CSIS BRIEFS

A Frozen Line
in the Himalayas
By Richard M. Rossow, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Kriti Upadhyaya AUGUST 2020

THE ISSUE
The United States has changed rules and created novel programs to strengthen defense ties with India. However, to many Western analysts,
India remains largely absent from key conflicts the United States considers globally significant. This report contends that Washington
must use a different lens in judging India’s involvement: looking beyond the periphery of the United States and its allies, it should instead
consider India’s growing role as a regional security provider in Asia. One region where India’s influence is strongly felt is the Himalayas,
where the territorial integrity and security of smaller nations across China’s western border hangs in the balance. Through satellite imagery
analysis, this report presents how India is on the front line of China’s expansionist territorial ambitions.

U
.S.-India defense ties continue to expand viewed as insufficient to change course. India chose a
and deepen, but questions linger in position of non-alignment during the Cold War, which was
Washington as to whether there is incompatible with Washington’s “black and white” view
merit in these efforts. The United States of the world. The United States chose to build stronger
has changed rules and created novel relations with India’s two regional rivals, China and
programs to strengthen defense ties Pakistan, as part of Cold War calculations; meanwhile,
with India. However, to many Western India cemented security ties with the Soviet Union in
analysts, India remains largely absent at the front line order to gain access to modern military platforms.
of key conflicts that the United States considers globally
U.S.-India strategic ties only started gaining momentum
significant. But this is the wrong lens to interpret India’s
when U.S. policy leaders recognized that their relationship
growing security role. India faces key challenges of its own
outside of the U.S. periphery, one of which lies in the cold with India required a new type of partnership. This new
reaches of the Himalayas, where the territorial integrity relationship would not fit neatly into past boxes, such as
and security of smaller nations across China’s western “treaty ally,” and it meant that the United States would
periphery hangs in the balance. have to put some big ideas on the table that it had rarely—if
ever—offered any partner. Examples include shepherding
Government-to-government relations between the
India into the club of declared nuclear powers and looking
United States and India were chilly during most of the
for novel ways to transfer defense technologies that India
latter period of the Cold War. Strategic choices by both
could use to build up its own military industrial base.
nations created a gulf between them, and the merits of
spending heavy political capital to bridge this gulf were

