VOL.

45, MAY 17, 1972 17

Libudan vs. Gil

PASCUAL LIBUDAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOSE L,

PALMA GIL, oppositor-appellant.

PASCUAL LIBUDAN, substituted by AWAD

SAMAL,TAWANG SAMAL,INTOS SAMAL,DESTINO
CORTES,TRINING CORTES & CAMAYAMA PACAY,
applicants-appellants, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE L. PALMA GIL,
opnositors-appellees.

Civil law; Land registration; Elements for allowance of

reopening or review of a decree.·The basic elements for the
allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (1) that the
petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2) that he has been
deprived thereof; (3) through fraud; (4) that the petition is filed
within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (5) that the
property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
Same; Same; Fraud that will justify review of a decree.· The
action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would be
unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Same; Same; Fraud, distinguished from intrinsic fraud.·
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
„outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.‰ But intrinsic
fraud takes the form of „acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case.
Same; Same; Case at bar, no extrinsic fraud existed.·The
averments in the petition for review (a) that the applicant Libudan,
while working as mere laborer on the land of Palma Gil,
surreptitiously procured its survey in his own name in 1915 or
1916, (b) that at the trial, the applicant and his successor-in-
interest, Palinkud Samal, submitted a fabricated new tax decla-

18

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

ration No. L-048, showing a greater area and improvement than

that shown in the original tax declaration No. 1003, attached to the
application, to counteract the finding of the Land Registration
Court in its original decision of September 14,1940, that the
property of the applicant actually contained only 3 hectares, 10 ares
and 40 centares, as declared in the earlier tax declaration, or (c)
that neither the applicant nor his alleged successors-in-interest
have ever been in actual possession of the property in question since
time immemorial, do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Remedial law; Evidence; Facts brought out in pre-trial is
evidence.·The findings of fact of the court based on the set of facts
brought out during the pre-trial are findings based on evidence and
they may support a decision or order of the court.
Same; Same; Admissions in pleadings are evidence.·The
applicantsÊ admission in their motion for reconsideration to the
effect that the 31,040 square meters, subject-matter of Civil Case
458, is part of the land applied for in the present registration
proceedings, do not require proof and cannot be contradicted by
them.
Same; Judgments; Law of the case, applied.·The finding of the
Supreme Court in a previous case respecting the identity of the
same land involved in the present case cannot be disregarded being
the law of the case. As previously held by us, the law of the case
does not apply solely to what is embodied in our decision but to its
implementation carried out in fealty to what has been by us
decreed.
Civil law; Statutory construction; Land registration; Section 29
of Act 496 also applies to involuntary dealings.·The use of the
phrase „may be dealt with.. .as if no application has been made‰
could not be construed to exclude from its statutory context
involuntary dealings of property for it makes no distinction between
voluntary and involuntary transactions. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemos, is a well known maxim in statutory
construction.
Remedial law; Judgments; Res Adjudicata applies only when
the prior judgment cited has become final.·The doctrine of res
judicata is predicated upon the existence of a prior final and
conclusive judgment over the same subject matter, cause of action
and parties, at the time the second action is filed.
Same; Jurisdiction; Estoppel by laches bars question of
jurisdiction.·Having voluntarily submitted their cause to the trial

19

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 19

Libudan vs. Gil

court, the petitioners can not later on, after receiving an adverse
verdict, now question its jurisdiction or authority. The doctrine of
estoppel by laches bars them now from raising the question.

DIRECT APPEAL from the orders of the Court of First

Instance of Davao.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mario E. Ongkiko for applicant-appellant Pascual
Libudan.
M. B. Ruiz for oppositors-appellees Heirs of Jose L.
Palma Gil.

ANTONIO, J.:

From the orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao,

dated September 10, 1962, in Land Registration case No.
281, denying the petition for review, but granting the
alternative petition for substitution, and ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration in favor of the
oppositors, heirs of Jose Palma Gil, over 31,040 square
meters of the 188,725 square meters of land involved in the
proceedings, and the issuance of another decree in favor of
the applicants successors-in-interest of Pascual Libudan for
the remainder, and that of October 27, 1962 denying
applicantsÊ motion for reconsideration, the oppositors1
appealed directly to this Court on pure questions of law;
the applicants to the Court of Appeals insofar as the
2
orders
granted the alternative petition for substitution. But the
appellate Court certified the appeal to Us after it 3 found
that applicants raised only questions of law. The
dispositive portion of the order of September 10, 1962
states:

„WHEREFORE, the petition to review judgment is hereby denied,

but the pstition for substitution is granted.
„The Commissioner of Land Registration shall issue the decree of
registration for 31,040 square meters of the land sub-

