Tendor of Pardon To Accomplice

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PAGE 1

THE CODE OF CRIMINAL


PROCEDURE, 1973

TOPIC:-
TENDER OF PARDON
(SECTIONS 306, 307, 308)

SUBMITTED TO:- DR. SARIKA GUPTA


SUBMITTED BY:- HARMANPREET KAUR
SECTION:- L
ROLL NO:- 82/17
PAGE 2

INDEX
S. NO. CONTENTS P. NO.
1. Introduction 3
2. Meaning of Pardon 4
3. Power of Court to grant
pardon 5
4. Pardon to accomplice
• Object 5
• Pardon befor committal
proceedings. 7
• Pardon after committal
proceedings 8
• Conditions for exercise of
power. 9
• Effects of pardon 13
• Consequences of breach of
condition of pardon. 14
• Constitutional validity
regarding exercise of power 15
PAGE 3

INTRODUCTION
Pardon, one of the biggest powers In the hands of the executives which
is 'part of Constitutional Scheme in almost all modern civilized
societies' is generally contained in the Constitution of a Country.^ In
India also the power to grant pardon is enshrined in the Constitution
itself. The main reason for incorporating this power in the Constitution
itself may be because of its importance as it saves a person from the
penalty or punishment inflicted upon him by the judiciary for breaking
the laws of the land. Moreover it may completely absolve such a person
from all disqualification attached to him for the commission of
criminal offence." This is an extraordinary power given to the
executive.
The Constitution of India confers this power on the President^ and
the Governor of each state. In India it is not only the Constitution that
contains the power to grant pardon, remission, commutation etc. and it
is not only the President or the Governor of the concerned State who
can enjoy this power to grant pardon, remission, commutation etc. but
there are a few more other statutes or legislations which contain the
provisions dealing with similar pardoning power and these powers to
grant such pardons have been conferred on certain other authorities.
These similar powers of pardon are also called as pardoning powers^
despite the fact that they are being exercised by some other authority.
It is not only the executives who enjoy this power to grant pardon but
the judiciary has also been empowered to exercise this power, although
the objective of the same is different. But all of these authorities
including judiciary are exercising these powers on behalf of the
sovereign.
The established principle of Criminal Jurisprudence is that the
responsibility or exemption from criminal liability to a person should
always be made in accordance with the procedure established in
criminal law for the time being in force. The provisions with regard to
tender of pardon is provided under Indian Constitution Article 72 and
Article 161 and Section 306, 307 and 308 of Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973,
PAGE 4

MEANING OF PARDON
In la w, a pardon is the release from guilt or remission of punishmen t.
A pardon may be full or conditiona l. It is conditional when its
effectiveness depends on fulfillment of a condition by the offende r,
usually a lesser punishmen t, as in the commutation of the death
sentenc e .The effect of a full pardon is unclear in some jurisdiction s.
According to the Bouviers Law Dictionary 'Pardo n' mean s-
A pardon is an act of grac e, proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the law s, which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowe d, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committe d. Every pardon granted to the guilty is in
derogation of the la w; if the pardon be equitabl e, the law i s, ba d; for
where legislation and the administration of the law are perfec t,
pardons must be a violation of the la w. But as human actions are
necessarily imperfec t, the pardoning power must be vested
somewhere in order to prevent injustic e, when it is ascertained that
an error has been committe d.
A pardon is said by Lord Coke to be a work of mercy where by
the king "either before attainde r, or conviction or after forgiveth any
crim e ,offenc e, punishment "and the kin g 's Coronation oath is " that
he will causejustice to be executed mercy "5 A pardon is as an act
ofgrac e, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowedfrom
the punishment the law inflictsfor a crime he has committe d.
As has been observed by the Supreme Court in K . M. Nanavati v
State ofBombay [AIR 1961 SC 11 2] , "Pardon is one of many
prerogatives which have beenr ecognized since time immemorial as
being vested in the sovereig n, wherever the sovereignty might b e.
The sovereign power to grant a pardon has been recognized in the
Constitution ofIndia in Arts 72 and 161 and also in Sec s .432 and 43 3,
Criminal Procedure Cod e, 197 3. These provisions relate to the grant
ofpardon after sentence has been removed and the tender of pardon
to an accomplice under certain conditions as contemplated by Sec s.
306 and 30 7, Criminal Procedure Cod e. There is no doubt that
the ;grant ofpardo n, whether it is under Ar t, 16 1or Ar t. 72 of the
constitution or under Sec s. 33 7, 33 8, 401 and 402 of old Criminal
Procedure Cod e, is the exercise ofthe sovereign powe r.
PAGE 5

