Human Rights
Human Rights
Human Rights
Human rights are rights of individuals in society. Every human being is entitled
to have rights - legitimate, valid, justified claims - upon his or her society for
certain freedoms and benefits. They are those freedoms and benefits deemed
essential for individual well-being, dignity, and fulfillment, and that reflect a
common sense of justice, fairness, and decency.
Human rights are universal: they belong to every human being in every human
society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology,
political or economic system, or stage of societal development. To call them
"human" implies that all human beings have them, equally and in equal
measure, by virtue of their humanity - regardless of their race, ethnic origin,
religion, gender, political affiliation, wealth or poverty, occupation, talent and
personal preferences.
The idea of human rights is primarily of political nature with strong moral
foundation. Minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions is critical
for exercise and protection of human rights. Politics is driving force behind all
changes in definition of individual rights as specific abuses enter the public
consciousness. However, people still have human rights even if the laws or those
in power do not recognize or protect them.
Human rights are inalienable: you cannot lose these rights any more than you
can cease being a human being. Human rights are indivisible: you cannot be
denied a right because it is "less important" or "non-essential." Human rights
are interdependent: all human rights are part of a complementary framework.
For example, your ability to participate in your government is directly affected
by your right to express yourself, to get an education, and even to obtain the
necessities of life. Human rights are both inspirational and practical. Human
rights principles hold up the vision of a free, just, and peaceful world and set
minimum standards for how individuals and institutions everywhere should treat
people. Human rights also empower people with a framework for action when
those minimum standards are not met.
Human rights are claims upon society. They imply both individual entitlement
and corresponding obligation on society. The state must develop institutions and
procedures, must plan and mobilize resources as necessary to meet the claims
individuals have. Political and civil rights require laws, institutions, procedures,
and other safeguards against tyranny, against corrupt, immoral, and inefficient
agencies or officials. Economic and social rights require taxation and spending
and a network of agencies for social welfare. The idea of human rights implies
also that society must provide some system of remedies to which individuals may
resort to obtain benefits to which they are entitled or be compensated for their
loss.
Human rights are not absolute categories. It means that each person is entitled to
exercise his or her rights in a way that does not interfere with rights of other
people or legitimate public interests. For example, freedom of speech does not
mean that one can speak about any topic at any time and place. Freedom of press
does not allow a person to intentionally publish false, harmful information about
another person. However, individual rights are not subordinate to common good.
In complex, democratic societies such as the United States, the primary goal is
striking the proper balance between individual rights and public interest.
The idea of human rights accepts that some limitations on rights are permissible
but the limitations are themselves strictly limited by law. Public emergency,
national security, and public order are examples of situations that indicate
important societal interests, but they cannot be lightly or loosely invoked to
unnecessarily invade or violate individual rights. Limitations are permitted only
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the particular situation.
However, the government may under no circumstances go so far as to invade the
right to life, or implement torture, inhuman punishment, slavery, or violate
freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.
Concern for human rights protection is of paramount importance in any type of
society. Even in countries that take pride in their human rights record, there are
areas that call for improved treatment of human rights. For example, the respect
for civil and political rights has been greatly emphasized in the United States and
American government is actively promoting those rights all over the world. On
the other hand, the very same government does not recognize health care, work,
homelessness, environmental pollution, and other social and economic concerns
as human rights issues. Rather, they are viewed as mere aspirations or goals to
be met someday in the distant future when they are feasible. Such approach has
very serious consequences for quality of democracy in this country. Being
deprived of their economic and social rights, people cannot effectively exercise
their civil and political rights. For example, national wealth implies that there
should be no hunger in the US. In reality, problem of hunger is very much
present in this country. As a consequence, people affected by such depravation
cannot be expected to actively exercise their political freedoms. Civil and political
rights should not be measured by the existence of laws protecting democratic
principles, but by a citizen’s capability to exercise these rights. The paper right
to participate in a democratic system does not guarantee inclusion in practice.
While the government cannot remove all barriers to ability, it should eradicate
the most basic impediments like hunger -- particularly in the richest nation in the
world.
"Western" philosophic foundations of human rights are not universally
accepted. Today in the world there is no general consensus about positive
definitions of human rights. Bills of rights differ from nation to nation. Even in
the Western world scope and exercise of human rights differ from one country to
another.
In non-Western countries, observance of human rights is based on quite different
premises. For example, socialist and communist countries have emphasized
social-welfare rights, such as right to education, right to job, and right to health
care. However, their citizens often have limited civil and political rights. In some
cultures, the Western idea of human rights as individual rights is completely
rejected. Emphasis on individual is viewed as egocentric, egoistic, and divisive.
