China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 159

China’s Peaceful Rise

and Sino-Indian Relations

Zhang Guihong

China and India rank among the world’s largest developing nations, fastest growing economies, most
populous states, and greatest ancient civilisations. But most importantly, they are among the foremost
rising powers in Asia. In the past quarter of century, both China and India’s productive forces and
overall national strength have been constantly enhanced, which are now widely perceived as ‘the rise
of China’ 1 and ‘the emerging India’ (see, for example Cohen 2001; Ma 2002). The rise of China has
to be grasped not only in terms of the past (when the Chinese people stood up, became enriched and
strengthened under the first, second and third generation of leaders, respectively), but also in terms of
the present and future (of a ‘peaceful rise’ under the new generations of leaders and in the wake of
globalisation). Fifty years ago, Beijing and New Delhi jointly proposed ‘Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence’ (known as Panchsheel in India) to guide bilateral relations between the two newly
independent countries. However, the Sino-Indian relationship has experienced an up-and-down process
since then, and the resolution of bilateral issues and the establishment of mutual trust still have a long
way to go. Therefore, it is extremely necessary to reiterate and materialise Panchsheel, especially in
the context of the simultaneous rise of China and India in Asia.

‘CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE’: INTRODUCTION

Beginning in late 2003, Chinese political leaders and eminent scholars began
promoting the notion of ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi) as the development road and
the strategic choice for China in the decades to come, arguing that China will rise to
international prominence as a responsible and peaceful power, not threatening either
its Asian neighbours or the United States. Since then, China’s peaceful rise has been
widely and even heatedly debated in China and the world at large. Since late April
2004, however, the ‘peaceful rise’ debate has considerably declined. It is necessary,
however, to examine the implications and future role of a rising China in Asia.
1
China’s annual economic growth rate in the past twenty-five years (1978-2003) was 9.4 per cent.
China’s gross domestic products (GDP) increased from $147.3 billion in 1978 to $1.4 trillion in 2003.
China’s foreign trade volume and foreign exchange reserves expanded from $20.6 billion and $167
million in 1978 to $851.2 billion and $403.3 billion in 2003, respectively. At present, China’s economy
is ranked sixth and its foreign trade is ranked fourth in the world.

CHINA REPORT 41 : 2 (2005)

Sage Publications New Delhi/ Thousand Oaks/London
DOI: 10.1177/000944550504100204
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
160 Zhang Guihong

It is widely accepted that the term ‘peaceful rise’ was first introduced by Zheng
Bijian, former vice president of Central Party School (CPS) of the Chinese Communist
Party (CPC) and current Chairman of China Reform and Opening-up Forum (CRF),
who addressed a speech ‘A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia’
at the annual conference of Bo’ao Forum for Asia (BFA) on 3 November 2003. He
said:

In the 25 years since the inception of its reform and opening up, China has blazed
a new strategic path that not only suits its national conditions but also conforms
to the tide of the times. This new strategic path is China’s peaceful rise through
independently building socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating
in rather than detaching from economic globalization. (Zheng 2003)

Later, in his speech ‘Turning Your Eyes to China’ delivered at Harvard University on
10 December 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao expounded on China’s development road to
peaceful rise. He told his audience:

China today is a country in reform and opening-up and a rising power dedicated
to peace. It is neither proper nor possible for us to rely on foreign countries for de-
velopment …. [W]hile opening still wider to the outside world, we must more
fully and more consciously depend on our own structural innovation, on constantly
expanding the domestic market, on converting the huge savings of the citizens
into investment, and on improving the quality of the population and scientific
and technological progress to solve the problems of resources and the environment.
Here lies the essence of China’s road of peaceful rise and development. (Wen 2003)

Then, on 26 December 2003, at the workshop celebrating the 110th anniversary of

the birth of Comrade Mao Zedong, General Secretary and President Hu Jintao empha-
sised that China should adhere to the development road of peaceful rise and inde-
pendent foreign policy of peace. He said:

We must persist in taking the development path of peaceful rise, persist in getting
along friendly (sic) with various countries on the basis of the ‘Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence’, actively conduct exchanges and cooperation with other coun-
tries based on equality and mutual benefits and make contribution to the lofty
cause of peace and development of mankind. (Xinhua News Agency, 26 March
2004)

Chinese top-level leaders continued to use the concept on various occasions in

2004 as well. In late February, at the 10th ‘collective study’ session of the Politburo of
Central Committee, General Secretary Hu Jintao called on the whole party to ‘persist
in the development path of peaceful rise and the peaceful foreign policy of inde-
pendence and self-reliance’ (Xinhua News Agency, 26 March 2004).