POWER OF COURT TO GRANT


PARDON
The Courts in any country are basically established to adjudicate
upon the question of a right or liability. Similarly in our country as
well the object also is the same one. But beside this one more task or
duty has been conferred upon the Courts in our country and that is
the granting of pardon. This power has been conferred on courts by
two different Acts i.e. The Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 and
the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The law contained in these
statutes can be discussed under the following four heads:
A. Pardon to an Accomplice.
B. Suspension of Sentences.
C. Commutation of death sentence of pregnant women.
D. Release of Offenders on Probation.

This paper discusses about tender of pardon to accomplice.

PARDON TO AN ACCOMPLICE
The power to grant pardon to an accomplice can be exercised by a
Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure. This discretionary
power conferred by the code on the Magistrate is basically a judicial
function. This power of Magistrate is contained in Chapter-XXIV,
Sections 306 to 308 of the Code. The very first section i.e. Section 306
deals with the power to grant pardon and the second section i.e.
Section 307 deals with the 'power to direct tender of pardon' to be
exercised by the court to which the case has been committed. Whereas
the last Section 308 provides for the trial of person pardoned for not
complying with the conditions of pardon.

• Object
It is the duty of the State to protect the individuals from external as
well as the internal disturbance. So far as the internal disturbance is
concerned it is the duty of the state to maintain the law and order. If
PAGE 6

any person breaks the law and violates the rights of other individuals, the
State is bound to punish the offender. But this is quite possible that due
to lack of evidence the State may not be in a position to punish the
offenders. In such type of a situation the State enters into a contract
resulting in pardon to one of the accomplices.
The word contract is appropriate because granting of pardon in
substance and in fact is a contract between the State on the one hand and
a person whom it is granted on the other. The reason for calling it to be a
contract is obvious that it is simply an agreement between the two parties
wherein one party i.e. approver, is willing to confess the commission of
crime and for doing so this party is receiving in consideration of
confession, a pardon from the other party.
To make it a complete contract there shall be an offer and its
acceptance and there shall always be the consideration. Even the
Supreme Court accepted this averment and held that "the power of
tendering pardon is restricted to one consideration alone, namely the
obtaining of the evidence from the person to whom pardon is granted
relating to offences being tried. But this power of pardon can never be
exercised in each and every case. This power shall be used only in those
cases where it is not possible to punish the offenders by other means
because of lack of evidence.
In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [AIR 1994 SC 2420], the
Supreme Court while dealing with the same question of the object of the
provision relied upon the judgment of the Court itself in Ganeshwara
Rao's case and held that "the main object of this section is to obtain the
true evidence of offence by the grant of pardon to accomplices so as to
prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment for lack of evidence
in grave offences.
In Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi,[AIR 2001 SC 2734 at 27], the
Supreme Court while dealing with the same question observed that:
The grant of pardon by the Court is rooted in the premise that most
criminals try to avoid detention. Crimes lil<e smuggling, by definition
are carried on secretively. The persons involved in such criminal activity
would obviously try to conceal and hide any evidence of their activity in
as many ways as human ingenuity can devise. That is why the prosecution
is often compelled to rely on the evidence of an accomplice to bring the
most serious offenders to book.
But it shall be pertinent to mention here that pardon shall never be
tendered in those cases where there are enough evidences available to
PAGE 7

punish the offenders for the commission of the crime without the
evidence of the approver. The reason behind that is quite obvious that if
such type of practice is permitted then every criminal will try to escape
from punishment with the help of section 306. This type of misuse of
power can never be permitted.
Thus it can be concluded that in order to do justice with the
aggrieved persons and to bring the accused to justice for the offence
committed by him it is necessary to confer certain powers upon the
Magistrate to tender pardon to an accomplice if the Magistrate is not in
a position to punish the offenders due to lack of evidence. It spreads a
massage to the criminals that it is not easy for them to escape from
punishment even if they committed the offence very carefully and
leaving no evidence behind.

