RAJA QAISER AHMED AND MISBAH ARIF

Space Militarization in South Asia

India’s Quest for Space Weapons and Implications for Pakistan

ABSTRACT

India’s quest for space weaponization will have consequences for regional stability.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

South Asia remains a precarious region given the historical rivalry between India and
Pakistan and their posture of mutual deterrence. India’s pursuit of space weapo-
nization and subsequent militarization will trigger an expensive and unnecessary
arms race between India and Pakistan, exacerbating the fragility of the South Asian
security matrix.
K E Y W O R D S : space weaponization, balance of terror, prevention of an arms race in
outer space, antisatellite weapons

INTRODUCTION

Every global common once accessed by humans has been turned into a bat-
tlefield. Holding the high ground has been considered a military advantage by
numerous strategists. Forts were built on high points, to keep an eye on the
movement of an adversary. After land, air, and sea, space is becoming the next
frontier for war and military operations. The borderless and unconquered
qualities of space make it unique, increasing the opportunities for civil and
military use, and weakening the security of states. Command of space will
become a crucial element in terrestrial battles. Space weaponization is not
a new term; argument over putting weapons in space started decades ago, and
is a critical issue today. But as of this writing, the potential battlefield of space
is still free of weapons, as far as we know.

RAJA QAISER AHMED is a Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid I
Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. M ISBAH A RIF is a Visiting Lecturer in the Department
of Defence and Diplomatic Studies at Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
A warm thanks is extended to Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal for his theoretical and scholarly input.
Email: <rajaqaiserahmed@gmail.com>, <misbaharif91@gmail.com>.

Asian Survey, Vol. 57, Number 5, pp. 813–832. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2017 by
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and
Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p¼reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/
AS.2017.57.5.813.

813
814  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

The United States’ success in the First Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan
made it evident that land, air, and sea military operations can be aided by
effective use of space assets. Space militarization is different from space
weaponization.1 Militarization of space is the use of space technology to
support military operations on land, air, and sea. Weaponization of space
is the development and deployment of weapons to be used in and from space
for defensive or offensive purposes, turning space into a conflict zone. Weap-

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

onization aims at protecting one’s own assets, and targeting the enemy’s
assets. Ground-based systems used to attack space assets also count as space
weapons. Monitoring by space-based weapons provides a better picture of
terrestrial targets, increasing the element of surprise, which becomes decisive.
During the Cold War, space weaponization was avoided because of its lethal-
ity, but technological advancement is making space weaponization inevitable.
Sooner or later space will be weaponized by states.
A number of treaties limit space-based military activities, such as the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Limited Test
Ban Treaty. There is also a draft resolution on the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS). These prohibit nuclear explosions in space,
development or deployment of space-based missile defense systems, and
putting weapons of mass destruction in space. None of these treaties ban
space-based weapons or antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. For many years, states
had a gentleman’s agreement not to put weapons in space. Now technology
makes this forbearance increasingly unlikely.
South Asia is a region of great importance because of its geostrategic
location, the presence of two nuclear powers, the interests of great powers,
and growing tension between India and Pakistan. In the past, South Asia has
been a proxy battleground of the great powers. During the Cold War, the US
and USSR tried to expand their areas of influence and indulged in a decade-
long war in Afghanistan. After the end of Cold War, the nuclearization of
India and Pakistan received immense attention as it was the first overt nuclear
development by states after the implementation of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US
changed the contours of world politics. The war against terrorism made

1. Deepak Sharma, ‘‘Weaponization of Space and India’s Option,’’ IDSA Occasional Paper no. 22
(2011), 3.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  815

South Asia the epicenter of the great powers’ attention. Pakistan became
a frontline ally of the US. And the Indo–US strategic partnership became
cemented, which now challenges the strategic stability of the South Asian
region.
The politics of South Asia mainly revolves around India and Pakistan.
The two nations have much in common historically, customarily, and
geographically, but unfortunately have never shared friendly relations.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

Instead India and Pakistan have a long history of conflicts, crises, and
wars. Since independence in 1947 the two nations have been at war four
times, along with a number of conflicts and protracted unresolved disputes,
resulting in acrimonious relations. Kashmir was one of the major unre-
solved issues and a source of conflict and distrust. The wars of 1947, 1965,
and 1971 did resolve the Kashmir issue but resulted in the separation of
East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. The 2001 terrorist attack on the
Indian parliament and the 2008 attack on a major Mumbai hotel both
brought the two declared rivals to the brink of war. Relations have been
strained, with short-lived sparks of hope such as the Lahore Declaration in
1999, bus service between Lahore and Delhi in 1999, and cricket diplomacy
in 2005.
Indian interests have been expanding from their immediate borders to the
region and beyond. Pakistan’s proposal of a Strategic Restraint Regime was
rejected by India, showing India’s desire to expand its arsenal. China con-
ducted an ASAT (antisatellite) test in 2007. The Chinese test started an
unnecessary and expensive ASAT arms race with India.2 India now seems
to be interested in acquiring space weapons. Such ambitions will damage the
strategic stability of South Asia, triggering an expensive and unnecessary
regional arms race in outer space.
The aim of this study is to identify the impact of India’s space dominance
over Pakistan and thereby suggest measures to counter the strategic asym-
metry between India and Pakistan. Space has been militarized but yet not
weaponized. Space militarization could lead to the weaponization of space,
which could result in a space arms race. Space could a play a decisive role in
future armed engagements.

2. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 290.
816  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

INDIA’S SPACE PROGRAM

Launch of the Russian Sputnik satellite in 1957 prompted the Indian space
program. In 1962 the Department of Atomic Energy funded the Indian
National Committee for Space Research. The Indian space program had
considerable achievements in the development of rockets, with the help of
NASA. At the end of the 1960s India launched its first rocket, the Rohini 75,
into outer space.3 The main organization under the Indian government, the

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), was established in 1968.4 The
main aim of ISRO is to develop space technology and make it useful for the
national tasks of development, welfare, and security. EDUSAT is an Indian
satellite meant to promote education in backward areas of India. This is
a communication satellite for interactive distance-based education through
national coverage beams. ViCTERS (Versatile ICT Enabled Resource for
Students) on EDUSAT is the first broadband network for schools. India
received early assistance from NASA and France. The Indian space program
has been primarily civilian in nature, focused on socioeconomic develop-
ment, but now there have been evident changes leading to military use of
space.
India’s urge for great power status and prestige, along with the political
environment and economic competition at the international level, resulted in
the development of the Indian space program (Figure 1). Originally, the main
objective of the space program was to raise standards of living.5 Satellites have
been viewed as a tool for development by supporting communication, mete-
orology, broadcasting, and remote sensing. The Indian lunar mission
Chandrayaan-1 in 2008 received special attention worldwide. ISRO works
on space projects in collaboration with international organizations and other
countries.6
In 1975, India launched its first satellite. After the successful launch of
the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3), India advanced in production of the
Augmented Launch Vehicle, the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and

3. Dream 2047: Monthly Newsletter of Vigyan Prasar, March 30, 2002, <http://www.vigyanprasar.
gov.in/dream/mar2002/english.pdf>.
4. Deepak Sharma, Space Capability and India’s Defence Communications up to 2022 and Beyond
(New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2010), 4.
5. D. Moorthi, ‘‘What ‘Space Security’ Means to an Emerging Space Power,’’ Astropolitics 2:2
(2004): 263.
6. Moorthi, ‘‘What ‘Space Security’ Means,’’ 263.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  817

figure 1. Space Expenditure as a Percentage of Indian GDP

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

SOURCE : Union Budget 2014–15, <indiabudget.gov.in/budget2014-2015/budget.asp>.

finally the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). At first, India

was not able to use its satellites for military and commercial purposes because
of the restrictions of low earth orbit. The GSLV enables India to launch its
satellites to high altitude in geostationary orbit. Besides India, only the US,
China, Japan, Russia, and Europe can do this. With the Polar Satellite
Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C7 and PSLV-C8) in 2007, India entered a new era
of launching satellites and bringing them back.7 This will help India with
manned space flights.
After the successful launch of the Aryabhata (1975), Bhaskara (1979), and
Rohini (1980) satellites, India moved toward dual-purpose advanced satellites,
such as the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) system in 1983. Its 10 satellites
make INSAT one of the largest national communication systems in the Asia-
Pacific. INSAT and the Indian Remote Sensing satellite program give India
military communication, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. They
can be independently launched thanks to the PSLV and GSLV.
Indian launch vehicles can be converted for use as ballistic missiles.8 India’s
SLV-3 was modified to launch with a one-ton payload, becoming the Agni
intermediate-range ballistic missile. The Indian Navy accesses data related to

7. Sharma, Space Capability, 43.

8. Dinshaw Mistry & Bharath Gopalaswamy, ‘‘Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles in
Regional Powers‘‘, Astropolitics, Vol. 10, N0. 02 (2012): 126–151.
818  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

submarine warfare from its own satellite, OCEANSAT 2. After the Mumbai
terrorist attack, ISRO launched RISAT 2, with the unique capability of all-
weather, day-and-night surveillance.9 The Indian space program is expanding
at a brisk pace. China, Japan, Russia, and India have improved their space
competitiveness by 35%, 44%, 20%, and 16%, respectively, over their own
relative starting points from when Futron’s benchmarking began in 2008
(Table 1).

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

In September 2014 India became the fourth country to put a spacecraft
into orbit around Mars, after Russia, the US, and the European Space
Agency. This indicates the astonishing progress of the Indian space program.
The ISRO has also launched 180 satellites for other countries since 1999. The
Indian space program is moving away from civilian purposes toward the
military domain. The international community should look at the other side
of the picture instead of just focusing on the civilian side. The dual use of
space assets will result in a security dilemma at the regional and international
levels.