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east

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Washington’s strategic leaders often question “when” the and broke down in 1987 after eight rounds. In 1988,
partnership with India will bear fruit but spend insufficient following Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China,
time pondering the question of “where” it is likely to do so. a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up “to seek a fair,
India has not played a leading role in many of the global reasonable and mutually acceptable solution on the
struggles the United States believes are crucial for a stable boundary question.” From 1988 to 1993, border tensions
world order, such as Russia’s incursions in Europe, the rise were reduced through confidence-building measures
of the Islamic State, and China’s destabilizing pursuits in (CBMs), including “mutual troop reductions, regular
the South China Sea. India is directly impacted by the last meetings of local military commanders and advance
two conflicts, yet it has hesitated in taking any type of notifications of military exercises.” Fourteen rounds of
coordinated action in either case. talks were held under this format through 2003. During
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in
However, if Washington wants to judge the merits of the
2003, the two sides agreed on the appointment of special
emerging partnership between the United States and India, it
representatives (SR) for consultations aimed at reaching
would be best suited by focusing on India’s role as a regional
a boundary settlement framework on which to base the
security provider. For example, the Himalayan region is one
process of delineation and demarcation of the border.
where analysts will find that India’s actions support peace
The SR consultations replaced the JWG process. The 22nd
and stability. The fact that India is playing an active role in
round of SR talks were held in December 2019, with
its neighborhood should inspire U.S. policy leaders to further
national security adviser Ajit Doval as India’s SR.
strengthen defense cooperation with India.
CBMs have established mechanisms for maintaining peace
Through satellite imagery analysis, this report presents how at the border. The mechanisms have been established
India faces another front in China’s expansionist territorial through five agreements signed between the two countries:
ambitions, one which flared up at the India-China-Bhutan
1993: The two sides agreed that “pending an
trijunction point in 2017. While few Western analysts have
ultimate solution to the boundary question between
considered this area as strategically significant as regions
the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect
such as the East China Sea, the Straits of Taiwan, and the
and observe the line of actual control.” “Each side will
South China Sea, this view is slowly evolving. As India
keep its military forces in the areas along the line of
struggles to maintain peace and security in the region, it
actual control to a minimum level compatible with the
is imperative that the United States support its effort to
friendly and good neighbourly relations between the
impede China’s territorial pressure through defense trade
two countries.” Further, if problems arise at the border,
and cooperation.
the “two sides shall deal with them through meetings
and friendly consultations between border personnel
THE BORDER QUESTION
of the two countries.”
The line of actual control (LAC) is a 3,488 km un-
demarcated border that runs between India and China and 1996: It was agreed that “neither side shall use its
is divided into three sectors: the western sector (Ladakh), military capability against the other side.” India
the middle sector (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and China also established protocols for preventing
Sikkim), and the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh). A intrusions on the border, including air intrusions.
contested border, the LAC’s ambiguity has prompted many 2005: India and China decided that “differences on
flare-ups and has even resulted in two battles between the boundary question should not be allowed to affect
India and China. Treaties from the British colonial era in the overall development of bilateral relations.” The
South Asia lie at the heart of these disputes. India believes agreement also established that the “boundary should
it inherited firm borders from the British, while China be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural
considers the border question unsettled. When the People’s geographical features to be mutually agreed upon
Republic of China assumed power in 1949, it renounced between the two sides.”
all prior foreign agreements as unequal treaties imposed 2012: The agreement established a Working
upon it during the century of humiliation, demanding a Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on
renegotiation of all its borders. India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), which would
Over the years, India and China have attempted to address ensure peace and tranquility in the India-China border
the border dispute. High-level border talks started in 1981 areas. The WMCC held 14 rounds of talks between

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 2012 and 2019. However, the mechanism was not under MNREGA scheme and by trying to build a road
intended to be used to discuss resolution of the in Indian territory across the international boundary
boundary question. (not LAC).”
2013: India and China laid out ways to implement •  In September 2015, Indian troops and the PLA faced off
border defense cooperation, which included in Burtse after Indian troops destroyed a watchtower
sharing information and increasing meetings. the Chinese were building on the mutually-agreed
patrolling line.
CHINESE AGGRESSIONS AT THE LAC •  In 2017, India and China were locked in a 72-day
Despite these multiple rounds of talks, the border question standoff in the disputed Doklam region claimed by
remains unresolved. China and India have only exchanged both Bhutan and China.
maps of the middle sector, and China remains ambiguous in
•  So far, 2020 has seen the Chinese opening up multiple
its border claims, thwarting any resolutions. Furthermore,
fronts with India along the LAC. At the heart of the
despite the existence of CBMs, Chinese transgressions and
issue have been Chinese concerns with India’s long-
incursions continue. Most notably:
delayed infrastructure-building activities on the Indian
•  In 1956, China built a road (national highway or G219) side of the LAC. Indian and Chinese troops have
through the disputed Aksai Chin, connecting Tibet reportedly clashed in at least five flashpoints: Naku
with Xinjiang. La in North Sikkim and Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley,
•  In 1967, clashes occurred at Nathu La and Cho La, Hot Springs, and Depsang Plains in Ladakh. Although
leading to the Second Sino-Indian war. no shots were fired, the clashes turned bloody in
Galwan; 20 Indian soldiers were killed, along with an
•  In October 1975, per the Indian government, a patrol
unconfirmed number of Chinese deaths. The standoff
of the Assam Rifles comprising a non-commissioned
continues well into its third month, even as senior
officer and four other soldiers was ambushed by about
commanders of the two sides met three times in June.
40 Chinese soldiers in an area well within Indian
Diplomatic engagements are continuing in parallel, and
territory which had been regularly patrolled for years
a meeting of the WMCC was held on June 24. The two
without incident. A CIA cable notes “that the Chinese
countries’ SRs had an emergency phone consultation
were ‘penetrating’ Indian territory; and that the
on July 6.
penetration implied a ‘change in China’s position’ on
the border question.” This incident also marks the last Transgressions are becoming common between the two
time shots were fired at the LAC. countries. Per India’s Ministry of Defence, “the number of
transgressions in 2017 ha[s] increased from 2016 indicating
•  In June 1986, Chinese incursions occurred in
PLA’s assertiveness and sensitivity to its claims on the
Sumdorong Chu valley.
Northern Borders.” Although transgressions decreased in
•  In April 2013, before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 2018, there were still about 1,025 transgressions between
state visit to India, Chinese incursions occurred 2016 and 2019. Transgressions picked up again in 2019, and
at the LAC. A PLA paramilitary unit put up tents and multiple fronts opened in 2020. The intensity and duration
an administrative base 19 km inside the area India of standoffs are also increasing, even if there are no shots
considers the LAC at Raki Nala in Depsang plains. being fired. Chinese assertions over neighbors’ territorial
Chinese officials denied any trespassing and claimed claims are also growing more frequent overall.
the land as theirs, resulting in a standoff in Daulet Beg
One region where China’s invigorated expansionism has
Oldie and Chumar. worsened relations with India is at Doklam, the disputed
•  In September 2014, India and China locked horns in a territory claimed by China and Bhutan, which lies close to
standoff at Demchok, with the backdrop of President India’s own border with both nations.
Xi Jinping’s visit to India. The standoff was ignited
by the Indian construction of a canal in response to
a request for waterworks in the region by residents
of Demchok. The Demchok and Chumar standoff is
notable because the “Chinese were trying to alter the
ground situation by demanding to stop a civil work

