Crim 3rd Week
Crim 3rd Week
Crim 3rd Week
FACTS: The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted
robbery. At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only
succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
Issue: WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery
RULING: YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty
of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.
RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his
evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final
objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the
accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former
convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have
been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
FACTS: Sy Pio shot three people early in the morning of September 3, 1949. Tan Siong Kiap, Ong Pian
and Jose Sy.Sy Pio entered the store at 511 Misericordia Sta Cruz Manila and started firing with a .45
caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Upon seeing Sy Pio fire at Jose Sy, Tan asked ―what is the
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idea? thereupon, Sy Pio turned around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot at his right shoulder and it
passed through his back. He ran to a room behind the store to hide. He was still able to hear gunshots
from Sy Pio‘s pistol, but afterwards, Sy Pio ran away.
Tan Siong Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital where his wound was treated. He stayed
there from September 3-12, 1949. He was released upon his request and against physician‘s advice and
was requested to return for further treatment which he did 5 times in a period of 10 days. His wound
was completely healed; he spent P300 for hospital and doctor‘s fees.
Sy Pio was found by the Constabulary in Tarlac. Lomotan, a police from Manila Police Department went
to Tarlac to get Sy Pio. He admitted to Lomotan that he shot the victims and handed him the pistol used
in the shooting.
According to Sy Pio‘s declaration, some months prior to the incident, he was employed in a restaurant
owned by OngPian. Sy Pio‘s wife, Vicenta was also employed by Ong Pian‘s partner. When he tried to
borrow money from Ong Pian for his wife‘s sick father, Ong Pian only lent him P1. his wife was able to
borrow P20 from her employer.
Afterwards, defendant-appellant was dismissed from his work. Ong Pian presented a list of Sy Pio‘s
debts and these were deducted from his wife‘s monthly salary. Sy Pio could not remember incurring
such debts. As such, he was resentful of Ong Pian‘s conduct. In Tan Siong Kiap‘s case, a few months
before Sept 3, Sy Pio was able to realize the sum of P70 and he put his money in a place in his room. The
next day, Sy Pio found that his money was gone. Tan told Sy Pio that he had probably given the money
to his wife. Thereafter, Sy Pio could hear that he had lost his money gambling. AS early in the morning of
Sept 3, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman who has a pistol was away, he got his pistol and went to a restaurant
in Ongpin where Ong Pian worked and shot him. Afterwards he went to Sta Cruz and shot Jose Sy and
Tan.
Issues: Trial court erred in not finding that Tan received the shot accidentally from the same bullet that
had been fired at Jose Sy. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Lower
court erred in sentencing him to pay an indemnity of P350.Defendant-appellant should only be found
guilty of less serious physical injuries instead of frustrated murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- BENITO LABABO ALIAS "BEN," WENEFREDO
LABABO, JUNIOR LABABO (AL), and FFF, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 234651, THIRD DIVISION, June 6, 2018, VELASCO, JR., J
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FACTS: Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were charged in
an Information for the crime of Murder. Additionally, Benito and Wenefredo were likewise indicted with
the crime of Frustrated Murder.
On October 27, 2007, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, BBB, his wife CCC, and their son AAA, alighted
from a motorcycle in front of Benito's house, some fifty meters away from their residence, and
proceeded directly to go to their house. A few minutes later, CCC heard a gunshot accompanied by a
child's scream emanating from near Benito's house. When she went outside to check, she saw her
husband and son lying on the ground, wounded. Within close proximity is Benito holding a 29-inch gun
locally known as "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos. Jesus Caparal
corroborated these accounts, saying that he was nearby when the incident occurred and that after
hearing gunshots, he proceeded to his house. On the way there, he saw Benito holding a "bardog," with
the three each holding a bolo, while AAA and BBB were lying on the ground. He reported the incident to
the Barangay Tanod.
When the victims were brought to the hospital, AAA was declared dead on arrival. BBB survived the
gunshot wounds but was confined at the hospital for one month. DDD, CCC's adopted daughter,
reported the incident to the police authorities of Northern Samar.