PAKISTAN’S SPACE PROGRAM

Pakistan’s space program also started in the 1960s after the Soviet launch of
Sputnik (Table 2). During the Cold War the space race between the two
superpowers was at its peak, and many other nations brought space technol-
ogy home with the help of one of the two competing powers. Pakistan
organized a space institute under the supervision of the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission in 1961.10 Later, a research wing named SUPARCO
(Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) was assigned to con-
duct scientific and technological experiments.
In 1961, SUPARCO, with the help of NASA, launched its first rocket,
Rehbar 1. Pakistan became the tenth country in Asia to successfully launch an
unmanned spacecraft. Pakistan managed 20 successful launches by 1972. In
1990 Pakistan began the Badr communication satellite series, with the assis-
tance of China. Badr-B was launched in 2001 using a Ukrainian rocket. In
2011 PakSat-1R, Pakistan’s first communication satellite, was launched; it was

9. Rajeev Sharma, ‘‘India’s Spy Satellite Launch?’’ The Diplomat, April 30, 2012.
10. Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, ‘‘Space Research in Pakistan 2004–
2005: National Report to the 36th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Beijing, China 16–23 July 2006,’’
<http://www.suparco.gov.pk/downloadables/space-research-report%2804-05%29.pdf>.
table 1. Relative Competitiveness Changes by Country, SCI 2013 to SCI 2014
South South Average
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada China Europe India Iran Israel Japan Russia Africa Korea Ukraine USA Change
Argentina 0.00 0.30

Australia 0.00 1.02 0.92

Brazil 0.00 0.38

Canada 0.00 2.31 þ0.66

China 0.00 1.01

Europe 0.00 þ1.53

India 0.00 1.07

Iran þ0.35 0.00

Israel þ0.60 0.00

Japan þ0.14 0.00

Russia þ3.05 0.00 þ2.98

South Africa þ0.92 0.00

South Korea þ1.84 0.00

Ukraine 0.95 0.00

USA 1.39 0.00

SOURCE : Futron 2014 Space Competitive Index, <futron.com>.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

820  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

table 2. Space Assets and Capabilities of India and Pakistan

India Pakistan

First satellite 1975 1990

First astronaut 2017 –
First antisatellite weapon test Gained capability –
Satellite in orbit 27 2

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

Launch sites 1 –
Satellite tracking and monitoring and control stations 9 1

Deepak Sharma, Space Capability and India’s Defence Communications Up to 2022 and Beyond
SOURCE :
(New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2010), 39.

developed and launched by China. The government announced Space Vision

2040 to bring home benefits from space technology. Pakistan is working on
communication and earth observation satellites. SUPARCO is working on
the Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite, scheduled for launch in 2030.

THREATS FROM SPACE

The rapidly changing strategic environment of South Asia has persuaded all
defense planners to take measures to counter imminent threats. The draw-
down of American/NATO forces from Afghanistan and America’s increasing
interest in the Asia-Pacific alarms South Asian nations. There is an evident
increase in the defense budgets of India and Pakistan for 2017–18 that under-
scores a growing threat to the delicate balance of power between India and
Pakistan. Boosting spending by 10% (where the total estimated defense
spending is US$ 53.5 billion),11 India is one of the world’s largest buyers of
arms and is trying to replace old weaponry with new to deter China. Defense
modernization is considered an important tool for Indian strategic objectives.
The increase in the Indian defense budget should not be ignored. It suggests
modernization and technological advancement in Indian military muscle,
which will endanger the prevailing strategic environment.
There are different kinds of space weapons. A directed energy beam uses
electromagnetic energy to destroy a target. This energy can destroy a satellite

11. Laxman K Behera, ‘‘India’s Defence Budget 2017–18: An Analysis’’, Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, February 03, 2017.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  821

in space or an intercontinental ballistic missile during its boost phase or in

midcourse. A kinetic kill vehicle can destroy satellites in space as well as
a missile in midcourse or reentry phase by hitting the target at very high
velocity in the upper or lower atmosphere. ASATs come under this domain.
Microsatellites and hypervelocity rod bundles can also be used as a space
weapons—the latter are long, slim, dense metal rods able to destroy deeply
buried and hardened targets.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

The Indian space program was at first intended only for civilian purposes,
but now there is an evident turn in its space policy.12 The ISRO and the
Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) are collaborat-
ing. The space weapons program of India is mainly focusing on the security
of the country’s space assets. The program is an obvious threat to interna-
tional security, and efforts must be made to curb this proliferation.
The prestige factor is also pushing India toward acquisition of space weap-
ons. India wants to attain great power status, for which it is working hard in
the economic, military, and political fields. India wants to maintain an edge
over its adversaries in all sectors. A state with ambitions for prominent status
at the regional and global levels needs to ensure its security for years to
come.13 The Indian attempt at space dominance seems in line with this goal,
but the implications are troubling.
One school of thought believes space weapons to be in the interest of the
state. Outer space will become a fourth theater for military applications in the
near future.14 Space will become a decisive factor and force multiplier in
military operations against a rival state. It is therefore in the interest of India
to exploit its space capabilities. ASAT capability is critical to answer the threat
to space assets.15 Efforts are being made to secure Indian space assets with the
collaboration of the US.
A second school of thought opposes the development and deployment of
space weapons, which would turn space into another battleground. States’
reactions to space capabilities would have direct consequences for the stability

12. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘‘India’s Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The Impact
of China’s ASAT Test,’’ India Review 10:4 (2013): 354.
13. Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Harrisonburg, VA: Donnelley and Sons, 2001),
157–68.
14. Ajay Bohtan, ‘‘The Ineluctable Outer Space for India’s National Security,’’ Maritime Affairs
9:2 (2013): 42–61.
15. Ashley J. Tellis, and Sean Mirski, eds., Crux of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global
Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 177.
822  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

and security of the region. They would alter the balance of power and create
asymmetry, again pushing insecure rival states to respond to the threat by
taking countermeasures. India is facing challenges in space, but those are not
immediate ones. India should look for options other than space weapons
because of the high risks. India modernizes its conventional military capabilities
and its nuclear arsenals regularly. Indo–US cooperation in the defense sector
will become a defining element in the relationship of the two countries.16

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

Pakistan launched its first communications satellite in 1990.17 India’s ef-
forts to strengthen its ballistic missile defense (BMD) and anti-ballistic mis-
sile systems are alarming for Pakistan. Indian efforts to compete with China
in outer space will have serious implications for the security structure of
South Asia. Back in 2011, Yousaf Raza Gillani, then the president of Pakistan,
directed SUPARCO to strengthen Pakistan’s ability to reach outer space in
his Vision 2040. The vision identifies Pakistan’s needs for communications
and remote-sensing satellites.
To prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space, pacts have been
signed such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the
Moon Agreement, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Treaties (SALT I and SALT II), and the PAROS resolution. Other
than PAROS, all were negotiated and formalized between the US and Russia
during the Cold War. Existing international laws to curb the proliferation of
weapons in outer space don’t seem to be working. Karl Hebert has proposed
a strict enforcement mechanism to deal with space weapons and the threats
they pose to the international community.18 He also gives recommendations
on how to control the space race.

CHINA, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN: THE NEW STRATEGIC

CHESSBOARD

According to Kenneth Waltz, self-help is the most common strategy adopted

by states in an anarchical world, and the only way to ensure survival is to

16. Randel R. Correll, ‘‘U.S. India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown,’’ Astropolitics 4:2
(Summer 2006): 159–77.
17. ‘‘Pakistan Space Program,’’ Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, <http://
suparco.gov.pk/webroot/pages/history.asp>.
18. Karl D. Hebert, ‘‘Regulation of Space Weapons: Ensuring Stability and Continued Use of
Outer Space,’’ Astropolitics 12:1 (2014): 1–26.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  823

table 3. Military Capabilities, 2012

Main Principal Combat- Defence

Active battle surface Tactical capable Strategic budget*
forces Reserves tanks combatants submarines aircraft missiles $bn

India 1,325,000 1,155,000 3,274þ 24 15 870 54 38.5

China 2,285,000 510,000 7,430þ 77 61 1,903 502þ 102
Pakistan n/a

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

642,000 2,411þ 10 8 423 60 5.8
Indonesia 395,000 400,000 n/a 11 2 69 n/a 7.7

SOURCE : IISS, The Military Balance, 2013, <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance>.

*Direct spending on armed forces only.

strengthen security.19 The relationship among India, China, and Pakistan has
always been the defining factor with regard to the stability and security of the
South Asian region. The Sino–Indian war in 1962 kept the two countries
apart for a long time, with mutual arms buildup and cold relations. After the
end of Cold War, they started cooperating in the economic sector. But
despite numerous trade pacts, the two rivals have never limited their military
buildups (Table 3). India perceives a threat from China and tries to balance
every move made by China in the economic or military sector. Pakistan, on
other hand, feels threatened by the increasing military might of India and
tries to balance it through nonconventional military buildup along with
modernization of conventional equipment. The troika of relations results
in instability and insecurity in South Asia and has been a major factor in
so many issues’ remaining unresolved. China has always been a good friend of
Pakistan, which is alarming for India, resulting in continuous strategic com-
petition between the rivals.
For the last decade, India has looked to the US for external balancing
against China. Defense and economic pacts between the two nations reflect
their efforts to curb China’s growing influence. The Indo–US nuclear deal
and Indo–US space cooperation in 2005, and India’s vetoing of the PAROS
treaty in 2005, compelled China to take countermeasures against what it
perceived as an imminent threat. China considers the rise of India a substan-
tial threat in the region. The Indo–US strategic partnership is boosting
insecurity and instability in South Asia.

19. Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper,
International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1981.
824  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

The Indo-Pakistani relationship has been called an ‘‘action-reaction syn-

drome.’’20 Measures taken by China result in a reaction from the Indian side,
and the reaction from India pushes Pakistan to take countermeasures. Asym-
metric conventional forces resulted in a security dilemma, pushing Pakistan
to go nuclear. The Indian Cold Start doctrine also pushed Pakistan to take
countermeasures, resulting in development of the HATF IX, a low-yield
short-range ballistic missile.21 India is moving toward ASAT capability,22

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

destabilizing the already tense situation in the region. Indian collaboration
with the US, Russia, and Israel is helping boost its ballistic missile defense
capabilities. This will have implications for strategic stability in South Asia.
India tested its Agni V intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile on April
19, 2012; it has been called a game-changer by many. It has a range of 5000 km
and high accuracy; it can reach the heartland of China. Indian BMD is
heading toward an ASAT program, which will obviously start another arms
race in the region.

INDIA’S SPACE WEAPONIZATION

India is trying to acquire a technological edge over its adversaries. Human

space flights and lunar missions are trademarks of the great powers. The
Indian ambition for great power status could materialize through such pro-
jects. The principle of self-reliance again pushes India toward an indigenous,
sophisticated space program.
India has complained that 1968’s Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty dis-
criminates between the countries that had nuclear weapons before January 1,
1967, and those that acquired them later. India managed it seven years later
and conducted its first test in 1974 with the Pokhran I underground test
called Smiling Buddha.
In a May 2010 policy document, India’s Headquarters Integrated
Defence Staff stated that India is planning to develop weapons capable of
destroying satellites in low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit, physically

20. Zafar Nawaz Japsal, ‘‘Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for India-Pakistan Strategic
Environment,’’ NDU Journal 25 (2011): 2.
21. Press Release, Inter Services Public Relations, April 19, 2011, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/
main.asp?o¼t-press_release&id¼1721>.
22. Victoria Samson, ‘‘India, China and the United States in Space: Partners, Competitors, and
Combatants? A Perspective from the United States,’’ Indian Review 10 (2011): 422.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  825

and electronically.23 At this time the highest priorities for India are space
warfare capability and BMD. At the 97th Indian Science Congress in 2010,
V. K. Saraswat, then chief of DRDO, stated that India has initiated the
development of ASAT capability.
After the successful test of Agni III in 2010, Saraswat stated that India’s
ASAT capability has been proven. This is a two-stage ballistic missile which is
capable of nuclear weapons delivery. There is a debate about whether India

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

possesses ASAT capability, and Saraswat claims that India does. He believes
that that India’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense program could be uti-
lized as an ASAT weapon, along with its Agni series of missiles.24
At the golden jubilee celebration of DRDO, Abdul Kalam, a scientist and
former president of India, stated that India has the ability to intercept and
destroy objects in space and will do so if Indian territory is endangered.25
V. Siddhartha, an Indian scientist, argued that India’s communications,
remote sensing, and weather satellites have contributed to its BMD and have
utility as space control, force-application assets, and ASAT weapons.26 In
June 2010, in view of the growing threats from China to Indian space assets,
an Integrated Space Cell was formed.27 The cell is under control of the three
Indian military branches (Army, Air Force, and Navy), the Department of
Space, and ISRO. This cell is primarily focused on the growing threats to
Indian space assets and developing space assets for military purposes; the
body is to formulate Indian space policy in near future. These statements
don’t guarantee that India has or will have ASAT capability, but they high-
light India’s deep concern with this project.
According to many analysts, there are obvious indications that India has been
exploring nondestructive countermeasures. India is looking for a KE-ASAT,
which could interdict hostile satellites, along with a laser program.28 After the

23. Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff, ‘‘Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap,’’
May 2010, 57, <http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/TPCR13.pdf>.
24. Harsh Vasani, ‘‘India’s Anti Satellite Weapons’’, The Diplomat, June 14, 2016.
25. ‘‘India Too Has Technology to Intercept, Destroy Rogue Satellites,’’ Hindu Business Line,
February 23, 2008, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-others/tp-states/india-
too-has-technology-to-intercept-destroy-rogue-satellites/article1616822.ece>.
26. V. Siddhartha, ‘‘Military Dimensions in Future of the Indian Presence in Space,’’ Journal of
the United States Services Institution of India 130:540 (April-June 2000): 249.
27. ‘‘Now, Space Cell to Keep an Eye on China’s Plans,’’ Times of India, June 11, 2008, <https://
www.pressreader.com/india/the-times-of-india-new-delhi-edition/20080611/282024733012766>.
28. Peter B. de Selding, ‘‘India Developing Means to Destroy Satellites,’’ Space News, January 4,
2010.
826  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

successful launch of the Agni V missile, ISRO and DRDO announced that they
could build ASAT weapons very quickly. DDRO can build mini-satellites as
well. According to Saraswat, now the chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
the Agni V ballistic missile test was a trial for KE-ASAT.
India plans to accommodate the ASAT as part of its BMD program. High-
altitude interceptors can act as ASAT devices, destroying low-orbit satellites.29
High officials have stated that the ASAT defense system proves India’s ability