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 161

On 14 March 2004, in the televised press conference during the Second Session of
the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC), Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out five
essences [yaoyi] of China’s peaceful rise:

l It would involve taking advantage of world peace to promote China’s development

and safeguarding world peace through China’s development;
l It would be based on China’s own strength and independent hard work;
l It could only be achieved by continuing the ‘opening-up policy’ and an active
set of international trade and economic exchanges;
l It would take several generations; and
l It would not stand in the way of any other countries or pose a threat to any other
country, or be achieved at the expense of any particular country (Xinhua News
Agency, 14 March 2004).

The above selections from the speeches and talks delivered by Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao, the new generation of leadership, provided the concept a great deal of impetus.
The ‘theory of China’s peaceful rise’ was also warmly discussed among the academia
from north to south China in the following months. For example, in March, first in
Beijing, Renmin University of China (RUC) initiated a seminar on ‘China’s Peaceful
Rise: International Environment and International Strategy’. Subsequently, the
Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), the only province-level think tank
in international studies in China, sponsored a seminar on ‘China’s Peaceful Rise Strat-
egy: Theory and Implications’. Around fifty strategists and analysts from top think
tanks and universities in China participated in the seminars, focusing on issues like
the background, prospects, theoretical dimensions and international order and con-
cepts, such as peaceful unification, etc., associated with China’s peaceful rise. In April
2004, during its annual conference, the BFA hosted a round table, the topic of which
was ‘China’s Peaceful Rise and Economic Globalization’. This conference attracted
some of the world’s major leaders and CEOs to Bo’ao, a small town in Hainan Island
located in south China.
Meanwhile, some renowned scholars published articles in journals and on the
internet to look at the theoretical and other aspects of this concept. While a few young
scholars referred to China’s peaceful rise as a (national and international) strategy
(see, for example Peng 2004; Dong 2004), others raised doubts (Shi 2004; Shi and Si
2004). Two other scholars wrote, ‘If Taiwan separatist elements go for “Taiwan
independence”, if foreign forces represented by the United States interfere in China’s
unification, China will not be able to “rise peacefully”’ (Chen and Xin, ‘Is Peaceful
Rise Possible?’). An American observer noted that,

Many Chinese scholars and analysts questioned the meaning and accuracy of the
new expression …. Many opposed the use of the term ‘rise’ arguing that China is
not rising and will not rise given the myriad of economic and social problems

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
162 Zhang Guihong

complicating its transition from a planned to a market economy. They argued it is

too early to talk about rising …. Others objected to the use of ‘rise’ because it
connotes a China-led ‘power transition’ in the region and possibly the emergence
of a new power center in Asia …. Furthermore…this new strategy would send the
wrong signal to Taiwan during a highly unstable period. (Medeiros 2004)

People are also aware that China’s political leaders have begun to use ‘peaceful
development’ instead of ‘peaceful rise’ since late April and early May 2004. Addressing
the 2004 annual conference of the BFA on 24 April 2004, President Hu Jintao in his
keynote speech titled ‘China’s development is an opportunity for Asia’, mentioned
‘peace and stability’, ‘peace and security’, and ‘peaceful coexistence’, but not ‘peaceful
rise’ (Hu 2004). Two days later when Vice President Zeng Qinghong made a speech
to the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, he also repeated
the words ‘peace and development’ but omitted to use the term ‘peaceful rise’ (Zheng
2004). One foreign observer explained this change as follows:

