SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ 94-995. September 5, 2002.]

LUZ ALFONSO, NESTOR ALMOGUERRA, ERNESTO AQUINO,

CARMELITA ARCENAS, IMELDA ARISTORENAS, CARLOS ATENTAR,
ENRIQUE ATENTAR, DELFIN BANAAG, MERCEDITA BELARMINO,
SHEILA BOMBAY, MA. LUISA BONGHANOY, CRISANTO DE CASTRO,
MILAGROS DE CASTRO, DIANA CRUZ, ROBERTO DAULAT, MA.
TERESITA DIZON, AMAR DOCTOLERO, OLGA SOCORRO DYCUECO,
OMAR ESPINA, CONCEPCION GATBONTON, MARY ANN GONZALES,
GLENN CLEMENT KAPUNAN, CECILIA LALIC, ASUNCION LANSANG,
RODELITO LAUNIO, JOSE MARANAN, ROWENA MATIBAG, JOCELYN
MORALDE, HONRICO DAVID NAVARRO, REBECCA OLLODO, RITA
ONGKIKO, ERNESTO PADOLINA, CARY PAUL RUDI, RENATO SAN
JUAN, MARCIANO SALAMAT, SUSAN TAGROS, TERESITA TESIORNA,
ROSALINA L. TIMBANG, TRANQUILINO TUPAZ, ALICIA VALDEZ, and
GERONIMO VILLANUEVA , complainants, vs . ROSE MARIE ALONZO-
LEGASTO, Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City,
EMELITA CAMAYA, Clerk of Court III, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, and REMEDIOS "BABY"
GARCIA, Records Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City , respondents.

Ernesto C. Jacinto for complainants.

Prospero A. Crescini for respondents.
Fernando P. Camaya collaborating counsel for E. Camaya.

SYNOPSIS

Complainants herein were employees of the City Government of Quezon City and
were assigned at the O ce of the Clerk of Court-Metropolitan Trial Court (OCC-MeTC) and
the different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City to assist the organic staff of the judiciary.
The instant administrative complaint had its roots from the transfer of complainants to
other o ces in the City Government made by respondent Judge. Complainants alleged
that conspiracy existed between respondents. Complainants also accused respondent
Garcia of falsifying her daily time records (DTR's). They likewise accused respondent
Camaya of receiving a bribe from a supplier of court equipment and supplies.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge, in deciding to return the forty-one
City Government employees previously detailed with the MeTC, has exceeded her authority
which is limited to the temporary re-assignment of court employees, i.e., for a period of
three months extendible only once for the same period. She had no authority to cause the
permanent transfer of court employees, as was done in the instant case, since the
jurisdiction for such action devolved solely upon the O ce of the Court Administrator and
not in her capacity as Executive Judge.
With regard to respondent Garcia, the Court ruled that she has not satisfactorily
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 explained the entries in the allegedly falsi ed DTR's upon which she drew the
corresponding salary and other bene ts. Hence, she is the person responsible for the
dishonest act of falsifying these DTR's. Respondent Judge was also found responsible for
Garcia's act of dishonesty in falsifying the DTR's for failure to initiate the proper
investigation when the dishonorable act nally surfaced during her term as Executive
Judge. caDTSE

The Court ruled that respondents Judge Legasto and Garcia should be both equally
reminded that public o ce is a public trust. This principle assumes greater importance
among judges and court personnel who, in the administration of justice, must always
adhere to the tenets of accountability, responsibility, integrity, loyalty and e ciency. From
the executive judge to the lowest clerk, each should ensure that public con dence in the
judiciary is maintained. Respondent Judge was ned the amount of P10,000.00, while
respondent Garcia was suspended from o ce for one (1) month without pay, or if her
suspension can no longer be imposed, a fine of P20,000.00 is imposed upon her.
The Court dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent Camaya for
lack of merit.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; EXERCISES

POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURT EMPLOYEES; CASE AT BAR. —
Respondent Judge Legasto violated rules and regulations governing the detail,
reassignment or transfer of court employees including locally-funded court personnel. It is
our considered opinion that her decision to return the forty-one (41) City Government
employees previously detailed with the MeTC exceeded her authority under Sec. IV of
Administrative Order No. 6 which is limited to the temporary re-assignment of court
employees, i.e., for a period of three (3) months extendible only once for the same period.
She had no authority to cause the permanent transfer of court employees, as was done in
the instant case, since the jurisdiction for such action devolved solely upon the O ce of
the Court Administrator and not in her capacity as Executive Judge. Furthermore, it was
Judge Legasto's duty to apprise this Court of the personnel requirements of the OCC-
MeTC and the alleged need to streamline the sta ng pattern before informing the local
government of the return of its employees, as it might unduly prejudice the services
rendered by the court to the residents of Quezon City. Instead, what Judge Legasto did
was to refer the matter personally to the o ce of then Vice-Mayor Charito Planas for
evaluation and assessment, which is contrary to Sec. III of Administrative Circular No. 30-
91 vesting in the Office of the Court Administrator the sole responsibility "for all liaison and
coordination activities with the Legislative and Executive departments as well as with local
government o cials . . ." and to Sec. IV of Administrative Order No. 6 requiring prior notice
to this Court, at least the O ce of the Court Administrator, as regards the purported
transfer of a considerable number of employees, as in the instant case, which would not
only affect the individual employees' rights but would also compromise the administration
of justice. The personnel action initiated by Judge Legasto was a clear derogation of the
power of administrative supervision of this Court over court employees and unfortunately
fell short of Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring judges to "maintain
professional competence in court management," among others.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES; COURT
PERSONNEL, FROM EXECUTIVE JUDGE TO THE LOWEST CLERK SHOULD ENSURE THAT
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 PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY IS MAINTAINED. — [R]espondents Judge
Legasto and Garcia should both be equally reminded that public o ce is a public trust.
This principle assumes greater importance among judges and court personnel who in the
administration of justice, must always adhere to the tenets of accountability, responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and e ciency. From the executive judge to the lowest clerk, each should
ensure that public con dence in the judiciary is maintained. In sanctioning errant judicial
o cers and employees, we have always stressed that the dispensation of justice is a
sacred task and that public servants involved in it must live up to its highest standards.
Unfortunately, respondent Judge and Garcia are found wanting in this regard.

