PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

HEROFIL OLARTE Y
NAMUAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

2019-03-11 | G.R. No. 233209

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

The State's bounden duty to keep its people and those who sojourn within its territory safe from harm includes
its obligation to protect their rights from any bureaucratic abuse. Striking a balance between utilizing
sovereign police power and safeguarding mandated civil liberties has plagued adjudicators worldwide and has
invited differing and sometimes divisive opinions. Nonetheless, courts are called upon to temper any
philosophical debates and conflicting interests between law enforcement and protection of civil rights. This
they can accomplish with lucid and objective decisions imbued with the wisdom of the Constitution and
reflecting the majesty of the law and jurisprudence.

The Case

This is an appeal by accused-appellant Herofil N. Olarte (accused-appellant) seeking to reverse the April 6,
2017 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01501-MIN which affirmed the January
27, 2016 Joint Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 21
(RTC), in Crim. Case Nos. 2014-830 and 2014-831. Accused-appellant was convicted for violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9516[3]which amended Sections 3 and 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[4] and
of Section 35, Article V of Republic Act No. 10591.[5] The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of the charge of
using an imitation firearm (.25 caliber pistol) in the commission of a crime (R.A. No. 10591) but convicted him
of unlawfully carrying an M61 fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse[6] assembly without the necessary
license or permit to possess it (RA. No. 9516).

Antecedents

Accused-appellant was separately charged for illegal or unauthorized possession of a hand grenade and an
unlicensed pistol (later found to be a replica). The relevant portions of the Informations[7] are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2014-830

That on July 19, 2014, at more or less 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon at LBC Pabayo-Chavez Streets,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, permit or license to possess or carry [an] explosive, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control, one (1)
Fuze M204A2 Grenade without first securing the necessary license or permit to possess the same from
the proper authorities.

Contrary to law.[8]
Criminal Case No. 2014-831

That on July 19, 2014, at more or less 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon at LBC Pabayo-Chavez Streets,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, permit or license to possess or carry [a] firearm, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control, One (1)
Caliber .25 Pistol (Replica) without first securing the necessary license or permit to possess the same
from the proper authorities.

Contrary to law.[9]
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Version of the Prosecution

Police Officer 2 Reggie M. Intud (PO2 Intud) and Police Officer 2 Pablo B. Monilar, Jr. (PO2 Monilar) were
members of Task Force "Boy Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to
be responsible for several robbery incidents at Pabayo and Chavez Streets in Cagayan de Oro City. On July
19, 2014, at around 1:30 P.M., PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar were conducting discreet monitoring operations in
the area.[10] During their watch, they noticed a man walking towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. (LBC), a
commercial establishment. His features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image was shown in closed circuit
television (CCTV) footages of past robberies in the area. [11] As "Boy Solo" was about to enter the
establishment, he pulled out a firearm.[12] This prompted PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar to immediately run
towards the suspect.[13] "Boy Solo," however, noticed the police officers running towards him so he ran away.[14]
"Boy Solo's" companions – Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and Rodel B. Rubilla, [15] acting as his
lookouts, also fled from their posts. They all boarded a Cugman Liner, a public utility jeepney heading towards
the Cogon Market.[16] Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested near Ororama Superstore in Cogon after a
chase by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.[17]

During the arrest, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar searched accused-appellant's person and recovered a .25
caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly, a flathead screwdriver, and a
transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance believed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[18] PO2 Intud then wrapped the grenade with masking tape and marked it
with his initials RMI2.[19] Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant to Police Station 1-Divisoria
where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. [20] PO2 Intud then turned over the grenade to the
prosecutor but the latter refused to take custody of It. He handed it to Chief Investigator Senior Police Officer
2 Allan Radaza (SPO2 Radaza) who, in turn, entrusted it to the PNP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Team headed by SPO2 Dennis Allan Poe L. Tingson (SPO2 Tingson). [21]SPO2 Tingson inspected the
grenade and identified it as an M61 fragmentation hand grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly. He issued
an acknowledgement receipt[22] and a certification[23] to the same."[24] Finally, the police officers found out that
accused-appellant had no license or permit to possess the M61 hand grenade as well as the .25 caliber pistol,
though a replica.[25]

Version of Accused-Appellant

On July 19, 2014, accused-appellant boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City.[26]
When the jeepney stopped in front of Ororama Superstore, two civilian-dressed persons suddenly
approached. They bear-hugged and handcuffed him, then told him to go with them. [27] Startled,
accused-appellant resisted, saying he did nothing wrong.[28] He was then brought by his captors to Police
Station 1-Divisoria where his bag was confiscated.[29] Afterwards, another person came to the police station
with a grenade and a pistol replica claiming that these were found inside accused-appellant's bag. [30]
Accused-appellant was then forced by the police officers to admit to illegally possessing the grenade and
imitation pistol.[31]

