A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 4
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF
 A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms
APPEALS, respondents.
thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner.
right vested in such person.
Florentino G. Libatique for private respondent.

The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported

At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian
waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit
boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a
(supra), where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver
point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the
said:
same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the . . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in
the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they
including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said
taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper
treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to
sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar
described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, Express Transit."
left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left. 1
x x x           x x x          x x x
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited

them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her

transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned
including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things: above will readily show that appellees did not actually
waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the
latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met an
that said document proves is that they expressed a
accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
"desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to mechanical defect and went off the road and
same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver
turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us;
of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
x x x           x x x          x x x
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against  the said driver and owner of the said
July 8, 1887) — which is not the case of the one relied
Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping
upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
us to be treated upon our injuries.

xxx xxx xxx 2

If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to
conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case
(Emphasis supplied)
cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner
action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular
sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the
generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to
stay away from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced
for employment. She prayed for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered
the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read
attorney's fees. In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances
already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private respondent) and his there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully
driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973. the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of
private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended
thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and

the driver of the mini-bus. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common
had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages: carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety
a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must
construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, although we conform to
carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary
the trial court's disposition of the case — its dismissal. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there being no
to law, morals, public policy or good
error committed by the lower court in dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint, the judgment of dismissal is hereby
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
affirmed. Without special pronouncement as to costs.
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
SO ORDERED. 3
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and
this Court to award her actual or compensatory damages as well as moral damages.
hence to render that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made

by petitioner. The relevant language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again: That we are no longer interested to file a
Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by
complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner  of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries. (Emphasis
action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral
supplied)
damages as a matter of course.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after
in protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary part of respondent and his driver.
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because
of this statutory presumption, it has been held that a court need not
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim
even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize because
common carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome this
of the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the
presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it had
day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer
exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The
with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's
standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is
job, a job which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The
considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary
Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she
diligence, i.e., the diligence of a good paterfamilias established in
was no longer employed in a public school since, being a casual
respect of the ordinary relations between members of society. A
employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her
common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers.
a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances". 11
In view of her employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held
that she could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after
Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private respondent has successfully proved that he had
and by reason of the accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the
exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records before the Court are bereft of
Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to due respect from this Court.
any evidence showing that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously, respondent
Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this
did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite
finding of fact, and she may not be awarded damages on the basis of
extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result
speculation or conjecture. 14
of force majeure. But allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his defense of force
majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is
majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the
entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for
human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the
which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as
injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. In Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 12
 the possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from
Court summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to
quoting with approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Española: her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be
expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded actual or

compensatory damages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had been
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there held:
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is
exempt from liability non-performance. The Partidas, the
antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta
fortuito" as 'an event that takes place by accident and could are inadequate. In allowing not more than P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and — something like
not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the
houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robber. court below overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible
and  restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention was needed,  for which the doctor's charges
would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization fees, expenses and medicines.  Furthermore, the operation,
In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the
according to Dr. Diño, would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while removal of the
Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In legal sense and,
scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery.
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a "caso fortuito"
presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of x x x           x x x          x x x
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be
impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not

fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not

avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original

impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a condition is undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no

normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any control over the parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity. . . . Still, taking into account  the necessity and cost

participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to of corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due to

the creditor. consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering
that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state,  we are of the opinion that the

indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner estimated
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00.  16
 Upon
negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In her direct
the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the
by petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between
vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was
P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that
suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old
a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973
woman, cried out, "What happened?" ("Apay addan samet
which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very
nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is only
probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the
normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if
amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not
anything had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply
unreasonable. Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the
necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard
long-established rule is that moral damages may be awarded where
in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus
gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since
had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what
we have earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and his
was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently
driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap
that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously
which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the
alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a
aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife, to get the
modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the
victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still
bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of
hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus,
moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which
petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries petitioner. But petitioner, however, failed to execute a document
including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the recognizing private respondent's beneficial ownership over said share.
amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim
for P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest. 19
Following AmCham's policy and practice, there was a yearly renewal
of employment contract between the petitioner and private
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as well as the decision of the then Court of
respondent. Separate letters of employment advice dated October 1,
First Instance of La Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby
1986 4, as well March 4, 1988 5 and January 7, 1989 6, mentioned the
ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
MPC share. But petitioner never acknowledged that private
to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages;
respondent is the beneficial owner of the share as requested in follow-
and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from
up requests, particularly one dated March 4, 1988 as follows:
the promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.

Dear Marsh:
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 116631 October 28, 1998
All other provisions of your compensation/benefit package will
MARSH THOMSON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and remain the same and are summarized as follows:
THE AMERICAN CHAMPER OF COMMERCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC, Respondents.
xxx xxx xxx