•Pardon before the Committal Proceedings:


The Section 306 deals with the power to tender pardon to an accomplice
before the committal of the case. Basically this section contains five sub-
sections. The very first sub- section mentioned above confers the power
to grant pardon on the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Metropolitan
Magistrate. This power can be exercised by them at any time i.e. either
during invesfigation or inquiry or during the trial itself. This sub-section
further says that these magistrates can exercise this power for the
purpose of obtaining the evidence of any person who falls within the
definifion of 'accomplice.' This sub section also confers this power to
grant pardon on the Judicial Magistrate first class, but he can exercise this
power only during the inquiry or during the trial. While exercising the
power under this provision the Magistrate can tender pardon only if the
person pardoned had been an accomplice makes full and true disclosure
of the complete circumstances within his knowledge relative to the
offence.
The second sub-section of this section provides that the power to
tender pardon under sub-section (1) can only be exercised in cases of
offences exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions or by a Special judge
appointed under Criminal Law Amendment Act or any offence
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or
more. That means the offences in which the prescribed punishment do
not fall under the four corners of the above mentioned limit, in such
type of cases this power can never be exercised by the authorities
concerned.
PAGE 8

The third sub-section says that whenever a Magistrate tender pardon


under this section he shall record the reasons for doing so. He shall also
record whether the pardon tendered to him was accepted by the person
concerned or not. Moreover Magistrate is bound to furnish a copy of such
record to the accused if he applies in writing to the Magistrate. Thus
under this provision the accomplice may refuse to accept the pardon
tendered to him. But if he accepts the pardon then he becomes the
approver in the case. And in such a case the Magistrate is bound to record
the reasons for tendering the pardon so that it can be scrutinised in
future if required.
The sub-section fourth of this section provides that such a person
who as been pardoned under sub-section (1) shall be examined as a
witness before the Magistrate taking the cognizance of the offence in the
subsequent trial. This sub-section also talks about the custody of such a
person and says that the pardoned person shall, unless he is already on
bail, be detained in the custody till the completion of the trial.
The last sub-section provides that if a person accepts the pardon
tendered to him under this section and he has also been examined as a
witness before the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence thereafter
such Magistrate shall commit the case to the Court of Session or the
Court of Special Judge if it is triable by them and in all other cases it is to
be tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate himself.
This section 306 of the code confers a wide power upon the
Magistrates to tender pardon to a person who himself was involved in the
commission of crime under scrutiny. If the person becomes the approver
on the condition imposed by the Magistrate then he may receive
pardoned in consideration. But this power under Section 306 can only be
exercised by the Magistrate before the committal of the case only.

•Pardon after the Committal Proceedings:


Once the case has been committed from a lower court to the higher court
then the power to grant pardon can only be exercised by the court
whom the case has been committed. This law has been contained in
Section 307.
This section applies to tender of pardon by the court to which the
case has been committed.That means pardoning power under this section
can be exercised by Court of Sessions, the special Judge or the Chief
Judicial Magistrate. But this section does not take away the additional
power of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any Magistrate under Section
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306 to tender pardon when the offence is under inquiry or trial. The
court to which commitment is made can itself exercise this power under
section 307 at any time after the commitment of the case but it should
be done before the pronouncement of the judgment. It has also been
made clear that the power to grant pardon under both of these sections
is not circumscribed by any condition except, that action must be taken
with a view to obtain evidence of any person who is supposed to have
been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence. The
main intent and purpose of tendering pardon to accused as envisaged in
Section 306 and Section 307 of the Code, is to bring to light the missing
and hidden circumstances which though very much relevant are not
coming forth from others.
Thus it can be concluded that the power under sections 306 and 307
are same or identical. The only difference is that the power is to be
exercised by different authorities under different sections and at
different time and this power contained in two different provision do
not go against each other.