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DOKLAM

The Doklam Plateau; boxes A, B, C, D indicate areas of analyses. Image from 2017. China is present in Doklam. Indian military post at Doka La lies to
the left.
CSIS prepared imagery analysis covering activity on a
portion of the Doklam Plateau (also known as Zhoglam
or Donglang) during the three years from 2017 to
2019. The Doklam Plateau lies at the junction of the
Bhutanese, Chinese, and Indian borders and is considered
to be Bhutanese territory by most of the international
community. China, however, has repeatedly expressed
territorial claims over the area and has undertaken large-
scale encroachment activities, as shown in the imagery in
this brief.

Same area; image from 2019. China is present in Doklam. Indian military post at Doka
La lies to the left.

THE DISPUTE
The Doklam dispute is grounded in the Chinese belief
that the “Thibet-Sikkim Convention [sic], 1890” settled
the border issue (the Chinese have been selective in their
renunciation of British treaties). However, Bhutan was
not party to the 1890 convention. China holds that Mount
Gipmochi is the trijunction point, while the Indian and
Bhutanese governments claim the trijunction point is near
The Trijunction Point (Batang La) between China, Bhutan, and India. China is present
in Doklam. Batang La. Despite claiming Gipmochi as the trijunction
point, the Chinese have been reluctant to formally
articulate their view on the location of Mount Gipmochi.
The confusion is amplified by the existence of Mount
Gyemochen near Mount Gipmochi, thereby complicating
the location of the real Gipmochi and Chinese claims. The
1890 convention does not provide any maps, nor was any
survey done, which leaves much to the imagination. The
first survey of the Bhutan boundary and the first official
map of Bhutan were made with the help of the Survey of