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

9) The Manila Polo Club membership provided by the Chamber for
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals on May 19, 1994, disposing as
you and your family will continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues
follows:
and other charges relating to such membership shall be for your
personal account and, if you have not already done so, you will
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY execute such documents as are necessary to acknowledge that the
SET ASIDE. ANOTHER JUDGMENT IS ENTERED ORDERING Chamber is the beneficial owner of your membership in the
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MARSH THOMSON TO TRANSFER Club. 7
THE SAID MPC [Manila Polo Club] SHARE TO THE NOMINEE
OF THE APPELLANT.
When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal in
1989, he notified private respondent that he would no longer be
The facts of the case are: available as Executive Vice President after September 30, 1989. Still,
the private respondent asked the petitioner to stay on for another six
(6) months. Petitioner indicated his acceptance of the consultancy
Petitioner Marsh Thomson (Thomson) was the Executive Vice-
arrangement with a counter-proposal in his letter dated October 8,
President and, later on, the Management Consultant of private
1989, among others as follows:
respondent, the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines,
Inc. (AmCham) for over ten years, 1979-1989.
11.) Retention of the Polo Club share, subject to my reimbursing the
purchase price to the Chamber, or one hundred ten thousand pesos
While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his
(P110,000.00). 8
superior, A. Lewis Burridge, retired as AmCham's President. Before
Burridge decided to return to his home country, he wanted to transfer
his proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to petitioner. Private respondent rejected petitioner's counter-proposal.
However, through the intercession of Burridge, private respondent
paid for the share but had it listed in petitioner's name. This was made
Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private
clear in an employment advice dated January 13, 1986, wherein
respondent executed on September 29, 1989 a Release and
petitioner was informed by private respondent as follows:
Quitclaim, 9 stating that "AMCHAM, its directors, officers and
assigns, employees and/or representatives do hereby release, waive,
xxx xxx xxx abandon and discharge J. MARSH THOMSON from any and all
existing claims that the AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns,
employees and/or representatives may have against J. MARSH
11. If you so desire, the Chamber is willing to acquire for your use a
THOMSON." 10 The quitclaim, expressed in general terms, did not
membership in the Manila Polo Club. The timing of such acquisition
mention specifically the MPC share.
shall be subject to the discretion of the Board based on the Chamber's
financial position. All dues and other charges relating to such
membership shall be for your personal account. If the membership is On April 5, 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to
acquired in your name, you would execute such documents as the petitioner demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share
necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the which "it (AmCham) owns and placed in your (Thomson's) name." 11
Chamber. 2
Failing to get a favorable response, private respondent filed on May
xxx xxx xxx 15, 1990, a complaint against petitioner praying,  inter alia, that the
Makati Regional Trial Court render judgment ordering Thomson "to
return the Manila Polo Club share to the plaintiff and transfer said
On April 25, 1986, Burridge transferred said proprietary share to
share to the nominee of plaintiff." 12
petitioner, as confirmed in a letter  3 of notification to the Manila Polo
Club.
On February 28, 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision, 13 thus:
Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the
transfer fee of P40,000.00 from his own funds; but private respondent The foregoing considered judgment is rendered as follows:
subsequently reimbursed this amount. On November 19, 1986, MPC
issued Proprietary Membership Certificate Number 3398 in favor of
1) The ownership of the contested Manila Polo Club share is
adjudicated in favor of defendant Marsh Thomson; and;
2) Defendant shall pay plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00 On 16 June 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 18 of
said decision. By resolution 19 promulgated on August 4, 1994, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Because both parties thru their respective faults have somehow
contributed to the birth of this case, each shall bear the incidental
expenses incurred. 14 In this petition for review, petitioner alleges the following errors of
public respondent as grounds for our review:
In said decision, the trial court awarded the MPC share to defendant
(petitioner now) on the ground that the Articles of Incorporation and I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the Decision
By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit artificial persons, such as dated 28 February 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch
corporations, to be club members, ratiocinating in this manner: 65, Makati, Metro Manila, in its Civil Case No. 90-1286, and in not
confirming petitioner's ownership over the MPC membership share.
An assessment of the evidence adduced by both parties at the trial will
show clearly that it was the intention of the parties that a membership II. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "the
to Manila Polo Club was to be secured by plaintiff [herein private Quitclaim executed by AmCham in favor of petitioner of September
respondent] for defendant's [herein petitioner] use. The latter was to 29, 1989 was superseded by the contractual agreement entered into by
execute the necessary documents to acknowledge ownership of the the parties on October 13, 1989 wherein again the appellee
Polo membership in favor of plaintiff. (Exh. C par 9) However, when acknowledged that the appellant owned the MPC share, there being
the parties parted ways in disagreement and with some degree of absolutely no evidence to support such a conclusion and/or such
bitterness, the defendant had second thoughts and decided to keep the inference is manifestly mistaken.
membership for himself. This is evident from the exhibits (E & G)
where defendant asked that he retained the Polo Club membership
III. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment
upon reimbursement of its purchase price; and where he showed
ordering petitioner to transfer the contested MPC share to a nominee
his "profound disappointment, both at the previous Board's unfair
of respondent AmCham notwithstanding that: (a) AmCham has no
action, and at what I consider to be harsh terms, after my long years
standing in the Manila Polo Club (MPG), and being an artificial
of dedication to the Chamber's interest."
person, it is precluded under MPC's Articles of Incorporation and