DECISION

CORONA , J : p

This resolves the instant complaint for various administrative charges against
respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, then Executive Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), 1 Quezon City, along with co-respondents Assistant Clerk of Court
Emelita Camaya and Records O cer Remedios Garcia, both of the O ce of the Clerk of
Court, MeTC-Quezon City (OCC-MeTC), consisting of graft and corruption, rendition of an
unjust interlocutory order, fraud against the public treasury, malversation of public funds,
estafa, discrimination, favoritism, grave abuse of authority, and grave and serious
misconduct. AaDSTH

Complainants Luz Alfonso, Nestor Almoguerra, Ernesto Aquino, Carmelita Arcenas,

Imelda Aristorenas, Carlos Atentar, Enrique Atentar, Del n Banaag, Mercedita Belarmino,
Sheila Bombay, Ma. Luisa Bonghanoy, Crisanto De Castro, Milagros De Castro, Diana Cruz,
Roberto Daulat, Ma. Teresita Dizon, Amar Doctolero, Olga Socorro Dycueco, Omar Espina,
Concepcion Gatbonton, Mary Ann Gonzales, Glenn Clement Kapunan, Cecilia Lalic,
Asuncion Lansang, Rodelito Launio, Jose Maranan, Rowena Matibag, Jocelyn Moralde,
Honrico David Navarro, Rebecca Ollodo, Rita Ongkiko, Ernesto Padolina, Cary Paul Rudi,
Renato San Juan, Marciano Salamat, Susan Tagros, Teresita Tesiorna, Rosalina L. Timbang,
Tranquilino Tupaz, Alicia Valdez and Geronimo Villanueva, forty-one (41) in all, were
employees of the City Government of Quezon City. They were appointed by various city
mayors at different times under separate appointment papers 2 and received salaries and
other bene ts from the City Government. 3 They held positions under the O ce of the City
Mayor, Special Assistance for the Metropolitan Trial Court and were assigned at the OCC-
MeTC and the different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City to assist the organic staff of
the judiciary. 4
On 16 August 1993 respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto wrote a letter to
Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. returning all but one 5 of the forty-one (41) complainants to the
Quezon City Government allegedly to —
". . . utilize the maximum potentials and resources of all National and City
paid employees, and in view of the observation of Honorable Vice Mayor, Charito
Planas, in the recent personnel survey, that the O ce of the Clerk of Court, MTC,
is overstaffed, I am returning herewith the following City employees assigned in
the said o ce . . . . The return of the said employees is necessary, in the
meantime, in order for the undersigned to properly assess, determine and evaluate
the actual number of support employees from the City in the effective and
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 e cient operation of the O ce of the Clerk of Court. I shall in due time notify
your good o ce of the number of City employees needed in the O ce of the
Clerk of Court in line with my further desire to eliminate manpower excesses
(emphasis supplied). 6

The letter returning the MeTC employees was based on alleged plan to reorganize
the OCC-MeTC which dated back to the time of former Executive Judge Guillermo Loja. 7
The transfer was, however, formally initiated sometime in June or July 1993 through an
assessment undertaken by the o ce of then Vice Mayor Charito Planas. A certain Victor
Ala 8 supposedly assessed the work aptitude of complainants by clandestinely observing
them for several days during a two (2)-week period at the OCC 9 and obtaining documents
from Clerk of Court III Emelita Camaya allegedly necessary for the purpose. 1 0 The results
of the observation were reduced into a con dential Aide Memoire 1 1 which concluded that
"there was general breakdown of o ce functions [as] personnel were engaged in lively and
animated conversation among themselves, accompanied by boisterous laughter
unbecoming of an o ce [and] non-productive moving about [was] also an ordinary sight,"
and which blamed "over-population" and poor "enforcement of o ce rules and regulations"
as causes of the disorderly office decorum. 1 2
Prior to the submission of her letter, respondent Judge met with then Clerk of Court
Herman R. Cimafranca and respondent Camaya to discuss the possibility of reducing
personnel in the OCC. 1 3 Judge Legasto likewise convened all the employees of the o ce,
including complainants, and divulged the plan to streamline the workforce. 1 4 It was
agreed that after the reorganization, she would further study the need for additional
manpower as she committed herself to seek the recall of any of the complainants
subsequently found to be necessary in the interest of the service. 1 5
On 17 August 1993 Mayor Mathay issued O ce Order No. 47 reassigning the forty-
three (43) City Government employees including herein forty-one (41) complainants to
different offices of the Quezon City Government. 1 6 The reassigned employees, particularly
complainants, suffered no diminution of salary or bene ts nor, were, in any manner,
subjected to di culties as a result of the personnel movement since the o ces they
reported to were just meters away from the OCC-MeTC. 1 7 They also retained their
respective items under the O ce of the City Mayor, Special Assistance for the
Metropolitan Trial Court, under which their salaries and benefits were paid. 1 8
After executing the transfer, Judge Legasto convened the supervisors of all the units
in the OCC-MeTC and ordered them to evaluate the work requirements of their respective
units by matching the number of personnel with the desired work output. 1 9 The reports of
the supervisors allegedly found the reorganization to be bene cial and instrumental in
achieving an e cient and effective work atmosphere in their respective units: Civil Case
Section (Exh. "44"); Criminal RPC Unit (Exh. "45"); Ordinance Clearance and Probation
Section (Exh. "46"); Tra c Case Unit (Exh. "47"); Marriage Section (Exh. "48"); and Receiving
Section (Exh. "49"). 2 0 None of the complainants who had been transferred was ever
recalled by Judge Legasto. 2 1
The transfer of complainants to other o ces in the City Government was admittedly
the root of the instant administrative complaint. 2 2 Complainants averred conspiracy
between respondents Camaya and Remedios "Baby" Garcia, the alleged girl Friday of
respondent Judge, on one hand, and on the other, Judge Legasto, purportedly to favor
some of her "favorite" national employees, i.e. from the organic staff of the judiciary over
City Government employees; hence, their arbitrary transfer to other o ces and the unfair
treatment as shown in the recording of attendance and in the bringing of children to the
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 OCC during o ce hours. Respondent Judge was likewise charged with doctoring a payroll
to fraudulently collect thirty (30) days of election-related work during the 11 May 1992
elections when she should have been credited with only ve (5) days of work.
Complainants also alleged that respondents Camaya and Garcia were "fixing the raffle" and
the disposition of cases for a fee. Camaya was further accused of having a low intelligence
quotient necessary for her position of Clerk of Court III but was ironically perceived by
complainants to have been one of the masterminds of the reorganization, the other being
respondent Garcia. It was also claimed that Camaya usurped for corrupt purposes the
authority of then Clerk of Court Herman R. Cimafranca in signing vouchers and purchase
request papers so she could collect bribe money from suppliers of court equipment and
supplies. Complainants claimed that, in one instance, Camaya received P5,000 from a
supplier. Finally, they accused respondent Garcia of falsifying three (3) daily time records
(DTR's), Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", for two and a half (2 1/2) months, i.e., in December 1989 and
in January and February 1990, wherein she made it appear that she reported for work when
in fact she did not. Based on this dishonest claim, she was indeed paid the corresponding
salary and other benefits.
Respondents led their respective comments/answers to the instant complaint. On
8 March 1995 we referred the case to Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo, RTC-Br. 116,
Pasay City, for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
notice of the referral. On 18 January 1996 Judge Gustilo recommended the exoneration of
respondents. On 21 August 1996 we required Judge Gustilo to conduct a more exhaustive
and thorough investigation of the case. To reiterate the mandatory principle that all
complainants and witnesses must be summoned to testify or otherwise shed light on their
knowledge of facts relevant to the integrity and competence of judges and staff alike, we
said —
"In his letter of 30 September 1996 Judge Gustilo manifested that he had a
full-blown hearing but was at a loss as to what further investigation to conduct,
and requested for instructions on the matter.

