Hacienda Luisita V Presidential Agrarian Reform Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO),

Council which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco

[G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011] Sr., Group.
 Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender
 Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Constitution is unequivocal: the farmers and regular Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be
farmworkers have a right to own directly or distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered
collectively the lands they till. judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda
The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: Luisita to the MAR.
direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to  In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the
individual farmers is the most commonly used method by government’s case against TADECO. The CA
DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of
alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
individual farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
collective ownership by farmers. No language can be  Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer
found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or or stock transfer as two alternative modes in
prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the
being the legal entity through which collective ownership stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of
can be exercised. TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the
Emergency Recit: The SC en banc voted 11-0 Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate
dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with stock acquisition by the farmers.
modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian  After conducting a follow-up referendum and
Reform Council (PARC for brevity) revoking Hacienda revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Luisita Inc.  (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the
(SDP) and placing the subject land in HL under Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led
compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government. by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved
Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-
operative facts that occurred in the premises. The SC 12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
thereat declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by  From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have
application of the operative fact principle, give the 5296 extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such
qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity) claim was subsequently contested by two groups
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI
stockholders or choose actual land distribution. Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR
meeting regarding the effects of their choice and asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or
therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice. The revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they
parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that
Reconsideration regarding the SC’s decision HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t
FACTS: really improved contrary to the promise and
 In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General rationale of the SDOA.
de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda  The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to
Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and
sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the
Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group.The recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of
Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of
obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition
 Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP
favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered
the sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition
the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant- scheme under the CARP law.
corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should  These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via
there be any, and whenever conditions should exist Rule 65.
warranting such action under the provisions of the  On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for
Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
with this condition affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP
 In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of
a program aimed at redistributing public and private outright agricultural land transfer.
agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who  For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
are landless. anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with
 One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in
Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural- Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution
industrial-residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was ISSUE(S):
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the
1. W/N  Is the operative fact doctrine available in interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the
this case? (yes) non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the
2. W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be
Distribution Plan or SDP. (YES) resolved without delving into the constitutionality of
3. W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial RA 6657.
review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA  Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon
6657 (NO) the constitutionality of acts of the executive or
4. W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the legislative departments have not been met in this
Constitution’s concept of agrarian reform (YES) case.
FOURTH ISSUE
HELD: MR of PARC is Partially lifted  Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the
Constitution is unequivocal: the farmers and regular
RATIO: farmworkers have a right to own directly or
FIRST ISSUE collectively the lands they till.
 The Court maintained its stance that the operative  The basic law allows two (2) modes of land
fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, distribution: direct and indirect ownership. Direct
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions transfer through collective ownership of the
made by the President or the administrative agencies agricultural land is the alternative to direct
that have the force and effect of laws.  ownership of agricultural land by individual
 Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective
they may have produced acts and consequences that ownership by farmers. No language can be found in
must be respected. It is on this score that the the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being
consequences that resulted from the implementation the legal entity through which collective ownership
of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of can be exercised.
HLI.   The word collective is defined as indicating a
 The majority stressed that the application of the number of persons or things considered as
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, constituting one group or aggregate, while
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs collectively is defined as in a collective sense or
because not only were they allowed to retain the manner; in a mass or body.  By using the word
benefits and homelots they received under the stock collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect
distribution scheme, they were also given the option ownership of land and not just outright agricultural
to choose for themselves whether they want to land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that
remain as stockholders of HLI or not. land reform may become successful even if it is
SECOND ISSUE done through the medium of juridical entities
 Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by composed of farmers.
DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock  The stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31
distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as
PARC. It may be that RA 6657 or other executive instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article
issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an the landless appears to be the dominant theme of
approved SDP, but such power or authority is that policy, the Court emphasized that Sec. 4,
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does
necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is not constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform
implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership
which is expressed. by farmers and no other, or else the enactment
 Following this doctrine, the conferment of express suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the intention were otherwise, the framers of the
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily Constitution would have worded said section in a
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval manner mandatory in character
of the plan.
THIRD ISSUE Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR
 No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged G. R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the
earliest possible opportunity. It should have been EMERGENCY RECIT: Petition for prohibition and
raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC mandamus questioning the validity of certain provisions
approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a of the IPRA. As per petitioners, the IPRA violates the
reasonable time thereafter. Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
 Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not because the law gives the IPs the right to utilize minerals
the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis and natural resources located in the properties awarded to
mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or them. The SC dismissed the petition because of a 7-7
not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion vote (procedural) but the ratio contains the separate
in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the opinions of the justices.
original positions of the groups representing the
FACTS: Spanish crown as an exception to the Regalian
 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought theory.
this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens  While embodying the theory of jura regalia, the
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of 1935 constitution is too clear for any misunderstand
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 or the which
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).  declares that all agricultural, timber , mineral lands
 OSG’s comment: IPRA is partly unconstitutional on of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal
the ground that it grants ownership over natural ,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the potential energy and other natural resources of the
petition be granted in part. Philippines belong to the state. And Nowhere does it
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the state that certain lands which are “absolutely
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules necessary for social welfare and existence”
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful including those which are not part of the public
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of dominion shall thereafter be owned by the state. The
the public domain as well as minerals and other provision should be interpreted in favor of
natural resources therein, in violation of the preservation rather than impairment or
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article extinguishment of vested rights.
XII of the Constitution.  The mere fact that sec 3 defines ancestral domains
 Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all- to include the natural resources found therein does
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
ancestral lands which might even include private resources as private property of the indigenous
lands found within said areas, it violates the rights peoples. Sec 5 cannot be construed as a source of
of private landowners. ownership rights of indigenous people over the
 In addition, petitioners question the provisions of natural resources simply because it recognizes
the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the ancestral domains as their private but community
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the property.
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains  The IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over
and ancestral lands on the ground that these natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Sec 7
provisions violate the due process clause of the merely
Constitution.  recognizes the right to claim ownership over lands
 Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied
Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order by
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the  indigenous peoples sacred places, traditional
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office hunting and fishing ground and all improvement
of the President is characterized as a lateral but made by them at any time within the domains.
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and  What is evident is that the IPRA protects the
program coordination. They contend that said Rule indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in to the
infringes upon the Presidents power of control over natural resources
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII  found within their ancestral domains, including the
of the Constitution. preservation of the ecological balance therein and
the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will
 After due deliberation on the petition, the members
not be unduly displaced when state approved
of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to
activities involving the natural resources located
dismiss the petition, Seven (7) other members of the
therein are under taken.
Court voted to grant the petition. 
Separate Opinion of J. Panganiban
ISSUE(S): As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7)
 Consistent with the social justice principle of giving
and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
more in law to those who have less in life Congress
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
in its wisdom may grant preferences and
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the
petition is DISMISSED.
Constitution must be respected. I personally believe
in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed
RATIO:
and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them
to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I
Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan
cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual
 The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership
inequality of access to the nation’s wealth or to
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands
stamp the Court’s imprimatur on a law that offends
and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional. The
and degrades the repository of the very authority of
regalian theory however does not negate the native
this Court—the Constitution of the Philippines.
title to land held in private ownership since time
 RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous
immemorial, The Carino ruing institutionalized the
cultural communities and indigenous peoples,
recognition of the existence of native title to land or
admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy
possession under a claim of ownership since time
enshrined in our Constitution to “recognize and
immemorial and independent of any grant from the
promote the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity
 and development.” Though laudable and well- cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that ownership generally
run directly afoul of our fundamental law from holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
which it claims origin and authority. More private but community property which belongs to
specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
8 and other related provisions contravene the disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
Regalian Doctrine—the basic foundation of the sustainable traditional resource rights.
State’s property regime.
 The concerted effort to malign the Regalian 4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural
Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by
Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural the IPs *The IPs claims are limited to lands, bodies
resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the of water traditionally and actually occupied by
Filipino people. As the protector of the ICCs/I
Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to Ps, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
uphold the tenets of that Constitution—not to dilute, grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
circumvent or create exceptions to them within the domains;* IPRA did not mention that the IPs
 But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional also own all the other natural resources found within the
power of full controlin favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as ancestral domains.
natural resources found within their territories are
concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and Juan G. Frivaldo vs COMELEC and Raul R. Lee
possession, they may develop and manage the [G.R. No. 120295; June 28, 1996]
natural resources, benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and the utilization Raul R. Lee vs COMELEC and Juan G. Frivaldo
thereof. And they may exercise such right without [G.R. No. 123755; June 28, 1996]
any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so
only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize  Under Sec. 39 of the LGC, "an elective local official
natural resources must also be limited to such must be:
period. In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to o a citizen of the Philippines;
negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the o a registered voter in the barangay,
exploration of natural resources, a right vested by municipality, city, or province . . . where
the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through he intends to be elected;
IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority o a resident therein for at least 1 year
group the State’s power of ownership and full immediately preceding the day of the
control over a substantial part of the national election;
patrimony, in contravention of our most o able to read and write Filipino or any
fundamental law.
other local language or dialect.
o In addition, "candidates for the position of
Separate Opinion of J. Puno
governor . . . must be at least be 23 years
of age on election day.
 The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian
 Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June
Theory
30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been
governor (and other elective officials) began -- he
theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE;they have
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to
lived there even before the Spanish colonization.
hold such office and to discharge the functions and
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre ‐conquest rights
responsibilities thereof as of said date. This is the
to lands and domains held under a claim of private
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
lands are deemed never to have been public lands
the purpose for which such law was enacted.
and are indisputable presumed to have been held
The law does not specify any particular date or time
that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
when the candidate must possess citizenship. The
citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be possessed by
2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian
an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
Doctrine:
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which
... Oh Cho vs Director of Lands:
he has been elected.
This exception would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his
EMERGENCY RECIT: Frivaldo, who was twice
predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial
disqualified because he was a US citizen, got the highest
number of votes in the 1995 governorship elections. He
3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private
now claims to have repatriated. BUT HE DID SO
Ownership
AFTER FILING HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.
