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Student and Course Details

Full Name Asim Zahoor
Course Title BA Islamic Studies

Assignment/coursework Details
Module Name Islamic Philosophy and Theology

Module Code BIS 503

Name of Tutor Sheikh Faizal A. Manjoo

Due date 7th May 2019 

Assignment title What are some of the major differences between classical
Ash‘ari and Maturidi theology?
Word count 2428

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The Maturidite and Ash’arite Schools of thought represent two of the major theological schools of thought
within Sunnism, despite their differences the Ash’arite and Maturidite school of thought have often come
to accept the validity of each other and maintain cordial ties, at times even wielding influence over the
thoughts of each other (Ozervarli 2015 p.2). The subject of this essay shall be to identify the major
differences that distinguish the two groups from one another. Montgomery Watt in his book ‘The formative
Period of Islamic Thought’ notes down four major differences between the Ash’arite and Maturidite
Schools (Watt 1998 pp.314-316). However in his risālah’ (epistle) Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (d.940 AH) lists 12 major
differences that existed between the two schools of thought (Foudah 2018), nevertheless an exhaustive
treatment of those twelve differences are beyond the scope of this essay, for this reason, only those
doctrinal differences shall be discussed which either represent a major difference that is pervasive and
influences differences in other points of doctrine, or they discuss key philosophical issues such as fatalism
or the nature of morality.

Of the most fundamental difference that exists between the two is their approach in categorizing the
attributes of God. Historically the discussion on whether certain attributes or acts of God can be seen as
eternal or not has resulted in the greatest of controversies, having even led to violence and persecution,
noteworthy is the inquisition launched in 833 CE by the Abbasid Caliph al Ma’mūn who sought to impose
the Mu’tazilite Doctrine of the created nature of God’s speech (Hurvitz 2016 p.2), as opposed to what came
to represent the orthodox position which asserted the eternal nature of God’s speech. The Maturidites held
the view that takwīn (bringing into existence) represented an eternal attribute of God, this was contrasted
to the assertion held by the Ash’arites who held the view that takwīn referred to an act of God and hence
could not be said to represent an eternal attribute of God (Foudah 2018 p.32). It is not automatically clear
what is meant by the Maturidites in their assertion that takwīn is an eternal attribute of God given that
creation is an act executed in time (Fakhry 2003 p.115), Foudah (2018) clarifies that the Maturidites in
asserting takwīn as eternal do not mean by this the idea that God constantly brings into existence creation
in pre-eternity -a view held by some Muslim Scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (Hoover 2016 p.17)- rather this
refers to God’s pre-eternal ability (Ṣulūḥī Qadīm) to bring things into existence, this is in fact affirmed by
the Ash’arites (Foudah 2018 p.36) resulting in the realisation that the differences that exist between the
two schools are merely of a semantic nature with both asserting the substrate behind each other’s
assertion. The Ash’arite on their part do not believe takwīn to be an eternal attribute of God professing
takwīn as an action of God and hence represents an attribute of action, the Maturidites too assert that
actions cannot be said to represent an eternal attribute of God but argue takwīn does not refer to the
instant when God brought creation into existence but it merely refers to his pre-eternal ability to bring
things into existence, both schools thus distinguish themselves from certain Hanbalite Theologians the likes
of Ibn Taymiyyah, who held the view that acts do in fact subsist in God eternally (Hoover 2016 p.18).

The assertions made by the Ash’arites and Maturidites that actions can’t be said to eternally subsist in God
make sense in light of the fact that acts are not in themselves pre-eternal but temporal, however although
the disagreement is merely of a semantic nature, it would seem that the affirmations and semantics
employed by the Ash’arites avoids the confusion that results from the Maturidite proclamation that takwīn
is eternal, this proclamation obfuscates the reality behind what the Maturidites really mean by this
statement, which in reality is a reference to God’s omnipotence and in turn gives the impression that the
Maturidites held the view that temporal actions represent God’s eternal attributes. In fact in no way does
takwīn, which literally means bringing into existence, convey the idea of God’s omnipotence although it
was intended to mean so by the Maturidites (Foudah 2018 p.34). In contrast the Ash’arites merely assert
qudrah’ (power) as an eternal attribute of God to assert God’s omnipotence which makes manifestly clear
the intent behind such a proclamation (as intended by both schools, that God’s omnipotence is a pre-
eternal attribute).