"We cannot see how Judge Gustilo can claim to be 'at a loss as to what
further investigation to conduct.' Out of the forty-one (41) complainants listed,
only six (6) were presented as witnesses. The various annexes attached to the
complaint were not even touched upon in the process. The complainants in this
case are lowly city employees who may not ordinarily be expected to present very
ably their arguments sustaining their 23-page complaint, exclusive of annexes 'A'
to 'K', as well as their 32-page reply. Judge Gustilo should have looked into the
basis of the charges by propounding questions himself, clari catory or otherwise,
to the complainants who should have been noti ed individually of the hearings
and asked to testify.
"A more thorough investigation is equally important to determine the
liability of complainants for giving false testimonies in case the charges, which
appear to be serious, later on turn out to be false and unfounded. Speci cally, the
veracity of the allegations in the complaint, comment and reply of the parties as
well as contents of the various annexes attached thereto should be examined and
delved into, and the parties concerned confronted with them. Judge Gustilo
should not have been content with the seeming nonchalant attitude of counsel for
complainants in presenting only six (6) witnesses.

"This is an administrative case where the Court is interested in determining

the integrity, competence and moral fitness of its employees, judges not excluded.
This is not a civil case where generally only private rights are involved. An
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 administrative matter partakes the nature of a criminal case in which the
government is interested specifically in pursuing to cleanse its ranks.
"In his Investigation Report dated 18 January 1996 Judge Gustilo observed
that complainants did not clearly specify in their complaint and in their reply as to
what acts were committed by respondents which would constitute any of the
charges included in the complaint. (N.B. Investigation Report of Judge Gustilo
dated 18 January 1996, pp. 67-70). If that be true, Judge Gustilo himself should
have inquired into the basis and speci cs of those charges from the
complainants and the witnesses they (complainants) may produce. That is
among the duties of an administrative investigator who in this case, incidentally,
was particularly designated by this Court. But Judge Gustilo, apparently, failed in
this regard; instead, he took his responsibility and the trust of this Court too lightly
...
"Forty-one (41) complainants, whose addresses are clearly stated in their
complaint, should be given their day in court, after which, respondents should
likewise be heard in their defense."