(took oath of allegiance under PD 752 at 2 pm, June 30,
‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the
1995). The main issue is whether FRIVALDO A RP
view that ancestral domains and all resources found
CITIZEN IF HE REPATRIATED AFTER FILING OF
therein shall serve as the material bases of their
COC. The Court said yes. The law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess  Lee filed an MR, which was denied by the
citizenship (vs. residence and age). Frivaldo's repatriation COMELEC en banc. On Feb. 26, 1996, the present
RETROACTED TO THE DATE OF FILING OF HIS petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a TRO,
APPLICATION ON AUGUST 17, 1994. this Court issued on Feb. 27, 1996 a Resolution
which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
FACTS: the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this
Lee vs COMELEC and Frivaldo petition."
 On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in Frivaldo vs COMELEC and Lee
the 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, Lee,  The facts of this case are essentially the same as
another candidate, filed a petition with the those above. However, Frivaldo assails the above-
COMELEC praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that
from seeking or holding any public office or under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue said
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy Resolutions because they were not rendered "within
be canceled. the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than 15
 Second Division of the COMELEC: Granted the days before the election."
petition. “Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to
 The MR filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified
until after elections. So, his candidacy continued petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
and he was voted for during the elections held on a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
said date. The COMELEC en banc soon affirmed person exclusively on the ground that any
the Resolution of the Second Division. material representation contained therein as
 The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate petition may be filed at any time not later than
of Votes dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the following votes obtained by the candidates for the certificate of candidacy and shall be
the position of Governor of Sorsogon: decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
o Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060 fifteen days before the election.”
o Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440  Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure
o Raul R. Lee 53,304 of the COMELEC to act on the petition for
o Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925 disqualification within the period of 15 days prior to
 Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of defect which renders the said Resolutions null and
Sorsogon. void.
 COMELEC en banc: Directed "the Provincial  By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court
Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since
the purpose of proclaiming Lee as the winning they are intimately related in their factual
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon environment and are identical in the ultimate
on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30pm of question raised, viz., who should occupy the
June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
Sorsogon. On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from
 Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a new petition the parties and required them thereafter to file
(SPC 95-317), praying for the annulment of simultaneously their respective memoranda.
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2pm, he took ISSUE/S:
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines 1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo is valid and
after "his petition for repatriation under PD 725 legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
which he filed with the Special Committee on citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to
Naturalization in Sept. 1994 had been granted". As hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of retroactive effect? If so, from when?
the COMELEC) . . . was released and received by 2. WON Frivaldo's "judicially declared"
Frivaldo on June 30 at 5:30pm, there was no more disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected
as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs  Comelec, the 3. WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering
position of governor. that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an
 COMELEC First Division: Held that Lee, "not election protest or a quo warranto case"?
having garnered the highest number of votes," was 4. WON the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the
not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected election, valid and legal in light of existing
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the jurisprudence?
highest number of votes, 5. WON the COMELEC exceed its jurisdiction in
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship
of PD 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon, considering that they were not
of Sorsogon." rendered within the period referred to in Sec. 78 of
 the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than 15 reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under PD.
days before the elections"? 725, with no less than the SolGen himself, who was
the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
HELD: lost, this time, as counsel the COMELEC, arguing
1. Yes; he is qualified; his repatriation took retroactive the validity of his cause (in addition to his able
effect from the date of his application. private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took
2. No. his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said
3. Yes. Decree at 2pm on June 30, 1995 is not disputed.
4. No. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have
5. Moot. been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at 8:30pm on the said date since, clearly and
RATIO: unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of
First Issue: Frivaldo’s Repatriation [Most Important votes in the elections and since at that time, he
Issue] already reacquired his citizenship.
 The LGC of 199 expressly requires Philippine  En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's
citizenship as a qualification for elective local repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: shall now discuss in seriatim.
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local  First, Lee tells us that PD 725 had "been effectively
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, Aquino exercising legislative powers under the
city, or province or, in the case of a member of Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
where he intends to be elected; a resident serious and contentious issue of policy which the
therein for at least one (1) year immediately present government, in the exercise of prudence and
preceding the day of the election; and able to sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment
read and write Filipino or any other local of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution",
language or dialect. adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,
1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, Naturalization constituted for purposes of PD 725,
vice governor or member of the sangguniang President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member from undertaking any and all proceedings within
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly your functional area of responsibility as defined
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three under LOI No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
(23) years of age on election day. amended."
 This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by
 Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a
Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of PD 725.
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a
in fine, that he possesses the qualifications repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
prescribed under the said statute (RA 7160). that no express repeal was made because then
 Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. and/or impliedly state that PD 725 was being
104654 and during the oral argument in this case repealed or was being rendered without any legal
that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act effect. In fact, she did not even mention it
of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so specifically by its number or text. On the other
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
endorsement of several members of the House of that repeals by implication are not favored. An
Representatives" due, according to him, to the implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".
procedural defects.  The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot
 Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not
was overwhelmingly elected governor by the every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and Constitution can nor should be regarded as an
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Lee. Twice, exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could
he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
twice disqualified from holding and discharging his Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, processing of applications for repatriation pending
with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
favorable decision from the COMELEC to boot. 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully former President did not repeal PD 725 but left it to
passed through the third and last mode of the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the
 matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she  So too, the fact that 10 other persons, as certified to
should have unequivocally said so instead of by the SolGen, were granted repatriation argues
referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she convincingly and conclusively against the existence
carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms of favoritism vehemently posited by Lee. At any
that clearly indicated the intention of "the present rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound repatriation should have been pursued before the
discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being of administrative remedies.
proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit  Third, Lee further contends that assuming the
unmitigated violence not only upon statutory assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
construction but on common sense as well. could only be effective as at 2pm of June 30, 1995
 Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," the LGC "must exist on the date of his election, if
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing
"filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in our decision in G.R. 104654 which held that "both
just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which the LGC and the Constitution require that only
"prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his office." Obviously, however, this was a
application for repatriation with the Office of the mere obiter as the only issue in said case was
President in Malacañang Palace on Aug. 17, 1994. whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not
This is confirmed by the SolGen. However, the -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the
Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the
1995, when presumably the said Committee started issue of when an aspirant for public office should be
processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Committee required. Under these circumstances, it  Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n
could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in elective local official must be:
the processing of his application. o a citizen of the Philippines;
 Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution o a registered voter in the barangay,
of the Special Committee on Naturalization was municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intended solely for the personal interest of intends to be elected;
respondent," the SolGen explained during the oral o a resident therein for at least 1 year
argument on Mar. 19, 1996 that such allegation is immediately preceding the day of the election;
simply baseless as there were many others who o able to read and write Filipino or any other
applied and were considered for repatriation, a list local language or dialect.
of whom was submitted by him to this Court, o In addition, "candidates for the position of
through a Manifestation filed on Apr. 3, 1996. governor . . . must be at least 23 years of age
 On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are on election day.
convinced that the presumption of regularity in the  From the above, it will be noted that the law does
performance of official duty and the presumption of not specify any particular date or time when the
legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact residence (which must consist of at least 1 year's
that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not residency immediately preceding the day of
a ground to conclude that such proceedings were election) and age (at least 23 years of age on
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of election day).
repatriation under PD 725 are not difficult to  Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. requirement for holding an elective public
In fact, PD 725 itself requires very little of an office, and the purpose of the citizenship
applicant, and even the rules and regulations to qualification is none other than to ensure that no
implement the said decree were left to the Special alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, nation, shall govern our people and our country or a
unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first- unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
time entry into Philippine political life, in govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born proclamation and on the day the law mandates his
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the
undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and term of office of governor (and other elective
faithfully served his country and his province prior officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified
to his naturalization in the United States -- a to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re- liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
in returning to his country of birth to offer once the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
more his talent and services to his people. even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
 construction, it should be noted that Sec. 39 of the  So too, during the oral argument, his counsel
LGC speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has
such qualification be required at the time of election voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in
or at the time of the filing of the certificates of 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such questioned, but the court dismissed his eligibility as
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- voted in all the previous elections including on May
should thus be possessed when the "elective [or 8, 1995."
elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time  It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this the province where he intended to be elected.
case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's  There is yet another reason why the prime issue
ruling in Vasquez vs  Giap and Li Seng Giap & of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
to ensure that our people and country do not end up date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Sec.
being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter,
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose presumably including the defeated candidate, the
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
construing the citizenship qualification as applying disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision
to the time of proclamation of the elected official of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
and at the start of his term. contest before the COMELEC an incumbent's
 But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
raised during the oral argument to the effect that the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the LGC. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed
time the candidate (or for that matter the elected of "within 10 days after proclamation" of the
official) registered as a voter. After all, Sec. 39, winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
specifies as another item of qualification, that he be cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the
a "registered voter". And, under the law a "voter" very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30pm, June
must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, 30, 1995), Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the afternoon of the same day, then he should have
the time of such registration. been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
 The answer to this problem again lies in discerning garnered the highest number of votes in the
the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended immediately preceding elections and such oath had
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to already cured his previous "judicially-declared"
election consistent with the requirement of being a alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
registered voter, then it would not have made ineligible.
citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law  But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even application on Aug. 17, 1994.
if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It  It is true that under the Civil Code of the
also stands to reason that the voter requirement Philippines, “laws shall have no retroactive effect,
was included as another qualification (aside from unless the contrary is provided." But there are
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when
nationality but to require that the official be the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law  A reading of PD 725 immediately shows that it
states: "a registered voter in the barangay, creates a new right, and also provides for a new
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Thus, in its preamble, PD 725 expressly recognizes
LGC requires an elective official to be the plight of "many Filipino women who had lost
a registered voter. It does not require him to their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens"
vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual and who could not, under the existing law (CA 63,
voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the
other words, the law's purpose in this second death of their husbands or the termination of their
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official marital status" and who could neither be benefitted
is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing
-- and not anywhere else. "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
 Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such
emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he provision of the new Constitution does not apply to
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his Filipino women who had married aliens before said
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by constitution took effect." Thus, PD 725 granted
judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire
precinct on May 8, 1995." Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to PD 725.
 On the other hand, said statute also provided a new nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (PD 725)
remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of the date of his application therefor, Aug. 17, 1994.