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India; the Bhutan-India boundary was demarcated in 1963, status quo of the border.” Subsequently, in 2012, India and
with boundary pillar work completed by 1971. According China reached a Common Understanding between their
to Indian and Bhutanese maps, Doklam is part of Bhutan’s SRs, determining that “the tri-junction boundary points
territory, with the trijunction about 200 meters from between India, China and third countries will be finalized
Batang La. The Indian-Bhutanese claim is “based on actual in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt,
surveys which show that that it the true water-parting point therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in
between the Teesta and the Amo Chhu.” violation of this understanding.”
Since China has raised claims to Bhutanese territories, India China’s actions in Doklam are in violation of the 1988
and Bhutan contend that the convention only settles the guiding principles, the 1998 agreement, and the 2012
boundary “on the basis of alignment.” China has agreed to understanding. Chinese actions since Doklam have caused
this, accepting the watershed principle and committing “a significant change in status-quo on the ground with
itself to maintaining status quo per the 2012 Common serious security implications for India and amounted to
Understanding between the Indian and Chinese SR. unilateral determination of the tri-junction point between
India, China and Bhutan.” The settlement of the India-
CHINESE CHANGE IN STATUS QUO China boundary issue remains elusive; China, however,
The Doklam 2017 standoff was not the first time that has disregarded all existing conventions and laid claim to
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops have transgressed in Doklam. As our new satellite imagery shows, there is strong
this region of Bhutan. However, the most recent standoff evidence that China considers these moves permanent.
is particularly relevant due to its strategic implications:
“the PLA came with the objective of changing the status INDIA: BHUTAN’S SECURITY PROVIDER
quo because they came in substantial numbers and brought India and Bhutan share a “special relationship,” with close
along construction equipment with them.” The Doklam geographical and religious-cultural ties. India plays a crucial
standoff became the longest such confrontation between role in Bhutan’s economic development, remaining its
the two countries in modern times. largest development partner. Bhutan has been perceived as
Owing to the persistent Chinese transgressions, Bhutan a quasi-protectorate of India, with India handling its foreign
wanted border issues with China to be raised as early as affairs and controlling its arms imports—an understanding
1961 during the Sino-Indian border talks. By 1981, Bhutan formalized in the 1949 Treaty of Friendship. In 2007, this
announced its intention to directly engage China over the treaty was updated to reflect contemporary values, and an
boundary question. The first round of talks on the matter element of equality was added, stating that both countries
was held in Beijing in April 1984; since then, Bhutan and “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating
China have had 24 rounds of talks. Until the fifth round of to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow
talks, the Bhutanese delegation was led by the Bhutanese the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national
ambassador in New Delhi. In the fifth round of talks, Bhutan security and interest of the other.” Bhutan did not have any
and China reached an agreement on the guiding principles diplomatic relations with China until 1991, relying solely on
for the settlement, and once these were established, India to engage on its behalf. Even today, China and Bhutan
substantive talks began by the sixth round in Beijing in do not have a formal bilateral diplomatic relationship;
1989. The official map was given to the Chinese at this sixth communication between the two countries occurs primarily
round of talks. The last boundary talks were the 24th round, through the Bhutanese Embassy in New Delhi.
held in Beijing on August 11, 2016. The 25th round of talks On June 16, 2017, the PLA began constructing a road
were expected to take place in 2017 but did not happen. in Doklam—the disputed area controlled by Bhutan—
The most notable breakthroughs in the boundary talks unilaterally changing the status quo. The Indian army had
happened with the 1998 agreement between China and to intervene to protect Bhutan’s territorial integrity. It is
Bhutan on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along worth noting that beyond securing Bhutan’s security and
the Sino-Bhutanese Border Areas. Both parties agreed that sovereignty, Indian intervention was also guided by its own
“prior to the ultimate solution of the boundary issues, peace interests, as the Chinese move had security implications for
and tranquility along the border should be maintained and India: to the south of Doklam is the Jampheri Ridge, which
the status quo of the boundary prior to March 1959 should overlooks India’s Siliguri Corridor—the vital connection link
be upheld, and not to resort to unilateral action to alter the to India’s northeastern states.