•Conditions for the exercise of the power:


The power to tender pardon is subject to so many conditions. Some of
these conditions are specified by the code itself and a few are prescribed
by the judiciary. The conditions for the exercise of the power to tender
pardon are as under:

i) Competent court to tender pardon:


This section 306 and 307 clearly point out the authorities who can
exercise the power to tender pardon under these sections. The power is
exclusively conferred by the Code on the following magistrates:
1. Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate;
2. Judicial Magistrate First class;
3. Court of Session;
4. Special Judge.
Thus these sections empower only four categories of magistrates to
exercise the power to tender pardon. The power conferred on the
different classes of Magistrates is concurrent and is of the same character.
Even the Supreme Court has also affirmed it.
There is no other authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure
which can enjoy this power. But the Supreme Court found it necessary to
consider the request of the prosecution for grant of pardon under this
section.
PAGE 10

In Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi,[AIR 2001 SC 2734 at 27], the court
ruled that "although the power to actually grant the pardon is vested in
the court, obviously the court can have no interest whatsoever in the
outcome nor can it decide for the prosecution whether particular
evidence is required or not to ensure the conviction of the accused. This
is the prosecution's job."
Similarly the position of the police is not different rather it is worst.
In a landmark judgment delivered the Supreme Court by P. Sirajuddin v.
State of Madras[AIR 1971 SC 520] it was held that the granting of pardon
is not the discretion of police at all.
The decision of the Court seem to be perfect as there are provisions in
Section 306 and 307 relating to pardon to an accomplice. An
investigating officer cannot himself grant pardon bypassing the
aforesaid provisions of the code.

ii) Person to whom pardon can be tendered


Sections 306 and 307 itself answer this question that who can be the
receiver of pardon. The qualification for becoming an approver under
both of these sections is basically the same and moreover the pardon
under both of these sections can be tendered on the 'same conditions'. In
other words the conditions mentioned in section 306 are equally
applicable to pardon under section under Section 307. The sub-section
(1) of Section 306 and Section 307 provide that pardon under these
sections can be tendered to 'any person.' But this term any person will
not include each and every person. By virtue of Section 306 (2) only
those persons can receive pardon who have committed certain specific
offences.
Both of these sections provide that 'any person supposed to have
been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence' can be
pardoned on certain conditions. The main condition imposed by Section
306 is that the approver shall make full and true confession.
As a general rule pardon can be tendered to an accomplice as the
language of the section 306 and 307 also makes it clear. An accomplice is
a person who sustains such a relation to the criminal act that he could be
charged with the accused and while granting pardon to such accomplice,
it is mandatory that the court should make an offer to one least guilty
among several guilty accused persons.
But it is 'not necessary that pardon under this provision can only be
tendered to an accomplice or who in his statement has implicated
himself in the offence. This section requires that the statement must be
PAGE 11

obtained from the concerned person who is supposed to be directly or


indirectly concerned or privy in the offence. It implies that it is not
necessary that granting of pardon should be made to a co-accused in a
particular case in which he is sought to be examined. Hence pardon
may be granted to sole accused of another case. It is more than enough
if he is directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence.
Another term 'concerned' used in sub-section (1) of Section 306 also
shows that such a person may be somehow directly or indirectly
connected with the offence. He may have some interest therein or the
incident which led to the offence may be of some importance to him.
Inculpation of the approver in the commission of a crime is not a
necessary condition for being pardoned.
Therefore in order to punish the main culprits the court may
tender pardon to the parson whose participation in the offence was
lesser. Hence the very first, basic, initial or primary condition is that the
approver should be one of the privy or an abettor in the commission of
the crime. In other words he should be an accomplice. But it is not
compulsory that he shall know in details each and everything regarding
the crime committed. The only condition for pardon is that he should
be an accomplice and pardon can be tendered to him on the condition
of making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within
his knowledge related to the offence.

iii) Offences for which pardon can be tendered

Pardon may be tendered under sub. Section (2) of section 306 Cr.P.C.
with respect of three classes of offences:-
(a) Offences triable exclusive by a Court of Session.
(b) Any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 7
years or with a more severe sentence.
(c) Any offence triable under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952.