The RTC Ruling

On January 30, 2015, the Hall of Justice of Cagayan de Oro City was razed by a fire which burned all the
records therein including those pertaining to the original information and arraignment of accused-appellant, as
well as some of the evidence presented by the prosecution.[32]

On April 27, 2015, accused-appellant was re-arraigned. The prosecution undertook the retaking of the
testimonies and the refiling of judicial affidavits already executed by some of its witnesses, as part of the
efforts to reconstitute the lost records.[33]

In the course of reconstituting the records, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 2014-830 (illegal possession of hand grenade) seeking to change the reflected fuse
assembly marking from "M204X2" to "M204A2." This was eventually granted by the RTC.[34]

On January 27, 2016, the RTC rendered a joint judgment [35] finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
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reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a hand grenade, for the following reasons: (a) an accused may be
arrested and searched without warrant when he/she is attempting to commit an offense;[36] and (b) frame-up,
denial, and alibi are weak and self-serving defenses which cannot overcome the affirmative and
straightforward allegations of the prosecution's witnesses. [37] However, it dismissed the case of illegal
possession of a .25 caliber pistol replica against accused-appellant because the Information in Criminal Case
No. 2014-831 was defective. It only alleged that the pistol replica was merely possessed and not used in the
commission of a crime as contemplated in Section 35, Article V of R.A. No. 10591.[38] The dispositive portion
of the Joint Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the charge under Crim. Case No. 2014-831 is DISMISSED.

In Crim. Case No. 2014-830, this Court finds proof beyond reasonable doubt to find the accused
GUILTY. The accused therefore is meted a penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. He is
credited of (sic) the period that he is under preventive detention.

The following are forfeited and confiscated in favor to (sic) the government:
1. One (1) Fuze M204A2 Grenade; and
2. One (1) Caliber .25 Pistol (Replica).

SO ORDERED.[39] (italics supplied)

The CA Ruling

On April 6, 2017, the CA rendered a decision[40] affirming the ruling in Crim. Case No. 2014-830 of the RTC,
ratiocinating that: (a) accused-appellant never questioned the legality of his arrest until his appeal;[41] (b)
accused-appellant was validly arrested and searched without a warrant as he was caught attempting to
commit a robbery, making the hand grenade admissible in evidence as it was validly obtained;[42] (c) all the
elements of the offense were adequately proven by the prosecution;[43] (d) the defenses of bare denial or
frame-up are invariably viewed by courts with disfavor for they can easily be concocted;[44] (e) it does not
matter if the fuse assembly marking on the grenade, as stated in the information (Criminal Case No.
2014-830), differs from that stated in the arresting officers' judicial affidavits; the alleged discrepancy being
"clearly a clerical error" as supported by other documentary evidence (July 28, 2014 Certification, Seizure
Receipt, and Extract Blotter), thereby justifying the amendment of the information;[45] (f) the identity of the
grenade from the accused-appellant was not compromised even if the marking "RMI2" was not on the same
grenade presented before the RTC; the prosecution adequately explained that the chain of custody remained
unbroken as testified by all witnesses; (g) that the masking tape containing the same marking had been
"removed and/or overlapped" with another strip of masking tape as per the July 28, 2014 Certification;[46] and
(h) the RTC's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight and, sometimes, even
finality which the appellate courts should not disturb because the trial judge had personally heard and
observed the demeanor of the witnesses. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, the conviction of the accused-appellant for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
2014-830 in the assailed Joint Judgment dated 27 January 2016 rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21 of Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[47]

Hence, this appeal.

In its Resolution,[48] dated September 25, 2017, the Court required both parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired.

On December 21, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion,[49] opted the brief it
filed before the CA as its supplemental brief. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, filed his Manifestation in
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lieu of Supplemental Brief,[50] stating that he is adopting in toto appellant's brief filed before the CA as it
sufficiently and ably discussed the issues in the present case.