governing rules and regulations from owning a proprietary share or
xxx xxx xxx from becoming a member thereof: and (b) even under AmCham's
Articles of Incorporation, the purposes for which it is dedicated,
becoming a stockholder or shareholder in other corporation is not one
Notwithstanding all these evidence in favor of plaintiff, however,
of the express implied powers fixed in AmCham's said corporate
defendant may not be declared the owner of the contested
franchise. 20
membership be compelled to execute documents transferring the Polo
Membership to plaintiff or the latter's nominee for the reason that this
is prohibited by Polo Club's Articles & By-Laws. . . . As posited above, these assigned errors show the disputed matters
herein are mainly factual. As such they are best left to the trial and
appellate courts' disposition. And this Court could have dismissed the
It is for the foregoing reasons that the Court rules that the ownership
petition outright, were it not for the opposite results reached by the
of the questioned Polo Club membership be retained by defendant. 15 .
courts below. Moreover, for the enhanced appreciation of the jural
...
relationship between the parties involving trust, this Court has given
due course to the petition, which we now decide.
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After carefully considering the pleadings on record, we find there are
two main issues to be resolved: (1) Did respondent court err in
On May 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals (Former Special Sixth holding that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the disputed
Division) promulgated its decision 16 in said CA-G.R. CV No. 38417, share? (2) Did the respondent court err in ordering petitioner to
reversing the, trial court's judgment and ordered herein petitioner to transfer said share to private respondent's nominees?
transfer the MPC share to the nominee of private respondent,
reasoning thus:
Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he
merely incurred a debt to respondent when the latter advanced the
xxx xxx xxx funds for the purchase of the share. On the other hand, private
respondent asserts beneficial ownership whereby petitioner only holds
the share in his name, but the beneficial title belongs to private
The significant fact in the instant case is that the appellant [herein respondent. To resolve the first issue, we must clearly distinguish a
private respondent] purchased the MPC share for the use of the debt from a trust.
appellee [herein petitioner] and the latter expressly conformed thereto
as shown in Exhibits A-1, B, B-1, C, C-1, D, D-1. By such express
conformity of the appellee, the former was bound to recognize the The beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property,
appellant as the owner of the said share for a contract has the force of while a creditor has merely a personal claim against the debtor. In
law between the parties. (Alim vs. CA, 200 SCRA 450; Sasuhura trust, there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and a beneficiary,
Company, Inc., Ltd. vs. IAC, 205 SCRA 632) Aside from the but there is no such relation between a debtor and creditor. While a
foregoing, the appellee conceded the true ownership of the said share debt implies merely an obligation to pay a certain sum of money, a
to the appellant when (1) he offered to buy the MPC share from the trust refers to a duty to deal with a specific property for the benefit of
appellant (Exhs. E and E-1) upon the termination of his employment; another. If a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but not a fiduciary
(2) he obliged himself to return the MPC share after his six month relationship between the parties, there is no express trust. However, it
consultancy contract had elapsed, unless its return was earlier is understood that when the purported trustee of funds is entitled to
requested in writting (Exh. I); and (3) on cross-examination, he use them as his or her own (and commingle them with his or her own
admitted that the proprietary share listed as one of the assets of the money), a debtor-creditor relationship exists, not a trust. 21
appellant corporation in its 1988 Corporate Income Tax Return,
which he signed as the latter's Executive Vice President (prior to its
filing), refers to the Manila Polo Club Share (tsn., pp. 19-20, August
30, 1991). . . . 17
In the present case, as the Executive Vice-President of AmCham, Is there any application filed in the Chamber to avail of this cash
petitioner occupied a fiduciary position in the business of AmCham. advance?
AmCham released the funds to acquire a share in the Club for the use A. Verbal only.
of petitioner but obliged him to "execute such document as necessary Q. Nothing written, and can you tell to this Honorable Court what are
to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber". 22 A the stipulations or conditions, or terms of this transaction of securing
trust relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated. this cash advance or loan?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his
How are you going to repay the cash advance?
allegation of being merely a debtor when the private respondent paid
MR. THOMSON
the purchase price of the MPC share. Applicable here is the rule that a
The cash advance, we never stipulate when I have to repay it, but I
trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of property
presume that I would, when able to repay the money. 25
in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays
for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. 23
In deciding whether the property was wrongfully appropriated or
retained and what the intent of the parties was at the time of the
Although petitioner initiated the acquisition of the share, evidence on
conveyance, the court must rely upon its impression of the credibility
record shows that private respondent acquired said share with its
of the witnesses. 26 Intent is a question of fact, the determination of
funds. Petitioner did not pay for said share, although he later wanted
which is not reviewable unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is
to, but according to his own terms, particularly the price thereof.
one which could not reasonably be drawn. 27 Petitioner's denial is not
adequate to rebut the trust. Time and again, we have ruled that
Private respondent's evident purpose in acquiring the share was to denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
provide additional incentive and perks to its chosen executive, the deemed negative and self-serving evidence, unworthy of credence. 28
petitioner himself. Such intention was repeated in the yearly
employment advice prepared by AmCham for petitioner's
The trust between the parties having been established, petitioner
concurrence. In the cited employment advice, dated March 4, 1988,
advanced an alternative defense that the private respondent waived
private respondent once again, asked the petitioner to execute proof to
the beneficial ownership of MPC share by issuing the Release and
recognize the trust agreement in writing:
Quitclaim in his favor.

