opted for Sylhet and got his way. While the EBR battalions
prepared, in July the Mukti Bahini began deploying 2,000-5,000 guerrillas in Bangladesh
each month. At the sector commanders' meeting, the Mukti Bahini agreed to increase
raids and ambushes and destroy power stations, railway lines, storage depots,
communications systems, bridges and culverts, fuel depots, trains and watercraft to thin
out Pakistani forces and increase their vulnerability. [86]
Action and reaction (June–September)[edit]
Pakistani deployment in May 1971, after reorganization of Eastern Command forces following Operation
Searchlight (some unit locations not shown)

The Pakistan army, after expelling the Mukti Bahini from Bangladesh by May 1971,
experienced relative peace in June and July. Mukti Bahini activity had lessened during
the months of preparation. The Indian army began shelling border outposts (about half
of the 370 outposts were destroyed by the end of July) [87] to facilitate infiltration into
occupied territories. Bengali regular forces were not ready for operation until mid-July.
With the conflict largely centred around the India-East Pakistan border region, the
Pakistani Eastern Command began reorganizing their forces to consolidate control of
the province.[88] An East Pakistan Civil Armed Force,[89] with 17 operational wings,[90]) was
raised from West Pakistani and Bihari volunteers, Razakars (50,000), Al-Badr and Al
Shams (5,000 from each unit).[91] Five thousand police were flown in from West Pakistan.
[92]

Pakistani authorities continued their campaign, [93] rejecting calls for political compromise
and a general amnesty.[92] The army deployed in the towns, and the paramilitary units
were deployed in the countryside. EPCAF took over the border-control and internal-
security duties of the defunct EPR. Pakistani forces occupied 90 crucial border
outposts.[87] Ad hoc units were often created by adding EPCAF troops and Razakars to a
skeleton army formation for deployment in forward areas. [94]
Monsoon Offensive[edit]
Partial representation of Pakistani and Mukti Bahini forces in November 1971; some location are approximate.