In his brief, accused-appellant presented the following arguments:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

Parties' Arguments

Accused-appellant, who adopted his brief before the CA,[52] insists that: (a) his arrest was illegal because PO2
Intud and PO2 Monilar merely assumed that he was "Boy Solo" based on CCTV footages and that "[o]ne
cannot, without a warrant, arrest anyone based on similarities of [p]hysical attributes;"[53] (b) "[a] waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest;"[54] (c) the corpus delicti is doubtful because, when the subject hand grenade was
presented in court, the marking "RJVII2" was not found on it and the fuse assembly marking stated in the
original information did not match the grenade's serial number;[55] and (d) the RTC should not have allowed
the amendment of the original information to change the fuse assembly marking from "M204X2" to "M204A2"
because it "affects the very identity of the grenade" and, thus, is clearly prejudicial to the accused.[56]

On the other hand, the prosecution argues that accused-appellant was lawfully arrested and searched without
a warrant because he was caught in the act of pulling out a firearm, even if it turned out to be a mere replica.
Such act, absent any provocation, would pose an imminent danger to the people in the vicinity. [57] The
prosecution's witnesses (PO2 Intud, PO2 Monilar, SPO1 Tiongson, and SPO2 Radaza), who have held or in
any manner dealt with the hand grenade, clearly testified as to the manner of its handling and the unbroken
chain of custody.[58] It has already been clarified that the discrepancy as to the markings on the grenade's fuse
assembly, "M204X2" and "M204A2," in both the original and amended informations as well as in the judicial
affidavits, was merely a clerical error brought about by a misreading of the handwritten inventory of the
confiscated items. This had been duly corrected with the permission of the RTC to conform to the evidence
presented during trial.[59] Accused-appellant's unsubstantiated defenses of denial, frame-up, and alibi are
weak and have been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor.[60]Lastly, accused-appellant failed to
present any ill motive on the part of the police officers who arrested him. Neither did he file any case against
them for alleged frame-up and torture.[61]

ISSUES

The issues for the Court's resolution are:

WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST IS VALID AND THE HAND GRENADE SEIZED FROM
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;

WHETHER THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION COULD BE VALIDLY AMENDED BY THE

WHETHER THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI HAVE BEEN
COMPROMISED CAUSING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT TO BE TAINTED WITH REASONABLE
DOUBT.

THE COURT'S RULING

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Legality of the Warrantless Arrest

A person may be validly arrested without warrant, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(a)
attempting to commit an offense;

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal
(b)
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
(c) where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112. (emphases supplied)
The first instance in Sec. 5 of Rule 113, on which the subject arrest was premised, is known as an in flagrante
delicto arrest where the accused was caught in the act or attempting to commit, already committing or
having committed an offense. For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be effected, two elements
must concur: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.[62]Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante
delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.[63]

The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless arrests based on
probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of
warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause which is discernible by a peace
officer or private person that an offense "has just been committed." Here, the offense had already been
consummated but not in the presence of the peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More
importantly, there is durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace
officer or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or immediate
vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases where the peace officer
or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act of committing an offense.

"Probable cause" (in the context of warrantless arrests) has been understood to mean a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. [64] While probable cause to justify a
warrantless arrest is required only in instances where the peace officer or private person who was present
only at the time when the offense was committed believes (based on his/her immediate perception) that an
offense had just been committed, some of its yardsticks for determination may be of help in ascertaining
whether an accused is attempting to commit an offense. This is because the probable cause needed to
justify a warrantless arrest ordinarily involves a certain degree of suspicion, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense based on
actual facts.[65] And such determination of reasonable suspicion "must be based on commonsense judgments
and inferences about human behavior."[66]

Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a reasonable suspicion to arrest
accused-appellant who was seen to have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common sense
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dictates that police officers need not wait for a serious crime, such as robbery, to be consummated before
they move in and make the arrest because it will definitely endanger the lives and safety of the public, as well
as their own. This is consistent with the jurisprudential dictum that the obligation to make an arrest by reason
of a crime does not presuppose, as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence
of a crime.[67] Moreover, even if the firearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the police officers were not
expected to know on sight whether the firearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second to
act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient ground to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. [68] As a result of the validity of the
accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the incidental search and seizure of the items in his possession is
also valid "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within reach."[69]

Additionally, accused-appellant's argument that the CCTV footage cannot be considered as a valid basis for
his arrest fails to persuade. While it is a long-standing rule that reliable information alone (such as footage
from a CCTV recording) is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, the rule only requires that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.[70]Therefore, it does not matter that accused-appellant was previously identified only from
a CCTV footage supposedly covering his previous criminal conduct because he was seen by PO2 Intud and
PO2 Monilar performing an overt act of drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC.

