KEYNOTE LECTURE

power shift and the death

of the west? not yet!*
michael cox
Department of International Relations and Co Director IDEAS, London School of
Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
E-mail: M.E.Cox@lse.ac.uk

doi:10.1057/eps.2011.31

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Abstract
It has become the new truth of our age that the western world we have

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known is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international
system shaped by China and increasingly determined by the economic rise
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of Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians and students of
world politics are now viewing the future of the larger international system.
This essay does not dispute some self-evident economic facts nor assume
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that the world will look the same in 50 years time as it does now. It does,
however, question the idea that there is a power shift in the making and
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that the West and the United States are in steep decline. The world has a
long way to go before we begin to live in a ‘post-western’ world.
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Keywords power; power shift; the West; US decline; the rise of China; the
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Transatlantic relationship
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T
hree big themes have dominated take all this for granted. Paul Kennedy is
the headlines over the last few certainly one (Kennedy, 2010). Power he
years. One is that China is fast believes is now shifting, and shifting
rising economically and will, over the next fast, from the West to the East. Asia’s
two or three decades, surge past the time has come. Another historian, Niall
United States to head the world’s eco- Ferguson agrees (Ferguson, 2009). The
nomic league table. A second is that the western moment that opened in the
United States is, yet again, in terminal sixteenth century is over. The future now
decline, one from which it will find it lies elsewhere. As yet another influential
impossible to recover (Cox, 2007). And writer, Jeffry Sachs, has put it: it is now
the third is that the axis of the world time for the West to pass on the baton
economy has tilted away from the Atlantic (Sachs, 2009).
towards Asia. Few now seem to dispute The notion that we are moving into
these assertions. Indeed, the bulk of a post-western world is a relatively
the West’s commentariat now appear to recent construct. It was certainly not a
416 european political science: 10 2011

(416 – 424) & 2011 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680-4333/11 www.palgrave-journals.com/eps/
fashionable thesis in the 1900s when ‘The notion that we
the West and the United States seemed
to be riding high following the collapse of are moving into a
communism and the USSR. Nor was it post-western world
much talked about during G.W. Bush’s is a relatively recent
early years when the United States was
being characterised as a new form of construct’.
empire. Only after the last few years in
fact has the idea become intellectually ‘y the twenty-first
and politically fashionable. Who spotted
the trend first, and why, is still something century looked like it was
of a mystery. However, it was impossible going to be China’s’.
not to be aware that something serious
was up when towards the end of Bush’s
first term, that most esteemed of jour- dislocation, currency turbulence and trade

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nals, Foreign Affairs, fired a warning shot friction were bound to follow. Disturbing
across western bows. No less a person times lay ahead (Plender, 2010).
than its editor, James Hoge, wrote tell- How disturbing became only too clear

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ingly – and from the West’s point of view as the dust began to settle following
rather worryingly – of a ‘global power shift the financial crisis of 2008. Once it did,
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in the making’, which if not handled the apparent contrast between a declin-
properly by the West could very easily ing West and a rising East could not have
lead to major conflict (Hoge, 2004). This been starker. In the former it was all
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somewhat alarming view, later restated gloom and doom; in Asia meanwhile
by American political scientist John the economic sun just kept on shining
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Mearsheimer, was reiterated by a number while China kept growing. Unsurprisingly,

of other observers in the years that this only seemed to strengthen the hand
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followed (Mearsheimer, 2005). One of those who were by now convinced

warned that an ‘irresistible’ shift of power that we were not only witnessing a wider
was taking place to the East and that shift in the balance of economic forces
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the West had better prepare itself for a from one region to another but the
diminished role in international affairs simultaneous rise of a most extraordinary
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(Mahbubani, 2008). In the same year new superpower as well. Communist in