Although this difference may appear trivial, the semantic differences also pervade other doctrinal
differences (and hence prudent to address in discussing the differences between the two schools), for
example the third difference discussed by Ibn Kamāl Pāsha on whether the wisdom of God is eternal or not,
is based on the same variance of expression which has given the false impression that both school have
adopted a different doctrine (Foudah 2018).Another point of significance is that this doctrinal difference
may bear utility in aiding us to understand the Mu’tazilte Controversy which featured the Mu’tazilite
professing the created nature of the Qur’an, it would seem that the difference between the Mu’tazilite and
Sunnites is not too dissimilar to the difference between the Ash’arites and Maturidites with respect to
takwīn. Despite the obscurity surrounding the debate of what exactly is meant by God’s speech being
eternal, for the Ash’arites and Maturidites their belief that the speech of God is eternal did not mean that
God has continuously been speaking since pre-eternity but that he always possessed the ability to
communicate (Ṣulūḥī Qadīm), a notion which seems far-fetched to claim the Mu’tazilites would reject in
view of their belief in the omnipotence of God (Watt 1998 p.245), this would relegate the difference to
merely semantic difference and accords to the conclusions of Nawas (1994 p.10) who held the violent
controversy not to be motivated on theological grounds, but due to other interests. In fact in this context
the Ash’arites could be seen as inconsistent seeing as their principle of relegating all acts of God as
contingent attributes (contingent as it depends upon the object of the act to manifest itself i.e. the
attribute of providence is contingent upon the existence of creation for it to manifest itself), as opposed to
eternal attributes (Watt 1998 p.246), is in direct conflict with their opposition to the Mu’tazilites who
viewed the speech of God to be a temporal act of God, especially when one considers speech to be an act
and hence should be relegated as a contingent attribute (which is contingent upon the existence of the
addressee i.e. God spoke to Moses hence the speech of God is contingent upon the existence of Moses to
manifest itself), in this sense ironically it is the Maturidite who are more consistent given their attestation
of all acts of God as pre-eternal (although they mean by this Ṣulūḥī Qadīm as opposed to acts being done in
pre-eternity) and hence their opposition to the Mu’tazilite who assert the contingent nature of speech is in
line with their categorization of the attributes of God.

Another point of contention that had arose between the Maturidite and the Ash’arite school of thought
pertained to the nature of morality, as to whether it could be discerned rationally and hence by extension
be something objective and intrinsic, or is it merely arbitrary and contingent on the will of God who if willed
could decree the reverse as good or bad (also known as the divine command theory), the latter view was
adopted by the Ash’arites whilst the Maturidite felt morality could be discerned by reason (Legenhausen
1988 p.4). This affirmation of voluntarism on the part of the Ash’arites could be seen as a deliberate
affirmation of God’s free will unfettered by any conformity to a particular standard independent of him, the
same trend could be seen in Europe much later in figures such as Scotus and William of Ockham
(Britannica), not surprisingly as both Muslim and Christian Theologians faced opposition from the same
quarters, namely in the spread of Islamic Rationalism and Philosophy in rationalists such as the Mu’tazilites
and in philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, figures as early as William of Auvergne criticized Arab
Philosophy which posited a view that it was necessary for God to create the world and for him to manifest
the best decisions (Britannica), On the one hand such a notion could be seen as in conformity to the
definition of God who is perfect and hence only manifests what is the best-also known as wujūb al ṣalāḥ
(Taftazānī N.D p.35), but from the Ash’arite perspective it was seen as an affront to God’s omnipotence and
choice, it was not appropriate to describe God as having to do things necessarily. On the other hand the
Maturidite position seems very close to those of the rationalists especially when one considers the seventh
difference mentioned by Ibn Kamāl (Foudah 2018 p.64) which highlights the Ash’arites rejection of the
Maturidite view that it is impossible rationally for God to punish believers or reward unbelievers, the
Ash’arites contend that it is a view invalid only by scripture not due to any rational impossibility that God
could do so. The Maturidites however contend that this necessity is not made compulsory by some external
force to God but rather it is an extension of his other attributes such as wisdom that would necessitate
certain decisions (Foudah 2018 p.67), in this sense objective morality is salvaged and reconciled with God’s
omnipotence.