Further, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court by virtue of its
unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment while
testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of its office.[71]
To be able to rebut a trial court's assessments and conclusions as to credibility, substantial reasons must be
proffered by the accused.[72] Relatedly, when it is decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused, the issue
of credibility is determined by the conformity of the conflicting claims and recollections of the witnesses to
common experience and to the observation of mankind as probable under the circumstances.[73]

Here, accused-appellant failed to rebut with affirmative evidence the testimonies of PO2 Intud and PO2
Monilar that he was caught in the act of drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC. He never substantiated
his claim, save for his self-serving account, that he was arrested without any reason. Moreover, the arresting
officers' credibility was reinforced even more with their consistent corroborating statements under intense
cross-examination. This reinforces the oft-repeated principle that trial courts are in the best position to weigh
the evidence presented during trial and to ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified.[74] Thus,
the CA and the RTC properly gave more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
over accused-appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up because these remained consistent even under
the crucible of cross-examination.

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; and will not even negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused.[75] The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused.[76] Furthermore, "[i]t is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him."[77] It has been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before his arraignment.[78] Besides, only those pieces of evidence
obtained after an unreasonable search and seizure are inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.[79]

In this case, accused-appellant failed to timely question the illegality of his arrest and to present evidence (or
at least some reasonable explanation) to substantiate his alleged wrongful detention. This renders the
warrantless arrest and the accompanying search valid; thus, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction over his person
and making all the items, confiscated from accused-appellant, admissible in evidence. Hence, the CA did not
err in affirming the RTC's validation of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and incidental search.
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 Validity of the Amended Information

I.

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him/her.[80] In this regard, every element constituting
the offense must be alleged in the information to enable the accused to suitably prepare his/her defense.[81]
This is because an accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.[82] Hence, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation is not transgressed if the
information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense
established to have been committed by the accused.[83]

Moreover, Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea[;]
[a]fter the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused."[84] As deduced from the foregoing rule,
there are two kinds of amendments to an information: (a) substantial amendments, and (b) formal
amendments.

To date, there is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment;[85] although it was held
that "it consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court"[86]—all other matters are merely of form.[87] As to formal amendments, the Court first held in People
v. Casey, et al.[88]that an amendment is merely formal and not substantial if: (a) it does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein; (b) it does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher
penalty; (c) it does not affect the essence of the offense; or (d) it does not cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. Moreover, the following have also been held to be mere
formal amendments, viz: (a) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (b) an amendment which does not charge another offense different
or distinct from that charged in the original one; (c) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense
he has or will assume; (d) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused; and (e) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.[89]

Notwithstanding the contrast between substantial and formal amendments, substantial amendments to the
information are even permissible as long as the requirements of due process—that the accusation be in due
form and the accused be given notice and an opportunity to answer the charge—are complied with. [90]
Therefore, the Court will have to determine and explain in the succeeding discussions whether the
amendment to the subject information was formal or substantial and whether such amendment either
complied with or violated the requirements of due process.

II.

The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, which include
explosives, ammunitions or incendiary devices,[91] are: (a) the existence of subject firearm, and (b) the fact
that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. [92]
Associated with the essential elements of the crime, the term "corpus delicti" means the "body or substance of
the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." [93] Its
elements are: (a) that a certain result has been proved (e.g., a man has died); and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act.[94] In the crime of illegal possession of firearms, the corpus delicti is the
accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited
by law.[95] To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists
and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
| Page 7 of 16
possess or carry the same.[96] However, even if the existence of the firearm must be established, the firearm
itself need not be presented as evidence for it may be established by testimony, even without the presentation
of the said firearm.[97]

III.

Before delving into the propriety of amending the original information, the Court clarifies and takes
discretionary[98]judicial notice[99] of the fact that different models of detonating fuses used in hand grenade
assembly are available in the market. These detonating fuses include the following models: M204A1, M204A
2, M206A2, M213, M228, and the C12 integral fuse (to date, there is no known fuse assembly model
denominated as "M204X2").[100] It means that the marking denominated as "M204A2" on the fuse assembly of
the subject grenade does not refer to the serial number—it pertains to the model number. This was explained
by SPO2 Tingson during his cross-examination[101] by accused-appellant's counsel Atty. Arturo B. Jabines, III
(Atty. Jabines), viz.:

Mr. Witness, you testified that you recognize the grenade as the same grenade received
[Atty. Jabines, III:]
by you at the police station at Divisoria because of the markings RMI2, is that correct?

[SPO2 Tingson:] Yes.

[Atty. Jabines, III:] And no serial number of the grenade was recorded?

All the unexploded ordnance [have] no serial number, the fuse assembly like the one
[SPO2 Tingson:] mentioned by the police station (sic) that it was a[n] M204A2[;] it is the fuse assembly
marking and not a serial number, (emphasis supplied)

Having settled that the marking "M204A2" on the fuse assembly of the grenade is not a serial number, the
Court addresses the question: Is the amendment of the hand grenade's model, as stated in the original
information, substantial?

The Court answers in the negative.