Mukti Bahini numbers and activity began increasing in June, the Pakistan Army
deployed Razakars and the EPCAF. Unable to match the Indians shell for shell, they
relied on barrages in selected areas and developed an intelligence network. [95][96] Denied
permissio to launch preemptive cross-border strikes, artillery ambushes were laid for
Mukti Bahini infiltrators and demining operations conducted.[72] Bengali regular forces
attacked BOPs in Mymensingh Comilla and Sylhet with mixed results, and Pakistani
authorities concluded that they had contained the Monsoon Offensive. [97][98]
The sector commanders reviewed Mukti Bahini activities from June to August, and
Osmani made an overall assessment in September. The findings were disappointing;
their network had not taken root, with many guerrillas withdrawing under Pakistani
pressure.[99] Amid Mukti Bahini supply problems, [100] Bangladesh was losing ground in the
international arena.[101] Although regular Bengali regular troops attacked the BoPs with
spirit, more training, better communication and coordination with the Indian Army were
needed for a successful conventional campaign.[102][103] The attack on Kamalpur by the 1st
EBR was repulsed, but the 3rd EBR attack on Bahadurabad was successful; attacks by
the 2nd, 11th and 4th EBR had mixed results. [104]
The failure of the Monsoon Offensive required the Bangladeshi high command to
rethink their strategy. Osmani initially considered dismantling the Z, K and S Forces,
sending platoons from the forces to aid the Mukti Bahini. Although his associates
prevailed against this, he deployed the Z Force battalions to aid the Mukti Bahini around
Sylhet.
Leadership style[edit]
Osmani did not micro-manage, delegating responsibility to the shorthanded sector
commanders;[74][77] the distance between Kolkata and the sector HQs and the absence of
direct links (communications were channeled through the Indian Army) gave him little
choice. The absence of an integrated command structure made it impossible to quickly
implement strategy.[105] Osmani lived a Spartan life, wore simple clothes, ate soldiers'
food and used camp furniture in Kolkata during the war, acting as an example for his
men.[106][107]
He insisted on protocol when dealing with his Indian counterparts. As commander-in-
chief, Osmani's position equaled that of Sam Manekshaw; to the Indians, his
stubbornness in dealing with the lieutenant generals made him difficult to work with.
[108]
 He was pragmatic enough not to allow protocol to impede the war effort, and did not
see Indians working through Khandker[109] as circumventing his authority.
With a brusque manner and volatile temper, Osmani sometimes criticised subordinates
in public. He discussed the framework of the future Bangladesh army and other issues
unrelated to the war while touring the front, to the bemusement and irritation of fellow
officers. Osmani opposed politicising the Bangladesh forces (supported by Prime
Minister Tajuddin Ahmed),[110] appointing officers on merit. Although only Awami League
members were initially recruited for the Mukti Bahini for security reasons, in September
Osmani opened recruitment to all willing to fight for Bangladesh (again with the prime
minister's support). Although sector commanders had previously recruited Awami
League nonmembers, Osmani turned a blind eye. [111]
He used his image and place in the Bangladesh forces to his advantage. Osmani's
problem-solving ability was limited to the agenda of India and the Bangladesh
government in exile. He would often break a deadlock by threatening to resign.
Osmani's bluff was called only once; when Bangladesh forces were placed under the
joint command headed by J. S. Aurora, Ahmed agreed to accept a written resignation
and Osmani dropped the issue.[112]
Controversies[edit]
Mujib Bahini[edit]
Although Osmani was commander-in-chief of all Bangladesh forces, a number of units
were beyond his control. Bengali fighters raised bands to fight the Pakistanis in several
areas of Bangladesh (the Kaderia Bahini, led by Tiger Siqqiqi of Tangail is the best-
known),[citation needed] and they operated independently. Although Osmani was unconcerned,
the Mujib Bahini worried the Bangladesh government in exile. The Mujib Bahini
leadership, initially allowed by Osmani to recruit students and other youths, had an
organized, well-armed, trained force with a primary allegiance to Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and their commanders rather than the Bangladesh government.
No one doubted the skill of the Mujib Bahini or their commitment to Bangladesh. Trained
by Sujan Singh Uban, an Indian Army insurgency expert, they operated under the
direction of the R&AW and outside the Bangladesh chain of command. Mujib Bahini
members were better trained[75] and armed than their Mukti Bahini counterparts. [113] The
Bangladeshi government and military leadership were concerned because most Mujib
Bahini recruits were former Mukti Bahini members.[114][115] Mujib Bahini activities often
hindered Mukti Bahini operations, creating misunderstanding and distrust. Clashes
occurred between the groups, and the Indian Army and other organizations supporting
the Bengali resistance were dissatisfied with Mujib Bahini activity. [116]
The government in exile unsuccessfully attempted to bring the Mujib Bahini under
Osmani by diplomatic means, approaching R&AW director Ramnath Kao. [117] By August it
was clear that their independence was detrimental to the war effort. Osmani threatened
to resign unless they were brought within the chain of command. [118] A meeting
with Durga Prasad Dhar on 29 August produced an agreement that Mujib Bahini would
inform sector commanders before beginning operations. After another meeting with
Ramnath Kao on 18 September, R&AW did not relinquish their control of the Mujib
Bahini.
On 21 October Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indira Gandhi, who ordered
Dhar to resolve the issue. He told B. N. Sarkar to meet with Mujib Bahini leaders and
take the necessary steps. Although the leaders did not attend the meeting, the Mujib
Bahini halted their disruptive activities. They and the Special Frontier Force under Uban
liberated Rangamati in December and helped the Indians dismantle the insurgent Mizo
network.
Absence from surrender ceremony[edit]
Osmani was not in Dhaka for the surrender ceremony on 16 December 1971. His
helicopter, flying from Sylhet, was hit in midair by gunfire and crash-landed in a field.
[119]
 After the crash, the injured Osmani and his crew were rescued by an Indian
surveillance jeep. Out of touch with Indian and Bangladeshi HQ, he could not reach
Dhaka in time for the ceremony.[120]
Medals[edit]
The Bangladeshi government issued four medals of valor to the freedom fighters:
the Bir Sreshtho, Bir Uttom, Bir Bikrom and Bir Protik. The list of recipients was made by
Osmani and several sector commanders at the beginning of 1972. [121] When it was
published, it was criticised and initially cancelled; Osmani was accused of bias for
supporting the list.[121][122][123]

