Secretary of Justice vs.

 Lantion

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government
of the U.S.A.  The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case.  Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request  for the consistency of Article 7 of the
RP-US  Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty.

RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB
1940]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted
to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided
the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103).
It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth. So ordered.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House

of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “their
eyes moving very fast.” Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and
observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of
men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to
detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
the latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only
recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw
the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
Malacat was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information”; and that the seizure of
the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In
its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and
frisk.”

Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be
confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there
could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act,
on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a
“stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and
frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3)
reasons why the “stop-and-frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that
Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This
claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police
officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
“moving very fast” — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates
were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with
a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade,
could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - People vs. Doria

[GR 125299, 22 January 1999]
People vs. Doria [GR 125299, 22 January 1999]
En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur
Facts: In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP)
Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one “Jun” was
engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest
“Jun” in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI’s, a meeting between the Narcom agents and
“Jun” was scheduled on 5 December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. On 5 December
1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for
the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as
team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members.
P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the
rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan
District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3
Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills — as money
for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit
marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. The team rode in two
cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 a.m., “Jun” appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit
as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed “Jun” the marked bills worth
P1,600.00. “Jun” instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto
Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. An hour later, “Jun” appeared at the agreed place
where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. “Jun” took out from his bag an
object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1
Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon
inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth.” “Jun” led
the police team to “Neneth’s” house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found the door of “Neneth’s”
house open and at woman inside. “Jun” identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked
“Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door,
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open
and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
“Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s discovery, SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from “Neneth.” The policemen arrested “Neneth.” They took “Neneth”
and “Jun,” together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that “Jun” is Florencio Doria y
Bolado while “Neneth” is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The 1 brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from
“Jun” plus the 10 bricks recovered from “Neneth’s” house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The bricks were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. On
7 December 1995, Doria and Gadda were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted
Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court found the existence of an “organized/syndicated crime group” and
sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally permissible.
Held: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment
the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the “seduction” of an otherwise innocent
person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of
the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state,
or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused
is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there
is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal. The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
to wit: “A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. xxx” Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Herein,
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence,
and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our
Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without
such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be lawful, the
warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao
to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily
chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be justified under the
second instance of Rule 113. “Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b)
of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause” which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion.” Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
accused, Doria. Save for Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she
was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows
that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.