For example, in Islamic countries religious concerns that dominate social life
have distinct primacy over individual rights. Unlike Western law, which is
primarily concerned with regulating public affairs of citizens and protecting
individual rights, the Islamic law seeks to regulate the entirety of human
existence leaving very little room for some civil rights and individual freedoms.
In some traditional societies, like Japan and India, concepts of personal loyalty
and obligation have been given far more weight than individual aspirations. In
those societies, self-worth and identity are viewed as stemming from groups to
which the person belongs rather than from what that person has accomplished.
References:
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-
5/6_glossary.htm
http://www.lincoln.edu/criminaljustice/hr/Classification.htm
http://www.lincoln.edu/criminaljustice/hr/Index.htm
Human Rights?
Human rights are freedoms established by custom or international agreement that
impose standards of conduct on all nations. Human rights are distinct from civil
liberties, which are freedoms established by the law of a particular state and
applied by that state in its own jurisdiction.
Human rights include the right to personal liberty and Due Process of Law; to
freedom of thought, expression, religion, organization, and movement; to freedom
from discrimination on the basis of race, religion, age, language, and sex; to basic
education; to employment; and to property. Human rights laws have been defined
by international conventions, by treaties, and by organizations, particularly
the United Nations. These laws prohibit practices such as torture, Slavery, summary
execution without trial, and Arbitrary detention or exile.
1. Inherent – Human Rights are inherent because they are not granted by any person
or authority. Human rights do not have to be bought, earned or inherited; they belong
to people simply because they are human. Human rights are inherent to each
individual.
2. Fundamental - Human Rights are fundamental rights because without them, the life
and dignity of man will be meaningless.
3. Inalienable - Human rights cannot be taken away; no one has the right to deprive
another person of them for any reason. People still have human rights even when the
laws of their countries do not recognize them, or when they violate them - for example,
when slavery is practiced, slaves still have rights even though these rights are being
violated. Human rights are inalienable. Human Rights are inalienable because:
5. Indivisible - To live in dignity, all human beings are entitled to freedom, security
and decent standards of living concurrently. Human rights are indivisible. Human Rights
are not capable of being divided. They cannot be denied even when other rights have
already been enjoyed.
6. Universal - Human Rights are universal in application and they apply irrespective of
one’s origin, status, or condition or place where one lives. Human rights are enforceable
without national border. Human rights are the same for all human beings regardless of
race, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin. We are all born
free, and equal in dignity and rights— human rights are universal.
Classification
Human rights can be classified and organized in a number of different ways, at an
international level the most common categorisation of human rights has been to
split them into civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights.
Indivisibility
The UDHR included both economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political
rights because it was based on the principle that the different rights could only
successfully exist in combination:
The ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may
enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his social, economic and cultural rights.
—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
This is held to be true because without civil and political rights the public cannot
assert their economic, social and cultural rights. Similarly, without livelihoods and a
working society, the public cannot assert or make use of civil or political rights
(known as the full belly thesis).
The indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights has been confirmed by
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and related. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
This statement was again endorsed at the 2005 World Summit in New York
(paragraph 121).
Categorization
Opponents of the indivisibility of human rights argue that economic, social and
cultural rights are fundamentally different from civil and political rights and require
completely different approaches. Economic, social and cultural rights are argued to
be:
positive, meaning that they require active provision of entitlements by the state
(as opposed to the state being required only to prevent the breach of rights)
resource-intensive, meaning that they are expensive and difficult to provide
progressive, meaning that they will take significant time to implement
vague, meaning they cannot be quantitatively measured, and whether they are
adequately provided or not is difficult to judge
ideologically divisive/political, meaning that there is no consensus on what
should and shouldn't be provided as a right
socialist, as opposed to capitalist
non-justiciable, meaning that their provision, or the breach of them, cannot be
judged in a court of law
aspirations or goals, as opposed to real 'legal' rights
Similarly civil and political rights are categorized as:
negative, meaning the state can protect them simply by taking no action
cost-free
immediate, meaning they can be immediately provided if the state decides to
precise, meaning their provision is easy to judge and measure
non-ideological/non-political
capitalist
justiciable
real 'legal' rights
Olivia Ball and Paul Gready argue that for both civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural rights, it is easy to find examples which do not fit into
the above categorization. Among several others, they highlight the fact that
maintaining a judicial system, a fundamental requirement of the civil right to due
process before the law and other rights relating to judicial process, is positive,
resource-intensive, progressive and vague, while the social right to housing is
precise, justifiable and can be a real 'legal' right.