RTC found accused appellants guilty of murder. Benito and Wenefredo were also found guilty for the
crime of frustrated murder. According to the trial court, despite the fact that there was no eyewitness to
the actual commission of the crime, the combination of the circumstantial evidence points out to
accused-appellants as the perpetrators and conspirators.
CA affirmed. Anent the theory that the accused appellants conspired to kill the victims, the CA held that
the pieces of circumstantial evidence establish a common criminal design — that is, to harm and kill the
victims. The appellate court added that although the victims only sustained gunshot wounds from
Benito's bardog, and not from the bolos held by the three, the fact that they stayed together while
wielding said bladed weapons are enough to demonstrate their common evil intent to threaten, harm,
and eventually assault the victims.
With respect to the penalties and damages imposed, the CA affirmed the penalty meted upon Benito
and Wenefredo. But for FFF, the appellate court noted that he was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime thus, being a minor, Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which states that
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed upon a person over fifteen and
under eighteen, but always in the proper period, shall apply to him. After following said provision and
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the CA held, the range of penalty for FFF is prision mayor in any of its
period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The CA thus modified the
RTC's ruling by imposing upon FFF for his commission of the crime of murder the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
ISSUE: Whether the accused appellants conspired to commit the crimes charged. (YES)
RULING: Article 8 of the RPC provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an
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agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony
was decided
upon. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.
In Bahilidad v. People, the Court summarized the basic principles in determining whether conspiracy
exists or not. Thus: ….. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to
commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohort.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by being present
at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence,
the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any
active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
Here, it was established that Wenefredo and FFF were present at the scene of the crime, both wielding a
bolo. However, it was also established that their alleged participation thereat did not go beyond being
present and holding said weapons. As a matter of fact, both the victims only sustained gunshot wounds.
While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, without
actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused conspired to
commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito, while wielding
bolos, does not partake of this nature.
Their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no other purpose
than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful
perpetration thereof. Their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and increased the odds
against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.
Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral
support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual
perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime. Under the
circumstances, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that they have nothing to do with the killing.
Therefore, indeed, the three conspired to commit the crimes charged.
People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
FACTS:
• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from a party. She
knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and
poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him.
Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the
second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her
neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the
knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her
head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to take
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off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the
floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a
knife, she did as told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted into
her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked
herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another room then another then
she jumped out through a window.
• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house and
knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back
door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting
on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody running away but
failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she
was physically examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape
HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim.
Facts: on May 2, 1924, Elias Magbual, an employee of the hacienda La Esperanza, while in the
performance of his duties, was treacherous attacked by a crowd of person, probably about forty in
number and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the persons who harbored enmity
against the Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. The
attack began by the crowd shouting "Avance" and with Magbual attempting to escape. But a stone
thrown by Anastasio Dagman hit Magbual in the breast, and knocked him down. In this position, he was
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attacked by Luis Pacunla who wounded him with a lance. Magbual made another attempt to flee only to
fall again and to receive wounds made by bolos and clubs wielded by the accused. Magbual escaped
death from his tormentors by the use of feigning death. The seven people involve, Luis Pacunla, Isabelo
Rebollido, Juan Otanan, Anastacio Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla were charged of
the crime frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance in Nueva Ecija.
Issue: Whether or not the murder should be regarded as frustrated or as an attempted murder. 1.
Whether or not the accused had the intention to kill Magbual 2. whether or not that there was an
argreement to kill Magbual and therefore in sentencing all of the accused to the same penalty.
Held: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all of the acts of
execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by
Magbual. There was also an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the life of the person attacked,
which intent may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the
nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused, "Vamos a matarle," and their fingering the nose of
Magbual to see if respiration continued. As in frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts
which he believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death, fails to follow for causes entirely apart
from his will. Inattempted murder the accused begins the commission of the crime by over acts, but
involuntarily desists from performing the other acts necessary to consummate the crime, he being
prevented from so doing by some cause outside of his own will.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and
renewed on December 22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been denied by a
resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in said resolution, the same was
due mainly to these circumstances: The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has
been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot
be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had not been
previously settled squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion
thereon, it was deemed best not to disturb, for the time being, the course of action taken by the lower
court, which denied bail to the movant.
