Minority Rights Group International R

E
P
O
Burundi: R
T

Prospects for Peace

AN MRG INTERNATIONAL REPORT • BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

BY FILIP REYNTJENS
 BURUNDI: Acknowledgements
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE Minority Rights Group International (MRG) gratefully
acknowledges the support of Trócaire and all the orga- Internally displaced
© Minority Rights Group 2000 nizations and individuals who gave financial and other people. Child looking
All rights reserved assistance for this Report. after his younger
Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or other non- sibling.
commercial purposes. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for com- This Report has been commissioned and is published by GIACOMO PIROZZI/PANOS PICTURES

mercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holders. MRG as a contribution to public understanding of the
For further information please contact MRG. issue which forms its subject. The text and views of the
A CIP catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. author do not necessarily represent, in every detail and in
ISBN 1 897 693 53 2 all its aspects, the collective view of MRG.
ISSN 0305 6252
Published November 2000 MRG is grateful to all the staff and independent expert
Typeset by Texture readers who contributed to this Report, in particular Kat-
Printed in the UK on bleach-free paper. rina Payne (Commissioning Editor) and Sophie Rich-
mond (Reports Editor).

THE AUTHOR
Burundi:
FILIP REYNTJENS teaches African Law and Politics at
the universities of Antwerp and Brussels. He is chair of
the Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes Region of
Africa, University of Antwerp, and of the African Studies
A specialist on the Great Lakes Region, Professor Reynt-
jens has published numerous articles and several books
on the region and its peoples. His latest book, La Guerre
des grands lacs: alliances mouvantes et conflits extraterri-
Prospects for Peace
and Documentation Centre in Brussels. He is also Vice- toriaux en Afrique Centrale, was published by L’Harmat-
Rector of the University of Mbuji-Mayi in the Democra- tan in Paris in 1999.
tic Republic of Congo

C O N T E N T S

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP tion of conflict and encouraging positive action to build
INTERNATIONAL trust between majority and minority communities. 3 Preface
MRG has consultative status with the United Nations Eco-
MRG works to secure rights and justice for ethnic, linguistic 5 Country, people and region
nomic and Social Council and has a worldwide network of
and religious minorities. It is dedicated to the cause of partners. Its international headquarters are in London. Legal-
cooperation and understanding between communities. 7 Historical background
ly it is registered both as a charity and as a limited company
Founded in the 1960s, MRG is a small international non- under English law with an International Governing Council. 10 Transition to democracy
governmental organization that informs and warns govern-
ments, the international community, non-governmental 11 The 1993 elections
THE PROCESS
organizations and the wider public about the situation of
minorities around the world. This work is based on the pub- 13 The 1993 coup and its aftermath
lication of well-researched Reports, Books and Papers;
As part of its methodology, MRG conducts regional 15 The search for a settlement: from Kigobe to Arusha
direct advocacy on behalf of minority rights in international
research, identifies issues and commissions Reports based
fora; the development of a global network of like-minded
on its findings. Each author is carefully chosen and all scripts 19 Not just Hutu and Tutsi: disadvantaged groups in society
organizations and minority communities to collaborate on
are read by no less than eight independent experts who are
these issues; and the challenging of prejudice and pro-
knowledgeable about the subject matter. These experts are 22 Reforming the state
motion of public understanding through information
drawn from the minorities about whom the Reports are writ-
and education projects. 27 Conclusion
ten, and from journalists, academics, researchers and other
MRG believes that the best hope for a peaceful world lies in human rights agencies. Authors are asked to incorporate
identifying and monitoring conflict between communi- comments made by these parties. In this way, MRG aims to 28 Recommendations
ties, advocating preventive measures to avoid the escala- publish accurate, authoritative, well-balanced Reports.
29 Notes

32 Bibliography, Acronyms

BY FILIP REYNTJENS
Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National Article 7

Preface
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Adopted by States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights as
the UN General Assembly; Resolution 47/135 of 18 Decem- set forth in the present Declaration.
ber 1992) Article 8
Article 1 1. Nothing in this Declaration shall prevent the fulfilment of interna-
1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cul- tional obligations of States in relation to persons belonging to
tural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their minorities. In particular, States shall fulfil in good faith the obliga-

M
respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the pro-
tions and commitments they have assumed under international RG’s timely new Report Burundi: hauled. A durable peace would encourage a redirection of
motion of that identity.
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to treaties and agreements to which they are parties. Prospects for Peace has been commis- spending away from armaments and towards clinics and
achieve those ends. 2. The exercise of the rights as set forth in the present Declaration sioned to further the search for peace schools which serve all of the people. It is essential that
shall not prejudice the enjoyment by all persons of universally rec-
Article 2
ognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
and stability in Burundi, giving a num- the international community helps by increasing aid: cur-
1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic ber of recommendations to this end. rently the vast majority of the population live in extreme-
minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minori- 3. Measures taken by States in order to ensure the effective enjoy-
ment of the rights as set forth in the present Declaration shall not The negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, that have been ly poor conditions, not least the Twa.
ties) have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and prac-
tise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private prima facie be considered contrary to the principle of equality under way since 1998, have reached a conclusion and This Report has been written by Filip Reyntjens, who
and in public, freely and without interference or any form of dis- contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. there is some chance that the peace which has so long is renowned for his work on Burundi and who wrote
crimination. 4. Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permit- eluded Burundi’s population could be within reach. MRG’s last Report on Burundi in 1995 (updated in 1996).
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effec- ting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the All agree that the path to peace has not been an easy The author highlights how a failure to move towards
tively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life. United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity
3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effec-
one and it will remain extremely difficult to implement peace in the current climate would lead to yet more vio-
and political independence of States.
tively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, region- proposals for peace. lence, especially given the recent conflicts in neighbour-
Article 9
al level concerning the minority to which they belong or the The specialized agencies and other organizations of the United
Burundi: Prospects for Peace gives a balanced and crit- ing states in the Great Lakes Region. As he argues, ‘If
regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with ical analysis of the crises which have befallen Burundi and Burundi were to revert to massive violence, this would
Nations system shall contribute to the full realization of the rights
national legislation. charts the course of the peace negotiations. Burundi has further compound an already explosive regional situation.’
4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and and principles as set forth in the present Declaration, within their
maintain their own associations. respective fields of competence. been in conflict for much of its history since indepen- MRG offers this Report, with its set of recommenda-
5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina- dence, leading to genocide and civil war in which tens of tions aimed at the Burundian government and the inter-
maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts tion (1965) thousands of people from all ethnic groups within Burundi national community, to support peace and stability based
with other members of their group, with persons belonging to Article 2 – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – have been victims. Some knowl- on human rights for all.
other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens 1. States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to edge of the background to these events is essential for
of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
religious or linguistic ties. anyone wanting to understand the issues which the coun- Alan Phillips
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting
Article 3 understanding among all races. try now faces in order for Burundi to move towards peace Director
1. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights includ- 2. States parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in and to rebuild the lives of its people. October 2000
ing those as set forth in this Declaration individually as well as in the social, economic cultural and other fields, special and concrete Much of the violence within Burundi has been charac-
community with other members of their group, without any dis- measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of terized as ‘ethnic’ whereas, as this Report demonstrates, it
crimination.
2. No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minori-
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the pur- has actually been of a distinctly political nature, manipu- ◗
pose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human lated by elites wishing to capture or maintain power. Eth-
ty as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case
as set forth in this Declaration. nicity has undoubtedly proved to be a strong mobilizing
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
Article 4 force where a numerical minority – the Tutsi – currently
rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which
1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons
they were taken have been achieved. controls much of the state, including its army, and the
belonging to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their numerical majority – the Hutu – are politically and eco-
human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimina- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
tion and in full equality before the law. of Genocide (1948) nomically marginalized. Moreover, each group has come
2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to Article I
to view the other with fear, many being convinced that the
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their character- The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide whether committed other is intent on genocide. This cycle of fear and retribu-
istics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international tion has to be broken. Furthermore, the position of the
and customs, except where specific practices are in violation of law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Twa – who self-identify as indigenous and who represent
national law and contrary to international standards.
3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possi- Article II less than 1 per cent of the population – has been largely
ble, persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts ignored in any discussions on Burundi. Yet their situation
to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their moth- committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, is dire: they are generally despised by both Hutu and Tutsi
er tongue. ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: and have been caught up in a war in which they have suf-
4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of (a) Killing members of the group.
fered disproportionately.
education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, tradi- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
tions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their group. MRG’s Report is forward-looking and seeks to high-
territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated light some of the most important issues that will need to
opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole. to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. be addressed in the peace deal. The aim of peaceful coex-
5. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. istence and cooperation between communities will
belonging to minorities may participate fully in the economic (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. require the goodwill of all of the people of Burundi. In
progress and development in their country.
Article III addition, the support of Burundi’s neighbouring states and
Article 5 The following acts shall be punishable:
1. National policies and programmes shall be planned and imple- of the international community will be essential.
(a) Genocide. This Report calls for a political transition towards
mented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide.
belonging to minorities. democracy and for confidence in the democratic process
2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance among States should (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
(d) Attempt to commit genocide. to be restored. Alongside this, the army and the judicial
be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate institutions must be reformed to institute respect for
interests of persons belonging to minorities. (e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV human rights and to end the impunity of those responsi-
Article 6
States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in ble for the massive human rights violations of recent
to minorities, inter alia exchanging of information and experi- Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally years. Health and education will also need to be over-
ences, in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence. responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.

BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

3
 BURUNDI
Country, people and
Lake
Kivu
D A Lake
region

er
N Tshohoha

ag
Nord K
A River
W

yanu
R Lake Country Burundi’s GNP. However, foreign aid declined dramati-

an
Rugwero cally in the second half of the 1990s as a consequence of

Ak
B
River urundi is a small, densely populated, land- war, insecurity and the regional embargo.
Ruhw Kirundo
a locked, poor country in the Great Lakes

River
KIRUNDO
Region of East-Central Africa. Its size
MUYINGA (27,834 sq km) compares to that of Belgium People
or Wales. It has about 6.5 million inhabi-

ga
a
CIBITOKE tants which gives it a population density of 230 per sq
B urundi has faced conflict during most of its history

w
us Muyinga
NGOZI am since independence in 1962. While strife has general-
Cibitoke R iv e r N y km; after Rwanda, this is the second-highest population
Ri

Ngozi
ly been interpreted as ‘ethnic’, it is in fact political, aimed
ve

Kayanza
density in mainland Africa. The country depends on
r

transit routes through neighbouring countries: Dar es at maintaining or capturing power. Controlling the state is
Salaam and Mombasa to the east are at a distance of of major importance in a poor country like Burundi, as it
Ru

KAYANZA
zi

u about 1,500 and 2,000 km respectively, while the Atlantic is the main avenue for accumulation and reproduction of
D E M O C R AT I C R E P UB L I C OF C ONGO

zi

Karuzi

vuv
Bubanza
coast is almost 2,000 km away (and inaccessible, due to a dominant class. As will become clear later, the process-

Ru
KARUZI CANKUZO the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and es of national reconciliation since 1988 and of democrati-
BUBANZA r v er
i ve Ri Cankuzo Angola). With a per capita income of US $140 in 1998, zation since 1991 have met with staunch and occasionally
R
Muramvya Burundi ranks as the third-poorest country included in violent resistance from certain elites. Thus, in 1993, the
MURAMVYA the World Bank statistics. violence was only apparently ethnic: the October coup
Over 90 per cent of the population is involved in agri- aimed at recapturing political power and privileges, lost or
Gitega
Bujumbura culture, generally at subsistence level. In 1998, the agricul- jeopardized after the June elections. Pitted against each
RUYIGI
tural sector provided about 50 per cent of GNP. The other were not Hutu and Tutsi as such, but those who
RA

Ruyigi
MWARO GITEGA gained power through the ballot box and those who lost it.
peasant mode of production, combined with the high pop-
BU

This does not mean that ethnicity plays no role: quite the
ulation density, means that Burundi’s main problem is pres-
M

Mwaro
contrary. It is a powerful mobilizing force, used and
onza
JU

sure on land: most farmers have less than 1 ha of land, while

manipulated by elites in their political strategies. The
BU

yir

Musongati at the same time the soil is deteriorating due to over-

Ru
v prominence of the ethnic factor in politics explains the
r exploitation and, increasingly, marginal land is brought cross-border implications of crises in Burundi and Rwan-
Rive

under cultivation. I shall return to the land issue later. da. As both have a similar ethnic composition, violence in
The industrial sector is very small; comprising enter- one country has tended to exacerbate tensions in the other
Lake

BURURI prises in the areas of brewing, match production, textiles and vice versa. Thus, for instance, the October 1993 coup
RUTANA
and processing of agricultural products, it amounts to in Burundi dealt a fatal blow to the Rwandan Arusha
Rutana
A

Bururi slightly over 20 per cent of GNP. While the main subsis-
Rumonge
peace accord, while the genocide against the Rwandan
tence crops are bananas (many of which are grown for Tutsi in April–June 1994 radicalized Burundian Tutsi, thus
I
Ta n

u tsindozi
Ri v e r M beer production), beans, sorghum, maize, sweet potatoes handicapping the search for solutions in Burundi.
N
g

and cassava, the principal export crop is coffee, which While the ethnic groups figure prominently in this
any

Makamba
A

si accounts for almost 80 per cent of export earnings, fol- report, we shall see that Burundi is not just the country of
ika

Z
ar

lowed by tea and cotton. Important nickel reserves have Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: other cleavages – based on gender,
ag

MAKAMBA
been discovered near Musongati in the south-east, but region, clan or rural/urban belonging – are at least as rel-
N
al

M
A doubts about profitability and the prevailing insecurity evant. As a matter of fact, it is paradoxical that the ethnic
r
Ri
ve
T have postponed effective exploitation. Burundi runs a divide should be so paramount in Burundi’s recent histo-
consistently high trade deficit: in 1998, export earnings ry, as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa do not even qualify as ‘ethnic
stood at about US $49 million, while imports were worth groups’ in the anthropological sense of the word. They tra-
about US $102 million. Likewise, the budgetary deficit is ditionally share the same monotheistic religion, the same
0 25 50 Miles
large: in 1998, foreign debt amounted to about US $1.1 language (Kirundi), the same customs and the same space:
0 25 50 75 Kms
billion, and its service cost over 58 per cent of export there is no ‘Hutu-land’ or ‘Tutsi-land’ and both main
income. These macro-economic imbalances have been groups lived side by side on the hills of Burundi, until
Capital city
National boundary more or less sustainable only because of huge internation- some degree of, hopefully temporary, segregation
Provincial capital city al assistance: in 1992, about US $315 million of aid was occurred as a result of the recent violence. In political
Provincial boundary
Other towns received, which amounted to about one-quarter of terms, the Burundian categories have nevertheless devel-

BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

4 5
 Country, people and region

Historical background
oped all the characteristics of ‘ethnic’ groups: belonging to Angola) did not end with the 1994 Lusaka peace accord. As
one or the other determines access to power, jobs, wealth, the alliances in the region are conjunctural, they are frag-
education and privileges, and even makes the difference ile and shifting. This has become clear from the beginning
between life and death. of the second Congo War in August 1998: yesterday’s allies
are today’s enemies. Thus Rwandan and Burundian Hutu
forces, which were opposed to Kabila in 1996–7, now side
Region with him in the context of an ‘anti-Tutsi’ alliance. More
From monarchy to republic er balancing of ethnic interests in government. Four gov-
shifts are likely to occur in the future, thus creating a high- ernments held office during 1963–5, each comprising

I n the context of the Great Lakes Region, a short com- ly unpredictable and unstable regional political-military