Three generations
Another categorization, offered by Karel Vasak, is that there are three generations of
human rights: First-generation civil and political rights (These are "liberty-orientated"
and include the rights to life, liberty and security of the individual; freedom from torture
and slavery; political participation; freedom of opinion, expression, thought, conscience
and religion; freedom of association and assembly.)
Out of these generations, the third generation is the most debated and lacks both legal
and political recognition. This categorization is at odds with the indivisibility of rights, as
it implicitly states that some rights can exist without others. Prioritisation of rights for
pragmatic reasons is however a widely accepted necessity. Human rights expert Philip
Alston argues:
—Philip Alston
Reference: http://wahabohidlegalaid.blogspot.com/2013/03/human-rights-definitions.html
Question: How do you define human rights? How do you explain what they are?
A right is a claim that we are justified in making. I have a right to the goods in my shopping basket if I
have paid for them. Citizens have a right to elect a president, if the constitution of their country
guarantees it, and a child has a right to be taken to the zoo, if her parents have promised that they
will take her. These are all things that people can be entitled to expect, given the promises or
guarantees that have been undertaken by another party.
Human rights, however, are super claims with a difference. They are not dependent on promises or
guarantees by another party. Someone's right to life is not dependent on someone else promising
not to kill him or her: their life may be, but their right to life is not. Their right to life is dependent on
only one thing: that they are human.
An acceptance of human rights means accepting that everyone is entitled to make these claims: I
have these rights, no matter what you say or do, because I am a human being, just like you. Human
rights are inherent to all human beings as a birthright. Why should that claim not need any particular
behaviour to back it up? Why shouldn't we require human beings to deserve their rights?
A human rights claim is ultimately a moral claim, and rests on moral values. What my right to life
really means is that no-one ought to take my life away from me; it would be wrong to do so. Put like
that, the claim doesn't need backing up. Every reader is probably in agreement with it because we all
recognise, in our own cases, that there are certain aspects of our life, our being, that ought to be
inviolable and that no one else ought to be able to infringe, because they are essential to our being,
who we are and what we are; they are essential to our humanity and our human dignity. Without
human rights we cannot achieve our full potential. Human rights simply extend this understanding on
an individual level to every human being on the planet. If I can make these claims, then so can
everyone else as well.
Key values
Two of the key values that lie at the core of the idea of human rights are human dignity and
equality. Human rights can be understood as defining those basic standards which are necessary
for a life of dignity; and their universality is derived from the fact that in this respect, at least, all
humans are equal. We should not, and cannot, discriminate between them.
These two beliefs, or values, are really all that is required to subscribe to the idea of human rights,
and these beliefs are hardly controversial. That is why human rights receive support from every
culture in the world, every civilised government and every major religion. It is recognised almost
universally that state power cannot be unlimited or arbitrary; it needs to be limited at least to the
extent that all individuals within its jurisdiction can live with certain minimum requirements for human
dignity.
Many other values can be derived from these two fundamental ones and can help to define more
precisely how in practice people and societies should co-exist. For example:
Freedom: because the human will is an important part of human dignity. To be forced to do
something against our will demeans the human spirit.
Respect for others: because a lack of respect for someone fails to appreciate their individuality and
essential dignity.
Non-discrimination: because equality in human dignity means we should not judge people's rights
and opportunities on the basis of their characteristics.
Tolerance: because intolerance indicates a lack of respect for difference; and equality does not
signify uniformity.
Justice: because people equal in their humanity deserve fair treatment
Responsibility: because respecting the rights of others entails responsibility for one's actions and
exerting effort for the realisation of the rights of one and all.
This means that you cannot lose them, because they are linked to the very fact of human existence,
they are inherent to all human beings. In particular circumstances some – though not all – may be
suspended or restricted. For example, if someone is found guilty of a crime, his or her liberty can be
taken away; or in times of national emergency, a government may declare this publicly and then
derogate from some rights, for example in imposing a curfew restricting freedom of movement.
This means that different human rights are intrinsically connected and cannot be viewed in isolation
from each other. The enjoyment of one right depends on the enjoyment of many other rights and no
one right is more important than the rest.
Which means that they apply equally to all people everywhere in the world, and with no time limit.
Every individual is entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction of "race" or ethnic
background, colour, sex, sexual orientation, disability, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, birth or other status.
