Rising China and Africa

Fall Semester 2020

IAFF 6385.10

CRN 57865

Tuesday 5:10 p.m. – 7:00 p.m. (Washington Time)

On-line

Ambassador David H. Shinn

Email:
dhshinn@earthlink.net
dhshinn@gwu.edu

Course Description and Objective

This course looks at the totality of the China-Africa relationship historically, currently
and into the future. It is based on research beginning in 2007 for a book that I co-authored with
Josh Eisenman published in 2012 by the University of Pennsylvania Press and titled China and
Africa: A Century of Engagement. We are near the end of writing a new book that focuses on the
China-Africa security and political relationship. The course, which covers both North Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa, pays special attention to China’s security relationship with Africa.

Required Reading
In addition to the book cited above, which is available in the university bookstore and on-
line, the readings for each class come from chapters in other books, recent journal articles,
reports/studies prepared by governments, think tanks, NGOs, international organizations,
academics, and journalists. All required reading except for the text is available by direct link, on
the Gelman Library E-Journal system or posted on Blackboard.

Basis for Grading

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 Three-quarters of the grade will be based on two papers mutually agreed upon by you and
by me. Please send by email no later than 11 September a one paragraph (double spaced)
proposal that briefly outlines your first paper, which is due 6 October. The one paragraph
proposal for the second paper is due by email no later than 13 October and the paper is due 24
November. Each paper should be double-spaced, 12-point, Times New Roman no less than 10
full pages and no more than 12 pages, including footnotes. In addition to a paper that is strong
on substance, I put a premium on clear and concise drafting and accurate footnotes that follow
the Chicago system. Do NOT include a bibliography as good footnotes make it unnecessary for
short papers. Late papers will be penalized. A 10-page paper will be graded the same as a 12-
page paper. I am looking for quality, not quantity. Early in the course, I will email to you my
extensive China-Africa bibliography. The entries cover all topics dealing with China-Africa
relations and should help you identify sources on whatever topic you wish to write about. I
encourage you to use additional sources not included in my bibliography.

One-quarter of the grade will be based on class participation. This is a seminar; regular
attendance and student engagement are essential. Students are expected to attend all on-line
classes, sign in on time and read all required reading. On 8 September, I will ask you to select a
subsequent week when you will make a ten-minute oral presentation on the seminar topic for that
day. These presentations will constitute part of the grade for class participation. Please do not
exceed 10 minutes and do NOT summarize the required reading for that day. Pick an issue
related to the required reading for that day and expand upon it beyond the required reading.
Originality and use of new material will result in a higher grade. Power point presentations are
recommended.

Office Hours
One of the advantages of an on-line course is greater flexibility of office hours. Since I
am pretty much confined to our house on Capitol Hill writing a China-Africa book, I can
accommodate a wide range of hours and encourage you to take advantage of this situation. Feel
free to request a time that we can meet on Skype or Webex. In fact, part of the course includes at
least one session with me where we can discuss whatever you wish: course material, careers in
international affairs, the global situation, China-Africa issues generally, etc. I taught this course
in the classroom at GW for almost ten years and was always disappointed by the small number
of students who took advantage of posted office hours. There is no reason now to ignore office
hours and, as I indicated, at least one session is part of the course requirement. I would like to
use these sessions to get to know you better. Please schedule these discussions before the last
two or three weeks of the course. I also encourage questions by email. I pay close attention to
email and am good about responding. These one-on-one sessions and email communications are
ways that we can partly make up for what is lost with on-line instruction. At the end of each
class, I will remain available on Blackboard to respond to individual questions.

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Learning Outcomes
It is important that students uphold the reputation of Elliott School graduates for strong
writing and oral communication skills and command of complex international affairs issues.
This class tries to accomplish these objectives by encouraging you to:

 Gain a solid understanding of the development and current state of China-Africa

relations.
 Understand China’s strengths and weaknesses in Africa.
 Learn how China interacts with African regional and sub-regional organizations and
other non-African emerging players on the continent.
 Gain an appreciation of the implications of China in Africa for US policy.
 Become aware of the most recent research on this subject and trends that may shape the
future of the China-Africa relationship.
 Improve writing and oral communication skills.

There is the impression in some quarters that on-line learning is a dumbed-down version of
in the classroom learning. I do not believe this is the case and this course is not treated that way.
I have taught this class for ten years at GW in the classroom; I look forward to equally good
results on-line, although all of us will have to adapt to this format.