U
almost equal proportions of Hutu and Tutsi. Tensions
landscape, which inevitably affects attempts at reaching a nlike most African states, Burundi and its
ment on the concept of minority/majority is called for. reached a climax when the Hutu prime minister, Pierre
peaceful solution in Burundi.2 northern neighbour Rwanda were not an
As the Hutu constitute a large demographic majority Ngendadumwe, was assassinated in January 1965, only a
artificial creation of colonial rule. When
(about 85 per cent), the Tutsi (about 15 per cent) and the week after taking office. The ensuing political crisis was
they were absorbed by German East
Twa (under 1 per cent) would seem to be the minorities in resolved by a clear Hutu victory at parliamentary elections
need of protection. While this is undoubtedly true for the ◗ Africa in 1899, they had been organized
held in May. Mwambutsa nevertheless appointed a ganwa
kingdoms for centuries, belatedly forced to open their
Twa, the Tutsi have dominated politics, the army, the civil as the new prime minister. Incensed by this, and by other
borders to European intrusion. When, in 1916, Belgium
service, the judiciary, education and the economy, and – actions taken by the mwami, a faction of the Hutu-domi-
occupied Ruanda-Urundi (as the League of Nations man-
up to the massacres of late 1993, when about half the dead nated gendarmerie (national police) attempted to seize
date territory encompassing both Rwanda and Burundi
were Tutsi – the Hutu were by far the most numerous vic- power in October. The repression of this abortive coup was
was designated), it continued the system of ‘indirect rule’
tims of ethnic-political violence. As Eide has pointed out, extremely violent: virtually the entire Hutu political elite
operated by the Germans. This choice of colonial policy
it is not always the numerical majority that oppresses the was massacred, together with thousands of rurally based
had a particular impact, as the ethnic minority of Tutsi had
minority.1 Politically speaking, the Tutsi are dominant, Hutu who were supposed to have supported the revolt.
long been dominant. Unlike the situation in Rwanda,
despite constituting a demographic minority. All three These events effectively ended any significant participa-
however, the potential for conflict between Hutu and
groups thus have the characteristics of a minority in one tion by the Hutu in Burundi’s political life for many years.
Tutsi was contained by the existence of the ganwa, an
sense or another: the Twa are a political and a demo- In July 1966 Mwambutsa was deposed by his son, who
intermediate princely class between the mwami (king)
graphic minority; the Tutsi are a demographic minority took the title of Ntare V. He appointed Captain (later
and the population. The mwami and ganwa stood apart
and a political majority; the Hutu are a demographic Lieutenant-General) Michel Micombero as prime minis-
from the Tutsi masses, who, in turn, comprised two main
majority and a political minority. Of course, the reference ter. In November Ntare was himself overthrown by
groups, the Banyaruguru and the Hima. Relations
to ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ here relates to their respective elites, Micombero, who declared Burundi a republic. With the
between the ordinary Tutsi and the Hutu were on an
who are involved in a struggle to maintain or acquire polit- abolition of the monarchy, the most important stabilizing
equal footing, and intermarriage was common.
ical and economic power. The overwhelming majority of element in the political system was removed, and subse-
The exercise of its perceived duties under the League
Burundian Hutu, Tutsi and Twa is absent from politics quent purges of Hutu officers and politicians further con-
of Nations mandate led to disruptive interventions by Bel-
and shares poverty and lack of access to health services solidated Tutsi supremacy. More specifically, the birth of
gium in Burundi’s social and political system.3 However, to
and education. the republic heralded a decades-long domination by
fulfil the criteria imposed by the UN Trusteeship Council
Burundi can only be understood in a broader regional Tutsi-Hima elites from Bururi province.
after 1948, the Belgian administration was moved towards
perspective. Particularly since the first Congo War, which
some degree of democratization. Two main parties came
in 1996–7 brought Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power in Kin-
to the fore. The Union pour le Progrès National
shasa, several conflicts have tended to merge: these
include the Great Lakes conflict, which has been the most
(UPRONA), led by Prince Louis Rwagasore (the eldest Genocide and the Bagaza years
son of the mwami), was a nationalist movement, aiming to
immediately visible one, and the Sudanese and Angolan
civil wars. The geographical proximity of these hotbeds of
instability and the play of objective alliances (where all
unite all groups and interests. The rival Parti Démocrate
Chrétien (PDC) was more conservative and maintained
cordial links with the Belgian administration. Old rivalries
F ollowing a violent attempt at insurrection by exiled
Hutu in April 1972, during which between 2,000 and
3,000 Tutsi were killed, massacres of unprecedented mag-
actors reason in terms of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my
between ganwa lineages also opposed these parties, Rwa- nitude and brutality were carried out by the Burundian
friend’) have linked up these conflicts, thus opening the
gasore being a Mwezi (pl. Bezi) and PDC leaders army and the youth wing of UPRONA. An estimated
prospect of the emergence of a war zone stretching from
Baranyanka and Ntidendereza being Batare (sing. 100,000–200,000 Hutu were killed, and a further 300,000
Luanda to Asmara. Zaire, as it then was, constituted the
Mutare). At legislative elections held in September 1961 fled the country, mainly to Zaire, Tanzania and Rwanda.
junction between these zones for two reasons. First, the
to precede the granting of internal self-government in Virtually all Hutu elements were eliminated from the
Zairean state had virtually disappeared, thus leaving a
January 1962, UPRONA won 58 of the 64 seats in the new armed forces.4 This genocide5 has been a major watershed
‘black hole’ with porous borders, almost no effective
National Assembly. Rwagasore, who became prime minis- in Burundian contemporary history, and it still provides a
national army or administration, very poor communica-
ter, was assassinated three weeks later by a hit-man acting crucial point of reference for the two main ethnic groups
tions between centre and periphery and between periph-
for the PDC. His death was to prove a crucial event in the today. For the Hutu, it is proof of the existence of an ongo-
eries, an essentially informalized economy. Second, the
subsequent history of Burundi; the absence of his unifying ing genocidal plan nurtured by extremist Tutsi;6 for the
Mobutu regime was implicated in the neighbours’ wars: it
influence was to lead to the division of UPRONA and to Tutsi, the fear of ‘le péril hutu’ – the threat that the major-
supported the Khartoum government in its war against the
the emergence of open conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. ity will exterminate the minority – is genuinely felt. The
southern Sudanese rebellion, which was in turn supported
UPRONA proved unable to contain the ethnic tensions events of 1972 also deepened a culture of impunity: the
by the USA, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea; Zairean terri-
that followed the attainment of independence on 1 July fact that no one was prosecuted and punished has con-
tory served as a rear base for attacks by armed movements
1962. The monarchy emerged as the only source of legiti- vinced those responsible for massive human rights viola-
against Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi; and the support
macy to which both Hutu and Tutsi could relate in any tions that anything is possible without fear of prosecution
offered by Mobutu to the Angolan rebel movement
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of meaningful fashion. In order to consolidate his own posi- by either the domestic judicial system or the international
tion, the mwami, Mwambutsa IV, sought to ensure a prop- community. As will be seen later, this practice of impunity

BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

6 7
 Historical background Historical background

has continued throughout the successive rounds of vio- Hima elite, who dominated the army, the civil service, the number of Hutu having access to secondary and higher
lence up to the present day. judiciary and educational institutions. Although Buyoya education. The second was the civil service, whose higher
In November 1976 Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, like emphasized a desire for rapprochement and released hun- echelons in particular used to be a near monopoly of Tutsi.
Micombero a Tutsi-Hima from Rutovu in Bururi province, dreds of political prisoners, it was clear that the major Here, again, progress was clear: not only did recruitment
seized power in a bloodless coup. Although the army challenge facing the new leadership, as had been the case procedures become more transparent, but the govern-
remained a significant force, attempts at developing civil- with Bagaza’s regime, was the claim by the Hutu majority ment took a number of measures aimed at recruiting
ian institutions were made by the Bagaza regime. A new for fuller participation in public life. The reins of power Hutu into responsible positions, sometimes even at the
Constitution, adopted by national referendum in Novem- remained firmly in the hands of the minority Tutsi elite, expense of incumbent Tutsi. However, the third and most
ber 1981, provided for a National Assembly to be elected and Hutu continued to be the victims of discrimination sensitive area remained problematic. The armed forces
by universal adult suffrage, and the first elections were and prosecution. and the security services, which, during the successive
held in October 1982. Having been re-elected president of New violence erupted in August 1988, less than a year crises since 1965, had become almost exclusively Tutsi,
UPRONA at the party’s second national congress in July after Buyoya came to power. In a tense situation, caused resisted change. Coup attempts in February 1989 and
1984, Bagaza was elected head of state in August, for the by rumours and fears of a ‘new 1972’, on which March 1992, and the way in which some army units mis-
first time by direct suffrage, winning 99.63 per cent of the PALIPEHUTU capitalized, several hundred Tutsi were behaved during the November 1991 disturbances in par-
votes cast; he was the sole candidate in both elections. killed and many more fled. During an operation aimed at ticular,10 showed that Buyoya’s message of reconciliation
During the period 1984–7 there was a sharp deteri- ‘restoring order’ the armed forces randomly killed thou- was meeting considerable resistance in penetrating the
oration in the government’s human rights record. This was sands of unarmed Hutu civilians in several northern com- military establishment.
particularly marked in relation to religious freedom, and munes, Ntega and Marangara in particular. The death toll
led Bagaza’s regime into intense conflict with several may have been as high as 20,000, while another 60,000
Christian denominations. The number of political prison- Hutu fled to neighbouring Rwanda.8 ◗
ers, which rose considerably during this period, included Although initially the reactions of the authorities did
members of Churches accused of criticizing government not differ much from those in the past, these dramatic
restrictions on religious activities, as well as people sus- events led to the start of a new policy. ‘Encouraged’ by a
pected of involvement in Hutu opposition groups. Many great deal of pressure from abroad, the president realized
detainees were subjected to torture.7 This intensification that the cycle of ethnic violence had to be broken, and he
of authoritarian rule led to strained relations with a num- initiated a courageous programme of reform. His first two
ber of donor countries, which sought to bring pressure on actions were of considerable psychological value. In Octo-
Bagaza by withholding substantial amounts of develop- ber 1988, Buyoya set up a ‘National Commission to Study
ment aid. Although Hutu rebel movements had been cre- the Question of National Unity’, comprising 12 Hutu and
ated in the past (the first one was the Mouvement de 12 Tutsi, and later that month he appointed a Hutu,
Libération des Bahutu – MOLIBA in 1965), they were Adrien Sibomana, as prime minister, while at the same
politically divided and geographically dispersed, and thus time creating a cabinet where Hutu and Tutsi held an
were no serious threat to the successive military regimes. equal number of portfolios. Although these measures
However, the authoritarian drift of the Bagaza years could be seen as cosmetic to a large extent, they were the
offered the context for the first structuring of the refugee beginning of a profound dynamic of change.
movement. In April 1980, Rémy Gahutu founded the In April 1989 the National Commission published its
PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple report which, while inadequate in many respects,9 initiated
Hutu) in Mishamo camp (Tanzania); some time later, a public debate that was to lead to the drafting of a ‘Char-
FROLINA (Front pour la Libération Nationale) was cre- ter of National Unity’. For this purpose many ‘symposia on
ated by Joseph Karumba in Kigoma, Tanzania. unity’ were organized both in towns and in the country-
On 3 September 1987, during a visit abroad, Bagaza side. Freedom of expression was considerable and the low
was deposed by an army-led coup, instigated by Major profile of the powerful State Security Bureau at this time
Pierre Buyoya, a close associate who accused the former contributed to the emergence of a climate favourable to
president of corruption and formed a Military Committee debate and reflection. The Charter was published as a
for National Salvation (CMSN), comprising 31 army offi- draft in April 1990 and, after a new round of consultations,
cers. The 1981 Constitution was suspended. On 2 October was approved by referendum in February 1991.
Buyoya was sworn in as president, at the head of a new 20- Assessing the situation beyond declarations, texts and
member government, including four army officers. reports, the progress made between late 1988 and early
Bagaza subsequently went into exile in Libya. 1991 was obvious. At the political level, many Hutu
entered the apparatus of the state: at the end of 1990, half
the cabinet, a sizeable number of provincial governors and
Buyoya embarks on a new mayors, and even the secretary-general of UPRONA were
Hutu. Furthermore, they were equally represented with
policy Tutsi in all major state bodies of a political nature. A
marked improvement likewise occurred in two of three

A part from its adoption of a more liberal approach to

the issue of religious freedoms, initially the new
regime did not differ significantly from that of Bagaza. It
key areas where discrimination against the Hutu had been
highly visible in the past. The first was education, where
the by-and-large fair organization of national examinations
remained dependent upon the support of a small Tutsi- after 1989 resulted in a considerable increase in the

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8 9
 Transition to democracy 11

The 1993 elections

I
nitiated in a single-party context, the process of
reform was to continue in quite a different envi-
very much a two-party affair. The Front Démocratique du
Burundi (FRODEBU) emerged as the only significant
The ballot was determined by the percentage of votes cast in favour
of each party, the only ‘distortions’ being those resulting
ronment when the ‘winds of change’ started to