We should note that the universality of human rights does not in any way threaten the rich diversity
of individuals or of different cultures. Universality is not synonymous with uniformity. Diversity
requires a world where everyone is equal, and equally deserving of respect. Human rights serve as
minimum standards applying to all human beings; each state and society is free to define and apply
higher and more specific standards. For example, in the field of economic, social and cultural rights
we find the obligation to undertake steps to achieve progressively the full realisation of these rights,
but there is no stipulated position on raising taxes to facilitate this. It is up to each country and
society to adopt such policies in the light of their own circumstances.
Question: Why do you think that the need for international agreements arose, rather than individual
countries simply drawing up their own standards?
REFERENCE: https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/what-are-human-rights-
There are three overarching types of human rights norms: civil-political, socio-economic, and
collective-developmental (Vasek, 1977). The first two, which represent potential claims of individual
persons against the state, are firmly accepted norms identified in international treaties and
conventions. The final type, which represents potential claims of peoples and groups against the state,
is the most debated and lacks both legal and political recognition. Each of these types includes two
further subtypes. Scholar Sumner B. Twiss delineates a typology:
Civil-political human rights include two subtypes: norms pertaining to physical and civil security (for
example, no torture, slavery, inhumane treatment, arbitrary arrest; equality before the law) and
norms pertaining to civil-political liberties or empowerments (for example, freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion; freedom of assembly and voluntary association; political participation in
one’s society).
Socio-economic human rights similarly include two subtypes: norms pertaining to the provision of goods
meeting social needs (for example, nutrition, shelter, health care, education) and norms pertaining to
the provision of goods meeting economic needs (for example, work and fair wages, an adequate living
standard, a social security net).
Finally, collective-developmental human rights also include two subtypes: the self-determination of
peoples (for example, to their political status and their economic, social, and cultural development)
and certain special rights of ethnic and religious minorities (for example, to the enjoyment of their
own cultures, languages, and religions). (1998: 272)
This division of human rights into three generations was introduced in 1979 by Czech jurist Karel Vasak.
The three categories align with the three tenets of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and
fraternity.
First-generation, “civil-political” rights deal with liberty and participation in political life. They are
strongly individualistic and negatively constructed to protect the individual from the state. These rights
draw from those articulates in the United States Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen in the 18th century. Civil-political rights have been legitimated and given status in
international law by Articles 3 to 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Second-generation, “socio-economic” human rights guarantee equal conditions and treatment. They
are not rights directly possessed by individuals but constitute positive duties upon the government to
respect and fulfill them. Socio-economic rights began to be recognized by government after World War
II and, like first-generation rights, are embodied in Articles 22 to 27 of the Universal Declaration. They
are also enumerated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
Third-generation, “collective-developmental” rights of peoples and groups held against their respective
states aligns with the final tenet of “fraternity.” They constitute a broad class of rights that have
gained acknowledgment in international agreements and treaties but are more contested than the
preceding types (Twiss, 2004). They have been expressed largely in documents advancing aspirational
“soft law,” such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the 1994 Draft
Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights.
Though traditional political theory presents liberty and fraternity as inherently antagonistic (and
therefore would assert the incompatibility of “collective-developmental” rights with the preceding
generations), progressive scholars argue that the three generations are in fact deeply interdependent.
For example, Twiss argues that no single generation can be emphasized to the exclusion of others
without jeopardizing personas and communities over time, including jeopardizing the very interests
represented in the type or generation of rights being privileged. (1998: 276). He offers examples of
self-defeating imbalances that would result from the excessive prioritization of any one generation
over another:
Twiss rejects alleged incompatibilities between the three generations of rights. He asserts that, at
worst, there may by tension between such rights in specific societies and at periods of socio-historic
transition, but this does not mean tensions cannot be solved in a way that respects all three
generations of rights. Human rights are so thoroughly interconnected that it is difficult to conceive of
them as operating properly except in an interdependent and mutually supportive manner (1998: 276). 2
Although the three generations framework is a valuable conceptual tool for thinking about rights, it is
worth questioning some of its assumptions. Does the notion of a progression of rights and the metaphor
of age it is based on make sense? Do second generation rights create the background conditions
necessary for the exercise of first generation rights, as certain sections of the International Bill of
Rights suggest, or are it the other way around? Should second and third generation rights be viewed as
simultaneous? Does one generation take precedence over another, or are all equally important? Should
second and third generation rights even be considered rights, or are they something fundamentally
different?
The three generations framework contains within it room for many of the key debates about the nature
of rights. It also encourages us to take a critical approach in challenging our own assumptions about
rights as we begin to think about some of the real-world problems involved in the application of human
rights in the sections ahead.