Compliance with Credit Hour Policy

Over 14 weeks, students will spend 1 hour and 50 minutes (110 minutes) per week in
class. Required reading for the seminar meetings, two term papers, and one oral presentation are
expected to take up, on average, 6 hours (360 minutes) per week. Over the course of the
semester, students will spend 25.66 hours in instructional time and 84 hours preparing for class.

Academic Integrity
Students are expected to comply with the strict standards of the George Washington
University Code of Academic Integrity which can be found at
https://studentconduct.gwu.edu/sites/studentconduct.gwu.edu/files/downloads/160912%20Code
%20of%20Academic%20Integrity%20-%20Final.pdf. All members of the GWU academic
community are expected to demonstrate honesty in all of their work, including the preparation of
papers.

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Class Schedule
UNIT 1

1 September: An Overview of the China-Africa Relationship.

The first part of the class will be devoted to a review of the syllabus, administrative issues,
and asking each student to comment on any involvement with China and/or Africa. I will also
ask from where you are communicating. In the remaining time, I will provide an overview of
the China-Africa relationship.

On 8 September, be prepared to select a unit for your oral presentation (maximum 2

students per unit).

Required Reading:

Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations (12 July 2017). Direct
link: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa.

Government of China white paper, “China’s Second Africa Policy Paper,” December
2015. Direct link: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-12/05/content_37241677.htm.

President Xi Jinping, “Text of Speech at 7th FOCAC Summit on 3 September 2018.”

Direct link: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm.

UNIT 2

8 September: The History of the China-Africa Relationship.

Most of this session will consist of a lecture on the development of the China-Africa
relationship since 1949, although I encourage students to ask questions and contribute their own
views. We will also use this class to determine which of the next twelve sessions you want to
select for your oral presentation.

Email to me no later than 11 September a one paragraph proposal for your first research
paper.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 2 – “A Historical Overview of China-Africa Relations.”

Shinn – Chapter 4 – “China-Africa Ties in Historical Context,” in China-Africa and an

Economic Transformation edited by Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019). Blackboard.

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 George T. Yu, “China’s Failure in Africa,” Asian Survey, v. 6, no. 8 (August 1966), pp.
461-68. Go to E-Journals (University of California Press).

Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s
Relations with Africa,” The China Quarterly, no. 199 (September 2009), pp. 777-95. Go to E-
Journals (Cambridge Journals).

Zhang Xiang, “From Sino-African Relations Comes a Steady Stream of Enlightening

Guidance,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, v. 40, no. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 11-28. Blackboard.

UNIT 3

15 September: The Importance of State-to-State Relations and FOCAC.

China’s strength in its ties with Africa is the fact that 53 of Africa’s 54 countries
recognize Beijing (Eswatini recognizes Taipei) and China has cordial relations with all 53
governments. China emphasizes the state-to-state relationship above all else. It institutionalized
this relationship in 2000 with the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Appendix 1 – Establishment of PRC Relations with African Countries,

pp. 377-80.

W.A.C. Adie, “Chou En-lai on Safari,” The China Quarterly, no. 18 (April-June 1964),
pp. 174-94. Go to E-Journals (JSTOR).

Ni Yanshou, “Strategic Partners,” Beijing Review, v. 49, no. 27 (6 July 2006), pp. 10-13.
Blackboard.

Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, Chapter 1, “Rolling Out the Red Carpet for the African
Continent,” in China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa. New York: Nation
Books, 2009, pp. 11-28. Blackboard.

Zeng Aiping and Shu Zhan, “Origin, Achievements, and Prospects of the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation.” China International Studies (September/October 2018), pp. 88-108.
Direct link: https://www.focac.org/eng/lhyj_1/yjcg/P020181026382446204313.pdf.

Janet Eom, Deborah Brautigam, and Lina Benabdallah, “The Path Ahead: The 7th Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation,” China Africa Research Initiative (August 2018). Direct link:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5c467754898583fc9a99131
f/1548121941093/Briefing+Paper+1+-+August+2018+-+Final.pdf.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021), 5 September

2018. Direct link: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1593683.shtml.

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 UNIT 4

22 September: Political Relations and the Role of the CPC.

China’s political relations with Africa have been based on support for state sovereignty
and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries. China makes frequent use of
senior Communist Party of China (CPC) officials in its interaction with both government and
party leaders in Africa. The leaders of ruling African political parties are often the guest of the
CPC. This interaction, with a few exceptions, does not extend to African opposition party
officials. This unit also covers some of China’s sensitive internal issues that have implications
for its relations with African countries.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 3 – “Political Relations.”