Accused-appellant's bone of contention as to the markings on the hand grenade's fuse assembly is the
discrepancy alleged in both the original and amended informations. Purportedly, this casts doubt on the
source and negates the existence of the contraband. However, it is simply not enough to invalidate the
amended information. A casual appreciation of the allegations in the original and amended informations
immediately shows that accused-appellant had been carrying a hand grenade without a corresponding
license; such effectively covering all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of an explosive device. It
does not matter whether the model of the grenade's fuse assembly was inaccurately alleged in the original
information. The same argument still supports the conclusion that the questioned amendment does not
prejudice accused-appellant's rights; it does not: (a) charge another offense different or distinct from the
charge of illegal possession of an explosive averred in the original information; (b) alter the prosecution's
theory of the case that he was caught possessing a hand grenade without a license or permit so as to cause
him surprise and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (c) introduce new and material facts; and
(d) add anything which was essential for conviction. In effect, the assailed amendment which reflected the
correct model of the subject hand grenade merely added precision to the factual allegations already
contained in the original information. Besides, a change of the subject marking from "M204X2" to "M204A
2" is an obvious correction of a clerical error—one which is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; or a mistake in copying or writing.[102] Accordingly, any amendment
as to the discrepancy in the description of an element alleged in the information is evidentiary in nature and
only amounts to a mere formal amendment.
| Page 8 of 16
Even assuming that the model number on the hand grenade is among the elements of illegal possession of
explosives, it may still be amended under the circumstances because accused-appellant was still afforded
due process when he was apprised in the information that he was being indicted for illegally
possessing a hand grenade; the model number, even the serial number, being immaterial. The allegations
in the original and amended informations sufficiently cover the element of the contraband's existence as well
as accused-appellant's lack of license to possess the same.

At this juncture, the Court stresses that the truth or falsity of the allegations in the information are threshed out
during the trial. The matters contained in an information are allegations of ultimate facts which the prosecution
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt to achieve a verdict of conviction. Conversely, an accused needs to
rebut or at least equalize these matters by countervailing evidence in order to secure an acquittal. An accused
cannot be allowed to seek an invalidation of the amended information, just because the information clarified
one of the elements alleged inadvertently misstated by the prosecution in the original information. Hence, the
RTC's act of permitting the amendment of the subject information, as affirmed by the CA, is permissible.

Admissibility of the Hand Grenade

I. Classifications of Object Evidence

Object evidence is classified into: (a) actual, physical or "autoptic"[103] evidence: those which have a direct
relation or part in the fact or incident sought to be proven and those brought to the court for personal
examination by the presiding magistrate; and (b) demonstrative evidence: those which represent the actual
or physical object (or event in the case of pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or
to aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness.[104] Further, actual evidence is subdivided into three
categories: (a) those that have readily identifiable marks (unique objects); (b) those that are made readily
identifiable (objects made unique) and (c) those with no identifying marks (non-unique objects).[105]

During the initial stage of evidence gathering, the only readily available types of actual evidence reasonably
obtainable by law enforcers are unique objects and non-unique objects. On one hand, unique objects either:
(a) already exhibit identifiable visual or physical peculiarities such as a particular paint job or an accidental
scratch, dent, cut, chip, disfigurement or stain; or (b) have a readily distinguishable mark such as a
unit-specific serial number in case of an industrially manufactured item. On the other hand, non-unique
objects such as narcotic substances, industrial chemicals, and body fluids cannot be distinguished and are
not readily identifiable; that is why they present an inherent problem of fungibility[106] or substitutability and
contamination which adversely affects their relevance or probative value. This is the reason why non-unique
objects have to be made unique by law enforcers upon retrieval or confiscation in order for these articles to be
authenticated by a sponsoring witness so that trial and reviewing courts can determine their relevance or
probative value.

II. Authentication of Object Evidence

In its previous rulings, the Court had sought the guidance of U.S. courts in interpreting or explaining the
rational basis underlying this jurisdiction's evidentiary principles. Some provisions of the Philippine Rules on
Evidence (Rules on Evidence) were derived from or bear some semblance to some provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules). In this regard, Rule 902(a) of the Federal Rules pertaining to
authentication and identification provides:

(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.

