FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 193156, September 26, 2018

IVQ LAND HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. REUBEN BARBOSA,

Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, C.J.:

This case returns once more to this Court after we ordered its
remand to the Court of Appeals in view of its singular and
complicated factual milieu. In our Resolution1 dated January 18,
2017, we directed the appellate court to conduct further
proceedings on the case and to receive additional evidence from the
parties, including but not limited to the evidence specifically
required by the Court. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals was ordered
to submit a report on its findings and recommended conclusions.
As the appellate court had since submitted its Report and
Recommendation2 to this Court, the case is now up for resolution.

The Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of Title

To recall the antecedents of the case, we quote the factual narration

laid out in our Resolution dated January 18, 2017, thus:

On June 10, 2004, Barbosa filed a Petition for Cancellation and

Quieting of Titles against Jorge Vargas III, Benito Montinola, [IVQ
Land Holdings, Inc. (IVQ)], and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q04-52842 in the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 222.
Barbosa averred that on October 4, 1978, he bought from Therese
Vargas a parcel of land identified as Lot 644-C-5 located on Visayas
Avenue, Culiat, Quezon City (subject property). Thereafter, Therese
Vargas surrendered to Barbosa the owner's duplicate copy of her
title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 159487. In the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa and in the copy of Therese
Vargas's TCT No. 159487, the subject property was described as:

A parcel of land (Lot 644-C-5 of the subdivision plan, LRC, Psd-140

38, being a portion of Lot 644-C, Fls-2544-D, LRC, Record No.
5975); situated in the District of Culiat, Quezon City, Island of
Luzon. x x x containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO (3,452) square meters, more or less.

Barbosa said that he took possession of the subject property and

paid real estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas.
Sometime in 2003, Barbosa learned that Therese Vargas's name
was cancelled and replaced with that of IVQ in the tax declaration
of the subject property.

Upon investigation, Barbosa found out that the subject property

was previously registered in the name of Kawilihan Corporation
under TCT No. 71507. Therese Vargas acquired the subject
property from Kawilihan Corporation and the date of entry of her
TCT No. 159487 was November 6, 1970. On the other hand, IVQ
supposedly bought the subject property from Jorge Vargas III who,
in turn, acquired it also from Kawilihan Corporation. The date of
entry of Jose Vargas III's TCT No. 223019 was October 14, 1976.
This title was later reconstituted and re-numbered as TCT No. RT-
76391. The title of IVQ, TCT No. 253434, was issued on August 6,
2003.

Barbosa argued that even without considering the authenticity of

Jorge Vargas III's title, Therese Vargas's title bore an earlier date.
Barbosa, thus, prayed for the trial court to issue an order directing
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Jorge
Vargas III's TCT No. 223019 and IVQ's TCT No. 253434 and
adjudicating ownership of the subject property to him.

In their Answer to the above petition, Jose Vargas III, Benito

Montinola, and IVQ (respondents in the court a quo) countered that
the alleged title from where Barbosa's title was allegedly derived
from was the one that was fraudulently acquired and that Barbosa
was allegedly part of a syndicate that falsified titles for purposes of
"land grabbing." They argued that it was questionable that an
alleged lot owner would wait for 30 years before filing an action to
quiet title. They prayed for the dismissal of the petition and, by way
of counterclaim, sought the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

The Register of Deeds of Quezon City neither filed an answer to

Barbosa's petition nor participated in the trial of the case.3
(Citations omitted.)