T
challenger to the entrenched rule of UPRONA because of from the reallocation of votes from parties that obtained
hree presidential candidates were put for-
blow over Africa in the early 1990s. Indeed, when its successful recruitment campaign nationwide, its orga- no seats, as well as those caused by unmarked or spoilt
ward to the electorate. The incumbent Pierre
in the past Burundi had returned to constitutional nization, the commitment of its members and the undeni- papers. Since seats were apportioned to provinces in
government after a period of military rule (in 1974 and Buyoya’s bid was supported by his own party,
able charisma of its leader Melchior Ndadaye. In addition, UPRONA, and by the Rassemblement terms of their relative demographic weight (approximate-
1981), this had only happened in a tightly controlled way, many sympathizers of the outlawed PALIPEHUTU saw ly one seat for 70,000 inhabitants), they ranged from nine
with UPRONA acting, together with the army, as the Démocratique pour le Développement
FRODEBU as a valid legal alternative to further the Hutu Économique et Social (RADDES), a small satellite orga- for Gitega to two for Cankuzo. As a result the composition
guarantor of Tutsi hegemony. Like many African leaders cause. This led to the second reality: starting at the end of nization. The main challenger, Melchior Ndadaye, was put of the Assembly in July 1993 was as follows: out of a total
before him, Buyoya was eventually forced into accepting 1992, the salience of ethnicity as a major electoral element forward by his own party FRODEBU, as well as by the of 81 seats, UPRONA held 16 and FRODEBU 65, or 80.2
the introduction of multi-party democracy, with all the
emerged with increasing clarity; after realizing the consid- Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (RPB), the Parti du per cent. Changes could only be made to Burundi’s Con-
dangers it entailed for his efforts at ethnic reconciliation.
erable ground that the new party was gaining, UPRONA Peuple (PP), and the Parti Libéral (PL); the clear ‘out- stitution by a vote of four-fifths of the 81 deputies, and
Many feared that ethnic voting in a competitive system
embarked on a campaign which attempted to discredit sider’, Pierre-Claver Sendegeya, was proposed by the roy- FRODEBU’s overwhelming majority lifted it just over
that was difficult to control would result in the demo-
graphic majority of Hutu emerging as a political reality. FRODEBU, accusing it of being an ethnic organization of alist party, Parti pour la Reconciliation du Peuple (PRP). that 80 per cent threshold. In ethnic terms, the break-
When the Constitutional Commission started its work Hutu, and even the ‘legal arm’ of PALIPEHUTU. Indeed, Given that ethnicity is of such obvious relevance, it should down in the membership of the new National Assembly
in April 1991, right after the approval of the Charter of some Tutsi who had joined FRODEBU were even physi- be noted that Buyoya, as a Tutsi, found himself faced by was as follows: 69 (about 85 per cent) Hutu and 12 (about
National Unity, this concern was ever-present in the cally intimidated by UPRONA supporters in order to two rival Hutu candidates. 15 per cent) Tutsi. Of the latter, eight were FRODEBU
minds of its members. As a consequence, the report pub- make such ‘traitors’ quit that party. This was a paradoxical The elections of 1 June took place in a generally calm and four were UPRONA, which meant that about 12 per
lished in August 1991 and the Constitution approved by and counter-productive policy, not only because it was and dignified atmosphere, under the watchful eyes of cent of FRODEBU’s members were Tutsi, compared to
referendum in March 1992 are remarkable documents. contrary to the spirit of the Charter of National Unity and about 100 foreign and 1,000 national observers. Apart 25 per cent of UPRONA’s. A major implication of the eth-
Certainly no other country’s constitutional engineering thus to UPRONA’s own ideology, but also, and more from a number of minor technical problems, the opera- nic breakdown was that, even across party lines, the Tutsi
has resulted in such an insistence on the need for ‘a spirit importantly, because it strengthened the view that tion was conducted in a fair manner. In a press release, did not have a blocking minority of 20 per cent, should
of national unity’. Formulated as a principle in as many as UPRONA was Tutsi and that FRODEBU was Hutu, one of the observer missions, the National Democratic they feel that a proposed constitutional amendment
12 Articles, this objective was made operational by the which – given the relative demographic weights of the Institute for International Affairs, confirmed: threatened their vital interests.15
obligation in several fields to take account of the ‘diverse ethnic groups – could only play into the hands of
FRODEBU. Although this was contrary to the latter’s ‘what the people of Burundi already know: the June
component parts of the Burundian population’, a refer- 1st elections have been organized in an atmosphere
ence to the ethnic groups and, to a lesser extent, to the stated policy, some local propagandists capitalized on this
feeling, making their constituents understand that of calm and transparency, thus allowing the free A demographic majority turned
regions.12 Thus, for example, ‘the government [shall] be expression of the Burundian people in the choice of
composed in a spirit of national unity, taking into account FRODEBU was the only efficient defender of Hutu
their new President’. (translated from French)14 political majority
the diverse component parts of the Burundian population’ interests. In particular, those local FRODEBU leaders
who were in reality PALIPEHUTU militants increasingly
(Article 84); likewise, the lists of candidates for the parlia-
mentary elections ‘shall be composed in a spirit of nation- manipulated ethnicity as the campaign proceeded.
Although some outspoken members of FRODEBU
There is, of course, a clear connection between the hon-
est running of the elections and the result which surprised
so many observers. Indeed, Ndadaye (64.75 per cent of the
A fter having ruled in Burundi since 1965 without chal-
lenge, UPRONA was significantly weakened by los-
ing the presidency and holding only a politically useless
al unity, taking into account … [etc.]’ (Article 101).
After the promulgation of the law-decree on political were the victims of harassment, arrest and even physical vote) decisively beat Buyoya (32.39 per cent). As was to be minority of under 20 per cent in the National Assembly.
parties in April 1992, the practice of multi-partyism start- violence by local authorities, and while the government- expected, Sendegeya (1.44 per cent) was never in the pic- The former single party (de jure since 1966) had comfort-
ed to take shape. Although the recognition of parties was owned media were far from impartial, the electoral cam- ture, and the remaining ballot papers were unmarked or ably survived three coups and several massive killings,
subject to stringent conditions – which meant that some paign was relatively open, with FRODEBU in particular void. The turnout was a massive 97.3 per cent of registered including one in 1972 which was of a genocidal nature,
organizations were forced to change their programmes, drawing huge attendances at its meetings and rallies. As voters, a clear sign of the interest of Burundians in their but was almost blown away by the first democratic exer-
and even their names – seven opposition parties were was to be expected, the other opposition parties were first opportunity ever to determine who should be their cise since 1965. This simply confirmed the fact that
operating legally by the end of the year.13 During 1992–3, hardly visible, except in the home areas of some of their head of state by means of a competitive election. UPRONA had little or no popular support as a national
the government declined to set up a transitional regime or main leaders. The picture which had emerged at the beginning of June party, being rather the instrument to legitimize and orga-
to hold a national conference as elsewhere in French- 1993 was considerably reinforced and made more explicit nize the monopolization of power in the hands of a small
speaking Africa. But, despite some incidents and accusa- at the end of the month during the legislative elections. Of Tutsi elite. While UPRONA was the political facade for
tions that UPRONA was taking undue advantage of its
◗ the 10 recognized parties, only six eventually submitted lists this ‘legitimacy’, the army was its physical base. The voters
position as the former single party, the country moved of candidates to the electorate. Overall, 71.4 per cent voted destroyed the charade of unanimity. What should have
quite smoothly towards the electoral moment of truth. for FRODEBU (up by more than 6 per cent on Ndadaye’s been an asset for Buyoya eventually turned out to be a
Although the opposition parties insisted on a later date, score) as against 21.43 per cent for UPRONA (down by major liability: the material and financial means of the
President Buyoya, who mistakenly believed he would almost 11 per cent on Buyoya’s score). Of the four other state, the complicity of the administration and the official
emerge as the winner, announced in early 1993 that the participating parties – the PRP, RADDES, the PP and the media and, above all, the support of a party supposedly
presidential elections were to take place on 1 June, fol- RPB – none reached 2 per cent nationwide, or even came well-organized and omnipresent. The association of Buy-
lowed by National Assembly elections on 29 June. close to winning a seat. oya with these symbols of past injustice, violence and
During the run-up to these deadlines, two realities As Burundi used a system of proportional representa- oppression undoubtedly put off many voters who might
soon emerged. First, it was clear that the contest was to be tion, the distribution of seats in the National Assembly otherwise have recognized his qualities of statesmanship.

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10 11
 The 1993 elections

The 1993 coup and its

The same unravelling of one-party rule has occurred in coming elections for the National Assembly be cancelled.
other African countries, and there would be nothing extra- These protests by students, later joined by school children
ordinary about this process in Burundi were it not for the and civil servants, continued for several days and led to vio-
country’s particular ethnic composition and relations. lence which resulted in a few casualties, as well as seriously
Indeed, although some leading figures of UPRONA and disturbing the school examinations. On 9 June, a petition
FRODEBU were respectively Hutu and Tutsi, the former
was perceived as a Tutsi and the latter as a Hutu party, while
at the same time both claimed ethnic ‘virginity’. Yet history
explains these ethnic identifications. UPRONA has in the
was published by an organization calling itself ‘Jeunesse en
Quête d’une Démocratisation Adaptée aux Réalités du
Pays’ (‘Youth in search of a democratization adapted to the
realities of the country’), insisting that political life had been
aftermath
past been very much a party of and for the Tutsi minority, ‘tribalized’, and claiming that the ‘pseudo-democracy’ put
and only during recent years were Hutu co-opted into its in place ‘automatically excludes the ethnic minority’.
leadership structure. FRODEBU, on the other hand, was However, a more serious threat was to come from the
created as a clandestine party in 1986, mainly as a response army, as most troops and almost all officers were Tutsi. A A short grace period required the implementation of a privatization policy.
However, many leaders in private business came from the
to authoritarian rule and human rights abuses under the first attempt was made by a group of soldiers from Bururi

F
or the new regime inaugurated on 10 July, the public sector (former ministers, senior civil servants, supe-
Bagaza regime. Conflicts then carried a definite ethnic over- during the night of 16–17 June, but it was easily sup-
period of grace was very short. It was imme- rior army officers); of course they were almost all Tutsi.
tone, and the initial leaders of FRODEBU were Hutu, pressed. Another serious warning of discontent in certain
diately faced with considerable problems: the For the new government, therefore, there was a real risk
some of whom had been active in the political organization Tutsi circles came on the night of 2–3 July, when a group
massive return of refugees, the delicate bal- that the privatization programme would allow the ‘barons’
of refugees. More generally, the fact that the new party was of soldiers from a Bujumbura barracks attempted to seize
ancing of the administration, the hostility of of the former regimes to transform their past political
challenging UPRONA, and therefore a long history of Tutsi the residence of the president-elect. After other units had
both the public and private media (generally very close to power into economic power. It is understandable, under
rule, was in itself sufficient to qualify it as Hutu. failed to support their attempted coup, the leaders of the
the former incumbents), the inertia and even sabotage of these circumstances, why the government wished to re-
The ‘ethnic’ interpretation certainly gained in cogency insurgents were arrested, including five high-ranking offi-
those in the army, the civil service and the judiciary close examine the conditions of privatization. A similar concern
from the presidential elections, and those for the Nation- cers, and their action was condemned both by the outgo-
to UPRONA, and the control of most of the economy by explains the decision to reduce drastically the deposit
al Assembly. When UPRONA’s Tutsi candidate, Buyoya, ing president and by the army command. Although the
the ousted elite. With the accession of FRODEBU to required from contractors in public tenders; this was to
obtained over 32 per cent, it was clear that a sizeable num- outcome at first sight seemed reassuring in that the num- power, the return of Hutu refugees suddenly accelerated encourage small-scale Hutu businesses to compete in
ber of Hutu had voted for him; and because the support ber of soldiers involved was limited, and they had been in a new political context, which gave rise to summary these markets. Another illustration of the distrust of the
of at least some Tutsi for FRODEBU’s Hutu candidate unable to muster much support, one of the arrested offi- methods of land dispute settlement. The large influx of government with regard to commitments made by previ-
Ndadaye was well known, it was obvious that voting dur- cers was President Buyoya’s Directeur de cabinet, and the refugees overloaded the system and, in practice, the local ous administrations was the suspension of privileges
ing the 1 June election had not been merely along ethnic attempt in itself reflected the considerable discontent felt authorities settled the land claims. This not only led to the which the gold refining and export company, Affimet,
lines. The further landslide by FRODEBU at the Nation- by some members of the ousted elite. eviction without due process of people long settled in enjoyed under the tax-free zone system. The anxiety
al Assembly elections, however, resulted in a distribution This was well understood by President Ndadaye, and refugees’ properties, but also to instances of usurpation of which this measure caused among the business communi-
of seats (80 per cent versus 20 per cent) that came close to his initial steps were cautiously aimed at building confi- land and the challenging of established tenure. ty was well reflected by a foreign consultant, who felt that
reflecting the demographic weight of the two main ethnic dence. On the day of his inauguration, 10 July 1993, he In a country like Burundi, where paid employment is the new regime ‘does not have a clear understanding of
groups (85 per cent versus 15 per cent). Hence, for many announced the formation of a government of national scarce, access to the civil service is always a delicate polit- the need to promote domestic and foreign investments’.16
members of the Tutsi elite, the spectre of the country’s unity. Out of a total of 23 portfolios, FRODEBU only held ical problem. But two elements further inflamed this issue A final illustration of the new government facing a state
demographic majority being turned into a political major- 13 (despite commanding a large majority in the National in Burundi. On the one hand, the new government had a apparatus which it did not trust, was the emergence of a
ity became a reality, all the more so since the ethnic com- Assembly), while UPRONA had six, and the PP and the legitimate interest in balancing an administration which conflict with the judiciary, another bastion of Tutsi hege-
position of the National Assembly fitted the 85 per RPB (among the parties that supported Ndadaye’s bid for was closely linked to UPRONA, and in which Tutsi held a mony. The political importance of the Constitutional
cent/15 per cent breakdown almost exactly. the Presidency) one each; in addition, two army officers disproportionate share of the posts. Although there was, Court, in particular, was apparent from the start, as a dis-
(classified as independent, albeit considered to be ‘close’ undeniably, some handing out of spoils to the winning pute arose between the FRODEBU and UPRONA
to UPRONA) held the Ministry of Defence and the State camp, the new government also had good reasons to National Assembly parties after the election of a FRODE-
The new regime threatened Secretariat for Internal Security. Looking at the cabinet doubt the loyalty of a civil service which it suspected of BU speaker, deputy speaker and secretary of the National
from an ethnic angle, more than one-third (9 out of 23) of resistance and even sabotage. On the other hand, a num- Assembly. In a judgment of 2 August 1993 the Court
T his was certainly the interpretation given to the elec-
toral exercise by many in the Tutsi elite. They saw
FRODEBU’s victory as proof that a demographic ethnic
its members were Tutsi, as was the prime minister, Sylvie
Kinigi (UPRONA). Another ‘reassuring’ element was the
ber of returning refugees had professional expertise,
which the regime wished to put to use. This being said,
found in favour of UPRONA, arguing that the Rules of
the National Assembly, dating back to 1982, were contrary
inclusion of five ministers from Bururi province, which clearly a policy of increasing ‘Frodebization’ resulted in to the 1992 Constitution. Gilles Bimazubute, the deputy
majority had translated into a political majority and they
had been the seat of power since 1965. the failure to comply fully with certain recruitment rules, speaker, reacted vigorously, stating that the judgment was
feared that they would be victimized as the outcome of a
vote that was seen as having taken place essentially on an On the other hand, Ndadaye also showed that he meant e.g. at the Military Academy (ISCAM), the National ‘a useless provocation’ and that the chair of the Court
ethnic basis. Indeed, FRODEBU’s communiqué of 3 to inaugurate a programme of change since no member of Police School (ENAPO) and the Centre for Postal Train- should resign.
June, in which the winning party thanked the outgoing the outgoing cabinet was re-appointed. In addition, all ing. In particular, the use of a quota system per province Clearly the transition was painful during the first three
president and the armed forces, did little to alleviate those provincial governors were replaced (14 of the 16 replace- during the selection of candidates for ENAPO caused a months of the new regime. The desire of the government
fears, despite its reference to ‘a victory of the whole ments were FRODEBU, one UPRONA, one PRP), as great deal of anxiety among Tutsi, because it was seen as a to acquire the means to implement its policies was legiti-
Burundian people and of all political forces adhering to were the chiefs of staff of the army and the gendarmerie, as precedent for the recruitment of army troops scheduled mate, but it met with a great deal of inertia and resistance,
democratic principles’. well as most ambassadors. Moreover, new personnel also for November. Likewise, in the administration at the and gave rise to excesses. In fact, Ndadaye was caught in a
These concerns were openly expressed when Tutsi stu- took possession of many intermediate and lower positions national, provincial and local levels, many civil servants dilemma Buyoya had also experienced: for some he was
dents demonstrating in Bujumbura on 4 June claimed that in the civil service and in the local administration. In other were replaced by new appointees who were not always the going too far too fast, for others progress was too slow and
the elections had in reality become an ‘ethnic inventory of words, while at the top the policy of ‘power-sharing’ (int- best qualified candidates. did not meet expectations. This was inevitable after a long
Burundi’; their slogans read ‘Oui à la démocratie, non à waro rusangi) was continued, the occupation of the field by In the economic field, too, the government inherited a period of monolithic and authoritarian rule by a minority.
l’ethnisation du pouvoir’ (‘Yes to democracy, no to the eth- FRODEBU became more intense towards the less visible situation requiring careful handling. While the Burundian Acts of political or simply criminal violence, insecurity of
nicization of power’) and they demanded that the forth- bottom of the pyramid. tradition is one of state control, structural adjustment land tenure and the attendant tensions, and, above all, the

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12 13
 The 1993 coup and its aftermath

The search for a

real or imaginary prospect of an imminent reform of the people, mainly Hutu, fled to neighbouring countries
armed forces, increasingly upset the groups privileged (400,000 to Rwanda, 250,000 to Tanzania, 60,000 to
under the former regimes, who, although they were a small Zaire). In addition, two types of internal population flows
minority, did have the monopoly of armed force. This dis- affected many hundreds of thousands: on the one hand
content was the origin of the coup of 21 October 1993. In people referred to as ‘displaced persons’, i.e. Tutsi, gath-
fact, this was just the most violent expression of resistance
to change of those who had enjoyed privileges for three
decades – resistance that had been visible since Buyoya
embarked on his new policy at the end of 1988.
ered in military installations, health units and administra-
tive centres under the protection of the army; on the
other, ‘dispersed persons’, i.e. Hutu, hid in the bush and
swamps, which some left during the day to work in their
settlement: from Kigobe
The coup and large-scale
violence
fields. In many places, Burundi resembled a leopard skin,
with patches of concentrated Tutsi, ‘surrounded’ by dis-
persed Hutu. This de facto segregation was to be further
accentuated when ethnic cleansing against the Hutu
to Arusha
started in Bujumbura in early 1994. Under the guise of
‘disarmament operations’, Hutu suburbs like Kamenge,

D uring the night of 20–21 October 1993, several units

of the army staged a coup d’état.17 President Nda-
daye, the speaker and the deputy speaker of the National
Kinama, Cibitoke and Gasenyi were targeted by the army
and radical Tutsi militia; hundreds were killed and many The Government Convention ties, which were not offered portfolios. They threatened
violence, and, only two days later, on 11 February, repre-
thousands fled to Zaire or the neighbouring countryside.

