5/11/2020 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v.

NLRC

247 Phil. 641

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 80609, August 23, 1988 ]

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MARILYN ABUCAY,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The only issue presented in the case at bar is the legality of the award of financial
assistance to an employee who had been dismissed for cause as found by the public
respondent.
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, was accused by two complainants of having demanded and received from
them the total amount of P3,800.00 in consideration of her promise to facilitate
approval of their applications for telephone installation.[1] Investigated and heard,
she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service.[2] She
went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally
removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the
company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
Nevertheless, the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision declared:

"WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.

"Considering that Dr. Helen Bangayan and Mrs. Consolacion Martinez are not
totally blameless in the light of the fact that the deal happened outside the
premises of respondent company and that their act of giving P3,800.00 without
any receipt is tantamount to corruption of public officers, complainant must be
[3]
given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance."

Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor
Relations Board, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals.[4]
The private respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly accepting the
validity of her dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to question the
affirmance of the above-quoted award as having been made with grave abuse of
discretion.
In its challenged resolution of September 22, 1987, the NLRC said:

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"x x x Anent the award of separation pay as financial assistance in complainant's

favor, We find the same to be equitable, taking into consideration her long years
of service to the company whereby she had undoubtedly contributed to the
success of respondent. While we do not in any way approve of complainant's
(private respondent) malfeasance, for which she is to suffer the penalty of
dismissal, it is for reasons of equity and compassion that we resolve to uphold
[5]
the award of financial assistance in her favor."

The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee

illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor
laws. However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement
nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in
accordance with law. In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded
financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10-year service
in the company despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded
rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or
justification. The award is made on the ground of equity and compassion, which
cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on dishonesty
and encourages instead of deterring corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished
with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for
her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working
faithfully with the company for ten years. In support of this position, the Solicitor
General cites the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
[6] [7]
Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, where the employees
were dismissed for cause but were nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of
social and compassionate justice. As the Court put it in the Firestone case:

"In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid grounds to dispense
with the services of Lariosa and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering his reinstatement. However, considering that Lariosa had
worked with the company for eleven years with no known previous bad record,
the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served if he is paid full
separation pay but not reinstatement without backwages by the NLRC."

In the said case, the employee was validly dismissed for theft but the NLRC
nevertheless awarded him full separation pay for his 11 years of service with the
company. In Soco, the employee was also legally separated for unauthorized use of a
company vehicle and refusal to attend the grievance proceedings but he was just the
same granted one-half month separation pay for every year of his 18-year service.
[8]
Similar action was taken in Filipro, Inc. v. NLRC, where the employee was validly
dismissed for preferring certain dealers in violation of company policy but was
allowed separation pay for his 2 years of service. In Metro Drug Corporation v.
[9]
NLRC, the employee was validly removed for loss of confidence because of her
failure to account for certain funds but she was awarded separation pay equivalent to
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one-half month's salary for every year of her service of 15 years. In Engineering
Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC,[10] the dismissal of the employee was justified because he
had instigated labor unrest among the workers and had serious differences with them,
among other grounds, but he was still granted three months separation pay
corresponding to his 3-year service. In New Frontier Mines, Inc. v. NLRC,[11] the
employee's 3-year service was held validly terminated for lack of confidence and
abandonment of work but he was nonetheless granted three months separation pay.
And in San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment, et al.,
[12] full separation pay for 6, 10, and 16 years service, respectively, was also allowed
three employees who had been dismissed after they were found guilty of
misappropriating company funds.
The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined
[13]
therein is not entitled to separation pay. The cases above cited constitute the
exception, based upon considerations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice
[14]
outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals
[15]
than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction
[16]
of positive law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the
labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for
separation pay.
Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there is no express justification
for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other than the
abstract consideration of equity. The reason is that our Constitution is replete with
positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection
of the rights of the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary
concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general
commitment to the cause of labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State
Policies, the new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of
social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII
expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the
advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in general. The
categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers
are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases
even if the dismissal be for cause.
The Court notes, however, that where the exception has been applied, the decisions
have not been consistent as to the justification for the grant of separation pay and the
amount or rate of such award. Thus, the employees dismissed for theft in the
Firestone case and for animosities with fellow workers in the Engineering Equipment
case were both awarded separation pay notwithstanding that the first cause was
certainly more serious than the second. No less curiously, the employee in the Soco
case was allowed only one-half month pay for every year of his 18 years of service, but
in Filipro the award was two months separation pay for 2 years service. In Firestone,
the employee was allowed full separation pay corresponding to his 11 years of service,
but in Metro, the employee was granted only one-half month separation pay for every
year of her 15-year service. It would seem then that length of service is not necessarily
a criterion for the grant of separation pay and neither apparently is the reason for the
dismissal.

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The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note that heretofore the separation
pay, when it was considered warranted, was required regardless of the nature or
degree of the ground proved, be it mere inefficiency or something graver like
immorality or dishonesty. The benediction of compassion was made to cover a
multitude of sins, as it were, and to justify the helping hand to the validly dismissed
employee whatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy should be re-examined. It
is time we rationalized the exception, to make it fair to both labor and management,
especially to labor.
There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous
causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the
dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has
worked for some time with the company. For example, a subordinate who has
irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly
dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A
working mother who has to be frequently absent because she has also to take care of
her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this being another
authorized ground. It is not the employee's fault if he does not have the necessary
aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to
maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too
may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award
to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy
even if the separation is for cause.
But where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the
generosity of the law must be more discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate
to give separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota
but surely he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the
receipts of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. A
security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be
allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if he was in
fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the
company premises, the situation is changed completely. This is not only inefficiency
but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified.
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice
only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may
not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance,
or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that
the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do
with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals
from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not
unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he
thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced

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compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the
infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the
Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because
it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it
certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of
every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an
undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be the refuge of scoundrels
any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those
who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our
Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not
worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of
their own character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the
case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty,
as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has
impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a
decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a
regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying
during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty,
perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to
cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.
The Court also rules that the separation pay, if found due under the circumstances of
each case, should be computed at the rate of one month salary for every year of
service, assuming the length of such service is deemed material. This is without
prejudice to the application of special agreements between the employer and the
employee stipulating a higher rate of computation and providing for more benefits to
[17]
the discharged employee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of September
22, 1987, is AFFIRMED in toto except for the grant of separation pay in the form of
financial assistance, which is hereby DISALLOWED. The temporary restraining order
dated March 23, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Fernan, C.J., see dissenting opinion.
Griño-Aquino, J., dissents, we should not rationalize compassion. I vote to affirm the
grant of financial assistance.

[1] Rollo, p. 15.

[2]
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[3] Id., p. 17.
[4]
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[4] Id., p. 22.
[5]
Id., pp. 21-22.
[6] 148 SCRA 187.
[7]
148 SCRA 526.
[8] 145 SCRA 123.
[9]
143 SCRA 132.
[10] 133 SCRA 752.
[11]
129 SCRA 502.
[12] 145 SCRA 196.
[13]
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule 1, Section 7.
[14] Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, 1968, p. 634.
[15]
Ibid.
[16] Id.
[17]
See Footnote No. 13.

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