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The Doklam standoff was a unique opportunity for India to
prove its emerging role as a bulwark against Chinese westward
expansionism. After a 72-day face-off, Indian and Chinese
troops disengaged. Per a Lok Sabha Committee report:
After the disengagement process, the Chinese troops,
equipment and tents were removed from the face-
off site, while our troops returned to positions. This
effectively addressed a challenge of potential road
construction activity by China in Southern Doklam
and a concern about China’s unilaterally pushing the
tri-junction points southwards. At the end of the
day we believe that it was triumph of diplomacy and
political maturity. Chinese road passing through Doklam with military facilities, defensive fighting
positions, and helicopter pads. Image from 2017.
Since the standoff, there have been continued media reports
of Chinese presence in the Doklam region. However, the
Indian and Chinese governments have both categorically
denied any change in status quo in Doklam. The Lok
Sabha Committee seemed unconvinced about Chinese
intentions and actions in Doklam, and noted: “while
dealing with China, it is always better to have a sense of
‘healthy skepticism.’ The Committee would, therefore,
urge the Government not to let its vigil down in order
to prevent any untoward incident in future.” Despite the
Indian government’s position, the Ministry of Defence’s
2019 annual report confirmed the PLA presence in Doklam,
stating that “post the disengagement on August 28, 2017,
after the 72 days standoff at Doklam, troops of both sides Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Paved roads and ongoing road construction
have redeployed themselves away from their respective by the Chinese.

positions near the face-off site. The strength of either side

has, however, reduced. The Indian Army is continuously
monitoring Chinese activities in the area and is adequately
prepared to respond to any contingency.” General Bipin
Rawat, then chief of army staff, had also indicated the PLA’s
continued presence in the area, even after the standoff
formally ended.

IMAGERY ANALYSIS (2017–2019)

Analysis of satellite imagery indicates that Chinese activity in
Doklam to date consists of extensive road construction and
the establishment of a network of small military facilities,
defensive fighting positions, and helicopter landing pads.1
Same area zoomed in; image from 2017. Chinese defensive military positions and
ongoing construction activity.

1. The Doklam Plateau and the territory claimed by China encompasses the 609.51 km2 Bhutanese Jigme Khesar Strict Nature Reserve. The reserve was originally
established in the mid-1990s as the Toorsa Strict Nature Reserve but was subsequently renamed during 2014 as the Jigme Khesar Strict Nature Reserve. See http://
www.dofps.gov.bt/?page_id=234 and http://www.wwfbhutan.org.bt/projects_/bhutan_biological_conservation_complex/jigme_khesar_strict_nature_reserve__/.

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Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Chinese defensive military positions, ongoing Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Chinese helicopter pads.
construction activity, and new communication towers.

Chinese defensive positions, ongoing construction activity, military base Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Chinese helicopter pads.
development, and helicopter pads. Image from 2017.

Same area; image from 2019. Chinese defensive positions, ongoing construction Paved road, basketball court, on-going road construction, and military base
activity, military base development, paved roads, and well-developed helicopter pads. development by the Chinese. Image from 2019.

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Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Paved road, basketball court, and military Same area; image from 2019. Chinese ongoing road construction.
base under development by the Chinese.

Construction is apparently being undertaken primarily

by military units—likely with the assistance of some
civilian contractors—as indicated by the predominance of
camouflaged structures and military-type vehicles seen
throughout the imagery. This construction activity has
been undertaken in some of the most challenging terrain in
the world, as indicated by the altitude and numerous (one
might say tortuous) road switchbacks to accommodate the
extreme steepness of the terrain.

Chinese ongoing road construction and recently installed concrete batch plant in
Doklam. Image from 2019.

Chinese road switchbacks in Doklam; made to accommodate extreme steepness of the

terrain. Image from 2019.

Same area zoomed in; image from 2019. Chinese ongoing road construction and
recently installed concrete batch plant in Doklam.

