with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime ofmurder

directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of
rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than
their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not
G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015 necessarily mortal.

GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, They all pleaded "not guilty." The defense, during trial, presented the following version of the events that
vs. transpired:
ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house when he heard his tenth son
DECISION Winston crying while the latter was being castigated by Elpidio. He went down and told Elpidio to come back the
next day to settle. His wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two blocks away. Barangay Chairman Joseph
PERALTA, J.: Ramos and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered
his daughter and Winston withit. Elpidio was brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil that it was a family problem. Elpidio went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa.
Procedure, dated January 20, 2010, of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva assailing the Elpidio asked Titus to open the door until the former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open door
Decision2 dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. and Salvador went out of the house because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
R. CR. No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Manila, Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.
in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners guilty of attempted murder.
According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and Titus when the incident
The following are the antecedents: occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out when Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for
hurting people when drunk and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he was mauled by
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister Isabelita the people.
Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing
invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in a Decision dated March 31,
slapthe latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol. 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said decision
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was taking place reads:
inorder to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some
coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there, he passed WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva
by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed alone. eight (8) years and one(1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the
actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of ₱10,000.00.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-in-law Gary
Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary responded, "putang ina mo, Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.
and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."
SO ORDERED.
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's elder son,
Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the latter court
his head that forced the latter tobow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case as follows: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in
eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two the decision appealed from, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
wrestled on the floor and grappled for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two
and sprayed something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to SO ORDERED.
extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go out of the
house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away Hence, the present petition.
from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with hisarnis, including Titus, chased him.
Petitioners stated the following arguments:
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe which caused
the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants tostop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE FACTS OF
times on his thighs, legsand knees using the rattan stick. THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.

While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND THE
tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees and NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. NOT ALL OF THE
the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, ELEMENTSOF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. THERE IS NO TREACHERY OR ANY
while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the back of his shoulder. OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF IN THIS CASE.

Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him: "Huwag makialam, THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRESENCE OF
away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
"maawa na kayo" but they only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio
then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). TRIAL COURT.

Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, was filed THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE
against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads:
THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO ATTACKED HIM IS
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase "not necessarily mortal" in the allegations in the Information.
AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part.
PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to this Court should only considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
raise questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition.5 malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
In the present case, the issuesand arguments presented by the petitioners involve questions of facts. Therefore, which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words
the present petition is at once dismissible for its failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.13 All of
Court, that the petition should only raise questions of law. The distinction between a "question of law" and a these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the
"question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
on a certain state offacts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence Procedure states:
presented by the parties- litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6 accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place
At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration. wherein the offense was committed.

It is the contention of the petitionersthat the Information filed against them was defective because it did not state In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that the
all the elements of the crime charged. However, a close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Information partly reads:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to assert any
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should have produced the crime of ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal. those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of the crime of attempted Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA and the RTC, the same is not
murder has been included. ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held that greater weight is given to the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony, thus: the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight
greater than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.15
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the petitionersas the
than his own spontaneous desistance.7 assailants, thus:

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?

The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the house, then, I saw Gary was
hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one foot, with
He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; the diameter of one inch.

The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)

The non-performance of all acts ofexecution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous A. I also used that.
desistance.8
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
A. In the kitchen.
(1) That there be external acts;
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.9
A. He is right in the kitchen.
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
Q. Then what happened?
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the kitchen door and holding a
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor bythe spontaneous desistance of the tomhack(sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my right side and my headand I got injury (sic) and blood
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a profusely oozing, I want to get hold of the tomhawk (sic).
direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation
has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
ofbeing equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of
the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and A. No sir.16
this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the xxxx
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the
intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the A. Rolly Villanueva.
offense.11
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound. The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, thus:

Q. Who are they? In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the
head as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan Iguiron. with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando "Rolly" Villanueva hit the victim on the head with
a lead pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first before you were hit? also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private
organ with a piece of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. "D"), Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him. (Exh. "D-2") and the fracture sheet (Exh. "D-4") all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple
lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt instrument like a
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit you, you mean you realized piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a
what he used in hitting you from behind? sharp object like a large knife or axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the
victim. The multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven that they
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length. hit Elpidio on the head. There is no sufficient evidence that the other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi,
Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw him holding that pipe, how Elpidio with the tear gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of wood,
was he holding the pipe when you saw him? on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as the medical certificate did not show any injury on that part
of the body of the victim.
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17
The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's house.1âwphi1 Whenhe
In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a
calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded high lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead
respect if not conclusive effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at close pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness
range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they testify.18 The rule finds an even more of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19 the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador
consciously adopted the said actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and
It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the medico-legal findings as must be considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and
testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with. There is clearly
testified as to the following: present here the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today? Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings supposedly seen when he was selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."24 "The fact that there were two persons
admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions of our Out Patient Department. who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim."25 The evidence must establish that
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this complainant? the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.26 "To
take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the patient. defense available to the person attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the
age, size, and strength of the parties.28
Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?
Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated casting. Normally, casting would years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum and ordered them to pay actual damages of
take around three (3) months only but since the nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of ₱10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.
necessitated prolong immobilization in a case.
For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
PROSECUTOR TEVES: states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him? maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances,
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
A. Yes, ma'am. Code. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be
within the range of prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained? A. I think one of his leg has close ten (10) years; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of
fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should have been imprisonment
an open wound which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20 from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of petitioners Gary
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or any other qualifying Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and
circumstance. Resolution dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the petitioners are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years of prision
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to ORDERED to pay Pl 7,300.00 as actual damages, as well as Pl 0,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and ina swift, deliberate, and unexpected date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery
tobe considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons
attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.21 From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the
second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the
possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery
where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation
on the partof the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.22
 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at
the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of
detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact
and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000 Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the
charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
vs. she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused. Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child.
He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help
BELLOSILLO, J.: from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.

On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita finally did away with frustrated rape and allowed only attempted rape Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and
and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but
emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of a Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was
woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his
concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed
intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be considered a
deadly fait accompli, which is absurd. Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory
rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was
left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her
ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and
however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was
rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the
organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a fact that the episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and
felony directly by overt acts. The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room
the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise was wide open for anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost
the crime to its consummated stage. inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she
stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of the He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts
female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for more than bolsters his innocence.
consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous
with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with
line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already
penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory
to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal
because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
committed amounts merely to attempted rape. perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being
below seven (7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in its penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the
attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the difference between constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of
life and death for the accused — a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and the the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed
attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis
limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or
light of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia? existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a
limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain,
the extreme penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6 organ on the lips of her vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. 13 Thus,
touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the
Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is
pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner
prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. 8 surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner
surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection. 23 On
majora is the labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he
consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together; 24 consequently, she did not feel
not acts of lasciviousness. any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-
17 but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness,
pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must
"shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion. be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to
harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused.
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held
Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.1âwphi1
witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that
she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs of
children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken
without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not
the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual
allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus: contact between the accused and the victim. 27

Q: How was Primo holding your daughter? In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while his variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is
right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim). necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the
female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.
observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have
provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his penis produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All
thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence, the
seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that accused should be punished only for it.
she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to
inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense
that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal,
prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is
appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act. fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6)
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or
witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of
Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his pants down. The statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
interval, although relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten
even to conceal his evil design. (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court
— SO ORDERED.

Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?

A: Yes, sir.

But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus —

Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?

A: No, sir. 20

This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this
case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight.
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration, 27 obviously induced by a question propounded to
her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is
improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis
of the accused touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the
victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her
pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate Crysthel. 22
 front of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at the corner of M. Almeda and M. Conception Avenues, San Joaquin,
Pasig City at about 4:00 p.m. of that day.

A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3 CALLORA, was then formed to
conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money was
prepared. The genuine two (2) pieces of ₱500.00 bills were placed on top of boodle money to make them appear
G.R. No. 186141 April 11, 2012 as ₱10,000.00.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, At about 4:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, the team proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3 CALLORA arrived in
vs. the vicinity of 7-Eleven on board a car driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and met with the informant. PO3 CALLORA
JESUSA FIGUEROA y CORONADO, Accused-Appellant. and the informant waited for accused-appellant FIGUEROA, who after a few minutes, arrived driving a Toyota
Revo with Plate No. XPN 433. Seeing the two, accused-appellant FIGUEROA waived at them and drove towards
DECISION them. Stopping near them, accused-appellant FIGUEROA rolled down the window of her car and asked where
the money was. On the other hand, PO3 CALLORA asked for the shabu. At that juncture, accused-appellant
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: FIGUEROA opened a Chowking plastic bag and showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
When PO3 CALLORA was about to hand over the buy-bust money to accused-appellant FIGUEROA, the latter
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 02348 dated October 25, sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she sped away towards the direction of Kalayaan Avenue
2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No. 04-2433 for violation of and C-5 road. The other occupants of the car were Susan Samson y Figueroa, sister-in-law of the accused,
Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Margie Sampayan y Garbo, Fe Salceda y Resma and Christian Salceda y Resma, a nine[-]year[-]old boy.

There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant: PO3 CALLORA immediately boarded the car being driven by PS/INSP. GARCIA and gave chase. PO2 PINILI,
who was driving another vehicle, joined the chase.
Criminal Case No. 04-2432
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue near the intersection of C-5
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this road. At that time, PS/INSP. GARCIA saw Christian Salceda y Resma alighted from the backdoor of the Toyota
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, Revo and threw the Chowking plastic bag to the pavement, which was about two steps from the backdoor.
unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, direct custody and control a total weight of nine point fourty PS/INSP. GARCIA picked it up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
[sic] two (9.42) grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the substance inside. PO3 CALLORA and PO2 PINILI introduced themselves as police officers. The Toyota Revo
above-cited law.2 was checked by PS/INSP. GARCIA and PO2 PINILI, which was witnessed by PO1 Alvarado and PO3 Basa of
the Makati Police PCP No. 7, MMDA Traffic Enforcers Gonzales and Salvador and a reporter/press photographer
Criminal Case No. 04-2433 of Manila Star named Eduardo Rosales. Retrieved under the floor matting of the Toyota Revo were two heat
sealed transparent plastic sachets of undetermined quantity of white crystalline substance.
That on or about the 2nd day of July 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and Accused-appellant FIGUEROA was informed of her violation and was apprised of her constitutional rights. She
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell, give away, distribute and deliver four point sixty (4.60) was brought to the office of Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP AIDSOTF for investigation. The items recovered
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, by then and there agreeing to from the crime scene were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were tested positive for
sell and deliver the said dangerous drug to the proposed buyer PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA, thereby commencing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.
the commission of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, but which nevertheless failed to consummate the said
sale by reason of causes other than her own spontaneous desistance, that is she got frightened by the presence Version of the Defense
of police officers at the scene of the crime.3
Accused-appellant FIGUEROA denied that she met and transacted with PO3 CALLORA regarding the sale of
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch shabu. She likewise denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered under the floor
64 of Makati City proceeded with the trial of the aforementioned charges. The versions of the prosecution and the matting of the car she was driving as well as the plastic sachet of shabu inside a Chowking plastic bag found on
defense of what transpired on July 2, 2004, as concisely summarized by the Court of Appeals, were as follows: the pavement of Kalayaan Avenue corner C-5 road.

Version of the Prosecution She alleged that between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. of July 2, 2004, she was driving a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XPN
433 on her way to the house of her elder brother at Eco Center, Barangay Calsada, Taguig City to get their
In the evening of June 20, 2004, an informant came to the office of P/Supt. Nelson T. Yabut (P/SUPT. YABUT), mother’s allowance. Their mother stays with her at her residence at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City.
Chief of the Special Operation Unit 1 of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (PNP AIDSOTF) With her as passengers were Susan Samson y Figueroa, Fe Salceda y Resma, and the latter’s nine[-]year[-]old
at Camp Crame, Quezon City and informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain "Baby," later identified son, Christian Salceda y Resma, and Margie Sampayan y Garbo, accused-appellant FIGUEROA’s
as accused-appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT instructed PS/Insp. Pepito Garcia (PS/INSP. GARCIA), PO3 laundrywoman. They stayed at her brother’s house for about twenty (20) minutes.
Josefino Callora (PO3 CALLORA) and PO2 Rogie Pinili (PO2 PINILI) to conduct discreet surveillance operation
to verify the information. From her brother’s house, she proceeded to Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila to bring Susan Samson y Figueroa to the
latter’s house. The other passengers remained in the car. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA then continued driving,
On June 23, 2004, at about 8:00 p.m., PO3 CALLORA, together with the informant, met with accused-appellant taking the C-5-Kalayaan Avenue route. When she was about to proceed after the traffic light turned green at the
FIGUEROA at the parking area of SM Bicutan in Taguig, Metro Manila. The informant introduced PO3 CALLORA junction of Kalayaan Avenue, a navy blue car blocked her path. P/SUPT YABUT alighted from said car and was
to accused-appellant FIGUEROA as the one who was willing to regularly buy shabu from her should her sample shouting that he was a police officer while approaching accused-appellant FIGUEROA. He ordered accused-
be of good quality. Accused-appellant FIGUEROA, however, told them that she had no stock of shabu at that appellant FIGUEROA to roll down her car window. Accused then asked, "Bakit po mister?" P/SUPT YABUT
time, but she promised to inform PO3 CALLORA through the informant once she already has supply of good reiterated that he was a police officer and ordered accused-appellant FIGUEROA to get down from her car as
quality shabu. they would be searching the same.