The Proceedings in the RTC

The trial court proceedings were likewise summarized in our

previous resolution in this wise:

During trial, Barbosa testified, inter alia, that he is the owner of the
subject property that he bought from Therese Vargas. The property
was at that time registered in her name under TCT No. 159487.
Barbosa took possession of the subject property seven days after he
bought the same and he employed a caretaker to live therein. Before
Therese Vargas, the owner of the property was Kawilihan
Corporation, which company was owned by Jorge Vargas. Barbosa
stated that the subject property remained registered in the name of
Therese Vargas as he entrusted her title to another person for
custody but the said person went to Canada. Barbosa paid real
estate taxes on the subject property in the name of Kawilihan
Corporation from 1978 until 2002. From 2003 to 2006, he paid real
estate taxes thereon in the name of Therese Vargas.
Barbosa added that in the year 2000, Santiago Sio Soy Une,
allegedly the president of Lisan Realty and Development
Corporation (Lisan Realty), presented to Barbosa's caretaker a Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, which was allegedly executed
by Jorge Vargas III and Lisan Realty involving the subject property.
Barbosa then went on to compile documents on the transactions
relating to the subject property.

Barbosa testified that in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of

Mortgage of Jorge Vargas III and Santiago Sio Soy Une, the Friar
Land Survey (FLS) number was denominated as FLS-2554-D, while
in the title of Therese Vargas it was FLS-2544-D. Barbosa obtained
a certification from the Lands Management Bureau that FLS-2554-
D was not listed in their electronic data processing (EDP) listing, as
well as a certification from the DENR that FLS-2554-D had no
records in the Land Survey Records Section of said office. On the
other hand, he obtained a certification from the Lands Management
Bureau that Lot 644 subdivided under FLS-2544-D was listed in
their records. Barbosa also learned that IVQ was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on June 5, 1998.
Moreover, on January 7, 2004, IVQ filed Civil Case No. Q-1 7499
(04); which is a petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim filed
by Santiago Sio Soy Une (Exhibit "RR"). In a portion of the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in said case, it was stated
that IVQ bought the property from Therese Vargas, not from Jorge
Vargas III.

Barbosa furthermore secured a certification from the EDP Division

of the Office of the City Assessor in Quezon City that there were no
records of real property assessments in the name of Jorge Vargas III
as of August 15, 2006. Moreover, Barbosa stated that Atty. Jesus C.
Apelado, Jr., the person who notarized the March 3, 1986 Deed of
Absolute Sale between Jorge Vargas III and IVQ, was not authorized
to do so as Atty. Apelado was only admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar in 1987. Also, the notarial register entries, i.e., the
document number, page number, book number and series number,
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ were exactly the same
as those in the special power of attorney (SPA) executed by Jorge
Vargas III in favor of Benito Montinola, who signed the Deed of
Absolute Sale on behalf of Jorge Vargas III. The Deed of Absolute
Sale and the SPA were notarized by different lawyers but on the
same date.

On the part of the respondents in the court a quo, they presented a

lone witness, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo. Her testimony was offered to
prove that she was the legal consultant ofiVQ; that IVQ's TCT No.
253434 was acquired from Jorge Vargas III through TCT No. RT-
76391; that Jorge Vargas III's title was mortgaged at Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Bacolod; that Benito Montinola, the attorney-
in-fact of Jorge Vargas III, sold the subject property to Lisan Realty
who in tum assigned its rights to IVQ and; that IVQ redeemed the
property from PNB. Barbosa's counsel offered to stipulate on the
offer so that the witness' testimony could already be dispensed
with.

As to the supposed sale to Lisan Realty and Lisan Realty's

assignment of rights to IVQ, the counsel for Barbosa agreed to
stipulate on the same of the transactions were annotated in Jorge
Vargas III's title. The counsel for IVQ said that they were so
annotated. Upon inquiry of the trial court judge, the counsel for IVQ
clarified that the transfers or assignment of rights were done at the
time that the subject property was mortgaged with PNB. The
property was then redeemed by IVQ on behalf of Jorge Vargas III.4
(Citations omitted ).

The Judgment of the RTC

The trial court thereafter rendered a Decision m favor of Barbosa,

viz.:

On June 15, 2007, the RTC granted Barbosa's petition and ordered
the cancellation of IVQ's TCT No. 253434. The trial court noted that
while the original copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Barbosa was not presented during trial, Barbosa presented
secondary evidence by submitting to the court a photocopy of said
deed and the deed of sale in favor of his predecessor-in-interest
Therese Vargas, as well as his testimony. The RTC ruled that
Barbosa was able to establish the existence and due execution of
the deeds of sale in his favor and that of Therese Vargas.

