HISTORY IS A WEAPON consciousness knowledge of what American historians have chosen

to call (when they refer to it at all, which is seldom) the "Philippine

by Luzviminda Francisco (1973) One prize of victory is that the winners get to write the history
books. This was never so true as it has been about the Philippine-
American War, and this fact, more than any other, has denied to
*With apologies to Mexicans, American Indians and other early Filipinos all but the merest scraps of distorted information about one
victims of American imperialism. of the most heroic struggles ever waged in modern times; a struggle
waged against implacable odds and at terrible cost. The Philippine-
Introduction American War, by which name it should properly be known, is one
One of the most startling phenomena of recent Philippine history has of those bits of historiography which-like the American Indian Wars-
been the development of a popuiar movement calling for the seems to have sunk beneath the surface of popular awareness. 2 Most
relinquishing of Philippine sovereignty and for political re-union Americans have never heard of it, most Filipinos understand it only
with the U.S. as the 51st state. Although the "statehood movement" through the prism of the victors' own account of how the war was
was understandably treated as something of a joke when it first waged and won. And yet the Philippine-American War was one of
surfaced several years ago, its popular reception and rapid growth, those illuminating moments of history which threw a shaft of light on
especially in the face of surging Philippine nationalist and anti- an era. As far as Filipinos are concerned, an understanding of our
imperialist sentiments, demands that the movement and the ideology liberation struggle at the turn of the century is without question or
which it represents be carefully analyzed. doubt the prerequisite, the starting point for a genuine understanding
of modern Philippine society.
It may well be that the statehood movement is a curio, a quirk in the
Philippine body politic, a nostalgic last remembrance of colonialism, It is ironic that it has taken half a century and the remarkably similar
emerging now only to be inevitably and inexorably swept away by situation in Indochina to re-focus attention on the Philippine struggle
the tide of history. These are comforting thoughts, but there remain for national liberation against the forces of American imperial
some nagging doubts. Philippine nationalism has, historically, been aggression. In all, save the ultimate outcome, history has uncannily
poorly defined. For a myriad of reasons, American colonialism as repeated itself in Vietnam, a fact which should be driven home to
perceived by Filipinos has been qualitatively different from, say, American apologists who hold that Vietnam is an "aberration" of
Vietnamese perception of their relationship with the French. One U.S. policy, unrepresentative of American foreign policy in general,
must reluctantly conclude that perhaps the most serious cancer of but simply a situation brought about by a series of mistakes and
twentieth-century Philippine society has been the traumatizing effect miscalculations. Leaving aside the obvious fact that "mistake" is
of mystification and false consciousness regarding the American equated with being beaten, and the curious frequency with which
colonial period. For the student of Philippine history, such a state of imperialist "aberrations" seem to crop up, it is important for Filipinos
affairs is not merely discouraging or upsetting, it is tragic. This is to recognize that we must vindicate ourselves by comprehending our
true for many reasons, but it is especially true for one reason in own history. With such a view in mind and within the limits of this
particular. The degree to which Filipino false consciousness exists is essay, attention will be focused on the three aspects of the war which
the measure of American success in obliterating from popular are the most critical and yet, for reasons which are perhaps obvious,
have attracted the least amount of attention, let alone analysis. hispanized Chinese-mestizos began referring to themselves as
Therefore, attention will not be focused so much on the war against Filipinos, a term previously reserved for Spaniards born in the
Spain, which preceded the Philippine-American War, nor will it deal colony.) But the Propagandists made little headway against
with the political infighting in the Malolos Government or General entrenched and often reactionary Spanish authority.
Emilio Aguinaldo's surrenderist prevarications. Attention will be
focused on the nature of America's policy of aggression, the depth of The failure of the Propagandist efforts spurred the formation in 1892
popular mass resistance to the American forces and the duration of of the Katipunan, a secret society which, after some initial
the struggle in what became, ultimately, suicidal refusal to capitulate indecision, began to recognize the futility of the earlier reformist
to imperialism. efforts. By 1895 independence became an increasingly realistic
prospect. Spain was having a difficult time suppressing the Cubans,
Spain never had an easy time in pacifying its Philippine colony and who were then in revolt, and her ability to sustain a similar effort in
in the course of over three centuries of colonial rule, scarcely a year the Philippines was an open question. By 1896 Katipunan ranks had
went by which did not witness rebellion in one form or another swollen to 30,000 and fighting between the Katipunan forces and the
somewhere in the archipelago. The fragmented, insular nature of the Spanish commenced.
country and the separate regional, ethnic and language groupings
made it difficult to coordinate a nationwide anti-Spanish struggle, The founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, lost control over
but at times the Filipinos came close to achieving a broad united the organization in March 1897 when Emilio Aguinaldo was elected
front against the foreign foe. As early as 1587, for example, a secret as the head of a newly formed Revolutionary Central Government.
society was formed in Manila by Magat Salamat which spread After Aguinaldo's victory the revolutionary forces became
throughout Central Luzon to the Visayas and as far south as Borneo. increasingly prone to vacillation and compromise as a number of
This early movement was not typical, however, and it was to be frustrated elitist reformers began to attach themselves to the
more than 300 years before such unity of action was again achieved. organization.
Subsequent rebellions were commonly local or regional affairs,
sparked by local conditions and grievances. Sometimes they lasted In June a Provisional Republican Government was established at
for a surprisingly long period of time, as in Bohol, where Spanish Biak-Na-Bato, Bulacan, and this event initiated several months of
authority was denied for over eighty years. The Islamic areas of dilatory negotiation with the Spanish. The older Katipuneros argued
Mindanao and Sulu were never really conquered. for the continuation of the military struggle along guerrilla lines, but
the reformist and assimilationist elements began to see the possibility
Spain was always able to exploit divisions in Philippine society in of finally achieving their long-sought-after goals via negotiation.
such a way as to prevent a coordinated national struggle and this After hesitancy and debate, a compromise treaty was negotiated in
situation was maintained until the last decades of the nineteenth November by a wealthy mestizo, Pedro Paterno. Under the terms of
century. The rise of a native moneyed class, consisting mainly of the treaty, the Spanish governor general, Primo de Rivera, promised
Chinese-native (or Indio) mestizo elements, gave rise to a liberal to consider the reformist demands in exchange for the surrender of
reformist movement anxious to win greater political and economic the rebel army. Satisfied with such weak promises and even more by
concessions from Spain. The Propaganda Movement, as it came to the promised initial payment of P400,000 to himself and his staff,
be called, was essentially an assimilationist effort. Its leaders aimed, Aguinaldo and his men voluntarily exiled themselves to Hong Kong,
ultimately, at closer ties with Spain. (It was during this time that the
but Spanish refusal to promulgate reforms led to agitation for a majority vote as necessitated by the Constitution. When Congress
renewed military confrontation. reconvened in January 1899, the pro-annexationist faction in the
Senate held a clear majority, but were one or two votes shy of the
Fighting broke out again in February 1898 and by May, when the required two-thirds majority they needed to ratify the treaty. Voting
American Commodore George Dewey steamed into Manila Bay to on the treaty was scheduled for Monday, February 6, and during the
attack the Spanish fleet, the Spanish Army (the Guardia Civil) had week preceding it seemed fairly clear to most observers that the
been all but thoroughly beaten. The Spanish, in fact, controlled only McKinley Administration was not likely to rally enough support in
the area of the old walled city of Manila. Aguinaldo had, meanwhile, the Senate to win ratification. By implication, this put American
been intermittently negotiating with the Americans in Hong Kong retention of the Philippines in jeopardy. 3
and Singapore, and he returned to the Philippines to resume
command of the Filipino forces with Dewey's sanction and with In the Philippines, insults-and occasionally shots-were being traded
(verbal) assurances that the Americans would aid the Filipinos in across the trenches by the two opposing armies throughout the month
securing their independence. of January. But war did not come until the evening of February 4,
1899, when general fighting erupted all along the line. The American
A three-way stalemate persisted until August, Dewey in Manila Bay command in Manila claimed at the time that the Filipinos initiated
without forces to land, the Spanish holed up in the walled city, and the fighting, but there seems little doubt that the Americans
the Filipinos dug in along the perimeter of the city. The Spanish themselves started the war and as much was later admitted by U.S.
decided they would rather surrender to the Americans than to the commanders. That the outbreak of the war was carefully orchestrated
Filipinos and in August 1898 a bizarre, tragi-comic "battle" was to influence the outcome of the treaty vote in the Senate seems
quite literally staged between the Spanish and the Americans, almost beyond question, and although initiating a war to influence
ostensibly to preserve Spanish "honor"-although six died in the farce. the passage of legislation seems a tactic singularly lacking in
The resulting surrender terminated three centuries of Spanish subtlety, historically it seems to work and in this instance it proved
colonialism and the American forces, newly reinforced, took successful. The news of the fighting-and the false information as to
possession of Manila. its instigation- was wired to Washington and its dramatic effect
persuaded the Senate to ratify the treaty by a margin of one vote.
By autumn 1898 it was clear that the Americans intended to retain
the Philippines as a Pacific colony. American troop strength was The First Battle
increasing and Admiral Dewey showed no sign of weighing anchor. From the very beginning, superior American firepower had a telling
Battle lines around Manila continued to be drawn roughly as they effect, and although the Filipino troops bravely stood their ground,
had remained at the end of the mock battle against the Spanish in the weaponry ensured the one-sidedness of the conflict. Dewey steamed
previous August. The Americans held the city and had trenches up the Pasig River and fired SOO-pound shells into the Filipino
along its perimeter, facing Filipino trenches along a semi-circle of trenches at close range with pulverizing effectiveness. The first battle
several miles. was so one-sided that the American troops jokingly referred to it as a
"quail shoot" and dead Filipinos were piled so high that the
The Treaty of Paris, designed to end the war with Spain and to cede Americans used the bodies for breastworks. A British witness to the
the Phlippines to the U.S., was signed in December and awaited
confirmation in the U.S. Senate, which required a two-thirds
carnage commented, "This is not war; it is simply massacre and the fighting ability of the Philippine Army. They referred to the
murderous butchery." 4 Filipinos as "niggers," "barbarians," and "savages," reflecting both
Although the Americans had been sending reinforcements to the the racist and imperialist attitudes of American society at large.