In the morning of the following day, the Special Operation Unit 1 of the PNP AIDSOTF requested the PNP Crime Accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were made to stay at the sidewalk for about thirty (30)
Laboratory to dust with ultra-violet powder the two (2) pieces of ₱500.00 bills with serial numbers FG403794 and minutes. They were asked to turn their backs and were told not to do anything while the search was going on.
MY883243 to be used in the planned buy-bust operation against accused-appellant FIGUEROA. P/SUPT. YABUT later said, "Aantayin muna natin sila." For another thirty minutes, they stayed at the sidewalk
until other persons referred to by P/SUPT. YABUT arrived at the scene.
On July 2, 2004, at about 12:00 noon, the informant called the Desk Officer of the Special Operation Unit 1 of
PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had informed him After the search, accused-appellant FIGUEROA and her companions were ordered to board the same Toyota
that she already had a stock of good quality shabu and asked how much shabu would be bought by PO3 Revo, which was driven to Camp Crame by one of the persons who arrived at the scene.4
CALLORA. P/SUPT YABUT instructed the informant to tell accused-appellant FIGUEROA that ₱10,000.00 worth
of shabu would be bought from her. Later on the same day, the informant made another telephone call and On May 18, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision5 acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 04-2432,
relayed the information that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had agreed to deliver the shabu worth [₱10,000.00] in but convicting her in Criminal Case No. 04-2433. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
 Accused-appellant’s contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] judgment is rendered as follows: invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA.
Thus, in People v. Berdadero,13 the Court noted that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations
1. In Criminal Case No. 04-2432[,] the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado is ACQUITTED of the charge for implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II RA No. 9165 for lack of evidence. The two plastic sachets of containing authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court consequently held that "this silence
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a combined weight of 9.42 grams are forfeited in favor of the [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or
Government. Let the custody thereof be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible."14 The same conclusion was reached by this Court in
appropriate disposition. People v. Roa,15 People v. Mantalaba16 and People v. Sabadlab.17

2. In Criminal Case No. 04-2433, the accused Jesusa Figueroa y Coronado alias "Baby" is found guilty beyond Alleged lack of prior agreement between accused-appellant and PO3 Callora.
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 26, Art. II, RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00). Accused-appellant argues that the alleged sale transaction borne out by the evidence of the prosecution was not
between Police Officer 3 (PO3) Josefino Callora and accused-appellant Figueroa, but was instead between the
Let the one plastic bag labeled Chowking containing one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet with 4.60 grams of latter and the unnamed informant. Accused-appellant concludes that the testimony of PO3 Callora regarding the
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for its appropriate disposition. alleged sale transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and without probative value, as it was the
informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement to sell drugs.18
The period during which the accused is detained at the City Jail of Makati shall be considered in her favor
pursuant to existing rules.6 We disagree. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay rule does
not apply where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
Alleging that the foregoing decision was contrary to law and unsupported by the evidentiary records, accused- immaterial.19 In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the conversations between the
appellant sought a review of the same with this Court through a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC gave due informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that said information led the police officers
course. However, in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,7 we remanded the case to the Court of to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation between the informant and the
Appeals for intermediate review. accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already
clear from accused-appellant’s actuations on July 2, 2004, which were all within the personal knowledge of PO3
On October 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused- Callora and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at the scene, she waived at the
appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: informant and PO3 Callora and approached them while driving her Toyota Revo;20 (2) upon reaching PO3
Callora and the informant, accused-appellant asked PO3 Callora where the money was, while the latter asked for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision, dated May 18, the shabu;21 (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking plastic bag containing a sachet of white
2006, in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2432 and 04-2433, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, is crystalline substance;22 (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give her the money, accused-appellant sensed that
hereby AFFIRMED. there were police officers around the area, and drove away;23 (5) PO3 Callora and the informant boarded the car
of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5 Road corner Kalayaan Avenue.24
Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-
SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of the Court of Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the offender commences its
Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
Appeals.8 by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.25 This definition has
essentially been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus in People v.
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court anew. Accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief,9 wherein she Laylo,26 we affirmed the conviction of the appellant therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by
highlighted the fact that the Court of Appeals did not discuss the first error assigned in her Brief with said the overt act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the sale was
appellate court. In the aforementioned Brief10 with the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant submitted the aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest.
following assignment of errors:
The identity of the white crystalline substance was furthermore established by the testimony of PS/Insp. Garcia,
First who likewise testified as to the following matters based on his own personal knowledge: (1) after the chase,
PS/Insp. Garcia saw a boy (later identified as Christian Salceda) alight from the vehicle and threw a Chowking
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED plastic bag two to three meters from the vehicle;27 (2) PS/Insp. Garcia picked up the Chowking plastic bag from
BY THE SPECIAL OPERATION UNIT 1 OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE ANTI-ILLEGAL DRUGS the sidewalk ad found a sachet of shabu inside the same;28 (3) PS/Insp. Garcia later proceeded with the other
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE WAS IRREGULAR BECAUSE OF LACK OF PRIOR COORDINATION police officers to their office, where they requested for a laboratory examination of the white crystalline
WITH THE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA). substance;29 PS/Insp. Garcia identified the Chowking plastic bag and the sachet containing white crystalline
substance in court. He identified the mark "PEG-1" on the sachet as his initial and testified that he was the one
Second who marked the same.30

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN The prosecution presented as its Exhibit "B" an Initial Laboratory Report.1âwphi1 The report states that the heat-
PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND ACCUSED REGARDING THE ALLEGED SALE OF SHABU. sealed transparent plastic bag with the marking "PEG-1" inside a Chowking plastic bag was found to contain 4.60
grams of white crystalline substance. The latter specimen was found positive for methylamphetamine
Third hydrochloride.31

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONFLICTING AND In light of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, which were found credible by both the trial court
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF PO3 JOSEFINO CALLORA AND P/INSP. PEPITO GARCIA THAT HAVE and the Court of Appeals, the crime of attempt to sell a dangerous drug under Section 26 of Republic Act No.
DIRECT BEARING ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. 9165 was sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Fourth As for the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we agree with the
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that discrepancies "referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPT upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair [the witnesses’] credibility"32 nor do they overcome the
TO SELL SHABU AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 26, ART. II OF R.A. 9165.11 presumption that the arresting officers have regularly performed their official duties.33

Lack of Prior Coordination with the PDEA In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of the lower courts in the instant case.

In both the Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals and accused-appellant’s Supplemental Brief before this WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02348
Court, the main defense proffered by accused-appellant was the alleged violation of Section 8612 of Republic Act dated October 25, 2007 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Jesusa Figueroa in Criminal Case No. 04-
No. 9165, requiring that the Philippine National Police (PNP) maintain close coordination with the Philippine Drug 2433 for violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on all drug related matters.
 the trial he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and burning,
and, without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a
pile of dry leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not
forewarn his mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to
continue burning until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof
was submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same
persons as the driver Hugo Labarro.

G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918 The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of
vs. said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the
SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant. piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.
Ariston Estrada for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with the commission of the
crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in degree to that specified in article 549 of
the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium degree.
TORRES, J.:
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the modification however, that the
This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney before the Court of First Instance of this penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be given eight years and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory
city, charging Severino Valdes y Guilgan and Hugo Labarro y Bunaladi, alias Hugo Navarro y Bunadia, with the penalties prescribed in article 57 of the Code. The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So
crime of arson, and, on the 20th of May of the present year, judgment was rendered whereby Severino or ordered.
Faustino Valdes u Guilgan was sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor and to pay one-half of the
costs. From this judgment this defendant appealed. With respect to Hugo Labarro or Navarro, the proceedings
were dismissed with the other half of the costs de officio.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning of April 28th of this year, when M. D. Lewin was absent from the house in
which he was living his family, at No. 328, San Rafael Street, San Miguel, Mrs. Auckback, who appears to have
been a resident of the neighborhood, called Mrs. Lewin and told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower
floor of the latter's house, for until then Mrs. Lewin had not noticed it, and as soon as her attention was brought to
the fact she ordered the servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did and he found, so asked with
kerosene oil and placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a
rag which were burning. At that moment the defendant Valdes was in the entresol, engaged in his work of
cleaning, while, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.

On the same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called for the purpose
by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement, Exhibit C, drawn up in the police
station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had
been noticed on the date mentioned. and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in
said house on previous days; that he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner,
Hugo Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters, and that, as he and his
coaccused were friends, he acted as he did under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such
fire that he should start. lawphi1.net

The defendant Severino Valdes admitted, in an affidavit, that he made declarations in the police station, although
he denied having placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with kerosene, in the place where they were
found, and stated, that it was the servant Paulino who had done so. He alleged that, on being arraigned, he
stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the
statement he made in the police station, to wit, that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the
house.

For lack of evidence and on his counsel's petition, the case was dismissed with respect to the other defendant
Hugo Labarro.

Owing to the repeated attempts made for about a month past, since Severino Valdes Began to serve the Lewin
family, to burn the house above mentioned. occupied by the latter and in which this defendant was employed,
some policemen were watching the building and one of them, Antonio Garcia del Cid., one morning prior to the
commission of the crime, according to his testimony, saw the defendant Valdes climbing up the wall of the
warehouse behind the dwelling house, in which warehouse there was some straw that had previously been
burned, and that, when the defendant noticed the presence of the policeman, he desisted from climbing the wall
and entering the warehouse.

The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of the
house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the latter, constitutes the
crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it.. This
crime of provided for and punished by article 549, in connection with articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal
Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for,
notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he
who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred
in said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though at
 at the Real residence so as not to alarm appellant's ailing mother considering his physical condition at the time.
Real agreed. Appellant thus stayed overnight with the Reals.

Attempting to narrate the events that took place during the evening of 14 December 1989, appellant said that,
between 8:00 to 9:00, while he was on his way home, he lighted a "five-star" firecracker near the place where his
G.R. No. 100699 July 5, 1996 brother and two friends were having a drinking spree. Apparently angered, appellant's brother stood up, raised his
arm and took aim at appellant. Appellant tried to move away. In the process, he hit the table of the group of young
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Alano. The table was toppled and bottles of liquor and the finger food fell to the ground. Alano and company
vs. started hitting appellant on the head and face until his mother succeeded in freeing him away from the group.
EDGAR GUTIERREZ y CORTEZ, accused-appellant. Paul Polinga, a policeman, brought appellant to the Jose Reyes Hospital for treatment. From the hospital, he
boarded a tricycle and alighted at Bayani Street. He requested Real to allow him to pass the night in Real's
house. The following morning, at around 7:15, he left the house to look for his brother. Instead, he met Mario
Alano who asked him to admit having been responsible for setting the latter's house on fire. Later, at the police
VITUG, J.:p station, he wanted to relate what had happened but the police took only the statement of Mario Alano. He was
detained until noon when he was escorted to the office of Fiscal Villalon before whom he admitted having
The accused, Edgar Gutierrez y Cortez, appeals from the 28th February 1991 judgment of the Regional Trial committed the offense.
Court (Special Criminal Court) of Kalookan City, Branch 131, convicting him of arson under Presidential Decree
No. 1613, amending the Revised Penal Code, and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua (Criminal In its 28th February 1991 decision, the trial court 7 found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Case No. C-34173[89]), in an information, dated 16 December 1989, that reads: offense charged; it concluded:

That on or about the 14th day of December 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment CONVICTING the herein accused EDGAR GUTIERREZ y CORTEZ
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by a desire for revenge, with deliberate intent to cause for the crime of Arson punishable under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1613 and
damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the house of one JOSEFA ARROYO y sentences him to suffer the maximum penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the owner of the house Josefa
ALANO, thereby causing damage to the front wooden-made walling located at the groundfloor thereof in the Arroyo the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as actual damages and to pay the costs.
amount of P500.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P500.00.
SO ORDERED. 8
Contrary to law. 1
In this appeal, appellant contends that the corpus delicti of the crime of arson has not been established. 9
The accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
Proof of the corpus delicti, indeed, is indispensable in the prosecution of arson 10 as in all kinds of criminal
The evidence for the prosecution, briefly, is to the following effect: offenses as well. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. 11 In arson, the corpus delicti rule rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire
In the evening of 14 December 1989, at around eight o'clock, while Felipe Enriquez, a barangay tanod, was in and of its having been intentionally caused. 12 Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if
front of his house in Makabalo Street, Kalookan City, he noticed a commotion at a distance. Repairing to the credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. 13
place, he saw appellant, bloodied, being embraced by his mother Corazon Gutierrez. His neighbor Paul Polinga,
a policeman of Valenzuela, was, by the time Enriquez arrived at the scene, already attending to appellant. In this case, the charge against appellant was amply supported in evidence by the eyewitness accounts of Felipe
Enriquez was told by some people around him that there had been a "fight" between appellant and a son of one Enriquez and Mario Alano. Also offered in evidence were copies of the police "blotters" of two barangays 14
Mario Alano. reflecting the report that appellant had thrown a bag of gasoline at the house of Mario Alano, then lit it and, after
setting a portion of the house on fire, fled. As regards appellant's identity, Enriquez testified that he and
Later that evening, at about 11:30, while Enriquez and appellant's brother Eric and sister Bolet, were conversing appellant's brother and sister were near a Meralco post when appellant went past them 15 Enriquez followed
at the corner of Rajah Soliman and Makabalo Streets about the incident, appellant passed by carrying a bag appellant and saw how the latter threw the substance he was carrying at Alano's house. The conditions of
containing what seemed to be "gasoline" ("parang gasolina" 2). Enriquez followed appellant. A few meters away, visibility were favorable. 16 Indeed, even the recognition by Mario Alano of appellant's voice could have sufficed
he saw appellant throw the bag at the house of Mario Alano and then lit it. The plea of appellant's mother, who 17 to pin down culpability.
screamed "Egay, Egay, huwag," 3 was ignored by the son. Enriquez yelled '"Mang Mario, Mang Mario, nagliliyab
ang bahay ninyo!" 4 Forthwith, Enriquez saw Mario Alano pouring water on the ablaze portion of the house. The evidence against appellant is simply too overwhelming for it to be easily overcome by an invocation of alibi.
Neighbors rushed in to help put the fire under control. Besides, the essential requirements of distance and the impossibility of an accused being at the scene of the
crime at the crucial time must be attendant so as to give this defense any serious consideration.
Mario Alano, testifying, said that he was at home in 104 Rajah Soliman Street, Kalookan City, watching the
television program "Tell the People," 5 when he heard appellant, whose voice he was familiar with, shouting that Appellant assails the credibility of Enriquez by an assertion that his testimony is "ill-motivated." 18 The Court itself
he (appellant) would blow-up the house. Mario then heard a sound resembling that of a piece of wet cloth has reviewed Enriquez's testimony, and it is satisfied that his statements disclose frankness, cohesiveness, and
("basahan" 6) being hurled at the wall of the house. Instantly, the wall was aflame. an absence of any serious dissemblance or inconsistency. 19 Moreover, the trial court's assessment on the
credibility of the witnesses, which has had the opportunity of observing how they have comported themselves at
The following morning, at approximately 8:30, Pat. Celerino Bertes, the desk officer of the Kalookan City's 6th the witness stand, cannot just be ignored.
Avenue police detachment, received a call on the "arson" incident in Makabalo Street. Police officer Nelson
Ombao, together with Pfc. Briccio Fernando and Pat. Bertes, were dispatched to the place. The group was met The information charges appellant with "'violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular provision
by Mario Alano who pointed to appellant as being the author of the arson. The police officers invited appellant to breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, 20 and not having
the police headquarters. He was accompanied by his mother and an uncle. been established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area, 21 appellant should be deemed to
have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Kalookan City might be a densely
P/Sgt. Reyes later conducted an ocular inspection. He took some fragments from the burnt portion of the house populated part of the metropolis but its entire territory cannot be said to be congested. Although the whole 2-
and referred them to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been completely gutted by the fire, the crime committed is still
consummated arson. 22 It is enough that a portion thereof is shown to have been destroyed. 23 Under Section 1
The house, made of light wooden materials and galvanized iron, was owned by Mario Alano's sister, Josefa of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor. The Court feels that the trial
Arroyo, an overseas worker. According to Joselito Arroyo, Josefa's son, it was his eldest sister, Carolina, who court should not have appreciated the "special" aggravating circumstance, under Section 4(3) of the decree, of
lodged the complaint with the police. Carolina informed the witness that a carpenter placed the cost for the repair the offender having been "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned."
of the house at P500.00. The prosecution does not dispute the mauling of appellant by a son of Mario Alano just a few hours before the
incident. It would appear to us to be more of impulse, heat of anger or risen temper, rather than real spite or
The defense interposed alibi. hatred, that has impelled appellant to give vent to his wounded ego.

