Wrong QNH Setting
Wrong QNH Setting
Wrong QNH Setting
MISUNDERSTANDINGS -
WRONG QNH SETTING
A C9, operated by the US military, was Conclusion drawn by the air traffic
approaching a civil airport. The controller:
approach controller guided the aircraft
to the ILS during descent to an altitude If the correct QNH value is set for the
of 3000 FT. radar display, the actual altitude is
shown on the radar screen.
APP: “C9 descend altitude 3000 FT
QNH 996” Statement by the DFS Safety
C9: “Descending 3000 FT 996 C9” Management Department:
The pilot reported reaching 3000 FT The conclusion drawn by the ATCO is
but the Mode C indication on the radar correct since both the altimeter and
display said “A2400 FT”. The pilot con- radar data processing use 1013 hPa as
firmed being at A3000 FT, so a Mode C the reference value. For altitudes below
inaccuracy was assumed. After the air- the transition level, on-board as well as
craft had been cleared for ILS and had ground-based systems make a correc-
intercepted the LLZ, it was transferred tion according to the QNH set. In the
to the TWR frequency. incident described above, the altimeter
of the C9 had the wrong correction
When the pilot confirmed the QNH value (which the pilot cannot see!!)
after having been transferred from APP while the radar used the right correc-
to TWR, the cause of the presumed tion value and thus showed the actual
“Mode C inaccuracy” became apparent. altitude of the aircraft.
The pilot had misunderstood the QNH.
He had confused 996 hPa with 29.96 For values above 1000 hPa, the “1”
inches. The Mode C indication was clearly indicates that the air traffic con-
indeed correct; the aircraft was at an troller has given the value as hPa. For
altitude of 2400 FT. The difference QNH values below 1000 hPa, there is a
amounted to 19hPa, which corre- risk that (mainly US or military) pilots
sponds to approximately 570 FT (29.96 who are used to QNH values expressed
inches corresponds to 1015 hPa). in inches confuse the hPa QNH values
within the range of 900 with the QNH
The glide path was intercepted at values expressed in inches starting
A2400 FT. The ILS guided the aircraft with 29. The pilots appear to be used
safely to the airport despite the wrong to the missing “2”. This could perhaps
altitude. It does, however, raise the be the result of negligent phraseology
question as to what could have hap- applied by foreign colleagues ...
pened as a result of the wrong altime-
ter setting if the ILS had not been avail- According to present German
able but if an NDB approach had to be radiotelephony procedures, it is not
performed instead, with a low ceiling in mandatory to explicitly mention the
IMC. The OCA for an NDB approach to measurement unit of the QNH. In order
that airport is approximately 600 FT to avoid misunderstandings, however,
above aerodrome level; with an error of the following solutions might be advis-
570 FT, this would have only left 30 FT able for QNH < 1000 hPa.
or about 10m - with a considerable dis-
tance to cover before reaching the run- to add a preceding “0” (e.g. QNH
way! 0996), or
to add “hPa” (e.g. QNH 996 hPa).
LESSONS LEARNED Specifying the altitude reference Pilots from the USA and Canada
when this changes (e.g. “descend are accustomed to a standard TA
From the many lessons learned from to 3,000 feet QNH” or “set QNH 993 of 18,000 feet. There is therefore an
this and other incidents concerning hPa and descend to 3,000 feet”). enhanced risk of error when clear-
all members of the aviation commu- ing them to a flight level below
nity, the following relate particu- Passing the pressure setting to the 18,000 feet. This risk may be
larly to Air Traffic Controllers: pilot of a North American aircraft. reduced by repeating the clear-
In the USA and Canada, pressure ance (e.g. descend to flight level
The controller can reduce the likeli- settings are always expressed in one two zero I say again flight level
hood of error by paying close atten- in.Hg.; the pressure setting refer- one two zero).
tion to the use of standard phraseol- ence should therefore be stressed
ogy and by insisting on the correct (e.g. “set QNH 993 hPa,” not, “set
read-back procedure. 993”).
* The EUROCONTROL Level Bust Toolkit has been developed as a result of the EUROCONTROL Level Bust Initiative. It contains much important
information and advice to help combat the level bust threat. The EUROCONTROL Level Bust Toolkit may be obtained on CD ROM by contact-
ing the Coordinator Safety Improvements Initiative, Mr Tzvetomir Blajev, on tel.: +32 (02) 729 3965 fax: +32 (02) 729 9082
tzvetomir.blajev@eurocontrol.int