ISSUE: Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, and robbery (NO)
RULING: According to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, one of the means by which rebellion may
be committed is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious
violence" in the prosecution of said war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely: resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions,
restraint of liberty, damages to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing
serious violence", said act of resorting to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and
property — when, as alleged in the information, performed "as a necessary means to commit rebellion,
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in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof" and "so as to facilitate the accomplishment of
the . . . purpose" of the rebellion — constitutes neither two or more offenses, nor a complex crime, but
one crime — that of rebellion plain and simply, punishable with one single penalty, namely, that
prescribed in said Article 135.
FACTS: Between 8 and 9 AM of April 28, 1918, when M.D. Lewin was absent from his house in which he
was living with his family. A resident of the neighborhood told Lewin and told her that heavy smoke was
coming out from the lower floor of her house. Once she was informed of the fact, she ordered her
servant to look for the fire. Her servant found a piece of jute sack and a rag soaked with kerosene oil
placed between a post of the house and a partition of the entresol which were burning. At that moment,
Severino Valdes (Defendant) was in the entresol, engaged in his work of cleaning, while the other
defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place. According to the testimony of a
witness, he saw the defendant climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the house and located
inside the warehouse were some straws which were previously burned. When the defendant noticed
the presence of the policeman, he eventually went down and entered the warehouse.
On arraignment, defendant stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves that he had
gathered together but on a statement he made in the police station, he claimed that he had set the fire
to the said rag and piece of sack under the house. A complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance
charging Valdes and Labarro with the crime of Arson. However, for lack of evidence, the charge against
Labarro was dropped but the charge against Valdes prospered. The Court found him guilty of the crime
charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was frustrated arson (YES)
RULING: The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an
upright of the house and a partition of the entresoln of the building, constitutes the crime of frustrated
arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. The crime is
classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conducive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which
he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by
the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had not yet started to
burn, although as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the
partition of the entresol.
US vs Adiao
The defendant claimed in his appeal that the lower court erred in holding that he was guilty of the
crime oftheft as disclosed by the facts appearing of record
Held: No, the crime cannot properly be classified as frustrated. The defendant has performed all of the
acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the crime of theft. He has taken possession of the
belt and this already constitutes the crime of theft. ―The act of making use of the thing having been
frustrated, which, however does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime‖ (Decision of
Supreme Court of Spain)
Note: The ponente referred to the decision of Supreme Court of Spain in its decision. It illustrated
several situations that constitute consummated theft.
FACTS: The accused, as salesman of the bookstore "Philippine Education Co., Inc." sold on the morning
of January 19, 1920, five copies of Sams' "Practical Business Letters," of the value of seven pesos and
fifty centavos (P7.50), which the accused should have immediately delivered to the cashier but which he
did not deliver, until after it was discovered that he had sold the books and received their value without
delivering it to the cashier, as was his duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the consummated offense of estafa. (NO)
RULING: An employee of a commercial firm commits the frustrated offense of estafa, when he makes a
sale and retains the proceeds in his possession with intent to misappropriate them but does not realize
the injury and the appropriation and therefore does not consummate the crime, because of the timely
intervention of the principal or his agents, who secure the delivery of the money, when the fraud is
discovered shortly after the sale.
Here, appellant is guilty of the frustrated offense of estafa of 37ó pesetas, inasmuch as he performed all
the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence, but which, by reason of causes
independent of his will, did not produce it, no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended
party, such damage being one of the essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the
acts prosecuted.
Facts: In the Supply Depot of Quezon City, the accused from the pile nine (9) pieces of hospital linen and
took them to their truck, where they were found by a corporal of the Military Police (MP) when they
tried to pass through the checkpoint.