Shinn/Eisenman, “Evolving Principles and Guiding Concepts: How China Gains African
Support for its Core National Interests,” Orbis, v. 64, no. 2 (February 2020), pp. 271-88.
Blackboard.

Zhong Weiyun, “Inter-party Relations Promote Sino-African Strategic Partnership,”

china.org.cn (28 August 2012). Direct link: http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-
08/28/content_26353120.htm.

Yun Sun, “Political Party Training: China’s Ideological Push in Africa?” Brookings (5
July 2016). Direct link: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/07/05/political-
party-training-chinas-ideological-push-in-africa/.

Zeng Aiping, “China-Africa Governance Exchanges and Experiences” (2015). Direct

link: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-12/03/content_8424552.htm.

“CPC Holds Dialogue with African Political Leaders,” FOCAC (19 July 2018). Direct
link: https://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx_4/zzjw/t1578247.htm.

Jonathan Holslag, “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa,”
African Affairs, v. 110, no. 440 (July 2011), pp. 367-86. Go to E-Journals (Oxford Journals).

UNIT 5

29 September: China-Africa Trade Relations.

In 2009, China passed the United States and became the largest trading partner with
Africa’s 54 countries by dollar value. China’s trade lead increased in subsequent years. Africa’s
trade with China was roughly in balance until 2014, although many individual African countries
had huge trade surpluses or deficits with China. Some of the African countries with large trade

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deficits are becoming concerned about the trade imbalance. China-Africa trade peaked in 2014
and then started falling because of the economic slowdown in China and the sharp drop in global
commodity prices, resulting in a continent-wide trade deficit with China. By 2018, China-Africa
trade was in balance again but still well below its 2014 peak. Perhaps more than any other
sector, trade defines the importance of the China-Africa relationship.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 4 – “Trade Relations” – pp. 99-121.

Heidi Østbø Haugen, “Chinese Exports to Africa: Competition, Complementarity and

Cooperation between Micro-Level Actors,” Forum for Development Studies, v. 38, no. 2 (June
2011), pp. 157-76. Blackboard.

“China-Africa Trade,” China Africa Research Initiative (December 2017). Direct link:
http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade/.

“Yes, China Is Kenya’s Biggest Trading Partner—But It’s Not a Balanced Trade,” Africa
Check (4 December 2018). Direct link: http://www.polity.org.za/article/yes-china-is-kenyas-
biggest-trading-partner-but-its-not-a-balanced-trade-2018-12-04.

Getahun Zewde, “Post 2006 Ethio-China Trade Relations: Challenges and Prospects,”
Asian Research Journal of Arts and Social Sciences (2017). Direct link:
http://www.journalrepository.org/media/journals/ARJASS_45/2017/May/Zewde322017ARJASS
33141.pdf.

Paula Jeanne Ihirwe, Godwin Norsense Osarumwense Asemota, and Samuel

Bimenyimana. (2018) “Bilaterial Trade Analyses Between China and East African Community
Countries,” Journal of Marketing and Consumer Research, 46, pp. 24-32. See at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325669629_Bilateral_Trade_Analyses_Between_Chin
a_and_East_African_Community_Countries.

UNIT 6

6 October: China’s Investment in Africa and Africa’s Investment in China.

No one knows how much money Chinese companies and individuals have invested in
Africa. China’s most recent official cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) total for Africa
is $40 billion, although other tracking organizations put the figure as high as $83 billion. It is not
clear what China considers as FDI and it acknowledges that its figure only captures investment
that is reported officially. It misses investment that goes through tax shelters such as Hong Kong
and the Cayman Islands. Chinese investment flows to Africa in recent years seem to be about
the same as those from the United States. Cumulative FDI from the United States and major

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European countries far exceeds the cumulative figure for China as these countries have been
investing over a longer period and, in the case of Europe, much more.

The first paper is due today.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 5 – “Investment and Assistance” – pp. 128-43.