Democrito Real, an optician and a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, residing at Barangay 36, testified that The prosecution tried to establish the actual amount of damage caused to the house through the testimony of
while he was on his way home at around 11:15 p.m. on 14 December 1989, he saw appellant with a bandaged Joselito Arroyo, the owner's son, who apparently was only told by his sister that, according to a carpenter, the
head, contusions on his face and a shut eye. Appellant requested Real to allow him (appellant) to spend the night
repair of the house would cost some P500.00. The evidence, being clearly hearsay, 24 may not be a basis for an
award.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to consider, the prescribed penalty is the medium
period of prision mayor or from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
prison term that may be imposed on appellant is anywhere within the range of prision correccional from 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years, as minimum. up to anywhere within the medium period of prision mayor from 8 years and 1
day to 10 years, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision finding appellant Edgar Gutierrez y Cortez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of arson is AFFIRMED; however, the sentence imposed on him by the court a quo is
MODIFIED in that appellant should now instead suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from a minimum
of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional to a maximum of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor. The
award made by the trial court of P500 by way of actual damage in favor of Mario and/or Josefa Arroyo is deleted.
Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Ocampo; that although he later saw appellant about two weeks after December 17, 1979, when the latter came to
the office to sign some papers, he never mentioned to appellant the one hundred peso bill (pp. 2-16, t.s.n.,
September 16, 1980)

Manalo further declared that at the nine the envelope with the one hundred peso bill was given to him by
G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984 appellant for delivery to Ocampo, he already had an inkling or knowledge that the Probation Office will
recommend for the grant of appellant's application for probation because he was the one who makes the final
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner, typing of a post, sentence investigation report and before said final typing Ocampo usually talks to him, so that he
vs. knows whether the recommendation was for a grant or denial of an application (pp. 16-19, t.s.n., September 16,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. 1980).

Macario C. Ofilada, Jr. for petitioner. Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation Office, declared that she
knows appellant because the latter was one of the applicants for probation in 1979 and she was the one assigned
Gil Venerando R. Racho collaborating counsel for petitioner. to investigate appellant's case; that as Assistant Probation Officer in the Investigation of applications for probation
and in the case of appellant, she requested him to submit certain pertinent documents required by their office,
The Solicitor General for respondent. such as barangay, police and court clearances, residence certificate, etc.; that she prepared appellant's post-
sentence Investigation Report (Exhs. "B" to "B-5") that she first saw appellant on December 7, 1979, when she
interviewed him on his social and personal history and his version of the offense, among others; that she gave the
GUERRERO, J. list of documents which are to be submitted to the office; that the second time she saw appellant was on
December 21, 1979 but appellant was out at the time and when she saw that he was in his car that broke down in
In an Information dated July 22, 1980 and filed with the City Court of Angeles City, Branch I, docketed thereat as front of the Pampaguena she tried to can him but the car left as she was about to reach the place (pp. 2-21, tsn,
Criminal Case No. CAT-326, petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines, was January 26, 1981).
charged with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official, allegedly committed as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21, 1979, the latter was asking
That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with Probation Officer, Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter; that
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an applicant for probation after he was convicted of she then prepared a draft of the Post-Sentence Investigation report and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo
an offense by a competent court, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, who told him not to delete the bribery incident from the report; that it was first from Manalo and later from Ocampo
Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of P100.00 in a paper bill with Serial Nos. BC530309, that she became aware of the bribery or more accurately corruption of a public official committed by appellant
under circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo liable for bribery. (pp. 21-25, t.s.n., January 26, 1981).

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. The third prosecution witness was complaint himself Danilo Ocampo, who declared that he has been the
Probation Officer of an Angeles City, Probation Office since 1977 and that his employees thereat were Ricardo
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said information and, after trial, the City Court inits decision Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and Ramon de Leon; that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 19,
of May 15, 1981 found the petitioner guilty of the crime of corruption of a public official, the dispositive portion of 1979, he received a closed letter envelope from his clerk. Manalo, at the Probation Office at Merlan Building,
which reads: têñ.£îhqw⣠Angeles City, Manalo informing him that the same came from appellant; that he opened the envelope on the
presence of Manalo and found that the same contained xerox copies of the passport (Exh. "D") and visa (Exh. "D-
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Gregory Pozar guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official 1") of appellant and inserted with said documents. was a hundred peso bill with Serial No. BC530309 (Exh. "A-l");
as charged in the Information, and the Court pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised that the envelope given him by Manalo was addressed to him Mr. Danilo Ocampo, Probation Officer, in
Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused Gregory James Pozar to an imprisonment of three (3) months and handwritten for that he could not, however, produce said envelope the same having been misplaced that he kept
one (1) day of Arresto Mayor, and hereby censures him for his actuation in this matter, with costs against the the one hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence against appellant; that when he met Atty. Reynaldo
accused. Suarez, appellant's counsel at the Angeles City Court on January 14, 1980, he told the latter about the envelope
received from appellant containing the passport, visa and the one hundred peso bill inserted with said documents
The one hundred peso bill is hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. and intimated to the lawyer that the client should not have inserted said one hundred peso bill (pp. 46-57, t.s.n.
September 16, 1980).
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was prepared by Mrs. Francisco who
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals (now In termediate Appellate Court) and subsequently, the conducted the investigation; that the first time he saw appellant was on December 10, 1979, when the latter was
appellate court affirmed the same in toto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 19, 1982 seeking permission to go to Baguio City and being a foreigner, he required him to submit to his office copies of
and on December 21, 1982, petitioner filed the instant petition for review of the decision of the respondent court, the latter's passport and visa; that the second time he met appellant was in March, 1980, when the hearing of
relying on the constitutional precept that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent appellant's application for probation was conducted at Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required
until the contrary is proved." (Article IV, Sec. 19), and that the State, having the burden of establishing all the appellant to give money, so that when he saw the one hundred peso bill (Exh. "A") in the envelope handed him by
elements of the crime with which the accused is charged, must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable Manalo, he was very much surprised; that he intended to confront appellant but was unable to do so but was able
doubt, has failed to present and establish the required quantum of proof against the accused petitioner, hence he to inform Atty. Suarez, appellant's lawyer, about the matter when he met him at the City Court; that at the time the
is entitled to an acquittal. . envelope containing the documents and money was handed to him on, December 19, 1979, the Post-Sentence
Investigation Report was not yet finished and that the same was submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on
The evidence for the prosecution are stated in the decision of the respondent court, thus: têñ.£îhqw⣠February 5, 1980; that the fact that appellant enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope was mentioned in
said report (pp. 60-73, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco and Mr. Danilo
Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed on the witness stand appellant himself and his counsel Atty. Ocampo further testified that at the time of the hearing of appellant's application or petition for probation, the
Reynaldo Suarez. Presiding Judge of Branch I of the City Court held a conference in the court's chamber with appellant's counsel
the trial fiscal and himself, during which they discussed the bribery incident mentioned in the report; that the
Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he started working at the Probation presiding judge of Branch I, after some clarifications regarding the incident in question, suggested that coplainant
Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know appellant because the latter had gone to said office in connection should lodge a complaint against appellant and the all should conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation
with his application for probation; that at about noontime of December 17, 1979, appellant came to the office to determine whether there was a prima facie case (pp. 75-76, 82-86, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).
looking for Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a closed
envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery to the latter; that two days later, he gave the envelope to Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-Sentence Investigation Report recommending the granting
Ocampo who opened the same in his presence; that the envelope contained some official papers connected with of appellant's application for probation, notwithstanding the bribery or corruption incident mentioned in said report,
appellant's application for probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso bill; that Ocampo then remarked: because appellant's act was not yet a disqualification under the law, as he was still presumed innocent until he is
'This s something bad that the opening of the envelope was done on December 19, 1979; that Ocampo kept the found guilty by the court (pp. 90-91, t.s.n. December 8, 1980).
envelope and its contents, including the one hundred peso bill, but within a week's time gave them to him with
instructions to give the same to appellant but the latter never came to the office and so he returned them to The appealed decision tersely cited the evidence for the defense in the following manner: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the envelope crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph,
delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in the xerox copying or and if said shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its
reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office. (p. 7, CA Decision). maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than twice such value,

Considering that the findings of fact in the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the decision of the trial If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing
court, do not mention nor indicate the circumstances surrounding the incident and the filing of the information something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium and
against the petitioner other than the admitted fact that the one hundred peso bill was placed in the envelope maximum periods and a fine not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value.
together with the visa and passport of the petitioner which he handed on December 17, 1979 to Mr. Ricardo
Manalo and which the latter in turn handed on December 19, 1979 to Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo, in In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
fairness to the petitioner, We quote hereunder the decision of the trial court which recited the said circumstances temporary disqualification.
that led to the filing of the Information against the petitioner, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
From the evidence presented, the following facts appear to the court to be indubitable; That the accused was appraisal and claim commissioners, experts, or any other persons performing public duties.
convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical Injuries, and the crime of Oral Defamation of the City Court of
Angeles City, Branch 1, and the said accused was sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto Menor Art. 211. Indirect Bribery. — The penalties of arresto mayor, suspension in its minimum and medium periods,
and to pay a fine of P50.00 and to pay the complaining witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
damages. After he was sentenced, he, on November 28, 1979 filed an Application for Probation. That after filing office.
the application for Probation, the accused, together with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to the Probation
Office purposely to inquire for the requirements need for his client's petition for probation. Unfortunately, Atty. It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public officer receives gift.
Suarez and his client did not reach the Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of the While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, in
Probation Office, whom they reached, and they were re. requested to come back to the office regarding their indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exist. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an
inquiry inasmuch as the Probation Officer was not in the office. Later, Atty. Suarez called through the telephone act or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or promise in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the
the Probation Office, and, on that occasion he was able to talk with the Probation Inspector, Mrs. Primitiva officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to
Francisco. He was inquiring from Mrs. Francisco the necessary documents regarding the application for probation him by reason of his office. (The Revised Penal Code by Luis P. Reyes, 1975 Ed., p. 332).
of his client and Mrs. Francisco suggested that he would come over the office in order to give him all the
necessary information. The lawyer just instructed Mrs. Francisco to give a list of the requirements to Mr. Pozar, In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the petitioner charged that the accused "did then and
the accused, who was then in the, Office of the Probation Officer, and accordingly, Mrs. Francisco handed to Mr. there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer,
Pozar a list of the documents needed in his probation (see Exhibit E for the prosecution, and Exhibit 3 for the the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with serial No. BC530309, under circumstances that
defense). It also appears that all the re. requirements listed in the list given by Mrs, Francisco were given to Mrs. would make the said City Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, liable for bribery.
Francisco, and at times to Mr. Manalo. The person who conducted the investigation was actually Mrs. Francisco.
On December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see the Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and in that The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as charged in the
meeting, aside from the fact that he was asking permission from the Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced the
Probation Officer required him to furnish the Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa, and his I.D. picture, accused to an imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and public censure. This is
inasmuch as it was explained to him these were needed, he being a foreigner. On December 17, 1979 Mr. Pozar erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as
went to the Probation Office looking for the Probation Officer, and when the Probation Officer was not there, he consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of the
handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope address to the Probation Of officer and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer
give the same to Mr. Ocampo. It was on December 19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the envelope given by Mr. did not accept the one hundred peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official. (See
Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when Danilo Ocampo opened it in the presence of Mr. Manalo, he found The Revised Penal Code by Justice Ramon Aquino, 1976 Ed., Vol. II, p. 1168, citing the cases of Uy Matiao, 1
enclose in the envelope a xerox copy of the applicant's passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with Phil. 487; Camacan 7 Phil. 329; Tan Gee, 7 Phil. 738; SyGuikao 18 Phil. 482; Te Tong, 26 Phil. 453; Ng Pek 81
the same document was a one hundred peso bill It would seem that Mr. Ocampo asked Mr. Manalo to keep the Phil. 562; Ching, CA-G.R. No. 439-R, July 31, 1947). Attempted corruption of a public official is punished with
one hundred peso bill and return it to Mr. Pozar, but when Mr. Pozar did not arrive to the office, Mr. Manalo gave destierro and is cognizable by inferior courts (See Revised Penal Code by justice Aquino, Vol. II, 1976 Ed., citing
it back to Mr. Ocampo Mr. Danilo Ocampo kept the one hundred peso bill but made it a point that this incident the cases of Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617; Santos y Bautista, 87 PhiL 687; Dalao v. Geronimo, 92 Phil.
regarding the receiving of the one hundred peso being be included in the post-sentence investigation report which 1942; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562).
was being prepared by Mrs. Francisco. At that time when the one hundred peso bill was given, the post-sentence
investigation report was not yet finished. The record shows that the same was submitted to the court only on Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
February 8, 1980. At the hearing of the application for probation in March 1980, when the Presiding Judge of City one hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it will be used to defray
Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, noted and saw from the report the alleged incident of the accused's giving the expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the Probation Office in connection with
one hundred peso bill he called for a conference and in that conference, he suggested that the manner should be petitioner's application for probation then pending in said office.
investigated by the Office of the City F'iscal Acting upon such suggestion Danilo Ocampo formally filed an
Information Sheet against the accused Gregory Pozar (Exhibit 2). It is also a fact admitted by the defense that The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive
after the one hundred peso bill was handed and the Probation Officer was not able to return the same, he Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information ( complaint) Court
informed Atty. Suarez at the sala of City Court Branch II sometime on January 14, 1980. (pages 8-9) decision, Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police, the Court, Barangay
Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and told to report once a week on Mondays. (Exhibit
As stated earlier, petitioner was found guilty of the offense of Corruption of Public Official as defined and "E"). This was on December 7, 1979.
penalized in the Revised Penn Code as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10, 1979 when the
Art. 212. Corruption of Public Officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except latter was asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. Mrs.
those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or Francisco to testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for Baguio. And according to the
promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles. petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office as he
was directed to report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks
The preceding Articles of the Revised Penal Code are Articles 210 and 211 which define and penalize the and there were times that he went there unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various re.
offenses of direct bribery and indirect bribery, and they provide as follows: têñ.£îhqw⣠requirements he needed. During all the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo
himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo interviewed him He submitted all the requirements to the Probation
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who will agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in Officer; at times, he submitted them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr.
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present Ocampo. Other than those listed in the list given by Mrs. Francisco, he was required to submit xerox copy of his
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shag suffer the penalty of prision passport, his visa and his pictures. He explained that he gave the requirements to the person who was
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than interviewing him, primarily Mrs. Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office xerox copy
three times such value, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, ff the same shall have of the original He likewise submitted his two passports, and later xerox copy of his passports. When Mrs.
been committed. Francisco was asking for the original, which documents are in the possession of his lawyer at his office, he had to
return to get the originals." (Decision of Trial Court, p. 5). Petitioner's travail is, therefore, quite evident.
From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation
in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since the accused petitioner is
a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner
was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever
documentation was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably
innocent and not criminal.