________________

1 Record on Appeal (L-21163, AppellantsÊ Brief (L-21163), p. 4.

2 Record on Appeal (L-25495), pp. 58-59; AppellantÊs Brief (L-25495), p. 9.
3 Rollo (L-25495), pp. 94-98.

20

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

ject matter of this registration to the oppositors and another decree

for the rest of the land to the successors-in-interest of Pascual
Libudan.
„The oppositors shall file a plan of the 31,040 square meters duly
approved by the Director of Lands and shall pay the fees which the
Register of Deeds would collect in accordance with Section 114 of
this Act, as amended, if the instrument of conveyance had been
presented for registration in the office of the register of deeds after
4
registration of the original certificate of title.‰

The cardinal questions raised by these two appeals are: (1)

whether the facts alleged in oppositorsÊ petition for review
constitute fraud within the context of Sec. 38, Act 496 to
warrant the reopening and review of the Registration
CourtÊs final judgment which incidentally bears the
imprimatur of affirmance by the Appellate Court; and (2)
whether the court a quo erred in granting without formal
presentation of evidence but solely on the pleadings, the
alternative petition of the oppositors for substitution under
Sec. 29, Act 496 with respect to the 31,040-square-meter
portion of the land previously adjudicated to applicants.
The factual setting stretches some 35 years back. On
June 18, 1937, the late Pascual Libudan filed a petition for
the registration of a 188,725-square-meter land in Barrio
Babac, Island of Samal, Davao, (described in Plan SWO,
submitted as Exhibit A, in Registration Case 281),
asserting title thereto by inheritance from his late father,
coupled with continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession since
5
time immemorial under a bona fide claim
of ownership. Jose Palma Gil claiming that he purchased
the entire
6
land from one Mangob Â(Samal), opposed the
petition. But later, or on August 3, 1939, the oppositor
amended his opposition by reducing his claim to only 15
hectares,
7
delimited within points 1 to 4, 7 to 17 and 1 of the
plan.
Three months after he filed his amended opposition in

_______________

4 Record on Appeal (L-21163), pp. 53-54; Record on Appeal (L-25495),

pp. 49-50.
5 Record on Appeal (L-21163), pp. 4, 46; Rec. on Appeal (L-25495) p.
43.
6 Id., Id.
7 Id., Id.

21

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 21

Libudan vs. Gil

the registration case, Jose Palma Gil sought in Civil Case

No. 204 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Samal, the
ejectment of Libudan from the 15-hectare area claimed by
the former in the registration case. Judgment was rendered
by the Justice of the Peace Court on December 18, 1939
ordering Libudan (and his agents) to vacate the premises,
restore the possession to Jose Palma Gil and pay him P320
for the value of the products taken8 therefrom plus P100 as
damages for the illegal occupation.
Nine months thereafter, or on September 7, 1940, the
Davao Land Registration Court rendered judgment
confirming the title of Jose Palma Gil over the 15-hectare
portion of „the land, and awarding the remainder
9
thereof or
the 31,040-square-meter portion to Libudan.
 Libudan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Sheriff of Davao,
to satisfy the alias Writ of execution issued in Civil Case
No. 204 (the judgment having already become final) levied
upon the 31,040-square-meter portion previously
adjudicated to Libudan by the Registration Court, and on
December
10
27,1940, sold it at public auction to Jose Palma
Gil. Failure of Libudan to redeem the property within the
one year statutory period resulted in the execution of the
final deed of sale, followed by the delivery of the possession
of the property to Jose Palma Gil. The deed of consolidation
was registered in the Davao Registry of Deeds under entry
No. 1297 on January 3, 1944.‰

_______________

8.AppellantÊs brief (L-21163), Annexes C and D, pp. 38, 43; Rec. on

Appeal (L-21163), p. 46.
9Record on Appeal (L-21163), pp. 46-47. The dispositive portion reads:
„En vista de los hechos arriba expuestos declaramos que el terreno
comprendido entre los punto 1 al 4, al 7, y 7 al 17 del piano Exh. B y
marcado con las letras ÂP-1Ê con sUS mejores, es de la propiedad del
oppositor Jose L. Palma Gil, y declaramoa. asimismo, que el terreno
comprepdido entre los puntos 4, 5, 6 y 7, marcado con las letras ÂP-2Ê del
piano, Exh. B, es de la propiedad del solicitante Pascual Libudan
(Samal).
10 Record on Appeal, (L-21163) p. 47.
11 Record on Appeal, (L-21163) p. 8.