PD 725 such former Filipinos would have had to The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of was the intent of the legislative authority that the
naturalization, but with the advent of PD 725 they law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship transactions existing even before the law came into
under the simplified procedure of repatriation. being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of
 The SolGen argues: former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
o By their very nature, curative statutes are enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
retroactive since they are intended to right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is
supply defects, abridge superfluities in to be given the fullest effect and expression,
existing laws and curb certain evils. then there is all the more reason to have the law
o In this case, PD 725 was enacted to cure apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
the defect in the existing naturalization situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
law, specifically CA 63 wherein married passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and
only upon the death of their husbands, and should be made to take effect as of date of his
natural-born Filipinos who lost their application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing
citizenship by naturalization and other in the law that would bar this or would show a
causes faced the difficulty of undergoing contrary intention on the part of the legislative
the rigid procedures of CA 63 for authority; and there is no showing that damage or
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious
naturalization. would result from giving retroactivity to his
o PD 725 provided a remedy for the repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
its provisions are considered essentially disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
remedial and curative. constitutional guaranty.
 In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the  Being a former Filipino who has served the people
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever
retroactive operation. "A retrospective operation is defects there were in his nationality should now be
given to a statute or amendment where the intent deemed mooted by his repatriation.
that it should so operate clearly appears from a  Another argument for retroactivity to the date of
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the applicants. If PD 725 were not to be given
statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
events and transactions not otherwise covered by decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as applications for any substantial length of time, then
it has been held that citizenship is a political and the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
civil right equally as important as the freedom of Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
speech, liberty of abode, the right against citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes
unreasonable searches and seizures and other outside their control. This should not be. In case of
guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
the legislative intent to give retrospective operation is to be presumed that the law-making body
to PD 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. intended right and justice to prevail.
"It has been said that a remedial statute must be so  And as experience will show, the Special
construed as to make it effect the evident purpose Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the applications for repatriation within relatively short
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to spans of time after the same were filed. The fact that
those in the future, then it will be so applied such interregna were relatively insignificant
although the statute does not in terms so direct, minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the
unless to do so would impair some vested right or government as a result of giving retroactivity to
violate some constitutional guaranty." This is all the repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
more true of PD 725, which did not specify any direct prejudice to the government is possible only
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of where a person's repatriation has the effect of
repatriation granted therein. wiping out a liability of his to the government
 At this point, a valid question may be raised: How arising in connection with or as a result of his being
can the retroactivity of PD 725 benefit Frivaldo an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
considering that said law was enacted on June 5, between application and approval, a situation that is
1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship not present in the instant case.
much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for  And it is but right and just that the mandate of the
repatriation even later, on Aug 17, 1994? people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail.
 While it is true that the law was already in effect at Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or
the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as
 having become effective as of the date of his and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial
application, i.e., on Aug. 17, 1994. This being so, all or curative nature of the law granting him a new
questions about his possession of the nationality right to resume his political status and the legislative
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
(June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, having been forced to give up his citizenship and
1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy political aspiration as his means of escaping a
(Mar. 20, 1995) would become moot. regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
 Based on the foregoing, any question regarding retroactive effect as of the date of his application
Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be therefor, during the pendency of which he was
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality.
having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the
citizenship restored -- as of Aug. 17, 1994, his vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the
previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed start of the term of office of governor, and should
validated as of said date. have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,
 It is not disputed that on Jan. 20, 1983 Frivaldo since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his Aug. 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
repatriation not effectively give him dual Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the LGC would said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are
disqualify him "from running for any elective local precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the
position?" We answer this question in the negative, citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was or disqualification to run for and hold public office.
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for rulings recognizing the COMELEC’s authority and
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
that he "had long renounced and had long annulment of proclamations.
abandoned his American citizenship -- long before  The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference
interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his stressed the importance of giving effect to the
Filipino citizenship." sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility
Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Disqualification? Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues
 NO! Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
with finality. This is because a person may cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
law for the purpose. must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
Third Issue: COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the principles that overriding such ineligibility and
Petition in SPC 95-317 thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
 YES! COMELEC has ample power to "exercise people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests the very democratic institutions and juristic
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of traditions that our Constitution and laws so
all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking,
Lee has miserably failed.
Fourth Issue: Was Lee’s Proclamation Valid?  In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically
 NO! The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
the sovereign will have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of
his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
Fifth Issue: Is Sec. 78 of the Election Code his failure to show his citizenship at the time he
Mandatory? registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
 Issue is now moot and academic; deemed could have disputed the factual findings of the
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the COMELEC that he was stateless at the time of
COMELEC. repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for
Epilogue: any elective local position." But the real essence of
 In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in justice does not emanate from quibblings over
the LGC is to be possessed by an elective official at patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law
start of the term of office to which he has been as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
elected. We further hold PD 725 to be in full force edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
and effect up to the present, not having been eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
 approximating venerability in Philippine political citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question
life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992
this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt elections. That is settled. But his supervening
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At repatriation has changed his political status -- not in
the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
sought to serve his people once more. The people of  Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation,
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment
every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since
during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be our courts are charged only with the duty of
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determining who Philippine nationals are, we cannot
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in Americans. It is basic in international law that a
spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, State determines ONLY those who are its own
of his consuming intention and burning desire to re- citizens -- not who are the citizens of other
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe countries. The issue here is: the COMELEC made
old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost such finding has not been shown by Lee to be
on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case
mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was law, such finding is binding and final.
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the  The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who
most powerful country in the world. But he opted, lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all 3
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and previous elections, should be declared winner
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal American was publicly known". First, there is
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
favor. And in the final analysis, over and above knowledge. Second, even if there is, such
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of knowledge can be true post facto only of the last
Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by two previous elections. Third, even the COMELEC
a leader of their overwhelming choice. and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995
elections. How then can there be such "public"
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): knowledge?
 Mr. Justice Davide submits that Sec. 39 of the LGC
Dissenting Opinion: Davide, Jr., J. refers to the qualifications of elective local
 In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials,
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a)
memorandum dated Mar. 27, 1987 should be of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by merely at the commencement of the term, but by
Lee) of PD 725. But whether it decrees a suspension Election Day at the latest. We see it differently. Sec.
or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
abrogate an existing law. qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply
 The existence and subsistence of PD 725 were to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
recognized in the first Frivaldo case;  viz., "under legislature would have said so, instead of
CA 63 as amended by CA 473 and PD 725, differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered Election Day or prior thereto, it would have
voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates
him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or for governor, mayor, etc.
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as  Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
there may have been in his registration as a voter for ground, among others, that the law specifically
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity provides that it is only after taking the oath of
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have
1992, which were the subjects of such previous reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
rulings. question what the provision states. We hold
 Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's however that the provision should be understood
holding that, given the unique factual circumstances thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the
of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is
holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and deemed for all purposes and intents to have
even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring
Concurring Opinion: Puno, J. all the time. For this reason, the Constitution and
 The sovereignty of our people is the primary our laws provide when the entire electorate or only
postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, some of them can elect those who make our laws
it appears as the first in our declaration of principles and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire
and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of electorate votes for our senators but only our district
our fundamental law proclaims that "the Philippines electorates vote for our congressmen, only our
is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty provincial electorates vote for the members of our
resides in the people and all government authority provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for
emanates from them." The same principle served as our city councilors, and only our municipal
the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions. It electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire
is one of the few principles whose truth has been electorate votes for our President and Vice-President
cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Sec. 4, but only our provincial electorates vote for our
Art. IV of the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of governors, only our city electorates vote for our
the Federal government to guarantee to every state a mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for
"republican form of government." With our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes
understandable fervor, the American authorities of voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the
imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that
1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino said sovereignty has been fragmented.
framers.  It is my respectful submission that the issue in the
 Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon
revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people- should be given the right to defy the law by
oriented. Thus, Sec. 4 of Art. II provides as a state allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather,
policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to the issue is: whether the will of the voters of
serve and protect the people." Sec. 1, Art. XI also Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor
provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at all ought to be given a decisive value considering
times be accountable to the people . . ." Secs. 15 and the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate
1 of Art. XIII define the role and rights of people's ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The
organizations. Sec. 5(2) of Art. XVI mandates that uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and
"the state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the
nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect United States, there are 2 principal schools of
for people's rights in the performance of their duty." thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a
And Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides that "amendments candidate must possess the qualifications for office
to this Constitution may likewise be directly at the time of his election. The other ventures the
proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All view that the candidate should satisfy the
these provisions and more are intended to breathe qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of
more life to the sovereignty of our people. the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision
 To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a that has squarely resolved this difficult question of
kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the adhered to the second school of thought while Mr.
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its Justice Davide dissents.
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,  I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in
the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
govern. Former Dean Vicente Sinco states that an dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my
essential quality of sovereignty is legal opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that
essential qualities inherent in the nature of Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This allow him to sit as governor without transgressing
means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and the law. I do not concede this assumption for as
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by
the power to determine exclusively its legal this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not
competence. Its powers are original, not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the
derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at people by according more weight to the votes of the
any given time." Citing Barker, he adds that a more people of Sorsogon.
amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final  Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of
power of final legal adjustment of all legal issues." Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them
The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty."
thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In
vs Hopkins, where it held that ". . . sovereignty his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a
itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the crime, a violation of Art. 134 of the RPC, an offense
author and source of law; but in our system, while against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people
government, sovereignty itself remains with the of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo
people, by whom and for whom all government as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of
exists and acts." candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for
 I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all
Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
need not always be exercised by the people together, our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a
 candidate should possess the qualification of  Petitioners Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian,
then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the were charged:
case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon. o with having purchased U.S. dollars in the
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of total sum of $130,000.00, without the
our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which necessary license from the Central Bank
is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. of the Philippines, and of having
For 3 times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of clandestinely remitted the same to
Sorsogon. For 2 times, he was disqualified on the ground Hongkong and
of citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as o with having attempted to bribe officers of
their governor despite his disqualification. The people the Philippine and United States
never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief
gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave of the Intelligence Division of the Central
him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI,
margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the U.S. Air Force) in order to evade
overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In prosecution for said unauthorized
election cases, we should strive to align the will of the purchase of U.S. dollars.
legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the  Following the filing of said deportation charges, a
sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by
reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the the presiding member of the Deportation Board.
eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an  Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and
enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners were
and is the ultimate source of established authority." The provisionally set at liberty.
choice of the governed on who shall be their governor  Petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss the
merits the highest consideration by all agencies of charges presented against them in the Deportation
government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people Board for the reason, among others, that the same
is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also do not constitute legal ground for deportation of
politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people aliens from this country, and that said Board has no
succeed. jurisdiction to entertain such charges.