In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense as against the
conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the
appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence
Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it
belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused
petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that moral certainty required to convict him. Even the
complainant himself, the Probation Officer, filed the complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding judge of the
Angeles City Court during the hearing on petitioner's application for probation, the complaint having been filed in
the City Fiscal's Office on June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED. The
accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 We do not feel inclined to disturb that ruling in this case in the absence of compelling reasons and in view of the
ambiguity of the information to which the herein appellant pleaded guilty, which ambiguity should be resolved in
his favor. We therefore hold that the crime committed was attempted corruption of a public official.

2. The penalty prescribe in the third paragraph of article 210, in relation to article 212, of the Revised Penal Code
for the consummated crime of corruption of a public official is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods
G.R. No. L-1895 October 2, 1948 and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value. In accordance with
article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, consummated felony should be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to commit a felony. Two degrees lower
vs. than arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods is destierro in its minimum and medium periods.(Article
NG PEK, defendant-appellant. 71, Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217.).

Koh, Aguilar and Koh for appellant. Conformably to articles 27 (paragraph 4) and 87 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should be as
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee. he is hereby sentenced to suffer six months and one day of destierro or banishment, during which period he shall
not be permitted to enter or to be in any place within the radius of twenty-five kilometers from his present place of
residence, 419 T. Pinpin, Manila. As thus modified, the sentence appealed from is affirmed in all respects, with
OZAETA, J.: costs. So ordered.

In the Court of First Instance of Manila appellant was accused of, and pleaded guilty to, attempted bribery.
Forthwith he was sentenced to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P3, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence he appealed to this Court, contending that (1) "the lower court erred in considering that the
statement given by the accused during his arraignment to the complaining witness is a manifestation or a
declaration of a plea of guilty," and (2) "the lower court erred in forthwith sentencing that accused to a prison term
of two months and one day and to pay a fine of P3 on the day of the arraignment, without giving him a chance to
defend himself.

Appellant's first assignment of error is promised upon allegations of fact which were not proven during the trial
and do not appear in the record before us. We cannot sustain an assignment error based on such allegations.

The record shows that when the case was called for the arraignment of the accused on November 3, 1947, the
accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty. That plea
necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than
to impose the penalty prescribed by law. Therefore the second assignment of error is also devoid of merit.

The only questions for us to determine in this appeal are (1) the nature of the crime committed and (2) the
propriety of the penalty imposed.

1. The offense charged in the information falls under article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, entitled "Corruption
of Public Officials," in relation to the third paragraph of article 210 of the same Code. The trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime charged in the information which, according to the contention of the Solicitor General,
is frustrated corruption of a public official. We note, however, that the penalty imposed by the trial court
corresponds to that of consummated corruption of a public official, as penalized in article 212, in relation to the
third paragraph of article 210, of the Revised Penal Code. Was the crime alleged in the information attempted,
frustrated, or consummated?

The information charged the appellant with attempted bribery, alleging that on September 23, 1947, in the city of
Manila, he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously did offer and deliver the amount of one peso to Patrolman M.
Garcia in order to dissuade him from complying with his duty of arresting said accused for a violation of City
Ordinance No. 2646 and filing charges against him, adding, however (using the language of article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, which defines an attempt to commit a felony), that "the said accused did not perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of bribery as a consequence by reason of a cause other
than his own voluntary desistance, that is, because the said police officer did not allow himself to be corrupted.
This additional allegation seems to contradict the main allegation that the accused offered and delivered the
money to the police officer. Be that as it may, assuming that the accused really offered and delivered the money
to the police officer, there is no question that the latter refused to be corrupted. In similar cases this court has
repeatedly held the crime to be attempted. (U. S. vs. Paua, 6 Phil., 740; U. S. vs. Camacan, 7 Phil., 329; U. S. vs.
Tan Gee, 7 Phil., 738; U. S. vs. Sy-Suikao, 18 Phil., 482; and U. S. vs. Te Tong, 26 Phil., 453.).

In the last of the cases herein cited, it appears that the accused Te Tong offered and delivered P500 to a police
officer in consideration of the latter's agreeing to deliver to the Chinaman certain books, which the police officer
had seized from him and which showed that he was guilty of playing the prohibited game of jueteng, and to
substitute said books with others fraudulently concocted for the purpose. Immediately after the delivery and
substitution of the books and the receipt of P500, the police officer arrested the Chinaman. The court said that the
only question was whether the crime was attempted, frustrated, or consummated bribery. Following the previous
cases above cited, which involved similar facts, the court held that "while there is some authority to the contrary,
we are of the opinion that we should follow the substantially uniform holding of this court which declares the crime
to be attempted bribery.lawphil.net
 As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias "Rey," an alias
"Jonard," an alias "Precie," and an alias "Renato," which read as:

G.R. No. 179943 June 26, 2009 Criminal Case No. 4747

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines,
vs. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant. together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and Alias "Renato" whose true names, identities and present
DECISION whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of
PERALTA, J.: treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by
means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Decision2 of the STATION, owned by Regino C. Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings worth ₱3,000.00, to the damage and
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00 and on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy
Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby
employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.3
Contrary to law.
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side in order to take the
key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield Criminal Case No. 4748
that there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in
the gas tank. After doing this, he returned the key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
the engine of the vehicle would not start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating , together
Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
the same, the six male passengers of the same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. Alias "Jonard," Alias " Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
They were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.5 unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car Wash of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a
Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked at them.8 motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A.
AMISTOSO, the Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob,
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet containing a steal and carry away the following, to wit:
pawnshop ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.9
a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth ₱3,000.00.10 Those
four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.11 Thereafter, the same robbers took b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00
Edralin Macahis' service firearm.12
c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately leave the
place.13 The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.14 When the robbers d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00
left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag and
jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00
which transported the injured Edralin Macahis to the hospital.15 Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital
due to the gunshot wound.16 to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-
named accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun at him.17 with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita Emma at Pantok, unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
appellant asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the on his trunk which directly caused his death.
latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw
FX, of a certain Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo Contrary to law.
asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed.
Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other passengers in the said vehicle.18 Criminal Case No. 4749

When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do so; That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
asleep. When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the unknown and still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with
vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they were followed by policemen who fired at them. The unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse
other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the other of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a
passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind. When the policemen arrived, he was motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security
immediately arrested.19 Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal, and carry
away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number 13265 valued at ₱12,000.00 owned by Alert and 3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground of
Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid amount of Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of
₱12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and
firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey", Alias "Jonard", Alias " Precie" and Alias unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of
"Renato", whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and Edralin Macahis in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the
upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death. costs;

Contrary to law. 4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Criminal Case No. 4750 amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the
together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, robbery, in the amount of ₱2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer
Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present possible and to pay the costs.
whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another,
while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-large, let a warrant of
treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to
means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.
EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit: As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and are still
a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued at at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon
₱2,000.00 the identification and apprehension of the said accused.

b) Cash money worth ₱50.00 SO ORDERED.

to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above- The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,28 in conformity with the Decision
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,
with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and
Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases
unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound Court, en banc dated September 19, 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving
on his trunk which directly caused his death. the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII,
Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to
Contrary to law. this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.

Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the dispositive portion
guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. reading:

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad,20 then officer-in-charge of Energex WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y
Gasoline Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis,21 a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only one count.
Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of the same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta,23 also a gasoline
boy of the same gas station, and Alberto Quintos,24 general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon de
where the deceased security guard was employed. Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.

The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo,25 a cousin of appellant and SO ORDERED.
the appellant26 himself.
On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,30 the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision27 convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt of all the
charges against him, the dispositive portion of which reads: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the
Supplemental Brief31 dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of that appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a supplemental brief.
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of Appellant filed a Manifestation32 on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief
R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:
Station owned by Regino Natividad and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of ₱3,000.00 as
compensatory damages and to pay the costs; I

2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm II
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may
CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY. be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.

The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime and the appellant's participation in From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence presented by the
the crime had been established. prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions
of all the accused that their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such robbery, a
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion perpetua, because homicide was committed. The question now is whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime.
the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged According to appellant, the prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no
with specificity. merit to appellant's argument.

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides: If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
the use of violence against or any person shall suffer: inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy.45 The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional positively identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of
mutilation or arson. the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:

In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with homicide, thus: Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the A: Yes, sir.
following elements:
Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court whether those two (2) persons who poked
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; their guns at you were (sic) present now?

(2) the property taken belongs to another; A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON
when asked.)
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.37
Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.38 The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking A: Yes, sir.
of human life.39 The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration.40 There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, A: His gun was poked at me, sir.
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the
victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial
is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a Q: What else, Mr. Witness?
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.
robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder,
parricide, and infanticide. Q: Who hit you with a gun?

Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. A: His other companion, sir.46
When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified
even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:
abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.41 The prosecution is not
burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him, was he also armed?
knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist
regardless of the exact amount or value involved.42 A: Yes, sir.

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide,
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the A: Also .38 caliber, sir.
same.43
Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of section?
robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as
principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal A: Yes, sir.
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it
has materialized.44 Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was A: Yes, sir.
committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of
Q: Kindly point to him? On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase
the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher
A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert de Leon).47 degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in
Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by
existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating
objective.48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,49 since all the conspirators are principals. mitigating circumstance.

As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled rule in this Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided
jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,66 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,67 which is a special law. Its
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or pertinent provision states:
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case.50
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
commission of the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was
merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the or qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the
felony and prevent the commission thereof.51 Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt act accused."69 Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying
neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by
therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be
facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self- considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance.70 This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held
serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm
providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.52 in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating
circumstance.71 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery with homicide. In the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case
the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
As decided53 by the Court of Appeals: aggravating circumstance.

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even
arising from one criminal resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; without the presentation of the firearm.73 In the said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo
hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.55 died of, and Pedro Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs recovered from the
place of the incident showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It
gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the was also established that the same appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the
employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts
set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.56 After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm was
This can be said of the case at hand. not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be
established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery that took place in several houses The prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to
belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as separate and carry or own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be
distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. appreciated.
In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the [appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the
evidence shows distinct and different acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons.58 The Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of
Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution
another.59 Thus, the single offense or crime. is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven during the trial.
Hence, this Court's rulings74 on temperate damages apply, thus:
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision60 merely states that, in view of the
enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral
reclusion perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.1avvphi1 expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be
awarded in the amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable funeral expenses was presented in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to
by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in less than ₱25,000 are proved during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of
all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be People vs. Villanueva77 which modified the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that "when actual
applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance.61 It must be damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000, the award of temperate damages for
remembered that the Informations filed with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and
unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, unfair because the victim’s heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less than
such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or ₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be
murder committed. As explained by this Court in Palaganas v. People:62 entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages.78

Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the absence of any
degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim, ₱25,000.00 as
be appreciated.63 Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. temperate damages, in addition to the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.
 subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the
following findings:

HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9 o’clock
area with eccymosi at 8-10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic

xxxx
G.R. No. 190632 February 26, 2014
ANAL EXAMINATION Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 o’clock area. No evident injury at the time of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, examination.
vs.
MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ, alias "Machete," Accused-Appellant. xxxx

DECISION IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
PEREZ, J.:
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement accusing the
Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0763 to 03-0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant because the former was wearing a
alias "Machete" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the jacket emblazoned with "Barangay Police," as well as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA3 the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral incident.13
damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) that the
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the
this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about
position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00
gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was dispensed
minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied). with.14

The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him.5 Thereafter, The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version
the cases were jointly tried. of the story.

The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as
University of the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH), who examined the victim. such was to receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow
barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is
The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15
p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with
her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied that he
appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of
curfew against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.6 those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that
AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00
AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25
friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained unheeded.7 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.16

AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay Hall. In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive
Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts
hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the
barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
house.8
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE,
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266-a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B
Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take
off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following assignment of
despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about errors:
five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the
third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant I.
stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should
she tell anyone about what happened between them.9 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in
Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell II.
anyone about the incident.10
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply advised COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24 August Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or
2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to AAA. In intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is
doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting under twelve (12) years of age.26
his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5)
minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when
again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as
on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20 could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at
Hence, this appeal.21 the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow
the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs23 filed with the when the latter is threatened with death.28
Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the trial
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended the court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed
commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and
her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then
episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice.
never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA
of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness. that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by
the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied,
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical examination is quite disturbing as it appears that therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this effect in her testimony. desires.