The Certification dated February 12, 2004 from the Office of the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC, Manila stated that
the page on which the Deed of Sale dated October 4, 1978 in favor
of Barbosa might have been probably entered was torn. This,
however, did not discount the possibility that said deed was
actually notarized and recorded in the missing notarial records
page. Moreover, the RTC found that Barbosa adduced evidence that
proved the payment of Therese Vargas to Jorge Vargas, as well as
the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas.

The RTC further observed that Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487
and Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. 223019 bear more or less identical
technical descriptions of Lot 644-C-5, except for their friar survey
plan numbers. However, the Lands Management Bureau and Land
Survey Records Section of the DENR, NCR issued certifications
attesting that their respective offices had no record of FLS-2554-D,
the land survey number in the certificates of title held by Jorge
Vargas III and IVQ. On the other hand, Barbosa presented a
certified true copy of the subdivision survey plan FLS-2544-D from
the Lands Management Bureau, thereby bolstering his claim that
the title of Therese Vargas was an authentic transfer of the title of
Kawilihan Corporation.

Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 was also issued earlier in time
than Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. 223019. Not only was the original of
Therese Vargas's TCT No. 159487 presented in court, but the same
was also proven to have existed according to the Certification from
the LRA dated October 6, 2003 that Judicial Form No. 109-D with
Serial No. 1793128 - pertaining to TCT No. 159487 - was issued by
an authorized officer ofthe Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

In contrast, the RTC noted that IVQ was not able to prove its claim
of ownership over the subject property. The deed of sale in favor of
IVQ, which was supposedly executed in 1986, was inscribed only in
2003 on Jorge Vargas III's TCT No. RT-76391 that was
reconstituted back in 1993. Instead of substantiating their
allegations, respondents in the court a quo opted to offer
stipulations, such as on the matter of Lisan Realty's assignment of
its rights of ownership over the subject property in favor of IVQ.
However, the said assignment was not reflected in the title of Jorge
Vargas III. The RTC likewise found it perplexing that when IVQ filed
a petition for cancellation of encumbrance in Jorge Vargas III's title,
docketed as LRC No. Q-17499 (04), it alleged therein that it
acquired the subject property from Therese Vargas, not Jorge
Vargas III.

The trial court added that while there is no record of tax

declarations and payment of real estate taxes in the name of Jorge
Vargas III, Therese Vargas declared the subject property for taxation
purposes in her name and, thereafter, Barbosa paid real estate
taxes thereon in her name. On the other hand, the only tax
declaration that IVQ presented was for the year 2006. The RTC also
opined that while Barbosa was not able to sufficiently establish his
possession of the subject property as he failed to put on the witness
stand the caretaker he had authorized to occupy the property, IVQ
also did not gain control and possession of the subject property
because the same continued to be in the possession of squatters.

To impugn the above decision of the trial court, IVQ, alone, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of Trial under the
representation of a new counsel. In its Motion for Reconsideration,
IVQ argued that the RTC erred in concluding that Barbosa's title is
superior to its title. IVQ alleged that Barbosa submitted forged and
spurious evidence before the trial court. On the other hand, in its
Motion for New Trial, IVQ alleged that it was defrauded by its former
counsel, Atty. Leovigildo Mijares, which fraud prevented it from fully
presenting its case in court. IVQ also averred that it found newly-
discovered evidence, which it could not have discovered and
produced during trial.
In an Order dated November 28, 2007; the trial court denied IVQ's
Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial/Reopening of Trial for lack of
merit.5 (Citations omitted.)

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

IVQ filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as

CA-G.R. CV No. 90609. IVQ made the following factual averments
in its Appellant's Brief:

On 12 March 1976, Kawilihan Corporation, represented by its

President and Chairman of the Board Jorge B. Vargas, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale x x x, whereby he sold the subject property to
appellant Vargas, III.