The Manila Polo membership provided by the Chamber for you and
This argument is less than persuasive. The quitclaim executed by
your family will continue on the same basis, to wit: all dues and other
private respondent does not clearly show the intent to include therein
charges relating to such membership shall be for your personal
the ownership over the MPC share. Private respondent even asserts
account and, if you have not already done so, you will execute such
that at the time the Release and Quitclaim was executed on September
documents as are necessary to acknowledge that the Chamber is the
29, 1989, the ownership of the MPC share was not controversial nor
beneficial owner of your membership in the Club. 24
contested. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective
must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
Petitioner voluntarily affixed his signature to conform with the which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right
employment advice, including his obligation stated therein - for him or benefit which legally pertains to him. 29 A waiver may not be
to execute the necessary document to recognize his employer as the attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and
beneficial owner of the MPC share. Now, we cannot hear him clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such
claiming otherwise, in derogation of said undertaking, without legal person. 30 If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in
and equitable justification. clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the
cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general
accountability, not specifically a waiver of AmCham's beneficial
For private respondent's intention to hold on to its beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.
ownership is not only presumed; it was expressed in writing at the
very outset. Although the share was placed in the name of petitioner,
his title is limited to the usufruct, that is, to enjoy the facilities and Additionally, the intention to waive a right or advantage must be
privileges of such membership in the club appertaining to the share. shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention
Such arrangement reflects a trust relationship governed by law and rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
equity. with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of
his conduct is possible. 31 Considering the terms of the quitclaim
While private respondent paid the purchase price for the share, executed by the President of private respondent, the tenor of the
petitioner was given legal title thereto. Thus, a resulting trust is document does not lead to the purported conclusion that be intended
presumed as a matter of law. The burden then shifted to the transferee to renounce private respondent's beneficial title over its share in the
to show otherwise, that it was just a loan. Such resulting trust could Manila Polo Club. We, therefore, find no reversible error in the
have been rebutted by proof of a contrary intention by a showing that, respondent Court's holding that private respondent, AmCham, is the
in fact, no trust was intended. Petitioner could have negated the trust beneficial owner of the share in dispute.
agreement by contrary, consistent and convincing evidence on
rebuttal. However, on the witness stand, petitioner failed to do so
persuasively. Turning now to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit
corporate membership. However, private respondent does not insist
On cross-examination, the petitioner testified as follows: nor intend to transfer the club membership in its name but rather to its
ATTY. AQUINO (continuing) designated nominee. For as properly ruled by the Court of Appeals:
Q. Okay, let me go to the cash advance that you mentioned Mr.
Witness, is there any document proving that you claimed cash
advance signed by an officer of the Chamber? The matter prayed for does not involve the transfer of said share to the
A. I believe the best evidence is the check. appellant, an artificial person. The transfer sought is to the appellant's
Q. Is there any document? nominee. Even if the MPC By-Laws and Articles prohibit corporate
COURT membership, there would be no violation of said prohibition for the
Other than the Check? appellant's nominee to whom the said share is sought to be transferred
MR. THOMSON would certainly be a natural person. . . .
Nothing more.
ATTY. AQUINO
As to whether or not the transfer of said share the appellant's nominee G.R. No. L-24687             September 21, 1968
would be disapproved by the MPC, is a matter that should be raised at
the proper time, which is only if such transfer is disapproved by the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A
MPC. 32
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FONG CHOY, also known as
CARLOS YEE, petitioner-appellee,
The Manila Polo Club does not necessarily prohibit the transfer of vs.
proprietary shares by its members. The Club only restricts REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
membership to deserving applicants in accordance with its rules,
when the amended Articles of Incorporation states that: "No transfer
Jose A. Uy for petitioner-appellee.
shall be valid except between the parties, and shall be registered in
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
the Membership Book unless made in accordance with these Articles
and the By-Laws". 33 Thus, as between parties herein, there is no
question that a transfer is feasible. Moreover, authority granted to a FERNANDO, J.:
corporation to regulate the transfer of its stock does not empower it to
restrict the right of a stockholder to transfer his shares, but merely
The question presented in this appeal from a grant of citizenship is
authorizes the adoption of regulations as to the formalities and
whether an applicant, who previously pleaded guilty to an indictment
procedure to be followed in effecting transfer. 34
for the violation of the Price Tag Law, had nonetheless successfully
hurdled the barrier rightfully interposed to weed out undesirables and
In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to bestow citizenship only on the deserving. The lower court, the Hon.
to hold the share and enjoy the privileges of the club. But upon the Francisco Geronimo presiding, answered in the affirmative. As the
expiration of petitioner's employment as officer and consultant of correct response ought to have been anything but that, we reverse the
AmCham, the incentives that go with the position, including use of lower court.
the MPC share, also ceased to exist. It now behooves petitioner to
surrender said share to private respondent's next nominee, another
In the statement of facts in the brief for the Republic as appellant,
natural person. Obviously this arrangement of trust and confidence
there being an acceptance of what was set forth therein in petitioner-
cannot be defeated by the petitioner's citation of the MPC rules to
appellee's brief, 1 it was expressly set forth: "During the hearing, the
shield his untenable position, without doing violence to basic tenets of
petitioner admitted that he was fined P25.00 for violation of the Price
justice and fair dealing.
Tag Law. He explained that at that time all the articles he was selling
were properly tagged as to its prices, but it so happened that the tag of
However, we still have to ascertain whether the rights of herein a certain article fell and when the inspector came the tag was not on
parties to the trust still subsist. It has been held that so long as there the article. In order to avoid any more discussion, he paid the
has been no denial or repudiation of the trust, the possession of the fine. ... ." 2
trustee of an express and continuing trust is presumed to be that of the
beneficiary, and the statute of limitations does not run between
The above admission notwithstanding, there being an opposition to
them. 35 With regard to a constructive or a resulting trust, the statute
the petition filed by the Republic as to his failure to conduct himself
of limitations does not begin to run until the trustee clearly repudiates
in a proper and irreproachable manner as shown by such violation of
or disavows the trust and such disavowal is brought home to the other
the Price Tag Law, the lower court, on March 24, 1965, rendered a
party, "cestui que trust". 36 The statute of limitations runs generally
decision to the effect that there was no impediment to applicant Fong
from the time when the act was done by which the party became
Choy's naturalization. It was held that he was possessed of all the
chargeable as a trustee by operation of law or when the beneficiary
qualifications required by law and none of the disqualifications
knew that he had a cause of action, 37 in the absence of fraud or
specified therein, thus entitling him to the grant of Filipino
concealment.
citizenship. The Republic appealed.1awphîl.nèt

