01.

Corpuz vs CA
205 SCRA 23 – January 26, 1998

Facts:
On July 1986, Atty. David Corpuz was appointed as the MTRCB’s legal counsel, Supervising
Legal Staff Officer. Subsequently, Corpuz was designated the position of Attorney V. In
August 1981, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91 5 entitled "An Act To
Declare The Appointments Of The Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of This
Board As Null And Void." This undated resolution noted that the past and present Chairmen
of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the appointments of administrative and
subordinate employees to the MTRCB before forwarding them to the CSC. On 14 July 1992,
Henrietta S. Mendez was appointed MTRCB Chairman. Thereafter, the Committee resolved
to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of Corpuz and
seven others. Mendez informed Corpuz that at the MTRCB regular meeting of 25 June
1993, his appointment was disapproved effective 30 June 1993.Corpuz filed a complaint
with the CSC requesting a formal hearing and investigation. CSC ruled in favor of Corpuz.
The MTRCB filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC, which was then denied. In the
meantime, Corpuz became a permanent employee of the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals
declared null and void Resolution of the CSC, ruling that since the appointment of Corpuz
was not approved by the MTRCB, the appointment was invalid and he could not invoke
security of tenure.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Corpuz had security of tenure.

Held:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi:
It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power of
appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent
or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may
issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is
required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such
assent or confirmation is obtained. Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim
no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure. Hence, in the case of Corpuz,
since the last act required for the completion of his appointment, viz., approval by the
MTRCB itself, was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved it,
his appointment ceased to have effect, if at all, and his services were properly terminated.
A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is
merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect
or irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably, under the facts here, Corpuz was such a de facto
officer.
02. Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 122197, June 26, 1998

Facts:
Dimaandal, then holding the position of Supply Officer III, was designated Acting Assistant
Provincial Treasurer for Administration by then Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas.
Pursuant to the designation, petitioner filed a claim for the difference in salary and
Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of Assistant Provincial Treasurer
and Supply Officer III for the whole year of 1993 in the total amount of P61,308.00.
However, the Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim. Petitioner appealed to the
respondent Commission on Audit which sustained the stand of the Provincial Auditor of
Batangas as valid and proper, and on the grounds that petitioner was merely designated as
an Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration in addition to his regular duties, and
the Governor of Batangas had no authority to designate him to the said position. As such,
he is not entitled to receive an additional salary.

Issue:
Whether or not an employee who is designated in an acting capacity is entitled to the
difference in salary between his regular position and the higher position to which he is
designated.

Held:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:
No. First, Sec. 471 of LGC provides that “ An Assistant treasurer may be appointed by the
Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible recommendees of the
governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations”. Undoubtedly, the
aforecited laws do not authorize the Provincial Governor to appoint nor even designate one
temporarily in cases of temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office.
That power resides in the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance.

Second, the right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial Treasurer is based on the
assumption that the appointment or designation thereof was made in accordance with law.
Considering that petitioner's designation was without color of authority, the right to the
salary or an allowance due from said office never existed.

Lastly, There is a great difference between an appointment and designation. While an

Facts:
Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.
PrivateRespondentwasproclaimedbytheMunicipalBoardofCanvassersastheduly elected
Mayor against the Petitioner. Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting
64outofthetotal181precinctsofthesaidMunicipality. ThetrialcourtdeclaredPetitionerasthe
duly elected Municipal Mayor.
The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which
declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor. The COMELEC found
Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary
and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages.
Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private
respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.
COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded
actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections
only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal
manner as a Usurper.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner acted as a Usurper.

Held:
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

Ratio Decidendi:
We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes
to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective
office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the
COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the
electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.

We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a “de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession
of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto” and is thus “legally entitled
to the emoluments of the office.”
04. Gamboa v Court of Appeals
(GR L-38068) Sep. 30, 1981

Facts:
Judge Ruiz of the CFI of Rizal issued an order on Sep. 18, 1972 granting herein petitioners’
motion for reconsideration of a judgment authorizing the public auction sale of petitioners’
property. Said order was promulgated and filed with the Clerk of Court on Oct. 18, 1972.
Judge Ruiz tendered his resignation on Oct. 4, 1972 pursuant to Letter of Instruction No.
11 issued by the President, and was notified of the President’s acceptance on Oct. 21, 1972.
Judge Alcantara, who was appointed in his stead, declared the Sep. 18, 1972 order to be
null and void. According to jurisprudence, an order, in order to be valid and binding, must
be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the Judge whose signature
appears thereon. He claimed that since Judge Ruiz ceased to be a member of the Judiciary
on the day he filed his resignation, or on the date indicated on the letter of the President’s
acceptance of the same, he cannot be considered a de facto officer after the aforementioned
dates by virtue of the absence of any objection to the resignation filed with the proper office,
which operates as sufficient acceptance, and thus does away with the notice of acceptance.
Herein private respondents, aggrieved by the ruling, filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was granted. Petitioners, after having their motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion denied, filed this petition for certiorari seeking
the reversal of the decision of respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Ruiz ceased to be judge de jure or de facto upon acceptance by the
President of the Philippines of his resignation.