REFERENCE: https://www.globalization101.org/three-generations-of-rights/
REFERENCE: https://www.globalization101.org/perspectives-on-rights/
Philosophers and political theorists make a distinction between negative and positive rights. A negative
right is a right not to be subjected to an action of another person or group; negative rights permit or
oblige inaction. A positive right is a right to be subjected to an action or another person or group;
positive rights permit or oblige action. In relation to the three generations of human rights, negative
rights are often associated with the first generation while positive rights are associated with the
second and third generations.
Negative and positive rights frequently conflict because carrying out the duties conferred by positive
rights often entails infringing upon negative rights. For example, the positive right to social welfare
confers a duty upon the government to provide services. Carrying out this duty entails increasing state
expenditures, which would likely require raising taxes. This would however infringe upon citizens’
negative right not to have their money taken away from them. Because positive rights imply positive
duties to take action whereas negative rights imply that others must only refrain from taking action,
positive rights are generally harder to justify and require more complex ethical substantiation than
negative rights.
Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin clarified the distinction in a famous lecture titled “Two Concepts of
Liberty.” If negative liberty is concerned with the freedom to pursue one’s interests according to one’s
own free will and without “interference from external bodies,” then positive liberty takes up the
“degree to which individuals or groups” are able to “act autonomously” in the first place (Berlin,
1958).1 In other words, what are the conditions under which individuals shape their understandings of
their own free will? What gives individuals a positive idea about how they should act, rather than
negative limitations on how they may not act?
There was some disagreement about the relative importance of these two conceptions during the
debates over the Universal Declaration and its Conventions.While the U.S. had adopted a welfare state
model under the New Deal reforms of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, economic and social rights
were not part of the American political tradition in the same way they had been for many continental
European governments or the increasingly powerful Soviet Union.
American disinclination to positive liberty can be attributed in part to the ideological campaign against
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviets gave a high place to the collective over the
individual. This meant priority for positive liberty, which they believed empowered the state to take
sweeping action to provide for the well-being and “self-realization” of its citizens, sometimes at the
expense of individual civil and political rights, such as the right to political participation.
Many in the West, however, viewed the Soviet position skeptically as a veiled attempt to return to the
excesses of authoritarianism that the United Nations system of governance was designed to had been
set up to prevent. Great injustices have often been committed for the benefit of the collective good.
Berlin and others were wary of “the way in which the apparently noble ideal of freedom as self-
mastery or self-realization had been twisted and distorted by the totalitarian dictators of the twentieth
century” (Berlin, 1958)Insisting upon the primacy of negative rights, however, impedes the
advancement of social justice by making it more difficult to justify allocating resources to help the
underprivileged yet easy to justify inaction.
Ultimately, it remains an open question whether the positive and negative forms of liberty are two
aspects of a common conception of rights or two distinct types of rights that are closely related
without being identical.
REFERENCE: https://www.globalization101.org/negative-vs-positive-rights/
Take, for example, the right to religious expression. This right ensures that members of religious
minorities are protected from interference in the exercise of their religious freedom; at the same time,
it means that they must display the same tolerance when it comes to other religious practices that may
differ from their own. In taking advantage of one’s own freedoms, one accepts an obligation to respect
the freedoms of others. Only in this way can the rights of all be protected and a measure of social
harmony is achieved.
Systems of social organization that give equal priority to both the community and the individual tend to
emphasize the dual nature of rights as both freedoms and duties. Society as a whole can only thrive
when everyone fulfills his or her obligations to their fellow citizens. Under this view, the ability to
exercise rights must first be earned by respecting them in others (Henkin, 1998). This principle is
enshrined in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, which states, in its first clause, that “Everyone has
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”
The doctrine of logical correlativity — that rights and duties are correlative — is dominant among
philosophers (Renteln, 1988). This view conceptualizes rights and duties as flip sides of the same coin;
one person’s right exists by exerting a duty upon others. For example, the right of free speech “is
understood in terms of the recognition that an individual’s interest in self-expression is a sufficient
ground for holding other individuals and agencies to be under duties of various sorts rather than in
terms of the detail of the duties themselves” (Waldron, 1979).
Logical correlativity affords a measure of flexibility to the formulation of international human rights
standards. Correlativity is crucial because it means that the framing of moral claims in terms other
than rights is not necessarily problematic. The recognition of an obligation may well signify the
presence of an implicit right; thus a moral theory couched in the language of duty can be a legitimate
vehicle for the advancement of rights (Renteln, 1988).
REFERENCE: https://www.globalization101.org/rights-vs-aspirations-vs-duties/