First and most obvious is … the principal flaw in the idea that China can accomplish
a transition to global-power status in a peaceful manner (is): the need to maintain
the threat, and perhaps the necessity of acting on the threat, of using force to
prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. Second, the theory itself did seem
somewhat rushed and incomplete. The third cause for the rise and fall of peaceful
rise is somewhat more troubling. The peaceful rise theory may have been part of
an effort to establish a policy foothold on … the formulations of China’s foreign
and security policy. (Suettinger 2004)

Nonetheless, China’s peaceful rise continues to be a subject of academic discussion

(Men 2004; Peng 2004; Ruan 2004; Yan 2004; Zhang 2004). The CRF and the US
Rand Corporation co-sponsored the 7th Annual Conference on ‘China’s Peaceful
Rise and Sino-American Relations’ in Beijing in August 2004. More than sixty prom-
inent Chinese and American scholars, diplomats, and leaders from the business
community attended the conference.
The evolution of the debate on the ‘peaceful rise’ indicates that, either as a concept,
strategy or theory, ‘peaceful rise’ is as yet in its initial, and one may say, superficial, level
of discussion and needs deeper exploration. For example, how does one examine the
linkage between ‘peace’ and ‘rise’? There are at least three dimensions: first, ‘rise by
peace’ which means that China’s rise depends on internal stability, regional tranquillity
and world peace; second, ‘rise of peace’ which requires China as a peaceful power to
play a more active, responsible, constructive and creative role in world peace and de-
velopment; and third, ‘rise for peace’ which implies that peace is more a goal than a
means of China’s rise. A rising China should be a peace constructor rather than a de-
structor. All these issues are yet to be addressed from the perspective of both theory
and reality by Chinese scholars.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 163

IMPLICATIONS FOR SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS:

FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION

There are both optimistic and pessimistic predictions for ‘China’s rise’ in India. One
observer described three scenarios in the evolution of China’s future: weak China
(2004–15), which lacks the requisite power potential to meaningfully challenge the
US power and policies; normal China (2015–30), which will complete peaceful
transition from state socialism to market economy and thus be full of confidence;
and a regionally strong China (2020–30), in quest for hegemony (Sahgal 2004).
Another view lists three possible scenarios regarding China’s mid to long-range
future:

l In spite of some internal and external challenges, China will continue to enhance
its national power as a rapidly modernising and reformist one-party state, that is,
increasingly integrated globally and regionally and would be in general, a factor
of stability in Asia. This could lead to pressures for political reforms within
China, and moves towards a pluralist and multi-party future;
l A possible breakdown of the party-state system in China, however, could lead
to renewed political turbulence, especially, if economic growth rates decline and
socio-economic problems become acute. China’s modernisation and search for
power in turn would be compromised; and
l ‘[A]n authoritarian, internally uneasy, but increasingly powerful and assertive
China is also one of the potential scenarios. Of these, the first scenario is likely
to hold for the coming years, especially with China’s increasing dependence on
global trade and investment, and such major events as the 2008 Olympics on
the table’ (Dutta 2004).

In an earlier study, he had argued,

Sino-Indian relations could become increasingly competitive or even confron-

tational if China begins to pursue its major territorial claims against India, if its
commitment towards détente and peaceful resolution of disputes over sovereignty
diminishes; or if its arms transfer policies, defence ties, and arms build-up is viewed
as threatening by India; or if the political situation in Tibet gets out of control.
(Dutta 1998: 94)

By and large, in India, there is no doubt about the ‘rise of China’, but there are
doubts about the ‘peaceful rise of China’. According to Mohan Malik, factors that
contribute to India’s doubts of China’s peaceful rise include ‘power asymmetry; Beijing’s
military alliances with Pakistan and Burma (Myanmar); Beijing’s support to insurgents
in northeast India in the past; China (and Pakistan) remaining the sole source of all

