LAW 121 - Kilosbayan v. Morato (G.R. No. 118910)
LAW 121 - Kilosbayan v. Morato (G.R. No. 118910)
LAW 121 - Kilosbayan v. Morato (G.R. No. 118910)
MORATA
G.R. No. 118910
NOVEMBER 16, 1995
J. MENDOZA
SUBJECT MATTER:
Self-Executory and Non-Self-Executory Provisions
Petitioners: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, Jovito R. Salonga, Cirilo A. Rigos, Erme Camba, Emilio C.
Parties Capulong, Jr., Jose T. Apolo, Ephraim Tendero, Fernando Santiago, Jose Abcede,
Christine Tan, Rafael G. Fernando, Raoul V. Victorino, Jose Cunanan, Quintin S. Doromal,
Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada, Rep. Joker P. Arroyo
Respondents: Manuel L. Morato, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
RATIO:
1. The Court held that the case did not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract of law, which petitioners,
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
○ Real issue is whether the petitioners were real party-in-interest
i. Real party in interest: Whether they were the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
ii. Petitioners invoked Sec. 5, 12, 13 and 17 of the Constitution.
The Court reiterated that these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer
rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
executive branch.
2. The Court noted that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture
agreement were removed.
○ Petitioners contended that the first ruling was the “law of the case.”
i. However, the Court said that “the law of the case” doctrine was inapplicable because this case is
not a continuation of the first one.
○ Petitioners also said that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
i. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment," however, is subject to the exception that a
question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions involve substantially
different claims.
ii. The ELA was substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.
○ The Court held that it seems that the only possible interpretation of Section 1 (A) and (B) of R.A. No. 1169
in light of its text and legislative history is that what PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a
business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing
so whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself."
DISPOSITIVE:
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.