Philippines throughout the fall of 1898 (there were 21,000 U.S.
troops in the Islands by the start of the war) they were still The Americans were elated by their initial success and their
outnumbered by the Filipinos. But the Filipino troops were at a commander, the rather wooden and unimaginative Gen. Elwell Otis,
dreadful disadvantage owing to their lack of rifles. Only one man in confidently predicted that the war would be ended in a matter of
three had a gun; others fought with bolos and spears or simply weeks. Otis had convinced himself that the opposition to U.S. rule
waited to snatch up a rifle from a fallen comrade. Although s~me of came only from the Tagalog "tribe," which (it was claimed) was only
their weapons were fairly new Remingtons and Mausers captured one of eighty or so "tribes" in the Philippines. This theme, which was
from the Spanish or smuggled in from abroad, many were rust-eaten trotted out by domestic U.S. annexationists at every opportunity,
museum pieces, more dangerous to the user than to the intended gave the impression that the war in the Philippines was but a slight
target. variation of the familiar Indian wars of the American West.

Thousands of Filipinos were killed in the first battle, hundreds more After the devastating first battle, the Filipino Army retreated into
died soon after from wounds.5 Few prisoners were taken by the Central Luzon, fighting rear-guard actions as it went. Malolos,
Americans, and Red Cross personnel reported an extremely high capital of the Philippine Republic, quickly fell and within the
ratio of dead to wounded on the battlefield, indicating"... the conventional framework within which he was operating, Otis
determination of our soldiers to kill every native in sight ... "6 equated this event with the fall of the Philippine Government, which
in turn would mean the surrender of the Philippine Army. Or so he
For the Filipino patriots, the opening battle in what proved to be one hoped. Confident predictions of imminent victory were forthcoming
of the longest and bloodiest wars in the sorry history of imperial again and it was with some degree of dismay that the Americans
aggression produced two sharp lessons. It was clear that the Filipinos began to realize that Aguinaldo considered his "capital" to be
could not hope to survive by fighting on American terms of fixed wherever he himself happened to be camped-which was always just
position, set-piece battles in the classical military tradition. The out of reach of the slow-moving American columns. It was with a
Philippine Army was quickly forced to resort to mobile warfare growing sense of uneasiness that the American command began to
where their su perior knowledge of the terrain and the universal realize that the further they were drawn into Central Luzon and the
support they enjoyed among the people could be utilized to their more they had to disperse their forces, the more difficult it became to
advantage. defend themselves against counter-attack, ambush, and harassment
by the highly mobile Philippine Army, which was itself free of the
Although an overt policy of guerrilla war was not specifically need for the ponderous supply chain required by the Americans. The
enunciated until the following November, guerrilla tactics were odds, which were so disastrously against the Filipinos in early
employed out of necessity immediately after the initial rout at February, began to even up.
Manila. The first battle also indicated to the Filipinos that they were
faced with a foe which gave no quarter and which was prepared to There was another-and to the more perceptive American
disregard the fundamental rules of warfare. The Americans were commanders, rather more disturbing-character to the fighting. It
contemptuous of Filipinos generally and they had little respect for gradually dawned on the Americans that the reason the Filipino
troops could move around so easily without concern for a supply affairs, but on June 10, 1899, in Laguna, Filipino Generals Ricarte
base, and the reason information and advice were so difficult to elicit and Noriel with 3,000 men caught an American division of 4,000 in
from the native population, were due to the fact that the Aguinaldo a cross-fire ambush and cut it to pieces. Battles of this size became
government and the Philippine nationalist cause had the total support increasingly rare, however.
of the Philippine masses. They slowly began to realize that their
major foe was not really the formally constituted, but in many ways By October all the American reinforcements had arrived and it was
ineffectual, Philippine Army; rather, it was the Filipino people, who, decided that the best way to terminate the war was to capture
having finally gotten rid of the Spanish, were unrelentingly and Aguinaldo and his staff. An ambitious three-pronged encirclement
implacably hostile to American imperialist designs. The implications campaign, encompassing the whole of Central Luzon, was decided
of this understanding were fully realized only later and in the upon. One column went north from Manila along the rail line,
bloodiest manner imaginable. But as early as April 1899, General another went by sea to the Lingayen Gulf port of Dagupan, and a
Shafter gave grisly portent to the future conduct of the war: "It may third went north from Manila along the eastern rim of the Central
be necessary to kill half the Filipinos in order that the remaining half Luzon plain in a giant pincer movement. The idea was to prevent
of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of life than their Aguinaldo's escape into the mountains of northern Luzon.
present semi-barbarous state affords."7
Aguinaldo did manage to escape, however, and from his mountain
The American command had presumably been taken in by its own headquarters he issued orders to formally adopt the guerrilla policy.
press releases. Gen. Arthur MacArthur 8, Otis's subordinate (and later While there was ambivalence about this move from some of the
replacement), commented, "... I believed that Aguinaldo's troops more orthodox members of Aguinaldo's staff, the directive in
represented only a faction. I did not like to believe that the whole actuality simply reflected the de facto situation and the hopelessness
population of Luzon-the native population, that is-was opposed to of engaging in frontal and positional warfare against the vastly
us..."9 But this he was "reluctantly compelled" to believe because the strengthened U.S. forces. Political circumstances also dictated a
"unique system of warfare" employed by the Filipino Army" ... policy of protracted warfare. The Filipinos began to realize that
depended upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native although outright military victory was unlikely at best, simply by
population." 10 keeping their forces intact they preserved the possibility of an
ultimate political victory.
With the approach of summer and with victory still beyond their
grasp, the War Department began to suggest to Otis that he might The Filipinos had some knowledge of the divisions being created in
need more troops. Embarrassed by his earlier confident predictions American society by the McKinley Administration's imperialist
and even more so by his growing inability to produce tangible policy. The Anti-Imperialist League was strongly condemning the
results, he at first declined the offer, but then he reversed himself and war and the opposition Democrats were taking a position against the
surprised the Department by asking for 60,000 more troops. Otis was retention of the Philippines. It appeared likely, even a year before the
limited by his textbook approach to war and failed to realize that event, that the November 1900 presidential election would be fought
American "victories" in which the Filipinos were "scattered" or on the issue of McKinley's colonial policy. This held out some hope
"routed" were next to meaningless. Otis was, in keeping with the at least for a political settlement of the war favorable to the
time-honored phrase, winning the battles but losing the war. Few of Philippines.
the battles were actually more than skirmishes and hit-and-run
The war took on a somewhat new character after the completion of of minor affairs resulted, some of which reached the dignity of
the Central Luzon campaign. From November 1899, the U.S. combats."12
considered the entire Philippines to be occupied territory-as indeed it
was-and the American command set about establishing garrisons A major problem for the Americans resulted from their inability to
throughout Luzon and the rest of the country. Filipino guerrillas were penetrate the guerrilla infrastructure. They soon began to realize, to
no longer treated as soldiers of an opposing army but were their dismay, that a whole underground network of dual government
considered to be bandits and common criminals (ladrones). When loyal to the guerrillas existed, even in areas considered thoroughly
captured they were treated as such. With the break-up of the "pacified." When a town was occupied the stars and stripes flew, and
Philippine Army, Otis once again felt he had victory within his grasp gratifying expressions of loyalty and support for the American cause
. Even MacArthur, usually more realistic about such matters, were publicly proclaimed by town officials. But reliable information
announced, "The so-called Filipino Republic is destroyed."11 But two about the guerrillas was almost never forthcoming, supplies and
developments forced them to once again regret their sanguine reports equipment were forever disappearing, and occasionally an American
to the War Department. First, the fighting simply continued. Chasing soldier would stray too far from camp and be found the next day
Aguinaldo into the mountains had made no difference, breaking up hacked to pieces by bolo. Albert Robinson, one of a handful of
the Filipino Army made no difference, and garrisoning the American newsmen covering the war (and the most ingenious when
archipelago simply invited guerrilla attacks on isolated outposts. it came to circumventing Otis's strict censorship), wrote that
Secondly, as the Americans spread their forces and their garrisons to unqualified U.S. control in the Islands extended "about as far as a
other areas of Luzon and to other islands, they found they were Krag-Jorgensen could throw a bullet."13
confronted with exactly the same kind of public hostility and
guerrilla opposition which characterized the situation in Central By early 1900 U.S. outposts were being established everywhere. 14 As
Luzon. The notion that opposition to the U.S. was confined to. the a rule the Filipinos allowed the Americans to capture and occupy any
Tagalogs was simply wrong. The Americans were at war with seven town they wished without opposition. Otis was so deceived by this
million Filipino people and wherever they went in the Islands they that he once again declared flatly that the war was over, hoping
took the war with them-a disconcerting state of affairs and one to perhaps that repetition of the statement would make it so. But the
which Otis could never reconcile himself. garrison network seriously thinned the U.S. troop strength and the
Americans were continually being counterattacked and ambushed. It
Settling in for a Long War was becoming clear that the entire Islands would have to be
The war, far from being over, had entered a new and far more "pacified." Moreover, guerrilla activity was both increasing and
difficult phase for the Americans. The enemy was now no longer becoming increasingly effective. Being incessantly ambushed,
simply the Philippine Army, the remnants of which had been boloed and betrayed was nerve-wracking and the Americans began
scattered over the whole of Luzon in any case. Now the Americans to exercise their mounting frustration on the population at large. All
found themselves harassed and attacked throughout the Islands by the "niggers" were enemies, whether or not they bore arms. Patrols
poorly trained and poorly organized but fanatically determined sent to fight the guerrillas usually had difficulty locating the enemy
peasant irregulars. MacArthur observed: " ... all regular and and often simply resorted to burning barrios in their path. Village
systematic tactical operations ceased; but as hostile contact was officials were often forced at bayonet point to lead American patrols,
established throughout the entire zone of activity an infinite number and non-combatants began to be held responsible for the actions of
the guerrillas. Any form of resistance to American objectives Lack of firearms indeed continued to be perhaps the single most
subjected the perpetrator to a charge of treason. pressing problem for the Filipinos. By mid-1900 they had at most
20,000 rifles, meaning that only one partisan in four was actually
Press censorship was so effective that few Americans actually knew armed. The American naval blockade made it all but impossible to
the difficulties being experienced in the Philippines-or, in fact, that o,btain arms and supplies from abroad and although efforts were
there were 70,000 U.S. troops in the Islands. In early 1900 the first made to manufacture gunpowder locally, cartridge shells had to be
whiff of scandal reached American shores when it was disclosed that used over and over to the point of uselessness. The Filipinos had to
the American forces had been issued expanding "dum-dum" bullets, adapt to their limitations as best they could. They stood up to the
in contravention of the 1899 Hague Convention concerning humane heavily armed Americans with spears, darts, the ubiquitous bolo, and
warfare (which the U.S. had conveniently neglected to ratify). even stones, prompting General Lawton to remark, " ... they are the
Reports of the burning of villages, the killing of non-combatants and bravest men I have ever seen."17
the application of the "water cure" to elicit information began to
filter back to the U.S. Often this information was contained in letters The Filipinos used conditions to their advantage; they laid booby
written by U.S. soldiers to their families which found their way into traps, they attacked at night and during driving tropical rainstorms,
local newspapers. A typical example: "On Thursday, March 29th and they ambushed the Americans by getting as close as possible by
[19001 ... eighteen of my company killed seventy-five nigger stealth and employing their bolos at close quarters, thus neutralizing
bolomen and ten of the nigger gunners .... When we find one who is the disparity in firepower. The American troops, who depended so
not dead, we have bayonets ..."15 heavily on their weapons, were frightened by the ferocity of such
attacks, especially as the Filipinos often made up in numbers what
Such atrocities were systematically denied by the War Department. they lacked in firepower. But such tactics were difficult to maintain
When the evidence was irrefutable, they were minimized and as the Filipinos almost invariably took heavy losses even in victory.