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

to neutralize the satellites of an adversary. The small-satellites plan will be
accomplished by joint efforts of ISRO and DRDO. Small satellites will
increase capabilities in reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence.30 The
Communication-Centric Intelligence Satellite was scheduled to become
operational by 2014.31 It will help monitor electronic communications across
the neighboring countries. According to DRDO, satellites will be placed in
low earth orbit and serve as a test beds for ASAT development.
Along with advancement and changes in practical application of satellites,
India has made some changes at the organizational level. The post of Assistant
Chief of Naval Staff (Communications Space and Network Centric Opera-
tion) has been created.32 The assistant chief ’s main task is to supervise space-
based military competences. India is also planning a Border Space Command
to keep an eye on India’s porous borders with Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and China. And there are media reports related to the formation of
a Space Command to strengthen India’s security.33
DRDO chief Saraswat publicly announced that India is working on
acquiring the technology to attack an enemy’s satellite and destroy it. He
claimed that India has all the basic building blocks to destroy a satellite.
DRDO is working on the Directionally Unrestricted Ray Gun Array
(DURGA) and Kinetic Attack Loitering Interceptor (KALI).34 Their basic

29. Praful Bidwai, ‘‘India’s Mars Mission Isn’t about Science, but Spectacle,’’ Rediff News,
November 19, 2013, <http://www.rediff.com/news/column/column-indias-mars-mission-isnt-about-
science-but-spectacle/20131119.htm>.
30. Debajit Sarkar, ‘‘Vision-2020: The Next Step for India’s Military Space Programs.’’ Defense
Update, December 20, 2011.
31. Sarkar, ‘‘Vision-2020.’’
32. Rajat Pandit, ‘‘Navy Creates New Post to Harness Space Based Capabilities,’’ Times of India,
June 3, 2012.
33. Ajay Lele, ‘‘Space Security: Possible Options for India,’’ Space Review, October 28, 2013.
34. V. Siddhartha, ‘‘Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space,’’ pre-
sentation at Center for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, September 17, 2010.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  827

functioning will be to destroy the launch of a missile toward India with

powerful pulses of relativistic electron beams.
After the successful launch of Agni V, Saraswat was asked in an interview
whether DRDO has ASAT capability. He answered that India is capable of
putting an ASAT system in place, as it has all the basic building blocks—only
a little improvisation and fine tuning is required.35 But India will not go for
a physical test by destroying any satellite because the debris would imperil the

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

rest of the satellites in space.36 DRDO is also planning programs such as
development of an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and laser-based sensors.
These would help in tracking and monitoring ASAT devices.
India launched its first navy satellite, GSAT-7, in September 2013.37 It will
detect maritime threats to the Indian Navy and facilitate networking among
navy warships, aircraft, and submarines. It will be followed by GSAT-7A, to
be used by the Indian Air force. The GSAT launch is an obvious change of
Indian space policy, which was originally centered on the peaceful uses of
outer space. GISAT, a geo-imaging satellite, is next on the list at ISRO.
Cartosat 2A and RISAT 2 are also being used for military applications.38
Cartosat 2A is under direct military control and serving the Indian Defense
Intelligence Agency’s Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre.39
The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System was launched in April
2014. It will help India work autonomously rather than relying on the Amer-
ican Global Positioning System. The system will also help the Indian armed
forces locate targets in real time.
In 2014, India became the sixth country to send a mission to the Red
Planet.40 On February 15, 2017, at Sriharikota Spaceport in the state of
Andhra Pradesh, India made history by launching a record 104 satellites from
a single rocket, beating Russia’s record of 37, established in 2014. Of the total
earth observation satellites, three were Indian, 88 American, and the rest from

35. Bohtan, ‘‘Ineluctable Outer Space,’’ 57.

36. ‘‘India Has All the Building Blocks for an Anti-satellite Capability,’’ India Today, April 27,
2012, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/agni-v-drdo-chief-dr-vijay-kumar-saraswat-interview/1/
186248.html>.
37. Madhumati, ‘‘Navy’s First Satellite GSAT-7 Now in Space,’’ The Hindu, August 30, 2013.
38. Shubhadeep Choudhury, ‘‘RISAT-2: A Feather in the Cap,’’ Tribune, May 17, 2009.
39. Kai Schrogl, Yearbook on Space Policy 2009/2010: Space for Society (New York: Springer Wien,
2011), 80.
40. Christopher Cannell, ‘‘The Hidden Value of India’s Space Program,’’ Foreign Affairs,
November 2013.
828  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emi-
rates. Such developments should be monitored, and both positive and neg-
ative repercussions should be considered.