QUA CHEE GAN v. THE DEPORTATION BOARD  This motion to dismiss having been denied by the
9 SCRA 27 (1963) Board, petitioners filed in this Court a petition for
habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The state has the right to was given due course, but made returnable to the
exclude aliens in its territory. The President of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Philippines is given the discretion to deport aliens who  At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a
are considered “undesirable”. The President’s authority bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
to deport aliens include the power to arrest, but only injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining
when there is already a deportation order. the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners,
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners are aliens who were pending final termination of the habeas corpus
charged with having purchased US dollars without the and/or prohibition proceedings.
necessary license from the Central Bank. Following the
 The Deportation Board then filed its answer to the
filing of said deportation charges, the Deportation Board
original petition, saying as an authorized agent of
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioners, claiming
the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges
that as an authorized agent of the President, it has
filed, and the authority to order their arrest.
jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to
 Trial Court (denied the petition for habeas corpus
order their arrest. Petitioners question the power of the
and/or prohibition):
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
o upheld the validity of the delegation by
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary
power to investigate, on the ground that such power is the president to the Deportation Board of
vested in the Legislature. SC held that the President has his power to conduct investigations for the
the power to deport aliens; that this includes the power to purpose of determining whether the stay
arrest, but ONLY when there is already a deportation of an alien in this country would be
order; and that this was validly delegated to the injurious to the security, welfare and
Deportation Board. Hence, Executive Order No. 398, interest of the State, and
series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation o sustained the power of the deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and bonds for the alien's temporary release
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said pending investigation of charges against
aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of him, on the theory that the power to arrest
arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is and fix the amount of the bond of the
declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to arrested alien is essential to and
such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. complement the power to deport aliens
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
FACTS: Administrative Code.
 Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present regulations therein provided, and make the
appeal. corresponding recommendation. Since then, the
 Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the Deportation Board has been conducting the
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the investigation as the authorized agent of the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary President.
power to investigate, on the ground that such power
is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is 2. Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien
claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond
there must be a legislation authorizing the same. with the Commissioner of Immigration in order to
secure their appearance. However, the same did not
authorize the arrest of the alien pending
ISSUE(S): investigation.
1. WoN the President has the power to deport aliens It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized
and whether such power is validly delegated to the motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by
Deportation Board. –YES. the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the
WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and
order the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT only when to hold him under detention during the investigation
there is already an ORDER OF DEPORTATION. unless he files a bond for his provisional release in
such amount and under such conditions as may be
RATIO: prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
1. Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Commissioner of Immigration the power to effect Code, upon whose authority the President's power to
the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the
determination by the Board of Commissioners, such exercise of the power to arrest.
power was not intended to be delimited to the Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in
Immigration Commissioner. Sec. 69 of the his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the
Administrative Code, although not expressly Constitution: “...no warrants shall issue but upon
conferring such power, lays down the procedure for probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
such deportation proceedings for the President. examination under oath or affirmation of the
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien complainant and the witnesses he may produce...”
may be effected in 2 ways: Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the
a. By order of the President, after due requirement — "to be determined by the judge" —
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of to any public officer who may be authorized by the
the Revised Administrative Code, and Legislature to make such determination, and
b. By the Commissioner of Immigration, thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.
upon recommendation by the Board of Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is
Commissioners, under Section 37 of necessary to carry into effect the power of
Commonwealth Act No. 613. deportation is valid only when there is already an
order of deportation. However, during the
While it may really be contended that the Sec 69 did investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be
not expressly confer on the President the authority arrested. It is enough that a bond be required to
to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant insure the appearance of the alien during the
to the Commissioner of Immigration under investigation, as was authorized in EO69
Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the
the procedure to be observed should there be Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon
deportation proceedings, the fact that such a the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens
procedure was provided for before the President can and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the
deport an alien-which provision was expressly temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
declared exempted from the repealing effect of the The order of arrest issued by the respondent
Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the Deportation Board is declared null and void and the
recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed
legislature of the existence of such power in the cancelled.
Executive. And the exercise of this power by the
chief Executive has been sanctioned by this Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Batugas
several decisions. G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013

There seems to be no doubt that the President's CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

power of investigation may be delegated. This is  The court acknowledges that the main objective of
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife
Administrative Code which provides for a "prior is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the members.
President) or his authorized agent." By virtue of it is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
Executive Order No. 33, President Quezon created traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
the Deportation Board primarily to receive should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, national treatment of one should be different from that of
to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests
the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership parte hearing, no representative from the OSG
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, appeared despite notice.
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the  Azucena’s personal circumstances
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances  Born in Malangas Zamboanga del sur on Sep
should the identity of husband and wife be refused 28, 1941 to Chinese parents
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our  Never departed the PH since birth
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where  Resided in Malanga from 1941-1942,
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Margosatubig 1942-1968, Bogo city for
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. 9months, Ipil 1969-1972, Talisayayan 1972-
1976 and in Margosatubig up to the filing the
Emergency Recit : Azucena Batugas filed for a petition petition
for judicial Naturalization with the RTC. The OSG tried  Can speak: English, Tagalog, Visatyan and
to dismiss the petiion alleging that she was not engage in Chavacano
a lucrative profession. The RTC denied the OSG. The  Studied in Margosatubig Central Elementary
RTC then set the hearing wherein because of the OSG’s School, Margosatubig Academy, and Ateneo
non appearance despite notice, Azucena was able to de Zamboanga. She graduated with the degree
present her evidence ex-parte. RTC granted her petition. in BS education and then precticed at the Pax
On appeal with the CA, the OSG asserted that the ex- HS for 5yrs. Marian Academy for 2 yrs and in
parte presentation of evidence violates the mandate of Talisayan HS for 2 yrs.
tCA 473 which mandates that the hearing should be  In 1968 at the age of 26, she married Santiago
public. The CA held that the OSG is the only one Batuigas, a natural born Fil Citizen, and hide 5
authorized to represent the people in this case and that children.
it’s the notice to them was enough to comply with the  After her stint at the talisayan HS, she and her
mandate. SC held the same. husband engaged in the retail business of on
millinh/distributing rice corn anc copra. As
FACTS: proof of their Income, Azucena submitted their
RTC PROCEEDINGS joint annual tax returns, the Business name and
 On Dec 2, 2002, Azucena Batugas(Azucena) filed a permits issued to them(Azucena’s General
petition for Naturalization before the RTC Merchandising),
 She alleges in her petition that she believes in the  To prove that she has no criminal record,
principles underlying the PH Constitution and that Azucena submitted PNP, NBI clearances.
she:  The RTC found Azucena supported her allegations
 Has conducted herself in a proper and in her petition, among these are:
irreproachable manner during her stay in the  Her lack of derogatory record
PH as well as in her relations with the Govt and  Her support for an organized Govt
with the community she was living in  That she is in perfect health
 That she has mingled socially w./ Filipinos and  That she has mingled with Filipinos since birth
has a sincere desire to learn and embrace their and can speak their language
customs, traditions and ideals  That she has never had any transgressiong and
 And that she has all the qualifications has been a law abiding citizen
required under Sec 2 of CA 473 and none of  That she has complied with her obligations to
the disqualifications enumerated in Sec 4 the Govt involving her business
 That she is not opposed to organized Govt nor  That the business and real properties she and
affiliated to those who are. Santiago own provide sufficient income for her
 That she is not defending/teaching the and her family.
necessity or propriety of violence for the  RTC granted her petition, finding that the petitioner
success and predominance of men’s ideas has all the qualifications and none of the
 That she is neither a polygamist disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the
 that the nation of which she is a subject of is Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the
not at war w/ PH Naturalization Law
 That she intents in good faith to become a  In its omnibus motion, the OSG argued that the ex-
citizen of the PH and to renounce absolutely parte presentation of evidence violates the law as it
and forever all allegiance to any foreign entity, mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.
particularly to China;  The RTC rejected this and held that the public
 That she will reside continuous ly in the PH has been fully apprised of the proceedings and
from the time of the filing of her petition up to was free to intervene and that the OSG and its
her naturalization delegate the Provincial Prosecutor which can
 After all the jurisdictional requirements set by the represent the public, thus, when the OSG was
CA 473 had been complied with, the OSG filed a furnished with a copy of the notice there was
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena already compliance with the requirement of a
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful public hearing.
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. RTC CA APPEAL
denied this motion  OSG contends that Azucena failed to comply with
 At the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s the income requirement of CA 473, that Azucena is
evidence, neither the OSG nor the office of the not allowed under the Retail Trade Law to engage in
Provincial prosecutor appeared, thus Azucena’s retail trade thus cannot meet the income
evidence was received ex-parte, and during the ex requirement. And even if she is permitted, her
 business is not a lucrative one within the letter of the citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
law. The OSG also disputes Azucena’s claim that the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
she owns real property because aliens are precluded married to an alien who is subsequently
from owning lands. naturalized here follows the Philippine
 The OSG furthers that the ex-parte hearing is citizenship of her husband the moment he
not a public hearing because ex-parte hearings takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
are done without the public in attendance. OSG that she does not suffer from any of the
claims that the State was denied its day in disqualifications under said Section”
court.  Procedure for an alien wife to formalize Filipino
 Azucena countered that although she is a teacher, citizenship:
she had to quit to help in their retail business and  The alien woman must file a petition for the
they were to send all their children to school. She cancellation of her alien certificate of
contends that the definition of lucrative registration alleging, among other things, that
trade/income should not be strictly applied to her, she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she
being the wife following Filipino tradition, she is not disqualified from acquiring her
should not be treated like male applicants for husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
naturalization. Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended
 Azucena denied that her hearing was not made  Upon the filing of said petition, which should
public, as the hearing before the clerk of court be accompanied or supported by the joint
was conducted in the court’s session hall. And affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino
that the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its husband to the effect that the petitioner does
day in court as notices have always been sent not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
to it. the cited section from becoming naturalized
 The CA dismissed the appeal, and found that Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her Immigration conducts an investigation and
family with reasonable comfort with the prevailing thereafter promulgates its order or decision
standard of living and consistent with the demands granting or denying the petition
of human dignity.  Records show that Azucena, before, applied to the
 The CA held that the RTC had complied with Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
the mandate of the law requiring notice to the for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
OSG and rthe provincial Prosecutor of its Registration (ACR) by reason of her marriage to a
scheduled. Filipino Citizen, the CID granted her application.