Noteworthy in the instant case, there was no declared or explicit

We sustain the appeal and reverse the lower court. Its rather generous
repudiation of the trust existing between the parties. Such repudiation
could only be inferred as evident when the petitioner showed his frame of mind in considering this application for citizenship,
manifested in the decision appealed from, finds no support in the law.
intent to appropriate the MPC share for himself. Specifically, this
The decision was rendered on March 24, 1965. Approximately five
happened when he requested to retain the MPC share upon his
months previously, on October 30, 1964, in Tio Tek Chai v.
reimbursing the purchase price of P110,000, a request denied
Republic,  3 this Court held that violation of the Price Tag Law
promptly by private respondent. Eventually, petitioner refused to
"certainly renders [petitioner's] conduct anything but proper and
surrender the share despite the written demand of private respondent.
irreproachable."
This act could then be construed as repudiation of the trust. The
statute of limitation could start to set in at this point in time. But
private respondent took immediate positive action. Thus, on May 15, What this Court has ruled is binding on inferior tribunals. The lower
1990, private respondent filed an action to recover the MPC share. court, instead of exhibiting deference and respect for a decision of this
Between the time of implicit repudiation of the trust on October 9, Court, would in effect overrule the same. It did not have such a
1989, as evidenced by petitioner's letter of said date, and private power. What this Court had decreed must be obeyed. The lower
respondent's institution of the action to recover the MPC share on court's duty was plain. It failed to do it. Its decision is tainted with the
May 15, 1990, only about seven months bad lapsed. Our laws on the corrosion of substantial legal error. It cannot stand.
matter provide that actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight
years from the time the possession thereof is lot, 38 unless the
possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period In the Tio Tek Chai  decision, the opinion being penned by Justice
of four years if in good faith. 39 Since the private respondent filed the Makalintal, reference was made to the testimonial evidence of
necessary action on time and the defense of good faith is not available applicant to the effect that he had the qualifications and none of the
to the petitioner, there is no basis for any purported claim of disqualifications for naturalization. The opinion continues: "One of
prescription, after repudiation of the trust, which will entitle petitioner the facts disclosed by such evidence, and now relied upon by
to ownership of the disputed share. As correctly held by the appellant as the only ground for urging the denial of the petition, is
respondent court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said that sometime in 1956, petitioner was charged with violation of the
share to the nominee of private respondent. Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71) and upon his plea of guilty was
sentenced to pay a fine of P10.00. Petitioner tried to minimize the
significance of that conviction as follows: that he was the owner of a
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. bakery, from which he was deriving his income; that one day in 1956
The Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 19, 1994, is his storekeeper cleaned the showcase in his establishment where
AFFIRMED. COSTS against petitioner. SO ORDERED. different kinds of bread and biscuit were displayed; that the
storekeeper failed to replace the price tag pertaining to one of them rightfully insistent on the rigorous observance of each and every
and a policeman noticed the omission; and that although petitioner requisite indispensable for the acquisition of citizenship. Such should
was not in the bakery at the time he nevertheless owned the violation, be the case if the boon of nationality which is the basis of political
preferring the fine to the trouble of defending himself in a litigation." rights is to be accorded only to those who, by their exemplary
behavior and conduct, have earned the title-deed to membership in
our political community.
It goes on to refer to the "considerable discussion in the briefs as to
whether or not the offense of which petitioner was convicted"
involves moral turpitude. Petitioner was sustained by the Court below The applicant in this case failed to live up to such a rigorous standard.
in his view that it does not, but the Solicitor General maintained the Hence, his petition ought to have been denied.
contrary. This Court, in the Tio Tek Chai decision, ruled that "the
point is of no decisive importance." It explained why: "Conviction of
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court naturalizing petitioner
a crime involving moral turpitude is one of the grounds upon which
Fong Choy, also known as Carlos Yee, is reversed. Costs against
an alien is absolutely disqualified from becoming naturalized as a
petitioner.
Filipino citizen, according to Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended). However, it is not
enough that an applicant be not disqualified under said provision; it is G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
also required that he be possessed of the qualifications enumerated in
Section 2. And among those qualifications is that he must have
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
vs.
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living."
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Moreover, in that case, the explanation that the plea of guilt was
inspired, presumably "for convenience as businessmen in general
desire to devote all their time to their business rather than to waste Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
[it]," in lawsuits failed to satisfy this Tribunal. Thus, according to the
concluding paragraph of the Tio Tek Chai opinion: "Republic Act No.
71, as amended by Republic Act No. 1074, provides that all articles of ANTONIO, J.:p
commerce and trade offered for sale to the public at retail shall be
publicly displayed with appropriate tags or labels to indicate the price Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
of each article and that said articles shall be sold uniformly and (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
without discrimination at the stated prices. The absence of price tags accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
could obviously serve as a means to facilitate profiteering; and the Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
law was enacted precisely to protect the buying public therefrom. ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
Violation of this law by petitioner certainly renders his conduct imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
anything but proper and irreproachable. The explanation given by him issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application
— that he pleaded guilty simply to avoid a troublesome court of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
proceeding — deserves little credence; and if true at all betrays a lack
of faith in the administration of justice in this country that is unseemly
in one desiring to become a citizen." So it ought to have been in this The complaint filed against the accused reads:
case.
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964,
That is all that needs be said concerning this appeal of the Republic in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,
which, as above pointed out, must be given a favorable response. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession,
One other point. The lower court apparently was satisfied with the custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made
explanation that while petitioner saw to it that the articles he was with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first
selling were properly tagged, "it so happened that the tag of a certain securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
article fell, and when the inspector came, the tag was not on the
article." 4
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea
of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.
Off-hand, such an explanation appears to strain the limits of human
credulity, but, of course, some minds are more credulous than others.
Such a version could, without implausibility, be looked upon as The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
indicative of applicant's ingenuity, apparently taxed to the utmost, to possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
explain the inexplicable and excuse the inexcusable. It could have complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
been inspired by an awareness that unless he could offer some sort of claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no
a justification, however lame, the obstacle to the grant of citizenship license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
was insuperable. Hence such a version. Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
Truth may be stranger than fiction, but it would not be safe rule to firearm in question.
consider as the test of veracity the improbability of what is asserted.
The unbelievable as such, can, more often than not, hardly claim
kinship with the truth. The lower court apparently was of a different Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned
mind. That is no guaranty of the correctness of its conclusion. Far officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor
from it. Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Even if there were no binding Tio Tek Chai ruling therefore, the lower Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting
court ought to have been less generous in its indiscriminate that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in
acceptance of explanations of such character. It ought to have shown the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas,
greater awareness of the trend of decisions of this Tribunal, which is especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use
of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the
AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine
such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained
officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a
month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic
shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached
cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R.
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to
parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic
bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection
Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides
with the performance of your duties.
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
thereof with us lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are
not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
(Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret
SN: — 64 agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .
Cal:— .22

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter
to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang  (1959)
loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole
connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
while in the performance of his duties. stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal
above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential of the appealed judgment.
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes
accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" —
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of
Agent. the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of
the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm society.
and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the
Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized
provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised done was held not to be punishable.
Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to
the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and significance of that conviction as follows: that he was the owner of a
appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio. bakery, from which he was deriving his income; that one day in 1956
his storekeeper cleaned the showcase in his establishment where
different kinds of bread and biscuit were displayed; that the
G.R. No. L-24687             September 21, 1968
storekeeper failed to replace the price tag pertaining to one of them
and a policeman noticed the omission; and that although petitioner
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A was not in the bakery at the time he nevertheless owned the violation,
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FONG CHOY, also known as preferring the fine to the trouble of defending himself in a litigation."
CARLOS YEE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
It goes on to refer to the "considerable discussion in the briefs as to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
whether or not the offense of which petitioner was convicted"
involves moral turpitude. Petitioner was sustained by the Court below
Jose A. Uy for petitioner-appellee. in his view that it does not, but the Solicitor General maintained the
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant. contrary. This Court, in the Tio Tek Chai decision, ruled that "the
point is of no decisive importance." It explained why: "Conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude is one of the grounds upon which
FERNANDO, J.: an alien is absolutely disqualified from becoming naturalized as a
Filipino citizen, according to Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
The question presented in this appeal from a grant of citizenship is Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended). However, it is not
whether an applicant, who previously pleaded guilty to an indictment enough that an applicant be not disqualified under said provision; it is
for the violation of the Price Tag Law, had nonetheless successfully also required that he be possessed of the qualifications enumerated in
hurdled the barrier rightfully interposed to weed out undesirables and Section 2. And among those qualifications is that he must have
to bestow citizenship only on the deserving. The lower court, the Hon. conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
Francisco Geronimo presiding, answered in the affirmative. As the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
correct response ought to have been anything but that, we reverse the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
lower court. living."