countered with examples of Filipino "barbarity." A standard response In bolo fights the American dead were inevitably mutilated in the
was that "harsh" methods had to be employed against "savages." As course of the fighting, a situation which the War Department was
the war progressed and as American atrocities became routinized, so quick to capitalize on as evidence of the "savagery" of the Filipino
did platitudinous defenses of American action. MacArthur called it guerrillas, thus justifying, to themselves at least, all manner of
"the most legitimate and humane war ever conducted on the face of retaliatory slaughter.
the earth." Senator Foraker, a staunch defender of annexation,
announced solemnly (and with a touch of unintended irony), "Our Otis was clearly unsuited for his job. His frequent pronouncements
army has shown in this work a surprising degree of humanity." of victory and his incompetent handling of the war were proving to
be an embarrassment to the McKinley Administration, which was
General Shafter, who, it will be recalled, was not averse to killing nervously anticipating the forthcoming presidential election.
half of the Filipino people in the name of this mission civilisatrice, Accordingly, Otis resigned "for pressing personal reasons" and was
was becoming preoccupied with the idea and had worked out a new replaced by General MacArthur. MacArthur had had experience in
reason to wipe out half .of the Island population. "My plan," he the American Indian wars and he, more than anyone on Otis's staff,
disclosed in January 1900, "would be to disarm the natives of the understood the wide-ranging implications of the problems then
Philippine Islands, even if we have to kill half of them to do it."16 confronting the American expeditionary force in the Philippines. A
convinced imperialist, he was also a realist. He openly admitted that
the Filipinos hated the Americans and he did not flinch from issue in the 1900 campaign. The Filipinos hoped to topple the
estimating that it would take "ten years of bayonet treatment" to "imperialist party" of McKinley by launching an offensive just
subdue the Filipino peopie-a prescient observation, as it turned out. before the election, and September and October saw some of the
sharpest fighting of the war. In spite of these efforts the question of
Heavy fighting coincided with the change in command and it was the Philippines never became the issue it might have been. Aided by
remarked that when he left, Otis " ... had the situation so little in heavy press censorship and the inability to obtain independent
hand that to go six miles out of Manila without a company furnished information on the Philippine situation, McKinley predictably
plenty of wholesome excitement,"18 With one eye on the upcoming pointed to the Taft Government as proof that all was going well in
November election, McKinley also sent a federal judge, William the Islands. Bryan, moreover, was a rank political opportunist. By his
Howard Taft, to Manila with instructions to establish a "civilian" own admission he had supported ratification of the Paris treaty
government in the Islands no later than September 1, 1900. The simply in order to provide himself with what he thought would be a
move was purely a public relations venture designed to trick the good issue with which to attack the Republicans. When he began to
American voters into thinking all was progressing smoothly in the see that his anti-colonial-position was hurting his campaign rather
Philippines. Taft was densely ignorant about the Philippines19 but he than helping, he backpedaled furiously and quickly compromised
knew enough about class society to detect a certain amount of himself, arguing now for a vaguely defined American "protectorate"
pliability in the upper-class elements in the country. This group, for the Philippines. In any event, both McKinley and Bryan
composed largely of mestizo landlords and export agriculture perceived that the electorate was bored by the Philippine issue and
interests, had been largely ignored by the U.S. military command, by the end of the campaign it had been quietly dropped by both
but Taft set out to woo them, appealing to their economic interests by candidates.
offering protected markets for their agricultural products in the U.S.
The effort bore fruit insofar as Taft was able-on cue-to establish his Predictably perhaps, McKinley was an easy victor. The result was a
Civil Government on September 1. Laced as it was with quislings crushing blow for the Filipino guerrilla leaders who had counted
and traitors-Buencamino, Legarda, Luzuriaga and, inevitably, Pedro heavily-too heavily-on a Bryan victory. Indeed, the guerrilla
Paterno notable among them-the Taft regime was a useful leadership began to falter badly after November and the surrender of
propaganda weapon and it provided the Americans with another several commanders (with men and guns) was a sharp blow to the
excuse to prosecute the war. Having created puppets, the Filipino cause. The theory of protracted war was, of course, only
continuation of the war and the retention of the Philippines were imperfectly understood, and with U.S. strength at its peak of 75,000
necessary to protect those who "loyally sided with the Americans" men the struggle began to take on suicidal overtones. 21 The class
against potential and future revenge at the hands of the guerrillas. divisions within the Filipino forces began now to emerge. The
With, one presumes, appropriate sarcasm, one American officers, like Aguinaldo himself, were usually fairly well educated
Congressman commented, " ... and so it appears that in order to keep and came largely from middle-class backgrounds; the ranks were
them from shooting each other down we have got to go in and shoot invariably filled by men of peasant origins. The American command
them down first."20 played upon these class divisions and treated surrendering
commanders with the respect due to fellow "officers and gentlemen,"
With the nomination of William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic sometimes dangling choice civil service positions as inducement for
presidential candidate, the question of American colonialism and officers to defect.
continued military intervention appeared likely to become a major
Despite MacArthur's claim, American conduct of the war heretofore neutrals. Everyone was now considered an active guerrilla or a
had not been the "most humane" in human history, as attested by the guerrilla supporter. Thus in the Visayas campaign the Navy felt free
countless and documented examples of callous and brutal conduct to shell the coastal villages with its gunboats prior to invasion. In
which were already being recorded. But in the autumn of 1900 there January and February 1901, the entire popUlation of Marinduque
was a perceptible alteration in American tactics. Tired of being Island (pop. 51,000) was ordered into five concentration camps set
chronically harassed and boloed by the Filipinos and finding it up by the Americans. All those who did not comply with the order"
difficult to pin the guerrillas down in the kind of conventional ... would be considered as acting in sympathy with the insurgent
firefight they so urgently desired, the Americans began to resort to forces and treated accordingly."24 This was to be the first of many
revanchist attitudes and policies. If the American command had ever instances of the application of the reconcentrado policy in the
believed they enjoyed any popular support in the Philippines (apart Philippines. Ironically, it was the abhorrence of just this sort of
from the handful of wealthy puppets serving in the Taft regime), a policy-when it was practiced by the Spanish General "Butcher"
year and a half of war certainly dispelled any continued illusions on Weyler in Cuba-which so exercised American public opinion against
the matter. If the people su pported the guerrillas then the people Spain prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.25
must also be classified as the enemy. The grim implications of such
an evaluation were beginning to emerge, although the fiction that In April 1901 major operations began in northern Luzon. The
widespread public support for the U.S. existed in the Islands was frequent examples of A~etican terror tactics which had heretofore
maintained for domestic U.S. consumption. Terrorism, it was occurred were, arguably, the acts of individual units in at least
explained, was the only reason Filipinos gave any support at all to technical violation of overall U.S. policy. With the advent of the
their guerrilla brethren, the only reason people did not welcome the northern Luzon campaign such pretensions and qualifications could
foreign occupying force with open arms. "Without this system of no longer be maintained. If the people sympathized with and
terrorism," Taft allowed, "the guerrilla campaign would have ended supported the guerrillas, and if, indeed, this was a "people's war,"
very quickly."22 MacArthur was not deluded by such fantasties: then the only solution was war against the people. The Amecican
Governor of Abra Province described the "depopulation campaign"
the success of this unique system of war depends upon almost in the following terms: "Whole villages had been burned,
complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such storehouses and crops had been destroyed and the entire province
unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; ... fear as the was as devoid of food products as was the valley of Shenandoah
only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and after Sheridan's raid during the Civil War."26 An American
apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One congressman who visited the Philippines, and who preferred to
traitor in each town would effectively destroy such a complex remain anonymous, spoke frankly about the results of the campaign:
organization.23 "You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon," he
"Pacification" Begins in Earnest reported, "because there isn't anybody there to rebel. . . . The good
Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put
In December 1900, with the election safely out of the way, martial
under ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records;
law was declared and the pretense of civil government was scrapped.
they simply swept the country and wherever and whenever they
American operations were extended to southern Luzon and to the
could get hold of a Filipino they killed him."27
Visayan islands of Leyte, Samar, Panay, Negros and Cebu. As far as
the American command was concerned there were no longer any
The observation that no records were kept of operations of this kind proving to be every bit as difficult for the Americans as Aguinaldo
later became a point of contention as'news of the atrocities began to had been.
leak out. A case in point was the murder of approximately 1,000
Filipino prisoners of war in Sorsogon. Eyewitnesses (U.S. soldiers) In August, General Smith invaded Panay Island and repeated the
testified that the prisoners were forced to dig their own graves in scorched-earth tactics employed in Abra. "The 18th regulars marched
groups of twenty and that each then received one bullet in the from Iloilo in the south to Capiz [now Roxas] ... in the north under
temple. When confronted with this evidence the War Department orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result
dismissed it out of hand: "No report has been received at the War was they left a strip of land 60 miles wide from one end of the island
Department in respect of or referring to the alleged incident."28 This to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have flown
became standard government response to such charges, even when without provision."30
the orders themselves necessarily implied butchery, as when Gen.
