1. The petitioner was found guilty by the trial court of illegal possession of explosives and was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years imprisonment.
2. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the warrantless arrest was invalid and the grenade seized was inadmissible.
3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful due to probable cause, as the petitioner was in possession of a grenade in an area known for bombings, and that the grenade was properly admitted as evidence.
1. The petitioner was found guilty by the trial court of illegal possession of explosives and was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years imprisonment.
2. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the warrantless arrest was invalid and the grenade seized was inadmissible.
3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful due to probable cause, as the petitioner was in possession of a grenade in an area known for bombings, and that the grenade was properly admitted as evidence.
1. The petitioner was found guilty by the trial court of illegal possession of explosives and was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years imprisonment.
2. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the warrantless arrest was invalid and the grenade seized was inadmissible.
3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful due to probable cause, as the petitioner was in possession of a grenade in an area known for bombings, and that the grenade was properly admitted as evidence.
1. The petitioner was found guilty by the trial court of illegal possession of explosives and was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years imprisonment.
2. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the warrantless arrest was invalid and the grenade seized was inadmissible.
3. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful due to probable cause, as the petitioner was in possession of a grenade in an area known for bombings, and that the grenade was properly admitted as evidence.
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GR NO 123595 - PART 2
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of
Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest
was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the
Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who
was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account
petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile
situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid
down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received
any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.