the influential Fareed Zakaria talked politics but deeply capitalist in economics,
eloquently of a post-American world in the twenty-first century looked like it
the making (Zakaria, 2008). In 2009 yet was going to be China’s. This was
another writer was warning (along with certainly the view of China-watcher
nearly everybody else) of America’s Martin Jacques. America, he opined, was
economic decline (Thompson, 2009). now self-evidently on the slide; China
And by the end of the next year, yet one meanwhile was most obviously rising.
more pundit not only thought the US was There was only one conclusion to be
on the slide, but that this was bound to drawn: the world was in the midst of the
have a marked impact on the stability biggest geopolitical shift since the dawn
of the larger international economy. As of the industrial era, one that might even
Plender noted in 2010, repeating the have us all learning our Mandarin (or
by now standard refrain, when great Cantonese) in a new global order where
powers declined (referring here to the others around the world would now be
United States of course) and others rose taking their economic lessons from Beijing
(obviously China) then extreme financial rather than Washington (Halper, 2010).
michael cox european political science: 10 2011 417
 Indeed, according to Jacques, this inevi- looked quite revolutionary (Jeffery,
table shift would involve more than just 2009). Whether or not all this was likely
power. China, he argued, was not merely to lead to increased conflict with the
another state, but rather a civilisation West remained an open and much
with a mission. Hence, as it rose, its ideas debated question (Organski, 1958), but
about the world – and not just its com- one thing seemed palpably obvious. As
modities and money – would begin to gain a result of one of the most amazing
traction (Jacques, 2009). economic transformations in centuries,
Nor did predictions of a less than China was forcing academics to think for
sanguine future for the West end there. the first time in a long time – and after
The great financial house Goldman Sachs nearly 20 years of American dominance in
not only seemed to agree with Jacques; a unipolar world – about the possibility
indeed it had been ahead of him in of a major change in the balance of world
anticipating major change in the world power (Clark 2011).
economy. It even appeared to support his It is never comfortable raining on

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thesis with possibly the most influential somebody else’s parade, especially when
statistical table published in years: the some of the world’s most influential
famous ‘Predicted Shift in the Economic intellectuals happen to be on it. It is even

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Balance of Power’. This made what looked harder perhaps to blow that proverbial
like an iron-clad economic case for a Cwhistle and call time. But that is what I
massive power transition. In 2015, it would like to do here, not because I want
posited, the American economy would to deny some fairly self-evident economic
still be significantly larger than China’s. facts, or even deny China or Asia their
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By 2050, however (and possibly much rightful place in a world that has for too
earlier), it would be at least 10 per cent long been dominated by Europe and the
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smaller. Not only that, four other rising United States. Rather it is because I think
economies – India, Brazil, Japan and the new truth needs to be interrogated
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Russia – when taken together with China rather more thoroughly than it has been
would by mid-century be out-producing, so far.
and presumably outplaying, the West. I have a number of broad reservations
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A new age was in the making (Goldman about the new consensus. First, I think
Sachs, 2009). that too many analysts have conflated
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Finally, amidst all this speculation, economics with power and thus con-
academics at last began to take note cluded (incorrectly) that the former –
of the fact that something quite extra- economics – is by definition synonymous
ordinary appeared to be happening. This with the latter – power. Second, in spite
had certainly not been predicted. Indeed, of all that has happened over the past 10
until very late in the day, most scholars years, I would want to argue that the
had adopted the view that for the foresee- West continues to possess many more
able future China was bound to rise slowly capabilities and assets than some are
on the not illogical grounds that it was now willing to concede. Indeed, I am still
only just emerging from decades of rather sceptical of the whole idea that
poverty and self-imposed isolation. This we are witnessing a major geographical
reticence soon began to evaporate how- tilt away from the Transatlantic towards
ever. The sheer speed of China’s econom- the East. I will explain why. Finally,
ic development, its growing international though it would be foolish to underesti-
self-confidence, and finally, and its more mate China’s rise and the impact this
assertive stance on the world’s stage, is already having on the world economy,
together added up to something that it is important to think through the
418 european political science: 10 2011 power shift and the death of the west
political and strategic (as opposed to countries, not to mention the engine
the economic) impact its rise is likely to of growth in its own region making it –
have in its own region. Indeed, as I will alongside other Asian economies to
argue towards the end of this essay, be sure – an increasingly important
though China’s economic transformation economic player in the world economy
has altered Asia in many ways, one of (Economist, 2010). But the western
the consequences has been to raise new economies overall still retain some big
fears in the region about what its ascent structural advantages, none more so
will mean over the longer term. These I than its supposedly beleaguered leader,
suggest will keep the United States very the United States of America.
much involved in Asia, and will do so Is the US economic star on the wane?
largely because many Asian countries Over the very long term, probably; and
remain suspicious of China’s intentions. naturally enough under conditions of
It would be going too far to argue that globalisation, others are beginning to
this will lead to major regional conflicts make giant strides forward. But they

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as suggested by certain writers (Emmott, still have a very long way to go to match
2008). On the other hand, so long as a country that still prints the universal
China remains the kind of state that it is, dollar, to which millions are still looking