The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis
(5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does
of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent. not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis
must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of his
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical
acquittal is inevitable. resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.

This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded in favor AAA It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think
must be modified. and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential
element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape can submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of
although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity
involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into
evidence for the defense.24 insensibility.30

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the complainant. Following In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the appellant puts stress
the above principles, this Court is duty-bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated
conviction for rape.25 by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.

After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse the rulings To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to appellant’s
of the lower courts. advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s testimony. As this Court has previously
stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal
paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state: penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly
found by both lower courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed - experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by
bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that
after the first penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again,
a) Through force, threat or intimidation; inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant
again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of "blunt
force or penetrating trauma" - a disclosure of sexual abuse.
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi.1âwphi1 Notably, these defenses are totally
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation thereby implying
circumstances mentioned above be present. that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.

xxxx Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported by clear
and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the
perpetua. positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate
defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,33
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be as in this case.
reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his job as count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all damages
radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony
of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape SO ORDERED.
incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant’s presence
at the scene of the crime.

This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against
him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her
reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and
stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime
committed against her.34

In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he
cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a
single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the
latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the
accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for
the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From
these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three
successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the
accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to
change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three
penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single
criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with
approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape.1âwphi1 It
appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA].
The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant]
would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
[AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by
several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in satiation
of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is
proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
"[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death." As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil
desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the
exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape
cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the
₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by both
lower courts in favor of AAA.

In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of exemplary
damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the
commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in
favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 dated
24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each
 In due course, an information was filed against Fortunato Vargas and Jesus Vargas in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo. They were charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and attempted
murder. In as much as the accused Fortunato Vargas was still at large, so only the accused Jesus Vargas was
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The trial on the merits was conducted at the termination of which a decision
was rendered on June 24, 1988 finding the accused guilty of the offense charged as follows:

G.R. No. 86728 April 6, 1990 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jesus Vargas, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of —
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. a) Two separate murders for the fatal shooting of Romeo Malones, Sr. and Rosalie Malones for which
JESUS VARGAS, JR. (AKA) "LUCKY", defendant-appellant. he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each Murder;

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. b) Two separate less serious physical injuries for the gunshot wounds sustained by Maribeth and Sheila
Virgilio A. Sindico for defendant-appellant. Malones for which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of Arresto
Mayor for each;

GANCAYCO, J.: c) Two separate slight physical injuries for the abrasions suffered by Ronald and Nona Malones for
which he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) DAYS of Arresto Mayor for
It was at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 29, 1982, while Romeo Malones, Sr. was reading the Bible by a each;
kerosene lamp in his house at Barangay Banugan, Municipality of Dueñas, Iloilo, when his house was sprayed
with bullets causing his death as well as that of his daughter Rosalie, and physical injuries to the remaining d) To pay the surviving heirs of the deceased Romeo Malones, Sr., the sum of P30,000.00 as death
members of his family. compensation and another sum of P30,000.00 for the heirs of the deceased Rosalie Malones as death
compensation;
Romeo Malones, Jr. heard the first burst of gunfire that came from the back of the house. He was resting in the
extension of the house. His mother, brother and sisters were also resting in the receiving room. e) To pay the surviving heirs of Romeo Malones, Sr., the sum of P9,983.70 by way of reimbursement for
funeral expenses; and,
Romeo, Jr. peeped through the wall of bamboo strips (tadtad) and saw the brothers Jesus Vargas and Fortunato
Vargas firing at their house. They were armed with a long firearm and an armalite, respectively. He recognized f) To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and,
them because the moon was bright. It was a full moon and they stood only about five (5) meters away from him.
Besides, the Vargases were his relatives. Upon seeing them, Romeo, Jr. lay flat on his stomach on the ground g) To pay the costs.
where his bed was situated, then he heard another set of gunfire followed by many others. After the firing ceased
he saw his father fall in the kitchen. He died instantly. 1 His brother and sisters were also wounded. He told his The accused who is presently detained shall be credited with the entire period of his detention in connection with
mother what he saw and his mother told him to inform his grandmother Leonora Malones and he did as he was this case.
instructed. The grandmother went with him to the house. Simplicia Segura, Modesto Lorilla and some relatives
came and brought the victims to the hospital. His sister Rosalie died in the hospital. 2 This case was brought on automatic review to this Court as Jesus Vargas, Jr. was meted two life sentences.
Inasmuch as the death penalty may no longer be imposed under the 1987 Constitution so that there is no more
Simplicia Segura was then the barangay captain of the barrio. When she learned about the incident she automatic review of capital offenses, the case is now treated as if it was brought on ordinary appeal.
immediately proceeded to the house of the Malones and she saw Romeo, Sr. already dead and the rest of the
family wounded. She conducted an investigation, and from her inquiries directed at those present at the scene In this appeal the appellant raises the following errors:
and the information furnished her by the victim's family, especially those of Florentino Ladines and Romeo
Malones, Jr., whom she interviewed, she learned that the person who was seen armed at the time and who fired I
the shots at the house were Fortunato Vargas alias Nono and Jesus Vargas alias Lucky. She knew the brothers
personally ever since they were small boys. She also remembered an untoward incident between the Vargas and THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED FOR ALL RESULTANT CRIMES AFTER FINDING THERE
the Malones family sometime in 1972 when Romeo Malones, Sr. went to her to complain about an attempt on his WAS NO CONSPIRACY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
life. Romeo, Sr. slept in her house that night for fear of losing his life. The following morning she accompanied
him to the police station to report the incident.1âwphi1 The chief of police summoned Fortunato Vargas who II
appeared. Since Romeo, Sr. was not wounded, upon suggestion of the chief of police the parties agreed to settle
the case amicably and Fortunato Vargas promised not to do it again. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROMEO MALONES, JR., THAT
ACCUSED WAS ONE OF TWO PERPETRATORS.
At 11:00 o'clock in the morning of October 13, 1982, Dr. Melchor G. Tupaz, senior resident physician of the
Western Visayas Medical Center, attended to the Malones family for their wounds as follows: III

a) Maribeth Malones for gunshot wounds in the right thigh and left leg (Exhibits "C" and "C-1 "); THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BY TREATING AS CORROBORATIVE
EVIDENCE CERTIFICATION OF PAGASA NOT INTRODUCED DURING TRIAL.
b) Ronald Malones for abrasion in the anterior chest area (Exhibits "D" and "D-1");
IV
c) Nona Malones for abrasions in the right thigh and left leg (Exhibits "E" and "E-1");
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ACCUSED DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
d) Sheila Malones for gunshot wound, through and through, in the lateral aspect of the left thigh. The
wound was serious and if not treated she "could have died secondary to hemorrhage" (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"); The appeal is devoid of merit.

e) Rosalie Malones for "head wound about 2 x 2 cm. right parietal area". There was no exit wound, only The case of the prosecution must rise or fall on the strength of the testimony of Romeo Malones, Jr. who was an
entrance. "And when x-rayed there is extensive linear fracture at both parietal bone with single irregular metallic eyewitness to the incident. The appellant argues that it could not have been possible that upon hearing the
density located at the soft tissue of the parietal area". She died in the emergency room (Exhibits "G", "G-1 ", "H" gunshots Romeo, Jr. would still have the guts to stand up and peep to see who were the assailants instead of
and Tsn., August 25, 1986, pp. 2-11). lying flat on the floor to protect his life as any experienced Filipino soldier would do. He also avers that it is not
probable that he could have peeped through the bamboo walling of the house when the wall of the house is of
Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta, NBI medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the bodies of Romeo, Sr. and flattened bamboo known as tadtad which can hardly be penetrated by wind, rain and light. He likewise states that
Rosalie. 3 Romeo, Sr. died of four gunshot wounds in the liver, stomach and lungs.4 Rosalie Malones died from even assuming that the moon was bright that evening, the place where the two men were allegedly seen was
one head wound.5 darkened by the shadows of some coffee plants.
Suffice it to say that Romeo, Jr. is not a Filipino soldier. He is a young man who was startled by the gunshots. He Q. After you saw these two (2) persons firing at your house and after you laid flat on the ground, what
stood up and looked through the slits of the wall of their house. Such bamboo poles when dried would tend to happened after that?
shrink so that one inside could easily peep through the slits to see what is outside. Romeo, Jr. also asserted that
the moon was bright. As it was a full moon he had no difficulty recognizing the two men. He testified as follows: A. I heard another bursts of firing.

Q. While you were there resting in your house, could you please tell us if there was any unusual incident Q. How many bursts of firing did you hear?
that happened?
A. Many.
A. I heard bursts of firing.
Q. You said that you heard several bursts of firing, what happened?
Q. You said you heard bursts of firing. Where did it come from?
A. I saw that my father was hit.
A. I heard bursts of firing coming at the back of our house outside the fence.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you heard bursts of firing, what did you do?
COURT
A. I observed.
Q. Please demonstrate how they were delivering the shots; what was Fortunato Vargas actually doing
Q. When you observed, what did you notice? when you saw him?

A. I saw two (2) men. A. He was standing firing his firearm towards our house.

Q. What were those two (2) men doing that time? Q. How about Jesus Vargas, Jr., what was he actually doing?

A. They were firing at our house. A. He was also firing facing our house. 6

Q. These two (2) persons which you said you saw, do you know their names? While it is true that the trial court observed that conspiracy and evident premeditation have not been established
by the prosecution, it is equally true that the testimony of Romeo, Jr. is clear that at the time he saw the accused
A Yes, sir. Vargases fire simultaneously towards the Malones home with their respective firearms and together they fled
from the scene of the crime. These are clear indicia of conspiracy.
Q. Who were the names of those two (2) persons?
In the motion for a new trial filed by the appellant before the trial court, he alleged that the prosecution failed to
A. Fortunato Vargas and Jesus Vargas, Jr." pinpoint who among the Vargases was responsible for the death of Romeo, Sr. and Rosalie Malones and for the
wounds inflicted on the rest of the family, that since there is no conspiracy as found by the trial court and
xxx xxx xxx considering the alibi of the accused, consequently the acquittal of the accused is sought. The motion was denied
in an order dated September 19, 1988 wherein it was observed that the weather bureau furnished the Court a
Q. While ago you said that you saw two (2) persons firing at your house. With what weapon they were certification that on the fateful evening of October 29, 1982, the moon was bright when the incident happened.
firing at the time?
The denial of the motion is well-taken. Indeed, there is a clear conspiracy between the two Vargases. The act of
A. An armalite. one is the act of the other. There is no need for the prosecution to pinpoint which of the victims was felled by the
shots of the two.
Q. Who was armed with an armalite that time?
The trial court committed no reversible error in considering the evidence presented consisting of the certification
A. I saw Fortunato was holding an armalite. of the weather bureau as corroborative evidence. This document that was submitted even after the trial, upon the
order of the court, was properly appreciated by the court. It is within the power of the court to require the
Q What about Jesus Vargas, Jr. production of such evidence to satisfy itself in its search for the truth even after the trial.

A. I saw that he was also holding a long firearm but I cannot identify what kind of firearm. The appellant then argues that his alibi should be even credence.

Q. Considering that it was nighttime at the time, how were you able to identify these two (2) persons, In disposing of this defense, the trial court said:
Jesus Vargas, Jr. and Fortunato Vargas?
The accused Jesus Vargas, Jr., anchors his defense on simple denials and alibi. While Romeo Malones, Jr.,
A. Because I peeped through the wall of our house. asserts having seen said accused and his brother Fortunato Vargas spray their house with bullets, herein
accused denies the same and maintains that he was in Brgy. Mabini, Buenavista, Guimaras, Iloilo, in the evening
xxx xxx xxx of October 29, 1982 attending a barangay fiesta. Attempts by the defense to establish and prove that the accused
was elsewhere or away from the scene of the incident notwithstanding, the Court noted glaring inconsistencies in
Q. After you peeped through the wall of your house, how were you able to see these two (2) persons as the testimony of defense witnesses. Whereas, defense witness Lolita Ferrer Vargas testified that the accused left
it was nighttime? their house at the New Poblacion, Buenavista, Guimaras, before lunch and returned to their house at 10:00
o'clock that same evening, another defense witness Rogelio Fernandez declared that he, the accused and their
A. Because the moon was bright. companions left the auditorium of Brgy. Mabini, Buenavista, Guimaras, at 12:00 o'clock midnight when the dance
was over. In fine, the accused could not have returned to the house of his uncle Rodolfo Vargas at New
Q. When you saw these two (2) persons, how far were they from the place where you were? Poblacion, Buenavista, Guimaras, at 10:00 o'clock that evening because said accused was still at the auditorium
of Brgy. Mabini until 12:00 o'clock midnight. Whereas, accused Jesus Vargas, Jr., averred that he and his
A. A distance of about five (5) meters. companions were served dinner in the house of Brgy. Capt. Pablito Gabe and left the place at 8:30 o'clock in the
evening, defense witness Rodolfo Fernandez on the other hand, testified that they were only served drinks in the
Q. If we take the place where you are sitting now, where were these two (2) persons at the place where house of Pablito Gabe leaving the place at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon and they returned to the house of
you were resting, where were these two (2)persons at the time you were resting? Fernandez for dinner (Gallon, pp. 4-5, tsn, October 28, 1987). This defense also endeavored to establish the non-
availability of regular means of sea and land transportation from Buenavista, Guimaras to the Municipality of
A. A distance of five (5) meters, more or less. Dueñas, Iloilo. The Court takes judicial notice that it will only take from 15 to 25 minutes by pumpboat to negotiate
from Buenavista to Iloilo City and that special hires could be obtained at very reasonable rates. The Municipality
of Dueñas is barely 53 kilometers from Iloilo City and it is not extremely difficult to reach the place via regular
means of transportation.

In order that an alibi as a defense may prosper, the evidence to support it must be clear and convincing as to
preclude the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime, while the evidence as to identification
must be weak and insufficient (P. vs. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 813). This is not so in the instant case. Besides the
marked inconsistencies in the testimonies of defense witnesses which dented their credibility, it was not
physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. More importantly, the accused was
positively identified by Romeo Malones, Jr., who was at a young age of 14 years when the incident happened and
the Court has observed, Romeo showed he was able to relate well what he saw that fateful evening on October
29, 1982 despite the rigid cross-examination he was subjected to by the defense during the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution as well as the rebuttal evidence. This Court noted that Romeo Malones, Jr., testified
in almost straight-forward manner, continuously and flawlessly and that he was not shaken during the cross-
examination. His testimony is admissible in evidence sans any showing that it was punctured with serious
inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was coached. 7

We agree.