J. Alexander Nuetah and Xian Xin, “Has China’s Investment Pattern in Sub-Saharan
Africa Been Driven by Natural Resource Quest?” Global Journal of Emerging Market
Economies, v. 11, no. 3 (2019), pp. 215-31. Blackboard.

Lucas Atkins, et al., “Challenges of and Opportunities from the Commodity Price
Slump,” China Africa Research Initiative (2017), pp. 4-5. Direct link:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/59f85883ec212d5a70e9624
c/1509447812591/bulletin+v5.pdf.

Xiaofang Shen, “Private Chinese Investment in Africa: Myths and Realities,” World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6311 (January 2013). Direct link:
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12174/wps6311.pdf?sequence=1.

Deborah Bräutigam, “5 Myths about Chinese Investment in Africa,” Foreign Policy, 4

December 2015. Direct link: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-
investment-in-africa/.

Thierry Pairault, “China in Africa: Goods Supplier, Service Provider Rather than
Investor,” Bridges Africa, 7 (5), July 2018. Blackboard.

Mina Baliamoune, A. Lee Gilbert, and Sam Park, “China’s Investments in Africa – The
Changing Landscape.” Nanyang Technological University, Centre for African Studies, v. 2020-
15. Direct link: https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10356/142635/2/NTU-SBF%20CAS%20ACI
%20Vol.%202020-15.pdf.

Chiponda Chimbelu, “Investing in Africa’s Tech Infrastructure. Has China Won

Already?” DW (3 May 2019). See at https://www.dw.com/en/investing-in-africas-tech-
infrastructure-has-china-won-already/a-48540426.

UNIT 7

13 October: China’s Aid to Africa.

Although reliable Chinese aid statistics for each African country are not available (China
treats bilateral aid figures as a state secret), China is becoming an increasingly important aid
donor. In the past several years, its annual OECD-equivalent aid to Africa has probably been

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about $2.5 billion. This compares to $8 billion annually from the United States. Most of the aid
is the concessionary component of some loans. There are also interest-free loans, cash, and in-
kind grants. More than half of China’s global development assistance goes to Africa. China
emphasizes that its aid, unlike that from the West, has no political conditionality.

The one paragraph for the second paper is due today by email.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 5 – “Investment and Assistance” – pp. 143-61.

Leah Lynch, Sharon Andersen, and Tianyu Zhu, “China’s Foreign Aid: A Primer for
Recipient Countries, Donors, and Aid Providers,” Center for Global Development (July 2020).
Direct link: https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinas-foreign-aid-primer-recipient-
countries-donors-and-aid-providers.pdf.

Government of China white paper, “China’s Foreign Aid,” State Council (July 2014).
Direct link:
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm.

Cheng Cheng, “The Logic Behind China’s Foreign Aid Agency,” Carnegie-Tsinghua
Center for Global Policy (21 May 2019). Direct link:
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/21/logic-behind-china-s-foreign-aid-agency-pub-79154.

Lauren Johnston and Marina Rudyak, “China’s Innovative and Pragmatic Foreign Aid:
Shaped by and Now Shaping Globalisation,” in China’s New Sources of Economic Growth
(2017), pp. 431-451. Direct link:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318571464_China's_'Innovative_and_Pragmatic'_Forei
gn_Aid_Shaped_by_and_now_Shaping_Globalisation.

Lucas Atkins, et al., “Challenges of and Opportunities from the Commodity Price
Slump,” China Africa Research Initiative (2017), pp. 6-9. Direct link:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/59f85883ec212d5a70e9624
c/1509447812591/bulletin+v5.pdf.

Deborah Bräutigam, “Aid ‘with Chinese Characteristics’: Chinese Foreign Aid and
Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime,” Journal of International
Development, v. 23 (2011), pp. 752-64. Go to E-Journals (Ebsco Host).

Yun Sun, “The Domestic Controversy over China’s Foreign Aid and the Implications for
Africa,” Africa in Focus, Brookings (8 October 2015). Direct link:
www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/10/08-domestic-controversy-china-foreign-
aid-africa-sun.

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 Anzetse Were, “Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa’s Development Options,” South
African Institute of International Affairs Policy Insights 66 (August 2018). Direct link:
https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf. (Download
file.)