In the statement of facts in the brief for the Republic as appellant, Moreover, in that case, the explanation that the plea of guilt was
there being an acceptance of what was set forth therein in petitioner- inspired, presumably "for convenience as businessmen in general
appellee's brief, 1 it was expressly set forth: "During the hearing, the desire to devote all their time to their business rather than to waste
petitioner admitted that he was fined P25.00 for violation of the Price [it]," in lawsuits failed to satisfy this Tribunal. Thus, according to the
Tag Law. He explained that at that time all the articles he was selling concluding paragraph of the Tio Tek Chai opinion: "Republic Act No.
were properly tagged as to its prices, but it so happened that the tag of 71, as amended by Republic Act No. 1074, provides that all articles of
a certain article fell and when the inspector came the tag was not on commerce and trade offered for sale to the public at retail shall be
the article. In order to avoid any more discussion, he paid the publicly displayed with appropriate tags or labels to indicate the price
fine. ... ." 2 of each article and that said articles shall be sold uniformly and
without discrimination at the stated prices. The absence of price tags
could obviously serve as a means to facilitate profiteering; and the
The above admission notwithstanding, there being an opposition to law was enacted precisely to protect the buying public therefrom.
the petition filed by the Republic as to his failure to conduct himself Violation of this law by petitioner certainly renders his conduct
in a proper and irreproachable manner as shown by such violation of anything but proper and irreproachable. The explanation given by him
the Price Tag Law, the lower court, on March 24, 1965, rendered a — that he pleaded guilty simply to avoid a troublesome court
decision to the effect that there was no impediment to applicant Fong proceeding — deserves little credence; and if true at all betrays a lack
Choy's naturalization. It was held that he was possessed of all the of faith in the administration of justice in this country that is unseemly
qualifications required by law and none of the disqualifications in one desiring to become a citizen." So it ought to have been in this
specified therein, thus entitling him to the grant of Filipino case.
citizenship. The Republic appealed.1awphîl.nèt

That is all that needs be said concerning this appeal of the Republic
We sustain the appeal and reverse the lower court. Its rather generous which, as above pointed out, must be given a favorable response.
frame of mind in considering this application for citizenship,
manifested in the decision appealed from, finds no support in the law.
The decision was rendered on March 24, 1965. Approximately five One other point. The lower court apparently was satisfied with the
months previously, on October 30, 1964, in Tio Tek Chai v. explanation that while petitioner saw to it that the articles he was
Republic,  3 this Court held that violation of the Price Tag Law selling were properly tagged, "it so happened that the tag of a certain
"certainly renders [petitioner's] conduct anything but proper and article fell, and when the inspector came, the tag was not on the
irreproachable." article." 4

What this Court has ruled is binding on inferior tribunals. The lower Off-hand, such an explanation appears to strain the limits of human
court, instead of exhibiting deference and respect for a decision of this credulity, but, of course, some minds are more credulous than others.
Court, would in effect overrule the same. It did not have such a Such a version could, without implausibility, be looked upon as
power. What this Court had decreed must be obeyed. The lower indicative of applicant's ingenuity, apparently taxed to the utmost, to
court's duty was plain. It failed to do it. Its decision is tainted with the explain the inexplicable and excuse the inexcusable. It could have
corrosion of substantial legal error. It cannot stand. been inspired by an awareness that unless he could offer some sort of
a justification, however lame, the obstacle to the grant of citizenship
was insuperable. Hence such a version.
In the Tio Tek Chai decision, the opinion being penned by Justice
Makalintal, reference was made to the testimonial evidence of
applicant to the effect that he had the qualifications and none of the Truth may be stranger than fiction, but it would not be safe rule to
disqualifications for naturalization. The opinion continues: "One of consider as the test of veracity the improbability of what is asserted.
the facts disclosed by such evidence, and now relied upon by The unbelievable as such, can, more often than not, hardly claim
appellant as the only ground for urging the denial of the petition, is kinship with the truth. The lower court apparently was of a different
that sometime in 1956, petitioner was charged with violation of the mind. That is no guaranty of the correctness of its conclusion. Far
Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71) and upon his plea of guilty was from it.
sentenced to pay a fine of P10.00. Petitioner tried to minimize the
Even if there were no binding Tio Tek Chai ruling therefore, the lower the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases
court ought to have been less generous in its indiscriminate cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.[5]
acceptance of explanations of such character. It ought to have shown
greater awareness of the trend of decisions of this Tribunal, which is
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order[6]cralaw dated
rightfully insistent on the rigorous observance of each and every
September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
requisite indispensable for the acquisition of citizenship. Such should
case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the
be the case if the boon of nationality which is the basis of political
penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.
rights is to be accorded only to those who, by their exemplary [7]
cralaw Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the
behavior and conduct, have earned the title-deed to membership in
Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for
our political community.
clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August
9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly
The applicant in this case failed to live up to such a rigorous standard. recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the
Hence, his petition ought to have been denied. Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court naturalizing petitioner The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec.
Fong Choy, also known as Carlos Yee, is reversed. Costs against 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under
petitioner. the Information.[8]cralawPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[9]
cralaw which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.
[10]
cralaw
G.R. No. 163586 : January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. MERLIN Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the latter
DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch dismissed the petition in the Decision under review. Petitioners
65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its motion for reconsideration[12] was also denied.
Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following: 

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 1.   Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the
22, 2003 Decision[1]cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) which Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this
Resolution[2]cralaw which denied the motion for reconsideration. Supreme Courts ruling in the First Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case, which
declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to
The facts are of record. cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2.   Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme
Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the
Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as accused to due process.[13]
follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August
9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior
on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case,
thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras,
the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of
investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such,
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999
was in the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of
Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision
P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her
was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by
case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the
for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and
offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position,
prosecutorial powers over the case.
with deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take,
The petition lacks merit. 
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and
benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,
made upon her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, [14]
cralaw  wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9,
to the damage and prejudice of the government.
1999 Decision of the Court in Uy[15]cralaw in a motion to dismiss the
11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the
CONTRARY TO LAW. Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon
petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and
held:
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16,
2001.
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same
resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Sandiganbayan. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her
salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and
the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4]cralaw petitioner further
held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not
argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the
only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular
investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by
courts. It held: 
 assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the must, therefore, be set aside.
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the
and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the
any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to
issue.
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed.[17]
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
Petitioner is grasping at straws. 
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
Ombudsman to such cases. 
interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing
one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction
of that law.[18] Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such
in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of
primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at
the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989. ch
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court,
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other
recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression
courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction
of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation,
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with
has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the
the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its
committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman
application.[19]cralaw But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine
are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during
incorporated at the moment of its legislation.[20]cralaw
their tenure of office. 