I
Assembly, and a few of Ndadaye’s close associates were sentatives of PIT, RADDES, PRP and Inkinzo were
As the coup formally collapsed in the face of its rejec- n an attempt to find a modus vivendi, the so-
assassinated. There was a power vacuum. The govern- appointed to government posts; at least two of the new
tion both internationally and at home, the conspirators called Kigobe talks were held in early 1994. How-
ment went ‘into exile’ in the French embassy, stating that ministers had been actively involved in the organization of
were forced to devise other, more covert and subtle ways ever, rather than addressing the real problems of
it did not trust the army and that its security could only be the violence at the beginning of the month.
to control the political situation. This was the beginning of the country, this process dealt with the distribu-
guaranteed by an international military force. The army, Not only was hooliganism thus seen as politically
a ‘creeping coup’ perpetrated by a coalition of the army tion of offices and functions, a feature we will
while claiming since 23 October that it obeyed the consti- rewarding, but the composition of the government
and opposition forces. It was eventually to be one of the meet again later. This was an approach in which only
tutional authorities, in fact continued to operate outside formed on 11 February explicitly confirmed the ethnic
‘most successful failed coups’ in history. The strategy FRODEBU could make concessions, and that is what
the law, and rejected any form of foreign intervention. bipolarization of the political system: all the ministers
deployed included attempts to destroy the legitimacy of happened increasingly. The Kigobe Accord was signed on
The power vacuum had two consequences: on the one from the opposition parties were now Tutsi, while – apart
FRODEBU by accusing it of being responsible for a 19 January 1994 by nine political parties. It was agreed by
hand, for several weeks the civilian authorities were from two Tutsi from FRODEBU – those from the mou-
planned genocide of the Tutsi; the use of the Constitu- all but three small Tutsi parties (ANADDE, PSD and
unable to take control of large parts of the country and to vance présidentielle (the presidential side) were Hutu.
tional Court to paralyse the presidency and the National ABASA) that the successor to President Ndadaye was to
engage in a campaign of restoring peace and order. This The way in which the government was formed, in two
Assembly; the unleashing of urban and rural violence with be elected by the National Assembly, and a constitutional
undoubtedly contributed to the violence which over- steps, under the threat of street violence and under the
the complicity of the armed forces and the physical intim- amendment to that effect was promulgated. The parties
whelmed the country on a massive scale. On the other aegis of the army, expressed the deep political impasse.
idation of FRODEBU officials, thus making the running also agreed that the new president was to come from the
hand, this situation allowed certain political forces of the of the state increasingly difficult; and, finally, the imposi- This episode also exemplified the profound rift between
ranks of FRODEBU and that Cyprien Ntaryamira was to Bujumbura and the rest of the country: the whole power
opposition, in connivance with the army, to implement a tion of a de facto constitutional order which in effect con- fill the position. The prime minister was to be appointed play took place in the capital, controlled by the army and
‘creeping coup’ as the initial formal coup collapsed. solidated the achievements of the coup. This strategy after consultation with all political parties, and it was by small extremist groups, in a way totally disconnected
As the coup unfolded in Bujumbura, violence erupted increasingly radicalized political life and progressively understood that he or she was to come from a party and or from the expectations of the vast majority of the rural pop-
in the provinces. In many places, resistance to the army handicapped the search for a peaceful solution.18 ethnic group other than that of the president. ulation, whose electoral choice was disregarded and who
and reprisals against Tutsi and even Hutu belonging to
However, the implementation of the accord was jeopar- had no say whatsoever.
UPRONA were immediately organized by local authori-
dized by the violence which accompanied the organization
ties (e.g. municipal administrators, hill chiefs); in other ◗ of ‘dead city’ days by small opposition parties in Bujumbu-
Less than two months later, the country was again fac-
places, the violence was carried out spontaneously. The ing an institutional vacuum as a result of President
population started blocking roads and cutting bridges in ra. During the next round of talks at Kajaga it was agreed Ntaryamira’s death in the attack against the Rwandan
order to prevent the military from moving into the coun- that the president was to be inaugurated under the condi- presidential plane in Kigali on 6 April 1994. This allowed
tryside. Indeed, people knew from experience that tion that the government be headed by a prime minister the opposition to claim new negotiations, and thus
‘restoration of order’ by the Burundian army tends to be from the opposition and that 60 per cent of the ministers attempt to obtain further concessions from the majority.
costly in terms of lost civilian lives. In many places, the came from FRODEBU and its allies and 40 per cent from As the ‘Novotel negotiations’ proceeded, from July
Hutu population, often under the command of FRODE- the opposition. Furthermore, the opposition was to be rep- onwards, the opposition required more and more, going
BU local authorities, started arresting Tutsi and members resented in so-called ‘sensitive sectors’ (intelligence, infor- so far as to claim 60 per cent of positions in government
of UPRONA. While some were killed immediately, others mation, police); it would also obtain 40 per cent of the in a document produced in August. A new agreement,
were initially kept hostage; a large number were executed positions of provincial governors and municipal adminis- finally signed on 10 September 1994, allowed for the des-
as soon as the news of Ndadaye’s death broke. It appears trators. The so-called Kajaga Agreement of 4 February ignation of Sylvestre Ntibantunganya of FRODEBU as
that many of those most active in the killings were recent finally allowed the inauguration of President Ntaryamira the new president. The ‘Government Convention’ was
FRODEBU recruits who in reality belonged to the next day. Still dissatisfied, the most radical micro-par- extremely far-reaching, not so much because the opposi-
PALIPEHUTU. Elsewhere, both the army and local Tutsi ties rejected the accord and called for resistance against tion increased its share in government to 45 per cent, but
embarked on a killing spree, attacking Hutu and FRODE- what they called a ‘coup d’état’. The threat of urban street rather because the 1992 Constitution was effectively sus-
BU members without provocation. About 50,000 people violence was renewed on the occasion of the formation of pended and replaced by mechanisms which annihilated
were killed, more or less as many Hutu as Tutsi. the government. When the new prime minister designate, FRODEBU’s electoral victory. In addition, it had supra-
Apart from the killings, the violence also caused huge Anatole Kanyenkiko (a Tutsi belonging to UPRONA), constitutional status, because ‘the Constitution remains
population movements of different kinds. About 700,000 announced his cabinet on 9 February, its composition did valid (only) insofar as it is not contrary to this Convention’
not correspond to the wishes of the small opposition par- (Article 6) during a transitional period which was to last

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14 15
 The search for a settlement: from Kigobe to Arusha The search for a settlement: from Kigobe to Arusha

until 9 June 1998 (Article 7). The amendments to the con- former Tanzanian President Nyerere, who was entrusted 29 July: no spectacular progress was made, but a relaxed negotiations should be conducted between two groups,
stitutional structure were important and manifold: indeed, with a mediation mission by the regional leaders. As most atmosphere allowed the adoption of procedural rules, an those who hold power today and those who lost it after the
the Convention was the institutional translation of the Burundian political forces across the political spectrum initial debate on the nature of the conflict and agreement coup in 1996;32 another former president, Jean-Baptiste
October 1993 coup; the Constitution was shelved and the were present, this isolated the government which was on the dates for the third round. The government also ini- Bagaza, stated that the prerequisites for meaningful nego-
outcome of both the presidential and National Assembly eventually dragged into the process. tiated steps to convince Nyerere, who was adopting a tiations had not been met.33 The positions on the delicate
elections was swept aside as the president and National legalistic attitude and only recognized Léonard Nyango- topics of power-sharing and the security forces remained
Assembly were placed under the tutelage of a ‘National ma as the president of the CNDD-FDD, to bring the dis- very divergent, while the same was true for the interpre-
Security Council’, an unconstitutional body dominated by The Arusha negotiations sident armed wing, FDD, under the leadership of Colonel tation of the country’s history: Hutu and Tutsi blamed
the opposition.19 Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, into the negotiations. The each other for genocide. The mediator became irritated

From creeping coup to formal

T he year 1998 saw the actual beginning of the Arusha
negotiations.21 After concluding a political partner-
ship, the formal swearing in of President Buyoya and the
issue of the sanctions imposed by the countries in the
region was raised, but not debated. The third round
brought the participants together from 13 to 22 October.
by these impasses and viewed progress as being too slow:
‘I would not be telling the truth if I told you that I am
pleased with the progress made to date.’34 In order to
installation of a new government, the regime felt it was An agreement was reached on the composition and the maintain pressure, he attempted to convince donors not
coup now in a position to take up the invitation of the mediator presidency of most of the committees: each committee to resume aid, which led to frustration on the part of the
Julius Nyerere. The first round of talks, from 15 to 21 June comprised 18 members, one representative per delega- Burundian government and to a hardening of positions,
W hile the creeping coup continued, the country
became increasingly engaged in an expanding civil
war. In June 1994, some leading members of FRODEBU
1998, brought together 17 delegations from Burundi.22
Some of the, mainly Tutsi, micro-parties consisted of no
tion admitted to the negotiations;29 the presidents were
the Reverend Matteo Zuppi from the Sant’Egidio Com-
especially on the Tutsi side.
Julius Nyerere died on 14 October 1999. After showing
more than their leader with a few friends and relatives. In munity, the South African professor Nicholas Haysom, the a great deal of reluctance, Nelson Mandela accepted his
created the National Council for the Defence of Democ-
addition to offering a semblance of legitimacy to radicals Mozambican politician Armando Emilio Guebuza and appointment as the new mediator by a regional summit
racy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie
without much of a constituency, this contributed to the Georg Lenkin, director at the Austrian Ministry for held in Arusha on 1 December 1999. His style was dis-
– CNDD) and its armed wing, the Forces for the Defence
of Democracy (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie complexity of the process. Although, at the beginning of Development Cooperation (the presidency of the com- tinctly different from that of Nyerere. More direct and
– FDD). During 1995, between 15,000 and 25,000 peo- the talks, the exchanges remained at a rather general level, mittee on guarantees for the implementation of the impatient than his predecessor, Mandela insisted on the
ple, mainly civilians, were killed. Most of the victims were the participants paved the way for the future discussions. accord resulting from the negotiations was temporarily direct involvement of the rebel movements in the talks,
Hutu, killed by the army and Tutsi militias, but the num- First, they committed themselves to ‘undertake serious left vacant). and he severely challenged the Burundian political class
ber of Tutsi victims started to increase in the second half negotiations until a fair and sustainable solution to the cri- The fourth round took place from 18 to 23 January on its ‘inflexibility’: ‘The daily slaughter of men, women
of 1995, when the FDD and two older rebel movements, sis in the country is reached’, and ‘to resolve the Burundi- 1999 and only brought very limited progress, an omen of and children is an indictment of every one of you … The
the National Liberation Front (Front National de Libéra- an conflict by peaceful means and to put an end to all a process losing momentum. Now that the participants lack of urgency is an indictment of every one of you.’35 On
tion – FNL, an armed faction of the PALIPEHUTU forms of violence’; therefore, ‘all armed parties in the con- were to deal with concrete issues, contradictions became 24 January 2000, he condemned Burundi for the contin-
party) and FROLINA (Front pour la Libération flict declare a cessation of hostilities beginning July 20, increasingly difficult to overcome and the positions of the ued detention of hundreds of thousands of civilians in
Nationale) stepped up their actions. 1998, at the latest’. These general commitments were fol- various parties remained fixed, for example, on the deli- ‘concentration camps’, a reference to the massive
In the meantime, the institutions were increasingly lowed by the identification of the issues which were to cate topic of reforming the security forces. Although it was regroupment of civilian populations.36 On 21 February, he
paralysed. When the cabinet was reshuffled on 12 form the subject of negotiations. They constitute a fairly agreed that the committees would continue working in said that Burundi would not return to peace if the Tutsi
December 1995, FRODEBU and its allies were left with complete list of issues to which solutions should be found.23 order to present reports to a plenary session scheduled for maintained a monopoly of power in politics, the military
only 11 out of 26 portfolios, a paradoxical situation for a The decision was taken to entrust the study of each of June, there were increasing doubts about the willingness and the economy: ‘This situation cannot continue.’37 While
party holding 80 per cent of seats in the National Assem- these issues to a committee, whose presidency and com- to arrive at a negotiated settlement. In a very Burundian Mandela’s previous statements already caused some
bly. Numerous FRODEBU officials at the local, provin- position would be decided during the subsequent rounds way of doing business, characterized by the ‘unsaid’ and grumbling, this time eight Tutsi-dominated parties react-
cial and national level were in jail or in exile, and the party of negotiations. Nevertheless, while setting the agenda the ‘almost-said’, there were perpetual retreats and ques- ed angrily. In a declaration made public on 23 February
was unable to carry out anything resembling normal polit- constituted an important step, in stark contrast to previous tioning, constant strategic re-positioning and the further they stated that Mandela’s comments ‘do not correspond
ical activities. The radicalization and fragmentation of the efforts,24 the reservations expressed not only by the gov- fragmentation of the internal and external political land- with the social and historical reality of Burundi’ and that
political landscape led to a total breakdown: president and ernment but also by the ‘Tutsi’ parties (UPRONA, AV- scape, the impression increasingly being that of a process ‘this thesis is dangerous in so much as it runs the risk of
National Assembly were impotent, the cabinet was divid- INTWARI, INKINZO, PIT, PRP and PSD), clearly in which the Burundians pretended to talk, with the inter- justifying the continuation of the genocide against the
ed and unable to formulate and implement coherent poli- indicated that a real consensus was far from being national community pretending to believe they did.30 In Tutsi’.38 Undeterred, the mediator continued to speak his
cies, and the army effectively controlled what little state reached. Thus, for instance, the government’s reservations addition, the large number of international and regional, mind in less than diplomatic language. On 25 March, he
power remained in the country. Thus, rather than bring- concerned the location of the next meeting, but more so bilateral and multilateral, governmental and non-govern- strongly criticized the Burundian government on the fate
ing stability, the Government Convention resulted in the the reference made to ‘armed parties’ when the issue of mental ‘mediators’ and ‘peace-makers’, and the lack of of political prisoners and the ‘regrouped’ populations:
total paralysis of the institutions, blocked by discord and suspending hostilities was raised: the government made it coordination between them, have hampered rather than
the progressive privatization of state functions.20 clear that this mention only related to ‘armed factions’ and helped the process.31 However, the close of the fourth ‘Some are languishing in jail because they do not
When, on 25 July 1996, the army staged a new coup and did not concern the Burundian army.25 Since, for its part, round coincided with an important victory for the Burun- agree with the head of state … Others are in
restored former President Buyoya to power, this in effect the military wing of the CNDD-FDD,26 which was not dian government. The seventh regional summit on Burun- regroupment camps that the United Nations has
described as not fit for any human being to live in …
confirmed the existing situation. While the countries of the involved in the talks, did not consider itself as being di, which took place in Arusha on 23 January, decided to
That is a situation that is totally unacceptable to a
region reacted by imposing an embargo on Burundi, Buy- bound by any ceasefire arrangement, the chances of a ces- lift the economic sanctions imposed on Burundi at the
person as me, who has spent 27 years in jail.’ 39
oya was to move slowly and cautiously towards negotia- sation of hostilities were rather slim, and, in fact, even end of July 1996. The joint communiqué specified, how-
tions. ‘Reflection seminars’ were organized throughout after the agreed date of 20 July, the fighting continued and ever, that ‘the lifting of sanctions could be reconsidered While some Tutsi groups (such as the Mukasi wing of
1997; discreet meetings were held in Rome with the involved parties ssuch as FROLINA and PALIPEHUTU27 bearing in mind the progress made in the negotiations’. UPRONA and the organization AC-Génocide Cirimoso)
CNDD-FDD; in August 1997 a ‘Peace Process Minister’ which were present in Arusha.28 The non-inclusion of The risk of failure loomed increasingly. The high num- had already openly opposed the peace process in the past,
was appointed; in October 1997, Prime Minister Ndimira some armed groups, in particular the FDD, was to prove ber of participants and the fragmentation of the political Mandela’s strong views reinforced this resistance. On 7
presented a plan for re-launching the peace process to the a fundamental handicap throughout the process. landscape were not the only reasons, and some Burundi- February, Tutsi organizations demonstrated in Bujumbu-
National Assembly. However, the regime refused to partic- This did not impede the continuation of the negotia- an actors doubted the chances for success: former presi- ra; a document published on 26 February by the govern-
ipate in a meeting called on 25 August 1997 in Arusha by tions. A second round of talks took place between 20 and dent Ntibantunganya expressed the view that the ment, while couched in cautious and ambiguous terms,