On 14 October 1976, TCT No. 71507 was cancelled and in lieu

thereof TCT No. 223019 x x x was issued in the name of appellant
Vargas, III who on 23 December 1976 executed a Special Power of
Attorney x x x in favor of appellant Benito C. Montinola, Jr. with
power among other things to mortgage the subject property for and
in behalf of appellant Vargas, III.

On 25 December 1976, appellant Vargas, III mortgaged the subject

property to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Victorias Branch,
Negros Occidental as security for a loan in the principal amount of
P506,000.00.

On 04 October 1978, Therese Vargas executed a Deed of Absolute

Sale x x x wherein she sold the subject property to appellee Barbosa
who however did not register the said sale with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City. It appears that Therese Vargas was able to
secure TCT No. 159487 x x x in her name on 06 November 1970
covering the subject property.

Meanwhile, appellant Vargas, III executed another Special Power of

Attorney x x x in favor of appellant Montinola, Jr. with power among
other things to sell the subject property for and in behalf of
appellant Vargas, III. Thus, on 03 March 1986, during the effectivity
of the mortgage contract with PNB, appellant Montinola sold the
subject property to appellant IVQ for and in consideration of the
amount of P450,000.00.6

Thereafter, the following incidents allegedly took place:

When appellant Vargas, III failed to pay his loan, PNB foreclosed the
mortgage and in the public auction that followed, the subject
property was sold to PNB.

A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB but the latter did
not cause the registration of the certificate of sale right away.

Sometime in 1991, appellant Montinola, Jr. caused the filing of a

Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. 223019 which was granted in
1993. Consequently, TCT No. RT-76391 was issued, in the name of
appellant Vargas, III, in lieu of TCT No. 223019. On 13 July 1993,
the Certificate of Sale in favor of PNB was inscribed on appellant
Vargas, III's new title.

On 17 February 1994, appellant Vargas, III executed a Deed of Sale

with Assumption of Mortgage x x x wherein he sold to Lisan Realty
and Development Corporation (Lisan Realty) the subject property
with the latter assuming the loan balance with PNB.

On 23 June 1994, appellant IVQ, for and in behalf of defendant

Vargas, III, redeemed the subject property from PNB and on 24
June 1994, the Certificate of Redemption was annotated at the
dorsal portion of TCT No. RT-76390.

On 21. August 2000, Lisan Realty caused the annotation of an

Affidavit of Adverse Claim x x x on TCT No. RT-76390.
Thereafter, appellant IVQ filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Encumbrance x x x with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 220, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-17499 (04).

On 06 August 2003, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled

TCT No. RT-76390 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 253434 was issued
in the name of appellant IVQ.

On 11 February 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,

Branch 220 rendered a Decision x x x granting appellant IVQ's
Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance and ordering the
cancellation of the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No.
253434.

In August 2004, appellant IVQ instituted [a] Complaint x x x for

unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 38 against several persons who were occupying the subject
property without any right whatsoever. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 38-33264.

On 26 October 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,

Branch 38 rendered a Decision x x x in favor of appellant IVQ
ordering the defendants therein to vacate the subject property.7

In a Decision dated December 9, 2009, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the judgment of the trial court as it found that Barbosa
was able to prove his ownership of the subject property. IVQ sought
reconsideration of the appellate court's ruling, but the same was
denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 30, 2010.

The Proceedings before the Court

IVQ then sought recourse from the Court.

IVQ instituted before this Court the instant petition for review on
certiorari on August 20, 2010, which prayed for the reversal of the
above rulings of the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated
September 29, 2010, the Court initially denied IVQ's petition for its
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error m its assailed rulings.

IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the denial of its petition.