This contention also bears with it another issue, as to whether revelation is necessary for human
accountability. The Ash’arites, in view of their assertion that morality is but what God dictates do not
consider humans to be accountable in absence of any exposure to revelation, on the other hand the
Maturidites consider humans to be liable to accountability even in absence of revelation. However this
point requires further elucidation, the Maturidites consider every human subject to the obligation of
believing in God in light of the teleological signs manifested in the world, and to abstain from polytheistic
practice such as idolatry due to its evident falsehood as opposed to belief, however they do not view belief
in the prophet obligatory for those not exposed to his message (al Shāshī N.D p.119), thus the Maturidites
distinguish between what they view to be evident truths or truths derived from human disposition and
those truth external to them where ignorance may be excused. The Maturidite view is highly contentious as
good and evil as evident truths cannot always be so boldly attested to, fornication (defined as sexual
intercourse outside marriage) may have been at one time an evident evil but in contemporary times this is
not a view universally held. It thus seems the Ash’arite position which does not negate the idea that
rationality can coincide with the divine will, but argues only that it is not an absolute tool by which we can
gain confident recognition of good and bad, bears a more realistic and practical understanding of human
reason and morality, in fact it could be argued the Maturidite position is made redundant in today’s post-
modern society which has seen great variance between historical and modern values as well as opposing
values in contemporary times.

The final point of contention to be discussed in this essay revolved around free will and predestination. The
great controversy around this question had plagued the Muslim World from the earliest periods beginning
with the Qadarites in the Umayyad Period (Judd 2014). Numerous responses were given in reaction to this
question and the Ash’arites and Maturidites too sought to reconcile God’s omnipotence with human free
will. The Maturidites along with the Rationalist Mu’tazlites posited the view that God had conferred upon
man in certain capacities, the power to choose between two acts (istiṭā’ah qabl al fi’l) in order to resolve
the issue of divine justice and human accountability (Watt 1998 p.315). The Ash’arites however were not so
readily assertive of human free will, Ash’ari himself when told that if God had charged men with the
obligation of belief then it would be possible for them to believe out of their own volition, responds by
saying ‘if the unbeliever could believe he would’, when asked how it would be just to not allow men to
believe, Ash’ari responds that their inability to believe is not due to any lack of ability but due to their
preoccupation in disbelief (Bahlul 1992 p.7), whilst this statement does not exclude human free-will, it
betrays a hesitancy to assert it in light of the imprecision of the answer issued by Ash’arī. Further
obfuscating the Ash’arite view on free will is their notion of istiṭā’ah ma’al fi’l which holds human being
given the ability to produce their acts simultaneously with the act itself (Watt 1998 p.315), this paradox fails
to posit human free-will as the free will is given along with the act and thus makes it impossible for human
volition to the initiator of the action, the convoluted answers offered by the Ash’arites opens them to the
charge of fatalism and accused of only nominally asserting human free-will (Bahlul 1992). Contrary to this
the Maturidites and Mu’tazilite posit the notion of istiṭā’ah qabl al fi’l (the power of choice being given
before the act) and thus reconcile God’s all pervasive will as encompassing human free will too.

The research at hand concerning the distinction between the Maturidite and Ash’arite schools of thought
has resulted in interesting findings, although there exists differences that are merely semantic in nature,
however not only does there exist points of differences concerning fundamental concepts such as ethics
and human volition (the strengths and limitations of each respective position has also been discussed), but
more interestingly such differences have revealed themselves as not so different to the differences that
existed between what developed to be the orthodox tradition and ancient heretical schools, particularly
the rationalists such as the Mu’tazilites who have been attributed to have instigated the kalām (theological)
tradition (Taftazānī N.D p.33). The Maturidites could be seen as sharing similar views with respect to the
necessity of God to rule in a particular way which is similar to the Mu’tazilite Concept of Wujūb al ṣalāḥ’,
similarly the Ash’arite rejection of takwīn as an eternal attribute but rather a contingent attribute, also
mirrors the Mu’tazilite rejection of kalām as an eternal attribute of God giving currency to those academic
voices who viewed incidents such as the miḥ’nah (inquisition) as motivated by interests other than just
theological differences.

Bibliography
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No.1
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9) Ozervarli, M (2015) Theology in the Ottoman Lands. The Oxford Handbook of Theology.

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