22

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

Meanwhile during the Second World War, the records of the

land registration case pending with the Court of Appeals
were destroyed, and, as said Court failed to reconstitute
them, the case was remanded to the lower court for new
trial on October 21, 1951.‰
It is not clear from the records when the new trial in the
registration case began. But in the interim, on February
21, 1950, the Administratrix of the estate of Jose Palma Gil
commenced, before the Davao Court of First Instance
against Palinkud Samal (widow and successor-in-interest
of the deceased Pascual Libudan), and four others, an
action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of
the parcel of land located in Babac, Samal, Davao, with an
area of 31,040 square meters, which land was previously
conveyed by the Davao Sheriff to Jose Palma Gil. It was
therein alleged that after the death of Palma Gil in
December, 1944, the defendants, taking advantage of the
chaotic conditions obtaining, illegally entered the land in
question. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 458.
The Davao Court of First Instance dismissed the case on
the procedural technicality: that the action should have
been instituted against the judicial administrator of the
estate of the deceased Libudan. But on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed, after finding that „... the land ordered
registered and title issued in the name of the late Pascual
Libudan in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Record No.
51986 . . is the same as that described in the complaint as
well as in the certificate of sale issued in Civil Case No.
204.‰‰
Not satisfied with this decision, Palinkud Samal
appealed to Us, but we sustained the Court of Appeals. The
pertinent findings of this Court are quoted below for a more
comprehensive overview of this case:

„On February 21, 1950, Gregoria Vda. de Palma Gil, as

administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Jose L. Palma
Gil, later substituted by Emilio Palma Gil, as administrator of the
same estate, commenced the present action in the

_______________

12 Record on Appeal, (L-21163) p. 47.

13Record on Appeal, (L-21163) p. 48.

23

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 23

Libudan vs. Gil

Court of First Instance of Davao to recover possession and

ownership of a parcel of land located in Babac, Samal, Davao, with
an area of 31,040 square meters, against Palinkud Samal, widow of
Pascual Libudan and four other defendants.
„In Civil Case No. 204 entitled ÂJose Palma Gil vs. Pascual
Libudan; et al.Ê of the Justice of the Peace Court of Samal, to satisfy
the judgment obtained by plaintiff Palma Gil, the parcel of land in
question was sold at public auction by the Acting Provincial Sheriff
of Davao to plaintiff Palma Gil himself on December 27, 1940. The
land was supposedly the property of Pascual Libudan one of the
defendants in the said case. Because of his failure to redeem the
property the Sheriff issued the final deed of sale in favor of Jose
Palma Gil sometime in December 1943, and possession thereof was
delivered to him through his representative, said final deed of sale
being recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Davao. Palma
Gil died in December 1944, and the herein defendants taking
advantage of his death and of the chaotic conditions therein
obtaining just after the last Pacific war, illegally entered the land in
question and gathered the coconut fruits therein. Pascual Libudan
died in 1946.
„At the trial, the defense tried to prove that the land in question
was covered by two free patent applications approved by the
Director of Lands way back in 1934 in favor of Pascual Libudan and
one Estanislao Malise (Samal). The trouble according to the Court
of Appeals is that the defense did not present any oral evidence to
identify the land said to be covered by said two free patent
applications to establish their relation, if any, to the land in
question. The Court of Appeals further found that as a result of the
application for registration filed by Pascual Libudan in Registration
Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Receipt No. 51986, the Court of First
Instance of Davao in an order dated September 7, 1940, decreed the
registration and issuance of a title in the name of said Pascual
Libudan over a parcel of land, which judging from the boundary
owners indicated in the SurveyorÊs Plan, is the same parcel now in
litigation; that although as already stated, this land was sold to
Jose Palma Gil by the Acting Provincial Sheriff in the execution
sale in 1940, and the final sale was issued to him in 1943, followed
by the delivery of possession, Pascual Libudan up to his death in
1946, did not contest the regularity or validity of the execution sale
nor his heirs do so up to the filing of the complaint in this case.
From all this, it is clear that regardless of the claims of the defense
that Pascual Libudan and Estanislao Malise (Samal) had filed free
patent applications later approved by the Director of Lands in 1934,
the fact is that the land in question was decreed and registered in

24

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

the name of Pascual Libudan in the Court of First Instance of

Davao in September 1940, and it was sold in December of the same
year as his property by the Acting Provincial Sheriff to Jose Palma
Gil, the final certificate of sale having been issued in 1943, followed
by the delivery of possession to Jose Palma Gil. It is also clear that
the defendants herein, particularly Palinkud Samal, had no right to
enter the land in 1945 because all rights and interest thereto of
14
Pascual Libudan had been legally transferred to Jose Palma Gil.‰

Two years before the aforequoted decision of the Supreme

Court was promulgated, or on May 29, 1954, the Davao
Registration Court, after holding a new trial in G.L.R.O.
281, adjudicated to Pascual LibudanÊs heirs, the entire
parcel of land applied for (18.8725 hectares), thus:

„POR TANTO, el Juzgado decreta el registro y titulacion del terreno

descrito en el plano-SWO (Exh. ÂAÊ), con todas las mejoras y
edificaciones existentes dentro del mismo, a nombre de los
herederos del finado Pascual Libudan alias Libudan (Samal),
residentes en Babac. Davao‰. (Record on Appeal in CA. G.R. No.
15
14628, p. 58).