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
164 Zhang Guihong

proliferation and terrorism; differences over the status of Tibet, Kashmir and Sikkim;
Chinese encroachments into what India sees as its “sphere of influence”, as evident in
Beijing’s plans for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and India’s counter-moves
to establish closer strategic ties with “China-wary nations”, and with the sole super-
power, the United States’ (Malik 2004: 36). While some of these factors are question-
able, others deserve our attention.
As ‘all the key issues of India’s foreign policy are intimately tied to the nature of its
relationship with China’ (Raja Mohan 2003: 142), how to accommodate China’s
peaceful rise is likely to be the biggest political challenge for Indian leaders in the
coming decades. Fortunately, both former and current top Indian officials have ex-
pressed their confidence in a better bilateral relationship. Yashwant Sinha, former
Indian External Affairs Minister, pointed out, ‘India’s policies will not be based on
fear of Chinese power nor on envy of China’s economic achievements’. Therefore,
‘(I)t is logical, reasonable and in the enlightened self-interest of both that the two
countries learn not just to live with each other but also address differences and build
on what is common. Further, both India and China are too large and too strong to be
contained or cowed down by any country, including each other’ (Sinha 2004: 3). In
response to the trend and challenge of a rising China, J.N. Dixit, the former Indian
National Security Advisor argued that, to establish a pattern of stable working and
friendly relationship with China and to resolve the boundary issue remain a matter
of priority in ensuring a positive security environment in the South Asian region
(Dixit 2004: 24).
The positive effects and factors of China’s peaceful rise exist in Sino-Indian relations
politically as well as economically. China’s peaceful rise does not mean only a big
market and economic opportunity, but has political meaning and security implications
as well. It implies the way Chinese leaders and people think and use its growing power
in the future.
The experience of twenty-five years of Sino-US relationship, since its normalisation
in 1979 suggests that, economic independence alone is not enough to ensure peace
and stability; however, it does help reduce the possibility of the occurrence and es-
calation of conflict. With regard to Sino-Indian relations, according to C. Raja Mohan,
a shift from politics to economics as the driving force in the bilateral relationship,
‘[a]s political problem-solving and deepening economic cooperation begin to
take root, the nature of the Sino-Indian engagement could be radically different in
the coming years’ (Raja Mohan 2004b). If we put this viewpoint in the context of the
rise of both China and India, it may be argued that, without economic interdepend-
ence, political and security thrust will be inane, and without political and security
trust, economic cooperation will be weak.
In the context of China’s peaceful rise, drawbacks or limitations in three dimensions
are likely to adversely affect the future of Sino-Indian relations, viz., economic inter-
dependence, security trust and regional cooperation. This paper will examine the
dimensions of security trust and regional cooperation.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 165

THE SHORTAGE OF SECURITY TRUST

The first is the absence or lack of security trust. From the Indian perspective, the
bitter legacy of the1962 war, unresolved border dispute, very little substantial change
in the Sino-Pakistan relationship, China’s political dictatorship, China’s unwillingness
to support India’s nuclear power status and UN Security Council membership have
added up to a situation in which Indian attitude to China remains negative to some
extent. China’s rise has been listed as one of the eight factors that may influence India’s
security environment in the mid-term future. A report of the committee on ‘India
Vision 2020’ states that ‘the increasing economic and military strength of China may
pose a serious challenge to India’s security unless adequate measures are taken to
fortify our own strength’ (Planning Commission, 2002). There are three cases that
highlight the Indian distrust.