"Howlin' Jake" Smith ordered his men to kill "everything over ten" On the eve of the Samar campaign, the war was clearly degenerating
in the notorious Samar campaign. (In that particular instance the War into mass slaughter. It was hardly precise to call it "war" any longer.
Department rather feebly declared that their records "did not The Americans were simply chasing ragged, poorly armed bands of
indicate" that the order-which was admitted-was ever carried out, guerrillas and, failing to catch them, were inflicting the severest
eyewitness testimony of American soldiers engaged in the campaign punishment on those they could catch-the people of the villages and
notwithstanding.) barrios of the theater of operation. U.S. commanders were becoming
increasingly outspoken about the true nature of their policy. Chaffee
Also in April 1901, Aguinaldo was finally captured. The Americans wrote in September, " ... we are dealing with a class of people whose
had been so unsuccessful at trying to catch him that for a long period character is deceitful, who are absolutely hostile to the white race
they simply gave up the effort. But an intercepted message resulted and who regard life as of little value and, finally, who will not submit
in a daring raid led by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston29 and to our control until absolutely defeated and whipped into such
Aguinaldo's capture. The Americans were delighted with the news, condition."31 The American command even developed a new term
which made banner headlines in the U.S. Taft felt the war was as for the kind of warfare they were engaged in, calling it "protective
good as over, especially after he persuaded Aguinaldo to sign an oath retribution." Semantic nonsense, perhaps, but its meaning was not
of allegiance and a proclamation calling upon his erstwhile comrades lost on the intended victims.
to give up the struggle. Aguinaldo did inore damage to his place in
the history books than he did to the Filipino cause, however, and the In late September, in the town of Balangiga, Samar, American troops
Americans were dismayed to discover that his capture and surrender had for some time been abusing the townspeople by packing them
appeal made no perceptible difference in the fighting, which into open wooden pens at night where they were forced to sleep
continued unabated. This was too much for MacArthur, who standing in the rain. Several score of guerrilla Gen. Vicente Lukban's
resigned and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee. bolomen infiltrated the town and on the morning of September 28,
while the Americans were eating their breakfast, Lukban's men
By mid-summer 1901, the focus of the war started to shift south of suddenly fell upon them. Heads dropped into breakfast dishes. Fifty-
Manila. Some of the guerrilla leaders of Northern and Central Luzon four Americans were boloed to death, and few of the eighteen
who were close to Aguinaldo began to surrender. Others held out, survivors escaped serious injury.32
however, and Gen. Miguel Malvar, operating in Batangas, was
The Balangiga massacre initiated a reign of terror the likes of which Samar campaign mark the end of this kind of practice, despite the
had not yet been seen in this war. General Smith, fresh from his heavy criticism it provoked. If anything, the Batangas campaign
"victories" in northern Luzon and Panay, was chosen to lead the which followed Samar by a few months was even more "pinching"-
American mission of revenge. Smith's orders to his men embarking to use the then-current euphemism for such pogroms. Indeed,
upon the Samar campaign could not have been more explicit: "Kill General Smith could legitimately defend himself the way Waller had
and burn, kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the done. He was, in fact, simply following orders. His superior and the
more you please me." It was, said Smith, "no time to take prisoners." overall U.S. commander in the Philippines, General Chaffee, was as
War was to be waged "in the sharpest and most decisive manner explicit as Smith, although he expressed himself somewhat less
possible." When asked to define the age limit for killing, Smith gave flamboyantly when he wrote on the eve of the Samar campaign:
his infamous reply: "Everything over ten." Smith ordered Samar to
be turned into a "howling wilderness' so that "even the birds could ... it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible; and both officers
not live there." It was boasted that" ... what fire and water [i.e., water and men must be cordially supported in this duty in this regard.
torture] ... had done in Panay, water and fire would do in There is one thing necessary; and that is the wholesome fear by these
Samar."33The now-familiar pattern of operations began once again. people of the Army, and that every hostile motion of any inhabitants
All inhabitants of the island (pop. 266,000) were ordered to present toward the troops will be quickly and severely punished. . .. It is to
themselves to detention camps in several of the larger coastal towns. our interest to disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and
Those who did not (or those who did not make it their business to any means to that end is advisable.37[emphasis added]
learn of the existence of the order), and were found outside the Even if the American commanders issued inhuman and draconian
detention camp perimeter, would be shot "and no questions asked." orders, the War Department argued that of course the men would not
Few reporters covered the carnage; one who did noted:"During my actually obey them. In Senate hearings, the obsequious Beveridge
stay in Samar the only prisoners that were made ... were taken by was at pains to make this point:
Waller's command;34 and I heard this act criticized by the highest Sen. Beveridge: The general conduct of our soldiers and officers
officers as a mistake .... The truth is, the struggle in Samar is one of there, irrespective of orders from headquarters, was in the direction
extermination."35 of kindness, mercy and humanity, was it? [emphasis added]
Gen. MacArthur: Absolutely, Sir. 38
When Smith's barbaric and outrageous orders gained him public
notoriety, the War Department attempted to portray his Samar But in spite of MacArthur's implicit faith in the propensity of his
campaign as an aberration of standard practices. Samar was a men to disobey orders (one imagines it would have been interesting
deviation from a war which (according to one typically gushing to hear from Major Waller on this score), information about the true
statement from the Secretary of War) " ... has been conducted by the nature of the conduct of the war came, as usual, from the soldiers
Army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare with themselves. 39 One letter, which was later republished in the New
careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and non- York World, gives an indication of what the Filipinos were up
combatant, with self-restraint and with humanity never surpassed if against. It bears reproduction in its entirety:
ever equalled in any conflict, worthy only of praise, and reflecting
'credit upon the American people."36 In actuality the Samar campaign It was on the 27th of December, the anniversary of my birth, and I
was simply a stronger dose of the same kind of extermination policy shall never forget the scenes I witnessed that day. As we approached
previously conducted in northern Luzon and in Panay. Nor did the the town the word passed along the line that there would be no
prisoners taken. It meant we were to shoot every living thing in been conducted with marked humanity and magnanimity on the part
sight-man woman or child. of the U.S."41 Major General Wheaton: "Unexampled patience was
The first shot was fired by the then 1st Sergeant of our company. His exercised throughout the department in the treatment of these
target was a mere boy, who was coming down the mountain path into savages [sic]."42General Hughes: "The policy as practiced in the
town astride of a carabao. The boy was not struck by the bullet, but Philippines has no element of cruelty in it."43 Governor Taft: " ... it is
that was not the Sergeant's fault. The little Filipino boy slid from the my deliberate judgment that there never was a war conducted,
back of his carabao and fled in terror up the mountain side. Half a whether against inferior races or not, in which there were more
dozen shots were fired after him. compassion and more restraint and more generosity
..."44 Furthermore, were it not for the bleeding hearts and hand-
The shooting now had attracted the villagers, who came out of their wringers back home who, by criticizing the army, were encouraging
homes in alarm, wondering what it all meant. They offered no the enemy to resist, "the insurrection would have been suppressed
offense, did not display a weapon, made no hostile movement finally in January 1900," according to General Funston. 45
whatsoever, but they were ruthlessly shot down in cold blood, men,
women and children. The poor natives huddled together or fled in The Batangas Campaign
terror. Many were pursued and killed on the spot. Two old men, As Smith ravaged Samar, General Malvar and his men carried on the
bearing a white flag and clasping hands like two brothers, guerrilla struggle in Batangas, Tayabas, Laguna and Cavite. With
approached the lines. Their hair was white. Tbey fairly tottered, they General Smith already occupied, command of the Batangas
were so feeble under the weight of years. To my horror and that of campaign was given to Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell. By word and by
the other men in the command, the order was given to fire and the deed, Bell made it clear that he was not going to be put in the shade
two old men were shot down in their tracks. We entered the village. by his brother officer when it came to slaughtering Filipinos. Even
A man who had been on a sickbed appeared at the doorway of his before he took command, Bell made his feelings known in
home. He received a bullet in the abdomen and fell dead in the unmistakable terms. "All consideration and regard for the inhabitants
doorway. Dum dum bullets were used in the massacre, but we were of this place cease from the day I become commander," he said. "I
not told the name of the bullets. We didn't have to be told. We knew have the force and authority to do whatever seems to me good and
what they were. In another part of the village a mother with a babe at especially to humiliate all those in this Province who have any
her breast and two young children at her side pleaded for mercy. She pride...."46
feared to leave her home which had just been fired-accidentally, I
believe. She faced the flames with her children, and not a hand was Beginning in early December 1901 and continuing for the rest of the
raised to save her or the little ones. They perished miserably. It was month, Bell issued a frightening series of orders. On December 8 he
sure death if she left the house-it was sure death if she remained. She began setting up his concentration camps. The people of Batangas
feared the American soldiers, however, worse than the devouring had two weeks in which to move into the garrisons. Everything lying
flames. 40 outside the perimeter of the camps was subject to confiscation or
destruction. Anyone found there would automatically be considered
In the face of mounting and irrefutable evidence of the true conduct an "insurgent." Neutrality was not to be entertained. Everyone
of the war, the War Department resorted to by-now-standard "should either be an active friend or classified as an enemy." How
procedure-deny, minimize, obliterate charges and criticism with a did one become an "active friend"? "The only acceptable and
blizzard of rhetorical overkill. Secretary Root: "... the warfare has
convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either individuals or need a thrashing," Bell announced on the day after Christmas. " ... I
town councils should be such acts publicly performed as must have become convinced that within two months at the outside there
inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by will be no more insurrection in this brigade, and nothing for
arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element." conspirators to negotiate about." Since " ... practically the entire
How did one arouse the animosity and opposition of the "insurgent population has been hostile to us at heart ... it is necessary to make
element"? By guiding troops to the camps of the enemy, by publicly the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more
identifying "insurgents," by accompanying troops in operations efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of
against the guerrillas, by denouncing the "enemy" publicly, and by the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living
identifying secret guerrilla supporters. Suspicion of aiding the under such conditions will soon become unbearable." Batangas, Bell
guerrillas in any way was sufficient cause for arrest without charge concluded, will "be thoroughly sear~hed and devastated."51
and incarceration for an indefinite period of time. "It is not necessary
to wait for sufficient evidence to lead to a conviction by a court. "47 Beginning January 1, 1901, as promised, Batangas was indeed
thoroughly searched and devastated, as were the neighboring
Bell's subordinates were given the widest latitude: "Commanding provinces. Bell assembled 2,500 men in columns of 50 and the hunt
officers are urged to use their discretion freely in adopting any or all for Malvar was on. Expecting to destroy everything, Bell was at least
measures of warfare...." The people of Batangas were to be made to as ruthless as Smith had been in the preceding extermination
"want peace and want it badly." On December 13, Bell announced campaigns. The details of the concentration camp policy were, by
that the killing of American troops would be paid back in kind. now, depressingly familiar. Filipinos were rounded up and herded
Whenever such an event occurred, Bell proposed to select a prisoner into detention camps where overcrowded conditions and lack of
"by lot from among the officers or prominent citizens" and have him proper food and clothing resulted in the predictable spread of
executed. On December 15, Bell announced that "acts of hostility or infectious diseases. Malaria, beriberi and dengue fever took their toll.