The observed Chinese activity has developed along three

axes: (1) west, toward the trijunction point where the
Bhutanese, Chinese, and Indian borders are generally
accepted by the international community to meet, (2)
southwest, toward the Doka La peak, and (3) south, in the

Same area zoomed in; image from 2017. Only defensive positions present.
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general direction of Gyemo Chen.2 Preliminary analysis
suggests that this activity follows a general pattern:
•  Extension of the Chinese road network to the
Bhutanese border;
•  Extension of these road networks across the Bhutanese
border into the Doklam Plateau area;
•  Establishment of small Chinese military bases and
defensive fighting positions;
•  Construction of helicopter landing pads;
•  Paving of the newly graded roads; and
•  Further expansion to the southwest and south. Another basketball court built by the Chinese in Doklam, indicating permanent
presence. Image from 2017.
To date, no large military facilities have been constructed
by the Chinese in the area under study. However,
satellite imagery taken in 2018 and 2019 shows that an
excavation area of approximately four hectares has been
undertaken near the Chinese border on the southern
axis (27.316316° by 88.953954°). The size, layout, and
location of this excavation suggests that it could be used
for the establishment of a larger military-related facility.
The validity of this supposition, however, requires future
observation and study.

Same area; image from 2019 showing considerable development.

U.S.-INDIA DEFENSE COOPERATION

As outlined in this report, the India-China military
standoff at Doklam in 2017 was not an isolated event;
border tensions have increased over time. This presents
an opportunity for the United States to widen the lens in
terms of how it thinks of its emerging defense relationship
with India. India is playing a greater role in contributing to
security and stability in its own neighborhood. U.S. support
Chinese ongoing excavation for large facility in Doklam. Image from 2019. for this role will require continued attempts to carve out
unique steps that will strengthen India’s capabilities while
While no helicopters or heavy weapons (e.g., tanks, armored enhancing the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
personnel carriers, or artillery) have been observed in any India’s nuclear tests in the spring of 1998 were both a low
of the imagery analyzed for this report, the imagery still point in the relationship as well as a launchpad for the
indicates that, from a military standpoint, the Chinese have strategic partnership the two nations enjoy today. While
made excellent use of the terrain in siting their installations, triggering onerous sanctions against India, the tests forced
defensive fighting positions, helicopter landing pads, and the United States to think more deeply about India’s
bases. The size, distribution, and layout of the Chinese growing power, the overlap of the two nations’ respective
activity indicates that they view their activity on the Doklam values, and shared security objectives in the region.
Plateau to be for the long term, if not permanent.

2. The names and spellings used here are based upon those accepted by the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).