On 25 February 1998 we reiterated the directive to probe deeper into the complaint
by receiving additional evidence and proffering clari catory questions. In the meantime,
Judge Gustilo was appointed to the Sandiganbayan, so that the Court designated his
replacement as Executive Judge, Judge Lilia C. Lopez, and directed her to commence
forthwith with the hearing and complete the same within ninety (90) days from notice of
the directive. In due time, Judge Lopez recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondents for insu ciency of evidence, despite our Resolution of 25
February 1998 hereinbefore quoted.
At the outset we stress that the instant complaint does not seek to invalidate the
Office Order of Mayor Mathay which precipitated the transfer of complainants to different
o ces within the Quezon City Government. Mayor Mathay has not in fact been impleaded
in this case. Neither are we minded to tackle the peculiar 2 3 character of complainants'
status — an aberration as Chief Justice Enrique Fernando would observe in another case 2 4
— within the personnel structure of the OCC-MeTC. These employees, as we have stated,
were appointed by various Quezon City mayors, presumably pursuant to RA 1575 (1956)
2 5 empowering them to appoint clerks and other o ce personnel which the City Council
may provide in the o ce of the clerk of the municipal court as the needs of the service
demanded. 2 6 To emphasize, the present disciplinary proceedings are circumscribed by
the sole issue of administrative culpability of respondents as alleged in the complaint.
We find some merit in the complaint.
First. Respondent Judge Legasto violated rules and regulations governing the detail,
reassignment or transfer of court employees including locally-funded court personnel. It is
our considered opinion that her decision to return the forty-one (41) City Government
employees previously detailed with the MeTC exceeded her authority under Sec. IV of
Administrative Order No. 6 which is limited to the temporary re-assignment of court
employees, i.e., for a period of three (3) months extendible only once for the same period.
2 7 She had no authority to cause the permanent transfer of court employees, as was done
in the instant case, since the jurisdiction for such action devolved solely upon the O ce of
the Court Administrator and not in her capacity as Executive Judge. 2 8
Furthermore, it was Judge Legasto's duty to apprise this Court of the personnel
requirements of the OCC-MeTC and the alleged need to streamline the sta ng pattern
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 before informing the local government of the return of its employees, as it might unduly
prejudice the services rendered by the court to the residents of Quezon City. Instead, what
Judge Legasto did was to refer the matter personally to the o ce of then Vice-Mayor
Charito Planas for evaluation and assessment, which is contrary to Sec. III of
Administrative Circular No. 30-91 vesting in the O ce of the Court Administrator the sole
responsibility "for all liaison and coordination activities with the Legislative and Executive
departments as well as with local government officials . . ." and to Sec. IV of Administrative
Order No. 6 2 9 requiring prior notice to this Court, at least the O ce of the Court
Administrator, as regards the purported transfer of a considerable number of employees,
as in the instant case, which would not only affect the individual employees' rights but
would also compromise the administration of justice. The personnel action initiated by
Judge Legasto was a clear derogation of the power of administrative supervision of this
Court over court employees and unfortunately fell short of Rule 3.08 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct requiring judges to "maintain professional competence in court
management," among others.
Judge Legasto cannot hide behind the authorization issued by Mayor Mathay for the
transfer of forty-one (41) court employees to give an impression of legality to her action.
While it was proper for her to consult the responsible o cials of the Quezon City
Government, without of course transgressing the authority of the O ce of the Court
Administrator, she undoubtedly had the correlative duty to promote the proper discharge
of the Court's mandate to improve judicial services and facilitate the dispensation of
justice by keeping this Court duly informed of the plan to considerably reduce court
personnel. The courtesy of prior notice, at least, could have afforded us the opportunity to
assess the propriety of such action prior to its implementation. Needless to stress, it is
absolutely essential to the proper administration of justice that courts have full control
over the o cial actions of those through whom the administration of the affairs of the
court proceeds. As keenly observed by Chief Justice Fernando in Bagatsing vs. Herrera, 3 0
"[f]or judicial independence to be a reality, the least interference by or in uence from other
governmental departments is of the essence." 3 1 Lest it be again ignored, we stress in this
regard that only this Court has the authority to order a personnel accounting of locally-
funded employees assigned in the lower courts to determine the necessity of their detail
3 2 and that, accordingly, all requests for detail of locally-funded employees, including
complainants herein, must pass the O ce of the Court Administrator for review and
appropriate action. 3 3
Second. Other than the fact that all forty-one (41) employees were appointees of the
Quezon City Government, there were no common derogatory records which would explain
respondent Judge's recommendation for their collective transfer. On the other hand,
respondent Garcia would herself admit that some of the complainants had been
commended for their punctuality and excellent attendance 3 4 and by respondent Camaya
for their outstanding performance. 3 5 We can reasonably infer from these admitted facts
that the move to return complainants was not based on any valid and substantive ground.
Judge Legasto defended her action by claiming that she only wanted to improve the
working conditions in the OCC-MeTC. 3 6 But if this was indeed the case, then she should
have forthwith identified the recalcitrant employees and charged each of them with various
administrative offenses. The recommendation to transfer wholesale forty-one (41)
employees, without regard to individual responsibilities, exhibited her unfairness if not lack
of judiciousness in dealing with the situation. Furthermore, the conclusion in the Aide
Memoire that the OCC-MeTC was over-staffed is hardly credible since the records show
that, after the wholesale transfer of complainants, three (3) City Government employees
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 were hired to take over vacant items in the OCC-MeTC 3 7 and that at least three (3) City
Government employees were retained at the OCC-MeTC. 3 8 Thus we cannot help but
conclude that Judge Legasto acted with manifest bias and partiality against complainants.
caSDCA