sabotage" would result in the "starving of unarmed hostile One correspondent described the prisoners as " a miserable-looking
belligerents."48 The warning to Malvar was clear: he either had to lot of little brown rats ... utterly spiritless."52
give up the struggle or the "detainees" would face mass starvation.
To show that he meant it, on December 20 Bell ordered all rice and In the "zone of death" outside the camp "dead line," "all rendered
other food lying outside the camps to be confiscated or destroyed. themselves liable," according to Bell.53 All property was destroyed,
Wells were poisoned and all farm animals were slaughtered. 49 all houses put to the torch and the country was made a "desert waste
... of death and desolation." 54 According to statistics compiled by
January 1, it was announced, was the deadline for rendering U.S. Government officials, by the time Bell was finished at least
"valuable service" to the Americans, and "those who have not fully 100,000 people had been killed or had died in Batangas alone as a
complied with their duty" by that date were subject to prison. On the direct result of the scorched-earth policies, and the enormous dent in
24th, Bell admitted that the only course open to the Americans the population of the province (which was reduced by a third) is
was"... to adopt apolicy that will create in the minds of all the people reflected in the census figures.55 American policy was so brutal that
a burning desire for the war to cease-a desire or longing so intense, even some of the U.S. government personnel became apprehensive.
so personal ... and so real that it will impel them to devote The American civil governor of Tayabas noted in his official report
themselves in earnest to bringing about a real state of peace, that will that killing, burning, torture and other harsh treatment was
impel them to join hands with the Americans..."50 "These people
. . . sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution. If these things need often ill-defined and unsophisticated response to (ill-defined and
be done, they had best be done by native troops so that the people of unsophisticated) colonialism. Moreover, there were depressing
the u.S. will not be credited therewith.56 tendencies toward blind revanchism, dead-end milennarism, and the
With Malvar's surrender in April 1902, the Americans at long last development of personality cults58 which paralleled similar
felt the war was finally over, and Taft dutifully intoned this fact once "primitive rebellions"59 in other areas of the world at the time.
again. The Washington Post editorialized in response: Having noted this, the point cannot be overemphasized that these
We have learned to repose the utmost confidence in Judge Taft's movements represented the collective will of the vast majority of the
opinions and predictions relative to affairs in the Philippines. Ever Filipino people who—however imperfectly they understood the
since he solemnly announced the fourth and final termination of phenomenon—simply refused to submit to imperial aggession.
hostilities two years ago, we have refused to accept any view of the
The "Post-War" War
situation in our new islands which did not have his sanction and
endorsement. The fact that it has been brought to an end on six "Post-war" fighting flared up in Albay in October 1902, when
different occasions since the Governor's original proclamation serves approximately 1,500 guerrillas led by Simeon Ola refused to
only to confirm our estimation of his wisdom. A bad thing cannot be surrender. This was politically embarrassing to the Americans, and to
killed too often.57 Roosevelt and Taft in particular. This war was supposed to be over!
Although there were still upwards of 20,000 U.S. troops garrisoned
The surrender of Malvar completed the capture or surrender of what on the Islands, it was thought the better part of wisdom to deploy
the Americans considered to be the "respectable military element." Filipino puppet troops (led by American officers) against the Albay
The only people left in the hills, it was thought, were ignorant guerrillas. In November, the Brigandage Act was passed, authorizing
ladrones (bandits), but they were, it was said, a traditional feature of the death penalty for membership in a guerrilla organization. The
rural life in the Philippines and were not to be taken seriously as a new law simply gave legal sanction to what had become common
threat to American hegemony. Just to make sure, President Roosevelt practice and it had little appreciable effect on the situation in Albay,
proclaimed the war to be over on July 4, 1902. Bands played, which continued to deteriorate for the Americans. In March 1903,
soldiers marched in parade, speeches were read, and just the tiniest the situation had reached a point where reconcentrado tactics had to
flaw marred an otherwise grand occasion. The fighting did not stop. be once again employed-this time on a wider scale than anything
The war would not admit to so tidy a solution. Declaring it over did heretofore attempted. Three hundred thousand Filipinos were herded
not make it so. A sullen, hostile people, the victims of three and a into concentration camps at gunpoint. Ola finally surrendered in
half years of the most savage aggression, simply refused to give up. October 1903, but this event did not end the fighting there by any
Malvar may have surrendered, but many of his men had not, and means. 60
fighting in Batangas continued. Elsewhere, new leaders such as
Sakay, Ricarte, Ola and Bulan emerged to carry on the struggle in Fighting also continued in Cavite, where a new Katipunan was
places previously considered pacified. Others, such as Felipe formed by a former Aguinaldo aide, Gen. Luciano San Miguel; in
Salvador and "Papa" Isio, both of whom had been fighting the Nueva Ecija and Tarlac, led by Felipe Salvador; in Rizal and
Spanish for many years prior to 1898, simply kept on fighting. Not Bulacan, led by Montalon, Felizardo and others; in Tayabas, led by
all of them were principled men; many were without ideology and Saria and Roldon-the list indeed could go on and on. In the year after
fought simply out of fanatical hatred of the occupying power; some the war had been declared officially at an end, 357 separate
interjected a confusing welter of reactionary religious dogma to their
engagements with the guerrillas were recorded by the U.S. military and Philippine Constabulary (puppet) troops and pro-U.S. municipal
command. officials were killed. One U.S.-appointed teniente (mayor) had a
kerosene-soaked U.S. flag tied around his head and ignited, which
The inability to stamp out the fighting induced the Americans to Caducoy said was "a lesson to those serving that flag."63 By August,
adopt more sophisticated techniques, some of which have become the governor of Samar was frantically demanding more. troops from
familiar features of more recent counterinsurgency efforts. The 1903 Manila because guerrillas "are boldly roaming the
census of the Philippines was a determined effort to enumerate not country."64 "Thousands joined in the movement," according to the
only people, but to also record the presence of cattle, hogs, chickens local commander, Gen. William H. Carter, and the guerrillas took
and so forth in hopes of tracing guerrilla sources of supply and to control of large areas of coastal territory in northeastern Samar.
intimidate people into denying provisions to the guerrillas for fear of Constabulary patrols, led by American officers and sent out to
being discovered. Such techniques proved to be of limited value and, engage the guerrillas, came in for some hard fighting. At Oras,
at times, counterproductive. Attempts to conduct such a survey in Bulan's men, armed only with bolos, engaged the Constabulary
Misamis Province sparked off an uprising there.61 In the following troops in hand-to-hand combat and secured 65 guns. At Dolores, 38
year an identification card system was inaugurated and a Constabulary troops fell, prompting the American commander to
"registration tax" was imposed on all male residents of the plead for the reintroduction of American troops. The problem, he
Philippines between 18 and 60 years of age. These Cedulas said, was ". . not solely one of killing and capturing the leaders or
Personates, as they were called, " ... also serve the purpose of a great numbers of their followers, for there are others ready to rise in
domestic passport ..." (their obvious intended purpose), according to their places."65 By April 1905, U.S. reinforcements had to be sent to
the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 62 Samar and fighting there continued for two more years.

The Americans were hoping that by imposing such restrictions they Elsewhere, in late 1904 and early 1905, guerrilla activity reached a
would hamper efforts at unifying the various resistance "post-war" peak, with fighting erupting in Rizal, where Felizardo
organizations. The activity of Artemio Ricarte, a case in point, successfully attacked a number of Constabulary garrisons, and in
illustrates the kind of organizational work the Americans feared. Taal, where Montalon and De Vega marched up the main street of
Ricarte, formerly a member of Aguinaldo's staff, was captured early town and people "openly fraternized with the bandits." In Malabon,
in the war and, because he refused to take an oath of allegiance to the which "was a hotbed of disloyal citizens and sympathizers with the
U.S., was deported to Guam. Upon being returned to Manila, he once outlaw element," Montalon and others disguised in Constabulary
again refused to take an oath and was sent to Hong Kong and exile, uniforms seized the garrison and very nearly kidnaped the provincial
where he began to correspond and coordinate with other guerrilla governor.
