Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

9/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 148
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 659

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-74457. March 20,1987.*
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority

to resolve the issue of constitutionality of legislative measures.—
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality
of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting
idea of fair play.—The closed mind has no place in the open
society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by
those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of
the question; the other half must also be considered if an
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017490a5da42ddbf37df003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed

appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that
the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow,
in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem
not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext
that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice
of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly
related to public welfare.—In the light of the tests mentioned
above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The
method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary
for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There
is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except
where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years
old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive
order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from
one
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VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 661
province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal

without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of
reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while
conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful
subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that
there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not
on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is

missing.
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between
the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of
the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared,
by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the
questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is
an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
662
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by

what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not

reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be
justified only where a problem needs immediate and urgent
correction.—It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the
exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy
of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need
to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of
time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have
been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive
Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the
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VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 663
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial

and conviction of the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated
carabaos being transported in violation of E.O. 626-A is not liable
for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared
unconstitutional.—We agree with the respondent court, however,

that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order
in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being
a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse
to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of
Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their
superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J..
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry

of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike—but hear me first!' "
It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as f ollows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the

interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order
No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the
violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef
instead; and
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of
Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial
664

movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said

Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos
and carabeef subject of the violation;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such

that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat

from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of1
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raised by the petitioner,
2
for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Ap-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 7, 28, 29, 34.

2 Ibid., pp. 6-7; Annex B.
665
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 665

3
pellate Court,** which upheld the trial court,*** and he has
now come bef ore us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is

unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty
is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained,
as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President
4
under Amendment No, 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
While also involving 5
the same executive order, the case
of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then
on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever 6 warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts
in, among others, 7all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures.
_______________
** Justices Coquia, Bartolome and Ejercito.

3 Rollo, pp. 6, 27, 33.
*** Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon.
4 Ibid., pp. 10; 11,14-16, 76.
5 129 SCRA 174.
6 Espiritu vs. Fugoso, 81 Phil. 637.
7 Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. X, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution.
666

This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be

made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a
clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare
them so, then8 "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a
law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve 9
the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is
demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear
of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially
this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law.
It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of
taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in
the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment
No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his
judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to
meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As
there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of
that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason,
indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion
not really
_______________
8 J. Laurel, concurring opinion, Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615,

627.
9 US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.
667
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 667

necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter

until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the
provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might
arise on their correct interpretation. That is the ideal. In
the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was
deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely
kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more
clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who
forcefully
10
argued against it. He was sustained by the
body.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions
of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.
The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt
their own specific description of due process lest they
confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive
them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning
of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended,
as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion
11
in the course of the decision of
cases as they arise." Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of
the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther
than to define due process—and in so doing sums it all up
—as nothing more and nothing less than "the
_______________
10 I Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution (1936), pp. 153-159.

11 Twinning vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.
668

12
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."
When the barons of England extracted from their
sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown
would thenceforth not proceed against the life, liberty or
property of any of its subjects except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby
won for themselves and their progeny that splendid
guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free
society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or
base, that every person, when confronted by the stern
visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and
open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is
part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of
the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow
the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling af ter
examination of the problem not f rom one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on
less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum13
.requirements of due process are notice
and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with ap-
_______________
12 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33.
13 David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707; Montemayor vs. Araneta Univ.
Foundation, 77 SCRA 321; Lentelera vs. Amores, 70 SCRA 37; Flores vs.
Buencamino, 74 SCRA 332; DBP vs. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366; Ong Su Han
vs. Gutierrez David, 76 Phil. 546; Banco-Español-Filipino vs. Palanca. 37
Phil 921.
669
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 669

plications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule

of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the
land," which Daniel Webster described almost two 14hundred
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be
so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the
reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative
in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for
example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or there is
a rational connection between the fact
15
proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances
when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be
killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport
of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without
16
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public 17health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due
process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a
clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the
_______________
14 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518.

15 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1; 1 Cooley 639.
16 Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833.
17 12 C.J. 1224.
670

power inherent in the State to regulate liberty 18 and

property for the promotion of the general welfare. By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent
domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is
born and follows him still after he is dead—from the womb
to beyond the tomb—in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity
or the property has some relevance to the public welfare,
its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable
Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination
of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government
to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic
rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter
of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original
measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of
its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buff aloes be conserved f or the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We
affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar
19
prohibition was challenged in United States v.
Toribio, where a law regulating the registration, branding
_______________
18 People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel

Operators Ass. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849; Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
75; U.S. v. Ling Su Tan, 10 Phil. 114; Collins v. Wolfe, 5 Phil. 297; U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 225; Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 603.
19 15 Phil. 85.
671
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 671

and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a

deprivation of property without due process of law. The
defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit,
and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure
to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which
were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had
stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their
number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural
output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine.
Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had
spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures
for the registration and branding of these animals. The
Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise
of the police power and declared in part as f ollows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of

the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the
enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by 'the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class' and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption,
so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services
of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the

Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so
is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary
for the pur-
672

pose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There
is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals
except where they are at least seven years old if male and
eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary
permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit
for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has
the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method.
We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited,
it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and

the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of
the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine
673
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 673

and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial

and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by
the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited
to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P1 2,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions
when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as20
procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however,
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with

the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution.
21
Considering that, as we held
in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation
_______________
20 New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. Rivera, 33 SCRA 602; Gas
Corp. of the Phil. vs. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653.
21 supra.
674

thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only

but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after
trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall
they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably

necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are
675
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 675

granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the

properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the
police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the
executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law
was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would
have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of
the President, to declare the executive order
unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone,
refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the
Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the
competence, for all their superior authority, to question the
order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to
assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case
would never have reached us and the taking of his property
under the challenged measure would have become a fait
accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his
spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would
have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would
have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it
guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do
is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and

fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby
declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is
ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
676

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,

Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
Decision reversed.
Note.—Judicial review exists precisely to test the

validity of executive or legislative acts in an appropriate
legal proceedings; there is always the possibility of their
being declared inoperative and void. Realism compels the
acceptance of the though that there would be a time-lag
between the initiation of such presidential or congressional
exercise of power and the final declaration of nullity. In the
meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at
times even of chaos, if the parties affected were left free to
speculate as to its fate being one of doom, this leading them
free to disobey in the meanwhile. Since, however, the
orderly processes of government, not to mention common
sense, requires that the presumption of validity be
accorded an act of Congress or an order of the President. It
would be less than fair, and it may productive of injustice,
if no notice of its assistance as a fact be paid to it, even if
thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in the case of
Presidential act, either to the Constitution or a controlling
statute. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA
533.)
——o0o——
677
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9/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 148

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 659

No. L-74457. March 20,1987.*

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority

impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 661

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal

purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by

because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 663

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial

unconstitutional.—We agree with the respondent court, however,

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry

"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said

"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat

1 Rollo, pp. 7, 28, 29, 34.

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 665

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is

** Justices Coquia, Bartolome and Ejercito.

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be

8 J. Laurel, concurring opinion, Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615,

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 667

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter

10 I Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution (1936), pp. 153-159.

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 669

plications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule

14 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518.

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

power inherent in the State to regulate liberty 18 and

18 People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 671

and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a

"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon

E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 673

and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial

should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only

employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 675

granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the