US RESPONSE TO INDIA’S SPACE WEAPONS

The US response to Indian pursuit of ASATs and space weaponization has

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

been muted. The US is concerned over the missile programs of Iran and
North Korea, but its response to India reflects close bilateral relations. This
could be due to economic and strategic interests. Both the US and India have
declared that their defense cooperation is not against any third party. Nev-
ertheless, China is concerned about the potential Indian role in the unfolding
US military turn toward the Asia-Pacific.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

The volatile relationship between India and Pakistan will determine whether
the region is secure and stable. Obviously it would be irresponsible for any
nation to ignore the advancing military might of a country it considers a rival.
It is impossible for Pakistan and India to ignore each other’s growing
capabilities.
India already has conventional weapons superiority over Pakistan, and the
space program will strengthen its strategic and military capability. India’s
intention to develop ASAT weapons will trigger a new arms race in South
and East Asia. Pakistan’s space program is only just beginning. India is far
ahead, and its advancement in the field of space is alarming for Pakistan.
India’s nuclear posture is no-first-use and minimum nuclear deterrence,
but the steps it is taking to improve its defense capabilities are challenging
this. India is moving away from no-first-use in various official statements that
give the Indian nuclear doctrine flexibility and suggest gray areas. In 2003
India stated that it would use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or
biological attack. India has been denying the Cold Start Doctrine for more
than a decade, but now it has all the prerequisites.41 India first said that its
space program is for peaceful purposes, but the Indian Army could make use

41. The Cold Start Doctrine is the Indian military’s proactive strategy in a possible war against
Pakistan. India had denied the doctrine, but in January 2017, Indian Army Chief General Bipin
Rawat admitted it.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  829

of mini-satellites in operationalizing the Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan.

According to the chief of the DRDO, ‘‘The mini-satellites will provide
communication, navigation and global positioning system (GPS) to armed
force of India.’’42
India’s pursuit of BMD and its intent to develop ASAT capability will
have implications for Pakistan and involve it in countermeasures. Given the
economic instability in Pakistan, it would be a challenge for the country to

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

follow suit. Pakistan’s nuclear program is India-centric, so threats from India
will lead Pakistan to take countermeasures to strengthen its defense and
security. Given their geographical proximity, one misperception or miscom-
munication could result in catastrophe. India has been enjoying the privilege
of membership in export control regimes such as the Missile Technology
Control Regime, Australia Group, Wassanar Arrangement, and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group waiver in the Indo–US nuclear deal. Efforts are underway to
make India a permanent member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This
would further enhance its technological advancement, with destabilizing
effect.43 Indian defense and space institutions such as DRDO and ISRO
have been removed from the ‘‘entity list’’ established in 1997 by the US to
curb the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Being on the list requires
additional licensing for dual-use goods and technology. The removal warrants
India’s access to hi-tech and nuclear technology.44 This would give India an
edge over Pakistan and China.
Such developments would have serious repercussions for the strategic
stability of South Asia and especially Pakistan. A new arms race is inevitable
in the region and will compel other states to adopt a similar course of action.
It is time for Pakistan to consider Indian advancement a serious threat. The
older radar-based technologies are suitable for conventional and air forces,
but space-based detection, navigation, communication, and monitoring give
a state the upper hand and are very useful for effective command and control.
Given the changing nature of warfare, where asymmetric attacks and
informational advantages are of vital interest for a state, the importance of
a space program is increasing day by day. Effective use of space satellite

42. Rajat Pandit, ‘‘After Agni-V Launch, DRDO’s New Target Is Anti-Satellite Weapons,’’
Times of India, April 21, 2012.
43. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, ‘‘Emerging Nuclear Power and International Non-Proliferation
Regime,’’ Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 2013, 9.
44. Ibid.
830  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

services will give India the upper hand over an adversary or competitor.
A space program multiplies conventional forces by providing accurate infor-
mation for analysis and assessment of threats. This is alarming for Pakistan.
The Indian military will be capable of conducting operations in a more
informed and sophisticated manner. India’s being capable of strong and
effective space programs based on ASAT technology will enlarge its influence
at the regional and international levels.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

Information domination will help India plan in a better way. The space
program will give India accurate information about enemy missile silos and
the movement of troops.45 India will be able to monitor troop movement in
Pakistan and can base its plans on early, accurate information.
Putting weapons in space will destabilize the already vulnerable interna-
tional nonproliferation regime. The US is now focusing on India to develop
its nuclear and space programs to counter China, but from US cooperation
with India, Pakistan may face serious national security threats. Commercial
use of Indian space assets and the sharing of technology throughout the
region could help regional confidence and current interdependence initia-
tives, such as the South Asia Free Trade Agreement and the proposed Iran–
Pakistan gas pipeline.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The strategic environment of South Asia is complex, ambiguous, volatile,

and unpredictable. South Asia is an important region geostrategically and
geopolitically. The stability and security of the region are dependent on
Indo–Pakistani relations, which have been strained for many years. The
conventional asymmetry led to Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons and
a first-use policy. The nuclear deterrence between the two has been suc-
cessful: no major war has occurred since nuclearization (aside from the
Kargil standoff). Through its nuclear posture Islamabad has been able to
achieve objectives like dissuading the enemy from considering aggression,
deterring potential enemies, reducing dependence on allies, and military