But, the ministry of justice set aside such ruling as it
ISSUE(S): W/N Azucena has all the qualifications to found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
become a naturalized Filipino citizen? husband is a Filipino citizen as only their marriage
certificate was present to establish his citizenship.
HELD: Yes  Thus, Azucena was constrained to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization thru CA 473.
RATIO: There is nothing that prevents her from seeking
 Under present laws, an alien may acquire PH PH citizenship though regular naturalization
citizenship through either judicial proceedings. The choice of what option to take
naturalization(CA473) or administrative is with the applicant.
naturalization (RA 9139) A third option, called  In this case, Azucena has chosen to file for
derivative naturalization, is available to alien judicial naturalization under CA 473,
women to Filipino is found under Sec 15. Of CA  The fact that her application for derivative
473 naturalization was denied should not
 "Any woman who is now or may hereafter prevent her from seeking judicial
be married to a citizen of the Philippines naturalization.
and who might herself be lawfully  It is to be remembered that her application at
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the the CID was denied not because she was
Philippines." found to be disqualified, but because her
 Under the provision, foreign women who are husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even
married to Philippine citizens may be if the denial was based on other grounds, it
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is proper, in a judicial naturalization
is neither necessary for them to prove that proceeding, for the courts to determine
they possess other qualifications for whether there are in fact grounds to deny
naturalization at the time of their marriage her of Philippine citizenship based on
nor do they have to submit themselves to regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
judicial naturalization  Records show that Santiago’s Filipino Citizenship
 Moy Ya Lim Tao vs. Commissioner of has been adequately proven.
Immigration: “We now hold, all previous  Under judicial proceedings, Santiago submitted
decisions of this Court indicating otherwise his Birth certificate indicating that he and his
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of parents are Filipinos and he also submitted his
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman vote’s registration, land titles an business
marrying a Filipino, native born or registrations. And he has always comported
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact
provided she is not disqualified to be a
 that should have enable Azucena to avail of should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
Derivative naturalization. national treatment of one should be different from that of
 However, the case is a petition for judicial the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests
naturalization not based on derivative in property and business activities reserved by law to
naturalization. The lower court heard the citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
petition and received evidence of Azucena’s and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
qualification and absence of disqualifications through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
to acquire PH citizenship this was affirmed by partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
the CA. The SC will not disturb the findings of should the identity of husband and wife be refused
the lower court which had the opportunity to recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
hear the petition. citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
 The OSG assertion that Azucena does not have the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
lucrative income and that the proceeding in the Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
lower court was not in the nature of a public
hearing.
 The OSG had the opportunity to contest the DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez et al v. Michael Alfio
qualifications of Azucena during the initial Pennisi
hearing, however the OSG or the Provincial [G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010]
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing.
This prompted the lower court to order the ex- CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In this case, respondent,
parte presentation of evidence, the OSG was prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino
also notified of the proceeding, but despite citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country
notice, it again failed to appear. because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the
 The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the Court of
and was denied for the reasons stated in its Appeals and before this Court showed his intention to
Decision. We find no reason to disturb the prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the
findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation
this issue further delay the grant of Philippine from the country. He was precisely questioning the
citizenship to a woman who was born and lived DOJ’s revocation of his certificate of recognition and his
all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all summary deportation by the BI. Thus, the Court ruled
her life to the care of her Filipino family. She that respondent’s deportation did not render the present
has more than demonstrated, under judicial case moot.
scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine
citizen. Emergency Recit: In 1999, Mick Pennisi petitioned for
 On the second issue, we also affirm the recognition as Filipino citizen. BI agreed, ayaw pa ni
findings of the CA that since the government DOJ nung una, but eventually agreed. Thereafter, he was
who has an interest in, and the only one who drafted in the PBA, where he played. In 2003, some
can contest, the citizenship of a person, was Senate committees recommended the deportation of
duly notified through the OSG and the several Fil-foreign PBA players, including Pennisi, and a
Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings review of all orders of recognition. Pennisi was included
have complied with the public hearing since the verification of the authenticity of the documents
requirement under CA 473. he submitted 4 years earlier revealed highly suspicious
 No. 4 sec. 2 of CA 473, provides as qualification circumstances as alleged by a Brgy. Captain and a Brgy.
that: He must own real estate in the Philippines Treasurer. DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisi’s
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine recognition; later on the BI directed the deportation of
currency, or must have known lucrative trade, Pennisi. CA sided with Pennisi. SC affirmed CA and said
profession, or lawful occupation. the case was not rendered moot and academic; see
 Azucena is a teacher by profession and only doctrine
quit her teaching job to assume her role as a
joint provider with her husband to support her FACTS:
family.  Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975
 Together, they were able to raise all 5 children, in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an
provided them with education and have all Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos,
become professionals and responsible citizens. allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999,
 Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband respondent filed a petition for recognition as
and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration.
professional and can resume teaching at Respondent submitted the following documents
anytime. Her profession never leaves her, and before the BI:
this is more than sufficient guarantee that she 1. Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
will not be a charge to the only country she has of Quintos, and a certification issued by the
known since birth. Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva
 The court acknowledges that the main objective of Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14
extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife August 1949 of Filipino parents, Felipe M.
is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in Panabingan,
members. San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished 2. Certified true copy of the certificate of
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband marriage of respondent’s parents dated 9
 January 1971, indicating the Philippines as o Both barangay officials further
Quintos’ birthplace; claimed that even in their census or
3. Certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian master list of voters, the family names
certificate of registration of alien, indicating of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist.
her nationality as Filipino; o His mother’s certificate of birth in the
4. Certified true copy of respondent’s birth civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva
certificate stating that he was born on 13 March Ecija was issued on the basis of an
1975 and indicating the Philippines as his application for late registration, which
mother’s birthplace; and is ten (10) years after the date of birth.
5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July  [So may nangyaring investigation] On 18 October
1999 of the Australian Department of 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating respondent’s certificate of recognition and
that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been directing the BI to begin summary deportation
granted Australian citizenship. proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-
 On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner foreign PBA players.
Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting  On 20 October 2004, respondent and Davonn Harp,
respondent’s petition for recognition as Filipino another Filipino-foreign PBA player, filed a
citizen. In a 2nd Indorsement dated 28 February petition for prohibition with an application for
2000, the DOJ Secretary disapproved the order. TRO and PI with the RTC of Pasig to enjoin the
However, upon respondent’s submission of DOJ and BI from instituting summary deportation
additional documents, BI Commissioner Rufus B. proceedings against them.
Rodriguez granted the order as per Recognition  During the hearing, OSG manifested that
Order No. 206679 dated 3 March 2000. In a 2nd respondent would not be subjected to summary
Indorsement dated 8 March 2000, the DOJ deportation and that he would be given an
affirmed Recognition Order No. 206679, opportunity to present evidence of his Filipino
superseding the Feb 28 2nd Indorsement. citizenship in a full-blown trial on the merits.
 Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for However, in a Summary Deportation Order dated
the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the 26 October 2004, the BI directed the deportation of
Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including
 On 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on respondent. RTC granted the withdrawal of the
Games, Amusement and Sports and on petition by Pennisi and Harp, who filed a petition
Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted for review with an application for TRO and PI with
Committee Report No. 256 recommending, among the CA.
other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary  CA: Granted the petition and set aside DOJ
deportation proceedings against several Filipino- resolution and Deportation Order; ruled that
foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) respondent’s citizenship was previously recognized
the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of by the BI and DOJ and it was only after 4 years
all orders of recognition. Respondent was included that the BI and DOJ reversed themselves in view of
in the list on the basis of the following findings of the finding in the Committee Report; ruled that
the Senate Committees: apart from the affidavits of the Brgy. Captain and
o F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to Brgy. Treasurer regarding the highly suspicious
present before the BI and the committees, circumstances, no other evidence was presented to
the documents required in granting prove that Quintos was not a Filipino citizen or that
recognition of Philippine citizenship, her birth certificate was false or fraudulently
particularly the birth certificate of his obtained; ruled that respondent’s documentary
Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos; evidence before the BI and DOJ have more
o However, a verification on the probative value and must prevail over the
authenticity of the above documents allegations of Soliman and Peralta.
reveals highly suspicious  In their Memorandum, petitioners allege that
circumstances. respondent’s petition was filed out of time.
o His alleged mother and other relatives, Petitioners further allege that respondent’s
specifically the parents of the former, voluntary departure from the Philippines had
namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina rendered the petition moot. Finally, petitioners
G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his allege that the cancellation of respondent’s
application for recognition of certificate of recognition as a Filipino citizen and
Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not the issuance of the deportation order against him
known and have never existed in are valid.
Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija. ISSUE:
o According to the affidavits executed by Whether the petition had been rendered moot because
Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman respondent already left the country.
and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Whether Pennisi’s certificate of recognition attained
Peralta of the abovementioned place, finality.
there are no Quintoses or Tomedas
that have lived or have resided in the HELD:
said barangay. No.
No. courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
Petition denied; CA decision affirmed. proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the
administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and
RATIO: reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to
 Petitioners cited Lewin v. The Deportation Board sustain the rulings.
where the Court ruled:
x x x. Even if the deportation case is to proceed Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong
and even if this Court will decide this appeal [G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012]
on the merits, there would be no practical value
or effect of such action upon Lewin, because CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The courts must always be
he has already left the country. Consequently, mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with
the issues involved herein have become moot the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be
and academic. rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
 However, the Court agreed with respondent that the government and against the applicant. The burden of
factual circumstances in Lewin are different from proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
Pennisi’s case. In Lewin, petitioner was an alien compliance with the requirements of law. Bare assertions
who entered the country as a temporary visitor, to are not sufficient.
stay for only 50 days. He prolonged his stay by
securing several extensions. Before his last Emergency Recit: Ong filed a Petition for
extension expired, he voluntarily left the country, Naturalization. Among the qualifications under Sec. 2,
upon filing a bond, without any assurance from the par. 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law is that the
Deportation Board that he would be admitted to the person must have some known lucrative trade,
country upon his return. The Court found that he did profession, or lawful occupation. Ong alleged that he is
not return to the country, and at the time he was a businessman earning 150,000 since 1989, presenting
living in another country. The Court ruled that his tax declarations and testimonies of character
Lewin’s voluntary departure from the country, his witnesses. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic
long absence, and his status when he entered the contended that the trial court erred in granting the
country as a temporary visitor rendered academic petition for Ong’s failure to prove that he possesses a
the question of his deportation as an undesirable known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as
alien. required. The SC agreed with the republic.
 In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation,
was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested FACTS:
his intent to return to the country because his  On Nov. 26, 1996, Kerry Lao Ong, 38 years old,
Filipino wife and children are residing in the filed a Petition for Naturalization under
Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Court of Appeals and before this Court showed his  Ong alleged in his petition the requirements under
intention to prove his Filipino lineage and the law such as age, residence, ability to speak and
citizenship, as well as the error committed by write in any principal Philippine language,
petitioners in causing his deportation from the enrollment of his minor children of school age in
country. He was precisely questioning the DOJ’s school recognized by the Office of Private
revocation of his certificate of recognition and his Education, and profession as a
summary deportation by the BI. Therefore, the “businessman/business manager” since 1989,
Court ruled that respondent’s deportation did earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.
not render the present case moot. As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax
 The Court agreed with petitioners that the issuance returns for the years 1994 to 1997.
of certificate of recognition to respondent has not  After presenting Carvajal Sepulveda as his character
attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled witnesses, the trial court granted the Petition, ruling
that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own that “by the testimonial and documentary evidence
and can be threshed out again and again as the adduced, the following facts had been established: x
occasion may demand. Res judicata may be x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business
applied in cases of citizenship only if the following manager engaged in lawful trade and business since
concur: 1989 from which he derives an average annual
income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material Pesos.
issue in a controversy where said person is a party; the  On appeal to the CA, the Republic faulted the trial
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took court for granting Ong’s petition despite his failure
active part in the resolution thereof; and the finding or
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
citizenship is affirmed by this Court. profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing Naturalization Law. CA dismissed the appeal.
the findings of the BI. Judicial review is permitted if
 Republic: Contrary to the trial courts finding,
the courts believe that there is substantial evidence
respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that
is a businessman/business manager earning an
there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the
average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His
claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a
income tax returns belie the value of his income.
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the
immediate review should be recognized and the
 nature of his profession or trade, which is the source circumstances which have a bearing on Ong’s
of his income. Considering that he has four minor expenses vis-à-vis his income: (a) that Ong does not
children (all attending exclusive private schools), he own real property; (b) that his proven average gross
has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, annual income around the time of his application,
and he has not declared owning a family home, his which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the
alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. education of his four minor children; and (c) that
Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive
that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not
possess a definite and existing business or trade. explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ong’s
income had an appreciable margin over his known
ISSUE: Whether Ong has proved that he has some expenses.
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in  The applicant provided no documentary evidence,
accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the like business permits, registration, official receipts,
Revised Naturalization Law or other business records to demonstrate his
proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead,
HELD: No. Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
possession of “some known lucrative trade,
RATIO: profession or lawful occupation.” Bare, general
 The courts must always be mindful that assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that
naturalization proceedings are imbued with the is required of an applicant for naturalization.
highest public interest. Naturalization laws A review of the decisions involving petitions for
should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from
in favor of the government and against the reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire
applicant to show full and complete compliance records of the naturalization case are open for
with the requirements of law. consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "[a]
 In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around naturalization proceeding is so infused with public
respondent Ong’s compliance with the qualification interest that it has been differently categorized and given
found in Section 2(4) of the Revised Naturalization special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial
Law, which provides: Fourth. He must own real contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have government another opportunity to present new evidence.
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful A decision or order granting citizenship will not even
occupation; constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
 Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful certification of naturalization already granted, on the
occupation” means “not only that the person ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently
having the employment gets enough for his procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the
the employment gives one an income such that matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x
there is an appreciable margin of his income over involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
his expenses as to be able to provide for an lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings,
adequate support in the event of unemployment, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid the purpose of determining the correctness or
one’s becoming the object of charity or a public incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and
charge.” His income should permit “him and the extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no
members of his family to live with reasonable need to present new evidence. A careful review of the
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has
standard of living, and consistently with the not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade,
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for
civilization.” naturalization.
 It has been held that in determining the existence
of a lucrative income, the courts should consider Republic v. Li Ching Chung:
only the applicant's income; his or her spouse’s [G.R. No. 197450; March 20, 2013]
income should not be included in the assessment.
The spouses additional income is immaterial "for CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A Naturalization
under the law the petitioner should be the one to Proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has
possess some known lucrative trade, profession been differently categorized and given special treatment.
or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a x x x Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a
Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has petition for naturalization does not preclude the
consistently held that the applicant's reopening of that case and giving the government another
qualifications must be determined as of the time opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order
of the filing of his petition. granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata
 The Court finds the appellate court’s decision to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent
erroneous. First, it should not have included the judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization
spouse’s income in its assessment of Ong’s lucrative already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally
income. Second, it failed to consider the following or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues
even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained praying that the hearing be moved from April 3,
on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire real estate
Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed properties. The OSG filed its Opposition arguing
decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in that the said motion for early setting was a "clear
their pleadings, the present proceeding may be violation of Section 1, RA 530, which provides
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the that hearing on the petition should be held not
correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light earlier than six (6) months from the date of last
of the law and extant jurisprudence. publication of the notice."
 The opposition was already late as the RTC, in its
Emergency Recit: Respondent, a chinese national, filed Order, denied respondent’s motion and decreed that
a petition for naturalization before the RTC. Along with since the last publication in the newspaper of
his application, he submitted his arguments (see facts) general circulation was on June 13, 2008, the
and other material documents as support and two other earliest setting could only be scheduled 6 months
witnesses that will prove his character. Respondent filed later or on December 15, 2008.
a motion for early setting so that he can acquire real  OSG filed a MTD but RTC denied it.
estate properties. OSG opposed his motion stating that  Respondent testified and presented 2 witnesses,
such motion is a violation of RA 530. RTC and CA Emelita V. Roleda and Gaudencio Abalayan
denied the OSG’s opposition. OSG argued further that Manimtim, who personally knew him since 1984
the petition for naturalization was filed to it less than 1 and 1998, respectively, to vouch that he was a
year from the time of the declaration of intent was person of good moral character and had conducted
mandatory, thus, fatal to Respondent’s application. SC himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
agreed with the OSG and reversed the CA and RTC’s during his period of residency in the country.
decision. That mo petition for naturalization may be filed  On June 3, 2009, RTC granted respondent’s
and heard and hence no decree may be issued granting it application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen.
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as  On June 30, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
amended, before the expiration of one year from and decision. The CA held that, although the petition for
after the date of the filing of a verified declaration of his naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this
is MANDATORY defect was not fatal.
 The CA further stated that "the Republic
FACTS: participated in every stage of the proceedings below.
 On August 22, 2007, Respondent, otherwise known It was accorded due process which it vigorously
as “Bernabe Luna Li” or “Stephen Lee Keng”, a exercised from beginning to end. Whatever
Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint
to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the the proceedings, let alone the Republic’s meaningful
OSG. exercise of its right to due process."
 On March 12, 2008 or almost 7 months after filing  Moreover, the CA noted that the OSG did not in any
his declaration of intention, respondent filed his way question respondent’s qualifications and his
Petition for Naturalization before the RTC. lack of disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of
 Respondent alleged that: i. he was born on this country. Indeed, the CA was convinced that
November 29, 1963 in Fujian Province, People’s respondent was truly deserving of this privilege.
Republic of China, which granted the same privilege  Hence, this petition to the SC.
of naturalization to Filipinos; ii. That he came to the  The appeal is predicated on the fact that the petition
Philippines on March 15, 1988 via PAL landing at for naturalization was filed (26 October 1950)
the NAIA; ii. That on November 19, 1989, he before the lapse of one year from and after the filing
married Cindy Sze Mei Ngar, a British national, of a verified declaration of his bona fide intention to
with whom he had 4 children, all born in Manila; iv. become a citizen (4 April 1950), in violation of
That he had been continuously and permanently Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
residing in the country since his arrival and is amended.
currently a resident of Manila with prior residence
in Malabon; v. that he could speak and write in ISSUE(S): Whether the RTC and CA erred when it
English and Tagalog; vi. That he was entitled to the granted Respondent’s Petition for Naturalization.
benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 473 reducing to 5 years the requirement under HELD: Yes. Respondent failed to prove full and
Section 2 of ten years of continuous residence, complete compliance with the requirements of the
because he knew English and Filipino having Naturalization Law. As such, his petition for
obtained his education from St. Stephen’s High naturalization must be denied without prejudice to his
School of Manila; vii. And that he had successfully right to re-file his application.
established a trading general merchandise business
operating under the name of "VS Marketing RATIO:
Corporation." He also submitted material I. General Rule:
documents in support of his application.  The law is explicit that the declaration of
 As an entrepreneur, he derives income more than intention must be filed one year prior to the filing
sufficient to be able to buy a condominium unit and of the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go
vehicles, send his children to private schools and Bon Lee likewise decreed that substantial
adequately provide for his family. compliance with the requirement is inadequate. the
 Respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting Court wrote:
 “The language of the law on the matter being in the lower court the question of non-
express and explicit, it is beyond the province compliance therewith does not preclude the
of the courts to take into account questions of Government from raising it on appeal.
expediency, good faith and other similar  Nevertheless, after the one-year period, the
reasons in the construction of its provisions.” applicant may renew his petition for naturalization
 Were we to accept the view of the lower court on and the evidence already taken or heard may be
this matter, there would be no good reason why a offered anew without the necessity of bringing to
petition for naturalization cannot be filed one week court the witnesses who had testified. And the
after or simultaneously with the filing of the Government may introduce evidence in support of
required declaration of intention as long as the its position.
hearing is delayed to a date after the expiration of  The decree granting the petition for naturalization is
the period of one year. The ruling of the lower court set aside, without costs.
amounts, in our opinion, to a substantial change in In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon
the law, something which courts cannot do, their the applicant to show full and complete compliance with
duty being to apply the law and not tamper with it. the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a
foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere
Exception: matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the
 The only exception to the mandatory filing of a State; the applicant does not possess any natural,
declaration of intention is specifically stated in inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to
Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit: Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has,
“Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is
to make a declaration of intention. – Persons that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire
born in the Philippines and have received their such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory
primary and secondary education in public conditions and requirements. The absence of one
schools or those recognized by the Government jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this
and not limited to any race or nationality, and necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the
those who have resided continuously in the naturalization process.