Admittedly, the practice of testimonial sponsorship of object evidence in the Federal Rules is not specifically
mentioned in the Rules on Evidence. Nothing in the Rules on Evidence deals with the authentication of object
evidence during the trial. Apart from the requirement of formal offer,[107] however, such practice is part and
| Page 9 of 16
parcel of having an object evidence admitted, because authenticity is an inherent attribute of relevance—a
component of admissibility.[108] The obvious reason is that an object offered in court as evidence but without
having any part in the fact or event sought to be proven by the proponent is irrelevant because it has no
"relation to the fact in issue as to induce a belief in its existence or nonexistence."[109]

Relatedly, the Court promulgated the Judicial Affidavit Rule[110] which mandates parties to file, not later than
five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference, judicial affidavits executed by their witnesses which shall
take the place of their direct testimonies. [111] Here, parties seeking to offer documentary and/or object
evidence are now required to describe, authenticate, and make the same evidence form part of the witness'
judicial affidavit under the said Rule.[112] Therefore, as a rule, object evidence now requires authentication or
testimonial sponsorship before it may be admitted or considered by the court.

Historically, the Court has applied the "chain of custody" rule as a mode of authenticating illegal drug
substances in order to determine its admissibility.[113] However, such rule has not yet been extended to other
substances or objects for it is only a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to
its admission into evidence.[114] At this point, it becomes necessary to point out that the degree of fungibility of
amorphous objects without an inherent unique characteristic capable of scientific determination, i.e., DNA
testing, is higher than stably structured objects or those which retain their form because the likelihood of
tracing the former objects' source is more difficult, if not impossible. Narcotic substances, for example, are
relatively easy to source because they are readily available in small quantities thereby allowing the buyer to
obtain them at lower cost or minimal effort. It makes these substances highly susceptible to being used by
corrupt law enforcers to plant evidence on the person of a hapless and innocent victim for the purpose of
extortion. Such is the reason why narcotic substances should undergo the tedious process of being
authenticated in accordance with the chain of custody rule.

In this regard, the Court emphasizes that if the proffered evidence is unique, readily identifiable, and relatively
resistant to change, that foundation need only consist of testimony by a witness with knowledge that the
evidence is what the proponent claims;[115] otherwise, the chain of custody rule has to be resorted to and
complied with by the proponent to satisfy the evidentiary requirement of relevancy. And at all times, the
source of amorphous as well as firmly structured objects being offered as evidence must be tethered to and
supported by a testimony. Here, the determination whether a proper foundation has been laid for the
introduction of an exhibit into evidence refits within the discretion of the trial court; and a higher court reviews
a lower court's authentication ruling in a deferential manner, testing only for mistake of law or a clear abuse of
discretion.[116] In other words, the credibility of authenticating witnesses is for the trier of fact to determine.[117]

In the case at hand, the chain of custody rule does not apply to an undetonated grenade (an object made
unique), for it is not amorphous and its form is relatively resistant to change. A witness of the prosecution
need only identify the hand grenade, a structured object, based on personal knowledge that the same
contraband or article is what it purports to be—that it came from the person of accused-appellant. Even
assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's
existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary value of the explosive had been sufficiently established by
the prosecution. As aptly observed by the CA:

As previously stated, PO2 Intud, SPO2 Radaza and SPO2 Tingson positively testified as to the integrity and
evidentiary value of the grenade presented in court, marked as Exhibit "B-1." PO2 Intud testified that it is the
same grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant at the time of his arrest. SPO2 Radaza testified that it
is the same grenade turned over [to] him by PO2 Intud. SPO2 Tiongson testified that it is the same grenade
turned over to him by SPO2 Radaza. Thus, there is no break in the chain of custody of the grenade
confiscated from the accused-appellant.

As to the absence of the marking "RMI2" which was placed by PO2 Intud on the grenade marked as Exhibit
"B-l," the same does not affect the evidentiary value of said object evidence. Said marking was placed by
PO2 Intud on the grenade before it was turned over to the PNP[-] EOD for examination, as shown by the
Acknowledgement Receipt dated 23 July 2014 prepared by SPO2 Radaza and duly received by SPO2

| Page 10 of 16
Tingson. However, after the examination conducted by the PNP[-]EOD where it was determined that the
grenade had "Safety Pull Ring, Safety Pin, Safety Lever intact and containing COMP B (Co[m]position B) as
Explosive Filler," the masking tape containing the marking "RMI2" was apparently removed and/or
"overlapped" with another masking tape. As such, the Certification dated 28 July 2014 issued by SPO2
Tingson of the EOD Team no longer reflected the "RMI2" marking on the grenade. In any event, what is
crucial is the testimony of SPO2 Tingson that the grenade marked as Exhibit "B-l" is the same grenade turned
over to him by SPO2 Radaza.[118]

The above factual finding clearly shows that the source and existence of the subject grenade were
authenticated by the prosecution's witness to be the very same explosive recovered from accused-appellant.
SPO2 Radaza even testified that he saw PO2 Intud write his initials "RMI2" on the masking tape used to wrap
the grenade and that the same initials were covered by another masking tape. [ 1 1 9 ] This makes
accused-appellant's claim, that the apparent absence of the masking tape wrapping the hand grenade
bearing the inscription "RMI2" makes "very doubtful" the corpus delicti,[120] an exercise in futility.