Case I—China’s Security Cooperation with Pakistan

India has always viewed the Sino-Pakistani relationship and Beijing’s alleged nuclear
and missile assistance to Islamabad in particular, as part of China’s strategy to contain
India within the subcontinent (Sawhny 1999: 16–25; Nayan 1999: 73–85). During
the cold war era (especially post-1962 war period), Chinese arms transfers as well as
nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan were perceived as serving the Chinese strategy
of setting up a counterweight to a predominant India in the region. Even after the
end of the cold war, in the Indian view, China continues substantial defence assistance
to Pakistan. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, China continues to support
General/President Musharraf ’s government mainly because of China’s concern over
the risks of Pakistani internal stability. As it was pointed out by J.N. Dixit, ‘[T]he
strategic and security cooperation between Pakistan and China can have a negative
impact on the regional security environment from India’s point of view’ (Dixit 2003:
439). In the context of China’s rise, both Beijing and New Delhi need to rethink their
relations with Pakistan and the role of Pakistan in Sino-Indian relations. For China,
according to a scholar, ‘[N]either an all-out India-Pakistan war nor Pakistan’s collapse
would serve China’s grand strategic objectives’ (Malik 2002). Thus, China’s ‘all weather’
and ‘all rounds’ relationship with Pakistan has to be guided by two points: first, to
work with the international community to prevent South Asia from any possibility
of conflict escalation, and second, to provide all assistance in its power for Pakistan’s
‘national construction aiming for good governance, legal order, market economy,
democratic politics, and a moderate civil society’ (Zhang 2003: 145–71). Unfor-
tunately, few people in New Delhi have an optimistic view as regards this and persist
in critiquing the Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian relations.

Case II—China’s Reluctance to Support India’s

Bid for a Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council

With regard to the question of the necessary/required qualifications for a new per-
manent membership of the UN Security Council, China’s position, from my
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
166 Zhang Guihong

understanding, will be: (i) support the candidature of some Western countries to join
the reformed Security Council, but also urge that the seat(s) for developing countries
must be equally considered at the same time, since the Security Council should not
be a club only for Western and rich powers; (ii) the representation and balance have
to be taken into account when the new members are selected; and (iii) the financial
support for UN, no doubt very important, cannot be the only basis for evaluating
possible membership to the Security Council. Instead, the will to maintain world
peace is more significant. As for India, China will be neither the first nor the last
country to say ‘No’. This means that China will not be the obstacle for India’s per-
manent membership to the Security Council; instead, China realises that India is
among the best candidates and the most suitable representative of developing countries.
India, characterised by its political, economical and cultural prominence, should benefit
from the Security Council reform.

Case III—China’s Refusal to Endorse India’s Nuclear Weapons Status

India has the right to choose between the nuclear haves and have-nots. However,
from China’s perspective, India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998, clearly run
counter to international non-proliferation efforts and have seriously destabilised the
South Asian regional security situation. In the ultimate analysis, they have not been
in the interests of India’s national security, to say nothing of the adverse impact of the
letter sent by India’s former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to the then US President
Bill Clinton, and the infamous ‘China as potential No. 1 threat’ statement of India’s
then Defence Minister George Fernandes on Sino-Indian relations. India is now a
de facto nuclear weapons state, but the UN Security Council resolution 1172, which
calls on India (and Pakistan) to give up nuclear weapons must be respected. As a senior
Chinese official pointed out, this issue ‘has to be settled at the level of the United
Nations’, and ‘UN Security Council resolution 1172 has to be ironed out before
China can get involved in consultations for a joint nuclear doctrine’ (Zhai 2004).
Only after that, can China acknowledge India’s nuclear power status.

THE SHORTAGE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

The other is the absence or lack of regional cooperation. As Jing-dong Yuan and
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, two US scholars with Chinese and Indian backgrounds
respectively, point out, ‘[E]ven though both China and India share similar concerns
and common interests at the global level, they remain reluctant to combine their ef-
forts’ (Sidhu and Yuan 2003: 80). China and India have common economic interests
and similar security concerns, but less cooperation in the following three regions.
In the South Asian region, China has developed its political, economical as well as
military relations with all South Asian countries bilaterally. On the other hand, China
rarely takes part in the process of regional economic integration in South Asia. As the
world’s third largest economy as well as the biggest neighbour to South Asia, China’s
participation in the activities of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 167