The Registration Court rejected the claim of oppositor Jose

Palma Gil that the property claimed by him is part of the
land he bought from Mangob. Thus:

„A la luz de los hechos obrantes en autos el Juzgado opina y asi

declare, que el terreno objeto de esta solicitud no es parte del
terreno adquirido en compra de Mangob por el opositor; que
Libudan adquirio este terreno en concepto de herencia de su finado
padre; que su posesion del terreno, unida a la de sus predecesores
data, desde tiempo inmemorial, de mamera publica, abierta, en
concepto de dueño, y adversa contra toda reclamation; x xx‰ (Italics
supplied) Record on Appeal, L-21163, p. 4)

This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision

promulgated on May 6, 1961, or five years after the
Supreme Court confirmed Jose Palma GilÊs ownership over
the 31,040-square-meter portion of the land in controversy.
Parenthetically, on July 25,1958, or during the pendency
in the Court of Appeals of the registration case, Awad
Samal, Tawang Samal, Intos Samal, Trining Cortes and

________________

14 Phil. 230.
15 Record on Appeal (L-21163), p. 14.

25
 VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 25
Libudan vs. Gil

Camayama Pacay, representing, themselves to be the 16

heirs
of Pascual Libudan, were substituted as applicants.
On December 6, 1961, or seven months after the
affirmance by the Appellate Court of the judgment in the
registration case, the substituted applicants filed two
motions in the court below: one, for issuance 17of a
registration decree; and, two, for a writ of execution. But
before the Court could act on those motions, the heirs of
Jose Palma Gil filed a „Petition to Review Judgment and/or
Substitution‰, dated January
18
5, 1962, and later amended
on February 27, 1962.
The first of the alternative remedies, i.e. review of
judgment is based on alleged fraud and deceit recited as
follows:

„(1) The applicant Pascual Libudan, while working as a mere

laborer for the oppositor Jose Palma Gil on the subject parcel of
land, surreptitiously with abuse of confidence of the latter who was
then studying in Manila, procured the survey thereof in his own
name way back in 1915 or 1916, and to hide the fact of survey from
the real owner, the oppositor Jose L. Palma Gil, falsely placed the
adjoining owner on the northern periphery of the said property as
one Placido Quiñones, knowing fully well that the adjoining
property on the north was (still) the property of the oppositor Jose
L. Palma Gil, of which the subject parcel of land is a part;
„2) At the new trial decreed by the Court of Appeals, supra, the
herein applicant and his successor-in-interest, Palinkud Samal,
fabricated an entirely new Tax Declaration No. L-048, showing a
greater area and improvements than the original Tax Declaration
No. 1003, attached to the application in a determined effort to
counteract the finding of this Court in its original decision dated
September 7, 1940 that the propertv of the applicant actually
contained only 3 hectares, 10 acres and 40 centanares as declared in
the earlier tax declaration;
„(3) The applicant Pascual Libudan and the present substituted
applicants fraudulently based their claim of ownership on an
alleged continuous and uninterrupted possession from time
immemorial, when in truth and in fact, neither the applicant nor
his alleged successor-in-interest have been in possession thereof.
The indubitable proof of the applicantÊs prevarication is the motion

________________
 16 Record on Appeal (L-25495), p. 40; Record on Appeal (L-21163), p. 43.
17ApplicantsÊ brief, (L-25495), p. 4).
18 Record on Appeal, (L-25495), p. 2; Record on Appeal, (L-21163), p. 2).

26

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

filed by the applicantÊs counsel, dated December 6, 1961, supra, for

the issuance of a writ of possession for the subject parcel of land.
„(4) The present substituted applicants named Awad Samal,
Tawang Samal, Intos Samal, Trining Cortes and Camayama Pacay,
in connivance with one another fraudulently, and wilfully
misrepresented themselves before the Court of Appeals on July
25,1958 as the legal heirs of Pascual Libudan when in fact they are
not; neither do they have any interest in the land subject of this
registration.‰

The second alternative remedy·for substitution·is

premised on the allegation that petitionersÊ predecessor
Jose Palma Gil, acquired at the Sheriffs public auction sale
of December 7, 1940, all the rights, title, and interests of
Libudan over the parcel of land applied for in the
registration proceedings and that this right of ownership
was confirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court.
Pascual LibudanÊs heirs, on March 3, 1962, moved to
dismiss the petition for review and/or substitution on the
grounds that (1) the Petition for Review is not based on
actual fraud; (2) the judgment of the Land Registration
Court rendered on May 29, 1954, adjudicating the land to
Libudan antedated the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Civil Case No. 458 (CA-G.R. No. 10978-R) and, therefore.,
the matter was already res adjudicata, when the appellate
Court rendered its decision in the latter case; and (3) the
petitioners are now estopped from claiming ownership over
a portion of the land in question on a ground different from
that alleged previously in the opposition of Jose Palma Gil,
their predecessor-in-interestÊs application.
After a pre-trial conference, the trial court decided first
to resolve the oppositors Petition for Review and/or
Substitution before ruling on the applicantsÊ motions for 19
issuance of registration decree and for writ of possession.
We affirm the appealed order.
I. We resort to the law. The pertinent portion of Section
88 of Act 496, reads:

________________

19 Rollo, (L-25495). pp. 59, 62.

27

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 27

Libudan vs. Gil

„SEC. 38. xxx Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decree; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land
or of any state or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition
for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest, x x x.‰

The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or

review of a decree, therefore,
20
are: (1) that the petitioner has
real or dominical right; 21(2) that he has been deprived
thereof; (3) through fraud ; (4) that the petition 22
is filed
within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (5)
that the property has23
not as yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser.
The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties,
deprived of land or any interest therein, through fraud in
the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the
decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in the
registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment,
upon the ground of fraud, would 24
be unavailing unless the
fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it
is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case 25
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed
by a pre-

________________

20 Roxas vs. Cuevas, 8 Phil. 469, 475 (1907).

21Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil. 790, 798 (1931); Arceo vs. Valera, 89 Phil.
212, 216 (1951); Labayen vs. Talisay Silay, 68 Phil. 376, 384 (1939).
 22 Sorongon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil. 259 (1948; Valmonte vs. Noble, 85
Phil. 251, 260 (1949); Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622, 627 (1934); Dizon
vs. Banues, 104 Phil. 407 (1958); Cabanas vs. Reg. of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620;
Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477, 481 (1959).
23 Rublico vs. Orellana, L-26582, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 511, 513,
Reyes, JBL, J.)
24 Republic vs. Sioson, L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 533, 536;
Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29, 38(1918).
25 Javier vs Paredes and Gregorio, 52 Phil. 910, 918 (1929) ; Labayen
vs. Labayen, 68 Phil. 376, 383, (1939); Teodora Domingo et al. vs. David,
68 Phil. 134 (1939).

28

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

vailing litigant „outside the trial of a case against the

defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case.‰ But intrinsic fraud
takes the form of „acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which lid not affect the presentation of the case, 26
but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.‰
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest
in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation 27
that the lots are not contested when in
fact they are; or in applying for and obtaining
adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of
land which 28
he knows had not been alloted to him in the
partition; or in intentionally concealing facts, and
conniving with the land inspector to include 29
in the survey
plan the bed of a navigable stream; or in willfully 30
misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in 31
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice;
32
or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true
owner by the 33
applicant causing the former to withdraw his
opposition. In all these examples the over-riding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party 34
from having his day
in court or from presenting his case, The fraud,
________________

26 Palanca vs. American Food Mfg. Co., L-22822, Aug. 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 819, 826; citing U.S. vs. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 26 L. Ed. 95;
Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil 248; Philippine Petroleum Co. vs. Jenkins,
91 F (2d) 183; OhlingerÊs Federal Practice, Revised Ed., Vol. 3-A, p. 448.
See also Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz. L-30694, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 318, 324.
27 Azurin v. Quitoriano, 81 Phil. 261, 265 (1948).
28 Arceo v. Varela, 89 Phil. 212, 216 (1051); Palet v. Tejedor, 65 Phil.
790, 798 (1931).
29 Republic v. Sioson, (L-13687). Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 533, 536.
30 Angelo v. Dir. of Lands, 49 Phil 838, 840 (1926).
31 Salva v. Salvador, 18 Phil 193, 197 (1911).
32Reyes v. City of Manila, 38 Phil. 340, 350 (1918).
33Marquiala, et al. v. Ybañez, 92 Phil 911, 914 (1958).
3433 Am. Jur. 230-232); Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil 248, 268 (1964).

29

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 29

Libudan vs. Gil

therefore, is35one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction

of the court.
The reason for the rule is to put an end to litigations.