Third. Complainants accused respondent Garcia of falsifying three (3) daily time
records (DTR's), Exhs. "M", "N" and "O," for two and a half (2 1/2) months, i.e., in December
1989 and in January and February 1990, wherein she made it appear that she reported for
work when in fact she did not, so she could collect the corresponding salary and other
bene ts. Respondent Garcia, however, denied executing these DTR's and alleged that she
reported for work for one-half month in December 1989 and that, for the rest of the month,
she applied for a leave of absence to accommodate her husband who was vacationing
from abroad. 3 9 Allegedly for the next two (2) months, January and February 1990, she was
on sick leave for asthma on the basis of a leave application she led in the last week of
January 1990. 4 0 She also testi ed that she submitted her daily time records for the three
(3) months in question, allegedly not Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", with time-in and time-out
notations for the rst half of December 1989 and a red bar on the face of the DTR's for the
second half of December 1989, and for the whole months of January and February 1990,
allegedly to indicate her absences for this period. 4 1 A certi cation dated 6 April 1990
from the O ce of the Court Administrator, Exh. "V", would, however, con rm that
respondent Garcia did not le an application for leave during the period 1 December 1989
to 28 February 1990. 4 2 After an absence of two-and-a-half (2-1/2) months, respondent
Garcia reported back to work in the first week of March 1990. 4 3
Respondent Garcia also testi ed that she received her salary for the month of
December 1989 on 13 December 1989, and on 27 December 1989. 4 4 She further
alleged that she got her salary for the month of January 1990 4 5 but was unable to
collect her pay for February 1990 since then Clerk of Court Atty. Sonia Perez allegedly
took the money in her behalf and pocketed the same while she was on leave of
absence. 4 6 She further averred that sometime between August and September 1990
she learned that three (3) sets of DTR's for December 1989, January and February
1990, 4 7 namely, Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", were falsi ed by indicating her name and
purported signature as well as the date and time of her supposed attendance for these
months when she was admittedly on leave. 4 8 She allegedly investigated these
anomalous DTR's and found that they were certi ed to be true by Atty. Sonia Perez 4 9
but she never discovered who falsi ed her signature and the attendance entries therein.
5 0 Nonetheless she failed to offer in evidence the genuine DTR's she had allegedly
executed which showed her absences and instead blamed Atty. Perez for the
supposedly mysterious loss or concealment of her records through the latter's
manipulation. 5 1 In place of the supposedly missing or misplaced authentic DTR's,
Garcia offered another set of DTR's 5 2 bearing her genuine entries and signatures for
comparison with the ones allegedly falsely attributed to her. Furthermore, she claimed
that Atty. Perez knelt before certain employees of the OCC begging them not to le a
complaint against her since she was then about to retire, 5 3 which consequently
in uenced respondent Garcia not to le a complaint against her to rectify the DTR's,
Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", being credited to her. 5 4
We hold that respondent Garcia has not satisfactorily explained the entries in the
allegedly falsi ed DTR's, Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", upon which she drew the corresponding
salary and other benefits. Hence we find her to be the person responsible for the dishonest
act of falsifying these DTR's.
The falsi ed DTR's for December 1989, January and February 1990, which were
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 offered by complainants as their Exhs. "M", "N" and "O", are copies certi ed on le by the
Assistant Chief of O ce of the Administrative Services of the O ce of the Court
Administrator and are therefore admissible public documents, as respondents themselves
would stipulate. 5 5 "In the case of public documents, the mere production of an admissible
copy is generally su cient to satisfy any requirement of proof of due execution of the
document, in accordance with the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse
acta." 5 6 Accordingly, respondent Garcia is presumed to be the author of Exhs. "M", "N" and
"O" purposely to falsify or cover up the fact that she was not reporting for work for two-
and-a-half (2-1/2) months. 5 7 While this presumption may be rebutted, it may only be done
by clear, strong and convincing evidence. 5 8
Respondent Garcia was not able to rebut this presumption. Her defense was mere
unsubstantiated denial 5 9 which of course is a weak defense. Furthermore, if we are to
compare the signatures on Exhs. "M", "N" and "O" with the admitted standard signatures of
respondent Garcia, Exhs. "33" and "34", we would see no marked difference between them.
"The test of genuineness," Chief Justice Moran stressed in his standard treatise, "ought to
be the resemblance, not to the formation of the letters in some other specimen or
specimens, but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the
involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit, or other permanent course, and
is, therefore, itself permanent." 6 0 It appears to the Court that there is a visible general
resemblance between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures, which
similarity is particularly marked in respect of Exhs. "M" and "O".
Other circumstances prove that Exhs. "M", "N" and "O" were truly recorded by
respondent Garcia. For one, Garcia exerted no effort to show who falsified her signature on
the questioned DTR's and to explain the loss of her supposedly genuine DTR's. She
certainly could have checked with the O ce of the Court Administrator or subpoenaed
Atty. Sonia Perez to shed light on this issue since, as she herself admitted, Atty. Perez as
then Clerk of Court certified Exhs. "M", "N" and "O" although they were allegedly falsified. We
also cannot accept her explanation that her genuine DTR's for December 1989 and January
and February 1990 could have already been lost and could no longer be retrieved. It must
be stressed that these are o cial documents under formal custodianship and for this
reason would not disappear overnight. Finally the certification issued by this Court, i.e., Exh.
"V", unmistakably states that she did not le any application for leave of absence during
the period in question and explains thus the existence of Exhs. "M", "N" and "O". It is obvious
respondent Garcia failed to prove diligent efforts to locate the allegedly missing DTR's
which she must have done if they truly existed.
We also nd respondent Judge responsible for Garcia's act of dishonesty in
falsifying the three (3) sets of DTR's. Although Judge Legasto was not yet the Executive
Judge when the offense took place in 1990, it became incumbent upon her to initiate the
proper investigation when the dishonorable act nally surfaced during her term as
Executive Judge. She was appointed Acting Executive Judge in June of 1992 6 1 and was
subsequently reappointed to the post in 1993 6 2 yet she did not exert any effort at all
throughout her tenure to seek the truth. The attitude of Judge Legasto favored respondent
Garcia to the point that the latter almost got away with the fraudulent act. This conduct is
anathema to the unmistakable mandate of Rule 3.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to ". .
. initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against . . . court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware."
In view of the foregoing, respondents Judge Legasto and Garcia should both be
equally reminded that public o ce is a public trust. This principle assumes greater
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 importance among judges and court personnel who in the administration of justice, must
always adhere to the tenets of accountability, responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
e ciency. 6 3 From the executive judge to the lowest clerk, each should ensure that public
con dence in the judiciary is maintained. In sanctioning errant judicial o cers and
employees, we have always stressed that the dispensation of justice is a sacred task and
that public servants involved in it must live up to its highest standards. 6 4 Unfortunately,
respondent Judge and Garcia are found wanting in this regard.
This brings us to the accusations of complainants which were not substantiated by
evidence.
First, after a thorough examination of the records, we nd no credible evidence that
respondent Camaya received a P5,000 bribe from a supplier of the OCC-MTC. The
respective testimonies of complainants Rita Ongkiko, Diana Cruz and Gerry Kapunan
contradicted each other.
Diana Cruz testi ed that Camaya required her to demand grease money from the
supplier to be used in purchasing gifts for Judge Legasto. 6 5 Since Diana Cruz was not the
one dealing with the suppliers, 6 6 she asked the help of Supply O cer Glenn Kapunan to
relay the demand to them. 6 7 She found out later that Kapunan delivered the bribe money
to Camaya. 6 8 On the other hand, complainant Kapunan testi ed that in response to