Bangladesh Army general[edit]

After the war ended with the surrender of the Pakistan armed forces to the joint
command of India and Bangladesh on 16 December 1971, Osmani arrived in Dhaka on
22 December and set up his HQ (probably in the Log Area HQ Building in the Dhaka
cantonment).[124] On 9 January 1972, he arranged an honor guard to greet Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman on his return to Tezgaon Airport. [125] The Bangladeshi government
decided promoted him to a two-star ranked officer (the first in Bangladeshi history)
through a battlefield promotion to maintain the chain of command in the army. He was
promoted on 7 April 1972, effective retroactively on 16 December 1971. [5]
Sector commander conference (2–11 January 1972)[edit]
Osmani and the Mukti Bahini senior sector commanders met in Dhaka from 2 to 11
January 1972 to discuss the future of the Bangladesh armed forces and other issues.
Wounded sector-eleven commander Abu Taher and the commander of the closed
sector nine were not present. A committee was set up to form a national militia from the
Mukti Bahini and members of the former East Pakistan Rifles. Sector-three commander
A. N. M. Nuruzzaman was chosen to command the militia.
The armed forces were reorganized, with Army, Navy, Air Force and Police personnel
ordered to join their respective organizations [126] and former EPR members joining the
new National Militia.[127]
Disturbance at Pilkhana[edit]
On 16 February 1972, tension between Mukti Bahini members and former EPR
members who had not fought in the war erupted into a shootout in Pilkhana. Although
Osmani was informed of the incident, he was unable to enter Pilkhana due to the
ongoing gunfire. The firing stopped at the arrival of President Mujibur Rahman, and
Osmani and Rahman defused the situation. It was decided to keep the EPR intact as
the Bangladesh Rifles and create another force, Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini, from the Mukti
Bahini members.[128] In April 1972 the Bangladeshi government abolished the post of
commander-in-chief, replacing it with a Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff and Chief
of Naval Staff to separate the services' command structures. [129]

Cabinet minister[edit]
Although Osmani may have hoped to become defense minister, [130] when the government
abolished the post of commander-in-chief he retired from the Army on 7 April and was
appointed Minister for Air and Inland Water Transport five days later (armed-forces
personnel may not hold political office).
Osmani resigned from the cabinet in May 1975, after the introduction of a one-party
government in accordance with the fourth amendment to the constitution. He
and Mainul Hosein resigned from the Awami League in protest of the abolition of
democracy in Bangladesh by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Osmani briefly was an advisor to
the president on 29 August 1975, after Rahman's assassination.
Army chief of staff[edit]
M. A. Rab, the first Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army (12 April 1971 - 7 April 1972),
was promoted to major general and retired on 7 April 1972. Osmani, reportedly
consulted about his successor, recommended K. M. Shafiullah. [131] The four serving
senior army officers who joined Mukti Bahini in March 1971 from the Pakistan Army
were Salahuddin Mohammad Reza, C. R. Dutta, Ziaur Rahman and Shafiullah. [132]
Ziaur Rahman joined the war on 25 March 1971, and Shafiullah joined three days later.
[132]
 Although they were commissioned in the Pakistan Army on the same day (completing
the 12th PMA Long Course on 18 September 1955), Rahman was above Shafiullah in
the final rankings.[131] Osmani disliked Rahman, and wanted to discharge him after the
battle of Kamalpur. However, Osmani may not have made a recommendation and
Shafiullah's appointment may have been a political decision. [5][133]
Cadet college crisis[edit]
In 1972, the Bangladeshi government issued a presidential decree in 1972 changing the
cadet colleges to government colleges. A delegation of former cadets visited Ziaur
Rahman, who helped them obtain an appointment with Osmani. Osmani discussed the
issue with President Mujib Rahman, and the decree was withdrawn. [134]
Khwaja Wasiuddin[edit]
Khwaja Wasiuddin was the most senior ranked East Pakistani officer in the Pakistan
Army[135] after the forced retirement of Maj. Gen. Ishfakul Majid in 1951.[136] Wasiuddin was
ranked Lieutenant General commanded the Pakistan Army's II Corps in 1971 (based
in Multan, Punjab). He planned to defect but was unable to do so when he was posted
to Rawalpindi Army HQ as the master general of ordnance.[137] After Pakistan's defeat,
he opted for Bangladesh and was interned in his home. Wasiuddin went to London in
October 1972 before coming to Bangladesh. Osmani and Wasiuddin served together in
1959 at Rawalpindi GHQ, and they had a cordial relationship. [138]
Osmani met Wasiuddin at the airport, and introduced him to Awami League leaders. At
age 54, Wasiuddin's experience would have benefited the Bangladesh Army. It was
rumoured that Osmani would recommend him to the government as Army Chief of Staff,
but some Mukti Bahini members of the army staff threatened to resign. Although
Osmani was reportedly hurt by the turn of events, [139] Wasiuddin received an
ambassadorship. When Shafiullah (who replaced Rab as Chief of Staff in April) asked
Rahman about the rumours, the president reportedly said that only a tested patriot
would be a chief of staff.[140]