The Court also deems noteworthy that accused-appellant never presented any evidence which would
effectively taint PO2 Intud's or any other prosecution witnesses' credibility with reasonable doubt. Bare and
unsubstantiated allegations of ill motive or impropriety[121] have no probative value and cannot (and will not)
take the place of evidence.[122] In this instance, the presumption that the prosecution's witnesses have been
regularly performing their official duty should be upheld absent any clear and convincing evidence of ill motive.[123]

Conclusion

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA's decision because: (a) the warrantless arrest as well as
the incidental search on the person of accused-appellant is valid; (b) the amendment of the original
information seeking the correction of a clerical error regarding the model of the illegally possessed grenade is
merely evidentiary in nature and is not substantial to cause the invalidation of an amended information; and (c)
the prosecution's witnesses have sufficiently laid down the testimonial foundations supporting the existence
and confirming the source of the confiscated hand grenade.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the appeal of Herofil N. Olarte and AFFIRMS
the April 6, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01501-MIN.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Carandang, JJ., concur.
___________________

Rollo, pp. 3-33; penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with Associate Justice Oscar V.
[1]

Badelles and Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, concurring.

[2]
CA rollo, pp. 39-55; penned by Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos.

[3]
An Act Further Amending the Provisions of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, entitled "Codifying the Laws on
Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing
Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes (December 22, 2008).

Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition, of
[4]

Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or

| Page 11 of 16
[5]
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act (May 29, 2013).

[6]
Also spelled and referred to as "fuze".

[7]
CA rollo, p. 39.

[8]
Id.

[9]
Id.

[10]
Rollo, pp. 6, 13 and 15-17.

[11]
Id. at 6 and 13-14.

[12]
Id. at 6, 14 and 18.

[13]
Id. at 6 and 14.

[14]
Id.

[15]
CA rollo, p. 44.

[16]
Rollo, pp. 6 and 13-14.

[17]
Id. at 6.

[18]
Id. at 14; see also: CA rollo, p. 43.

[19]
Id. at 6 and 29.

[20]
Id. at 7.

[21]
Id. at 6-7 and 29.

[22]
Id. at 29, dated July 23, 2014.

[23]
Id. at 30, dated July 28, 2014.

[24]
Id at 7-8 and 30-31.

[25]
Id. at 8.

[26]
Id.

[27]
Id.

[28]
Id.

[29]
Id.

[30]
Id

[31]
Id.

| Page 12 of 16
[32]
CA rollo, p. 40.

[33]
Id.

[34]
Id. at 33.

[35]
Id. at 39-55.

[36]
Id. at 52-53.

[37]
Id. at 54.

[38]
Id.

[39]
Id. at 55.

[40]
Id. at 91-12; rollo, pp. 3-33.

[41]
Rollo, p. 11.

[42]
Id. at 11-21.

[43]
Id. at 21-22.

[44]
Id. at 23.

[45]
Id. at 23-31.

[46]
Id. at 31-32.

[47]
Id. at 32.

[48]
Id. at 40-41.

[49]
Id. at 42-43.

[50]
Id. at 51-52.

[51]
CA rollo, p. 23.

[52]
Rollo, pp. 51-52; CA rollo, pp. 16-38.

[53]
Id. at 23-28.

[54]
Id. at 27-28.

[55]
Id. at 28-35.

[56]
Id. at 35-36.

[57]
Id. at 77-79.

[58]
Id. at 82.

| Page 13 of 16
[59]
Id. at 82-83.

[60]
Id. at 83.

[61]
Id. at 83-84.

[62]
People v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212, 238 (2014); emphases supplied; citations omitted.

[63]
Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017.

[64]
People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511, 522 (2013); emphasis supplied, citation omitted.

[65]
See Judge Abelita, III v. P/Supt. Doria, et al., 612 Phil. 1127, 1134 (2009); citation omitted.

[66]
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); citations omitted.

[67]
People v. Ramos, 264 Phil. 554, 569 (1990); citation omitted.

[68]
Pestilos, et al. v. Generoso, et al., 746 Phil. 301, 317 (2014).

[69]
People v. Calantiao, 736 Phil. 661, 670 (2014); citation omitted.

[70]
See People v. Racho, 640 Phil. 669, 678 (2010); citation omitted.

[71]
People v. Esugon, 761 Phil. 300, 311 (2015); citation omitted.

[72]
See People v. Sanchez, 681 Phil. 631, 635 (2012), citing: People v. Laog, 674 Phil. 444, 457 (2011);
citations omitted.