(SAARC) is welcomed (Raja Mohan 2004a). However, this is only encountered in

Indian academia instead of the actual political process. Even in the academia, there
have been doubts about the necessity of Indian support for China’s membership to
the SAARC. (Stobdan 2004)
In the Southeast Asian region, even though both are members of ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and dialogue partners of ASEAN, China and India always deal with
Southeast Asian countries separately. Though India lags behind China with regard to
regional economic integration or security cooperation with ASEAN, neither Beijing
nor New Delhi plays a leading role in Southeast Asia. As the junction of the interests
and influence of both states, Southeast Asia sees more competition than cooperation
between the two Asian giants.
In the Central Asia region, both China and India have a common requirement
(demand for oil/gas) and common interest in containing terrorism. Substantial econ-
omic and security cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi, however, still has a
long way to go. With regard to India’s joining Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), there exists divergence not only between Beijing and New Delhi, but also in
New Delhi.
In other regions, such as Middle East and Northeast Asia as well, it is difficult to
find cooperation between India and China. As two large developing economies, both
China and India will be more dependent on oil supply from the Middle East. They
also share many common concerns and positions in Middle Eastern affairs. Both criti-
cised US’s unilateral action in Iraq and have kept silent on the question of offering
cooperation to US-led post-war control in Iraq. Nonetheless, India and China hardly
have mutual cooperation in Middle East affairs, either in the economic or security
field. In Northeast Asia, while India has no presence, China so far has hosted three
rounds of six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear issue.

CONCLUSIONS

The rise of both China and India will be the most significant event in this century.
With different national conditions, respective advantages and disadvantages, the two
countries will adopt varying ways and differing models. There will be races and com-
petitions, as well as reciprocity and cooperation between them. Besides promoting
common interests and reducing divergences, Sino-Indian relationship needs greater
mutual understanding and greater sensitivity to the other’s security considerations.
This would augur well for a better future relationship, especially in the context of the
rise of both countries.
Both China and India need to enlarge mutual security understanding. China under-
stands Indian concerns regarding China’s support for Pakistani military construction,
nuclear and missile capability in particular, as it is sensitive to India’s national security.
But the differences between normal military exchange and allied relations, conventional
arms sale and strategic weapons supply, nuclear exchange for civil purpose and military
use, those nuclear and missile exchanges which accord with, and those which violate
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
168 Zhang Guihong

international non-proliferation regulations should be clearly demarcated. However,

China may increase transparency and adjust the focus in arms transfers, and explore
possible Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) with India with regard
to South Asian affairs, such as reporting to the other side about military exercises, arms
sale as well as purchase.
On the other hand, China needs India to understand Beijing’s concerns on the Tibetan
issue, as it is related to issues of China’s sovereignty, unification, as well as national
security. Dalai Lama is not only a spiritual leader, but also the head of the exile gov-
ernment. India’s nationalism (strong cultural and religious linkages and feelings
between India and Tibet) and Constitution (freedom of expression) are not sufficient
justification for its substantial support for Dalai Lama’s engagement in separatist
activities on Indian soil. Without the active cooperation and tacit approval of the Indian
government, representatives of the Dalai Lama’s group could not travel abroad (and
return to India) for political purposes. New Delhi should forbid Dalai Lama’s political
activity in India. His activity must be strictly restricted to the religious field.
Both sides may improve regional strategies for security. The former Defence Minister
George Fernandes said in 2003, ‘We (India and China) could not become “brothers”
as envisaged in the idealistic days of the 1950s. We will not be a “threat” to each other
and this has been reiterated at the highest political levels’ (Fernandes 2004). However,
we could be ‘good neighbours’ henceforth and ‘good friends’ in future, if both Beijing
and New Delhi improve their security consideration with rational, stable, and a long-
range perspective.
China may consider the following policy options:

l After resolving the border issue, China may declare unilaterally that missiles in
any part of China will not be targeting India.
l Considering the fact and international consensus, China should recognise in
public that Sikkim is part of Indian territory.
l Considering APEC as an open forum and India’s economic potential, China
may support India’s entry to the APEC.
l China may not oppose India as a member (first as an observer) of SCO, which
will make the Chinese-Russian-Indian triangular cooperation possible, at least
in the field of anti-terrorism and in the Central Asia region.
l China can respect and even recognise Indian nuclear power status, if the related
UN Security Council resolution could be ironed out.
l China should not refuse India as one of the best candidates of the reformed UN
Security Council. However, the vetoes of new permanent members have to be
limited.