UNIT 8

20 October: Media, Educational and Cultural Links.

This is the softest of China’s soft power effort in Africa. China has emphasized all three
areas since the beginning of its interaction with Africa in the late 1950s. The media engagement
has evolved from an early ham-handed approach by Xinhua to a much more sophisticated
operation that has become the largest news service in Africa. It has been joined by increasingly
strong programming from China Radio International and China Global Television Network.
China offers about 5,000 fully paid scholarships annually, although the program remains
hindered by the language issue. It also pays considerable attention to cultural exchanges but has
been unable to compete with Western music and films, European football, and even Indian films.
Confucius Institutes are among the most recent additions to China’s soft power in Africa. All of
these programs are government-controlled.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 7 – “Media, Education, and Cultural Relations and Ties with
Chinese Communities in Africa.”

Xin Xin, “Xinhua News Agency in Africa,” Journal of African Media Studies, v. 1, no. 3
(2009), pp. 363-77. Go to E-Journals.

Iginio Gagliardone, “China as a Persuader: CCTV Africa’s First Steps in the African
Mediasphere,” Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, v. 34, no. 3 (2013), pp. 25-40.
Blackboard.

“Chinese Media in Africa: Soft Power and Censorship,” The Economist (20 October
2018). Blackboard.

Kathryn Batchelor, “Twenty-first Century Sino-African Cultural Cooperation: Exploring

Reciprocity,” in China-Africa Relations: Building Images Through Cultural Cooperation, Media
Representation and Communication edited by Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang. Routledge
(2017), pp. 75-97. Blackboard.

Kenneth King, “Confucius Institutes in Africa: Culture and Language Without

Controversy?” in China-Africa Relations: Building Images Through Cultural Cooperation,
Media Representation and Communication edited by Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang.
Routledge (2017), pp. 98-112. Blackboard.

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 Tene Rodrigue Taling and Yao Jiaojiao, “Kungfu Movies as Driver of China-Africa
Cultural Exchanges: Case Study of Cameroon,” International Journal of African and Asian
Studies (2017), pp. 45-54. Direct link:
http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JAAS/article/view/37845/38928.

Paul Nantulya, “Grand Strategy and China’s Soft Power Push in Africa,” Africa Center
for Strategic Studies (20 August 2018). Direct link: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-
strategy-and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/.

UNIT 9

27 October: Military Assistance, Exchanges, and Sales.

Africa is a low security priority for China compared to countries on its periphery and
Western powers. Nevertheless, Africa has grown in importance because of China’s reliance on
African oil and minerals. China is a major arms supplier to Africa and has at least a minimal
security relationship with all 53 countries that recognize Beijing. China has stepped up its
military interaction with Africa as demonstrated by increasing arms sales and the importance it
attaches to high level exchange visits.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 6 – “Military and Security Ties, Assistance, Visits, and Arms
Transfers” – pp. 162-79.

Xiaohong Xu, “China’s Engagement in African Security Affairs in the Post-Cold War
Era,” International Relations and Diplomacy (2017), pp. 412-425. Direct link:
https://www.davidpublisher.org/Public/uploads/Contribute/59a38bf079db5.pdf.

Andrew Hull and David Markov, “Chinese Arms Sales to Africa,” IDA Research Notes
(Summer 2012), pp. 25-31. Blackboard.

Tim Helper, “Bristling with Hardware, China Airshow Targets Arms Exports,” Reuters
(4 November 2016). Direct link: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airshow-china-arms-
exports/bristling-with-hardware-china-airshow-targets-arms-exports-idUSKBN12Z1KB?il=0.

Lee Jeong-ho, “Everything You Need to Know about the Weapons China Sells to
Africa,” South China Morning Post (8 July 2018). Direct link:
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2154189/everything-you-need-
know-about-weapons-china-sells.

Nan Tian, “China’s Arms Trade: A Rival for Global Influence?” Lowry Institute (17
September 2018). Direct link: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinas-arms-trade-
rival-global-influence.

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 “Chinese-built Military Training Centre Opens in Tanzania,” Defence Web (13 February
2018). Direct link: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=50704:chinese-built-military-training-centre-opens-in-
tanzania&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105.

Richard D. Fisher, “China Militarizes Its Influence in Africa,” The National Interest (25
November 2018). Direct link: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-militarizes-its-influence-
africa-36667.