leaders in the Philippines. He secretly returned to Manila in
December 1903 and embarked upon a clandestine tour of northern In January 1905 the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended and a
and Central Luzon, where he engaged in organizing, unifying and state of insurrection was declared. "It is hoped the result will be the
recruiting activities. For months he eluded capture, much to the effectual cleaning out of these bands and that the people will be so
consternation of the Americans. inconvenienced that instead of sympathising with and aiding the
outlaw bands an effort will be made to aid the authorities
In July 1904, fighting broke out in Samar, where Bulan and Juliano ,"66 reported the district commander. Familiar tactics these, but by
Caducoy led several hundred men. Coastal villages were attacked March conditions had deteriorated so badly in Batangas and Cavite
and in some parts of Laguna and Rizal that reconcentrado had to be The guerrillas were also learning how to utilize their solidarity with
employed there for five months-three years after Malvar's surrender the people to advantage and they began to shun the uniforms they
and General Bell's boast that within two months of January 1902 previously wore in order to facilitate intermingling with the general
there would be no more insurrection in Batangas. population. Funds were often extorted from wealthy landowners
(who hoped thereby to purchase immunity from more permanent
In Pangasinan, where Sakay was active, the American military depradations) and used to purchase food and provisions from
commander wrote plaintively, "This Province seems to be the peasants. An underground communication system was established in
rendezvous of disturbers ... and we scarcely get one broken up until the various areas of guerrilla operation, but interregional
another is started. We have had ... various classes of Katipunan communication and coordination was all but totally lacking and this
organizations, seditions and efforts at organization for insurrection .. proved to be a fatal handicap when, as occurred in 1904-06, the
and the province in consequence has furnished its quota to swell the resistance was progressing well in other respects.
population of Bilibid [prison] ... "67 In Albay, "conditions were in a In Central Luzon, Sakay continued to elude the Constabulary. In
rather disturbed state." Agustin Saria had taken up where Ola left off June 1905 the American commanding officer wrote that previous
and it was noted that his" ... principal aim was to levy tribute on the indications were " ... that we were making material progress against
people and to maintain an independent insurgent government."68 In them [Sakay and his men) ... but that like 'Brer Rabbit' they were not
Ambos, Camarines, " ... practically open insurrection existed due to exterminated but were simply lying low ..."72 Almost all of the
the influence of Jose Roldon.... He reorganized his forces in the most guerrilla leaders active in 1905 had, of course, been deeply involved
impoverished sections of Ambos, Camarines, and had remarkable in the 1899-1902 struggle. As fighting flared up the class
success in securing municipal officials and prominent individuals to contradictions in the old Philippine Army leadership began to
assist him."69 Roldon and Saria were killed in September and emerge once again. The members of Aguinaldo's staff and the
October 1905 respectively, but others picked up the cudgels. In various commanders of the earlier period who had surrendered or
Tayabas it was reported that "the inhabitants of certain localities are been captured had, for the most part, been well treated by the
exceedingly inflammable and easily influenced by the oratorical Americans and were content to make their peace with American
flights and acrobatic gyrations of demagogic outlaws or fanatical colonial rule. (Aguinaldo himself settled down on 500 hectares of
propagandists."70 Whatever the cause, the "demagogic outlaws" were land near Imus, Cavite, and reaped the benefits of one or two
becoming increasingly effective. One American officer described the profitable arrangements with the Colonial Government.73 Many of
nature of the attack employed against constabulary compounds: the 1899-1902 leaders disparaged the later efforts and echoed the
American position that such guerrilla bands were simply ladrones,
The attempts are always preceded by a thorough spying out of the and that there was no real political significance attached to the
surroundings, strength and habits of the intended victims, a careful various movements. This was sad commentary on the ideological
weighing of chances and a deliberate planning. Consequently, an pliability of the early leaders, and such statements had a measurable
enterprise once undertaken seldom fails. Frequently they try to propaganda effect. But the damaging influence of such men was
minimize the risk of jumping a police station or looting a municpal offset somewhat because almost all of the new guerrilla leadership
treasury by establishing relations with and winning confederates on had emerged at one point or another from the ranks. Moreover, with
the inside.71 men like Ricarte, Montalon, Felizardo, and especially Sakay still
alive, a direct link was maintained with the highest leadership circles
of the 1899-1902 period. The Americans understood this, of course, had surrendered and this ended whatever flickering hopes might have
and the hunt for Sakay in particular became an obsession with them. remained for the re-establishment of the Philippine Republic.
Sakay was considered by many to be Aguinaldo's heir and was Yet, incredibly, the war was still not over, nor would it be for several
referred to by the forces in his command and by the people in the years to come, and fighting continued in a number of areas. In
districts in which he operated as the President of the Republic. Mindanao, Moslem resistance to American efforts at subjugation
continued unabated and led to the adoption of the standard
Filipino morale received a tremendous (albeit unwarranted) boost extermination policies. Moslem resistance differed from that which
with the Japanese success in the Russo-Japanese War.74News of the typified other areas in that it was largely unconnected with questions
war-and cheap color prints of little brown men slaying big white of Philippine independence or anti-colonialism, but was rather
men-filtered into the most remote and backward corners of the predicated an the desire to maintain Islamic communal laws and
Philippines and generated tremendous interest "even among the customs free from interference from the "conquered North." (It
ignorant taos ... who otherwise are uniformly impervious to the should be noted that the Spanish never actually subjugated the
progress of the outside world ... " 75 Moslem areas.) Guerrilla tactics adopted in other areas were not
typical in the Moslen regions, where the practice was for whole
Things were not going too well for the Americans in spite of communities to band together and retreat to a fortified position
uniformly glowing reports of success heaped upon success (such (usually a hilltop) in the face of an attack. For American troops
propaganda as was being churned out had long ~ince bcome an grown callous by years of fighting against non-combatants, attacking
endemic feature of America's Philippine adventure and was, such communities necessitated no departure from previously
unfortunately, usually accepted at face value in the U.S.-and by later established norms. The resultant slaughter from such wanton tactics,
historians). Occasionally, information would filter through the however, was fearful. In March 1906, American troops killed over
official veil and chip away, if only ever so slightly, at the orthodox, 600 men, women and children in an assault on the Mount Dajo
roseate view. An Englishwoman wrote from Iloilo in 1905: community. Photographs of the neaped bodies of women and
children created a sensation in the U.S., but this did not reflect itself
The Americans give out and write in their papers that the Philippine in any alteration of American policy. Sporadic fighting continued to
Islands are completely pacified and that the Filipinos love Americans flare up in Mindanao as late as 1916, and martial law was not lifted
and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives, is complete and until December 1906. Even then, the preparedness of the Moslem
utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed with insurrection and community to lay down their arms was due simply to the recognition
plots, the fighting has never ceased, and the natives loathe the that superior force of arms had been brought to bear against them,
Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their native press nothing more.
and showing their dislike in every possible fashion. Their one idea is
to be rid of the U.S.A . ...76 Negros was another area where fighting continued beyond 1906, led
By 1906 the ultimate futility of engaging in continued resistance by the intrepid "Papa" Isio. Isio's movement was unique in its
without regional coordination, without agreed-upon aims, without longevity; by the time of the arrival of the Americans, Isio had been
more than the most rudimentary ideological overview, and without in the hills for nearly twenty years against the Spanish. In 1880, the
any hope-or thought-of international support for their movement 39-year-old farm laborer Isio (then Dionisio Magbueles) quarreled
took its predictable toll. By mid-year, Sakay, Montalon and De Vega with a Spaniard, wounded him, and fled to the mountains of Negros,
where he joined with and eventually became the leader of a rebel
group known variously as Babaylanes ("priests") and Pulahanes and his men, and the "independent" Republic of Negros, which
("red trousers"). Negros, especially the fertile northwest crescent of existed mostly on paper and in the minds of a few hundred wealthy
the island, presented unusual economic conditions inasmuch as the plantation owners.
sugar plantations there represe,nted the most commercially advanced
agricultural area to be found in the Philippines. Because of this, class On February 22, 1899, a delegation of hacenderos went to Manila
contradictions reached their most advanced level and chronic labor and again asked for U.S. intervention, reminding the Americans
unrest characterized conditions in the Negros canefields in the late pointedly that "their action would cause much hatred among the
19th century. Disaffected sacadas (canefield workers) provided a insurgents."77 Now that the Philippine-American War had started, the
steady stream of men to Isio's mountain band prior to 1898. Americans were more than eager to accomodate the hacenderos, and
Col. (later Gen.) Smith initiated his career in the Philippines by
The founding of the Malolos Republic and the arrival of the going to Negros with a battalion of the First California Volunteers.
Americans further sharpened the divisions between the plantation He also tried to organize native troops but abandoned the practice
and mill owners and the sacadas. Dewey's arrival in Manila Bay and when the men signed up and promptly went over to Isio with their
the resultant crisis led to the withdrawal of Spanish forces from new weapons. For several months after Smith's arrival, class war
Negros and in the power vacuum Isio and his men declared reigned in Negros. Sacadas flocked to the hills and joined in attacks
allegiance to the Republic and marched into the capital of Bacolod. on plantations. By September 1899, over 100 plantations lay in ruins,
Isio's army by this time numbered between five and six thousand and expensive sugar-milling machinery had been wrecked, farm animals
he enjoyed almost total support among the sacadas and peasant were lost, and sugar production (the second most valuable Philippine
farmers. Landlords and mill owners on Negros, who had previously export product at the time) had come to an almost complete
co-existed peacefully and profitably with the Spanish authorities standstill.78
(and with whom they identified socially) viewed developments with
consternation. Their major fear was that the Malolos Government Such was Isio's background, and for seven more years the
would sanction and solidify the Isio regime. mountainous interior of Negros remained a "liberated zone" despite
repeated forays by American and Constabulary troops. By 1905 Isio
To checkmate Isio, the Negros hacenderos tried to prevent him from had become a folk hero, a symbol of continued resistance when all
getting arms and from establishing direct contact with Malolos. In realistic hope of overthrowing the hacendero oligopoly had long
the autumn of 1898 some of the planters sent a delegation to the since vanished. In January 1905, when it was reported (incorrectly)
captain of a U.S. man-of-war then at anchor in Iloilo harbor to ask that Isio had been killed, thousands wore black armbands in
him for U.S. protection and armed intervention against Isio. The mourning. In June of that year, after Isio and his men had taken
Americans refused the request because at this point they were not yet possession of the town of Isabela, the American commander ruefully
at war with the Filipinos. They did not want to trigger the fighting hinted at the depth of the popular support Isio stil~ enjoyed when he
before the arrival of needed reinforcements and the signing of the reported, "It remains to be seen whether or not the people of Isabela
Paris Treaty. The hacenderos then established an "independent" will come forward and identify the raiders or aid in their capture. If
Republic of Negros, adopting an American-style Constitution which they do, it will be unprecedented."79 It was not until August 6, 1907,
defined the new power configurations. For several months until the that "Papa" Isio, age 67, finally came down from the mountains.