Camaya's demand on Diana Cruz for bribe money, he gave the P5,000 to the latter who in
turn gave it to Camaya. 6 9 Kapunan also claimed that respondent Camaya personally knew
the supplier from whom the P5,000 had been taken 7 0 and that it was she who arranged for
the payoff. 7 1 Kapunan further testi ed that he and Camaya were not on speaking terms 7 2
although he perpetrated the criminal act for her bene t. He quoted Camaya as saying
"Isauli mo iyan sa supplier" when Diana Cruz gave the P5,000 to her. 7 3
Rita Ongkiko had still another version of the P5,000 bribe. According to her, Glenn
Kapunan received P2,000 out of the P5,000 given by the supplier while the remainder of
P3,000 was paid to and pocketed by respondent Camaya. 7 4 She also testi ed that
Kapunan told her that he returned the P2,000 to the supplier 7 5 who subsequently turned
over the money to Camaya. 7 6 Ongkiko admitted that she and Diana Cruz reported the
alleged bribery to Judge Legasto who was allegedly infuriated by the corrupt practices of
her subordinates 7 7 and that this incident was reported to but dismissed by the O ce of
the Ombudsman. 7 8
On these three (3) versions rests the case of corruption against respondent
Camaya. No coherent story worthy of credit appears to have been presented. Diana Cruz
claimed that it was Glenn Kapunan who gave the P5,000 bribe to Camaya. But Kapunan
contradicted her, testifying that it was she who gave the P5,000 to Camaya. The
complainants made no effort to reconcile this contradiction. Furthermore, complainants
quoted varying amounts of the bribe: Rita Ongkiko declared that P2,000 was given to
Glenn Kapunan and P3,000 to Camaya, while Diana Cruz and Glenn Kapunan reported that
P5,000 was delivered to her. They likewise never explained why respondent Camaya would.
say "Isauli mo iyan sa supplier" when it was she who allegedly instructed them to mulct the
supplier.
There is also no reasonable explanation for the apparent audacity of Camaya in
ordering complainants Diana Cruz and Glenn Kapunan, who were her known enemies, to
commit bribery in her behalf. Nor do we find any credible reason for respondent Camaya to
relay her demand for bribe through complainant Diana Cruz when it was not the latter's job
to deal with the concerned businessman. 7 9 Complainants even admitted that respondent
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 Camaya know the supplier 8 0 and had in fact arranged the alleged meeting between Glenn
Kapunan and the supplier. 8 1 In sum, if she really wanted to engage in corruption, Camaya
could have very well talked directly to the supplier to ask bribe money from him. Indeed it
de es human nature that respondent would be so reckless as to expose herself to Glenn
Kapunan who had previously declared that as supply o cer, he was instituting a policy of
cleansing his office of corruption. 8 2 Clearly, there is no substantial evidence 8 3 to prove the
alleged corrupt disposition of respondent Camaya.
Second, we also do not believe that respondents Camaya and Garcia were the real
authors of the transfer of complainants. While it is true that Judge Legasto consulted
respondent Camaya about the impending reorganization, she did so in a meeting attended
by then Clerk of Court Herman Cimafranca. The consultation with Camaya could hardly be
called extraordinary since she was then the Assistant Clerk of Court of the OCC-MTC. No
credible evidence was likewise offered to show that respondents Camaya and Garcia were
engaged in xing cases for a fee. The accusation stands on sheer speculation and is
therefore bereft of merit. 8 4
Third, there was also nothing irregular in the collection by Judge Legasto of
compensation equivalent to thirty (30) days of election-related activities since she, along
with other judges of rst and second level courts, was assigned by this Court "to receive
the sixth copy of the election returns in the election for President, Vice-President, Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, and the fth copy of the election returns
for local o cials in the May 11, 1992" from the fourth (4th) congressional district of
Quezon City. 8 5 Her area of responsibility covered one thousand two hundred and forty-
three (1,243) precincts in thirty-eight (38) barangays and her task took more than one (1)
month to complete. 8 6 She was compensated P9,750.00 for rendering election-related
duties from 11 May to 10 June 1992 under a payroll 8 7 duly approved by Quezon City
Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., passed in audit by the Commission on Audit representative and
certi ed to be correct and truthful by complainants' own witness Lourdes Lansang who
signed as then City Personnel O cer. 8 8 Signi cantly, while complainant Ernesto Aquino
who held the position of Administrative Assistant was paid P19,200.00 for election-related
duties for the period 13 May to 5 June 1992, just like his co-complainants who received
varying amounts as payment for services rendered in connection with the 11 May 1992
elections, none of them ever questioned the correctness of the payroll under which they
received their respective compensations. 8 9
Fourth, complainants were not able to prove that respondents barred them from
signing the logbook of attendance in the OCC-MTC whenever they reported late for work.
As admitted by complainants themselves, the OCC adopted the practice of securing the
logbook in the o ce of respondent Judge after 8:15 a.m. and 1:15 p.m. to prevent the
insertion of the wrong time of arrival or attendance of City Government employees and
organic judiciary staff alike. 9 0 In the same manner, no evidence proved the accusation that
children of City Government employees, particularly complainants Rowena Matibag and
Teresita Tesiorna, were barred from the OCC during o ce hours while children of the
organic staff of the judiciary could stay there anytime. The allegedly aggrieved employees
did not testify on the supposedly unfair treatment despite the opportunity to do so in the
proceedings a quo, and worse, the evidence of complainants did not provide details of the
allegedly inequitable situation except to state the generalization that Matibag and Tesiorna
"were sent home when they had their children with them and [respondents Camaya and
Garcia] told them [that the OCC was] not a nursery." 9 1
Finally, we nd no su cient evidence to demonstrate that respondent Camaya
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 usurped the authority of then Clerk of Court Herman R. Cimafranca to sign vouchers and
purchase request papers so she could collect bribe money from suppliers of court
equipment and supplies. Documents and testimonies proved that it was Clerk of Court
Cimafranca who routinely signed vouchers and purchase documents 9 2 and that Camaya
signed such documents only when Cimafranca was absent, 9 3 a practice consistent with
the Manual for Clerks of Courts.
In resumè, the substantial evidence establishes the administrative liability of
respondent Judge for abuse of authority and neglect of duty while respondent Garcia is
hereby held responsible for dishonesty and falsi cation of o cial documents. Bearing in
mind the nature of the offenses committed and the evidence presented to prove their
culpability and considering further their individual circumstances, i.e., that this is their rst
administrative case, that respondent Garcia was commended several times for her
punctuality and attendance, 9 4 and that they have long served the judiciary with Garcia
having completed at least 26 years, 9 5 the appropriate penalties, following jurisprudence,
9 6 are as against respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, a ne of P10,000.00, and,
as regards respondent Remedios "Baby" Garcia, suspension from o ce for one (1) month
or, in lieu thereof, in case such penalty has become inappropriate or can no longer be
enforced, a fine equivalent to P20,000.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, in her capacity as
then Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, is FINED P10,000.00 to
be paid within twenty (20) days from notice of this Decision for abuse of authority in
connection with the transfer of herein complainants, forty-one (41) in all, from the O ce of
the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, to different o ces within the
Quezon City Government, and for neglect of duty for her failure to initiate an investigation
into the falsi ed daily time records of respondent Remedios "Baby" Garcia. On the other
hand, respondent Remedios "Baby" Garcia, in her capacity as Records O cer I, O ce of
the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, is found GUILTY of using falsi ed
daily time records for 16-31 December 1989 and the whole months of January and
February 1990, and is hereby SUSPENDED from o ce for a period of one (1) month
without pay effective immediately. However, if her suspension from office can no longer be
imposed for any reason, respondent Remedios "Baby" Garcia is hereby ordered to pay a
ne of P20,000 within twenty (20) days from notice of this Decision in lieu of such
suspension. Both are WARNED that a graver penalty shall be imposed for any repetition of
the same or similar act. The Administrative Complaint against Emelita Camaya, in her
capacity as Clerk of Court III, O ce of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. LLphil