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16 17
 The search for a settlement: from Kigobe to Arusha

Not just Hutu and Tutsi:

contained a warning to the mediator: ‘No solution will be about the integration of rebel forces. The implementation
imposed or precipitated … The government intends to of this complex accord by parties who profoundly distrust
play its leading role.’40 A worse omen still, on 3 April, five each other would be difficult in itself, but the implemen-
organizations of the radical Tutsi opposition vowed to take tation of what is, to some extent, a non-accord may well
up arms to fight any agreement with the ‘authors of geno- prove almost impossible. On the other hand, the 28
cide’.41 For their part, the FDD and FNL rebel groups
also remained very reluctant to commit themselves unre-
servedly to the search for a political settlement.
August signing could be one step in an ongoing process.
Only the future will tell, but the possibility of the violent
rejection of an agreement, perceived as imposed by those
who feel implementation is contrary to their interests,
disadvantaged groups in
Insecure outcome
cannot be ruled out from the outset.45

◗
society
C learly, many obstacles remain on the road to peace.
The resistance of certain small but powerful groups
in Bujumbura is one, the situation in the Congo is anoth-
er. The siding of Burundian rebels, the FDD in particular,
with Congolese President Kabila and his allies42 tempts Regions budgetary allocations show a very strong urban bias. In
the 1980s, Bujumbura and its hinterland absorbed 50 per
them to believe that they can remove the Burundian

B
cent of all public investment; this figure reached 90 per
regime by force. In addition, the constantly shifting ecause of both history and the present, the
cent for social sector outlays. Total funding for the rural
geopolitical landscape, demonstrated, for example by the notion of ‘groups’ and ‘minorities’ in Burundi
sector amounted to a mere 20 per cent.49 Commenting on
Rwandan-Ugandan conflict, affects the predictability nec- tends to refer exclusively to Hutu, Tutsi and
a villagization programme in the Imbo region, J.-C.
essary for negotiations to be held in good faith. Because of Twa. This is due to what the French historian
Willame notes that ‘many peasants were not the owners of
constantly emerging obstacles, deadlines set for the sign- Jean-Pierre Chrétien has called ‘ethnic
the plots they received and they worked for (Tutsi) civil
ing of the accord were postponed on several occasions, regression’, i.e. the fact that all conflicts and divisions in
servants and political notables living in Bujumbura’.50
adding to increasing donor fatigue. Moreover, some ‘pro- Burundian society are reinterpreted in terms of the ethnic
FRODEBU’s 1993 electoral programme,51 however,
fessional negotiators’ have an interest in prolonging the divide. Yet, other cleavages pit groups against one another.
reflected a desire to initiate a redistribution in favour of
process. The Human Rights League Iteka has calculated In fact, even the ethnic groups are not homogeneous cat-
the rural world. Investments in the primary sector (agri-
that, by saving on the daily allowances, delegates can egories. Thus, there exists an old antagonism between
culture) were to reach 50 per cent of the state investment
‘earn’ their normal income for five months in just one Tutsi-Banyaruguru and Tutsi-Hima, the latter being geo-
budget; tax incentives were to stimulate the agricultural
week’s attendance at Arusha.43 While progress has graphically concentrated in Bururi province and dominat- sector; associations of farmers were to be encouraged; and
undoubtedly been made,44 the slow pace, the lack of trust ing the successive military regimes since 1965. This division an institution specialized in the funding of activities in
and genuine commitment, the constant challenges, and even affects the armed forces, considered the ‘bastion of agriculture and stock-breeding was to be put in place. It is
the constant shifting of the political landscape threaten Tutsi hegemony’. In a document released in early May impossible to tell whether these policies would have been
the process and irritate regional and international 1999, a group of officers from provinces other than Bururi, effectively implemented, as FRODEBU was neutralized
observers. Finally, the Rwandan (Arusha 1993) and commonly called ‘Tiers Monde’ (‘Third World’), who con- as a result of the October 1993 coup; at any rate, the civil
Angolan (Lusaka 1994) precedents serve as a warning of stituted a ‘Front d’Action pour la Vérité’ (FAV, Action Front war and attempts to put an end to it have taken centre
the consequences of the peace accord breaking down. for Truth), challenged the ‘injustice, regionalism and cult of stage since 1994 at the expense of structural policies. Also,
These fears materialized during what Mandela hoped mediocrity which was put in place a long time ago by the it is not certain that the current leadership of FRODEBU
was to be the last round of talks in July 2000. While the military leaders of Bururi’.46 Even among the officers from is still committed to strategies aimed at redressing the bal-
mediator announced that the accord was to be signed on Bururi, clan cleavages oppose the Bayanzi to the Bashin- ance in favour of Burundi’s rural majority.
20 July, it became clear that agreement was lacking on a go;47 likewise, the neighbouring Bururi municipalities of In addition, the rural populations have been the main
number of major issues, such as the organization of the Matana and Rutovu are engaged in constant political com- victims of the violence during recent years. Most of the
transition, the electoral process, the reform of the army petition. Regional antagonisms divide the Hutu as they do killings in October–November 1993 took place in the
and the presence of international peace-keepers. Mandela the Tutsi, so much so that some Hutu leaders from Bururi, countryside, and the majority of the 50,000 killed were
grudgingly accepted the need for new consultations, but e.g. Léonard Nyangoma, have been suspected by others of peasants and local elites (teachers, municipal leaders, shop
announced that the accord was to be signed on 28 August. seeking alliances with Tutsi from their home province. keepers, etc.), Hutu and Tutsi alike. Again, most of the
During the days preceding the ceremony, it was obvious FDD leader Colonel Ndayikengurukiye and the leader of 200,000 people reportedly52 killed during the following
that, while the Hutu parties by and large agreed with the the FRODEBU dissidents allied to the government, years were rural populations. When the government
terms of the proposed text, the Tutsi parties and the Augustin Nzojibwami, are actually brothers and both from embarked on a ‘regroupment’ policy in early 1996, this
Burundian government had grave misgivings. US Presi- Bururi. At the time of finalizing this report, there were sug- was, once more, essentially targeting the rural areas. While
dent Clinton was called in to exert pressure and, on 28
gestions that players from Bururi in both camps were trying some ‘regroupment camps’ – officially aimed at protecting
August, 13 of the 19 negotiating parties signed the accord.
to ‘come to an arrangement’.48 the population, but in reality an anti-insurgency strategy –
Although several of the six Tutsi parties who initially
have been closed, more have been opened. At the end of
refused did sign during the following days, most of the
1999, over 800,000 people were thus ‘regrouped’; of these,
Tutsi parties and the government expressed reservations
on points that are so important that part of the accord is The rural/urban divide about 350,000 were confined to camps in the province of
Bujumbura Rural, which amounted to a staggering 80 per
emptied of substance. In addition, as the rebel groups
were not present, no ceasefire agreement was negotiated,
and the Burundian army expressed grave dissatisfaction
A nother major cleavage is that between urban and
rural Burundi. While over 90 per cent of the popula-
tion lives in the countryside, government policies and
cent of the province’s population.53 Adding up the
‘regrouped’, the ‘displaced’ (Tutsi concentrated under mil-
itary protection) and the refugees abroad (almost all of

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18 19
 Not just Hutu and Tutsi: disadvantaged groups in society Not just Hutu and Tutsi: disadvantaged groups in society

them Hutu), about 20 per cent of the Burundian popula- also tensions arise over scarce resources, such as camp a judge or prosecutor, or a university teacher. One of the
tion was not living in its original homes. Even though most food rations. few who did emerge, Stanislas Mashini, a former executive
of the camps in Bujumbura Rural were closed by the end Girls constitute between 40 and 45 per cent of the member of the opposition party RPB, was sentenced to
of July 2000, this serves as a measure of the tragedy of this pupils in elementary and secondary schools – already death and executed on 31 July 1997, after a trial labelled
country. In the ‘regroupment camps’, which Nelson Man- lower than their proportion in the population of school- ‘grossly unfair’ by Amnesty International.63 The govern-
dela has called ‘concentration camps’, rural people suffer going age – but this rate drops to around 25 per cent in ment seemed to attempt to redeem itself through the
malnutrition, untreated illness, killings and other abuse by higher education. In addition, women remain disadvan- appointment of Mashini’s widow, Libérata Nicayenzi, as a
the army.54 Clearly, those entrusted with implementing the taged in certain legal matters, particularly in the area of co-opted member of the transitional National Assembly in
peace accord agreed at Arusha will have to come to terms inheritance, which is still regulated by the male-biased July 1998; she is the only Twa in the 121-member Assem-
with the overwhelming majority of its population. customary law. In particular, the issue of access to land bly, and the first Twa MP ever.
rights, which women cannot directly hold at present, will The Twa have been particularly vulnerable in the con-
need to be addressed in a context of changing gender rela- text of violent conflict in the Great Lakes Region. During
Gender tions (women performing ‘men’s functions’) and possible the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, they were targeted by both
Hutu extremists and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).
gender imbalance (more women than men) as a result of
As they do not fit into the Hutu-Tutsi bipolar divide, they
W omen in Burundi, as elsewhere in Africa and the
world, are another massively disadvantaged group.
While they constitute over half the population, they are
years of conflict and displacement. Although the govern-
ment has published two reports on the status of women in
August and December 1999, the Human Rights League
are forced to ‘take sides’ in Burundi too, and as a result
become the victims of killings by both camps in a war that
discriminated against in all spheres of society: politics and Iteka deplores the: is not theirs.64
the civil service, the economy, education, the justice sys-
‘total lack of directives and mechanisms to imple-
tem. The under-representation of women in the political
institutions has actually worsened as the crisis has deep-
ment the recommendation contained in the general
programme of the transitional government adopted
Cross-cutting cleavages
ened. Only one woman holds office in the current transi- in November 1998 which stipulated that all sectoral
tional government, and her portfolio is a ‘typically female’
one carrying little political weight (she is in charge of
policies of the ministries should include policies
aimed at the promotion of women’.60
T he fact that groups other than Hutu and Tutsi –
regional groups, clans, peasants, women, Twa – have
objective interests which transcend the Hutu-Tutsi divide
social action and the promotion of women). Ten women
sit in the transitional National Assembly out of a total of Of course, gender discrimination is not only attribut- could be an asset for Burundi. Indeed, here are cross-cut-
121 members, i.e. a mere 8 per cent. Perhaps even more able to the state. Custom plays a part, as well as short-term ting cleavages waiting to be articulated: there are Hutu
significantly, not one single woman was part of the teams economic considerations: many parents, including moth- and Tutsi peasants and women, there are Hutu and Tutsi
participating in the Arusha negotiations, where the future ers, prefer girls to contribute to household work rather living in the same disadvantaged regions, the clans are
of the country was debated.55 than to enjoy formal education. Some girls even fear that multi-ethnic. The bipolar ethnic divide, which in Burun-
Yet women have borne the brunt of the conflict. As they will ‘grow old at the school desk’ if they engage in di and elsewhere65 proves difficult to manage peacefully,
more men than women have been killed or jailed, or have long periods of study. would become more multipolar and easier to accommo-
joined the rebel movements, most single-parents are date. It would also allow the real issues, which have been
women, who must ensure their families’ survival in extra- obfuscated for years by the prominence of the ethnic
ordinarily harsh circumstances. With the government The Twa conflict, to be put on the political agenda. As the ethnic
divide is essentially kept on the agenda by a small minor-
army and rebel groups engaged in operations country-
ity of urban elites, such a shift of attention would also
wide, women are also exposed much more than in peace-
time to the risk of being raped. Data are hard to come by,
as Burundian culture – like many other cultures – dis-
T he ethnic group that is worst off is also the one hardly
ever mentioned in the debate on Burundi. The Twa
number less than 1 per cent of the total population; while
allow the issues confronting the vast majority of Burundi-
ans to be addressed.
courages complaints by the victims of sexual aggression.56 they are the earliest known inhabitants of Burundi and
However, research carried out by the International Res- self-identify as ‘indigenous’, they are marginalized socially,
cue Committee’s (IRC) Sexual and Gender-Based Vio- culturally, economically and politically, and despised by
◗
lence Program57 shows a high prevalence of sexual and Hutu and Tutsi alike, who will generally not share a beer or
other forms of violence against women.58 In a survey of a meal with them. Even in normal times, the major issue
339 women in Kanembwa refugee camp (Tanzania), 27 confronting the Twa is discrimination, which takes the
per cent said they had experienced at least one incident forms of negative stereotyping, segregation and denial of
of rape during the conflict. In the regroupment camps rights.61 Their access to resources essential for their eco-
too, women and girls are frequently subjected to rape and nomic activities is increasingly limited: land for cultivation,
other forms of sexual abuse by government soldiers and clay for pottery, forest for hunting and gathering (including
rebels.59 While they are not seen as a direct threat to the medical herbs), lakes for fishing. Likewise, state-provided
enemy, women are also targeted for their role in repro- resources are less accessible to the Twa than other groups;
ducing their ethnic group. Specific methods of killing, these include health care, justice, jobs and education. Lim-
such as slitting of throats and disembowelment, particu- ited access to the latter, being an avenue of social promo-
larly of pregnant women, aim at eliminating ‘enemy’ chil- tion, is a particular handicap for the promotion of Twa
dren. The threat of violence even follows women from rights. As those with a full secondary education represent
the conflict to their place of refuge. Many report an less than 0.5 per cent of the Twa population,62 it is hardly
increase in forced marriages, and in domestic violence, as surprising that so few reach a position where they can fully
a result of the loss of family and community structures participate in public life: no Twa has ever been a member
that offered them some degree of protection in Burundi; of government, an army officer, an executive civil servant,

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20 21
 Reforming the state

Reforming the state

and perpetuates ethnicity as the most relevant political substantial increase of the access of Hutu to judicial
variable, which in the long run may not be in the interest office. Achieving this is likely to be easier than reforming
of those, the Tutsi, whom these schemes are supposed to the army, which will need to be substantially trimmed
protect. In reality, demands for the ‘protection of the down. Indeed, the judiciary is grossly understaffed, under-
Tutsi’ are often part of a strategy developed by small Tutsi equipped and under-funded, which makes the injection of
parties, who know that they do not have the slightest new resources, including in the form of Hutu personnel,