outbreak of fighting on February 4, 1899, two regimes vied in
Negros, the Republican (Malolos) Government, supported by Isio
The major guerrilla organization still active after Isio's surrender was The Americans took pains to portray Salvador as simply a religious
the Santa Iglesia led by Felipe Salvador (alias Apong Ipe), one of the sectarian, a polygamist, a wild man. Such an interpretation, of
most colorful and charismatic leaders in a movement which course, was aimed at belittling and dismissing Salvador's political
produced an abundance of such men. Allegedly the son of a friar, seriousness of purpose which was obviously striking a responsive
Salvador, like Isio, had been active against the Spanish long before chord among the peasants of Central Luzon. Salvador's avowed aim
Malolos and Manila Bay. The Santa Iglesia, a "fanatical and oath- was the overthrow of the American Colonial Government. This was
bound society" (according to the Americans) was founded in 1893 in the cornerstone of the Santa Iglesia movement. Also of interest was
Pampanga. In 1898 it joined forces with the revolutionary movement the socially progressive nature of the movement, which indicated a
and Salvador and his men attacked Spanish garrisons at Dagupan and political shift from the vaguely defined post-colonial vision of the
Lingayen in Pangasinan. Salvador was made a colonel by Aguinaldo, Katipuneros. Salvador repeatedly raised the land question and
but he never became a part of the Malolos inner circle and his promised his supporters that land redistribution, the breaking up of
organization always maintained a separate identity, never fully haciendas, and the abolition of tenancy would swiftly follow his
incorporated into the Philippine Army. In 1902 Salvador refused to assumption of state power.
surrender when many of Aguinaldo's generals were heeding the call
of the latter to lay down their arms. Salvador was captured soon after One aspect of the post-1896 period which has been largely
but escaped from jail and resumed his guerrilla activities in overlooked was the class nature of the Philippine Revolution. That
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan. It is perhaps the best testimony the war represented Filipino resistance to Spanish colonialism and
to Salvador's skill as a leader and organizer that his movement came American aggression is obvious. That the period represented class
into full flower only after other organizations and guerrilla struggle on several levels is not as clearly understood today,
movements had been beaten into submission and surrender in the probably because it was most imperfectly understood' at the time.
post-1905 period. Except for the tiny collaborationist elite, whose economic, ethnic and
class origins put them in a category quite far removed from the mass
By 1906 Salvador had begun to roam throughout Central Luzon. He of Indio peasants, few understood clearly their economic and class
negotiated alliances with other guerrilla organizations and staged interests and how they were being manipulated by the Americans as
spectacular raids, the most notable being the one on the Constabulary part of the imperial design. Within the anti-imperialist camp, class
barracks at Malolos, the political implications of which escaped no antagonisms were muted, both because they were not understood and
one. The support and respect he and his men commanded from the because of the need to present a united nationalist front. But the
people of Central Luzon was legendary. Reported one American latent class contradictions were always present, and they began to
with finality, "inhabitants ... do not volunteer information of [his] '" surface in the second and third year of the war against the Americans
presence to the authorities."80 In spite of concentrated efforts to with the defection of a number of army officers. These men came
portray members of the Santa Iglesia as "some of the most wicked largely from middle-class backgrounds and, with a few notable
and desperate men ever at large in the Philippine Islands," Colonel exceptions, were prone to elitist thinking and surrenderist attitudes.
Bandholtz, charged with his capture, admitted, "He treats the barrio The speed and apparent ease of conscience with which many such
people well and it is said he does not rob them of provisions, but men were able to take up posts within the American colonial
prays with the people and asks them for contributions, which they bureaucracy was to a large degree attributable to their class solidarity
usually give."81 which, on the evidence, was stronger than their racial and ethnic ties
to the Indio peasants.
So it was that the fight was left to be fought by the poor and saw the confinement of 300,000 people in Albay, wanton slaughter
uneducated, bandits and outlaws, religious screwballs and wild men- in Mindanao, and astonishing death rates in Bilibid Prison, to name
or so we are told. And yet, significantly, when the officers and but three instances where killing continued.
gentlemen had made their peace with imperialism, the only people
left defending the honor of Philippine nationalism were now also A million deaths? One does not happily contemplate such carnage of
fighting for primitive social justice as well. The class struggle began innocent people who fought with extraordinary bravery in a cause
to emerge as co-equal to the national struggle-long after any which was just but is now all but forgotten. Such an estimate,
immediate hope of winning either had passed. however, might conceivably err on the side of understatement. To
again quote the anonymous U.S. Congressman, "They never rebel in
In 1909, a decade after the first battle on the outskirts of Manila, Luzon anymore because there isn't anybody left to rebel."
Felipe Salvador was still fighting. "His influence over the lower class
has defied the efforts of the Government to capture him ... " He was
not to be captured until the following year, snuffing out the last
flickering flame of a fourteen-year struggle against colonial Notes
aggression. Salvador, who had been in the hills for seventeen of his 1. The choice of terms for the Philippine-American War and the
forty-one years, was tried for banditry, convicted, and executed in corresponding reference to the Filipinos as "insurgents" was not
1912. haphazard or accidental, as it gave semantic reinforcement to the.
American position that the (Malolos) Philippine Government was
The Cost of the War illegitimate and that those who took up arms against the Americans
How many Filipinos died resisting American aggression? It is were engaged in rebellion against (legitimate) American authority. It
doubtful if historians will ever agree on a figure that is anything is, perhaps, overstating the obvious to make the point that quite a
more than a guess. The figure of 250,000 crops up in various works; different interpretation is not only possible but, in my view, more
one suspects it is chosen and repeated in ignorance and in the accurate, historically speaking. The Malolos Government was, for at
absence of hard evidence to the contrary. Records of the killing were least a year after its inception, the only legitimate government in the
not kept and the Americans were anxious to suppress true awareness Philippines insofar as Malolos alone exercised unchallenged legal
of the extent of the slaughter in any case, in order to avoid fueling authority throughout the Islands. That Malolos was not recognized
domestic anti-imper!alist protest. How many died of disease and the by the U.S. did not, legally speaking, alter this fact. Nor did it make
effects of concentration camp life is even more difficult to assess. the subsequent war against the U.S. an "insurrection." At no time
General Bell, who, one imagines, might be in as good a position to were Filipinos themselves in revolt against their own government. A
judge such matters as anyone, estimated in a New York Times more accurate interpretation-and, I believe, the only correct one-is
interview that over 600,000 people in Luzon alone had been killed or based on the understanding that the Philippine-American War was,
had died of disease as a result of the war. The estimate, given in May both legally and objectively, Filipino resistance to American military
1901, means that Bell did not include the effects of the Panay aggression against the sovereign Philippine state. The fact that the
campaign, the Samar campaign, or his own bloodthirsty Batangas Americans eventually won the war does not, in my view, alter this
campaign (where at least 100,000 died), all of which occurred after basic fact. Accordingly, the terms "insurrection" and "insurgent" will
his 1901 interview. Nor could it include the "post-war" period, which not be employed in this essay except when used in quotation.
2. Literature on the war is woefully skimpy and no adequate political Post, was by far the most courageous American newsman in the
analysis now exists. Little Brown Brother by Leon Wolff (Manila: Philippines. His outspoken reporting won him hasty re-assignment to
Erehwon, 1968) is an excellently written popular introduction. Africa.
Domestic U.S. reaction to the war has received far more attention 14. Senate Doc. no. 331, vol. 2, 57:1, pp. 1927-28. Report of General
than the war itself, especially in recent years. Daniel Schirmer's MacArthur. There were 53 garrisons in November 1899, over 400 by
Republic or Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971) is the the following August.
best recent accountt of the anti-imperialist, or, more accurately, the 15. Fairfield, Maine Journal, excerpted from a letter from Sgt.
anti-colonialist movement in the U.S. Howard McFarlane, 43rd Infantry. Quoted in Wolff, 305. The
3. At least insofar as the Treaty of Paris was concerned. Had the soldiers who wrote such letters were invariably contacted by military
treaty not been approved, theoretically the Islands would have been authorities and forced to write retractions, which were then hastily
retained by Spain, although as a practical matter the Spanish were published to refute the original information. Reading the retractions
hardly in a position to reassert themselves in the Islands. It seems tends to confirm in one's mind the verity of the original statement.
improbable also that the McKinley Administration would have Refusal to write a retraction was not kindly looked upon by the
withdrawn U.S. troops simply on the basis of the treaty vote, had it military and the kinds of pressure tactics employed by the War
gone against them. Department became something of a scandal after being disclosed in
4. Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 226. Senate hearings in 1902. Senator McLaurin called it a "remarkable
5. Forty-five hundred dead bodies were counted by the Americans. coincidence" that in every case where the soldier was still in the
Witnesses estimated the total number of dead to be 8-10,000. H. Van army, 'retractions were forthcoming. But when the soldier had
Mete~, The Truth About the Philippines from Official Records and already been discharged and was no longer subject to military
Authentic Sources (Chicago: Liberty League, 1900), p. 333. discipline, " ... there was not an instance found where there was any
6. Van Meter, 332. modification, qualification or retraction of what had been said ... "
7. Van Meter, 368. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15,1902, 5480.
8. Father of Douglas, World War II commander in the Pacific. 16. Quoted in the Boston Transcript, January 12, 1900, cited by
9. Van Meter, 366. Wolff,299.
10. Eyot, Canning, ed., The Story of the Lopez Family (Boston: J. H. 17. Wolff, 290.
West Co., 1904), 23. 18. Boston Herald, August 25, 1902. Quoted in Moorfield Storey and
11. MacArthur later admitted, "The Filipino idea behind the Julian Codman, Marked Severities in Philippine Warfare: Sec. Root's
dissolution of their field army was not at the time of occurrence well Record (Boston: George H. Ellis Co., 1902), 115.
understood in the American camp. As a consequence, misleading 19. As was McKinley, who confessed he could not find the
conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had Philippines on the map the first time he looked for them. In light of
been destroyed and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of later disclosures, this remark smacks of coyness, but it is true
the rebel army." Renato Constantino, Dissent and Counter- nevertheless that the Americans had the most limited understanding
Consciousness (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 80, quoting War of Philippine society.