Philippines for a period of thirty years or more
before filing their application, may be
naturalized without having to make a Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC
declaration of intention upon complying with [G.R. No. 198742; Aug. 10, 2012]
the other requirements of this Act.
 To such requirements shall be added that which Emergency Recit: Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino
establishes that the applicant has given primary and citizen. She became a naturalized Australian citizen in
secondary education to all his children in the public 1984 as she married an Australian. But in 2005, she filed
schools or in private schools recognized by the an application to re-acquire PH citizenship. In 2006, she
Government and not limited to any race or filed an unsworn declaration of renunciation of her
nationality. The same shall be understood applicable foreign citizenship and later ran for an elective office in
with respect to the widow and minor children of an the 2007 (For mayor but lost) and 2010 (For vice-mayor
alien who has declared his intention to become a and she won). But respondents filed this case alleging she
citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is is disqualified because she is a dual citizen and she failed
actually naturalized.” to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her
 Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the foreign citizenship. The RTC, COMELEC, and the
category of such exempt individuals that would Supreme Court, ruled in respondents’ favor. Petitioner is
excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one disqualified for having an unsworn declaration of
year prior to the filing of a petition for renunciation.
naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding,
respondent’s premature filing of his petition for FACTS:
naturalization before the expiration of the one-year  Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon is a natural-
period is fatal. born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino
 No petition for naturalization may be filed and parents on Aug. 8, 1944. On Dec. 13, 1984, she
heard and hence no decree may be issued became a naturalized Australian owing marriage to
granting it under the provisions of a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before  On Dec. 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
the expiration of one year from and after the acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
Philippines is MANDATORY "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
 The position of the Government is well taken, 2003." Her application was approved and she took
because no petition for naturalization may be her oath of allegiance to the Republic of PH on Dec.
filed and heard and hence no decree may be 5, 2005.
issued granting it under the provisions of  On Sept. 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, before Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
the expiration of one year from and after the Citizenship before the Dep’t of Immigration and
date of the filing of a verified declaration of his Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the turn issued the Order dated Sept. 27, 2006,
Philippines. This is mandatory. Failure to raise certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
 citizen. She then ran for Mayor in her hometown in 1. WON the COMELEC en banc may resolve
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. But she lost merits of an appeal after ruling on its
her bid. reinstatement;
 Petitioner again ran during the May 10, 2010 2. WON the COMELEC en banc may order the
elections for Vice-Mayor and she got the highest execution of a judgment rendered by a RTC in
number of votes and was proclaimed as the winning an election case;
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 3. WON respondents are barred from questioning
2010. But respondent Robelito Picar, Wilma the qualifications of petitioner; and
Pagaduan, and Luis Bautista, all registered voters of 4. For purposes of determining petitioner’s
Caba, filed separate petitions for quo warranto eligibility, WON the “sworn renunciation of
questioning petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. foreign citizenship” in Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225
They sought petitioner’s disqualification from is a mere pro-forma requirement.
holding her elective post as she is a dual citizen and
she failed to execute a “personal and sworn HELD: 1. YES; 2. YES; 3. NO; 4. NO.
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an RATIO:
oath” as imposed by Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225. 1. COMELEC en banc may resolve merits of an appeal
 But the petitioner denied being a dual citizen and after ruling on its reinstatement:
argued that since Sept. 27, 2006, she ceased to be an a. The Court ruled that the power to decide
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration motions for reconsideration in election cases is
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she given unto the COMELEC en banc by Sec. 3,
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Article 9-C of the Constitution. This is
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of complemented by another provision in Sec.
running for public office is a clear abandonment of 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
her Australian citizenship. Procedure;
 On Oct. 22, 2010, RTC ruled that the petitioner’s b. Thus, there’s nothing to prevent COMELEC
failure to comply with Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 from directly adjudicating the substantive
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. merits of an appeal after ruling for its
As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the reinstatement instead of remanding the same to
personal declaration of renunciation she filed in the division that initially dismissed it. There’s
Australia was not under oath. The law clearly no GADALEJ on the COMELEC en banc’s
mandates that the document containing the part when it proceeded to decide the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal
before any public officer authorized to administer after ruling for its reinstatement.
oath. COMELEC affirms. 2. COMELEC en banc has the power to order
 Petitioner alleges COMELEC committed discretionary execution of judgment:
GADALEJ. She argues that: a. There’s no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s
a. Since she ceased to be an Australian authority to order discretionary execution of
citizen on Sept. 27, 2006, she no longer judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory
held dual citizenship and was only a application of the Rules of Court is expressly
Filipino citizen when she filed her sanctioned by Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the
certificate of candidacy as early as the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under Sec. 2,
2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" pending appeal may be issued by an appellate
imposed by Sec. 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction;
dual citizens seeking elective office does b. The Court even said in Batul vs. Bayron that
not apply to her; judgments in election cases which may be
b. A sworn renunciation is a mere formal executed pending appeal includes those
and not a mandatory requirement. She decided by trial courts and those rendered by
even cites portions of the Journal of the the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its
House of Reps dated June 2 to 5, 2003 original or appellate jurisdiction.
containing the sponsorship speech for 3. Respondents are not estopped from questioning
House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor petitioner’s eligibility to hold public office:
of R.A. No. 9225. She claims that a. The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications
respondents are estopped from were not questioned when she filed
questioning her eligibility since they certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010
failed to do so when she filed certificates elections cannot operate as an estoppel to
of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 the petition for quo warranto before the
elections; and RTC. Under the B.P. 881 (Omnibus Election
She disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) Code), there are 2 instances where a petition
take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal questioning the qualifications of a registered
instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second candidate to run for the office for which his
Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; certificate of candidacy was filed can be
and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s raised:
judgment. i. Before election, pursuant to
Sec. 78 of B.P. 881; and
ISSUE(S):
 ii. After election, pursuant to Sec. before the filing of the certificate of
253 of B.P. 881. candidacy;
b. Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to f. Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 compels natural-born
disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
petition within the 25-day period prescribed by citizens of a foreign country, but who
Sec. 78 for whatever reasons, the elections reacquired or retained their Philippine
laws do not leave him completely helpless as citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
he has another chance to raise the under Sec. 3 of R.A. 9225, and (2) for those
disqualification of the candidate by filing a seeking elective public offices in the PH, to
petition for quo warranto within 10 days from additionally execute a personal and sworn
the proclamation of the results of the election, renunciation of any and all foreign
as provided under Sec. 253; citizenship before an authorized public
c. Both remedies were available to respondents officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
and their failure to utilize Sec. 78 cannot stop their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
them should they opt to file a quo warranto candidates in PH elections;
petition under Sec. 253. g. The intent of Congress was not only for Pinoys
4. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective reacquiring or retaining their PH citizenship
office for failure to renounce her Australian under R.A. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance
citizenship as per Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225: to the Republic but also to explicitly renounce
a. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re- their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural- elective posts in PH. To qualify as a candidate,
born citizens who have lost their Philippine Filipinos must only have one citizenship, PH
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to citizenship;
the Republic. Sec. 3 provides for the oath and h. Petitioner also argues that the "sworn
Sec. 5 provides for the civil and political rights renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be
and liabilities for those who have retained or deemed a formal requirement only with respect
have re-acquired PH citizenship under R.A. to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a
9225; natural-born Filipino so as to override the
b. In petitioner’s case, she validly re-acquired her effect of the principle that natural-born citizens
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of need not perform any act to perfect their
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines citizenship. But never was it mentioned or even
on Dec. 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual alluded to that, as petitioner wants the Court to
citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino
Sept. 18, 2006, she filed a renunciation of citizenship and thereafter run for public office
Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia has the option of executing an unsworn
but such was not under oath contrary to the affidavit of renunciation;
exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the i. The Court ruled that Sec. 5 of R.A. 9225 was
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be intended to complement Sec. 18 of Art. 9 of the
sworn before an officer authorized to Constitution on public officer’s primary
administer oath; accountability of allegiance and loyalty. An
c. This is why petitioner argues that such sworn oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a
renunciation of foreign citizenship swearing to God or a revered person or thing,
requirements in Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 is a that one’s statement is true or that one will be
mere pro-forma requirement in conformity bound to a promise. The person making the
with the intent of the Legislature; oath implicitly invites punishment if the
d. The Court ruled that Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 is statement is untrue or the promise is broken.
free from any ambiguity. The case of Lopez vs. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the
COMELEC dictates that the form of the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit is false. To hold the oath to be a mere pro
duly executed before an officer of the law who forma requirement is to say that it is only for
is authorized to administer an oath stating in ceremonial purposes; it would also
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is accommodate a mere qualified or temporary
renouncing all foreign citizenship; allegiance from government officers when the
e. The same doctrine was reached in Jacot vs. Constitution and the legislature clearly demand
Dal where it was ruled that Filipinos re- otherwise;
acquiring or retaining their Philippine j. Petitioner argues that the Australian
citizenship under R.A. 9225 must explicitly Citizenship of 1948, under which she’s already
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish deemed to have lost her Australian citizenship,
to run for elective posts in the Philippines. is entitled to judicial notice. But she didn’t
Thus, the law categorically requires persons allege and prove it in court. Hence, not entitled
seeking elective public office, who either to judicial notice.
retained their Philippine citizenship or those
who reacquired it, to make a personal and MAQUILING V COMELEC
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
citizenship before a public officer authorized
to administer an oath simultaneous with or CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of  April 30, 2010 – COMELC (1st division) issued an
representation as to one’s nationality and order requiring Arnado to personally file his answer
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship and memorandum within 3 days from receipt
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of thereof.