SO ORDERED.
Mendoza and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1. Now Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 99, Quezon City.
2. TSN, 3 August 1998, p. 19; See e.g. TSN, 6 May 1998, p. 6 (testimony of complainant
Diana Cruz); Exh. "TT" to "AAA" (Personnel Schedule prepared by the City Personnel
Office of the Quezon City Government).
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 3. TSN, 6 May 1998, p. 16.
4. See Note 2.
5. Complainant Rosalina L. Timbang was re-assigned by Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr.
although she was not among those recommended for transfer by Judge Legasto.
6. Exh. "H"; Rollo, p. 87.
7. TSN, 7 June 1995, p. 29.
8. TSN, 27 June 1995, p. 4.
9. Ibid., pp. 7, 33.
10. Ibid., p. 5.
11. Exh. "G"; ibid., p. 9; Rollo, pp. 85-86.
12. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
13. TSN, 7 June 1995, pp. 38, 43.
14. Ibid., p. 46.
15. Ibid., p. 49.
16. Exh. "I;" Rollo, p. 88-89.
17. TSN, 13 August 1998, p. 22; See e.g. TSN, 20 July 1998, pp. 19-20 (testimony of
complainant Glenn Kapunan); TSN, 21 June 1995, p. 31 (testimony of complainant
Carmelita Arcenas); TSN, 16 June 1995, p. 43 (testimony of Enrique Atentar).
18. TSN, 30 July 1998, p. 29; Exh. "AAA".
19. TSN, 7 June 1995, p. 59.
20. TSN, 25 July 1995, pp. 45, 47; Rollo, pp. 31-32.
21. TSN, 20 July 1998, pp. 18-19.
22. TSN, 9 June 1995, p. 59.
23. See Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Bagatsing v. Herrera, No. L-
34952, 25 July 1975, 65 SCRA 434, where he noted that the status of an executive
sheriff and court liaison officer appointed by the city mayor and receiving compensation
out of city funds should not exempt him from the exclusive competence of this Tribunal
to exercise supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
24. Ibid., p. 443.
25. Entitled An Act to Amend and Repeal Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered Five
Hundred Thirty-Seven, Otherwise Known as The Revised Charter of Quezon City.
26. Suffice it to note however that as early as the 1973 Constitution, and under the present
Constitution as well, this Court has been vested with the power to appoint and
administratively supervise all courts and personnel thereof and for this reason, PD 185
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 (1973) stripped the Secretary of Justice of the power to appoint or approve the
appointments of court personnel and to discipline and remove them from the service
and transferred to this Court the exercise of such powers. Correspondingly we have ruled
that the authority to detail employees of the judiciary to places other than their official
station is at all times subject to our approval. In 1975 the creation of the Office of the
Court Administrator, under PD 828 (1975), as amended, by PD 842 (1975), supplemented
the design to focus in this Court the administrative supervision over court employees.
Thereafter, BP 129 (1980) and EO 864 (1983) abolished all existing courts of justice and
decreed that only the necessary court personnel would continue though on a temporary
basis until reappointed or replaced by competent authority.
27. As mandated by the OCA Adm. Circ. No. 18-97.
28. Sec. III (C) (2) of Adm. Circ. No. 30-91 which provides in part: "III. Matters to be attended
by the Court Administrator . . . C. Other Administrative Matters . . . 2. Administrative
problems of lower courts regarding assignment, detail and transfer of court personnel."
29. Particularly No. 7 thereof which states in part: "To recommend to the Supreme Court the
imposition upon erring employees of such disciplinary sanctions as may be necessary
and proper;" and No. 14 which provides: "To apprise the Supreme Court of vacancies and
requirements for additional court personnel within his area of administrative supervision
. . . . ."
30. See Note 22.
31. Ibid., p. 446.
32. In re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 22
and 27, Iloilo City, Adm. Matter No. 98-2-58-RTC, 3 March 1998; Legaspi v. Garrete, A.M.
No. MTJ-92-713, 27 March 1995, 242 SCRA 679.
33. OCA Adm. Circ. No. 17-99.
34. TSN, 7 July 1995, p. 3.
35. TSN, 18 July 1995, p. 13.
36. TSN, 9 June 1995, pp. 31-32, 35-36.
37. Exhs. "EEE" to "HHH."
38. TSN, 9 June 1995, p. 25.
39. TSN, 6 July 1995, p. 31.
40. Ibid., pp. 32, 33; TSN, 7 July 1995, p. 50.
41. TSN, 6 July 1995, p. 32.
42. TSN, 7 July 1995, p. 27; Exh. "V."
43. Ibid., p. 26.
44. TSN, 6 July 1995, pp. 29-30.
45. Ibid., p. 34.
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 46. Ibid., p. 35.
47. Exhs. "M", "N", "O."
48. TSN, 6 July 1995, p. 36.
49. Ibid., p. 37.
50. TSN, 7 July 1995, p. 21.
51. Formal Offer of Respondents' Exhibits, p. 25.
52. Exhs. 33 and 34.
53. Ibid.
54. TSN, 7 July 1995, pp. 28-29.
55. TSN, 26 June 1995, p. 27.
56. P. Murphy, "A Practical Approach To Evidence" (1980), p. 510; Secs. 23 and 24, Rule 132,
Revised Rules of Court.
57. Asido v. Guzman, 37 Phil. 652 (1918); U.S. v. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 241 (1902).
58. Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, 1 March 1994, 230 SCRA 550;
Bunyi v. Reyes, No. L-28845, 10 June 1971, 39 SCRA 504; Chilianchin v. Coquinco, 84
Phil. 714 (1949); Robinson v. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171 (1911).
59. TSN, 6 July 1995, pp. 25, 36.
60. Alcos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 79317, 28 June 1988, 162 SCRA 823,
833-834.
61. TSN, 7 June 1995, p. 19; Exh. 21.
62. TSN, 25 July 1995, p. 35; Exh. 41.
63. Reyes-Domingo v. Branch Clerk of Court, A.M. No. P-99-1285, 4 October 2000, 342 SCRA
6.
64. Loyao v. Annecin, A.M. No. P-99-1329, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 47.
65. TSN, 18 May 1998, pp. 6, 9.
66. Ibid., p. 33.
67. Ibid., p. 10.
68. Ibid., p. 11.
69. TSN, 20 July 1998, pp. 3, 25.
70. Ibid., p. 21.
71. Ibid., p. 28.