Department Annual Reports, 1901, vol. I, part 4,88. 20. Statement by Rep. Vandiver, Congressional Record, 57:1, May
12. Senate Document no. 331, vol. 2; 57:1 (1902), 1926-27. I5, 1902,5505.
13. Wolff, 294. Robinson, who reported for the New York Evening 21. At their peak, Spanish forces in the Philippines never numbered
more than a few thousand. jingoist circles, causing Roosevelt to regret his actions: "The court
22. Taft testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,69. martial of General Smith cost me votes-votes'" (Schirmer, 239 n).
23. MaCArthur testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,135. 35. Stephen Bonsal, Boston Transcript, quoted in Storey and
24. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2443. Codman, 38.
25. In his first annual message to Congress, McKinley expressed his 36. Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senate Doc. no. 205, 57:1, part I,
(evidently feigned) outrage at the concentration camp policy being pp. 2,3.
employed in Cuba. This "cruel policy," he said, "was not civilized 37. Chaffee to Gen. Hughes, September 30, 1901, quoted in Storey
warfare; it was extermination." Quoted in Storey and Codman, 94. and Codman, 28.
26. Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra, Senate Doc. no. 331, 38. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1,5.
part 1,430. 39. It should be remarked that not all of the V.S. soldiers reveled in
27. Wolff, 352. the bloodlust of their commanders. Many were repulsed by what they
28. Charles E. Magoon, Acting Chief of Division, Senate Doc. no. had witnessed and experienced in the Philippines and were anxious
331, part 3, 2263. to expose American policy upon their return to the U.S. Others took
29. Later charged with (and eventually acquitted of) torturing 134 to drink or went mad. Alcoholism and insanity followed venereal
Filipino P.O.W.s to death. disease as the major cause for the reduction in available V.S.
30. Boston Herald , August 25, 1901 (quoting a letter from an manpower in the Philippines. Desertion was difficult due to
American officer). Quoted in Storey and Codman, 116. geographical factors, but incidences of officers being shot in the back
31. Chaffee to General Hughes, Manila, September 30, 1901, Senate "by snipers" were not unheard of, and a handful of Americans
Doc. no. 331, part 2, 1592. actually joined with and fought with the guerrillas (see Ellwood
32. Testimony of William J. Gibbs, a survivor of the massacre. Bergerey, Why Soldiers Desert from the U.S. Army (Philadelphia:
Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2284 et seq. William Fell & Co., 1903), 132.
33. Storey and Codman, 116. Congt'essional Record, 57:1, May 40. Cpl. Richard O'Brien, New York World, reprinted in the
15,1902, 5525. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902, 5500.
34. Major Waller was later court martialed for his actions in Samar, 41. Root to Lodge, Army and Navy Journal, AprilS, 1902. Reprinted
one suspects in retaliation for his refusal to engage in the in Storey and Codman, 88.
extermination practices of his fellow officers. During the course of 42. Senate Doc. no. 205,57:1, part I, p. 50.
his trial he revealed the nature of Smith's orders and the public 43. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57:1, p. 19.
disclosure created a sensation in the U.S. President Theodore 44. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1, p. 4.
Roosevelt (McKinley's successor upon the latter's assassination in 45. Address before the Marquette Club, Chicago, March II, 1902.
1901), in order to neutralize outraged public opinion, had Smith Quoted in Frederick Chamberlin, The Blow from Behind (Boston:
himself brOUght up on charges. The charges did not stem from any Lee & Shepard, 1903), 109.
overt act of the Samar campaign (it is recalled that the War 46. Eyot, 146-47.
Department had "no record" that the orders were actually carried out) 47. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552 et seq.
but rather because the orders themselves were "unprofessional." 48. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552.
Smith was convicted, "admonished" by the tribunal, and sentenced to 49. James H. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines
"early retirement." Smith became something of a cause celebre in (Manila: Malaya Books, 1968), 388.
50. Storey and Codman, 71-72. surrendering for principled (but tactically faulty) reasons and was
51. Storey and Codman, 73. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, pp. betrayed and executed by the Americans, who had previously
1628,1690-1. promised amnesty. Artemio Ricarte survives better than most, and
52. Storey and Codman, 91. for years after 1910 he waged an almost singlehanded struggle from
53. Senate Doc. no. 331, 57:1, part 2, p. 1632. abroad. But, sadly, in old age he could not see that Japanese and
54. Storey and Codman, 92-93. American imperialism were cut from the same cloth. "Papa" Isio
55. Philippine Census, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: V.S. Government finally surrendered, one suspects, because at the age of sixty-seven
Printing Office, 1905), vol. 2, p. 20. Comparing the 1903 figures and after more than twenty-five years in the mountains the rigors of
with the Spanish figures of 1887, Batangas lost 54,000 people in guerrilla life"simply got to be too much. And so it went. To hold
absolute terms, making no allowance for intervening population rise. such men against a standard which has only slowly evolved in the
Estimating on the basis of an annual population increase of 1.5 course of the 20th century seems to miss the point. Given the
percent, it is certain that Batangas was depopulated by 100,000 or historical context within which the struggle was enjoined, how can it
more. reasonably be expected that it could have evolved differently? The
56. Report of Major Corneliu~ Gardiner, Governor of Tayabas, real heroes were not so much the leaders, who served their people
Congressional Record, 57: I, May 1S, 1902, 5500. By native troops with a greater or lesser degree of fidelity and ability, but the people
Gardiner was referring to the Macabebes, a tiny, pro-U.S. ethnic sub- themselves. A simple point, perhaps, but one which I believe bears
group which had played a praetorian role during the Spanish regime making.
and for this reason was well hated by the majority of Filipinos. 59. The struggle in the Philippines never degenerated into social
57. Congressional Record, 57: 1, May 16, 1902, 5542. banditry in the strict sense of the term, although in its later stages
58. A current diversion in some areas of the Filipino left of late has several of the guerrilla organizations developed into "Robin Hood"-
been to try to decide which guerrilla leaders were principled type bands. The fascinating history of such movements as they have
revolutionaries and which were opportunist manipulators. Few-if occurred historically and in various parts of the world has been
any-of these men can withstand such a rigorous and, ultimately, largely ignored by orthodox historians, partly, no doubt, because of
unfair historical test, precisely because all of them lacked one or the inherent difficulties in researching such phenomena. The
more of the foHowing: (a) a revolutionary ideology; (b) a theory of opportunities for such work in the Philippines are immense. The
imperialism; (c) anything other than a primitive understanding of the reader is directed to the pioneering work of E. J. Hobsbawm,
class nature of the struggle in which they were engaged; (d) an Primitive Rebels (New York: Praeger, 1959) and Bandits (New
understanding of protracted warfare and guerrilla strategy. There was York, 1971).
no real experience (except their own) upon which they could draw, 60. Report of the Governor of Albay, in Sixth Annual Report of the
nor was there a historical example known to them of the successful Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
prosecution of such a struggle. They fought by their wits and their Printing Office, 1905), part 1, Appendix H, 144. Blount, 49.
instincts alone, which led in turn to terrible reversals and, ultimately, 61. Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1903), part
.defeat in an uneven, suicidal struggle doomed from the start. So all 1, p. 30.
of them to one degree or another fail the exacting test of their 62. Report of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, Sixth Annual
modern critics. Simeon Ola surrendered, betrayed his men, and Report of the Philippine Commission (1905), part 4, p. 177.
turned state's witness against them. Macario Sakay was tricked into 63. Blount, 453.
64. Cable, Governor Feito to Carpenter, August 9,1904. Quoted in American rule, although there may have been isolated cases where
Blount, 461. this did occur.
65. Report of Col. Wallace C. Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the 74. Euphoria at the outcome of that war was not, of course, confined
Philippine Commission Appendix A, 54. to Japan and the Philippines. News of the Japanese victory electrified
67. Scott, 55. Conditions in Bilibid were scandalously bad, and in the masses of people in Southeast Asia generally, e.g., Indochina,
1903 it became a point of controversy because American prisoners where guerrilla war was being waged against the French.
were being kept there as well as Filipinos. American investigators 75. Report of Maj. Samuel D. Crawford, Commanding Officer,
reported, "Considering the appalling mortality in Bilibid and the Fourth District, Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the
charac­ter of the diseases with which the prisoners are Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 101-2.
afflicted, there is no question but that the latter are suffering greatly 76. Blount, 505, quoting Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, An Englishwoman
from the effects of crowd poisoning." In reporting on conditions in in the Philippines, 88.
late 1904, Secretary of Commerce and Police William Cameron 77. Which of course it did. Testimony of Frank J. Bourns, First
Forbes issued a statement which can only be described as incredible: (Schurmann) Report of the Philippine Commission, part 2, p. 356.
"In Bilibid Prison discipline has been uniformly good and conditions 78. Ibid., 355-56, 414-16. Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine
on the whole satisfactory. On the 7th day of Dec. 1904 a small Commssion, part 2, p. 311. The story of the short-lived Negros
outbreak occurred among the detention prisoners, in which 200 Republic and, more importantly, the development of the social forces
endeavored to gain their liberty. The prompt use of a gatling gun in which led to its founding have not, to my knowledge, been
the tower and the riot guns with which the guards on the walls were adequately treated by Filipino historians, which points up the sorely
armed ended the trouble in eight minutes. There were 19 killed and felt need for regional histories of the Philippines.
40 wounded, but the work in the shops and other industrial 79. Report of Colonel Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine
departments of the prison was not interrupted, and in 30 minutes' Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 88.
time there was no evidence except in the hospital that there had been 80. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906),
any trouble." The "uniformly good" conditions Forbes spoke of part 1, p. 142.
included a death rate of 438 per 1000 by 1905. To be sentenced there 81. Report of Colonel Bandholtz, First District, Philippine
was tantamount to a death sentence. Constabulary, ibid., part 2, p. 239.
68. Report of H. H. Bandholtz, Commander, Second District
Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine
Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 69. Back To History Is A Weapon's Front Page
69. Ibid., 69.
70. Ibid., 78.
71. Report of D. J. Baker, Provincial District Commander, ibid., part
3, Appendix A, 130.
72. Report of W. S. Scott, 53. You can't have capitalism without
73. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), racism.
part 1, pp. 3031. I am not aware of any of the prominent leaders of —Malcolm X
1899-1902 going back into the field after a spell of civilian life under