Issue: Whether or not the crime was considered theft in its consummated stage.
Ruling: The court that it was consummated theft. The crime is consummated the moment the offender
gets ahold of the thing taken and/or is in a position to dispose of it freely.
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Facts: On June 20, 1946, Roberto Diño was hired as a driver of the US army at a station in Quezon City.
At above 11:30 in the morning, he brought a truck load of articles to manila harbor; the article came
from the US army. At the check point a guard approached the truck and found three boxes, containing
ten caliber 30 army rifles. The guard brought Diño to the lieutenant of the US army for questioning, Diño
pointed to the gang but later denied. Later Diño confessed that there were four persons who placed the
boxes on board and he was instructed to bring them out of the area. While they were to meet after the
truck passed the checkpoint.
Issue: Whether or not Diño can be convicted of the crime of consummated theft?
Ruling: It was held that the crime committed was frustrated theft, because of the timely discovery of the
boxes on the truck before it could pass out of the check point. in order for the crime of theft to be
consummated the article should have passed the checkpoint, so that the thief could have full control
and could dispense of the property
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 160188, EN BANC, June 21, 2007, TINGA, J.
FACTS: On May 19, 1994, Petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within SM North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post
at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification
card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of
the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with
more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking
space. Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic
inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the
taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the
merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert
his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and
the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide
Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of ₱12,090.00. The RTC convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of
consummated theft. Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose of the articles stolen. The CA rejected this contention and affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.
Hence this petition.
RULING: Under Article 6 of the RPC, a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
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by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. Furthermore, the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without
the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Facts: The case is a petition for appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court sentencing respondent,
Dante Marcos, of life imprisonment and fine of Php 20, 000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. On December 1985, Dante Marcos – a security guard and part-time student at the
University of Baguio – was caught on a “buy-bust” operation and was consequently charged of illegal
sale and distribution of marijuana. Without any authority of law, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sold and
distributed dried marijuana leaves weighing about nine (9) kilos which was stocked in a sack, for P700.00
per kilo or a total of P6,300.00, knowing fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited drug in
violation of the law.
According to the witnesses presented by the prosecution, a police asset posed as a buyer of the said
illegal marijuana. He was introduced by their informer to the accused, Dante, who – after being
presented with the order – brought out kilos of marijuana in a light blue sack and gave it to him. He then
signaled for his back-up police officers to entrap Dante which they have done successfully. However,
according to the defense, Dante was wrongfully accused since it was actually his companion, Roland,
who was selling the illegal leaves. Dante insists that he was at scene of the said crime since he was asked
by Roland to stay and accompany his guests without having any idea that they were visiting for illegal
purposes. During the
entrapment, Roland was able to escape and Dante was immediately captured.
The RTC favored in the evidences presented by prosecution. Thus, Dante now appeals his case.
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld and affirmed the decision of the lower court. According to SC, the
testimony of the police asset was clear and convincing and demonstrated that the accused needed no
instigation or prodding to commit a crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the
fact that the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and
disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the
arresting officers here constituted entrapment.
In instigation, the officers of the law or their agents induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing
an offense, which he otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused
cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit the offense
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charged originates from the mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct.
In entrapment, police resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his
criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant
into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution
and conviction while in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the means
originate from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him.
In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal
from liability while the other does.
SC points out that the mere fact that the asset made Dante believed that they were interested to buy
the illegal drug makes the operation an entrapment. But the decisive factor that made the case strong
against the respondent was that he was positively identified by the witnesses and thus, this should
prevail over his mere and plain denial.
