Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B Guevara, Jose M Aruego, Sotero H Laurel Felixberto M Serrano, Solicitor General
Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B Guevara, Jose M Aruego, Sotero H Laurel Felixberto M Serrano, Solicitor General
Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B Guevara, Jose M Aruego, Sotero H Laurel Felixberto M Serrano, Solicitor General
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H . Laurel and Felixberto M.
Serrano, for petitioners.
Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REGALA , J : p
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the
elective of cials of both Houses (of Congress). The suit was instituted by the Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-pro t, civic organization, duly
incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing of cers of
both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning
the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member
of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic
Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing of cers of the House
and Senate, respectively, and their successors in of ce from paying the said retirement
and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for
the retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is
unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on
the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain of cers of
Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of Section
21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
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2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of of ce, contrary to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "sel sh class legislation" because it
allows members and of cers of Congress to retire after twelve (12)
years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year
salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other of cers
and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
(20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent
to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, can
not exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
"AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
'Elective or appointive of cials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection
shall be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based
on the highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the time of
retirement."
"SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Solicitor General's Of ce, in representation of the respondents, led its answer on
September 8, 1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension bene ts under Republic Act No. 3836
to the of cers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
"forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article
VI of the Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question suf ciently complies with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."
3. The law in question does not constitute class legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, speci cally the elected of cers of
Congress who are authorized to approve vouchers for payments for
funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to
be presented for payment under said items, were not included in the
petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave bene ts under the
said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity
due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836.
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by
Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third
District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee on
Civil Service, which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129,
recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word
"TWENTY" in the bill as led — representing the number of years that a senator or member
must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under the bill — must be reduced to
"TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME
(referring to GRATUITY) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
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NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF
REINSTATEMENT OR RE-ELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the
proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading
on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23,
1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was nally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others —
"The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 C. A. 186, as
amended, will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a
minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the
security of the family of the retiring member of Congress without the latter
engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted position and
usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his
loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve
their people in Congress."
As nally approved, the law (subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a
Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective of cer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must have
served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of
Representatives. For an elective of cer of either House, he must have served the
government for at least twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been
rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the employer or office concerned
is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said
gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable
in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point — personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The rst point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute
this action. This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter.
This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of
substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to
bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales
v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 ([1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-pro t, civic organization composed of several
leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the
Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court
stated, among other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the
taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the
expenditures of public funds by an of cer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined
at the request of the taxpayers." 1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the
disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
". . . the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is
very different. His interest in the money of the Treasury — partly realized from
taxation and partly from other sources — is shared with millions of others; is
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comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of
any payment out of the funds, so remote, uctuating and uncertain, that no basis
is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity "
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American
Jurisprudence, thus —
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have suf cient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditures of public
moneys." (II Am. Jur. emphasis supplied)
As far as the rst point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the
Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point — Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the
prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of the
Constitution.
The rst constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article
VI, of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." (Emphasis
supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some
limitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other of ce or employment in the Government
without forfeiting their respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to
any civil of ce which may have been created or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased while they were members of
Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an
adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
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6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an of cer or
employee of the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI,
Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits
members of Congress to have any special interest in any speci c business which will
directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authorized by them during their
term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with
these limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical
demonstration or application of the principle of checks and balance which is one of the
peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We
conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement bene ts
to its members, without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section
14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation as including other
emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly
(unicameral body) was xed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per
annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral
body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act
4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for
each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is signi cant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention rst
determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount xed by it was
only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of
the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the
Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p.
187)
This goes to show how, zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in
guarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries.
However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the
Constitutional amendments were approved in 1940. 2
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental
question as to whether the retirement bene t as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall
within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the pro t
arising from of ce or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or
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which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." 3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been de ned as "the pro t arising from of ce or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to
the possession of of ce, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain public or private.
The gain, pro t or advantage which is contemplated in the de nition or signi cance of the
word "emolument" as applied to public of cers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain,
pro t, or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon
County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 901, 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767).
