Slight Physical Injury Research
Slight Physical Injury Research
Slight Physical Injury Research
Moreover, treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself.
[46]
Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter
[47]
how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. Mere
probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish each element necessary to convict.
Under Article 27 of the RPC, the penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30)
days. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since the said law excludes from its
coverage cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year. In the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty shall be arresto menor in its medium
period, which ranges from eleven (11) days to twenty (20) days. Consequently, the Court imposes
upon petitioner a straight sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor.
Under paragraph (1), Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a criminal
[51]
offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result
[52]
of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous
jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for
[53]
less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.
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her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element of
intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC.
In order to be found guilty of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266
of the [RPC], the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal
intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus,
in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a
specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and
deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of
inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom
and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does
not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of the minor victim Lin that
Jabalde slapped him on his neck and choked him, 49 and that of Ray Ann
that she saw Jabalde struck Lin on his neck, squeezed it and then
shouted, "Better that you are able to free yourself because if not I should
have killed you,"50 deserve more credit than Jabalde's own statement that
she merely held Lin still because the latter kept on jumping. 51 The laying
of the hands and the utterance of words threatening the life of Lin
established the fact that Jabalde, indeed, intended to cause or inflict
physical injuries on, much less kill, Lin.
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges
from one (1) day to thirty (30) days of imprisonment. 52 In imposing the
correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the
RPC,53 because Jabalde lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power.54 There is passional obfuscation
when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus
so powerful as to overcome reason.55 For passion and obfuscation to be
considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that: (1) an
unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed
by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable
length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the
obfuscation in the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation
arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or
revenge.56 With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her
daughter, Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten
[10] days) when only mitigating circumstance is present in the
case.57 Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, 58 Jabalde
shall suffer a penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed
self-defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting
evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he
everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was
attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by
the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both testified that it was the
petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.
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As regards civil liability, no finding could be made for lack of
factual bases that complainant incurred actual expenses;
neither was there any testimony that she suffered moral
damages.
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Noting the..
In the face of all the foregoing, we have reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused
for rape. Reasonable doubt –
1
x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and
depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that
state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all
the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law
independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to
be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt
remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is
not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the
doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding
and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt;
because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral
nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would
exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.
Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 320, 52 Am. Dec. 711;
cited in Schmidt v.Ins. Co., 1 Gray (Mass.) 534; Bethell v. Moore, 19 N. C.
311; State v. Goldsborough, Houst. Cr. Rep. (Del.)316 (Bold underscoring is
supplied for emphasis).
Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His
acquittal should follow, for, as we have emphatically
reminded in Patula v. People: G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135.
19
x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the
Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all
these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not
anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The
burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the
weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of
proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying
the accused as the malefactor responsible for it. 20
March 8, 2017
Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense
responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its
own merits, not merely on relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course.
People v. Vasquez, this Court refused to undiscemingly lend credence to the
69
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must
rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The
burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the
accused to prove his innocence.Macayan, Jr. y Malana v. People, G.R. No. 175842,
March 18, 2015
The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish
the moral certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of
the defense's entire version of events, they nevertheless disclose how the
prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.
They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were actually
stopped in their tracks to be assaulted, and support the possibility that they may
have instead deliberately intended to bring themselves to Vicente's house to provoke
or challenge one (1) of the petitioners.