In determining the offense or offenses committed the court reproduces with approval the disquisition of the court
a quo:

The shooting and/or spraying with series of gunfires the house of Romeo Malones, Sr., by accused Jesus
Vargas, Jr., resulted to the death of Romeo Malones, Sr., and his daughter Rosalie Malones (Exhs. "A" and "B"),
gunshot wounds to Maribeth and Sheila Malones requiring medical attendance for more than nine (9) days but
less than thirty (30) days (Exhs. "C" and "F") and abrasions to Ronald and Nona Malones requiring medical
attendance in less than nine (9) days (Exhs. "D" and "E"). The aforenamed victims sustained gunshot wounds
and abrasions because of the several bursts of fire delivered by Fortunato and Jesus Vargas, Jr., (Tabud tsn, p.
305, March 2, 1987). A perusal of the Necropsy Report (Exh. "A") and a reading of the testimony of Dr. Ricardo
Jaboneta, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI Western Visayas Regional Office, reveal that Romeo Malones
sustained one (1) grazing wound caused by a bullet and four (4) gunshot wounds with three (3) deformed slugs
recovered therefrom. As reflected in another Necropsy Report (Exh. "B"), Rosalie Malones sustained gunshot
wounds on the right side of her head where a deformed slug was likewise recovered. Evidently, this is a case
where several persons were killed and others injured by successive shots. In the case of People vs. Mones, No.
L- 2029, May 6, 1950; 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 11; 86 Phil. 331, the Supreme Court found the accused guilty of
three distinct and separate murders, each qualified by treachery, when said accused fires a series of shots killing
three persons attending a school commencement exercise. Similarly, in the case of People vs. Desierto, CA., 45
OG 4542, it was ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machinegun causing several deaths, although
caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was
caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the
person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them (L.B Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, pp. 559-
560, Book I, 1971 Revised Ed.). This Court is of the considered view and holds that the aforecited jurisprudence
stand four-square with the case at bar. Consequently, the accused should be held responsible for each of the
resultant crimes, instead of the complex crime of double murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 8

The guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the single eyewitness,
Romeo Malones, Jr. proved to be competent, credible and clear. It is corroborated by the other evidence on
record. Thus, the appeal must fail.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired
at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants
tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a
certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And
vs. Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants. considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold
that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf. appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta. tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee. questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the
occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made
MORAN, J.: by the trial court.

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them
separately from this judgment. believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court
held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion,
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v.
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is
reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer.
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will
police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and
knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder
the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled,
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real,
taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands
at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such
by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then
.32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and
at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to
killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy
by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure
Tecson's body which caused his death. and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected
Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S.
door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive
former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for
receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson. killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he
is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234,
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if 242).
you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still
lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the
something from the floor, he fired at him. criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we
cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance;
are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such
character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation. for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had
found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital,
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the there to be examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and,
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National
que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and
dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs.
Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment during
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
liability.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-
alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person behind the act.
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he
be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The
second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives,
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.
him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they
have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes,
resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed. What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen
not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them.
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even
years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the
the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur. All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with
a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr.
Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950 insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, THE FACTS

vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant. Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General
and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense,
Mariano A. Albert for appellant. as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee. may be stated as follows:

PER CURIAM, J.: On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political
group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the
Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking
P2,000 and to pay the costs. after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de
honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and
rendered judgment as above stated. surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform
erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of
the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went
the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted. after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and
managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the
which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the
early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with
chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but explosion.
having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de
Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947. The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the
occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and
document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of
its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time
translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads: he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place
where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand
alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to
reached my conclusion. It was my duty. question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest
(Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have and made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
THE ISSUES
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there
are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated. In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by
the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying
people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the
the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of
nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the contempt of public authorities in the commission of crime."
good of those eighteen million souls.
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into
act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those
degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act. two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the
persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
Hurrah for a free Philippines. explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home. Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript)
supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the
May God pity on me. President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people around the President when he
hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
Amen. President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were
identified with the latter. In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
JULIO C. GUILLEN President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through
handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to
appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda. Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the
corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the Revised Penal Code.
platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting
and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is
closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform. therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words
thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to
crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced
persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.'
found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang. 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that
one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado vs.
este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de FILOMENO MARASIGAN, defendant-appellant.
hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A
desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si Silvester Apacible for appellant.
solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion
por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero MORELAND, J.:
debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte
de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, In this case it appears that about 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 23d of January, 1913, Francisco Mendoza,
sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in
articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to approach them.
al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea
la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, On arriving near them the accused said to Mendoza: "Why is this line curved?" [indicating the division line
se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el between the lands of the two.] "Let us make it straight."
Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Francisco replied saying: "Why do you want to make the line straight? If you make the line straight, it will put
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: certain logs and trees on your land.?"

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, To this the accused replied: "This is false." Saying this he drew his knife and struck at Mendoza.
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack,
whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were lying
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is upon the ground the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. The latter seized the hand which held
clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. While they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife,
grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon the wife of the accused came forward and took the dagger from her husband's hand, throwing it to one side. She
Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, then seized who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow which knocked him senseless.
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of about P45, but the middle finger of the
Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even left hand was rendered useless.
when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence
that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In The story of the affair told by the accused is quite different from that just related, but the facts as stated were as
the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the found by the trial court and the evidence given fully supports the findings. We have examined the case carefully
account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. and see no reason why it should be reversed upon the facts. We may say the same as to the law.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be given another
with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed opportunity to present evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which
in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the the court found to have been rendered useless by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless
same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal
not frustrated murder. condition. He also asserts that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger
that was disabled but the third finger instead.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of
article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case
upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that
eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger
official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate it was.
allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary
throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from
information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating Mendoza.
circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty
for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the
facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a
unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the G.R. No. 116524 January 18, 1996
date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LYNDON FLORES y MALARAYAP, accused-appellant.

DECISION

G.R. No. L-9426 August 15, 1914 MELO, J.:

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, Charged with murder in an Information reading as follows:
 body appeared to be normal However, in the afternoon of June 21, the victim complained of epigastric pain such
That on or about the 20th day of June 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, in barangay Malusak, Municipality of that believing it to be merely gas pain he gave medicine for such. He endorsed the patient normally to another
Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named physician (Dr. Sevilla) there being no alarming sign and symptom.
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, and with treachery,
assault, attack, maim and violently kick the vital parts of the body of one Manuel Lazarte y Malvar, while he was Alfredo Alvarez declared that at 12:00 noon of June 20, 1993 after hearing a commotion outside their residence
lying dead-drunk and unconscious on the pavement, inflicting upon him the following fatal injuries: at Malvar and Madrigal Streets, Boac, Marinduque he went out and found Emperatriz Lazarte arguing with
Lyndon Flores. Later he saw Lyndon kick Manuel Lazarte who was lying on the pavement dead drunk in front of
Ruptured Small Intestine (jejunum) with spillage of the Intestinal content Intraperitoneally Malvar's residence about 4 armslenght away from him. Flores hit Lazarte three times at the breast and stomach
with Lyndon's left and right feet wearing leather shoes. Chic-Chic, Lyndon's companion, held Manuel's breast
Cause of Death: shirt, slapped Manuel and dropped him. That it was Cesar Lanot who first pacified Lyndon while Chic-Chic was
just looking. Police arrived and together with others carried (inusong) Ato upstairs of their residence, after which
Ruptured Viscus, allegedly secondary to mauling he went to the cockpit and did not know anything that transpired.

(p. 3, Rollo.) He described that the kicking was by dropping the feet on the stomach, first by the right foot which landed on the
chest while the second and third at the stomach. He did not hear anything from Manuel Lazarte.
Lyndon Flores, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and after trial on the merits, he was found guilty by
the court a quo in a decision which accordingly disposed: Emperatriz Lazarte, mother of the victim, claimed that at 12:00 noon on 20 June 1993 while watering her plants
she saw people outside their residence with her son lying prostrate on the pavement but did not know why. She
In view of the above observations and findings, this Court found Lyndon Flores y Malarayap guilty beyond saw the accused Lyndon looking straight to her rubbing his hands. She recalled having lost her cassette and was
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant to its able to trace it at Salvo's Pawnshop pawned by the accused in his name. When Mrs. Salvo refused to give it back
commission. she redeemed it for P20.00 and instructed Mrs. Salvo to inform anybody who will complain to see her.
Confronting the accused, exchange of words ensued which made Lyndon mad. Accused Lyndon turned to her
Under the rule on application of penalty and as enunciated in People vs. Muñoz, et al., G.R. No. L-38969-70, son and lacked him three times then pulled him by the shirt lifting his son then left him fall. She got nervous
February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107, reiterated in People vs. Sadia, Jr., G.R. No. 92633, Oct. 17, 1991, 203 SCRA because she heard the head hit the pavement. The accused was with other man, one of whom was a certain
62-71, the proper penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua. Hence, Lyndon Flores y Malarayap is hereby Chic-Chic. That the accused was pacified by Cesar Lanot up to the time her son was brought to her residence.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA together with the accessory penalty thereof (People Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital that Sunday afternoon and died in the evening of the following day,
vs. Penilles, et al., G.R. No. 65673, 30 Jan. 1992; People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 89732, Jan. 31, 1992). Monday.

The accused shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with the provision That the victim was married with six children. She allegedly spent P30,000.00 for the hospital, coffin, church and
of the Revised Penal Code. medicines.

The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the surn of P50,000.00 as and for death indemnity; Her son has no permanent occupation but earns. That the victim was not suffering from any illness before the
the further sum of P30,000.00 for hospitalization and medicines and for the coffin and burial of Manuel Lazarte. death but did not know why he was lying on the pavement that day.

The body of the accused is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of Prisons, National Penitentiary, Dr. Edgardo Marquez was consulted on June 21, 1993 to evaluate Manuels' condition whose abdomen was
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, thru the Provincial Jail Warden of Marinduque. distended and tender There was no clear hematoma on the abdomen. X-ray showed presence of air intra-
abdominally. Suspecting that there was ruptured viscus, they operated on and found ruptured intestines,
Let the mittimus be prepared for the accused's immediate commitment. duodenum, with two (2) ruptured areas intra-abdominally with the abdomen body (chocolate color) with alcoholic
contents. He opined that it must have been caused by a strong blow, like repeated kicking on the abdomen.
(p. 25, Rollo.) Before the surgery the patient can communicate. The proximate cause of loss of fluid was intestinal infection. He
did not find any ulcer on the small intestines since there was no perforation. However, the ruptures appeared to
From said decision, the instant present appeal has been interposed, with accused-appellant putting up the be about 2 or 3 days but there was no abscess.
general allegations or, shot-gun type of arguments that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder instead
of simple homicide. In consequence, accused-appellant submits that the trial court erred when it imposed the (pp. 1-5, Decision; pp. 14-18, Rollo.)
penalty of reclusion perpetua. We find no merit in the first argument. With regard to the second argument, we
sustain accused-appellant but on the basis of grounds other than those he proffers. But first to the background Accused-appellant denies having kicked the victim. He asserts that he merely touched, with his right foot, the
facts which were capsulized by the trial court in this wise: victim who was lying dead drunk on the pavement to wake him up so that the victim could explain the
circumstances of the loss of Emperatriz Lazarte's cassette recorder. Emperatriz imputed to accused-appellant the
Cesar Lanot pointed to the accused who is in court and declared that at 12:00 noon of June 20, 1993, while he loss of her cassette recorder which she eventually found in a pawnshop from where she redeemed it. Accused-
was at the ground floor of their residence he saw Manuel Lazarte alias Ato being kicked by Lyndon Flores alias appellant insists that it was the victim Manuel Lazarte who pawned the cassette recorder and so he was trying to
Jojo (accused). Ato was then opposite Rustico Malvar's house lying on the pavement seven arms length from him wake up the victim so that the latter could inform his mother that it was he who pawned the cassette recorder.
dead drunk. Thereafter, Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital.
Accused-appellant's denial that he kicked the victim runs counter to the evidence on record. Prosecution witness
He explained that the accused hit Ato Lazarte at his stomach twice with the use of the right foot with Topsider Cesar Lanot categorically testified that accused-appellant kicked the victim in the belly, thusly:
leather shoes.
Q. What happened to Manuel Lazarte when he was kicked by the accused Lyndon Flores alias "Jojo"?
He relayed that on that noon Ato's mother Emperatriz Lazarte had an altercation with the accused due to a
cassette belonging to the former. He was attracted by a commotion outside prompting him to go out so he saw A. He was brought to the hospital, sir.
Lyndon kicking Manuel Lazarte who had been lying on the pavement five (5) minutes before the kicking.
Q. When the accused kicked Manuel Lazarte, do you know if he was hit?
Of the persons present around he can remember only Popong Mendoza, Taba, whose exact name he does not
know and Lydia Vargas. Thereafter, Ato Lazarte was brought to the hospital where he died two days after the A. Yes, sir.
incident. He even dissuaded Jojo, saying "that is enough because Manuel will not fight back as he remained
lying", thereafter Flores left Ato. COURT:

Dr. Dante Osmillo of the Marinduque Provincial Hospital attended to Manuel Lazarte on June 20, 1993 identifying Q. In what part of the body was he hit?
Exh. B, explaining that there was no swelling nor abrasion but found tenderness at the epigastric area. The
exploration of the intestine was done by Dr. Edgardo Marquez (Exh. B-2) without his assistance. A. On the stomach, sir.