David Shinn, “Africa: China’s Laboratory for Third World Security Cooperation,” China
Brief, 16 (11) (6 July 2016). Direct link: https://jamestown.org/program/africa-chinas-
laboratory-for-third-world-security-cooperation/.

UNIT 10

3 November: Support for Peacekeeping Operations, Protecting Chinese Interests, and

China’s First Military Base.

China is a significant provider of troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and is

committed to increasing this support. As China’s presence and interests have grown in Africa,
so too have its security concerns. The estimated one million Chinese nationals living in Africa
have experienced increasing security threats ranging from common crime to terrorist attacks.
One of the tools China is turning to is the use of private security companies. It has also
established its first military base outside China in Djibouti.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 6 – “Security Threats and Peacekeeping Support” – pp. 179-

87.

Sunghee Cho, “China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since the 2000s,”

Journal of Contemporary China, v. 28, no. 117 (2019), pp. 482-98. Go to E-Journals.

Theo Neethling, “China’s Evolving Role and Approach to International Peacekeeping:

The Cases of Mali and South Sudan,” Australasian Review of African Studies, 38 (2), 2017, pp.
11-33. Blackboard.

Mathieu Duchâtel, Richard Gowan, and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, “Into Africa: China’s
Global Security Shift,” European Council on Foreign Relations policy brief (June 2016). Direct
link: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Into_Africa_China
%E2%80%99s_global_security_shift_PDF_1135.pdf.

Charles Clover, “Chinese Private Security Companies Go Global,” Financial Times (26
February 2017). Blackboard.

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 Sidney Leng, Coco Liu, and Kristin Huang, “A Peek into China’s Top ‘Bodyguard
Factories’,” South China Morning Post (25 July 2017). Direct link:
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2102703/peek-chinas-swashbuckling-
bodyguard-factories-and-their.

Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti,” The Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies (August 2018). Direct link: https://besacenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/153-Chaziza-Chinas-Military-Base-in-Djibouti-web.pdf.

Zach Vertin, “Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea: China’s Experiment in Djibouti and
Implications for the United States,” Global China, Brookings Doha Center (June 2020). Direct
Link: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_djibouti_vertin.pdf.

UNIT 11

10 November: China’s Naval Expansion into the Western Indian Ocean.

All of the oil and minerals exported from Africa to China pass through the Western
Indian Ocean. Safe transport of these products in addition to other imports and China’s exports
to Africa and through the Red Sea to Europe constitute a growing security concern. Chinese
vessels and crews have been subject to attack and capture by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden
and Indian Ocean. As China expands its nuclear submarine fleet and builds its carrier capacity, it
clearly has in mind a naval role that goes well beyond the South China Sea. This includes the
Western Indian Ocean, east coast of Africa, and Mediterranean. Eventually, China can be
expected to extend its naval capacity to Africa’s entire coastline.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 6 – “Naval Diplomacy” – pp. 187-93.

Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, “China’s Blue Soft Power: Antipiracy,
Engagement, and Image Enhancement,” Naval War College Review, v. 68, no 1 (Winter 2015),
pp. 71-91. Go to E-Journals.

David Brewster, “Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China’s
New Pathways in the Indian Ocean,” Geopolitics, 22 (2), 2017, pp. 269-291. Blackboard.

David Shinn, “China’s Power Projection in the Western Indian Ocean,” China Brief (20
April 2017). Direct link: https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-power-projection-western-
indian-ocean/.

Mike Chia-Yu Huang, “A New Game Started? China’s ‘Overseas Strategic Pivots’ in the
Indian Ocean Region,” China Report, 3 (2018), pp. 267-284. Blackboard.

13
 Chad Peltier, “China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations,” Jane’s, 15
April 2020. Direct link: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/China
%20Expeditionary%20Logistics%20Capabilities%20Report.pdf. This is a long report and it is
not necessary to read all of it, but those of you especially interested in this subject should find it
informative. Just focus on the Africa-related sections.

UNIT 12

17 November: Implications of Rising China-Africa Ties for Other Rising Nations in Africa.

China is not the only country rising in Africa. The purpose here is to underscore that
China is not only competing with Western nations but other rising nations, which compete with
each other, with Western powers, and with China. All of these new players increase both the
opportunities and challenges for African countries and complicate the diplomatic playing field on
the continent.