India on its part, at the same time, may

l improve its strategy with wider perspective and higher stand, which means that
it is necessary for India to reduce the weight of the Pakistan factor in its dealings
with China;
Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 169

l not use the ‘US card’ or ‘Taiwan card’ to contain China, which will gain less but
lose more for India;
l raise the pace of economic cooperation with China by removing political or
security misgivings;
l support China’s constructive role in South Asian regional integration such as
SAARC, and collaborate with China in regional affairs with a more open mind;
and
l play a more constructive role in regional stability and international affairs, as
Indian dominance in the subcontinent should be based not only on hard power
but also on soft power.2

REFERENCES

Chen Xiankui and Xin Xiangyang, ‘Heping jueqi shifou keneng?’ (Is Peaceful Rise Possible?), http://
www.cp.org.cn/2233/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=3119.
Cohen, Stephen Philip, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001).
Dixit, J.N., India’s Foreign Policy 1947-2003 (New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003).
———, ‘Emerging International Security Environment: Indian Perceptions with Focus on South Asian
and Central Asian Predicaments’, in K. Santhanam and Ramakant Dwivedi (Eds.), India and Central
Asia: Advancing the Common Interest (New Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 2004).
Dong Guozheng, ‘Heping jueqi nai Zhongguo de guoji zhanglue jueze’(Peaceful Rise is China’s
International Strategic Choice), Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 5 April 2004.
Dutta, Sujit, ‘China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia’, in Janathan D.
Pollack and Richard H. Yang (Eds.), In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign
Policy and Military Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), available online at http://
www.rand.org.
———, Personal Interview with Author, 9 August 2004.
Fernandes, George, ‘The Valedictory Address Delivered at the Fifth Asian Security Conference (ASC)
organized by IDSA in 2003’, in K. Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli (Eds.), Asian Security and
China 2000-2010 (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004).
Hu Jintao, ‘China’s Development is an Opportunity for Asia’, 24 April 2004, http://www.peopledaily.
com.cn/200404/24/eng20040424_141419.shtml.
Ma Jiali, Guanzhu Yindu: jueqi zhong de daguo (Pay Attention to India: Emerging Power), Tianjing:
Tianjing Renmin Chubanshe (Tianjing: Tianjing People’s Publication, 2002).
Malik, Mohan, ‘Fear, Awe and Contest: Three Steps to Harness the Dragon Fire’, Force (New Delhi),
January 2004.
———, ‘The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict’, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Occasional Paper, November 2002; http://www.apcss.org/Research/researchpublications.html,
accessed on 25 March 2005.
Medeiros, Evan S., ‘China Debates Its “Peaceful Rise” Strategy’, Yale Global Online, 22 June 2004,
http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4118.
Men Honghua, ‘Zhongguo jueqi yu guoji zhixu’ (China’s Rise and International Order), Taipingyang
xuebao (Pacific Journal), Vol. 86, No.2, June 2004.

2
Visible forces such as geography, population, military and economic capability, as emphasised by
Hans Morgenthau, as well as invisible power such as culture, ideology, value, etc. as elucidated by
Joseph Nye.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
170 Zhang Guihong