In no cases the Magistrate can go beyond the limitations prescribed in


the Section 306 itself. While explaining it the court held that "where the
disclosure of the approver makes out certain subsidiary offences
committed by him, which do not come within the categories under this
section, the pardon granted cannot be said to include such subsidiary
offences notwithstanding the fact that they have been mentioned in the
application by police for tender of pardon or in the order of the
Magistrate granting pardon.
PAGE 12

iv) Stage for the exercise of the power

The provision of Sec. 306 Criminal Procedure Code makes it clear that a
pardon may be tendered at any stage of an investigation or trial or
injury38 even though the principal offender is absconding or after
framing a charge.
Chief Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate specified in sub-sec. (1) are
competent to tender at any stage of-
(i) the investigation.
(ii) any inquiry prior to the trial;
(iii) during the trial itself. This means that the power under s. 306(1) can
be exercised at any time after a case is received for trial and before its
conclusion.
A Magistrate of the First Class has no power to tender pardon during
investigation. He would be competent only during the inquiry or trial he
is himself holding.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the power to tender pardon to an
accomplice under Section 306 and 307 can be exercised at any fime
before the passing of the judgment. The pardon may be tendered even if
the previous request of the accused for pardon has been turned down.

v) Obligations on Accomplice
Since the tender of pardon to an accomplice is basically a part of contract
between the approver and the state hence if the pardon is tendered to an
accomplice he is also bound to perform his part of the contract. Such
type of a contract is entered only with one goal that is the punishment of
the accused persons involved in a criminal act.
In order to achieve such a goal the very basic requirement or
condition is that the approver shall accept the pardon. Once the
approver accepts the pardon then it is the turn of such approver to make
full and true disclosure of facts of the case. It has been held that the
approver must make such a disclosure before the committing Magistrate
and before the Sessions Court. He cannot withdraw it after making it
once.The tender of pardon to an approver has to precede and not to
follow on the making of full and true disclosure. There is no obligation
on the Magistrate to record the statement of the person before he is
tendered a pardon. The sole consideration in this regard is that he
should make a full and free disclosure of all facts within his knowledge
with regard to the offence. A witness making a self incriminatory
statement in the evidence voluntarily is not covered by Section 306 or
PAGE 13

307. The court may act in its discretion against him.


Therefore to conclude it can be said that the person whom pardon is
tendered is bound to disclose the complete and true disclosure of the
facts within his knowledge pertaining to the commission of the offence.
But at the same time it shall be taken care that the disclosure of facts is
free and voluntary.

• Effects of Pardon:
The effects of pardon granted under Section 306 or 307 of the code are
as under:
1. The grant of pardon carries with it the imputation of guilt and the
acceptance thereof a confession of it. It completely exempts the
individual from the punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is in substance and effect a contract between State and
the person to whom it is granted. But an accomplice selected for award of
pardon cannot be said to have obtained complete exoneration from guilt
till he complies with the terms of his undertaking
2. Where a pardon is tendered and is accepted under Section 306, the
accused person ceases to be an accused and becomes a witness thereafter.
The person to whom pardon has been tendered cannot be re-arrested for
the same offence or any other offence connected with that offence.
Where prosecution has been instituted ignoring the legal bar created by
the existence of an operative pardon, it would be an abuse of the process
of the court to continue such prosecution and the High Court can quash
the proceedings in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
3. The withdrawal of prosecution against the individual is not necessary
in cases where a pardon is tendered and accepted. But the prosecution
may be stayed till the trial of the case in which pardon is granted is over.
4. If the order of the Magistrate granting pardon also includes offences
not falling within Section 306 of the code, the person to whom the
pardon is granted cannot be treated as an approver and examined as such
in a trial which is concerned only with respect to an offence not falling
within this section. In other words if an order granting pardon also relates
to sections not falling under section 306 the accused can never be treated
as an approver.
5. The Supreme Court has held that the pardon extends to all connected
offences. But a pardon will not operate as a bar to trial for a distinct and
entirely different offence.
PAGE 14