Presidential defense advisor[edit]

Osmani did not support the 15 August 1975 assassinations, and did not tolerate undue
criticism of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[141][142] He accepted a post as defense advisor (the
equivalent of a cabinet minister) to Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, who took over as
president after the 15 August coup and may have been involved. Osmani, who ignored
advice to avoid the Mushtaq government,[143] was appointed to the post after Ziaur
Rahman was appointed Army Chief of Staff on 24 August 1975 and Khalilur Rahman
became Chief of Staff in the Defense Ministry. [144][145] Although it was a cabinet post,
Osmani did not draw a salary.[146] He visited several Army formations, stressing the need
for discipline and morale, and may have hoped to prevent further bloodshed with his
influence on the armed forces.[147][148] As defense advisor, he did not oppose the promotion
of the 15 August coup leaders or the reinstatement of retired army officers [144] involved in
the coup. The coup leaders had installed themselves in Bangabhaban, disregarding the
army chain of command,[149] and Osmani accepted the situation. He tried to implement
the decision to disband the Jatya Rakshi Bahini, placing its members in police
and anser organizations, before Ziaur Rahman received approval to integrate Rakshi
Bahini formations into the army in October 1975. The coup leaders maintained control
of the 1st Bengal Lancer and 2nd Field Artillery units [150][151] (involved in the 15 August
coup) and deployed outside the army chain of command. Their actions, demonstrating
the weakness of the chain of command, created a de facto parallel command structure.
[152][153]
When Khaled Musharraf learned of the killing of four political leaders in Dhaka Central
Jail, he and some staff went to Bangabhaban to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power.
Khandker Mushtaq and Osmani spent the day negotiating, and Shaffat Jamil came to
Bangabhaban to meet Musharraf. As he and his soldiers entered the meeting room, he
heard Mushtaq browbeating Musharraf: "I have seen many brigadiers and general of
[the] Pakistan Army! Don't try to teach me." This angered the CO of the 1st Bengal
Company, who drew his gun and said: "And now you will see majors of [the]
Bangladesh Army." Mushtaq dropped to the floor, Osmani stood between him and the
officer and asked Shaffat Jamil to restore order. After Mushtaq resigned and a new
government was formed, Osmani resigned.[154]

Death[edit]

Epitaph of Osmani at the Sylhet Shah Jalal Mazar

In 1983, at age 65, Osmani was diagnosed with cancer at the Combined Military
Hospital (CMH) in Dhaka and was flown to London for treatment at St Bartholomew's
Hospital at government expense. Most of his time in the UK was spent at the home of
his nephew and niece, Mashahid Ali and Sabequa Chowdhury. [citation needed] He died on 16
February 1984.[155] Osmani's body was flown to Bangladesh, and he was buried with full
military honours adjacent to his mother's grave in Darga, Sylhet. [citation needed]

Legacy[edit]
The airport in Osmani's hometown, Sylhet, has been named in his honour.