Mohan, C. Raja, ‘China and SAARC’, The Times of India, 29 July 2004a.
———, ‘India and China: A Shifting Paradigm’, The Hindu, 29 July 2004b.
———, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Penguin Books
India, 2003).
Nayan, Rajiv, ‘Sino-Pakistani Missile Collaboration’, Peace Initiative, Vol. 5, No. 3–6, May–December
1999, pp. 73–85.
Pang Zhongying, ‘Gouzhu heping jueqi de guojia zhanglue’ (Building a National Strategy for Peaceful
Rise), Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), 26 March 2004.
———, ‘Zhongguo jueqi de heping xing pandu: guanyu heping jueqi de lilun xing wenti’ (A Judging
and Reading on China’s Rise: Theoretical Issues of Peaceful Rise), Guoji guancha (International
Observation), No. 3, 2004.
Planning Commission, Government of India, India Vision 2020 (New Delhi: Planning Commission,
Government of India, 2002).
Qin Yaqing, ‘Shijie geju yu zhongguo de heping jueqi’ (World Pattern and China’s Peaceful Rise), http://
www.irchina.org/index.asp, accessed on 25 March 2005.
Ruan Zongze, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi fazhan daolu de lilun tantao’ (The Theoretical Exploration of
the Road to the Development of China’s Peaceful Rise), Guoji wenti yanjiou (International Studies),
Vol. 102, No. 4, 2004.
Sahgal, Arun, ‘Dragon Awakens: Alternative Scenarios of Chinese Development: Implications for
Regional Security’, Paper Presented at IDSA Weekly Fellows Seminar on 1 May 2004.
Sawhny, Karan R., ‘The Sino-Pakistani Nuclear Alliance: Prospect and Retrospect’, Peace Initiative, Vol.
5, No. 3–6, May–December 1999, pp.16–25.
Shi Xiaohu and Si Yintao, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi mianlin de liuda anquan taiozhan’ (The Six Security
Challenges Facing China’s Peaceful Rise), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-06-02/ba3379212.shtml.,
2 June 2004, accessed on 25 March 2005.
Shi Yinhong, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi de jiben he biyao pintai’(Basic Trials and Essential ‘Platforms’ for
China’s Peaceful Rise), Hong Kong Da Gong Bao (Hong Kong), 14 March 2004.
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Yuan Jing-dong, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Boulder
and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
Sinha, Yashwant, ‘Asian Security: Long-term Trends and Implications’, The Inaugural Address Delivered
at the Fifth Asian Security Conference organised by IDSA, in K. Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli
(Eds.), Asian Security and China 2000-2010 (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004).
Stobdan, P., ‘What China could Bring to SAARC?’, Indian Express, 20 August 2004.
Suettinger, Robert L., ‘The Rise and Descent of “Peaceful Rise”’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 12,
Issue 4, Fall 2004. Also available online at http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20044/rs.pdf,
accessed on 25 March 2005.
Wang Yizhou, ‘Zhongguo de heping jueqi hai meiyou wancheng’ (China’s Peaceful Rise is not Yet
Complete), http://sis.ruc.edu.cn/news/shownews.asp?newsid=143, accessed on 25 March 2005.
Wen, Jiabao, ‘Turning Your Eyes to China’, Speech at Harvard University. People’s Daily Online, 12
December 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200312/12/eng20031212_130267.shtml.
Xinhua News Agency, ‘Full Text of Chinese Premier’s Press Conference’, 14 March 2004, http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/15/eng20040315_137493.shtml.
———, ‘Zhongyang lingdao lun Zhongguo heping jueqi’ (Chinese Leaders Discuss China’s Peaceful
Rise), 26 March 2004, http://news3.sinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004_03/26/content_1386611.htm.
Yan Xuetong, ‘Zhongguo heping jueqi: tiaojian, yiyi yu celiu’(China’s Peaceful Rise: Conditions,
Meanings, and Tactics), Zhonguo suihui kexue (China Social Science), No. 5, 2004.
Zeng Qinghong, ‘Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 60th Session of the United Nations Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific’, Nanfang Wang, 26 April 2004, http://
www.southcn.com/nflr/ldjh/200404270204.htm.
Zhang Guihong, ‘US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and Its Implications for
China: A Chinese Perspective’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2, April–June 2003, pp. 145–71.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015
China’s Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations 171

Zhang Wenmu, ‘Daguo jueqi de luoji’(The Logic of the Rise of Great Power), Zhonguo suihui kexue
(China Social Science), No. 5, 2004.
Zheng Bijian, ‘A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia’, 3 November 2003, http://
history.bo’aoforum.org/English/E2003nh/dhwj/t20031103_184101.btk

Author’s Address: Institute of International Politics, Zhejiang University, 148,

Tianmushan Road, Hangzhou (310028), China. Email: ghzhangcn@hotmail.com;
ghzhang@hzcnc.com.

Downloaded from chr.sagepub.com at NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIV LIB on May 27, 2015