To prove that its title to the subject property is genuine, IVQ averred
that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jorge Vargas III was
notarized by Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, then a notary public for
Mandaluyong. IVQ attached to its motion for reconsideration,
among others, a photocopy of a Certification dated October 8, 2010
from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City that
"ATTY. JEJOMAR C. BINAY was appointed Notary Public for and in
the Province of Rizal for the year 1976" and that he "submitted his
notarial reports for the period January, 1976 up to December,
1976." IVQ also attached a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Jorge Vargas III obtained from the records of the National
Archives on October 14, 2010.

To prove that Barbosa's claim of ownership is spurious, IVQ

attached to its motion for reconsideration the following documents:

(1) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 27, 2010 from the

Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court that Espiridion J.
Dela Cruz, the notary public who supposedly notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas, is not a member of the
Philippine Bar;

(2) a photocopy of the Certification dated October 19, 2010 from the
National Archives of the Philippines that a copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Therese Vargas is not extant in the files of
said office;

(3) a Certification dated October 12, 2010 from the Office of the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila, stating
that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa - Doc. No.
1947, Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978 -actually pertained to a
different deed of sale;

(4) photocopies of pages 90, 91 and 92, Book XIV, Series of 1978 of
Atty. Santiago R. Reyes's notarial records, which were reproduced
from the National Archives on October 14, 2010, showing that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa was not
found therein;

(5) a photocopy of a Certification dated October 14, 2010 of the City

Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, stating that Residence
Certificate No. A-423263 -the residence certificate number of
Therese Vargas in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa -
was not among those allotted to the City of Manila; and

(6) a letter dated October 20, 2010 from Director Porfirio R. Encisa,
Jr. of the LRA Department on Registration, explaining that the land
survey number of FLS-2554-D in IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was a mere
typographical error and it should have been FLS-2544-D.

In a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, the Court denied IVQ's

Motion for Reconsideration.

Undaunted, IVQ filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, arguing

that it was able to submit new pieces of documentary evidence that
surfaced for the first time when its Motion for Reconsideration was
submitted by its new counsel. IVQ entreated the Court to consider
the same in the higher interest of justice.

Barbosa opposed the above motion, countering that the same is a

prohibited pleading. Barbosa maintained that it was impossible for
IVQ to acquire ownership over the subject property as the latter was
only incorporated on June 5, 1998. Thus, IVQ could not have
bought the property from Jorge Vargas III on March 3, 1986 or
subsequently redeemed the property in 1994.

In a Resolution dated June 6, 2011, the Court reinstated IVQ's

petition and required Barbosa to comment thereon.

Barbosa moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution, citing

IVQ's lack of legal personality when it supposedly purchased the
subject property and IVQ's inconsistent statements as to how it
acquired the same. The Court treated the above motion of Barbosa
as his comment to IVQ's petition and required IVQ to file a reply
thereto.

In its Reply, IVQ primarily argued that Barbosa did not bother to
refute the allegations and the evidence on the spuriousness of his
title and instead sought to divert the issue by attacking IVQ's
corporate existence.

The Court, thereafter, gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In its memorandum, IVQ avers that while the evidence supporting

its case surfaced for the first time after its petition was filed with
this Court, peculiar circumstances involving the actuations of IVQ's
former counsel and Barbosa's introduction of spurious documents
warrant the suspension of procedural rules in the interest of
justice. IVQ insists that Barbosa was not able to prove his claim by
preponderance of evidence.

Upon the other hand, Barbosa contends that IVQ could not legally
claim ownership of the subject property as this claim is anchored
on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jorge Vargas III on March 3,
1986 while IVQ was incorporated only on June 5, 1998. Barbosa
also points out that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ was
signed only by Jorge Vargas III's representative, Benito Montinola.
There is no corresponding signature on the part of the vendee
Barbosa adopts entirely the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that the sale in favor of Therese Vargas is the one to be
legally sustained.8 (Emphases supplied. )

In our Resolution dated January 18, 2017, we did not rule on the
merits of the case and instead directed the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence relative to the documents belatedly submitted by
IVQ, as well as any other additional evidence that the parties may
choose to submit on their behalf. This we found necessary in light
of the ostensible materiality and relevancy of the documents
submitted by IVQ and in order to verify the authenticity and
veracity of the parties' documentary evidence.