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Over the last 20 years, the United States has taken many •  India Given Tier-1 Status Under Strategic Trade
important steps to expand defense cooperation with Authorization (2018): U.S. Secretary of Commerce
India. Each involved senior-level leadership in the U.S. Wilbur Ross announced that India would be given Tier-1
administration and forced the United States to think deeply status under the U.S. Strategic Trade Authorization (STA)
about their long-term vision for the relationship. rules. This provides India with easier access to a range
Among the highlights: of embargoed technologies related to defense, policing,
medical research, and more.
•  TPQ-37 Firefinder Sale (2002): India agreed to a $140
million deal with Raytheon to procure eight TPQ-37 Beyond specific bilateral initiatives, the United States
counter-battery artillery radar systems. This was the first has also played a crucial role in helping secure India’s
modern U.S. defense sale to India. membership in global nonproliferation regimes.
Despite some hurdles—mainly presented by China’s
•  Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004): intransigence—India is now a part of three of the
Workstreams were established for India to access high- four main global nonproliferation regimes, including
end U.S. technology related to civilian nuclear activities, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
civilian space, and other forms of high-technology Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. The
defense trade. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is the only regime India is
•  New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship not yet a part of.
(2005): This formalized the frequency of senior-level Some of the steps outlined above are generally reserved for
military engagement. the United States’ closest security partners, such as those
•  U.S. India Civilian Nuclear Agreement (2005): holding STA-1 status. Some are more general in nature,
Announced in July 2005, the Civilian Nuclear such as the “Enabling/Foundational” agreements, which
Agreement laid down the path for India to formally join nonetheless demonstrate a strong directional willingness
the world’s “nuclear club”—having nuclear weapons of the United States to tangibly improve defense ties with
while being able to procure equipment and fuel for its India. But other steps are truly unique—initiatives created
nuclear power program. only for India—such as the IRRC and the DTTI. Another
•  Defense Technology & Trade Initiative (DTTI) Projects step the United States has taken falls into a similar camp,
(2015): While technically launched three years earlier, where the United States voluntarily pushed ahead with
the DTTI came to life during U.S. President Barack allowing technology release for defense platforms that
Obama’s visit to India in January 2015. During the India desired but for which it had not yet offered a formal
visit, the United States and India announced a series of procurement process. Accelerating such approvals without
joint projects and working groups to expedite defense a formal request to buy from India takes energy and some
technology cooperation. amount of political capital within the U.S. government
agencies that have a hand in such processes.
•  U.S. Department of Defense Creates India Rapid
Reaction Cell (IRRC) (2015): The IRRC’s role is to Given these unique programs, a question often comes
accelerate defense technology collaboration with India. up in Washington: when will the United States see the
benefits of all this heavy lifting? In other words, when will
•  The United States and India Sign Defense “Enabling/
India take up its role as a “net provider of security in the
Foundation” Agreements (2016, 2018, and 2019):
region?” Otherwise, how can the United States continue to
India and the United States have signed three
press forward with offering groundbreaking programs and
agreements to further enable technical aspects of
technologies to India but not to other nations?
defense cooperation. First was the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in August India does not often talk up its own actions, but the list
2016, which was followed by the Communications of its security initiatives is growing. For example, India
Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was the first major nation to publicly raise concerns
in September 2018 and the Industrial Security Annex about China’s One Belt, One Road program. India helped
(ISA) in December 2019. Only one agreement remains organize refugee missions out of conflict zones, notably
to be signed—the Basic Exchange and Cooperative Operation Raahat, which evacuated international citizens
Agreement (BECA). from Yemen in April 2015. But the most striking instance
was India’s defense of Bhutan’s territorial integrity during

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the fall 2017 standoff with China in the region where the Richard Rossow is a senior adviser and holds the Wadhwani
Chinese, Bhutanese, and Indian borders merge. Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic
Reports indicate that the United States was willing to find and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. Joseph S.
ways to support India’s position during the 2017 standoff Bermudez Jr. is a senior fellow for imagery analysis for the iDeas
as well as the more recent border tensions, but India Lab and Korea Chair at CSIS. Kriti Upadhyaya is a research
demurred, preferring to handle the situation directly. Still, associate with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies
U.S. defense cooperation with India has directly boosted at CSIS.
India’s ability to handle such confrontations, and this will This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct
only increase in the future. sponsorship contributed to this report.
•  Defense Sales: U.S. sales of key defense platforms
such as the CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter
increase India’s mobility in difficult terrain. Today,
the Indian air force operates 15 Chinook helicopters;
the first was delivered just a year ago. Apart from
moving troops and weapons into tight spaces, the
Indian government wants to leverage the Chinooks’
heavy-lift capabilities to support the construction of
infrastructure along the border. The M-777 “ultra-
lightweight” howitzers supplied by BAE Systems again
assist the Indian army with mobility and firepower.
BAE Systems will supply 145 howitzers to India, with
domestic production underway.
•  Enabling/Foundation Agreements: The defense-
enabling agreements outlined above will allow the
United States to assist India’s military capabilities,
including along the border. For example, the COMCASA
agreement will allow the United States to sell India
more advanced detection systems, while the BECA will
allow the United States to share classified geospatial
information and technologies.
•  Joint Exercises: Launched in 2004, the annual Exercise
Yudh Abhyas focuses specifically on mountain warfare.
If the United States only considers a narrow list of threats to
be the scorecard against which to rate India’s effectiveness
as a security provider—for instance, China’s expansionist
tendencies in East and Southeast Asia or the fight against
the Islamic State—it may take much longer to see a payback
for U.S. efforts. But if the United States instead considers
India’s existing role in pulling South Asian nations out
of China’s orbit and in defending the territory of smaller
nations such as Bhutan, then India is already stepping up in
meaningful ways.

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