That at the time of admission the patient Manuel Lazarte was positive of alcoholic breath complaining of Q. How many times?
epigastric pain. He did not see any abnormal physical appearance and no sign of external illness. The whole
A. Two (2) times, sir. court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had been
Q. With what foot? overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case (People vs. Gomes, 230 SCRA 270 [1994]).
Much as one way may scour the record, no such fact of substance or value seems to surface. Accused-
A. Right foot, sir. appellant's denial is a feeble defense which cannot stand against the positive testimony of the eyewitnesses to
the crime (People vs. Gomes, 229 SCRA 138 [1994]). The findings of fact of the trial court, therefore, stands.
FISCAL, OPIZ:
The testimony of accused-appellant that he merely touched or nudged with his foot the victim as the victim was
Q. What was the appearance of the accused at the time he kicked Manuel Lazarte? lying dead drunk on the pavement in order to wake him up so that he may explain to his mother the
circumstances concerning the pawning of a cassette recorder is totally negated by the extent of the injuries
A. He was wearing shoes, sir. suffered by the victim. Had accused-appellant merely poked or nudged the victim with his foot, the latter would
not have suffered any injury, much less deadly damage to internal organs. Verily, the foot jabs delivered by
Q. What kind of shoes? accused-appellant to the victim were more than nudges, but severe kicks which ruptured the intestines of the
victim, later resulting in his death. Dr. Edgardo Marquez, the attending physician, had this to say on the point:
A. He was wearing a topsider leather shoes, sir.
Q. Did you make any surgery?
(p. 5, tsn., Oct. 5, 1993)
A. We had an impression that there is rupture of the viscus pre-operatively so, we did an emergency surgery,
Cesar Lanots' testimony was corroborated by Alfredo Azaula who testified as follows: exploratory laparatomy on the patient.

Q. Who kicked Manuel Lazarte? Q. What step was done next?

A. Lyndon Flores, sir. A. We did an exploratory laparatomy and the operative findings are the following:

Q. Who is this Lyndon Flores? There is ruptured small intestines in particular the jejunum with two ruptured areas intra abdominally. The
abdomen was filled with bloody chocolate colored fluid with alcoholic scent. The whole intestines are soaked with
A. The accused, sir. spilled intestinal contents.

Q. Where was Manuel Lazarte when he was kicked by Lyndon Flores? Q. What could have caused the ruptures viscus, Doctor?

A. He was lying on the pavement in front of the house of the Malvars, sir. A. This was possibly caused by a very strong blow.

Q. How far were you from Manuel Lazarte at that time? Q. Could repeated kicks to the abdomen have caused the injuries?

A. More or less four arms length, sir. A. Possible, sir.

Q. Where was Manuel Lazarte hit by the kicks of Lyndon Flores? (p. 4, tsn., Dec. 3, 1993)

A. On the chest and stomach, sir. (pp. 12-13, Appellee's Brief; p. 70, Rollo.)

Q. Did you observe the appearance of the feet of the accused which he used in kicking Manual Lazarte? Accused-appellant's finally contends that the crime he committed is homicide and not murder.

A. Yes, sir. Such contention is devoid of merit. The evidence clearly establishes the fact that the victim was totally
unconscious, dead drunk, lying on the pavement, when accused-appellant administered strong, vicious, and as
Q. Was he wearing anything? borne out later, killing kicks at the belly of the victim. Totally unconscious at the time of the attack, the victim could
not have put up any defense whatsoever against the sudden assault by the accused-appellant. Unquestionably,
A. Shoes, sir. the attack was characterized by treachery. An attack upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any
defense whatsoever is treacherous. There was absolutely no risk to accused-appellant from any defense that the
xxx xxx xxx victim might have make. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly and specially to insure its
Q. Aside from kicking Manuel Lazarte what happened before the accused left the scene? execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party may make (No. 16, Article 14,
Revised Penal Code).
A. He held the collar of Manuel Lazarte and delivered a slapping blow on the face and then dropped Manuel
Lazarte on the cemented pavement, sir. Nonetheless. we believe the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-
appellant.
Q. How many times did the accused kick Manuel Lazarte?
Under Paragraph 1, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
A. Three times, sir. felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Thus, anyone who inflicts
injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death that
(pp. 14-16, tsn., Oct. 7, 1993) supervenes as a consequence of the injuries. Here, accused-appellant is liable for the demise of the victim for
such was caused by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim's body. And, as earlier
(pp. 10-12, Appellee's Brief; p. 70, Rollo.) discussed, since the assault was qualified by treachery the crime committed is murder and not homicide as
suggested by accused-appellant.
There is no reason to doubt the credibility of these prosecution witness and the veracity of their testimony. Their
statements are not tainted with any contradiction, inconsistency, or prevarication. As the trial court observed, However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Paragraph
witnesses testified in a candid, categorical, and consistent manner, lending much credibility to their declarations 3, Article 13, Revised Penal Code) should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant for he had no intent to kill
and making their testimony deserving of full faith and credit (People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 [1994]). when he attacked the victim. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim.

Likewise, there being nothing on the record to show that said witnesses were actuated by any improper motive, Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for it failed to appreciate the mitigating
their testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit (People vs. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994]). Moreover, it circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed in favor of the accused-appellant.
is settled that when the credibility of witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. There being no aggravating circumstance to offset the mitigating circumstance of lack at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the
maximum period, or 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day, to 20 years, the minimum of the penalty provided for by law latter.
(Paragraph 2, Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower
in degree is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period or 10 years and 1 day CONTRARY TO LAW.3
of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal (People vs. Espinosa, 243 SCRA 7 [1995] citing
People vs. Roel Ponayo Y Villanueva, G. R. No. 111523, August 10, 1994). Criminal Case No. 16613:

The Court is not unaware of the New Death Penalty Law (Republic Act No. 7659) which took effect on December That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and
31, 1993 (People vs. David, 235 SCRA 366 [1994]), amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
increasing the imposable penalty for murder to reclusion perpetua to death. But such amendment cannot be policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
applied to the present case for the crime was committed on June 20, 1993, before the effectivity of the Republic confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
Act No. 7659. armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their
office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is HEREBY AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with
IS HEREBY SENTENCED to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores,
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (People vs. Sarol, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of murder
139 SCRA 125 [1985]), as maximum. directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some cause or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Case No. 16614:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then
policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively,
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their
office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the
green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are
G.R. Nos. 120744-46 June 25, 2012 necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder, but which
did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,6 the accused – except
DECISION Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,7 and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed8 – entered
individual pleas of not guilty.9 A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his
PERALTA, J.: arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.10 In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu,
Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.11 Said motion was
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never justified heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases
when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at
civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never the trial on the merits.12 On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.13
predicated on the cost of human life. Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991.14
Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,15 and accordingly, the charges against him were dismissed.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 30, 1995
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases for murder, frustrated At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest. 16 Hence, joint trial
murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail
on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup applications.
(Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican
Police (INP)2 stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30
and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As
Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out
Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as
all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were
portions of which read: both wounded and bleeding profusely.17

Criminal Case No. 16612: Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any one on the road
flag them down.18 In open court, Flores executed a sketch19 depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of
policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He
confederating and mutually helping one another, and while responding to information about the presence of could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and
armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from
office, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the yard of Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At
this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have
(Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the
scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at the right, which
jeepney to be taken to the hospital.20 This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licup’s left side. He explained that if this wound had
had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his
another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.21 position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by
a bullet fired at the victim’s back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior.33
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each other, and
that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would say.22 He professed that he, Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have been caused by a bullet fired from the front
together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the
observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the infliction of the other wounds, unless
companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together there was more than one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he
with his two armed companions.23 He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very
Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.24 He claimed that all the accused in the case rapidly. He could not tell which of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the
had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down
and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have with his head lying low and steady.34
otherwise inspired ill motives. 25 He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger
side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.26 Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the
accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for gross
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his companions at misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations
his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’ narration of the events thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service.35 Dolly Porqueriño,
immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated
passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This,
moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for according to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the
help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for
gate of Naron’s house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not consideration.36 The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint counter-
recognize. 27 At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney occupied by affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva
and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the
on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and
remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated
his mother’s house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not able that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu
to talk.28 suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan,
concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in front of Naron’s house station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.37
uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions
to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had
and Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital.29 earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly
intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle
them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the
discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney
because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and
Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the Puno,38 to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the
passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron’s house directly at
the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or moving forward the subject jeepney.39
in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road.30 Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan,
administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they
and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the
memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and
Yapyuco.31 delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to
investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries of Villanueva was likewise gone.40
and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanueva’s head as
well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in
would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel
thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming elements,41 and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed
the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of men therein.42 That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of
the assailant’s waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, 43 the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as
coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed.44
behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.32 He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney
would have been killed. 45 He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of
wound at the right temporal region of the head – one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they
a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired were assembled.46
upon from the front: one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the
right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused after the incident
the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated by
the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.47 He sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members,
admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they
dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded acted as they did;56 that there was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of
to an investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. 48 the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have
been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain
volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims commendation.57
of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on the
Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution witnesses Villanueva,
Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted "clearing operations" in sugarcane plantations in the Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan
barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted of the presence pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as claimed by
of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s declaration, he confessed having investigated the Yapyuco especially since – as it turned out after the search of the vehicle – they had no firearms with them, and
shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuan’s statement hence, they had nothing to be scared of.58 It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide
referring to Flores as being "married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to
"frequently visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired that night and that have known them and the location of their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so
the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. 49 that the presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that evening could not have
possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988 did
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as the latter’s not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the
documentary evidence.50 Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in
present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.51 his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men – which allegedly included Cafgu
members from neighboring barangays – were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had
performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s house – such
of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at the
of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of Naron, the
them.52 With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that
guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as night.60
charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of
frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the position of the Tamaraw jeepney and
of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and by
Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads: the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants
were inside the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners
had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto discharged.61
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to the
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number,
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. 62
₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate
shares of the costs of said action. This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners’ admission that they did
discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the information, namely, another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus,
Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that
Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those
Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night – petitioners herein.63 Interestingly, it was
charged therein, with costs de oficio. speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or
contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;64 and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.65 It likewise found very
penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because
them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front
prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the yard of Naron’s residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.66
amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action. As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and
SO ORDERED.53 how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this
circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The
eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for
and order;54 that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found
evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.67
fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had
voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official duty;55 that the theory of Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for 60 days which were all
mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had charged against his accumulated leave credits;68 that he was earning ₱8,350.00 monthly;69 and that he had
spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.84 This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire,
spent ₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during the wake, ₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.85 It refutes the
₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the prosecution of these cases.71 He also submitted a certification from San invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the
Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.72 On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had previously
petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to
and ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
deceased Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent
plus the proportionate costs of the action. individuals instead.86

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse. As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence adduced before the
Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy and labels the same to be petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for
conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their
participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the
common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego
Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is
were taken to the hospital on his jeepney.73 He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has failed to
declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was register his objection thereto.87
the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an
amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on loose predicates.
could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the
homicide and frustrated homicide. 74 He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the I.
incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof – a fact
which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the incident on the date
misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.75 He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno – as
Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained the belief that well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the
the suspects were armed rebel elements.76 prosecution,88 explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the Sandiganbayan has victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now
not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact.
which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it
sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not there
barangay officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that
presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their
behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not participate in the The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal.89 To this end, the
presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit90 of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the
the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.77 Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the counter-affidavit91 of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit92 of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit93 of
Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit94 of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the
those presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that "[their] team was forced to fire at the said
and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution.78 Finally, they lament that vehicle" when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to
the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were stop;95 in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained x x x to fire
with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the victims, and directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle."96 Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan
neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.79 and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it allegedly
failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that judging by the escape.97 He suggested – substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at
uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police the fleeing vehicle" 98 – that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only
operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted
beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.99
concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that
alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from their Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra from their group
commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots,100 and that it was the "policemen [who]
before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal design with the directly fired upon" the jeepney.101 Manguerra himself shared this statement.102 Yet these accounts do not sit
rest of the accused.80 They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney,81 well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in
but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged down both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique
as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away – as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyuco’s claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the
chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of fire to the
would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the victims had been passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost
personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had
believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron’s house sitting on the right side of
fact, they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the
They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the victims directly.82 line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.103

Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of conspiracy as While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who among the accused
established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw
suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsang’s residence. It jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed
posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing
commit the crimes charged.83 It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted,
chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the trajectories of
they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties
trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.104 must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear
and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in
admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into criminals are also human beings with human rights.114
a judicial admission.105 It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and
Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right Thus, in People v. Tabag,115 where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members of a family in their
to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking
in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the
they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for
II. the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under "suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On
or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.106 The day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution.116
guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.107 Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that it failed to heed the first
committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the
offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed
office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or petitioners’ signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from the
duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis. party they had just been to,117 still, we find incomprehensible petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms
when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco – which
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
case.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force, and it is
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement operation. incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect.
No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them – who were either police and barangay officers Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this
or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order – were bound to, as they did, respond to case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney
information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at
occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no
they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby
were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of
offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official order the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not have been the necessary consequence of the
to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference fulfillment of their duties.
to the victims having launched such aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having
exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark III.
on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to
show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of
suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities. criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution.118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not they were at charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime.119 It may be a defense even if the offense
the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the charged requires proof of only general intent.120 The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,121 and
prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.122 A proper invocation of this defense
of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;123 (b) that it be a matter of fact;124 and (c) that it negate
legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must the culpability required to commit the crime125 or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes
be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he with respect to an element of the offense.126
should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without
danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong,127 but in
requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains to that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case
other government officers or agencies.108 had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused,
fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door
himself from bodily harm.109 United States v. Campo110 has laid down the rule that in the performance of his and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the
is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be
justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.111 He x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in offense, a sufficient excuse").
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.112 People v. Ulep113 teaches that –
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability,
indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone of the victims,
justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the
or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying
so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is
he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.144
not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x x
128 The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber carbine.145 While
the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis129 and Baxinela v. People,130 the justification of an act, which is otherwise in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the
criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.131 passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it
Thus, Ah Chong further explained that – was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to
imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, tires – especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled
by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the likelihood
be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact even the driver himself – of being hit and injured or even killed is
the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.132 great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that
the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their
IV. authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon
the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been established jeepney suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned towards the latter.
beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite
of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the passenger
own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed.
relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.133 By reasonable doubt is The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable
meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State146 tells that:
let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.134 The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts
the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.135 This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is
applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will,
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.136 Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.137 In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was
the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c)
that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced V.
the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of killing Licup and
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must
uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.138 In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted another act performed without malice.147 People v. Guillen148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a
homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in
of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses.140 People v. Castillo,150 we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence
inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the homicide cannot exist.
allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-
accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise
affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded
to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the
San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against members of law common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.141 personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has
been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and materiality. Motive is generally conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.142 The question of motive is purpose.151
important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the
act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.1a\^/phi1
important to know the reason for the deed.143 From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its execution.152 The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement
among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to
conclude that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged
and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners
had been ignited by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it
suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the
signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with the convenient
yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepney’s supposed escape even if it meant killing the
driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost
simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate G.R. No. 163927 January 27, 2006
environment of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve their
object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, Petitioner,
perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged vs.
their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to have been
in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively DECISION
responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.153
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
VI.
Before the Court is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24413
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of homicide and affirming the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nava, Biliran, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. N-1901,
attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, where petitioner Alfonso Gaviola was convicted of qualified theft.
and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with
respect to the unharmed victims.154 The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond The antecedents are as follows:
reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the
minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and evading On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the then Court of First Instance of
arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title with a plea for injunctive relief. The suit involved a 40,500-square-meter parcel
attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners. of coconut land located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as Cadastral Lot 1301 and covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 743.3 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 111. Eusebio, for his part, claimed
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt ownership over the property.
thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating On July 29, 1955, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and declared Eusebio the lawful owner of
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the the property. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the
penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the Court renders judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint and declaring
correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. the defendants the absolute owners and entitled to the possession of the disputed land. The preliminary
injunction which was granted by this Court through Judge Lorenzo Carlitos is ordered dissolved, with costs
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted homicide, a against the plaintiffs.
modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a
consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of SO ORDERED.4
voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) The decision became final and executory. On September 3, 1955, the trial court ordered the sheriff to place
months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Eusebio in possession of the property.5 The sheriff complied with the order on December 19, 1958.6
Law must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor. In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola also died intestate and
was survived by his son, Alfonso.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and order
herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Cleto filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for recovery
as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise of possession of a parcel of land and execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The property involved was
bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and located on the north of Lot 1301 and covered by TD No. 1546. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-0600.
₱20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes. The plaintiff therein alleged that the houses of the defendants were located in the property that had been
adjudicated to his father, Eusebio Mejarito, in Civil Case No. 111. He prayed that the court issue judgment as
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. follows:
16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
a) Ordering [the] immediate execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111, against defendants Segundo Gaviola
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and and Alfonso Gaviola;
one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four b) Ordering all defendants evicted from any portion of the land they presently occupy as residential;
(4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
c) Ordering all defendants to pay rent in favor of the plaintiff with legal interests imposed reckoned from June
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of 1984 until full payment of what is due and/or until their complete and absolute eviction from their respective
₱77,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of residences which rent liabilities when computed annually for each of them is in the sum of PESOS: THREE
₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency;