„.. .In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the
judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his
adversaryÊs proofs. But the settled law is that judicial
determination however erroneous of matters brought within the
courtÊs jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It
is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponentÊs perjured
36
evidence.‰

The averments in the petition for review (a) that the

applicant Libudan, while working as mere laborer on the
land of Palma Gil, surreptitiously procured its survey in his
own name in 1915 or 1916, (b) that at the trial, the
applicant and his successor-in-interest, Palinkud Samal,
submitted a fabricated new tax declaration No. L-048,
showing a greater area and improvement than that shown
in the original tax declaration No. 1003. attached to the
application, to counteract the finding of the Land
Registration Court in its original decision of September 14,
1940, that the property of the applicant actually contained
only S hectares, 10 ares and 40 centares, as declared in the
earlier tax declaration, or (c) that neither the applicant nor
his alleged successors-in-interest have ever been in actual
possession of the property in question since time
immemorial, do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Neither is
the act of the substituted applicants of allegedly
representing themselves as the true heirs of Pascual
Libudan when in fact they are not, the fraud envisaged by
Sec. 38 of 496, as would warrant the reopening of the
decree.
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of

________________

35Labayen, et al. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 68 Phil. 376, 383;

Palanca y. The American Food Mfg. Co., L-22822, Aug. 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 819; 826.
36 De Almeda v. Cruz, 84 Phil. 636, 641, .643; also Soriano v De Leon,
87 Phil. 551 (1950) j Rambs V. Albano, 92 Phil. 834 (1958); Varela v.
Villanueva; 95 Phil. 248 (1954); Escudero v. Flores, 97 Phil. 240 (1955);
Koppel (Phil.) Inc. v. Magallanes, 107 Phil. 926 (1960); Sterling
Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318, 323 (1969).

30

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

fraud will not be granted

37
where the alleged fraud goes 38
into
the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not
39
collateral, and
has been controverted and decided. Thus we have
underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the
fraud consisted in the presentation
40
at the trial of a
supposed
41
forged document, or a false and perjured testi-
mony; or in basing 42the judgment on a fraudulent
compromise agreement; or in the alleged fraudulent acts
or omissions of the counsel which43prevented the petitioner
from properly presenting the case.
II. This brings us to the issue of substitution.
a. Applicants would find fault in the trial courtÊs finding
that the 31,040-square-meter lot purchased by Jose Palma
Gil in the sheriffs sale on December 27, 1940, forms part of
the 18.8725-hectare land applied for by, and adjudicated to
the heirs of Pascual Libudan by final judgment of the court
in the registration proceedings, when no formal hearing
and presentation of witnesses or submission of evidence
was conducted in connection with the petition for review
and/or for substitution, and the factual finding based solely
on the pleadings. It is applicantsÊ posture, that the trial
courtÊs reliance on the annexes to the petition for review
and/or for substitution as basis of its factual findings is a
reversible error, such annexes not having been formally
offered in evidence in accordance with Section 72, Rule 123
(now Rule 132, Sec. 35).
One cannot, of course, quarrel over the need for a formal
offer of evidence, the purpose of which is to inform the
court about what is expected to be proved and „to preserve

_______________

37 Velasco, L-15129, June 3, 1961, 2 SCRA 736, 740.

38 Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, supra.
39 Teodora Domingo, et al. v. David, 68 Phil. 134 (1939); Labayen v.
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., supra; Government v. Italia, 59 Phil. 713
(1934).
40 Melgar v. Delgado, 54 Phil. 668, 683 (1930); Teodora Domingo, et al.
v. David, supra; Velasco, et al. v. Velasco, supra.
41 De la Cruz v. Quevedo, L-14430, March 29, 1950; 19 Velayos Digest
(New Series) p. 307.
42 Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, supra.
43 Palanca v. American Food Mfg. Co., supra.

31

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 31

Libudan vs. Gil
44
exceptions to the conclusion of the offered evidence.‰
Moreover, the judge has to build his factual findings and
his judgment only and strictly
45
upon the evidence offered by
the parties at the trial. Hence, documents that form no
part of the proofs before the46court will not be considered in
disposing of issues before it.
But that does not dispose of the question. For it should
be noted that a pre-trial was held, and as a result thereof
the trial court issued an order on July 28, 1962, granting
the parties 20 days to file their respective memoranda,
„after which47 the petition will be considered submitted for
resolution.‰ The applicants concede that „the findings of
fact of the Court as contained‰ in its order are not based
„merely on the allegations of the appellantsÊ petition for
review judgment
48
but on the set of facts brought out during
the pretrial.‰ Moreover, the applicants in their motion to
dismiss did not deny the oppositorsÊ allegations on the
identity of the land or of the fact that the land (the
registration and issuance of title of which was decreed in
favor of Pascual Libudan by the Davao Registration Court
in G.L.R.O. No. 51986) was subsequently sold at a Sheriff Ês
sale on December 27, 1940 to Jose Palma Gil, and his title
thereon confirmed by this Court. As a matter of fact, in
their motion for reconsideration, dated October 18, 1962,
applicants admitted that „the 31,040 square meters,
subject-matter of Civil Case 458, is part of the land applied
49
for in the present registration proceedings. . .‰
Admissions by parties in the50
pleading do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted.