T
he issues confronting the negotiators in that in the successful European models, accommodation chance in a ballot, to claim a share in power. an obvious policy option which does not need to be imple-
Arusha, which will eventually have to be has come first and constitutional entrenchment only later, These dilemmas translate elite concerns, thus masking mented at the expense of the (Tutsi) incumbents. The
addressed by whoever is entrusted with gov- if at all. Therefore, some reservation has to be expressed the nature of the relations between politicians and the intake of Hutu students at the Law School of the Univer-
erning Burundi, relate to the proper func- about the effectiveness of constitutional rules if they are populations they supposedly represent. These relations sity of Bujumbura and in para-legal training programmes
tioning of the state in such a fashion that no not preceded or at least accompanied by the willingness of are generally distant, authoritarian and paternalistic: will have to increase substantially.78
citizen feels left out. Among others, these issues are the political players to pay a price for peace. It is not real- urban rulers claim to know what is best for rural popula- Of course, getting more Hutu into the system does not
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; istic to believe that unity can be legislated into existence.68 tions, but in reality they are engaged in power politics in itself guarantee the improvement of justice, which –
the security apparatus; education and health; and the The Burundian situation offers two additional difficul- played out in Bujumbura (and its extraterritorial extension even apart from the ethnic imbalance – is of poor quality.
management of the economy. ties. The first is that territorial devolution is precluded by Arusha) in total disconnection from the rest of the coun- The government has formulated an ambitious plan of
the fact that there are no Hutu or Tutsi areas. Historical- try. Most parties lack even a genuine urban base and are reform,79 and a new code of criminal procedure, which
ly, the ethnic groups have lived side by side, and only instruments for the promotion of personal and sectarian offers more guarantees to defendants and detainees, came
Democracy, the rule of law and recently has the violence caused some – hopefully tempo- interests. Therefore, creating a viable political system will into force on 1 January 2000. The appointment of former
require more than accommodating elite ethnic concerns Justice Minister Gérard Ngendabanka of FRODEBU as
human rights rary – segregation.69 A second problem relates to the iden-
tification of ‘groups’, necessary in an institutionalized and claims; it will need to include all Burundians as citi- General Prosecutor at the end of 1998 showed the willing-
system of minority protection. This would require the reg- zens, actively concerned by and involved in running the ness of the government to tackle some of the issues.
E xperience of democratic government is very limited
in Burundi: apart from the period 1961–5 and the
few months between the elections and the coup of 1993,
istration of people according to their ethnic origin, a mea-
sure that might rigidify and possibly exacerbate ethnicity
affairs of state.72
To achieve this, upholding the rule of law will prove at
Ngendabanka instructed the district prosecutors to visit
the prisons and look into cases of inmates held for years
rather than diminish its salience. The risk of perpetuating least as important as mechanisms of power sharing. without having appeared before a judge; he also asked
the country has been governed by regimes without an
the ethnic divide is obvious. Amnesty International observes that most of the people prison directors only to accept people whose arrest papers
elective mandate, and at times by brutal dictatorships,
Opinions on this issue naturally differ widely. The detained are Hutu and that the members of Tutsi militia are in order. Hundreds of prisoners were released and the
since independence. As already mentioned, the ethnic
Hutu-dominated parties in Arusha favour the one person- generally escape prosecution and punishment.73 More- situation of those on death row improved, at least in
equation creates a situation where the demographic
majority constantly threatens to translate into a political one vote system, while the predominantly Tutsi parties over, in the few cases where the military has been prose- Bujumbura’s Mpimba prison.80 In addition, over recent
majority, a prospect which is naturally resented by the advocate indirect electoral systems which they expect cuted, double standards continue to operate: years, two organizations of civil society, the Human Rights
Tutsi elites who have dominated the state and the econo- would dilute ethnic voting. PARENA and PRP even ‘While hundreds of people, convicted of participation League Iteka and the Association Burundaise pour la
my since 1965. favour a system of community voting in which Hutu and in the massacres of mainly Tutsi civilians which fol- Défense des Droits des Prisonniers (ABDP), have devel-
Therefore, inspiration might be sought in consociation- Tutsi would organize elections within each group. This lowed the assassination of President Ndadaye have oped strategies aimed at improving the performance of the
al techniques used elsewhere, which attempt to correct application of the ‘two peoples, one nation’ vision to which received long prison sentences or the death penalty, criminal justice system and the condition of detainees. In
the effects of a strictly majoritarian system. While some these parties adhere would, of course, create subnational- the few soldiers who have actually been convicted of 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross
authors have claimed that a democratic system cannot ities, an option which effectively institutionalizes ethnicity similar offences have received substantially lower (ICRC) was able to resume its work in the prisons, thus
function in plural societies, Arthur Lewis has challenged as the main, if not the only, politically relevant variable.70 sentences, often of only a few months.’ 74 contributing to a decline in the appalling death rate.
that view. According to him, it is not democracy that fails It also leaves the Twa and the naturalized Burundians out However, the implementation of many other much-
The chiefs of mission of the European Union in
in these societies, but a particular form of democracy, in the cold. Other means to alleviate the majority princi- needed measures will require human and material
Bujumbura reached a similar, and indeed severely worded
namely majoritarian democracy.66 In more general terms, ple advocated in Arusha are the introduction of the (sus- resources for which budgetary allocations are not available
conclusion:
A. Lijphart has summarized this argument as follows: pensive) veto, the requirement of higher than 50 per cent at present. At a general level, the judiciary which –
majorities and the institution of a Senate71 or a High ‘The judicial system thus dispenses a biased justice through the membership and powers of the Conseil
‘In plural societies, therefore, majority rule spells Council of the State. While mechanisms of that kind – which favours the Tutsi minority over the Hutu supérieur de la magistrature – is controlled by the execu-
dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. which are in fact consociational – may be helpful, they will majority … The prison population is essentially tive, must be made independent from formal (govern-
What these societies need is a democratic system composed of Hutu, who are the victims of a selective ment) and informal (corruption, ethnic and other bias)
not by themselves eliminate the fears and frustrations
that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, principle from the start of the procedure. Together
inherent in the situation of Burundi. interference.
that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to with the army, Justice is the main instrument of eth-
The prominence of ethnic considerations leads to two A more democratic political system and a functioning
maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of nic discrimination.’ 75
dilemmas with regard to democracy. The first is the rela- justice system would almost automatically lead to an
being satisfied with a bare majority: consensus
tion between democracy and genocide. Many Tutsi feel Indeed, the ethnic breakdown of the judiciary is telling: improvement of the human rights situation, which has
democracy.’ 67
that democracy was at the origin of the crisis of late 1993 only four out of a total 49 leading judges and prosecutors been dire for many years.81 Most basic rights, including
Pacification mechanisms include forms of joint deci- and that a democratic system, seen as ‘rule by the Hutu’, are Hutu.76 the right to life, are massively violated, routinely and on a
sion-making and the use of a minority veto in certain mat- contains the constant threat of genocide against the Tutsi. This is now widely acknowledged by the Burundian daily basis. Almost 10,000 people are detained for real or
ters, arbitration procedures, grand coalitions, proportional This opinion ignores the fact that it was not democracy, government and the negotiators in Arusha. The platform imaginary politically inspired crimes, while the peniten-
distributions of posts and so on. However, consociational but rather the lack of it, which caused the violence. It also of the political partnership agreed in June 1998 states that tiary capacity is about 3,600. At the going rate (436 judg-
arrangements, like those used in countries like Switzer- masks the reality that both Hutu and Tutsi have been ‘ethnic imbalances exist in certain judicial sectors … In ments rendered in 1999), it will take 25 years to process
land and Belgium, cannot be exported. A number of killed on a massive scale, and that fighting genocide is, order to achieve the necessary corrections, a programme the cases of those who have already spent several years in
favourable conditions identified in the consociational lit- therefore, in the common interest of all Burundians. The of adequate promotion and training will be put in place’.77 pre-trial detention; the vast majority of them never came
erature, such as the existence of sufficiently strong cross- second is the relation between democracy and ethnicity. Similarly, all parties in Committee II on democracy and before a judge who, under Burundian law, must decide on
cutting group affiliations and elite accommodation, may As already stated, the introduction of ethnic quotas and good governance at the Arusha peace talks agreed on the their continued custody. Moreover, death sentences are
not be present in Burundi. It should also be borne in mind other mechanisms based on ethnic belonging rigidifies necessity to reform the justice system, and to ensure a on the increase: 47 in 1998, 90 in 1999; during January

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22 23
 Reforming the state Reforming the state

2000 alone, 28 capital punishments were pronounced,

‘virtually all after unfair trials’.82 In addition, people
sure would make sense, as the gendarmerie is in charge of
internal law and order, while the army is committed to the
Education and health has greatly contributed to the grave deterioration of
health indicators. In 1993, an estimated 6 per cent of
detained in local lock-ups and police facilities are subject- defence of the country’s territorial integrity. A second Burundi’s children were malnourished; regional surveys
ed to torture and ‘disappearance’. A democratic and inclu-
sive political system would not engender such abuse and a
issue is that of international supervision. Again, this is
rejected by the Tutsi and the army; indeed, the prospect
T he civil war has badly affected the social sectors.
While, between 1992 and 1997, defence spending
soared from 8.1 billion Burundi Francs (FBu) to 21.1 bil-
conducted in 1996–7 show a 20 per cent rate. Seventy-
three health centres out of a total of 351 have been
competent, honest and impartial judiciary would not let it of the deployment of an international force was a major lion, an increase of 160 per cent, expenditure on health destroyed since 1993. In addition, as in education, the
go unpunished. As impunity is the rule rather than the reason for the military coup of July 1996. Many Tutsi fear decreased by 20 per cent from 2.6 billion FBu to 2.0 bil- provision of health care is very unevenly spread: for
exception in Burundi, and given the extreme gravity of the that a foreign military presence would result in the effec- lion; expenditure on education increased only marginally instance, 70 per cent of all doctors work in Bujumbura,
crimes committed, the extension of the jurisdiction of the tive neutralization of the army. However, a candid inter- by 8 per cent from 10.3 billion to 11.2 billion. Put in anoth- while the provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke and Karuzi have
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the setting pretation of this position is that they wish to leave open er way: health and education combined received 159 per only one doctor each. The impact of the conflict on struc-
up of an ad hoc international court for Burundi would the option of a coup d’etat by avoiding the presence of cent of the defence budget in 1992, but only 62 per cent in tural imbalances clearly shows: in 1993, Bujumbura had a
make sense, a proposal on which most negotiating teams players who could intervene in such a scenario. As they do 1997. The UNDP’s Human Development Index shows the 1,799 population-to-doctor ratio, compared to 43,922 for
in Arusha agreed in principle.83 However, the effective not trust the army, and are particularly concerned about overall deterioration: in 1992, Burundi occupied 152nd the rural areas; in 1997, these ratios were 1,319 to 67,769
functioning of both domestic and international justice the delicate period of integration of new recruits, the place, but it had dropped to 170th place by 1997. respectively. The reasoning developed above for the edu-
may well be resented and sabotaged by those who have in Hutu, for their part, obviously insist on the presence of Even before the conflict erupted, education was a cational sector applies equally to health provision: Burun-
the past enjoyed immunity for their crimes. international peace-keepers. major political issue. In his preface to a recent report of dians deserve more, and more evenly spread, services as a
Even though a credible international force would be International Alert, Bill Yates notes that exclusion starts strategy of both reconstruction and reconciliation.
desirable, resistance to it in Burundi will probably prove with differential access to education, especially so in a
The security apparatus insurmountable; in addition, it is unlikely that the inter- society and economy in which state employment is virtu-
national community will be willing and able to gather the ally the only alternative to peasant agriculture, and educa- The economy
T he future of the armed forces is such an important
issue that one of the committees in the Arusha talks
type and size of force needed to cope with Burundi’s tion is the only path to such advancement.85 Therefore,

deals exclusively with peace and security. This is natural,

given the history of Burundi. Most Tutsi consider control
security needs. Therefore, the solution to this problem
will probably be found in a compromise. First, physical
protection will have to be offered to political leaders
education has been a major instrument for the promotion
of Tutsi hegemony in the civil service, the army and the
judiciary. However, here as elsewhere, regional differ-
A ll macro-economic indicators have dramatically wors-
ened as a result of the conflict, the massive decrease
of international aid and, between mid-1996 and early
of the army as an essential life insurance policy, a convic- presently in exile, as they take up their positions in the ences too are discriminatory. Six provinces, with about 1999, the imposition of sanctions by the regional states.
tion that has become even more compelling since the transitional institutions. The gendarmerie would need to one-third of the population, have over half of the primary Real GDP fell by almost 20 per cent between the last ‘nor-
genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. For most Hutu, teachers. There are almost as many teachers in the
be trained in the specific skills of maintaining order in a mal’ year, 1992, and 1998. A study by two economists
the Tutsi-dominated army is a constant threat; in their
peaceable way and with the appropriate equipment, province of Bururi as in the provinces of Cankuzo, Muyin- shows that GDP per capita, which stood at US $210 in
view, the military have not only killed vast numbers of
which would require foreign assistance. This would ga, Rutana and Ruyigi taken together. Net primary school 1990, would normally have reached US $230 in 1997; due
Hutu, but they are also the physical instrument of Tutsi
domination. Both positions are based in reality, which ensure at least some unobtrusive international presence, attendance in 1996–7 was 44.17 per cent in Bururi, com- to the conflict, it actually fell to US $140.91 In 1998, exter-
makes the search for a compromise difficult, particularly which would not threaten Burundi’s sovereignty, while at pared to a mere 6.15 per cent in Bubanza. Bururi and nal debt service stood at 60 per cent of export revenue,
as this is literally a matter of life or death. the same time giving some sense of security to the popu- Bujumbura city account for 32 per cent of all secondary compared to 42 per cent in 1992. The total balance of pay-
However, there is now a consensus that the security lation. Similarly, the presence of international instructors pupils, while these provinces represent only 11 per cent of ments was +US $24.7 million in 1992, but had dropped to
forces must be reformed. The government and the army in army units might help discourage would-be adventur- the national population.86 Similar imbalances affect higher –US $25.3 million in 1998. Total bilateral and multilateral
even accept that the armed forces should include 50 per ers. Such a shift of focus from foreign intervention education, a fact which explains the recent creation of a aid fell from US $310 million in 1992 to US $119 million
cent Hutu and 50 per cent Tutsi, although in their view towards foreign assistance would conceivably be accept- private university in the northern town of Ngozi. in 1997, a drop of over 60 per cent. The budget deficit of
this does not mean that the Hutu contingent must be the able to all parties involved. This assistance could be While it was already in crisis before the beginning of the over 30 per cent is financed by the printing of money, a
integrated elements of the rebel forces. As with some offered by other African countries that have considerable civil war, the education system has all but collapsed since. practice which of course fuels inflation (the average bas-
institutional arrangements, the 50/50 arrangement again experience of conflicts similar (though by no means iden- During the last ‘normal’ school year, 1992–3, 52 per cent of ket of basic food has risen by 120 per cent between mid-
raises the issue of the perpetuation of ethnic subnation- tical) to those of Burundi. Thus, South Africa, Namibia primary age children were at school, a very low proportion 1996 and early 1999)92 as well as leading to a deteriorating
alities. In contrast to reforms in the judicial system, the and Zimbabwe have created new national armies, which, which plunged even lower to a mere 37 per cent in exchange rate (between 1992 and 1998, the value of the
integration of new elements in the army will inevitably to a greater or lesser extent, have been able to inspire 1998–9.87 The loss of teachers, through violent death, exile FBu to the US$ fell from 208.3 to 435.2, a loss of over 100
be at the expense of troops and officers presently serv- confidence among the population. and internal displacement,88 runs in the thousands. Hun- per cent). From 1993 to 1999, per capita food production
ing, the more so since the Burundian army has grown A final important point must be stressed with regard dreds of schools were destroyed, damaged or used for declined by 22 per cent; the study quoted above shows a
considerably in recent years: reducing a force that prob- to the debate on the military. While, as already men- other purposes, such as sheltering displaced persons.89 spectacular regional correlation between the displace-
ably numbers about 40,000 to a manageable and afford- tioned, the prominence of this issue is understandable in Like the justice sector, the education system will need a ment of populations and a diminished production.93
able peace-time force of under 20,000, as well as the light of Burundi’s history, the outcome of the negoti- major injection of resources. This is essential, not just for Even before the war, a small elite used the resources of
reserving 50 per cent to new recruits will require the ations risks putting the security forces at the heart of the the sake of a much needed improvement of this sector, but the successive authoritarian regimes to exploit the state-
demobilization of tens of thousands of men. This is like- political system once again. It is paradoxical that a suc- also as a means of ensuring peace. Better access for disad- controlled economy. As political power goes hand in hand
ly to cause resistance and will, at any rate, be very expen- cessful integration of rebel groups would turn the army vantaged regional, ethnic and gender groups must not be with the maintenance of economic privileges, the sharing
sive in terms of demobilization premiums and re-training into the cornerstone of a new political dispensation, to a provided at the expense of those who are now (relatively) of power, let alone the loss of it, is not just a political threat
for civilian occupations.84 greater extent, even, than it has been of previous privileged. A win/win strategy is required: Yates stresses to these Tutsi elites, but, above all, a challenge to their eco-
Two other related issues give rise to debate. Most Hutu regimes. However, Burundi not only needs a smaller and that the cake must be made larger with significant new nomic power. This became clear when structural adjust-
parties want to separate the gendarmerie (national police) more balanced army, but also a military establishment resources being allocated to even up the proportions.90 ment imposed a policy of privatizations in the late 1980s
from the army; indeed, this was one of the decisions taken that is professional and politically neutral. It must be The health sector has also been badly affected by the and early 1990s. As most ‘private’ entrepreneurs came
by the Ndadaye administration when it came to power in transformed into a body of the state at the service of protracted conflict. Life expectancy at birth fell from 48.2 from the public sector (former ministers, top civil servants
July 1993; it was heavily resented in army circles and democratic institutions, without its own agenda. Only in 1992 to 42.4 in 1997. While the Aids epidemic and and army officers) and belonged to the Tutsi elite, privati-
never implemented. Although many Tutsi fear that the then will it avoid being the tool of factional and regional lethal violence partly account for this dramatic drop, the zation meant that economic control remained in the same
gendarmerie would counterbalance the army, such a mea- interests and thus become a truly national army. collapse of the health system in many parts of the country hands. Further, those bidding for state-owned enterprises:

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24 25
 Reforming the state

Conclusion
‘expected the financial support of the state to allow
them to acquire a privatized company. The public
sector is thus supposed to fund its own privatization
… Clearly, for these “businessmen” used to a context
of kinship ties, nepotism and protectionism, it is dif-
ficult to adapt to the laws of the market’.94

I
We have seen earlier that attempts by the newly elect- t has been stated on several occasions during the Rights League Iteka and the ABDP have already been
ed government in 1993 to address the issue of privatiza- last decade that ‘Burundi is at the crossroads’. mentioned. In the media, Studio Ijambo (a radio station
tion and the economy more generally was among the This is again the case today. Compared to Rwan- run by NGOs) offers a generally objective voice to coun-
principal reasons for the privileged of former regimes da, Burundi has the advantage that there is a dia- terbalance the official broadcasts by the government radio
staging the October 1993 coup. logue between political and military actors, station and the radical statements made in the predomi-
The war economy has generated a logic of looting, cre- despite the fact that they are also fighting it out on the nantly partisan private press. Non-partisan human rights
ated new opportunities for making profits, for instance ground. The collapse of the Arusha accord and the inter- and national development associations, production and
through speculation and by-passing the regional embargo, nal attempts at political accommodation would discredit distribution cooperatives, the private media and profes-
peaceful solutions in the years to come and leave the sional groupings will need to be strengthened, in order to
and engendered new categories of ‘entrepreneurs of inse-
country in a new period of protracted violent strife. While allow them to participate in the efforts at democratization,
curity’, including army officers, who cash in on the oppor-
progress has undoubtedly been achieved, success is by no
tunities offered by regional war and instability.95 In a reconciliation and development.
means guaranteed.
declaration made on 4 December 1999, the ANAC, a The regional situation must be kept in mind. While
Some actors can contribute to the promotion of solu-
grouping of parties opposed to the government, referred Burundi is itself the theatre of instability and violence, it is
tions. The international community, besides supporting
to army officers ‘engaged in mercantile racketeering’. at the same time threatened by events surrounding it. The
the outcome of the negotiations, will need to play a major
Even though his name did not appear in the document, ongoing conflict in the DRC, the constantly shifting
role in the implementation of an agreement, particularly
the then Defence Minister, Colonel Alfred Nkurunziza, alliances in the region, and the criminalized cross-border
through the provision of funding. The reform of the army,
was amongst the officers targeted, as he was mentioned in extractive activities have a perverse impact on peace-mak-
the rehabilitation and improvement of health, education
relation to various illicit forms of trading, particularly in ing in Burundi. However, if Burundi were to achieve a
and justice, and the restructuring of the economy will
sugar. Since the beginning of the civil war, army officers durable settlement, it would also serve as an example for
require considerable amounts of money which Burundi is
and their civilian partners have controlled most of the other trouble spots in Central and East Africa. Conversely,
unable to generate. Doubling the state budget would, how-
‘survival economy’ (beans, palm oil, sugar, rice, fuel), the if Burundi were to revert to massive violence, this would
ever, cost only about US $150 million, which is merely
import-export of essential commodities and the security of further compound an already explosive regional situation.
twice the very low level of aid presently given to Burundi
transport channels. While, even in ‘normal’ times, Burun-
(total bilateral and multilateral aid in 1998: US $76 mil-
di was already quoted as an example of a criminalized
economy,96 the war in the DRC and cross-border ‘infor-
lion). Simply raising aid back to the level of 1992 (total ◗
bilateral and multilateral: US $312 million) would triple
mal’ trade all over the region have exacerbated the crimi-
the resources available for vital expenditure. These figures
nalization of the economy and the privatization of public
show what a difference relatively modest outlays can make
space. Clearly, a more democratic, just and transparent
in a small economy and a poorly funded state. In the medi-
management of the economy will have to be part of the
um and long term, the International Crisis Group intends
peace deal, as much as the political mechanisms agreed in
supporting an active education policy and equal access to
Arusha.
education; moves towards the provision of firm founda-
A last aspect of the economic sphere must be men-
tions for the rule of law; production diversification; policies
tioned, as it affects most Burundians living in the country-
aimed at promoting exports and regional economic coop-
side. As mentioned in the introduction, pressure on land
eration; and reforms in state administration.97
is enormous in Burundi. In the event of an effectively
Non-state actors will need to play a role and to be sup-
implemented peace deal, over half a million Burundian
ported. As a result of a long tradition of authoritarian rule
refugees are likely to return, mostly from Tanzania. If not
and of statist policies, civil society in Burundi is weak and
managed properly, this will cause considerable tensions, as
handicapped by the ethnic divide. However, the Church-
it did in 1993, and may contribute to the derailing of the
es – the Roman Catholic Church in particular – have
accord. Transparent procedures must be put in place and
played a constructive role in the political restructuring of
the inevitable disputes over ownership must be dealt with
the country since the late 1980s. Relations with the state
fairly and impartially. In addition, here again, the donor
have improved since the Bagaza era and clergy like Arch-
community will have to release the means necessary to
bishop Ntamwana and Bishop Bududira, a Hutu and a
allow more rural Burundians to make a living otherwise
Tutsi respectively, as well as priests at the local level have
than in agriculture.
attempted to contribute to efforts at reconciliation. By
and large, however, the Churches remain politically timid.
In addition, some Hutu and Tutsi in the clergy have con-
◗ tributed to the tension and a few have even been involved
in engineering violence. After a period of profound
impasse following the 1993 coup d’Etat, some organiza-
tions of civil society have regained their autonomy and
again assumed their mandate. The activities of the Human

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26 27
 N O T E S

Recommendations
1 Eide, A., New Approaches to Minority Protection, Lon- 17 More detailed information can be found in: Human
don, MRG, December 1993. Rights Watch, Fédération Internationale des Droits de
2 On the regional context, see Reyntjens, F., La Guerre l’Homme, Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la
des grands lacs: alliances mouvantes et conflits Région des Grands Lacs, Organisation Mondiale Con-
extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale, Paris, L’Harmat- tre la Torture, Centre National pour la Coopération au
tan, 1999. Développement, Nationaal Centrum voor Ontwikkel-
1. The international community should continue to sup- civil conflict to peace, will address potential areas of con- 3 See Gahama, J., Le Burundi sous administration belge, ingssamenwerking, NOVIB, Commission interna-
port the peace process. This support should not be limit- flict, such as over housing, land and other resources, con- Paris, Karthala, 1983. tionale d’enquête sur les violations des droits de
ed to the accord signed at Arusha, but should aim at trol of local government and other key sectors, etc. 4 Lemarchand, R., Selective Genocide in Burundi, Lon- l’homme au Burundi depuis le 21 octobre 1993: rapport
involving all strata and sectors of the population within don, Minority Rights Group, Report no. 20, July 1974. final, July 1994, pp. 14–45; also see Reyntjens, F.,
Burundi. The international community could contribute 6. International development and government policies in 5 This term is used in its strict legal sense, as defined by Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire,
by providing not just adequate diplomatic and financial post-conflict Burundi should focus on redressing discrim- the Genocide Convention, i.e. ‘acts committed with Brussels-Paris, Institut Africain-L’Harmattan, Cahiers
backing, but also coordinated and, whenever possible, ination against disadvantaged groups and discrimination intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethni- Africains, no. 16, 1995, pp. 93–115.
unified approaches. The bilateral and multilateral, gov- along geographical, gender and other lines, with a view to cal, racial or religious group, as such’ (emphasis 18 For more details see Reyntjens, F., Burundi: Breaking
ernmental and non-governmental parties involved should supporting implementation of international human and added). the Cycle of Violence, London, Minority Rights Group,
provide coordinated mediation and search for durable minority rights standards. 6 Whenever there is a rise in ethnic-political tension, March 1995, pp. 13–20.
solutions in ways which are impartial, and which are seen many Hutu refer to the so-called ‘Simbananiye Plan’, 19 An account and analysis of these negotiations and their
to be impartial by parties within the polarized environ- 7. All branches of government in Burundi will have to pri- named after an extremist Tutsi politician, one of the aftermath can be found in Ould-Abdallah, A., Burundi
ment of Burundi. oritize measures for respect of basic international human most influential ministers of the Micombero regime. on the Brink 1993–95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on
and minority rights standards, which Burundi is party to. However, there is no proof that such a plan existed. Preventive Diplomacy, Washington, DC, United States
2. Solutions for peace should be inclusive of the views and Appropriate measures should be devised, with the support 7 Amnesty International, Background briefing on Institute of Peace, 2000.
interests of all sectors of society including those of the of the international community, for capacity-building Amnesty International’s concerns in Burundi, May 20 International Crisis Group, Burundi: les enjeux du
most marginalized groups and those marginalized and dis- measures which would support the implementation of 1986. débat. Partis politiques, liberté de la presse et prison-
advantaged for reasons besides those of ethnicity. A high such standards, such as reform of the judiciary and educa- 8 See Chrétien, J.-P., Guichaoua, A. and Le Jeune, G., La niers politiques, 12 July 2000.
degree of inclusion and acceptance of peace solutions tion systems, human rights training for members of the Crise d’août 1988 au Burundi, Paris, CRA, 1989; 21 See Parqué, V., ‘Le Rôle de l’OUA et des pays voisins
needs to be achieved not just to ensure the successful security forces, grassroots human rights education and Amnesty International, Burundi: Killings of Children dans la gestion du conflit burundais’, in S. Marysse
implementation of peace measures, but also to avoid a awareness-raising, and measures towards an end to by Government Troops, October 1988. and F. Reyntjens (eds), L’Afrique des grands lacs:
return to cycles of violence which have deeply affected impunity as a key obstacle to protection of rights. 9 For comments, see Lemarchand, R., ‘The Report of Annuaire 1998–1999, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999, pp.
the country since independence. the National Commission to Study the Question of 23–52 .
8. To the latter purpose the international community National Unity in Burundi: a critical comment’, Journal 22 The government, National Assembly and 15 political
3. Given the extreme and increasing poverty of the coun- should support the institution of mechanisms to address of Modern African Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, 1989, pp. parties, in the presence of some observers from the
try, the international community must support solutions impunity for the mass violations of human rights which 685–90; Reyntjens, F., Burundi 1972–1988: continuité civil society.
for peace by injecting resources in key sectors such as have occurred in Burundi’s recent past, such as a national et changement, Brussels, Centre d’Étude et de Docu- 23 For a detailed list of these issues, see Parqué, op. cit.
health, education and justice, which affect all sectors of truth and reconciliation commission and/or an interna- mentation Africaines, 1989, pp. 65–71. 24 This calls to mind the work in 1988–9 of the National
the population. Due to the modest size of the country, and tional criminal tribunal for Burundi, drawing on the expe- 10 Amnesty International, Burundi: Sectarian Security Commission charged with studying the issue of nation-
its extreme poverty, efforts on a relatively modest scale riences of other countries emerging from similar Forces Violate Human Rights with Impunity, Novem- al unity, whose report, published in May 1989, formu-
would offer real opportunities to rebuild the country and situations. Failing this, the reign of impunity will contin- ber 1992; Erler, B. and Reyntjens, F., Les Événements lates, in the words of René Lemarchand ‘the “public
to redress deeply ingrained discrimination and imbalance ue, thus paving the way for further massive human rights de novembre–décembre 1991 au Burundi: rapport transcript” of the Tutsi domination, occasionally
against the disadvantaged without necessarily leading to violations. d’une mission d’enquête, Brussels, February 1992. amended by half-hearted concessions to the “hidden
an overall decrease in resources for other groups. 11 More details can be found in Reyntjens, F., L’Afrique transcript” of Hutu elements’ (Lemarchand, R.,
9. Non-state actors have an important role to play. Civil des grands lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi 1988–1994, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, Cam-
4. Amongst the priority areas to be considered in the society organizations at the local, regional and national Paris, Karthala, 1994. bridge, Woodrow Wilson Center Press-Cambridge
peace negotiations are restructuring of the army and civil- levels, must be supported by both the government and the 12 More information on these provisions and the prob- University Press, 1994, p. 139).
ian security forces under international supervision and international community. Likewise, in the light of Burun- lems of implementation can be found in Reyntjens, F., 25 The minister responsible for the peace process,
with international assistance. di’s history of militarization, unarmed democratic political ‘L’Ingénierie de l’unité nationale: quelques singularités Ambroise Niyonsaba, stated that ‘at this stage, the gov-
groups need promotion and protection. de la constitution burundaise de 1992’, Politique ernment is not concerned by the cessation of hostilities
5. Solutions will have to be found to the issues to be raised Africaine, no. 47, October 1992, pp. 141–6. and it has to continue its action of policing and defend-
by the likely demobilization of tens of thousands of gov- 13 Others, considered opposed to the Charter of National ing the population’.
ernment troops and rebels. Plans of action, backed by ◗ Unity and accused of waging armed attacks from 26 In early 1998, the armed wing of the CNDD-FDD
adequate funding and other resources, will have to be
neighbouring countries, were refused recognition, broke away. While both wings call themselves CNDD-
devised in order to reintegrate demobilized soldiers into
including PALIPEHUTU. FDD, for the sake of clarity I shall use the term
civilian life and the civilian economy, for instance by pro-
14 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, CNDD for the political wing, led by Léonard Nyango-
viding adequate resources, training and, whenever possi-
Communiqué de presse, Bujumbura, 2 June 1993. ma, and FDD for the military wing, led by Jean-Bosco
ble, opportunities for employment for former soldiers and
15 For more details on the elections and their outcome, see Ndayikengurukiye.
others in the communities where reintegration is to take
Reyntjens, F., ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating: 27 It should be noted, however, that the political wing of
place. Demobilization of soldiers and the return and rein-
the June 1993 elections in Burundi’, Journal of Modern the PALIPEHUTU, led by Etienne Karatasi and rep-
tegration of refugees and internally displaced persons will
African Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1993, pp. 563–83. resented in Arusha, has no control over its military dis-
have to be part of integrated plans of action which, draw-
16 Interview in Panafrika (Bujumbura), no. 14, 17 sidents in the FNL, which formally broke away at the
ing on experiences from other countries in transition from
November 1993. beginning of 1993.