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not

be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under
Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in
where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach
him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows petitioner. 
him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and
6770. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary academic.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) No costs.
against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur
even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the SO ORDERED. 
regular prosecutors. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional G.R. No. 187451               August 29, 2012
Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON
and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
same. (Emphasis supplied) vs.
JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,
[16]
cralaw in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC
dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the DECISION
Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, given the
Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial courts MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse occupying the said lot and, introducing permanent improvements
and set aside the February 25, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals thereon since 1960.
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72613, reversing and setting aside the
February 19, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
The RTC Ruling
Isabela, Basi Ian (RTC), in Civil Case No. 685-627, an action for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary
Injunction." The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring
Virtucio. The decretal portion of which reads:
The Facts
WHEREFORE, upon the merit of this case, this court finds for the
plaintiff and against the defendant by:
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application
No. V-33203 (E-V-49150) for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land
situated in Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan in 1949. His application was 1. Ordering the defendant and all those acting in his behalf to vacate
approved on January 23, 1952.3 In 1955, however, the land was Lot No. 140, Pls-19, located at Lower Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan and
subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140, Pls-19 - as surrender the possession and ownership thereof to plaintiff;
a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to
Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio), who filed Homestead Application No.
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Fifteen
18-4493 (E-18-2958). Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Thousand Pesos (₱ 15,000.00) as attorney's fees and another Ten
Virtucio (Virtucio), who filed Homestead Application No. 18-4421
Thousand Pesos (₱ 10,000.00) as expenses for litigation; and
(E-18-2924).4

3. To pay the cost of the suit in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and
(₱500.00).
Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole
area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140.5
SO ORDERED.12
On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision
denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to Not in conformity, Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.
exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The
applications of Custodio and Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140,
respectively, were likewise given due course.6 The CA Ruling

Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural On February 25, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision declaring
Resources, who dismissed his appeal on July 28, 1967. He then Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140, Pls-19, thereby reversing and
sought relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however, setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Alegarbes
affirmed the dismissal order of the Secretary of Agriculture and became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain
Natural Resources in a decision, dated October 25, 1974. Alegarbes possession of it.
moved for a reconsideration, but the motion was subsequently
denied.7 Consequently, the awards of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit were deleted.
On May 11, 1989, an order of execution 8 was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural In so ruling, the CA explained that even if the decision to approve
Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes and Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
all those acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused. Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.
The decisions on the issues of the approval of Virtucio's homestead
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint 9 for application and its validity were impertinent as Alegarbes had earlier
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot 140 which he claimed by
before the RTC. virtue of adverse possession.

In his Answer,10 Alegarbes claimed that the decision of the Bureau of The CA also found reversible error on the part of the RTC in
Lands was void ab initio considering that the Acting Director of disregarding the evidence before it and relying entirely upon the
Lands acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the provisions of decisions of the administrative bodies, none of which touched upon
the Public Land Act. Alegarbes argued that the said decision the issue of Alegarbes' open, continuous and exclusive possession of
conferred no rights and imposed no duties and left the parties in the over thirty (30) years of an alienable land. The CA held that the
same position as they were before its issuance. He further alleged that Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
the patent issued in favor of Virtucio was procured through fraud and and the OP did not determine whether Alegarbes' possession of the
deceit, thus, void ab initio. subject property had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of
public land and, thus, was beyond their jurisdiction.

Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative

defenses, that the approval of his homestead application on January Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition.
23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and
could not be reversed, modified or set aside. His possession of Lot ISSUES
Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and
uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and
had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription. Virtucio assigned the following errors in seeking the reversal of the
assailed decision of the CA, to wit:

In his Amended and Supplemental Answer,11 Alegarbes also averred

that his now deceased brother, Alejandro Alegarbes, and the latter's 1. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the judgment of the
family helped him develop Lot 140 in 1955. Alejandro and his family, trial court, which awarded the lot in question to the respondent
as well as Alegarbes' wife and children, had been permanently by virtue of acquisitive prescription and ordered herein petitioner
to surrender the ownership and possession of the same to them.13
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without
decision in CA-G.R. CV-26286 for Recovery of Possession and need of title or of good faith.22
Ownership, Custodio vs. Alegarbes which contains same factual
circumstances as in this case and ruled against JOSE
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is
ALEGARBES.14
acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as
expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
3. The Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is
fees to the petitioner.15 extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse
of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139. Another
name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. 23 These two
The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired
kinds of prescription should not be interchanged.
ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.

Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of

Ruling of the Court
prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the
other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus,
The petition must fail. Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period
of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of
interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription
Indeed, it is fundamental that questions of fact are not reviewable in are natural and civil interruption.24
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in the
petition.16 Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to
the possessor.25 When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to
issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
Here, the main issue is the alleged acquisition of ownership by acquisitive prescription continues to run.
Alegarbes through acquisitive prescription and the character and
length of possession of a party over a parcel of land subject of
controversy is a factual issue.17 The Court, however, is not precluded In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against
from reviewing facts when the case falls within the recognized his homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of
exceptions, to wit: acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence, however,
dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said
period.
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,26 the
impossible; Court ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion; effective interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel,27 which also cited the
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting; Rañon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the property for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the one's name cannot defeat another's right of ownership acquired
appellant and the appellee; through acquisitive prescription.28
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
In the same vein, a protest filed before an administrative agency and
evidence on which they are based;
even the decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll the running
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
of the period of acquisitive prescription. In such an instance, no civil
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
interruption can take place. Only in cases filed before the courts may
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbesbecame
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it
different conclusion.18 [Emphasis supplied]
because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over
In the case at bench, the findings and conclusions of the CA are
thirty (30) years of alienable public land.Virtucio emphasizes that the
apparently contrary to those of the RTC, hence, the need to review the
CA erred in disregarding the decisions of the administrative agencies
facts in order to arrive at the proper conclusion.
which amended Alegarbes' homestead application excluding Lot 140
and gave due course to his own application for the said lot, which
On Acquisitive Prescription decisions were affirmed by the RTC.

Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are
interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the entitled to great weight and respect on appeal and, in fact, are
protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the
course to his homestead application and that of Ulpiano Custodio. record.29 It appears, however, that the conclusion made by the RTC
Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands was not substantially supported. Even the RTC itself noted in its
were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot. decision:
Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in
Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.19
The approval of a Homestead Application merely authorizes the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he could comply with
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, the requirements prescribed by law before a final patent could be
provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through issued in his favor – what divests the government of title to the land is
the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by the issuance of a patent and its subsequent registration with the
law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may Register of Deeds.30
either be ordinary or extraordinary.20 Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a
A perusal of the records would reveal that there was no issuance of
period of ten years,21 while extraordinary acquisitive prescription
any patent in favor of either parties. This simply means that the land
subject of the controversy remains to be in the name of the State. Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish
Hence, neither Virtucio nor Alegarbes can claim ownership. There judicial precedent.40 "The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence
was, therefore, no substantial and legal basis for the RTC to declare by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
that Virtucio was entitled to possession and ownership of Lot 140. decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. "41
It can be argued that the lower court had the decisions of the
administrative agencies, which ultimately attained finality, as legal
bases in ruling that Virtucio had the right of possession and The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's
ownership. In fact, the Department of Environment and Natural insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to disregard its earlier
Resources (DENR) even issued the Order of Execution 31 on May 11, decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to
1989 ordering Alegarbes to vacate Lot 140 and place Virtucio in adhere to that decision by invoking the stare decisis principle, which
peaceful possession of it. The CA, however, was correct in finding is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are
that: considered precedents.42

But appellant had earlier put in issue the matter of ownership of Lot In view of the foregoing, the Court need not dwell on the complaint of
140 which he claims by virtue of adverse possession. On this issue, Virtucio with regard to the deletion of the award of attorney's fees in
the cited decisions are impertinent. Even if the decision to approve his favor. It is ludicrous for the CA to order Alegarbes to pay
appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, attorney's fees, as a measure of damages, and costs, after finding him
appellant could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.32 to have acquired ownership over the property by acquisitive
prescription.
In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando, 33 the Court ruled
that the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the required
period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for.34 It
SO ORDERED.
likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon 35 and Pineda v. CA,36 where
the Court ruled that the possession of a parcel of agricultural land of
the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure G.R. No. 166562               March 31, 2009
converts the lot into private property.37
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as TING, Respondent.
1949. He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR
NACHURA, J.:
issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his
possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed
the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
possession of the subject property for forty-eight (48) years. November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
The CA correctly observed that the RTC erred in disregarding the
affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
evidence before it and relying entirely upon the decisions of the
(RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article
and the OP, which never touched the issue of whether Alegarbes’
36 of the Family Code.4
open, continuous and exclusive possession of over thirty (30) years of
alienable land had ipso jure segregated Lot 140 from the mass of
public land and beyond the jurisdiction of these agencies.38 The facts follow.

When the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in relying on the Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-
abovementioned decisions, it merely recognized the primary Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
jurisdiction of these administrative agencies. It was of the view that medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26,
the RTC was not correct in the other aspects of the case. Thus, it 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their
declared Alegarbes as owner ipso jure of Lot 140 and entitled to first child.
retain possession of it. There is no reason for the Court to disturb
these findings of the CA as they were supported by substantial
evidence, hence, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.39 At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay,
Mandaue City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided
to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975,
On the CA Decision involving a similar case Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter
proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but
shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision
completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980,
in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for Recovery of
he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as
Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual
member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s
circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.
Treasurer.11

It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December
allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was not a party to that case.
9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on
The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment
April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles
may have had just because it involved similar factual circumstances.
Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive
1991.12
prescription in that case was effectively interrupted by Custodio's
filing of a complaint, which is wanting in this case.
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking
the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a
with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the
and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in
with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive
Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert
witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the
financial support to their family and would even get angry at her psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr.
and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. 17 He rarely Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with
stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19 petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with
his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive
gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times a week and would On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring
borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The
had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made
jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive
gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-
after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect
gambling establishments.23 existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
xxxx
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and
regular drinking; SO ORDERED.37

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the
found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted
inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support
longer had money to pay the same; and the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the
time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24
of Appeals and Molina.41

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated.

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would
that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the
confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic
Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more
clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. 42 She
leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked
claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.
financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would
Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having
collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still
been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a
serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony,
manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support
the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted,
within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at
respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a
respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on
Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often
directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to
first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47 cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare
decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
Hence, this petition.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
For our resolution are the following issues: decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases; in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
and departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what
petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on
and jurisprudence. judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice
Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this
We find merit in the petition. Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance
I. On the issue of stare decisis. reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
courts' limited resources.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings;
Code.51 (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. with them.
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion
on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening: the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy
the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme
century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public
decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision." reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law
are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration,
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
"disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal
with for over two centuries." The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
justification.53 provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines
a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the
for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
pre-trial conference.60
The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained
that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, petition for nullity of marriage.
non respicit."
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
doctrine. husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate
We have not.
court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we
declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket,
and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must
forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity,
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about
no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57
to assume.621avvphi1.zw+

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were
is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner
of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best,
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 59 The parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate
the proceedings. testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a
personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo
greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing
Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did,
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
interview with Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking
the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife.
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court
10-SC), viz.:
finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In
this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on

certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision
and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.