We further instructed the parties to submit to the Court of Appeals:

(1) a certified true copy of TCT No. 71507 that is registered in the
name of Kawilihan Corporation, if possible; (2) evidence that would
establish the character of the· parties' possession of the subject
property; and (3) information regarding the results of the
investigation of the Task Force Titulong Malinis of the LRA as to the
authenticity of TCT No. 159487 registered in the name of Therese
Vargas and TCT No. 223019 registered in the name of Jorge Vargas
III.

The Report and Recommendation

of the Court of Appeals

Before the Court of Appeals, the parties agreed to submit additional

documentary evidence through the filing of memoranda and
additional testimonial evidence in the form of judicial affidavits.
They likewise manifested that they were open to the possibility of
reaching an amicable settlement.

The Court of Appeals then submitted to the Court its Report and
Recommendation,. the relevant portions thereof state:

On October 02, 2017, the parties' efforts to enter into an amicable

settlement proved to be futile. The parties manifested that they
could not agree on the terms of settlement that each proposed.
Accordingly, this Court required IVQ to present its witness in
support of its position. After Ian Pama, IVQ's lone witness,
identified his judicial-affidavit and the documentary exhibits
previously marked, counsel for Barbosa conducted his cross-
examination. Thereafter, IVQ rested its case. No rebuttal evidence
was proffered by Barbosa. On October 24, 2017, IVQ filed its
Formal Offer of Exhibits.

The parties failed to present a certified true copy of TCT No. 71507
registered in the name of Kawilihan Corporation as required by the
Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, [IVQ] offered in evidence the result of the investigation

of the Task Force Titulong Malinis of the LRA regarding the
authenticity of TCT No. 159487 registered in the name of Therese
Vargas and TCT No. 223019 registered in the name of Jorge Vargas
III. In the certified true copy of the Report dated September 01,
2016, the Investigation Team concluded that:

xxxx

Further, it is quite regrettable that the TFTM (Task Force Titulong

Malinis) could not determine with certainty which of the two (2)
titles is spurious [and] which is not in view of the fact that the
traceback titles, the supporting documents, as well as the registry's
record books are no longer available in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.

x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended

that the investigation of this case be terminated and that the same
be deemed closed. Let a copy of this report be furnished the parties
mentioned herein for their information.

xxxx
RECOMMENDATION

After a careful examination of the records of the case and the

additional evidence adduced by [IVQ], this Court finds that the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and [Barbosa] is
indeed tainted with irregularity as to the manner of its notarization.
Again, based on the certification, Atty. Santiago R. Reyes's Notarial
Reports for the month of October 1978 shows that Doc. No. 1947,
Book No. XIV, thereof refers to a document denominated as "Deed
of Absolute Sale" executed by and between Francisco T. Lim and
Teresita C. Narioca, Vendors and Santiago T. Co, Vendee, and not
between Reuben Barbosa and Therese Vargas. Unfortunately,
[Barbosa] failed to refute the same during the hearing. Thus, the
same is deemed a private document and needs to be properly
identified and its due execution proven. x x x

xxxx

Notwithstanding, this Court still recommends for the dismissal of

the petition pending before the Supreme Court.

Although the Deed of Absolute Sale was irregularly notarized, the

same was properly identified and its due execution proven during
the trial in the court a quo. During [Barbosa's] direct examination,
he testified that he entered into a contract of sale with Therese
Vargas as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, to wit:

"x x x x

Atty. Castillon, Jr.:

Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you bought this property from
Therese Vargas, do you have proof to show of the transaction you
entered into with Therese Vargas when you acquired or bought this
property?

A: Yes, sir, I have also here the original of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Therese Velez vda. De Vargas and I.