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an  Arnado failed to file his answer. Balua moved
elective position. to declare him in default and to present
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a evidence ex-parte.
candidate.  Neither motion was acted upon, having been
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
Emergency Recit: Arnado is a natural born Filipino garnered the highest number of votes and was
citizen. However, he lost his Filipino citizenship due to subsequently proclaimed as the winning
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the USA. He candidate for Mayor.
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 and took the Oath  It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
of Allegiance to the RP. He again took his Oath of filed his verified answer.
Allegiance to the RP and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He filed his COMELEC (1st Division): WHEREFORE, in view of
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
Lanao del Norte. However, after his renunciation. He cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado
continued to use his US passport. Issue is WON Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
is qualified to run for public office despite his continued proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal
use of his US passport after his renunciation of his Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
foreign citizenship. The court ruled in the negative. (see ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section
doctrine) 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.

FACTS: COMELEC (En Banc): Reversed and set aside the

 Respondent Arnado (Arnado) is a natural born ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion
Filipino citizen. However, he lost his Filipino for Reconsideration.
citizenship due to his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the USA. ISSUE(S): WON Arnado is qualified to run for public
 He applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before office despite his continued use of a US passport after
the Consulate General of the PH in San Francisco, renouncing his foreign citizenship.
USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP on
July 10, 2008. On the same day, Order of Approval HELD: YES. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
issued in his favor. COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
 April 3, 2009 – Arnado again took his Oath of ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
 November 30, 2009 – Arnado filed his Certificate of MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
Norte. 2010 elections.
 April 28, 2010 – Respondent Balua (Balua), another
mayor candidate, filed a petition to disqualify RATIO:
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
Norte in connection with the May 10, 2010 local representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship;
and national elections. it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
Balua’s Contention: Arnado is not a resident of required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,  Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
Immigration dated April 23, 2010 indicating the he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
travel record dated December 3, 2009 indicating that represented himself as an American, in effect
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 declaring before immigration authorities of both
in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record countries that he is an American citizen, with all
shows that Arnado left the country on April 14, 2009 and attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
returned on June 25, 2009, and again departed on July States of America.
29, 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on November  The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a
24, 2009. He also presented a certification from the BIR hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
dated April 23, 2010, certifying that the name “Arnado, time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
Rommel Cagoco” appears in the available Computer an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
April 21, 2010.
 civil and political rights granted by the foreign  By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on
country which granted the citizenship. 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
 Mercado v. Manzano already hinted at this situation enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
when the Court declared: American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
His declarations will be taken upon the faith by the express disqualification under Section 40(d)
that he will fulfill his undertaking made under of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are to run for a local elective position.
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his  In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days,
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor- or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on
Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into which date he first used his American passport
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after renouncing his American citizenship.
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he  This Court has previously ruled that:
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese Qualifications for public office are continuing
passport and declared in commercial requirements and must be possessed not only at
documents executed abroad that he was a the time of appointment or election or
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be assumption of office but during the officer's
taken against anyone who, in electing entire tenure. Once any of the required
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign qualifications is lost, his title may be
nationality, but subsequently does some act seasonably challenged. x x x.
constituting renunciation of his Philippine  The citizenship requirement for elective public
citizenship. office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
 While the act of using a foreign passport is not not just at the time of the renunciation of the
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act citizenship issue to attack.
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation  We agree with the pronouncement of the
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run consistently using his US passport effectively
for a local elective position. negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." This does
 When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of did.
Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually  It was after complying with the requirements that he
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the performed positive acts which effectively
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he disqualified him from running for an elective public
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
and political rights and privileges of the United Government Code of 1991.
States of America."  The purpose of the Local Government Code in
 We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
act of using a foreign passport does not divest elective public office would be thwarted if we
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he were to allow a person who has earlier
acquired by repatriation. However, by renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
representing himself as an American citizen, subsequently represents himself as a foreign
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to citizen, to hold any public office.
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion  Arnado justifies the continued use of his US
was not retroactive; it took place the instant passport with the explanation that he was not
Arnado represented himself as an American notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on
citizen by using his US passport. 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able
 This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for later.
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a  Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine
disqualification to run for an elective local position. passport does not correct the fact that after he
 Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing
which foreign citizenship is acquired through a his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport.
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is In the same way that the use of his foreign passport
distinct from those considered dual citizens by does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the undo his earlier use of his US passport.
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an  Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are and political rights accorded by the state to its
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant
the Republic of the Philippines but also to duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to country. While those who acquire dual
qualify as a candidate for public office. citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment
 to public office are required to renounce their made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
trust. Holding public office demands full and
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the
other. highest number of votes from among the qualified
 We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US candidates.
passport after renouncing his American citizenship,  With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. becomes the winner in the election as he obtained
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code the highest number of votes from among the
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only qualified candidates.
from holding the public office but even from  We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a  Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate. candidate are not considered at all in
 The ballot cannot override the constitutional and determining the winner of an election.
statutory requirements for qualifications and  Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate
disqualifications of candidates. When the law are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
that certain disqualifications be not possessed by favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
persons desiring to serve as elective public the sole and total expression of the sovereign
officials, those qualifications must be met before voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
one even becomes a candidate. When a person legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually must also be respected.
garners the highest number of votes, even the  As in any contest, elections are governed by rules
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot that determine the qualifications and
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the disqualifications of those who are allowed to
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon participate as players. When there are participants
and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
We might as well write off our election laws if the does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy eligible as candidates.
elective positions in our republic.  The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
 The first requirement that may fall when an disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
local government officials. Equally susceptive of makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
that sets out what should be stated in a COC. necessary before a qualified candidate who
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere placed second to a disqualified one can be
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 the vote count is actually the first-placer among
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data the qualified candidates.
wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk  That the disqualified candidate has already been
falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
an election victory will cure any defect that their moment. The subsequent disqualification based
COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
magic formula to bypass election eligibility filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
requirements. (Citations omitted) only the COC but also the proclamation.
 What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual  The disqualifying circumstance surrounding
from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does
disqualification, and employing every strategy to not involve the commission of election offenses as
delay any disqualification case filed against him so provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
winning the election will guarantee a disregard of disqualify the individual from continuing as a
constitutional and statutory provisions on candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates? holding the office.
 It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the  With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
constitutional and statutory provisions on rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is prior to the elections because he filed his answer to
not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral the petition when the elections were conducted
anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is
 To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate
the prohibitory character of the disqualification ISSUE(S): Whether he should be re-admitted or not.
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of
not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections. appropriate fees
 Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his
favor should not have been counted. This leaves RATIO:
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on  In pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the
succession under the Local Government Code will Court for the practice of law, the OBC required, and
not apply. in compliance thereof, petitioner submitted the
following:
In Re: Petition to Re-acquire Privilege to Practice Law, 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
Epifanio Muneses) Citizenship;
[A.M. No.2112, July 24, 2012] 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship);
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: A Filipino lawyer who re- 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
acquires citizenship remains to be a member of the Philippines;
Philippine Bar but must apply for a license or permit to 4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of
engage in law practice. Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
Emergency Recit: The petitioner alleged that he became 5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Surigao City
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice Chapter attesting to his good moral character as
law when he became a citizen of the United States of well as his updated payment of annual
America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September membership dues;
15, 2006,he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship 6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the 2010;
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” 7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE
by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen for the 2nd compliance period; and
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, 8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-
if granted, to resume the practice of law. MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to
FACTS: his compliance with the MCLE.
 On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying  The OBC further required the petitioner to update
that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
Philippines. all the requirements were satisfactorily complied
 Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
lost his privilege to practice law when he became a qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
American citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or  The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in law. The loss thereof means termination of the
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
law R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost
 In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
the Court was confronted with a similar petition naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
requested leave to resume his practice of law after citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was Republic.
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
medical attention for his ailments and eventually citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July member of the Philippine Bar.  However, as stated in
14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
his oath of allegiance before the Philippine intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
to the Philippines and intended to resume his engage in such practice.
practice of law.
 petition moot and academic. The broader and
Nicolas- Lewis v. COMELEC transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the
497 SCRA 649 petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate
and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however,
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners are dual- citizens remains unresolved.
who re-acquired Filipino citizenship as per RA 9225.
They were not allowed to exercise absentee voting ISSUE(S): WON petitioners and others who might have
because as per Macalintal v. COMELEC, they failed to meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
comply with the residency requirement. SC held that the citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee
essence of absentee voting is to give non-residents the voter under R.A. 9189. (YES no need to establish
opportunity to vote. Thus, it is against its spirit if residency)
residency shall be considered as pre-requisite to voting.
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself RATIO:
admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition  After what appears to be a successful application for
Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy
FACTS: political rights, specifically, the right of suffrage,
 Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225  Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent
(Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5
2003) which accords to such applicants the right of (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote,
suffrage. as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
 Long before the May 2004 national and local requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
elections, petitioners sought registration and Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing
certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the
advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of
States that they have yet no right to vote in such the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires
elections owing to their lack of the one-year residency in the Philippines for a certain period,
residence requirement prescribed by the and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident
Constitution.  absentee voting rights.
 Prodded for clarification by There is no provision in the dual citizenship law—
petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually establish
ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC on the residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
response: contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its
presumption of constitutionality, Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
it is the Commission's position absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
that those who have availed of overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
the law cannot exercise the right enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
of suffrage given under the who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
OAVL for the reason that the ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
OAVL was not enacted for vote.
them. Hence, as Filipinos who
have merely re-acquired their
citizenship on 18 September
2003 at the earliest, and as law
and jurisprudence now stand,
they are considered regular
voters who have to meet the
requirements of residency,
among others under Section 1,
Article 5 of the Constitution.
 Faced with the prospect of not being
able to vote in the May 2004 elections
owing to the COMELEC's refusal to
include them in the National Registry of
Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-
Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
 COMELEC’s comment: denial of
petition; petitioners were not able to
register let alone vote in said elections.
OSG’s Manifestation: all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right
of suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the