SO ORDERED. d) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing moral damages;

e) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing attorney’s fee and litigation expenses.

Plaintiff prays for such relief and other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.7
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the property in which their houses were located is
different from that which was adjudicated by the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio Mejarito. Alfonso Gaviola appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment, on October 1, 2003, affirming the
decision of the RTC. He then filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied.
The parties could not agree on the identification and metes and bounds of the parcel of land claimed and owned
by the plaintiff and those claimed and owned by the defendants. This impelled the court to appoint Bienvenido Alfonso, now the petitioner, raises the following issues in the instant petition: (1) whether the prosecution proved
Ricafort, the Officer-in-Charge of the sub-office of the Provincial Assessor, as Commissioner, to resurvey the beyond reasonable doubt that he had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction; and (2)
property subject of the complaint. A sketch of the property was prepared, indicating the location of the plaintiff’s whether he is liable for exemplary and liquidated damages.
lot (Lot 1301) and the parcel of land where the house of Gaviola stood (Lot 1311). The Commissioner also
prepared a report8 stating that the property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No. 111 was Cadastral On the first issue, petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove animus lucrandi (intent to gain) on his part.
Lot No. 1301, while that which belonged to Elias Gaviola was Cadastral Lot No. 1311; and the old one-storey He asserts that he had been taking coconuts from the property in broad daylight three times a year since August
house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola was located in the latter lot. The defendant did not object to the report.9 5, 1993 on his honest belief that he was the owner of the land where the coconut trees were planted. He points
out that it was only after he took coconuts on September 6, 1997 that he was charged of qualified theft.
On May 4, 1990, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0600 and ordered
the complaint dismissed. The court ruled that the parcels of land occupied by the defendants, inclusive of Lot Moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of
1311, were different from the property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No. 111, which is actually Lot theft. He argues that the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 declared him to be the owner of the property where the
1301. The court also ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of action for the execution of the court’s decision in Civil coconut trees were planted; the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff and, since then, he had
Case No. 111 because such decision had long been enforced, per report of the sheriff.10 planted bananas and gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.

Eusebio appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment on September 18, 1992, affirming the In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the decision of the RTC, which was
decision of the RTC.11 The appellate court declared that the house of Alfonso Gaviola was located in Lot 1311 affirmed by the CA, is in accord with the evidence on record. The OSG maintains that under the decision of the
covered by TD 1611 under the name of Elias Gaviola. Cleto filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, then CFI in Civil Case No. 111, the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 and that of the CA affirming on appeal the RTC
which was denied due course in a Resolution12 dated March 24, 1993. Thus, the CA decision became final and ruling, the owner of Lot 1301, the property from which the coconuts were taken, was Eusebio Mejarito, the private
executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution, a copy of which Sheriff Ludenilo S. Ador served on the complainant’s father.
defendants on August 5, 1993.13
We rule against the petitioner.
In the meantime, Cleto Mejarito left the Philippines and stayed in the United States of America. He entrusted the
land to the care of his nephew, Rafael Lozano. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:

At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman, Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence,
saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees in Lot 1301. Under the against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they latter’s consent.

gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees.14 The Officer-in-Charge of the Maripipi Police Theft is likewise committed by:
Station then filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the spouses Gaviola and those who gathered the
coconuts in the municipal trial court.15 In the meantime, the coconuts were entrusted to the care of the barangay 1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
captain.
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
On February 6, 1998, an Information was filed with the RTC of Naval, Biliran, against the spouses Alfonso and fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft. The accusatory portion of the decision reads:
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
That on or about the 6th day of September 1997, at around 9 o’clock in the morning at Brgy. Calbani, Municipality another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
of Maripipi, Province of Biliran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named other forest or farm products.20
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, and with intent to gain, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, deliberately took, harvested and gathered one thousand five hundred (1,500) coconut fruits from the Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
plantation of Cleto Mejarito without the consent and authority of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner amounting to P3,000.00. owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.21
Contrary to Law.16
The provision was taken from Article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code which reads:
Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted that the trees from which they
were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his father, Elias Gaviola; the property of 1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin violencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las
private complainant Cleto Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso testified that the property was cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad, de su dueño.
placed in his possession by the sheriff since August 5, 1993, and that since then he had been gathering coconuts
every three months without being confronted or prosecuted by anybody.17 He insisted that his claim was based 2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropiaren con intencion de
on the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600, which was affirmed by the CA.18 lucro.

On April 13, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Alfonso of qualified theft. The fallo of the decision 3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en
reads: los artículos 606, num. 1., 2. y 3; 608, num. 1; 610, num. 1.; 611;613; segundo párrafo del 617 y 618. (Art. 437
del Cod. Penal de 1850. – Art. 379, Cdo. Franc. – Art. 331, Codigo Brasil. – Art. 151, Cod. Austr. – Arts. 461 y
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfonso Gaviola y Dimakiling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the 508, Cod. Belg. – Art. 242, Cod. Alem. – Arts. 422 y 423, Cod. Port. – Art. 402, Cod. Ital.)22
crime of qualified theft; hereby imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Five (5) Years,
Five (5) Months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, maximum period, as the minimum, to Eight (8) Years According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of a
and One (1) day of prision mayor, minimum, as the maximum. plantation:

The accused shall pay the private complainant Cleto Mejarito, through his duly authorized representative, Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and liquidated damages in the amount of P3,000.00. those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken
SO ORDERED.19 from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The trial court ruled that the accused took the coconuts from the coconut trees planted on Cadastral Lot 1301
which was owned by Cleto Mejarito, and not on his own property, Lot 1311, as he claimed.
For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property,
meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is 1. land of plaintiff and Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola:
apart from, but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolos
malus). The animo being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the a. Both have the same northern boundary: Isabela Mejarito. But the same can be explained by the fact that
manner and conduct of the accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General criminal sometime in 1934 Isabela Mejarito, through Pastor Armoela, sold the land now owned by Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola
intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to have to him. See Ex. "15." In fact, the first time that the land bought by Elias Gaviola was declared in his name was in
willed the natural consequences of his own acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the taking of 1935 in Tax Dec. No. 2839 (Exh. "14") which cancelled in part Tax Dec. No. 1942 (Exh. "16") in the name of
personal property without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same may be rebutted by the Isabela Mejarito.
accused by evidence that he took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property.23
What caused the confusion (identical northern boundary of the lands of plaintiff and Elias Gaviola) was that the
In Black v. State,24 the State Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the open and notorious taking, without any northern boundary (Isabela Mejarito) of the land of plaintiff was not adjusted accordingly despite the sale. It
attempt at concealment or denial, but an avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption that there is no animus should have been changed to Elias Gaviola to reflect the sale.
furandi. But, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, taking the property of another will not protect the taker:
b. The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of
xxx "In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff the land having been adjudicated to his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio
the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exhibit "A") (See also Exh. "6," Tax Dec. No. 3437, reverse side)
taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will
not protect the taker." 2. land of plaintiff and Hermenegildo (Segundo) Gaviola:

The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of a. The eastern boundary of the land of plaintiff is stated as "Hermenegildo Gaviola," father and predecessor-in-
wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly interest of defendant Segundo Gaviola;
believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or
for another, for the protection of the latter.25 b. The western boundary of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (Exh. "31-A") was previously declared as Melecio
Gaviola. But after the case (Civil Case No. 111, Exh. "A"), it was changed to "Eusebio Mejarito," predecessor-in-
In Charles v. State,26 the State Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the belief of the accused of his ownership interest of plaintiff by virtue of said case. (Exh. "31-A" and "30-A."
over the property must be honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo Gaviola),
In the present case, the trial court found the petitioner’s claim of having acted in the honest belief that he owned and that they are two distinct and separate lands.
Lot 1301 when he ordered the harvesting of the coconuts barren of probative weight. The trial court ruled that the
petitioner even admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private complainant’s property was separate from his: Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant Alfonso), and of defendant Segundo
Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola before) are separate and distinct from each other is shown by the fact
The accused have put up a defense of ownership although from the records of Civil Case No. B-0600, Alfonso that they have been covered by different sets of tax declarations since as early as 1906. It should be noted that
Gaviola, et al., thru their counsel admitted that from the evidence of Cleto Mejarito especially Exh. "E," Writ of the tax declarations that cover each land do not merge with, overlap, or cancel, each other. There appear
Execution, it appears that the decision was already executed on December 22, 1958. apparent minor discrepancies but they can easily be explained by two events: the sale of a portion of the land of
Isabela Mejarito to Elias Gaviola and the decision in Civil Case No. 111. If these two events are considered, these
Further admitted that: apparent discrepancies vanish into thin air.

"The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral
Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), the land having been adjudicated to his predecessor- survey where the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot
in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exh. "A") (See also Exh. "6," Tax Declaration No. Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are even delineated
3437, reverse side). in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and
series, of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached even states that the house of defendant Alfonso
Alfonso Gaviola could not have made a mistake to extricate themselves from the ejectment, Cleto Mejarito Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and while said report enumerates the houses located on the land
wanted to pursue in Civil Case No. B-0600. of plaintiff, neither the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the other
defendants are among those mentioned therein.28
They submitted a well entrenched analyses as they concluded further; to quote:
Moreover, petitioner’s land is residential, while that of the private complainant is coconut land. There are no
"Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the cadastral coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on private
survey were the lands of plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of Segunda Gaviola, are complainant’s property at any time, believing that it was his own land. Petitioner could thus not have mistaken the
denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and property of the private complainant for that of his own.
boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which sketch is now
marked as Exhibits "H" and series" (Memorandum of defendants Gaviolas dated April 13, 1989, in Civil Case No. We further note that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to corroborate his claim that, prior to September 6, 1997,
B-0600). he had gathered coconuts from the coconut trees on the private complainant’s property three times a year, and
that the latter or his caretaker was aware thereof but failed to remonstrate.
The general rule is that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof;
except when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake and (2) when shown that no such In United States v. Villacorta,29 the Court debunked the claim of the appellant therein that he should not be held
admission was in fact made. (Atillo III vs. C.A. 266 SCRA 596).27 criminally liable for theft (larceny) for honestly believing that he owned the land from which he took the paddy.
That case is on all fours with the present case, in that there was also a court ruling declaring the private
The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the appellate court. The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts complainant therein as the owner of the land on which the paddy grew. The Court therein ratiocinated as follows:
of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that the trial
court and the appellate court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts to show that the defendant could not be guilty of larceny,
substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. We have even though it be admitted that he took and carried away the paddy in question, for the reason that he claimed to
reviewed the records and find no justification to modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial and appellate be the owner of the land. That question had been decided against him by a court of competent jurisdiction and he
courts. made no objection to said decision. After that decision he could no longer claim that he was the owner of the land
from which he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover, it was shown during the trial of the cause that
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and bounds of Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually planted the paddy upon the land in question. It is difficult to
the private complainant’s property, Lot 1301, vis-à-vis that of his own, Lot 1311. Indeed, in his Memorandum in understand upon what theory the defendant could justify his claim that he was the owner of the paddy, after a
Civil Case No. B-0600, petitioner as one of the defendants below, categorically stated: final decision had been rendered against him to the contrary, and when it was clearly proven that he had not even
planted it. The paddy had been planted by Domingo Corpus upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction
From the above enumeration or statement of boundaries, it is clear that these three parcels of land are distinct decided belonged to him and had been harvested by him and piled upon the land at the time the defendant
and separate from each other, as the following observations can be made: entered the land and took and carried it away. The defendant neither planted the paddy nor reaped it. The court
decided, before he took and carried away the paddy, that the land belonged to Domingo Corpus. The defendant
must have known that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the litigation, he must have known to whom it
did belong.30

In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner’s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the private
complainant’s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.

We rule that there is factual and legal bases for the award of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. Under
Article 223031 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, the petitioner is guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified
theft.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.