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with the history it is heir to, there is every to emigrate, whose capacity to innovate
reason to think that other Asian powers remains deeply impressive, whose long-
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are likely to see it as being as much of a term stability is assured, and around
problem to be contained as a partner with which the rest of the world economy
whom one can easily co-operate within continues to rotate. As Carla Norloff has
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the larger Asian community. recently shown, despite a gradual eco-
nomic decline since the end of the World
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War II, the United States still possesses

IS THE USA DOWN AND critical features that give it what she
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OUT? calls ‘positional advantages’ over all

other states (Norloff, 2010). She even
Let us deal with some of these issues in challenges the now fashionable view
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turn, beginning with the wider question as that America’s hegemonic burdens are
to whether or not the US and the West are outweighing the benefits. She suggests
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as ‘down and out’ economically as some otherwise: Washington actually reaps

now seem to be suggesting (Serfaty, more than it pays out in the provision of
2011). Here I think we have to distinguish public goods.
between recent headlines – all of which There is also the small matter of size.
seem to support the now widespread Others are clearly catching up in terms
belief that the last 10 years have been of physical output; China most visibly.
‘hell’ for the West (Time magazine, Still, measured even in terms of GNP, the
2009) – and some basic economic facts. United States is still ahead of the rest.
Some of these undoubtedly point, as Indeed, the only other part of the world
Danny Quah has argued, to a certain tilt that comes anywhere close to matching
eastwards (Quah, 2011). But one should the US in sheer economic weight is that
not confuse this ‘tilt’ with an irreversible other member of that failing western club
economic decline of the West itself. China to which nobody wants to belong: the
may well be consuming twice as much European Union. Other economic indica-
crude steel as the US, the EU and Japan tors point to an even greater gap between
combined. It may also be becoming the United States and the rest. Take per
the world’s largest market for many key capita income. In China life is definitely
michael cox european political science: 10 2011 419
 getting better for the ordinary citizen. But ‘y it is still only the
in 2010, average income was still only
one-tenth of that found in the United United States that
States ($4000 per annum in 2010 com- appears to have some
pared to $45,000). Comparisons of sort of positive vision
Gross National Income tell much the
same story, with the US registering a for the world economic
huge $10 trillion total income in 2010 order’.
compared to China’s $1 trillion.
Finally, though much can be said about
(and against) the quality of American suggesting of late, so too does that
economic leadership, it is still only the much maligned entity known as the
United States that really thinks in leader- Transatlantic relationship. Indeed, it is
ship terms when it comes to the larger by no means clear that power has been
international economy. No doubt its ca- moving elsewhere quite as fast as has

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pacity to lead has been badly dented by been suggested by certain writers (Bisley,
the economic crisis; and the rise of the 2010). That Asia is becoming more im-
rest, as others have pointed out, means it portant economically is obvious. How-

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will have to consult more. However, unlike ever, one should not underestimate
the rest (including China) it is still only the Chow much strength is possessed by the
United States that appears to have some key states making up the Transatlantic
sort of positive vision for the world region. If nothing else, this ignores at
economic order. This was first formed in least one rather obvious fact: that taken
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the period after 1945 and has remained together the United States and the
remarkably consistent ever since. In fact European Union still account for over 40
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so attractive has this ‘open door’ vision per cent of the global economy, hardly
been, that even China has been drawn an insignificant amount for a part of
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towards it, initially in the 1970s when it the world that many now claim is on the
opened up diplomatic relations with the slide. Nor is it just a question of weight
US, then again in the 1990s when it was (Hamilton and Quinlan, 2010). The most
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becoming clear that China had to rejoin important international banks are to be
the world economy or stagnate, and then found in Europe and the United States;
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finally in 2001 when it formally entered so are the overwhelming majority of the
the World Trade Organization. All this, world’s leading corporations. Europe and
moreover, tells its own hegemonic story. the United States are also home to most
After all, it was not the US that joined a of the world’s leading universities; they
Chinese created system and then played play host to nearly all of its major busi-
by its rules. Rather it has been China that ness schools; and in areas such as oil
has chosen to join a world economic order exploration, aviation and chemicals,
originally created, and in many ways still they still lead the way. The two together
governed by, rules written in the United are also the world’s most important
States. source of Foreign Direct Investment, and
are by far and away the world’s most
important markets too. They also invest
THE TRANSATLANTIC in each other’s future in vast amounts.
RELATIONSHIP Indeed, in 2010, the United States in-
vested far more in Europe than it was
If the US remains far more important ever likely to do in Asia or China (three
economically than some have been times more to be precise). Meanwhile
420 european political science: 10 2011 power shift and the death of the west
the EU had eight times more invested in Europeans who form part of NATO, who
the United States than it had in the whole have built the EU, and who have two
of Asia. Americans may not view Europe permanent seats on the Security Council,
as being terribly exciting right now; and whom the Americans know they can rely
Europeans will no doubt continue to on most.
worry as to their current status in a
Washington fixated on nearly everything
else except the European Union. But HARD POWER: SOFT POWER
that does not make the economic
relationship any the less significant in If Europe and the United States still
international terms (Higgott, 2010). continue to constitute a formidable force
Power though is not just about econom- in world politics, one of the reason for
ics; it also matters a great deal who you this is that they are particularly adept in
happen to be allied with in world politics projecting different forms of power in
and how important they are. Here China complex ways (Parmar and Cox, 2010).

