GR No 123595 - Part 2

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GR NO 123595 - PART 2

In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but


promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus
found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No.
186, and sentenced him to suffer:

[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17)


YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more
than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA,
as maximum.

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of


appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR
No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. 21

In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of


Appeals, petitioner asserted that:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING


THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF
THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS
AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST."

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING


AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM
HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN
UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.

In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest


was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions
provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search
was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible
in evidence.

In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the


Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and
prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24

In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of


Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that
petitioner abandoned his original theory before the
court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the
police officers; and second, the factual finding of the
trial court that the grenade was seized from
petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue.
Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility
in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized
from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the
ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as
petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:

We are at a loss to understand how a man, who


was in possession of a live grenade and in the
company of other suspicious character[s] with
unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda
at a time when political tension ha[d] been
enkindling a series of terroristic activities,
[can] claim that he was not attempting to
commit an offense. We need not mention that
Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for
being a favorite bomb site especially during
times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by
itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply
too preposterous to inspire belief.

In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account


petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence
reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact
that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the
latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that
petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the
"accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to
convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to
be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:

The police officers in such a volatile


situation would be guilty of gross negligence
and dereliction of duty, not to mention of
gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait
for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill
several innocent persons while maiming numerous
others, before arriving at what would then be
an assured but moot conclusion that there was
indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in
agreement with the lower court in saying that
the probable cause in such a situation should
not be the kind of proof necessary to convict,
but rather the practical considerations of
everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent
mind, and not legal technicians, will
ordinarily act.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid


down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied
upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial
differences," to wit:

[In Mengote] the police officers never received


any intelligence report that someone [at] the
corner of a busy street [would] be in
possession of a prohibited article. Here the
police officers were responding to a [sic]
public clamor to put a check on the series of
terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and,
after receiving intelligence reports about a
bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the
historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they
conducted foot patrols for about seven days to
observe suspicious movements in the area.
Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers
[had] no personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. Here,
PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact
that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two
days before he finally succeeded in
apprehending him.

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