Atty. Castillon, Jr.:

Witness hands to this representation, Your Honor, a copy (of) the

Deed of Sale/Absolute Sale, this marked as our Exhibit "A". I
believe, Your Honor, Atty. Mijares may again make some
observations that this may not be a faithful reproduction because of
some ball pen increase but we [will] again have it again xerox copy
so we can present the faithful xerox copy.

Atty. Mijares:

Except for the submarkings, Your Honor, admitted as faithful

reproduction.

xxxx

Counsel for [IVQ] even admitted to the genuineness of the

document.

The trial court, therefore, was correct in admitting, as [Barbosa's]

evidence, the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and
Reuben Barbosa and in giving the same probative value. To
reiterate, the same was properly identified and was duly
authenticated during the trial of the case.

Anent the other certifications presented and formally offered by

[IVQ] to show that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Jorge Vargas
and Therese Vargas was improperly notarized, We recommend that
the same be given of little, if not no value.

At the outset, this Court notes that these certifications are merely
photocopies. Although, they were not objected to by [Barbosa] on
such ground and this Court had accordingly admitted the same,
this Court is not obliged to give them weight and probative value.

The transfer of the subject land between Jorge Vargas and Therese
Vargas is already fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act. The sale was consummated and a transfer
certificate of title (TCT No. 159487) had already been issued in favor
of Therese Vargas. Further, [Barbosa] had even secured a
certification from the LRA, which was already presented and offered
in evidence in the court a quo, confirming the validity of the
issuance of Therese Vargas's title.

As things are, the Report of Task Force Titulong Malinis of the LRA
marked as Exhibit "V" did not conclusively make a determination
regarding the authenticity of TCT No. 159487 registered in the
name of Therese Varg<;ts on one hand, and TCT No. 223019
registered in the name of Jorge Vargas III, on the other. Simply put,
it failed to determine whether the titles of Therese Vargas and Jose
Vargas III are genuine and authentic. It is, therefore, of little
significance to the resolution of the case.

Finally, the other documentary evidence presented and offered by

(IVQ] are insufficient to warrant a decision in its favor, either
because these had already been presented before the court a quo
or, even if they are newly offered in evidence, they are inadequate
and could not overturn the Supreme Court's dismissal of [IVQ's]
petition.

IN VIEW THEREOF, it is hereby recommended that [IVQ's] Second

Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED for lack of merit[.]9

The Ruling of the Court

We have perused the records of the case once again and we found
the recommendation of the Court of Appeals well-taken. IVQ still
failed to convince us to rule in its favor.

Secuya v. De Selma 10 reiterates that:

In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs or complainants must

demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an interest in, the
subject real property. Likewise, they must show that the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud
on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. This point is clear from
Article 476 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest

therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet title."

"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein."

We emphasize, to the point of being repetitive, that in this case, the

Court of Appeals sustained the judgment of the RTC that granted
Barbosa's petition for cancellation and quieting of title. The lower
courts found that Barbosa was able to substantiate his title to the
subject property, while IVQ failed to establish its claim of ownership
thereto.

We initially resolved to dismiss the petition of IVQ that assailed the

rulings of the lower courts in our Resolution dated September 29,
2010, but IVQ filed a Motion for Reconsideration whereby it
attached photocopies of specific documents that ostensibly negated
Barbosa's title to the subject property. On December 15, 2010, we
denied IVQ's Motion for Reconsideration. IVQ then filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration, entreating us to examine the case
again. On equitable grounds, we reinstated IVQ's petition.

Even if to the mind of the Court the documents belatedly submitted

by IVQ were not newly-discovered evidence, we remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals to conduct further proceedings on the case.
Not only was this done to give IVQ the opportunity to formally offer
in evidence the documents it brought to our attention and for
Barbosa to refute them, but also to give the parties yet another
chance to submit additional evidence in the interest of fairness and
the proper disposition of the issues of this case.