Ruling:
Petition is DENIED.

Ratio Decidendi:
In order to constitute a complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be
an intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment. A
resignation is an expression of the intent to relinquish a part of the term, and such
resignation requires an acceptance before it can become effective, since a public officer who
abandons his position before such acceptance becomes liable under Art. 238 of the Revised
Penal Code.
All acts performed by Judge Ruiz after having tendered his resignation on Oct. 4, 1972 and
before having been notified of the President’s acceptance of the same on Oct. 21, 1972 are
considered to be, at the very least, acts of a public officer de facto, and are thus valid and
effective. The fact that the letter containing the acceptance was dated Oct. 6, 1972 does
nothing to change the validity of the acts done by Judge Ruiz prior to being notified, which
in this case includes the promulgation of the Sep. 18 order.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Art. 238. Abandonment of office or position. — Any public officer who, before the acceptance
of his resignation, shall abandon his office to the detriment of the public service shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor.
If such office shall have been abandoned in order to evade the discharge of the duties of
preventing, prosecuting, or punishing any of the crimes falling within Title One and
Chapter One of Title Three of Book Two of this Code, the offender shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and by arresto mayor if the
purpose of such abandonment is to evade the duty of preventing, prosecuting or punishing
any other crime.
05. GSIS vs Civil Service Commission
245 SCRA 179 – June 19, 1995

Facts:
Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz from January 1972 up to
February 1988. From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue
of an election and was paid a fixed salary. From December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988,
she held the position of Vice Governor in a holdover capacity, broken into two periods:
1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem basis from December 31, 1976 to December
31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary — from January 1, 1980 to February
1,1988.
In its June 7, 1989 Resolution on the matter, CSC held that the services rendered for the
first holdover period between January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for
purposes of retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent Belo
actually served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on call 24 hours a day.
Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was paid on
a per diem basis should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable service
to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court,
questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within
the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186
(Government Service Insurance Act), we granted the petitions in G.R. Nos. 98395 and
102449, and reversed the CSC Orders and Resolutions in question.

Issue:
Whether or not regular service in the government on a per diem basis, without any other
form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term
“service with compensation” under the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.

Ruling:
The orders of the CSC requiring GSIS to consider creditable the services of private
respondents on a per diem basis AFFIRMED.

Ratio:
If the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does not
constitute a mere allowance for expenses but appears to be his actual base pay, then no
amount of categorizing the salary ass a per diem would take the allowances received from
the term services with compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of
service in government. A per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or
employee of the government is away from his home base. It is intended to cover the cost of
lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of
their permanent station. The term per diem may be construed either as compensation or as
allowance. The clear intent of the Government Service Law was to exclude those incidental
expenses or those incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional definition of the term
per diem.
06. Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees
G.R. No. 78623, December 17, 1990

Facts:
The Leyte State College Board of Trustees took up the matter of the designation of herein
petitioner as vice-president of the college. In the Compensation and Position Classification
of the college, petitioner’s position of vice-president does not appear on the itemization.
Subsequently however on the college's plantilla of personnel for 1984, petitioner's position
was designated and classified as "Professor 6 (Vice-Pres.)

When there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees of the Leyte
State College, the petitioner was ousted as the Vice President. She filed a motion for
reconsideration to the Board but the latter arrived at the consensus that the position of
vice-president being "honorific” only. When the board resolution denying her petition for
reconsideration remained unacted upon, Dr. Ofelia P. TRISTE filed the instant petition for
Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was a duly appointed Vice-President.

Held:
Petition is granted and the immediate reinstatement of petitioner is ordered.

Ratio Decidendi:
The mode of authorization was by "designation" inasmuch as the position of Vice-President
did not appear in the College's Personnel Services Itemization for the year 1984. This
omission was, however, corrected in the Plantilla of Personnel and Salary Adjustment Form
of the Leyte State College for the same calendar year 1984, which listed as Item No. 2-1 the
position of "Professor 6 (Vice-President)." Herein petitioner was listed as the incumbent
Vice-President receiving the salary for such position. Thereafter, on December 27, 1985,
herein petitioner was extended an appointment as "Professor 6" with a salary which is
equivalent to the item designated as "Professor 6 (Vice-President)" in the Plantilla of
Personnel for 1984. Said appointment was issued "By authority of the Board of Trustees"
and approved by the Civil Service Commission as permanent.

