EN BANC

[G.R. No. 175592. June 14, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON C.

MAGBITANG , accused-appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN , J : p

Every child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known his
perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to
testify.
The Case
We resolve the appeal of accused Edison C. Magbitang of the July 21, 2006
decision, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) af rmed his conviction for the
composite crime of rape with homicide.
Antecedents
Magbitang was charged with rape with homicide under the information led by
the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija on February 22, 1999 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December 1998, in the Municipality of
Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, and taking advantage of the tender age of one [AAA], a seven year old
girl, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the latter against her will
and without her consent and after having satis ed his bestial lust, the accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle
the neck and choke the child victim to death, to the damage and prejudice of her
family and heirs, in such amount as may be awarded to them under the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Evidence for the State shows that at around 5 p.m. of December 25, 1998, 7-year
old AAA 3 asked permission from her mother, BBB, to go to a nearby store. BBB
allowed her daughter to leave the house, but the child did not return home. Later that
evening, the child's lifeless body was found by the riverbank. The post-mortem
examination of her cadaver revealed that she had succumbed to asphyxiation, and that
there were "incidental ndings compatible to rape." 4 The lone witness to what had
befallen AAA was 6-year old CCC, who recalled in court that he and AAA had been
playing when Magbitang approached AAA; and that Magbitang brought AAA to his
house. CCC testi ed on re-direct examination that he had witnessed Magbitang raping
AAA (inasawa), as well as burning her face with a cigarette (sininit-sinit). 5
Magbitang, denying the accusation, claimed that he had attended a baptismal
party on December 25, 1998, and had been in the party from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.; that
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 from the party he had gone looking for his nephew to have the latter tend to his
watermelon farm; that he had returned home by around 6 p.m.; that at around 7:30 p.m.,
he had gone to his farm to check on his nephew; and that he and his wife had remained
in the farm until 4 a.m. of the following day. 6
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on April 22, 2003, 7 the RTC found Magbitang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, nding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, this court hereby sentences him to death and to pay the heirs of
[AAA], the following
1. P100,000.00 in actual damages for the death of Rachelle
Mendoza, and
2. P50,000.00 in moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC held that CCC had the capacity to observe, recollect and communicate
what he had witnessed; hence, he was entitled to credence. It ruled that suf cient
circumstantial evidence pointing to Magbitang as the author of the rape with homicide
existed in the records considering his being the last person seen with AAA; that he had
admitted leaving the drinking session at the party around 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.,
thereby substantiating CCC's testimony; and that AAA's lifeless body had been found at
the back of his house. CAIHTE

Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA af rmed the conviction. It agreed with the RTC that CCC was a
competent witness despite his tender age because he showed his capacity to observe,
recollect and communicate whatever he had witnessed; that CCC, being only a child,
was not expected to give the exact details of the incident he had witnessed; that CCC
was able to positively identify Magbitang during the trial as the culprit; 9 and that the
evidence adduced by the Defense consisted only of the uncorroborated and self-
serving testimony by Magbitang.
Issues
In this appeal, Magbitang contends that the CA committed the following
reversible errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
MATERIALLY INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE 6-YEAR OLD WITNESS
[CCC].
II
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
LATTER'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. 10

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 Ruling of the Court
We sustain the conviction but modify the penalty.
To start with, the Court generally defers to the factual ndings of the trial court
by virtue of the latter's better position to observe and determine matters of credibility
of the witnesses, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during
trial. 11 This deference becomes rmer when the factual ndings of the trial court were
af rmed by the intermediate reviewing court. The Court does not disturb such factual
ndings unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value that were
plainly overlooked or misappreciated by the lower courts could affect the outcome of
the case. 12
A review of the records persuades the Court to declare that the RTC and the CA
correctly appreciated the evidence adduced herein. Hence, their factual ndings are
upheld.
Secondly, Magbitang's contention that CCC, being a child of tender age, was not
a competent witness because his testimony was lled with inconsistencies and
suffered from improbabilities was unfounded.
Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to
render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and
of relating the facts truthfully. 13 The testimony of the child of sound mind with the
capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the absence of
any showing of an improper motive to testify. 14 Once it is established that the child
fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full
credence. 15 In the case of CCC, the Defense did not persuasively discredit his
worthiness and competence as a witness. As such, the Court considers the reliance by
the trial court on his recollection fully justified.
And, thirdly, we dismiss the argument of Magbitang that the trial court
erroneously relied on circumstantial evidence to establish his criminal responsibility for
the rape with homicide. The evidence of guilt against him consisted in both direct and
circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence was supplied by CCC's testimony, while
the circumstantial evidence corroborated CCC's testimony. Such evidence, combined,
unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit.
In this connection, it is worth reminding that circumstantial evidence is not
necessarily weaker in persuasive quality than direct evidence. As the Court said in
People v. Villaflores: 16
We have often conceded the dif culty of proving the commission of rape
when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission.
The dif culty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide,
because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself
killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of
Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the
crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue
directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the
fact nder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue,
such that the fact nder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial
evidence. 17 To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when
to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free. 18DETACa