_______________

44 Francisco, Rules of Court, Evidence (1964), p. 997, citing 53 Am.

Jur. 88.
45 Ayala v. Valencia, 5 Phil. 182, 183 (1905); U.S. v. Solaña, 33 Phil.
582, 593 (1916); Dayrit v. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182 (1906).
46 Dayrit v. Gonzales, supra.
47Rollo CA-G.R. 32167 (L-25495,), p. 62.
48 Rollo SC-G.R. L-21163, p. 47. On the matter of pre-trial it is said
that „no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial
hearing.‰ 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1970 Ed.) p. 565.
49 Record on Appeal (L-25495), p. 53.
50 Rule 129, Sec. 2: „Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings,
or in the course of trial or other proceedings do not

32

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Libudan vs. Gil

Aside from applicantsÊ judicial admission, we have this 51

CourtÊs decision in Palinkud Samal vs. Court of Appeals
There, we sustained Jose PalmaÊs ownership over the
31,-040-square-meter lot sold to him in 1940 at a public
auction by the Sheriff of Davao to satisfy the judgment in
his favor in Civil Case No. 204. Referring to the identity of
the land, We said:
„... The Court of Appeals further found that as a result of the
application for registration filed by Pascual Libudan in Registration
Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 51986, the Court of First Instance
of Davao in an order dated September 7, 1940, decreed the
registration and issuance of a title in the name of said Pascual
Libudan over a parcel of land, which judging from the boundary
owners indicated in the SurveyorÊs plan, is the same parcel now in
litigation that although as already stated, this land was sold to
Palma Gil by the Acting Provincial Sheriff in the execution sale in
1940, and the final sale was issued to him in 1943, followed by
delivery of possession, Pascual Libudan up to his death in 1946, did
not contest the regularity or validity of the execution sale nor did
52
his heirs do so up to the filing of the complaint in this case.‰

This CourtÊs finding in the Samal case that the 3-hectare

land, the title of which was decreed to Libudan on
September 7, 1940, by the Court of First Instance of Davao
in Registration Case No. 281, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 51986,‰ is
the same parcel how in litigation‰ or the same land
involved in Civil Case No. 458 has therefore judicially
settled the question. We cannot
53
now disregard this finding.
This is the law of the case. As previously held by Us, the
„law of the case does not apply solely to what is embodied
in our

________________

require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to

have been made through palpable mistake.‰ This rule, not found in the
old Rules, is culled from Supreme Court doctrines based on estoppel. Sta.
Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 81, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018, 1023, citing
Irlanda V. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383, 5 Moran 57-59,1963, ed. See also
Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227.
5199 Phil. 230.
52Id., at pp. 232-233.
53 Indochinoise v. Deutsch-Australiasche, Dempschiffs Gesellschaft, 39
Phil. 474, 476 (1919); NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated Union, L-26894-
96, Feb. 28, 1968, 27 SCRA 227, 231; Mesa v. Bales, L-29784, May 21,
1969, 28 SCRA 263, 267; Balmes, v. Suson, L-27235, May 22, 1969, 28
SCRA 304, 310; Alhambra Industries v, CIR, L-22219, Aug. 28, 1969.

33

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 33

Libudan vs. Gil
decision but to its implementation
54
carried out in fealty to
what has been by Us decreed.‰
b. Applicants assail the lower courtÊs reliance on Section
29, Act 496, in issuing the order of substitution on the
theory that said section applies only to voluntary dealings.
To draw from the language of the statute the facile
interpretation that it refers only to voluntary dealings, is to
encase its application in a semantic strait jacket. The use of
the phrase „may be dealt with ... as if no application has
been made could not be construed to exclude from its
statutory context involuntary dealings of property for it
makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary
transactions. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemos, is55 a well known maxim in statutory
construction.
c. Applicants further insist that (1) the judgment of the
Davao Land Registration Court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 14628-R) adjudicating the entire
parcel of land to the heirs of deceased Pascual Libudan is
res judicata on the question of title over the 31,-040-square-
meter portion thereof; and (2) the decision rendered by the
Court in Civil Case No. 458 on the reliance of which the
order of substitution was granted, is null and void, because
the Land registration court having previously acquired
jurisdiction over the res retained it, and had the sole and
exclusive authority to determine the question of title of the
parties over the land involved to the exclusion of the other
courts.
(1) ApplicantsÊ reliance on the doctrine of res judicata or
estoppel by judgment is misplaced. At the time of the
institution of Civil Case No. 458 on February 21, 1950,
there was as yet no final judgment in the land registration
case, On the contrary when the Court of Appeals in CA-G-
R. No. 10978-R, confirmed the oppositorsÊ title and right of
possession over the 3-hectare land, which decision was
affirmed by this Court in L-8579, on May 25,1956, the de-

_______________

54 Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26932, March 28, 1969.