Osmani, nicknamed bongobir (Hero of Bengal), had a major role in organising the

Bangladesh armed forces. The international airport in his hometown, Sylhet, was
named Osmani Antorjatik Biman Bondor (Osmani International Airport) for him. MAG
Osmani Medical College and the city's state-run hospital also commemorate
him. Osmani Memorial Auditorium in Dhaka, Osmani Primary School is in the London
Borough of Tower Hamlets.[156] The Osmani Museum is in Sylhet.

See also[edit]
 Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War
 Artistic depictions of the Bangladesh Liberation War
 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
 Liberation War Museum
 Rape during the Bangladesh Liberation War
 Awards and decorations of the Bangladesh Liberation War

References[edit]
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a b

Dhaka: Ananyā. p. 238.  OCLC 755214448.

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p. 1000.
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8. ^ Indian Army List-Special Edition (August 1947). Government of India
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9. ^       Islam, Sheikh Akthar Ul, Sadhinota Judher Sipahasalar Bongobir
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General Osmany p. 18, ISBN 978-984-8901-08-3

10. ^ General Osmany p.128
11. ^ Hamid, Lt. Col. (ret.) Muhammad A., Felay Asha Shainik
Jibanp42, ISBN 984-412-099-3
12. ^ Siddiqi, Brig Gen. (ret.) A.R., The Military in Pakistan Image and
Reality Chapter 1
13. ^ Khan, Maj Gen. (ret.) Fazal Muqeem, Pakistan's Crisis in
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army] (in Bengali). Dhaka: Mowla Brothers. p.  20. OCLC  42761824.
15. ^ Raja, Dewan Mohammad Tasawwar, O GENERAL MY GENERAL
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8866-18-4
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17. ^ Islam, Sheikh Akthar Ul, Sadhinota Juddher Sipahasalar Bongobir
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Palgrave Macmillan. p.  128. ISBN 0-312-23193-8.
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p. 110, ISBN 9694022827
26. ^ Siddiqi, Brig. (ret.) A. R., The Military in Pakistan: Image and
Reality p. 135, ISBN 9694022827
27. ^ Khan, Maj. General Rao Farman Ali, How Pakistan Got Divided, p12
| Bengali Translation: ‘Bangladesher Janmo’ University Press Ltd.
1996 ISBN 984-05-0157-7
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29. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender p. 11
30. ^ Ali, Col (ret.) Shawkat, Satya Mamla Agartala p109, ISBN 978-984-
8765-60-9
31. ^ Ali, Col (ret.) Shawkat, Satya Mamla Agartala p189, ISBN 978-984-
8765-60-9
32. ^ Arefin, Maj. (ret.) A.S.M Shamsul, History, Standing of important
persons involved in the Bangladesh War of Liberation p3, ISBN 984-
05-0146-1
33. ^ Ahmad, Col. (ret.) Oli, Revolution Military Personnel and The War of
Liberation in Bangladesh p115-125, ISBN 978-3838393421
34. ^ a b Khandker, Air Vice Marsha (ret.) A.K, Hasan, Moyeedul, Mirza,
Wing Commander (ret.) S.R., Muktijuddher Purbapar p. 7, ISBN 978-
984-8765-22-7
35. ^ Arefin, Maj. (ret.) A.S.M Shamsul, History, Standing of important
persons involved in the Bangladesh War of Liberation p. 4, ISBN 984-
05-0146-1
36. ^ Ahmad, Col. (ret.) Oli, Revolution Military Personnel and The War of
Liberation in Bangladesh p. 125, ISBN 978-3838393421
37. ^ a b Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p64
38. ^ Khan, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali, How Pakistan Got Divided, p93
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40. ^ Khandker, Air Vice Marsha (ret.) A.K, 1971 Bhetore Baire p40-
41, ISBN 978-984-90747-4-8
41. ^ Khandker, Air Vice Marshal (ret.) A.K, Hasan, Moyeedul, Mirza,
Wing Commander (ret.) S.R., Muktijuddher Purbapar p15-
18, ISBN 978-984-8765-22-7
42. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p75
43. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p70
44. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p12
45. ^ Pir, M. Ataur Rahman, Revolution Military Personnel and The War of
Liberation in Bangladesh p. 128, ISBN 978-3838393421
46. ^ Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudha: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p. 29, ISBN 984-415-286-0
47. ^ Jamil, Col.(ret.) Shaffat, Ekaturer Muktijuddho, Roktakto Moddho
August O Shorojontromoy November p35, ISBN 984-465-144-1
48. ^ a b Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudha: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p30, ISBN 984-415-286-0
49. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. (ret.) K.M., Bangladesh at
War p159, ISBN 984-401-322-4
50. ^ Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudha: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p35, ISBN 984-415-286-0
51. ^ Islam, Sheikh Akthar Ul, Sadhinota Juddher Sipahasalar Bongobir
General Osmani p195, ISBN 978-984-8901-08-3
52. ^ Islam, Major (ret.) Rafikul PSc.(ret.), Muktijuddher
Itihas p189, ISBN 984-437-086-8