Required Reading:

Amanda Lucey, Mark Schoeman, and Catherine Grant Makokera, “India-Africa

Relations: The Role of the Private Sector,” Institute for Security Studies paper 285 (October
2015). Direct link: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper285.pdf.

Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Ambitious African Outreach,” The Diplomat (4 October 2017).
Direct link: https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/indias-ambitious-african-outreach/.

Narayani Basu, “India Enhances Ties Across Africa,” The Diplomat (17 May 2018).
Direct link: https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/india-enhances-ties-across-africa/.

Marcus Vinicius de Freitas, “Brazil and Africa: Historic Relations and Future
Opportunities,” German Marshall Fund (February 2016). Direct link:
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/brazil-and-africa-historic-relations-and-future-opportunities.

John Burger, “The Return of Russia to Africa,” The New African (November 2018), pp.
14-21. Direct link: https://newafricanmagazine.com/the-return-of-russia-to-africa/.

Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa,” The
New York Times (31 March 2019). Direct link:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-military-africa.html.

Paul Stronski, “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 2019. Direct link:
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.

David Shinn, “Competition and Cooperation in the Red Sea Region,” Great Decisions
2020. Blackboard.

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 UNIT 13

24 November: Implications of Rising China-Africa Ties for the United States and the West.

The rise of China in Africa presents challenges for the United States and the West but
also opens some areas for cooperation, depending on the status of the China-US relationship.
There is obvious competition in trade, investment and the winning of contracts and potential
competition for access to strategic resources and sometimes African support for positions in
international forums. If the broader Sino-American relationship is positive, there are possibilities
for cooperation in peacekeeping, supporting political stability in Africa and enhancing economic
development, especially in the areas of health care and agriculture.

The second paper is due today.

Required Reading:

David Shinn, “Economic Diplomacy and Africa’s Foreign Partners: Focus on the United
States and China,” Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai (27 June 2017). Blackboard.

He Wenping, “‘Trust’ Is the Key Word for China-US Cooperation in Africa,” China US
Focus (6 August 2012). Direct link: www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/trust-is-the-key-
word-for-china-us-cooperation-in-africa/.

Jeffrey Payne, “Can the US and China Cooperate on Counterterrorism?” The Diplomat
(23 July 2014). Direct link: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/can-the-us-and-china-cooperate-on-
counterterrorism/.

David Shinn, “Extended Ground for U.S.-China Competition?” China Quarterly of

International Strategic Studies, 2 (1) (2016), pp. 35-55. Blackboard.

John R. Bolton, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on

the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” 13 December 2018. Direct link:
https://td.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-on-the-
trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.

David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, “China Has Nothing to Fear from America’s Africa
Strategy as It Is Largely Bluster,” South China Morning Post (29 January 2019). Direct link:
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2183622/china-has-
nothing-fear-americas-africa.

Anna Katharina Stahl, “Chapter 3: The Bilateral EU-China Dialogue on Africa,” in EU-
China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World: Hic Sunt Dracones. London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018, pp. 47-64. Blackboard.

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 Uwe Wissenbach, “China-Africa Relations and the European Union,” in China and
Africa Development Relations (ed.) Christopher Dent. London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 21-41.
Blackboard.

UNIT 14

1 December: The Future of the China-Africa Relationship, Challenges and Lessons

Learned.

China is in Africa to stay. The relationship is important to both sides. But the more
engaged China becomes in Africa the more complicated the relationship becomes and the more
problems and challenges both sides face. There are increasing numbers of Chinese living in
Africa, at least pre-COVID-19, and they are encountering more problems. The impact of
China’s activities in Africa and its policies on human rights, democratization, the environment,
respect for labor laws, and competition with African traders and small industry presents
challenges for China. For their part, individual African countries must maximize the benefits
they obtain from such a huge player on the international stage.

Required Reading:

Fei-ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot, “China in Africa: Presence, Perceptions and Prospects,”
Journal of Contemporary China, v. 23, no. 90 (2014), pp. 1012-1032. Blackboard.

Martyn Davies, Peter Draper, and Hannah Edinger, “Changing China, Changing Africa:
Future Contours of an Emerging Relationship,” Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 9, issue 2
(2014), pp. 180-199. Go to E-journals.

Shannon Tiezzi, “The New China-Africa Relations: 4 Trends to Watch,” The Diplomat (6
December 2015). Direct link: http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-new-china-africa-relations-4-
trends-to-watch/.