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 72. TSN, 21 July 1998, p. 18.
73. Ibid., p. 32.
74. TSN, 5 June 1995, p. 9.
75. Ibid., p. 10.
76. Ibid., p. 23.
77. Ibid., pp. 13, 15.
78. Ibid., p. 6.
79. TSN, 18 May 1998, p. 33.
80. TSN, 20 July 1998, p. 21.
81. Ibid., p. 28.
82. TSN, 21 July 1998, p. 37.
83. This is the standard of proof according to Araos v. Luna-Pison, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677,
28 February 2002.
84. TSN, 19 June 1995, pp. 2-4, 7.
85. Exhs. 37 (Adm. Order No. 9-92) and 38 (Adm. Order No. 14-92); TSN, 25 July 1995, pp.
36-38.
86. TSN, 25 July 1995, pp. 38-41.
87. Exh. "P."
88. TSN, 25 July 1995, pp. 41-45; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
89. Exh. 9; TSN, 31 May 1995, pp. 26-27.
90. TSN, 7 June 1995, pp. 10, 12, 13; see TSN, 19 June 1995, pp. 12-13.
91. TSN, 31 May 1995, pp. 38-39; TSN, 29 May 1995, pp. 62; TSN, 17 May 1995, p. 30.
92. Exhs. 10, 11 and 12.
93. TSN, 14 July 1998, p. 11; see TSN, 20 July 1998, pp. 6-8, 11.
94. Rollo, p. 235.
95. TSN, 6 July 1995, pp. 8-10.
96. Reyes-Domingo v. Branch Clerk of Court, see note 62 (where respondent was found
manifestly guilty of dishonesty and misconduct for utilizing office hours in pursuing his
personal business on 13 May 1996 and was fined P5,000.00; Cagating v. Demecillo,
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1423, 10 March 1999, 304 SCRA 369 (where respondent who interfered
with a final and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission by improvidently
issuing an injunction was found liable for abuse of authority and fined P1,000.00);
Anonymous v. Geverola, Adm. Matter No. P-97-1254, 18 September 1997, 279 SCRA 279
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 (where we found respondent guilty of falsification of her application for sick leave and
of her daily time record for the month of July, 1993, which are both official documents
and meted upon her suspension for two (2) months without pay effective immediately
and ordered her to return to the Court overpayment of her basic salary and personal
economic relief allowance (PERA) for July 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1993 within thirty (30)
days from notice); Angeles v. Casañas, A.M. No. P-87-120, 26 June 1989, 174 SCRA 277
(where we held respondent guilty of misconduct in office consisting of non-performance
and inefficiency in the performance of official duties, frequent and unauthorized
tardiness and falsification of entries in her daily time records and ordered her to pay a
fine equivalent to her five (5) months salary); see also Siawan v. Inopiquez, A.M. No.
MTJ-95-1056, 21 May 2001; Cabarloc v. Cabusora, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1256, 15 December
2000, 348 SCRA 217; Esmeraldo-Baroy v. Peralta, A.M. No. MTJ-93-751, 5 March 1998,
287 SCRA 1.

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