53. ^ Jamil, Col.(ret.) Shaffat, Ekaturer Muktijuddho, Roktakto Moddho
August O Shorojontromoy November p39, ISBN 984-465-144-1
54. ^ Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudha: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p31-32, ISBN 984-415-286-0
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p110, ISBN 984-401-322-4
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58. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p147
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6
60. ^ Ali Khan, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman, How Pakistan Got Divided, p89
61. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 1971, p11-14
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p90, p91
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68. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, p181-182
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70. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, p181-183
71. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p. 211
72. ^ a b Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p100
73. ^ Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Part I, Chapter VI, para II
74. ^ a b c Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p50
75. ^ a b Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M, Bangladesh at War, p161-162
76. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M, Bangladesh at War, p162-163
77. ^ a b Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p231-232
78. ^ Muniruzzaman, Talukder, The Bangladesh Revolution And Its
Aftermath, p. 107 ,ISBN 984-05-10975
79. ^ a b Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, p43-44
80. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p53-55
81. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p234-233
82. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, p43
83. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, p93
84. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, p90
85. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen JFR, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation, p44
86. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p227
87. ^ a b Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 1971, p45
88. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p92
89. ^ Niazi, Lt. Gen AAK, The Betryal of East Pakistan, p105-106
90. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca,: Birth of a Nation, p189
91. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p105
92. ^ a b Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p96
93. ^ Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p94
94. ^ Quereshi, Hakeem A., The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War: A Soldiers
Narrative p95, 111
95. ^ Quereshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem A, Indo Pak War of 1971, p108 – p110
96. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions p284
97. ^ Ali, Mag. Gen. Rao Farman, When Pakistan Got Divided, p100
98. ^ Niazi, Lt. Gen. A.A.K, The Betryal of East Pakistan, p96
99. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca p94
100. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions p292
101. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p274, p292
102. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p114
103. ^ Islam, Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p236
104. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions p297
105. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, pp. 51–52, 56.
106. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, p43
107. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions p222
108. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p54
109. ^ Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, p44
110. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p26
111. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p223
112. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p155
113. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p278
114. ^ Islam, Maj. Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p276
115. ^ Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M, Bangladesh at War, p161-163
116. ^ Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions p279
117. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p71
118. ^ Hasan, Moyeedul, Muldhara 71, p72-74
119. ^ Administrator.  "Muktijuddho (Bangladesh Liberation War 1971)
part 46 - controversial absence of Colonel MAG Osmani,
Muktijuddhas speed up victory - History of Bangladesh".  Londoni.
Archived from  the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 16
August2015.
120. ^ The Independent.
Dhaka https://web.archive.org/web/20160304052246/http://www.thein
dependentbd.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=50552:whereabouts-of-the-c-in-
c-on-16-dec-1971. Archived from  the original on 4 March 2016.
Retrieved 16 August  2015. Missing or empty |title= (help)
121. ^     Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er
a b