Moreover, like the requirement of an oath, the fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees
may aid in determining the nature of a position, but it is not conclusive, for while a salary
or fees are usually annexed to the office, it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the oath,
the salary or fees are mere incidents and form no part of the office. Where a salary or fees
are annexed, the office is often said to be coupled with an interest; where neither is
provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the
public good."
07. LORETO D. DELA VICTORIA V. HON. JOSE P. BURGOS
245 SCRA 374

Facts:
Raul Sesbreño filed a case against Bienvenido Mabanto Jr. among other people wherein the
court decided in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay former a definite
amount of cash. The decision had become final and executory and a writ of execution was
issued. This was questioned in the CA by the defendants. In the meanwhile, a notice of
garnishment was issued to petitioner who was then the City Fiscal. He was asked to
withhold any check or whatnot in favor of Mabanto Jr. The CA then dismissed the
defendant’s petition and the garnishment was commenced only to find out that petitioner
didn't follow instructions of sheriff. He is now being held liable.

Issue:
Whether or not the salary check of a government official or employee funded with public
funds can be subject to garnishment.

Held:
Petition is GRANTED. The orders of 9 March 1993 and 20 April 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Br. 17, subject of the petition are SET ASIDE. The notice of garnishment
served on petitioner dated 3 February 1992 is ordered DISCHARGED.

Ratio Decidendi:
Garnishment is considered as the species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to
the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger in litigation. Emphasis is laid on the
phrase belonging to the judgment debtor since it is the focal point of resolving the issues
raised.
As Assistant City Fiscal, the source of Mabanto’s salary is public funds. Under Section 16 of
the NIL, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until
delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As ordinarily
understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by the maker
or drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof.
The petitioner is the custodian of the checks. Inasmuch as said checks were in the custody
of the petitioner and not yet delivered to Mabanto, they didn't belong to him and still had
the character of public funds. The salary check of a government officer or employee doesn't
belong to him before it has been physically delivered to him. Until that time the check
belongs to the government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the
payee has no power over it, he cannot assign it without the consent of the government.
*If public funds would be allowed to be garnished, then basic services of the government
may be hampered.
08. Rodrigo Jr. v Sandiganbayan
(GR 125498) Feb. 18, 1999

Facts:
The Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioners Rodrigo Jr.
(Mayor), Facundo (former Municipal Treasurer), and Mejica (Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator) before the Ombudsman after having discovered a discrepancy
between Mejica’s report and COA’s audit of the actual accomplishment of an electrification
project in the Municipality of San Nicolas, Pangasinan.
Petitioners moved to quash the information, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan, and
opposed the prosecution’s motion to suspend them pendente lite, claiming that the
Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it
did have jurisidiction over petitioners and ordered the suspension. Hence this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioners.

Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.

Ratio Decidendi:
Although the position of ‘Municipal Mayor’ does not appear on the list of officers coming
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as per Sec. 4(a) of PD 1606, as modified by
Sec. 2 of RA 7975, there is a catchall in Sec. 4(a)(5) which, with reference to the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the Department of
Budget and Management, places such position within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ contention that Rodrigo, the highest ranking public official impleaded in this
case, occupied a Grade 24 position by virtue of the amount of his monthly salary at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime and is thus outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction,
is an incorrect interpretation of the law. The Court stated that an official’s salary is
determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his position.
That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by
Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758. To give credence to petitioners’ argument that
Mayor Rodrigo’s salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of
R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
09. 9. Antonio Santos vs CA
G.R. No. 139792 - November 22, 2000

Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of
the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301, which held that petitioner’s separation pay
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the number of years of his service in
the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given
retirement gratuity and pension. Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down
an opinion that the payment of petitioner’s separation pay must be in accordance with Civil
Service Resolution No. 92-063. Stating, in this instance, the employee concerned has the
option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross retirement/
separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his separation pay received, or not
[to] refund his separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/
separation gratuity for the total amount representing his previous separation/retirement
pay received. CSC and the CA affirmed the decision of Director Acebedo.

Issue:
Whether or not the years served as a Judge of the MeTC by the petitioner should be
included in the computation of his separation pay.

Ruling:
Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Ratio:
To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay
under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving
the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double
compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Petitioner
already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to
receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay.
10. Cuenco v. Fernan
A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988

Facts:
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to
Justice Fernan containing charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against
Justice Fernan on the ground that in a certain civil case (Estate of Vito Borromeo
Proceedings)he continued to appear as a counsel despite his appointment as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, and exerted personal efforts to take away from the Supreme
Court en banc the said case to his Office as Chairman of the Third Division to enable him to
influence the decision or the outcome thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office.

Held:
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any
offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. The effect of
impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to
immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined. A
member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of
impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively
(that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.