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in particular faces a real problem. It has Even those Kantian Europeans who seem
masses of trading partners. However, it to rely more on their economic, civilian
has very few allies; and those it does and institutional strengths to shape inter-

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have are either poor or politically unat- national affairs, still possess some pretty
tractive or both (like North Korea). The formidable military assets ($424 billion
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United States on the other hand has spent in 2009). The United States has
many allies, and one might add (perhaps even more of course. China’s spending
with some hesitation) quite a lot of on national security may be on the rise;
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dependent and needy friends as well. and countries like Brazil and Russia
These look to the United States in ways (two of the famous BRICs) have sizeable
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that other states will probably never look defence sectors. But it is the Europeans,
to China; and none look more longingly and more obviously the Americans,
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towards Washington than its still very who still dominate the world in terms of
influential friends across the Atlantic. militarily spending (71 per cent of the
Much has been made of Obama’s non- world’s total no less). Indeed, in 2010
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European background; he has even alone the United States spent close to
been called the first US leader to be more $700 billion annually on national security;
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interested in Asia than Europe. But this ten times more than its nearest allies,
can be overdone. Personal biography is and fourteen times more than China. Nor
one thing: interests are something else. is this asymmetry about to change any
And clearly the US has an enormous time soon. In fact, all future projections
interest in Europe and in maintaining a show that the US will be the only major
very close relationship with its European actor in the world capable of global
allies. The two may forever be quarrelling projection for several decades to come.
about this policy or that. But at the end Iraq might have cost the United States
of the day the two share the same dear. And Afghanistan might cost it
ideological and political universe. And more. But neither war will change what
this is critical. China might be growing has been true since the end of the
rapidly; and Asia is more likely to get the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR:
world out of the recession faster than that there is still only one serious
moribund Europe. But in a deeply uncer- superpower operating in the international
tain world (in part made more uncertain system today (Woodward, 2010).
precisely because of the rise of China) it Nor, to continue, does the West face
is, in the last analysis, those democratic much of a challenge in terms of soft
michael cox european political science: 10 2011 421
 power competition either. The US may democracy’ and the rise of the authoritar-
have lost much standing because of the ian alternative. But no serious states in
Iraq War; and the western economic the world today – excluding the deeply
model might have suffered a blow unattractive North Korea, the fast evol-
because of the economic crisis. However, ving Cuba and Vietnam – are any longer
the first seems to have proved temporary ruled by communist parties. Nor is the
– except in the ever hostile Arab world – tide of history moving in that direction.
and the second appears to have been China of course might be run in ways
short-lived. Furthermore, though China that make it economically dynamic for
has won more than its fair share of the time being; it might even be the kind
grateful friends on continents like Africa of system that most ordinary Chinese
because of its economic largesse, there prefer to what they had before. But there
is little indication (yet) that it is wining is very little chance of it being replicated
hearts and minds as well. China might elsewhere.
aid and trade in ever increasing amounts; Finally, there is no guarantee that the

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it can also buy massive amounts of raw model it now has will remain in its current
materials and oil. But it has proven rather form forever. Liberals are certainly wrong
inept when it comes to acquiring true to argue that capitalism always requires