Nirab Shakhay p50, ISBN 984-410-175-1
122. ^ Jamil, Col.(ret.) Shaffat, Ekaturer Muktijuddho, Roktakto Moddho
August O Shorojontromoy November p74, ISBN 984-465-144-1
123. ^ Ibarāhima, Saiẏada Muhāmmada Ibarāhima.  Misrakathana.
Dhaka: Ananyā. p. 236.  OCLC 755214448.
124. ^ Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudho: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p128, ISBN 984-415-286-0
125. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p23, ISBN 984-410-175-1
126. ^ Zaman, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Imamuz, Bangladesh War of
Liberationp185, ISBN 978-984-713-036-1
127. ^ Shamsul Huda Chowdhury (1982). Ekaturer Ranangan. Ahmed
Publishing House. p. 266.  OCLC 59050995.
128. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p35, ISBN 984-410-175-1
129. ^ Ibarāhima, Saiẏada Muhāmmada Ibarāhima.  Misrakathana.
Dhaka: Ananyā. p. 158.  OCLC 755214448.
130. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p40, ISBN 984-410-175-1
131. ^     Ibrahim, Sayed Muhammad (1999).  Senābāhinīra abhyantare
a b

āṭāśa bachara  (in Bengali). Dhaka: Mowla Brothers.

p. 22.  OCLC 42761824.
132. ^ a b Arefin, Maj. (ret.) A.S.M Shamsul, History, Standing of important
persons involved in the Bangladesh War of
Liberationp.182, ISBN 984-05-0146-1
133. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p41, ISBN 984-410-175-1
134. ^ Ibarāhima, Saiẏada Muhāmmada Ibarāhima.  Misrakathana.
Dhaka: Ananyā. pp. 37–43. OCLC  755214448.
135. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p57, ISBN 984-410-175-1
136. ^ Hamid, Lt. Col (ret.) M.A. Psc, Tinti Sena Avutthan O Kitho Na
Bola Kotha p135
137. ^ Rahman, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Khalilur, Purbapar 1971 p27, ISBN 984-
465-404-1
138. ^ Noor-Ujjaman, Col (ret.) Qazi, 71er Muktijudha: Akjan Sector
Commanderer Smritikatha p33, ISBN 984-415-286-0
139. ^ Hamid, Lt. Col (ret.) M.A. Psc, Felay Asha Sainik Jiban p137-
p138, ISBN 984-412-099-3
140. ^ Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er Nirab
Shakhay p57-58, ISBN 984-410-175-1
141. ^ Hamid, Lt. Col (ret.) M.A. Psc, Felay Asha Sainik
Jiban p137, ISBN 984-412-099-3
142. ^ Islam, Sheikh Akthar Ul, Sadhinota Juddher Sipahasalar Bongobir
General Osmani p59, ISBN 978-984-8901-08-3
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Shakhay p73, ISBN 984-410-175-1
144. ^ a b Chowdhury, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moinul Hossain, Ek General-Er
Nirab Shakhay p79, ISBN 984-410-175-1
145. ^ Hossain, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Sakhawat, Bangladesh: Roktakto
Addhay p69, ISBN 984-445-085-3
146. ^ Pir, M. Ataur Rahman, General Osmani p105
147. ^ Pir, M. Ataur Rahman, General Osmani p91
148. ^ Hossain, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Sakhawat, Bangladesh: Roktakto
Addhay p72, ISBN 984-445-085-3
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Addhay p57, ISBN 984-445-085-3
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151. ^ Jamil, Col.(ret.) Shaffat, Ekaturer Muktijuddho, Roktakto Moddho
August O Shorojontromoy November pp. 107, 129, ISBN 984-465-
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Bola Kotha p71-75
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