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28 29
 N O T E S N O T E S

28 For a useful analysis of this first round of negotiations, en Afrique Centrale, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1989, vol. 1, Cyprus, Dutch-speakers and French-speakers in Bel- 81 See the annual reports of the Burundian Human
as well as the internal partnership, see International pp. 168–73. gium, Lendu and Hema in the Ituri region of the Rights League Iteka, Amnesty International, Human
Crisis Group, Burundi. Négociations à Arusha: Quelles 50 Willame, J.-C., Les Manipulations du développement: Democratic Republic of Congo and many others. Rights Watch and the US Department of State.
chances pour la paix?, 20 July 1998. ajustement, cogestion et démocratisation au Burundi, 66 Lewis, A., Politics in West Africa, London, George 82 Amnesty International, ‘Urgent Action’, 13 April 2000.
29 ANADDE had joined the talks in the meantime. Brussels, Les Cahiers du CEDAF, no. 5, 1992, p. 44. Allen and Unwin, 1963. 83 ‘In principle’ because the parties diverge widely over
30 For an analysis of the efforts of the international com- 51 FRODEBU, Melchior Ndadaye: Pour construire un 67 Lijphart, A., Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and modalities and even disagree on which violent events in
munity see Reychler, L., Musabiyimana, T. and Burundi nouveau – 46 propositions, Bujumbura, May Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, Lon-
Burundi’s history constitute genocide. Thus the Hutu
Calmeyn, S., Le Burundi sur le chemin de paix: Analyse 1993. don and New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984,
claim the 1972 massacres as ‘their’ genocide, while the
de l’impact des interventions extérieures, Rapport 52 The figure of 200,000 is routinely quoted in the press; p. 23.
préliminaire, Leuven, Université de Leuven, CPRS as a matter of fact, we have no precise idea of the num- 68 On this, see Reyntjens, F., ‘The constitutional status of Tutsi claim those of 1993 as ‘theirs’.
Working Paper 1/1999, 8 February 1999. ber of victims. ethnicity in Africa South of the Sahara’, SA Public Law, 84 The anticipated minimal cost of this operation in the
31 Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, who was the 53 The most recent report on the regroupment policy is 1993, pp. 36–52. Rwandan Arusha peace accord of 1993 was the equiva-
special representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights Watch, Emptying the Hills: Regroup- 69 The analogy with a leopard’s skin has already been lent of the total annual state budget.
Burundi from November 1993 to October 1995, has ment in Burundi, July 2000. used: Tutsi are the dark spots, concentrated in most 85 Jackson, T., Equal Access to Education: A Peace Imper-
bitterly complained about what he called ‘arsonist 54 For one example among many, see C. McGreal, neighbourhoods of Bujumbura and in other towns or ative for Burundi, London, International Alert, June
diplomacy’. See Ould-Abdallah, A., La Diplomatie ‘800,000 held in Burundi camps’, The Mail and living near administrative centres and military posi- 2000, p. 2.
pyromane, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1996; See also his Guardian (Johannesburg), 17 December 1999. tions, while Hutu are scattered or ‘regrouped’ else- 86 Ibid., pp. 27–8.
Burundi on the Brink …, op. cit., pp. 94–7. 55 The fact that an expert team of women sent by where; in addition, almost all refugees are Hutu. 87 Interestingly, primary school attendance is almost 90
32 Fondation Hirondelle, Arusha, 9 March 1999. UNIFEM (the UN Development Fund for Women) 70 It should be noted that this constitutes a major shift in per cent in the refugee camps in Tanzania.
33 Ibid. was present during a round of talks in June 2000 hard- PARENA chair Bagaza’s thinking. Under his presiden-
88 In addition, almost 2,000 foreign teachers have returned
34 Ibid., 16 March 1999. ly compensated for the absence of Burundian women. cy (1976–87) it was forbidden even to mention the eth-
to their countries of origin, Rwanda in particular.
35 Nelson, C., ‘Mandela criticizes Burundi talks’, Associ- A ‘last-minute’ meeting of women delegates of the 19 nic groups.
89 Jackson, T., Equal Access …, op. cit., pp. 9–10.
ated Press, Arusha, 16 January 2000. parties taking part in the talks was held in Arusha from 71 Advocates of this mechanism forget that the senate
36 Mseteka, B., ‘Mandela says UN criticism of Burundi 17 to 20 July 2000. Although they met with Mandela, which existed in the mid-1960s was an arena of con- 90 Ibid., p. 4.
justified’, Reuters, Johannesburg, 24 January 2000. their set of gender-specific proposals, including a 30 stant ethnic confrontation. 91 Van Acker, F. and Marysse, S., ‘Les coûts de la guerre
37 Fondation Hirondelle, Arusha, 21 February 2000. per cent quota for women in all areas of public admin- 72 I resist the temptation to discuss the role which tradi- civile au Burundi: “une décennie perdue”’, in: F. Reyn-
38 Ibid., 23 February 2000. istration (but, surprisingly, not in the army), came only tional institutions, like the Bashingantahe (local nota- tjens and S. Marysse (eds), L’Afrique des grands lacs:
39 Ibid., 25 March 2000. after a draft accord was already formulated by the bles) and Bushingantahe (the values of integrity and Annuaire 1999–2000, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2000.
40 ‘Message du gouvernement du Burundi sur l’évolution mediation team. respect governing them), can play. During the 30 years 92 UNDP, Choosing Hope: A Case for Constructive
du processus de paix’, Bujumbura, 26 February 2000. 56 However, some information can be found in: Human of one-party and military rule, the Bashingantahe have Engagement in Burundi, December 1998, p. 17.
It is no coincidence that this follows Mandela’s state- Rights League Iteka, Rapport annuel … 1999, op. cit. become so politicized that they have lost most of their 93 Van Acker, F. and Marysse, S., ‘Les coûts de la guerre
ment of 21 February. 57 I wish to thank Darlene Rude, a Canadian-based gen- legitimacy. At any rate, if the concept and practice of …’, op. cit.
41 Agence France Presse, Bujumbura, 3 April 2000. der consultant, for having drawn my attention to these Bushingantahe is to be revived, it will have to emerge 94 Statement made during a workshop on the promotion
42 FDD troops have been trained and equipped by Zim- IRC studies. She has also offered me valuable insights organically at grassroots level and cannot be engi-
of the private sector, Bujumbura, October 1990, quot-
babwe. which have inspired parts of this section on women. neered top-down as part of a macro-political settle-
ed in Willame, J.-C., Les Manipulations du développe-
43 Human Rights League Iteka, Rapport annuel sur les 58 See Nduna, S. and Goodyear, L., Pain Too Deep for ment.
droits de l’homme: édition 1999, Bujumbura, April Tears: Assessing the Prevalence of Sexual and Gender- 73 Amnesty International, Burundi. La Protection des ment …, op. cit., p. 101.
2000; also see an ironic text by Prunier, G., Les Con- Based Violence among Burundian Refugees in Tanza- droits humains: une étape essentielle dans la recherche 95 International Crisis Group, Burundi: Proposals for the
versations de paix sur le Burundi à Arusha (6 au 17 nia, New York, IRC, 1997; Fain, L., Unsafe Haven: de la paix, January 2000. Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation,
juillet 1999), 23 July 1999. Report of Findings of the Baseline Sexual Violence Sur- 74 Amnesty International, Burundi. No Respite without 4 May 1999, p. 3.
44 A survey can be found in International Crisis Group, vey, Karago Refugee Camp, New York, IRC, February Justice, 17 August 1999, p. 31. 96 See e.g. Hibou, B., ‘Le “capital social” de l’état falsifi-
The Mandela Effect. Prospects for Peace in Burundi, 18 2000; Nduna, S. and Rude, D., ‘The War Followed Me’: 75 Rapport des chefs de mission de l’UE au Burundi con- cateur ou les ruses de l’intelligence économique’, in:
April 2000 and Fondation Hirondelle, ‘Résumé des Documenting Refugee Women’s Experience of Domes- cernant la situation en matière des droits de l’homme, J.-F. Bayart, S. Ellis, B. Hibou, La Criminalisation de
travaux des commissions’, 3 March 2000. tic Violence, New York, IRC, 2000. Bujumbura, January 2000. l’état en Afrique, Brussels, Editions Complexe, 1997,
45 For a theoretical framework applied to the Burundi 59 Human Rights Watch, Emptying the Hills …, op. cit., 76 A list can be found in Burundi-Bureau, Des prisonniers p. 118.
peace process, see Reychler, L., Musabyimana, T. and pp. 18–20. politiques, une réalité non acceptée au Burundi, 97 International Crisis Group, Proposals for the Resump-
Calmeyn, S., Le Défi de la paix au Burundi: téorie et 60 Human Rights League Iteka, Rapport annuel … 1999, Dossier d’analyse no. 65, Bujumbura-Bonn, 29 June
tion …, op. cit., pp. 12–15.
pratique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999. op. cit. 2000.
46 Front d’Action pour la Vérité, Communiqué no. 01, 61 For a detailed discussion, see Lewis, J., The Batwa 77 République du Burundi, Accord sur la plate-forme
Ngozi, 1 March 1999. Some have claimed that this text Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region, London, Minority politique du régime de transition, Bujumbura, June
was simply an attempt at manipulation; this may well Rights Group, 2000, pp. 13–18. 1998, p. 6.
◗
be true, but it does express views strongly felt in some 62 Ibid., p. 15. 78 Here, too, the strong anti-Hutu bias needs to be
quarters of the army. 63 Amnesty International, Burundi: Government Carries addressed: fewer than 10 per cent of law students are
47 On this, see Lemarchand, R., Burundi: Ethnocide …, Out Political Executions after Grossly Unfair Trials, 1 Hutu.
op. cit., pp. 139–42. August 1997. 79 République du Burundi, Ministère de la Justice, Plan
48 Integrated Regional Information Network–Central and 64 For more details on the Twa experience of war, see de réforme et de modernisation du système judiciaire et
Eastern Africa (IRIN–CEA), ‘Update 987 for the Lewis, J., The Batwa Pygmies …, op. cit., pp. 23–5. pénitentiaire burundais, Bujumbura, March 1999.
Great Lakes’, 11 August 2000. 65 Witness Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, 80 Jackson, T., Justice in Burundi: Situation Report, June
49 Guichaoua, A., Destins paysans et politiques agraires Sinhalese and Tamil in Sri Lanka, Greeks and Turks in 1999, London, International Alert, 1999.

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30 31
B I B L I O G R A P H Y / A C R O N Y M S

Chrétien, J.-P., Guichaoua, A. and Le Jeune, G., La Crise

d’août 1988 au Burundi, Paris, CRA, 1989.
Acronyms MRG Reports
Eide, A., New Approaches to Minority Protection, London,
ABASA Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut
Minority Rights Group, December 1993.
ABDP Association Burundaise pour la Défense
International Crisis Group, The Mandela Effect: Prospects
des Droits des Prisonniers
for Peace in Burundi, April 2000.
ANAC Alliance nationale pour le Changement
AFRICA Minorities in the Balkans
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe
Jackson, T., Equal Access to Education: A Peace Imperative The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region Minority Rights in Yugoslavia
ANADDE Alliance Nationale pour le droit et le
for Burundi, London, International Alert, June 2000. Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence Native Peoples of the Russian Far North
développement
Lemarchand, R., Selective Genocide in Burundi, London, Chad The North Caucasus
CNDD Conseil National pour la Défense de la Eritrea: Towards Unity in Diversity
Minority Rights Group, Report no. 20, July 1974. Northern Ireland: Managing Difference
Démocratie Ethiopia: A New Start
Lemarchand, R., Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Prac- The Rastafarians
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo The Falashas
tice, Cambridge, Woodrow Wilson Center Press-Cam- Refugees in Europe
FDD Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie Indian South Africans
bridge University Press, 1994. Inequalities in Zimbabwe Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority
FNL Front National de Libération
Lewis, J., The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region, Jehovah’s Witnesses in Africa Romania’s Ethnic Hungarians
FRODEBU Front Démocratique du Burundi
London, Minority Rights Group, June 2000. The Namibians Minorities in Southeast Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion
FROLINA Front pour la Libération Nationale
Ould-Abdallah, A., Burundi on the Brink: A UN Special The New Position of East Africa’s Asians The Saami of Lapland
ICRC International Committee of the Red The Sahel: The People’s Right to Development
Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy, Washington, The Southern Balkans
Cross The San of the Kalahari
DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2000. The Two Irelands
Inkinzo Parti Socialiste et Panafricaniste Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil
Reychler, L., Musabyimana, T. and Calmeyn, S., Le Défi de
IRC International Rescue Committee Sudan: Conflict and Minorities
la paix au Burundi: théorie et pratique, Paris, L’Harmat-
tan, 1999.
MOLIBA Mouvement de Libération des Bahutu Uganda THE MIDDLE EAST
PALIPEHUTU Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu The Western Saharans
Reyntjens, F., Burundi 1972–1988: continuité et change- The Armenians
PARENA Parti pour le Redressement National
ment, Brussels, Centre d’Étude et de Documentation The Baha’is of Iran
Africaines, 1989.
RADDES Rassemblement Démocratique pour le THE AMERICAS The Beduin of the Negev
Développement Économique et social The Copts of Egypt
Reyntjens, F., ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating: the Afro-Brazilians: Time for Recognition
PDC Parti Démocrate Chrétien Afro-Central Americans: Rediscovering the African Heritage Israel’s Oriental Immigrants and Druzes
June 1993 elections in Burundi’, Journal of Modern
PIT Parti Indépendant pour les Travailleurs Amerindians of South America The Kurds
African Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1993, pp. 563–83.
PL Parti Libéral Canada’s Indians Lebanon
Reyntjens, F., L’Afrique des grands lacs en crise: Rwanda,
PP Parti du Peuple The East Indians of Trinidad and Guyana Migrant Workers in the Gulf
Burundi 1988–1994, Paris, Karthala, 1994. French Canada in Crisis
PRP Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple The Palestinians
Reyntjens, F., Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence, Lon- Haitian Refugees in the US
PSD Parti Social-Démocrate
don, Minority Rights Group, March 1995. Inuit (Eskimos) of Canada
RPB Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais
Reyntjens, F., La Guerre des grands lacs: alliances mou-
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front
The Maya of Guatemala
The Miskito Indians of Nicaragua
SOUTHERN OCEANS
vantes et conflits extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale,
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence Mexican Americans in the US Aboriginal Australians
Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999.
of Angola The Original Americans: US Indians Diego Garcia: A Contrast to the Falklands
Van Acker, F. and Marysse, S.,‘Les coûts de la guerre civile
UPRONA Union pour le Progrès National Puerto Ricans in the US East Timor, West Papua/Irian and Indonesia
au Burundi: “une décennie perdue”’, in F. Reyntjens and
Fiji
S. Marysse (eds), L’Afrique des grands lacs: Annuaire The Kanaks of New Caledonia
1999–2000, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2000. ◗ ASIA The Maori of Aotearoa – New Zealand
Willame, J.-C., Les Manipulations du développement: ajuste- The Adivasis of Bangladesh Micronesia: The Problem of Palau
ment, cogestion et démocratisation au Burundi, Brussels, The Adivasis of India The Pacific: Nuclear Testing and Minorities
Centre d’Étude et de Documentation Africaines, 1992. Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities
The Baluchis and Pathans
The Biharis of Bangladesh THEMATIC
◗ Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development?
Children: Rights and Responsibilities
The Chinese of South-East Asia
Japan’s Minorities – Burakumin, Koreans, Ainu, Okinawans Constitutional Law and Minorities
The Lumad and Moro of Mindanao Education Rights and Minorities
Minorities in Cambodia Female Genital Mutilation: Proposals for Change
Minorities of Central Vietnam International Action against Genocide
Muslim Women in India The International Protection of Minorities
The Sikhs The Jews of Africa and Asia
Sri Lanka: A Bitter Harvest Land Rights and Minorities
The Tamils of Sri Lanka
Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War Language, Literacy and Minorities
The Tibetans Minorities and Human Rights Law
New Approaches to Minority Protection
Race and Law in Britain and the US
EUROPE The Refugee Dilemma: International Recognition and
The Basques and Catalans Acceptance
The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans The Social Psychology of Minorities
Cyprus: In Search of Peace Teaching about Prejudice
Minorities and Autonomy in Western Europe War: The Impact on Minority and Indigenous Children

BURUNDI: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

32
Burundi: Prospects
for Peace Minority
B urundi has experienced conflict during most of its history
since independence in 1962. The violence has generally been
interpreted as ethnic, but is in fact political, aimed at maintaining
Rights Group
International
or capturing power. Controlling the state in Burundi is of major
importance as it is the main avenue for accumulation and repro- Minority Rights Group International
duction of a dominant class. Ethnicity is a strong mobilizing (MRG) is a non-governmental organiza-
force, manipulated by elites in their political strategies and, since tion working to secure rights for ethnic,
so many have been killed on the basis of their ethnic belonging, linguistic and religious minorities world-
it has become a major political variable in its own right. wide, and to promote cooperation and
understanding between communities.
MRG’s timely new Report, Burundi: Prospects for Peace, by
Filip Reyntjens, has been commissioned to further the search for We publish readable, concise and accu-
peace and stability in Burundi. It gives a balanced and critical rate Reports on the issues facing
analysis of events in Burundi, from the transition to democracy, oppressed groups around the world. We
through to the 1993 coup and its aftermath. Finally, it charts the also produce books, education and
course of the peace negotiations, contributing to an understand- training materials, and MRG’s 800-page
ing of the issues that must be faced if Burundi is to move towards World Directory of Minorities.
peace and rebuild the lives of its people. The author highlights
how a failure to move towards peace in the current climate would We work with the United Nations,
lead to yet more violence, compounding an already explosive among other international bodies, to
regional situation. increase awareness of minority rights,
often in conjunction with our partner
The Report ends with a set of recommendations aimed at the organizations. We also coordinate
Burundian government and the international community, to sup- training on minority rights internation-
port peace and stability and human rights for all. ally and work with different communi-
ties to counter racism and prejudice.

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