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    Flixborough Disaster

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    wingedamphibian
    The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in Flixborough, England. A temporary bypass pipe containing cyclohexane ruptured, releasing 40 tonnes of cyclohexane and forming a vapor cloud that ignited, causing an explosion equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT. 28 people were killed. Key lessons learned include the need for a full assessment of plant modifications, pressure testing of pipework, consideration of major disasters in plant layout and control room design, operating procedures during start-up, and limiting hazardous material inventory.

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    Flixborough Disaster

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    wingedamphibian
    1K views4 pages
    The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in Flixborough, England. A temporary bypass pipe containing cyclohexane ruptured, releasing 40 tonnes of cyclohexane and forming a vapor cloud that ignited, causing an explosion equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT. 28 people were killed. Key lessons learned include the need for a full assessment of plant modifications, pressure testing of pipework, consideration of major disasters in plant layout and control room design, operating procedures during start-up, and limiting hazardous material inventory.

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    The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in Flixborough, England. A temporary bypass pipe containing cyclohexane ruptured, releasing 40 tonnes of cyclohexane and forming a vapor cloud that ignited, causing an explosion equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT. 28 people were killed. Key lessons learned include the need for a full assessment of plant modifications, pressure testing of pipework, consideration of major disasters in plant layout and control room design, operating procedures during start-up, and limiting hazardous material inventory.

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    1K views4 pages

    Flixborough Disaster

    Uploaded by

    wingedamphibian
    The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in Flixborough, England. A temporary bypass pipe containing cyclohexane ruptured, releasing 40 tonnes of cyclohexane and forming a vapor cloud that ignited, causing an explosion equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT. 28 people were killed. Key lessons learned include the need for a full assessment of plant modifications, pressure testing of pipework, consideration of major disasters in plant layout and control room design, operating procedures during start-up, and limiting hazardous material inventory.

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    of 4

    Risk and Safety Management in Process

    Industries

    Assignment 1
    Error Analysis of the Flixborough Disaster

    Submitted by:
    Harshal Sawant
    08CH14
    3 yr-6th sem
    rd

    B.Tech Chemical Engineering


    Date: 24/01/2010
    Flixborough Disaster

    Facility: Flixborough (near Scunthorpe), Humberside (now North


    Lincolnshire), England, UK

    Date: 1 June 1974

    Consequences: 28 fatalities and 36 injured. Offsite consequences resulted in 53


    reported injuries.

    Background: The chemical plant, owned by Nypro UK (a joint venture between Dutch
    State Mines and the British National Coal Board) and in operation since
    1967, produced caprolactam, a precursor chemical used in the
    manufacture of nylon. Residents of the village of Flixborough were not
    happy to have such a large industrial development so close to their
    homes and had expressed concern when the plant was first proposed.

    Description of The cyclohexane plant consisted of a train of six reactors in series


    Modification: connected througn short 28-in.-diameter connecting pipes. To allow for
    expansion, each 28-in. pipe contained a bellows (expansion joint). The
    plant was used to produce a mixture
    of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone. On 27 March 1974, it was
    discovered that a vertical crack in reactor No.5 was leaking cyclohexane.
    The plant was subsequently shut down for an investigation which
    identified a serious problem with the reactor. The decision was taken to
    remove it and install a bypass assembly to connect reactors No.4 and
    No.6 so that the plant could continue production.
    The bypass was a temporary 20-in. pipe, which had two bends
    in it, to allow for the difference in height. The existing bellows were
    left in position at both ends of the temporary pipe .

    The bypass had been designed by engineers who were not experienced
    in high-pressure pipework, no plans or calculations had been produced,
    the pipe was not pressure-tested, and was mounted on
    temporary scaffolding poles that allowed the pipe to twist under
    pressure. The by-pass pipe was a smaller diameter (20") than the
    reactor flanges (24") and in order to align the flanges, short sections of
    steel bellows were added at each end of the by-pass - under pressure
    such bellows tend to squirm or twist. The pipe was not properly
    supported; it merely rested on scaffolding. Because there was a bellows
    at each end, it was free to rotate or "squirm" and did so when the
    pressure rose a little above the normal level. This caused the bellows to
    fail. No professionally qualified engineer was in the plant at the time the
    temporary pipe was built. But in addition, the engineers at Flixborough
    did not know that design by experts was necessary.

    Description At 16:53 on Saturday 1 June 1974, the temporary bypass pipe


    of Accident: (containing cyclohexane at 150°C (302°F) and1 MPa (10 bar)) ruptured,
    possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby 8 inch (20 cm) pipe which had
    been burning for nearly an hour. Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of
    the plant's 400 tonne store of cyclohexane leaked from the pipe and
    formed a vapour cloud 100–200 metres (320–650 feet) in diameter. The
    cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace
    at a nearby hydrogen production plant) exploded, completely destroying
    the plant. Around 1,800 buildings within a mile radius of the site were
    damaged.
    The fuel-air explosion was estimated to be equivalent to 15 tonnes
    of TNT (60 gigajoules) and it killed all 18 employees in the
    nearby control room. Nine other site workers were killed, and a delivery
    driver died of a heart attack in his cab. Resulting fires raged in the area
    for over 10 days.

    Key Lessons Plant modification


    Learnt:
    A plant modification occurred without a full assessment of the potential
    consequences. Only limited calculations were undertaken on the
    integrity of the bypass line. No calculations were undertaken for the
    dog-legged shaped line or for the bellows. No drawing of the proposed
    modification was produced. No HAZOP(A hazard and operability study)
    was carried out.

    Maintenance procedures

    No pressure testing was carried out on the installed pipework


    modification. Could make use of flexible pipes

    Plant layout

    Those concerned with the design, construction and layout of the plant
    did not consider the potential for a major disaster happening
    instantaneously.
    Control room design

    Control rooms should be designed to withstand major hazards events.


    18 fatalities occurred in the control room.

    Operating procedures

    The incident happened during start up when critical decisions were


    made under operational stress. In particular, the shortage of nitrogen
    for inerting would tend to inhibit the venting of off-gas as a method of
    pressure control/reduction.

    Limit inventory in plant

    The large inventory of flammable material in the plant contributed to the


    scale of the disaster. Limiting inventory is part of the inherently safer
    design principle.

    References: What went wrong: Case history of process plant disasters–Trevor Kletz

    The Flixborough Disaster: Report of the Court of Inquiry

    Frank P Lees: vol3. Loss Prevention in Industries

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