Mehari Taddele Maru, “Why Africa Loves China,” Aljazeera (6 January 2019). Direct
link: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/africa-loves-china-190103121552367.html.

Brendon J. Cannon, “Is China Undermining Its Own Success in Africa?” The Diplomat
(8 February 2019). Direct link: https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-china-undermining-its-own-
success-in-africa/.

David Shinn, “China and Africa: Challenges and Predictions,” Speech to the
Cosmopolitan Club in New York on 8 April 2013. Blackboard.

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 University Policies and Services

(Some of these policies do not apply to on-line teaching)

University Policies & Services

Academic Integrity Code

Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own
work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate
authorization, and the fabrication of information. For details and complete code, see:
studentconduct.gwu.edu/code-academic-integrity

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

Any student who may need an accommodation based on the potential impact of a disability
should contact the Disability Support Services office at 202-994-8250 in the Rome Hall, Suite
102, to establish eligibility and to coordinate reasonable accommodations. For additional
information see: disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/

Religious Observances

In accordance with University policy, students should notify faculty during the first week of the
semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance. For
details and policy, see: https://registrar.gwu.edu/university-policies#holidays

Mental Health Services 202-994-5300

The University's Mental Health Services offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students'
personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include: crisis and
emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual
and small group), and referrals. For additional information see: counselingcenter.gwu.edu/

Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures

The University has asked all faculty to inform students of these procedures, prepared by the GW
Office of Public Safety and Emergency Management in collaboration with the Office of the
Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.

To Report an Emergency or Suspicious Activity

Call the University Police Department at 202-994-6111 (Foggy Bottom) or 202-242-6111

(Mount Vernon).

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Shelter in Place – General Guidance

Although it is unlikely that we will ever need to shelter in place, it is helpful to know what to do
just in case. No matter where you are, the basic steps of shelter in place will generally remain the
same.

• If you are inside, stay where you are unless the building you are in is affected. If it is
affected, you should evacuate. If you are outdoors, proceed into the closest building
or follow instructions from emergency personnel on the scene.
• Locate an interior room to shelter inside. If possible, it should be above ground level
and have the fewest number of windows. If sheltering in a room with windows, move
away from the windows. If there is a large group of people inside a particular
building, several rooms maybe necessary.
• Shut and lock all windows (for a tighter seal) and close exterior doors.
• Turn off air conditioners, heaters, and fans. Close vents to ventilation systems as you
are able. (University staff will turn off ventilation systems as quickly as possible).
• Make a list of the people with you and ask someone to call the list in to UPD so they
know where you are sheltering and who is with you. If only students are present, one
of the students should call in the list.
• Await further instructions. If possible, visit GW Campus Advisories for incident
updates (http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu) or call the GW Information Line 202-
994-5050.
• Make yourself comfortable and look after one other. You will get word as soon as it
is safe to come out.

Evacuation

An evacuation will be considered if the building we are in is affected or we must move to a

location of greater safety. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds. In the event of an
evacuation, please gather your personal belongings quickly (purse, keys, GWorld card, etc.) and
proceed to the nearest exit. Every classroom has a map at the door designating both the shortest
egress and an alternate egress. Anyone who is physically unable to walk down the stairs should
wait in the stairwell, behind the closed doors. Firemen will check the stairwells upon entering the
building.

Once you have evacuated the building, proceed to our primary rendezvous location: the court
yard area between the GW Hospital and Ross Hall. In the event that this location is unavailable,
we will meet on the ground level of the Visitors Parking Garage (I Street entrance, at 22nd
Street). From our rendezvous location, we will await instructions to re-enter the School.

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Alert DC

Alert DC provides free notification by e-mail or text message during an emergency. Visit GW
Campus Advisories for a link and instructions on how to sign up for alerts pertaining to GW. If
you receive an Alert DC notification during class, you are encouraged to share the information
immediately.

GW Alert

GW Alert provides popup notification to desktop and laptop computers during an emergency. In
the event that we receive an alert to the computer in our classroom, we will follow the
instructions given. You are also encouraged to download this application to your personal
computer. Visit GW Campus Advisories to learn how.

Additional Information

Additional information about emergency preparedness and response at GW or the University’s

operating status can be found on GW Campus Advisories (http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu) or
by calling the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.

19