45. Jacob Chriqui, ‘‘Military Applications of India’s Space Program: The Military Surveillance
and Reconnaissance System,’’ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2006, <http://www.ipcs.
org/article/military/military-applications-of-indias-space-program-the-military-surveillance-and-
2043.html>.
 QAISER AND MISBAH / SOUTH ASIAN SPACE MILITARIZATION  831

independence.46 Pakistan has been trying to preserve the credibility of its

minimum nuclear deterrent since 1998. Pakistan’s proposed Strategic
Restraint Regime would ban anti-ballistic missiles and submarine-
launched missiles in the region.47 But India rejected the proposal, wanting
to balance the growing Chinese military muscle and engaging Pakistan in
an expensive arms race.
India’s space weapons program will solidify its defense and increase its

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

options. It will also have serious repercussions for Indo–Pakistani relations
and strategic stability in South Asia. It will heighten the asymmetry between
the declared rivals, India and Pakistan. Further advancement and deployment
of Agni V will give New Delhi second-strike capability. This will obviously
have a negative effect on Pakistan’s security. Pakistan’s space program is only
in its initial phases. India is very far ahead, and its rapid advancement in the
field of space is alarming for Pakistan.
To preserve its space assets, India has showed interest in building satellite-
killer devices, lasers, and military satellites to support Indian forces. Space
weapons are unpredictable and fragile. It will be disastrous for mankind if
these weapons are placed in outer space. To attain space dominance by
developing such dangerous weapons would not be a rational approach. It
is therefore recommended that alternative options be considered. India’s
space weapons would have direct implications for Pakistan in particular.
Indian activities in space will force Pakistan to make changes in its nuclear
posture, imperiling stability and security.
Indian space weaponization will force Pakistan to take measures to
strengthen its defense forces. India’s having information about silos and the
movement of troops, along with the ability to hit them, will require precau-
tionary measures from Pakistan. Technological developments in the Indian
space program could be a great threat to Pakistan, so the Pakistani govern-
ment must now pay full attention to its space satellite program, to counter the
Indian hegemonic space threat, and not always rely on the US and China.
Pakistan receives technology from the US and China and does not possess
indigenous technology production. Pakistan’s F-16s were provided by the US,
and Pakistan’s space program is largely contingent on China’s help. Plans

46. Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘‘The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South
Asia,’’ Arms Control Today, October 2003, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Khan_10>.
47. UN General Assembly document A/56/136 add.2, August 21, 2001.
832  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

should be made to speed the development of Pakistan’s space program. India

has always impelled Pakistan to take defensive security measures, as it did in
1998, when Pakistan had to test nuclear weapons in the aftermath of India’s
nuclear tests.
Pakistan doesn’t have its own launch vehicles or a launch pad for space
vehicles. Pakistan needs to have its own launch vehicle and a geographically
suitable place to build a launch pad. It is time for Pakistan to have an

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/57/5/813/79113/as_2017_57_5_813.pdf by guest on 09 June 2020

indigenous space program, not reliant on anyone else. Given the changing
geostrategic environment, Pakistan must focus on internal balancing.
India is working on expanding its conventional and nonconventional
military might, as is evident in its rising defense budget allocations. Pakistan
needs to pay special attention to this trend. Pakistan needs to work on a more
robust nuclear triad with the development of nuclear submarines. Pakistan
has made a significant development in this regard, with the successful test of
its Nasr solid-fueled multi-tube tactical ballistic missile. Pakistan should go
for nuclear submarines, which are hard to detect and can remain underwater
for long periods. It must devise ways to overcome the economic challenge, to
meet these increasing defense demands. And Pakistan can take this issue to
the United Nations with the collaboration of other states, as its adversarial
relations with India endanger the security of all states.
The prevailing strategic environment will force Pakistan to take measures
to counter the threats to its security. The measures will trigger an arms race in
outer space and will create further instability in an already vulnerable South
Asia. Efforts should be made at the global level to curb the proliferation of
weapons in space, which is a global common and should be prevented from
becoming a battleground.
India’s space program is growing at a very brisk pace. The main regional
issues of South Asia pivot around India–Pakistan rivalry. Space weaponiza-
tion in South Asia will have dire implications for strategic stability. India’s
quest for space weaponization is motivated by aspiration for supremacy and
regional hegemony. India also wants to balance its capabilities with those of
China to counter China’s growing influence in South Asia. Closer analysis of
the issue suggests that given the historical relations between India and Paki-
stan, India’s quest for space weaponization will threaten the security of the
region.