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friends. This is in part cultural. It is also democracy to flourish. But one does not
linguistic. It is economic too. Take Africa. Chave to be a liberal to suggest that over
Here China has made massive economic time the present Chinese model could
inroads. But if various reports from easily confront some very serious pro-
around the continent are to be believed, blems indeed. Divisions between its inc-
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the Chinese are not only regarded as reasingly unequal regions, the growing
being aloof and distant; among many gap between rich and poor, inflation and
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small African business people they are corruption, and the very obvious tension
also seen as being ruthless competitors between its dynamic open economy and
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whose only ambition seems to be to its highly restrictive polity, all suggest
create a monopoly after they have wiped that China is still very much a work in
most of the local competition. progress with more than a passing chance
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There is also a much bigger problem of deep tensions and conflicts emerging
facing China: namely that while its own in the future. What chances then, one
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very unique model combining Stalinist wonders, for the Goldman Sachs projec-
political rule and dynamic state capitalism tion of China overtaking the United States
might work under Chinese conditions in the coming decades?
(for the time being) there is little indica-
tion that it is for export elsewhere. China
might attract admiration; it may also POWER SHIFT: REGIONAL
command respect. But there is not much DYNAMICS
evidence that it is attracting many imita-
tors. In part this is because there is, This then brings us then lastly to the
as the Chinese leaders point out, some- larger questions of precisely what it is
thing distinctly ‘Chinese’ about what is that we mean by a ‘power shift’ and what
happening in China. But it is also because the implications are of China’s ‘peaceful
what is happening, is occurring under rise’ in its own region?
the direction of a party whose formal Let us deal first with the issue of power.
ideology at least has been abandoned in As I have suggested throughout this
most other parts of the world. Much has short essay, though China’s economic
been said of late about ‘the crisis of achievements are impressive, we should
422 european political science: 10 2011 power shift and the death of the west
not confuse what it has achieved ‘y China [y] appears to
economically with the acquisition of
‘power’. China indeed remains a most have a much better grasp
incomplete actor on the world stage. As of international realities
we have seen, it has only very limited than many western
amounts of soft power; it has few major
allies worth the name; and even its hard commentators y’
power capabilities are light years behind
those of the West, in general, and the
United States in particular. Furthermore, terms about its rise. Its leaders certainly
for a supposed emerging great power appear to understand that any move on
with what some claim are hegemonic their part to balance the power of the
ambitions, the Chinese themselves ap- United States, or define its policies in
pear to be exceedingly modest about ways that challenged a world order that
what it is they are seeking to achieve has underwritten 35 years of stability and

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internationally and how far they actually record economic growth, could be extre-
want to go in challenging the existing mely damaging. Such moves would not
international order. No doubt there may only impact negatively on its prospects

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be those in China who want China to at home, and naturally enough unite a
confront the West and the United States still very powerful West against it; it
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more forcefully; and there is some evi- would also frighten a number of other
dence to suggest that these voices might very powerful states in the region as well.
be becoming much louder (Leonard, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan
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2008). Even so, what the more influential might be thousands of miles away from
voices in China (as opposed to the the US or Europe, but as functioning
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shrillest) seem to be saying is something market democracies whose security

that they have been repeating for a very needs are intimately tied up with –
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long time: that China is still a relatively indeed, dependent upon – the United
backward country with all sorts of pro- States, they would soon run for cover if
blems that will take it years to address; Beijing were to pose a serious challenge
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therefore it is much wiser to keep one’s to the status quo. Indeed, if China were
head down internationally, work within to break from the foreign policy course
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the existing global system, and hope along which it had been travelling for
that over the longer term China’s voice years and seek to contest the United
will begin to carry more weight abroad. States more aggressively – something
This is already beginning to happen many now claim it is doing – its leaders
anyway. So why create problems by would soon discover two things: what an
asserting oneself too forcefully against unforgiving place the world can be (and
a West whose power one would be very none would be more unforgiving than
foolish to underestimate and whose the Americans); and that while its
main leaders for several years have been neighbours might happen to live in
keener to work with China rather than the East, this does not mean they do not
against it? view themselves as being part of that
If this indeed remains the line, then hugely successful and extraordinarily
China, it would seem, appears to have dynamic entity known as the West. For
a much better grasp of international them at least geography is not fate, no
realities than many western commenta- more than their global relationships are
tors who seem unable to mention the predetermined by where they happen to
country without talking in hyperbolic be located on a map of the world.
michael cox european political science: 10 2011 423
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*This was the keynote address given at the 3rd Annual Graduate Conference of
the European Consortium for Political Research. Dublin City University, Ireland.
August 30–1 September 2010.

About the Author

Michael Cox is a leading authority on world politics and US foreign policy. The only British
academic and IR scholar to be elected Chair of the ECPR, he is the author, editor and co-
editor of over twenty books including most recently US Foreign Policy and Soft Power
(2009), The Global 1989 (2010) and the best selling, US Foreign Policy (2011: 2nd edition).

424 european political science: 10 2011 power shift and the death of the west