[73]
See Medina, Jr. v. People, 724 Phil. 226, 228 (2014).

See People v. Mercado, 755 Phil. 863, 874 (2015); People v. Ocdol, et al., 741 Phil. 701, 714 (2014);
[74]

People v. Bautista, 665 Phil. 815, 831 (2011); citations omitted.

[75]
Miclat, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191, 203 (2011); citation omitted.

[76]
People v. Nuevas, et al., 545 Phil. 356, 377 (2007).

[77]
People v. Emoy, et al., 395 Phil. 371, 384 (2000); citation omitted.

[78]
People v. Tan, 649 Phil. 262, 277 (2010); citation omitted.

[79]
Comerciante v. People, 764 Phil. 627, 633-634 (2015); citation omitted.

[80]
Canceran v. People, 762 Phil. 558, 566 (2015); citation omitted.

[81]
Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480, 497 (2006); citation omitted.

[82]
Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, et al., 201 Phil. 311, 323 (1982); citation omitted.

[83]
People v. Manansala, 708 Phil. 66, 68 (2013); emphasis supplied.

[84]
Banal, III v. Judge Panganiban, et al., 511 Phil. 605, 613 (2005).

| Page 14 of 16
[85]
Dr. Mendez v. People, et al., 736 Phil. 181, 191 (2014).

Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, et al., 544 Phil. 237, 249 (2007); Almeda v. Judge Villaluz, et al., 160 Phil. 750,
[86]

757 (1975); citation omitted.

[87]
Teehcmkee, Jr. v. Hon. Madayag, et al., 283 Phil. 956, 966; citation omitted.

[88]
See People v. Casey, et al., 190 Phil. 748, 759 (1981); citation omitted.

[89]
Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, et al., 640 Phil. 620, 642 (2010); emphases supplied.

[90]
See Buhat v. Court of Appeals, et al., 333 Phil. 562, 575 (1996); citations omitted.

[91]
Cf. Del Rosario v. People, 410 Phil. 642, 660 (2001); citations omitted.

[92]
Jacaban v. People, 756 Phil. 523, 531 (2015); citation omitted.

[93]
Zabala v. People, 752 Phil. 59, 69 (2015).

[94]
People v. Quimzon, 471 Phil. 182, 192 (2004); citation omitted.

[95]
See: Capangpangan v. People, 563 Phil. 590, 598 (2007); citation omitted.

[96]
Sayco v. People, 571 Phil. 73, 82-83 (2008); citation omitted.

[97]
See People v. Narvasa, et al., 359 Phil. 168, 179 (1998), citation omitted.

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts (See: Spouses Latip v.
[98]

Chua, 619 Phil. 155, 164 (2009).

[99]
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 678 Phil. 358, 425 (2011);
citation omitted).

[100]
See: http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/infantry/grenade/hand.html (last visited: November 26, 2018).

[101]
CA rollo, p. 41.

[102]
Republic v. Labrador, 364 Phil. 934, 942 (1999); italics supplied.

Autoptic proference, in legal parlance, simply means a tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing
[103]

itself (Balingit v. Commission on Elections, et al., 544 Phil. 335, 347 (2007); citation omitted.

[104]
See Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., et al., 10 Ill. App.2d 67 (1956).

[105]
Riano, W.B., EVIDENCE (The Bar Lecture Series), 2nd Ed. (2016), p. 107, citing: 29A Am. Jur., §§945- 947.

The quality of being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or the will
[106]

of the parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct individuality (BPI Family
Bank v. Franco, et al., 563 Phil. 495, 506 (2007); citations omitted.

[107]
RULES OF COURT, Section 35, Rule 132.

| Page 15 of 16
[108]
See State of Arizona v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376 (1991), citations omitted.

See Gumabon v. Philippine National Bank, 791 Phil. 101, 118 (2016), citing: Section 4, Rule 128, Rules of
[109]

Court.

[110]
A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (September 4, 2012).

[111]
Section 2 of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC.

[112]
Section 8(c) of A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC.

[113]
See People v. Moner, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018.

[114]
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231898, September 4, 2018; citation omitted.

[115]
29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 945 (1994), p. 364; citation omitted.

[116]
Id. at 365; citations omitted.

[117]
Id. at 364-365; citations omitted.

[118]
Rollo, pp. 31-32; references omitted.

[119]
CA rollo, p. 31.

[120]
Id. at 28.

[121]
Id. at 49.

[122]
LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010).

[123]
See: People v. Alcala, 739 Phil. 189, 198 (2014); People v. Pagkalinawan, 628 Phil. 101, 118-119 (2010).

| Page 16 of 16