Inexplicably, IVQ merely rehashed its previous arguments and still

formally offered in evidence to the Court of Appeals mere
photocopies of almost all of the documents it attached to its motion
for reconsideration. Excepted from these are two documents,
namely: (1) the Certification dated October 12, 2010 from the Office
of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila,
stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa -Doc.
No. 1947, Page 92, Book No. XIV, Series of 1978- pertained to a
different deed of sale; and (2) the letter dated October 20, 2010 from
LRA Director Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr., explaining that the FLS-2554-D
in IVQ's TCT No. 253434 was a mere typographical error and it
should have been FLS-2544-D.

Additionally, IVQ attempted to introduce new documentary evidence

relative to the character of its possession of the subject property,
but the same likewise consisted of photocopied documents.

We find that the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not giving
weight and probative value to the submitted documents that were
mere copies. Given the significance and consequence of the original
copies of the documents in the outcome of this case, the same
should have been presented immediately to the Court or to the
Court of Appeals. The fact that the originals were not so submitted
is counter intuitive, dubious and even speaks of negligence on the
part of IVQ.

The Court reiterated in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Court of

Appeals11 that:

The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any
evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as
photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent a
clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, the photocopy must be disregarded,
being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
piece of evidence. (Citations omitted.)

Moreover, we stressed in Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez12 that:

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the
exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering
that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of
the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as
respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills
and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a
great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of
inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting
or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give
from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations
generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud.
Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place,
the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose
and defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences
resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)

In this case, IVQ offered no valid reason for the non-production of

the original copies of most of the documents it submitted before the
Court of Appeals. Worse, in its Formal Offer of Exhibits13 in said
court, IVQ even claimed that all the original and certified true
copies of the exhibits/documents enumerated therein were attached
to and were appended to form part of the records of the case
through the memorandum that IVQ submitted to the Court of
Appeals. This is simply untrue. We have carefully gone through the
documents annexed to said memorandum and found that almost all
of them were mere photocopies. Given the foregoing circumstances,
the Court of Appeals was justifiably cautious in doubting the
credibility of the documents submitted by IVQ. That the same may
have been tampered with or somehow altered in the process of
being copied cannot be discounted.

As to the documents the certified true copies of whi c i hn were

offe ;ed evidence before the Court of Appeals, the same still do not
warrant the reversal of the RTC and the Court of Appeals rulings.

With respect to the certified true copy of the Certification dated

October 12, 2010 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Manila, which stated that the notarial
entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Therese Vargas and Barbosa -Doc. No. 1947, Page 92,
Book No. XIV, Series of 1978- pertained to a different deed of sale,
the same pertained to a possible defect in the notarization of the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese Vargas and Barbosa.
However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the same was
insufficient to prove IVQ's allegation that the said deed was fake
and invalid.

As noted by the Court of Appeals, Barbosa testified on the

genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
favor and he presented the original of said deed. The TSN of the
case also bear out the fact that the then counsel of IVQ, Atty.
Leovigildo Mijares, was shown the original copy of the deed and a
photocopy thereof marked as Barbosa's Exhibit "A" and he admitted
that the latter was a faithful reproduction 9f the original deed. IVQ
was then bound by its counsel's admission.14

As to the letter dated October 20, 2010 from LRA Director Porfirio
R. Encisa, Jr. that explains that the FLS-2554-D in IVQ's TCT No.
253434 was a mere typographical error, the same pertains to an
entry in IVQ's TCT No. 253434 and does little to bolster IVQ's claim
of ownership over the subject property. The correctness or
incorrectness of the entries in a party's certificate of title covering a
particular property does not directly translate to the validity or
invalidity of said party's ownership or title to the property.

As the Court clarified in Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente

Ermac15:

[O]wnership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a

piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the
certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner. (Citations omitted.)

All told, despite the exceptional opportunity that was granted to it,
IVQ again failed to adduce sufficient and creditworthy evidence that
would convince us to reconsider our previous denial of its petition.

WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner

IVQ Landholdings, Inc. is hereby DENIED.