Facts: The municipality of Gasan in Marinduque advertised a call for proposals to furnish the city with
street lamps. Having heard of the said bidding, Jose Basa – a member of the municipal council –
submitted a written proposal by which he stated his agreement in providing the street lamps at a given
price. However, according to Section 28 of the Municipal Code, Jose Basa as member of the municipal
council, cannot pursue business with the municipality. Thus, the lower court convicted Jose for such
violation.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. According to SC, the respondent,
Jose, only made an offer to the municipality which the latter never accepted. He, therefore, never
became
interested in any contract work or business with the local government. SC strongly holds that Section 28
does not sanction an attempt to commit such crime. Moreover, SC upheld that Article 3 of the RPC does
not apply to crimes defined by laws of a commission such as a municipality.
Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is conclusive
that the defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt
whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of
the mother and the sister of the child. The physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few
hours after the commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ,
indicating that an effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before the court he
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expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. The mother of the child testified that she
found its genital organ covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive
evidence of penetration.
Issue: Whether or not there was a consummated rape even though there was no full penetration
Ruling: No, the judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant appellant is hereby found guilty
of the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor, with the
accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.
Facts: At 2:00 a.m., Mihangos and Guigue, who were at the disco, decided to call it a night and walked
home, with their respective bicycles. At the crossing they saw Otte, a German national and a tourist who
was billeted at Alona Ville Beach Resort, lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past
the prostrate man. When they were about a few meters away from the body by the road, they met
Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barrio mates. Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo lunged at them.
Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigue’s uncle. The
police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about Otte. The man died due to a stab
wound. Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body, as well as their encounter with Bongo
and Buntag. Buntag gave a statement to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a.m. that fateful
night, he was walking back home from the disco place where he caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at
the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte
but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three times on the
face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran
back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal the incident to anybody or else he
would be involved.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the
victim Otte and that Buntag and Bongo, in fact, killed him.
Ruling: Based on Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, it provides that there is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests. It is
not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all
the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Appellants are found guilty, as principals, of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- JONATHAN PAL, THANIEL MAGBANTA, and
TATAN CUTACTE, Accused, RON ARIES DAGATAN CARIAT, Accused Appellant.
G.R. No. 223565, FIRST DIVISION, June 18, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.
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FACTS: AAA testified that her neighbors Jonathan Pal and Thaniel Magbanta invited her to celebrate
Pal’s
birthday. After joining their drinking spree, AAA later on felt dizzy and intoxicated. She testified that
Magbanta punched her stomach and Pal, Magbanta, Tatan Cutacte, and appellant Ron Cariat dragged
her to a grassy and secluded area near Pal’s house. AAA cried for help but no one heard her. Magbanta
punched her again and warned her not to resist or else he would kill her. She added that appellant Ron
Cariat held her legs and pointed a knife at her while Pal and Cutacte acted as a lookout. Magbante laid
on top of her and forcibly inserted his penis inside his vagina. Cariat, Pal and Cutacte were all laughing as
they watched Magbanta rape AAA.
The RTC found Ron Cariat guilty of the crime of rape. The prosecution through AAA’s testimony was able
to establish conspiracy among the four accused to commit the crime of rape. While it was Magbanta
who had sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant Ron Cariat held her legs which allowed Magbanta to
consummate the rape. This constituted direct participation in the commission of the crime. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s judgement.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Ron Cariat was guilty of the crime of rape. (YES)
RULING: Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under
twelve years of age or was demented. In this case, the testimony of AAA established that Magbanta had
sexual intercourse with her with the assistance of Cariat, Pal, and Cutacte. She testified that Cariat held
her legs, pointed a knife at her and helped his co-accused drag her to a secluded grassy area which
allowed Magbanta to consummate the rape. These show that Magbanta had sexual intercourse with
AAA against her will through force, threat, and intimidation with the assistance of Cariat and the other
accused. Conspiracy was established in this case. There is conspiracy "when the acts of the accused
demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose." In the case
at bar, although Cariat did not personally have sexual intercourse with AAA, his acts together with Pal
and Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal knowledge of AAA. Cariat helped
Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining AAA and in dragging her to a secluded grassy area. He also
pointed a knife at AAA while Magbanta inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Cariat concurred in the
criminal design to rape AAA. Since there was conspiracy, the act of one was the act of all making them
equally guilty of the crime of rape against AAA.