The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a

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 fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be
inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 19 Nor has
the quantity of circumstances suf cient to convict an accused been xed as to
be reduced into some de nite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus,
the Court said in People v. Modesto: 20
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of
circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage
from People vs. Ludday : 21 "No general rule can be laid down as
to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will
suf ce. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt."
Notwithstanding our concurrence with the ndings of the RTC and the CA, we
reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in view of the intervening enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346, 22 but without eligibility for parole of Magbitang. 23
Conformably with the ruling in People v. Jugueta , 24 which the Court recently
promulgated in order to lay to rest the inconsistencies in the xing of damages as part
of the civil liabilities in crimes, we modify the awards by imposing civil indemnity of
P100,000.00; moral damages of P100,000.00; and exemplary damages of
P100,000.00 because the penalty of death, although proper, had to be reduced to
reclusion perpetua in deference to the application of Republic Act No. 9346. 25 In
addition, although we delete the actual damages for failure to prove them, the heirs of
AAA were entitled to temperate damages of P50,000.00.
Lastly, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the damages
herein awarded reckoned from the finality of this decision. 26
WHEREFORE , the Court AFFIRMS the conviction of EDISON C. MAGBITANG
for rape with homicide; REDUCES his penalty from death to reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346; DELETES the award of
actual damages; GRANTS to the heirs of AAA temperate damages of P50,000.00,
exemplary damages of P100,000.00, civil indemnity of P100,000.00, and moral
damages of P100,000.00; IMPOSES interest of 6% per annum on all the damages
herein awarded reckoned from the nality of this decision; and ORDERS the appellant
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Leonen and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, * Peralta ** and Jardeleza, ***** JJ., are on official leave.
Del Castillo, *** J., is on wellness leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, **** J., took no part.
Footnotes
* On official leave.

** On official leave.
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 *** On wellness leave.
**** No part due to prior participation in the Court of Appeals.
***** On official leave.

1. Rollo, pp. 3-21; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid (retired), with Associate
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe (now a Member of the Court) concurring.
2. Records, p. 1.

3. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004), and its implementing rules, the real names of the victims, as well those of their
immediate family or household members, are withheld, and ctitious initials are
instead used to represent them, to protect their privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto ,
G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

4. Exhibit "A," RTC records, p. 6.

5. TSN, February 6, 2002, p. 3.

6. TSN, April 24, 2002, pp. 2-6.

7. CA rollo, pp. 24-27; penned by Judge Ismael P. Casabar.
8. Id. at 27.

9. Rollo, pp. 16-19.

10. CA rollo, p. 42.

11. People v. Ending, G.R. No. 183827, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 180, 190.
12. People v. Mangune, G.R. No. 186463, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 578, 588-589.

13. Section 21 (b), Rule 130, Rules of Court.

14. People v. Gacho, G.R. No. 60990, 23 September 1983, 124 SCRA 677.
15. Id.

16. G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 365, 384.
17. Id., citing People v. Ramos , G.R. No. 104497, January 18, 1995, 240 SCRA 191, 198; citing
Gardner, Criminal Evidence, Principles, Cases and Readings, West Publishing Co.,
1978 ed., p. 124.

18. Id., citing Amora v. People, G.R. No. 154466, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 485, 491.
19. Id., citing People v. Ramos, supra , note 14; citing Robinson v. State , 18 Md. App. 678, 308
A2d 734 (1973).
20. No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36, 41.
21. 61 Phil. 216, 221-222 (1935).

22. An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines (repealing Republic
Act 8177 otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, Republic
Act 7659 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and All Other Laws, Executive
Orders and Decrees).
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 23. Section 3, R.A. No. 9346.

24. People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

25. See People v. Notarion, G.R. No. 181493, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 618, 631.
26. People v. Combate , G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 797, 824; Nacar v.
Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.

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