27 SCRA 500.
55 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Company, et al., 104 Phil. 688,
690 (1958); Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No.·

34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Libudan vs. Gil

cision of the Davao Land Registration Court of May 29,

1954, was still pending in the Court of Appeals. As a
matter of fact the Court of Appeals only affirmed the Davao
Land Registration CourtÊs decision on May 6, 1961 or about
four years after this CourtÊs decision in L-8579 was
published in the Official Gazette (53 O.G. No. 3, February
15, 1957, p. 682). The doctrine of res judicata is predicated
upon the existence of a prior final and conclusive judgment
over the same subject matter, cause56of action and parties,
at the time the second action is filed.
Considering that the final judgment of this Court
confirming Jose Palma GilÊs ownership over the 3-hectare
lot antedated by five years the decision of the Court of
Appeals adjudicating the entire land to the successors-in-
interest of Libudan, the effects of res judicata should be
applied, if at all, in favor of the oppositors and against the
applicants. For undoubtedly a prior decision in a civil case
may constitute
57
as res judicata in a land registration
proceedings. And again, „[i]t is the first judgment for the
same cause of action that constitutes the effective defense,
without regard to the order of time in which the suits were
commenced
58
or that they were both pending at the same
time.‰
(2) We cannot, in absolute fidelity to our trust, accord
our stamp of approval to the belated attempt of applicants
to question the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Davao in Civil Case No. 458. Having voluntarily submitted
their cause to said Court, they can not later on, after
receiving an59adverse verdict, now question its jurisdiction
or authority. The doctrine of estoppel by laches bars them

________________

56 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil.

339. Claridad vs. Novella, L-4207, October 24, 1952; 92 Phil. 1066, where
motion to dismiss on ground of res judicata, was denied, after it was
shown that judgment in the prior action, although in favor of defendant,
was still pending appeal.
57 Menor vs. Quintares, 56 Phil. 657, 665 (1932).
58 50 C. J.S. Judgments, Sec. 602, p. 26.
59 Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 36;
and cases cited therein.
 35

VOL. 45, MAY 17, 1972 35

Libudan vs. Gil

60
now from raising the question. Moreover, the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance over the subject61 matter in
Civil Case No. 458 cannot be seriously disputed. d. On the
claim of oppositors that they should be substituted to the
entire 18-hectare
62
land and not only to the 3-hectare portion
thereof, such claim, involving as it does factual questions,
is deemed foreclosed, oppositors having
63
directly appealed to
this Court on pure questions of law.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of the court a quo, dated
September 10, 1962 and October 27, 1962, are hereby
affirmed. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar,.

Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Orders affirmed.

________________

60 Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29264, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA

419; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., supra.
61 Sec. 44(b) Judiciary Act of 1948; Tarnate vs. Daza, 76 Phil. 842, 844
(1946).
62 Brief for oppositor-appellant (L-21163), y. 24. The second
assignment of error reads: „The lower court erred in the alternative in
holding that, while the heirs of oppositor Jose L. Palma Gil are entitled
to substitution as successors-in-interest to the late Pascual Libudan, they
can only be substituted to a portion of the parcel of land in question
measuring 31,040 square meters.‰
63 Victorino vs. Lao, L-25273, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 61; Laiusar vs.
Guerrero, L-21581, August 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 107; People vs. Raquiñio,
L-16488, August 12, 1966, 17 SCRA 914; Abuyo vs. Suazo, L-21202, Oct.
2, 1966, 18 SCRA 600; Perez vs. Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968, 24
SCRA 43; Miguel vs. Catalino, L-23072. Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 55.
Findings of fact are deemed admitted in direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from the Court of First Instance. Aballe vs. Santiago, L-16307,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 925; Savellano vs. Diaz, L-17944, July 81, 1963, 8
SCRA 586; De Comilang v. Delenela, L-18897, March 31,1964, 10 SCRA
598; Sotto vs. Sotto, L-20921, May 7,1924,1966,17 SCRA 243; State
 Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Manila Port Service. L-22395,
December 17, 1966; Pahang vs. Sotto, L-21175, July 15, 1968, 24 SCRA
33; Lucero vs. Loot, L-16995, October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687.

36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yap vs. Republic

Notes.-·Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed

is a nullity and conveys no title, however there are
instances when such a fraudulent document may become
the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the
certificate of title was already transferred from the name of
the true owner to the forger and while it remained that
way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser. Fule vs. De Legare, L-17951, February 28, 1963,
7 SCRA 351.
The remedy of review of decree of registration is
available only to an aggrieved party who has been deprived
of land or any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration, and the only ground that may be invoked for
this purpose is actual fraud. A petition for review of a
decree of registration may be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the city or province where the land lies, within
one year after the date of the entry of the decree, provided,
that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest therein. Upon the expiration of said term of one
year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
therewith becomes incontrovertible. Section 38 of Act No.
496.

_____________

© Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.