•Consequences of breach of Conditions of


Pardon:
Pardon to an accomplice can be tendered under Sections 306 and 307
of the Code. This power to grant pardon carries with it the right to
impose a condition limiting the operation of such a pardon. Hence a
pardoning power can attach any condition, precedent or subsequent so
long it is not illegal, immoral or impossible of performance. The
Section 306 (1) clearly enjoins that the approver who was granted
pardon had to comply with the condition of full and true disclosure of
the facts and circumstances within his knowledge relative to the
commission of the offence under scrutiny.
It is quite possible that the approver may not comply with the
conditions of the pardon. In such type of situation the question arises
whether the person concerned be tried for the offence in respect of
which pardon was tendered to him alongwith the offence of giving false
evidence? The code itself provided the answers to this question.
Thus the breach of the condition results in a trial of the person
under the code for the offence in respect of which pardon was tendered
to him.
The Section 308 simply says that in case a person who accepted a
tender of pardon under section 306 or 307 willfully conceal anything
essential or gave false evidence or did not comply with the conditions
of the pardon such a person may be tried for the offence for which
pardon was tendered to him. He may also be tried for giving false
evidence as well with the prior permission of the High Court. But it can
be done only when first of all the Public Prosecutor certifies that the
approver has not complied with the conditions on which pardon was
tendered. This certificate of the Public Prosecutor was held to be a
condition precedent to the prosecution of an approver to whom a
tender of pardon has been made but who has failed to comply with the
conditions of tender of pardon.
While dealing with the question of the effect of the forfeiture of
pardon the Supreme Court held that this section provides that failure
to comply with the conditions on which the pardon was tendered
removes the protection provided under Section 306. Thus the approver
will be tried for the offences and will never enjoy the protection
provided to an approver.
Therefore, a pardon tendered under Section 306 or 307 can be revoked
PAGE 15

if the conditions of pardon are violated by the approve r. Such a person


will have to face prosecution for the commission of the offence wherein
he was an accomplice and for giving false evidenc e.

•Constitutional validity regarding


Exercise of Pardon powe r:
The philosophy underlying the pardon power is that "every civilized
country recognize s, and has therefore provided fo r, the pardoning
power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity in proper case s.
Without such a power of clemenc y, to be exercised by some department
or functionary of a governmen t, a country would be most imperfect and
deficient in its political moralit y, and in that attribute of Deity whose
judgments are always tempered with merc y."
It is necessary to keep in mind the salutary principle tha t: "To shut
up a man in prison longer than really necessary is not only bad for the
man himsel f, but also it is a useless piece of cruelt y, economically
wasteful and a source of loss to the communit y"
The power of pardon under criminal procedure draw its validity
from the constitution of Indi a. Section 306 C r . P .C in corporated
principles enshrined in various Articles of Indian constitution and does
not conflict with the fundamental rights provides by our constitutio n.
An elaborate comparison and explanation is discussed below -

( i) Section 306 and Art 14 of the constitutio n:-

Section 306 is enacted for the purpose of facilitating the securing of


evidence to establish a criminal offenc e. It was attacked on the ground
that it favours one accused person at the expense of the other accused
and hence it offends Ar t .14 of the Constitutio n.

The Madras High Court in Mohideen v state ofMadra s [1965 2Cr LJ 51 6]


held that the section refrains fro m' prosecution of one accused for
creation reasons enjoined by the statute in the interest of the successful
prosecution of certain other persons and getting the best evidence
possible against the m .It is not a case of failure to give protection to the
accused who are prosecute d, and hence the section does not offend Ar t.
14 of the Constitutio n.
PAGE 16

(ii) Section 306 Cr. P.C. and Art. 20 (3) of the Indian
Constitution:-
Article 20 (3) of the Constitution protects a person who is accused of an
offence that he shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself.
But as a co-accused accepts a pardon of his free will on condition of a
true disclosure in his own interest, and is not "compelled" to give self
incriminating evidence, the law in ss 306 and 308 Cr. P. Code is not
affected. He is a person who voluntarily answers questions from the
witness-box waives the privilege, because he is then not a witness against
himself but against others. The evidence of an accomplice cannot,
therefore, be ruled out because he could have been tried jointly with the
accused but was not and was instead to give evidence in the case.178 Art.
20(3) of the Constitution gives no right to the approver to refuse to
answer incriminating question because-
The moment he is granted pardon, he ceases to be an accused and
becomes a witness, and as a witness he is fully protected from
prosecution or conviction for incriminating statements made by him as
approver, by virtue of s. 132 of the Evidence act.
As on account of, Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution, no person accused
of an offence can be compelled to be a witness against himself. So the
compelled statement even of an approver cannot be used as evidence
against him in his subsequent trail.

(iii) Section 306 Cr.P.C. and Sect. 132 of Evidence Act:-

The approver is bound, by the terms of the pardon under s. 306 (1) to
answer any question even if the answer to such question is likely to
criminate him directly or indirectly, His protection lies under the
proviso to s. 132 of the Evidence Act, viz that the answer given by him
cannot be proved against him except in a prosecution for giving false
evidence by such answer.

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