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright vs. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391,
af rmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement
allowances are part of compensation of public of cials ; otherwise their payment would be
unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N. W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in
Article 4, section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or
Representative shall hold any of ce, the emoluments of which have been increased during
the session of the Legislature of which he was member, until after the expiration of his
term of of ce in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the xed salary
alone, but includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the of ce is by law entitled
to receive because he holds such of ce and performed some service required of the
occupant thereof ."
From the decisions of this cases, it is evident that retirement bene t is a form or another
species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was
on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point — Whether or not the law in question violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said
Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. (Art III, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
In the rst place, while the said law grants retirement bene ts to Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives who are elective of cials, it does not include other
elective of cials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial
boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
The principles of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully
explained by Us in the case of People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where we stated that the
classi cation to be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make
real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition) p.
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1937, the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons
similarly situated. Why limit the application of the bene ts of Republic Act 3836 to the
elected members of Congress? We feel that the classi cation here is not reasonable. (See
also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law
[1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement bene ts
after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government of cers
and employees are given retirement bene ts after serving for at least twenty years. In fact,
the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government of cers and employees are given only one retirement
bene ts irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic
Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement bene ts
or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement bene ts (annuity) to an employee who had been
retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth
Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement bene ts to of cials who are
not members of the Government Service Insurance System. Lost grantees of retirement
bene ts under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute
a portion of their monthly salaries to the system. 4
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far
as Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected of cers of
each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836,
the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the bene ts of retirement
without having served for twenty years as required with other of cers and employees of
the Government.
Fourth Legal Point — Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is
germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836
complies with the requirement of paragraph 1 section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to
construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act,
liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or
notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable
vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner
learned of this law for the rst time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing of cer of the
House, testi ed on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the
hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for
its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the scal year 1964-1965, Republic Act No.
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4164, provides:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this
Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until approved claims shall
have been paid — P210,000.000.
In the appropriation for the House of Representatives, the following items appear:
"7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of
Members and employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under
Republic Act No. 1616 — P1,300,000.00
"8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick
leaves as provided for under Republic Act. No. 611, and retirement gratuities of
Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.
1616 — P1,300,000.00."
In the Appropriations Act of 1965 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item
appears in the appropriations for the Senate:
"13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED. That no portion of this
appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall
have been paid — P100,000.00."
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for
P210,000.00 to implement Republic Act 3836, was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966) the following items appear:
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the rst paragraph of section
12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 660 and
3096, the retirement bene ts are granted to members of the Government Service
Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of
Congress and to elective of cers thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement bene ts, therefore, for these of cials, would
relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other
words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement bene ts for Members of Congress
and elected of cers, such as the Secretary and Sergeant-at-arms for each House) is not
related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the
Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and
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insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an
act should be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise
or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of
being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965]
p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
"The Constitutional requirements with respect to titles of statutes as suf cient to
re ect their contents is satis ed if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of
the content." (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
"The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the
enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than
technical, construction. It should be a suf cient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the
statute are germane to that general subject." (Sumulong v. The Commission on
Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated
and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was
whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its
application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to
agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to
lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural
lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the
subject matter of an Act in its title, is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to
Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not
conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676;
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of
said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation
of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: rst, the pr
prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal
protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more
than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared
null and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the
elected of cials thereof, as being-unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our
resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C . J ., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar, JJ ., concur.
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Footnotes
1. Kubbs v. Thompson, 56 N.E. 2d 761; Reid v. Smith, 375 III. 147, 30 N.E. 2d 908; Fergus v.
Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130; Burke v. Snively, 208 Ill. 328; Jones v. Connel, 266 Ill.
443,107 N.E. 731; Dudick v. Baumann, 349 Ill. 46, 181 N.E. 690.
4. In the case of Justices of the Supreme Court, Justices of the Court of Appeals, Judges of
courts of record — all contribute a certain amount to the GSIS, although under a different
plan of premiums from other members (See R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1057
and 2614).
In the case of the Armed Forces, of cers and enlisted men are also members of the System,
but their retirement benefits are provided for under R.A 340.
However, the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections
are entitled to retirement bene ts, under R.A. 1568, notwithstanding the fact that they are
not members of the System, provided they have at least 20 years of service.