HISTORY OF MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

(MNLF)

Submitted by:

Amamore L. Plaza
College of Accounting Education
University of Mindanao

In Fulfillment of the Requirements

Submitted to:

Lindsey C. Espino
06277| 12:30 – 1:30 PM

January 15, 2020

The Philippines has had a long history of Moro insurgent movements dating back to
Spanish rule. Resistance to colonization was especially strong among the Muslim population
of southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. With pride in their cultural heritage and
a strong desire for independence, Moros fought Christian and foreign domination. Spanish
control over the Moros was never complete, and the Muslim struggle carried over into the
United States colonial era. The Moros earned a reputation as fierce fighters in combat against
United States troops. Following independence, Filipino Muslims continued to resist Manila's
rule, leading to widespread conflict in the 1970s.

More immediate causes of insurgency rose out of the increasing lawlessness in the
southern Philippines during the late 1960s, when violence associated with political disputes,
personal feuds, and armed gangs proliferated. In this climate of civil turmoil, longstanding
tensions between Moro and Christian communities escalated. Already in competition over
land, economic resources, and political power, the Moros became increasingly alarmed by the
immigration of Christians from the north who were making Moros a minority in what they
felt was their own land. By mid-1972, partisan political violence, generally divided along
religious lines, gripped all of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. After martial law was
declared in September 1972 and all civilians were ordered to surrender their guns,
spontaneous rebellions arose among Moros, who traditionally had equated the right to carry
arms with their religious heritage and were suspicious of the government's intentions toward
them.

In its initial phases, the rebellion was a series of isolated uprisings that rapidly spread
in scope and size. But one group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), chaired by
Nur Misuari, managed to bring most partisan Moro forces into the loosely unified MNLF
framework.

The MNLF was conceptualized and organized by Abul Khayr Alonto and Jallaludin
Santos who were at that time active with the Bangsamoro Movement. With Muslim
congressmen and leaders as advisers, they recruited young Muslims from different tribes.
Jallaludin Santos suggested to Abul Khayr that they could benefit from the vibrancy of Nur
Misuari, professor at University of Philippines, who was with the leftist movement
Kabataang Makabayan. Abul Khayr persuaded Nur to join the movement. Advisers and
members wanted Abul Khayr to chair the MNLF, but he declined and indicated that Misuari
could have the position. As he saw it, the work of the Chairman would be to solicit help from
Muslim countries and negotiate their involvement in creating a solid solution for the Bangsa
Moro problem. Abul Khayr on the other hand, out of loyalty to his men could not bear to
travel and leave his brothers in battle. Accordingly, Misuari became the Chairman though not
the founder or leader.

Fighting for an independent Moro nation, the MNLF received support from Muslim
backers in Libya and Malaysia. When the conflict reached its peak in 1973-75, the military
arm of the MNLF, the Bangsa Moro Army, was able to field some 30,000-armed fighters.
The military responded by deploying 70 to 80 percent of its combat forces against the Moros.
Destruction and casualties, both military and civilian, were heavy; an estimated 50,000
people were killed. The government also employed a variety of nonmilitary tactics,
announced economic aid programs and political concessions, and encouraged factionalism
and defections in the Muslim ranks by offering incentives such as amnesty and land. The
government's programs, and a sharp decrease in the flow of arms from Malaysia, set back the
Moro movement. In 1976 the conflict began to wane.

Talks between the government and the Moros began in late 1976 under the auspices
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a union of Muslim nations to which the Moros
looked for support. The talks led to an agreement between the Philippine government and the
MNLF signed in Tripoli that year providing for Moro autonomy in the southern Philippines
and for a cease-fire. After a lull in the fighting, the truce broke down in 1977 amid Moro
charges that the government's autonomy plan allowed only token self-rule.

The Moro rebellion never regained its former vigor. Muslim factionalism was a major
factor in the movement's decline. Differing goals, traditional tribal rivalries, and competition
among Moro leaders for control of the movement produced a three-way split in the MNLF
during the late 1970s. The first break occurred in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by
ethnic Maguindanao’s from Mindanao, formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which
advocated a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. Misuari's
larger and more militant MNLF was further weakened during that period when rival leaders
formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, drawing many Mindanao Maranaos away
from the MNLF, dominated by Misuari's Sulu-based Tausug tribe. The Bangsa Moro
Liberation Organization eventually collapsed, giving way to the Moro National Liberation
Front/Reformist Movement. Moro factionalism, compounded by declining foreign support
and general war weariness, hurt the Muslim movement both on the battlefield and at the
negotiating table. Moro fighting strength declined to about 15,000 by 1983, and Muslim and
government forces only occasionally clashed during Marcos's last years in office.

In keeping with her campaign pledge of national reconciliation, Aquino initiated talks
with the MNLF the largest of the three major factions--in 1986 to resolve the conflict with
Muslim separatists. Discussions produced a cease-fire in September, followed by further talks
under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In January 1987, the
MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions and
accepting the government's offer of autonomy. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the next
largest faction, refused to accept the accord and initiated a brief offensive that ended in a
truce later that month. Talks between the government and the MNLF over the proposed
autonomous region continued sporadically throughout 1987 but eventually deadlocked.
Following the government's successful diplomatic efforts to block the MNLF's latest bid for
Organization of the Islamic Conference membership, the MNLF officially resumed its armed
insurrection in February 1988, but little fighting resulted.
 The government, meanwhile, pressed ahead with plans for Muslim autonomy without
the MNLF's cooperation. Article 10 of the 1987 constitution mandates that the new congress
establish an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In the November 1989 plebiscite,
only two Mindanao provinces--Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur--and two in the Sulu
Archipelago--Sulu and Tawi-tawi opted to accept the government's autonomy measure. The
fragmented four-province Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, with its own governor
and unicameral legislature, was officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990.

Armed activity by the Moros continued at a relatively low level through the late
1980s, with sporadic clashes between government and Muslim forces. The military still based
army and marine battalions in Moro areas to maintain order in 1990, but far fewer units than
it had in the 1970s. (Four battalions were on Jolo Island, a Moro stronghold, down from
twenty-four at the rebellion's height.) Most of the endemic violence in Muslim areas was
directed at rival clans, not at the military's peacekeeping forces.

The Moro movement remained divided along tribal lines in three major factions.
Misuari's MNLF forces in the Sulu Archipelago totaled 15,000, and the Mindanao-based
Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the MNLF-Reformist Movement fielded around 2,900 and
900 troops, respectively. Weakened by these divisions, Muslim infighting, and the formation
of an autonomous region, the Moro armies did not appear to be an imminent threat. Still, the
MNLF which did not recognize the autonomous region showed no sign of surrendering, and
it promised to remain a potent military and political force in the southern Philippines.

REFERENCE:

Pike, J. (2001). Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Retrieved on January 12,
2020 from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/mnlf/htm