REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DIOSDADA I.

GIELCZYK,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179990, FIRST DIVISION, October 23, 2013, REYES, J.

In this case, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and
occupation for purposes of prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1,
1965, that the properties in question are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the
filing of the application of the respondent on July 17, 1995, the respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the said properties for only 29 years
and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year possession period. The
respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of
dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who testified to
substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone else to support
her claim of “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.”
Unfortunately, her testimony simply made general declarations without proof.

FACTS:

On July 17, 1995,Gielczyk sought the registration under her name of the lands
denominated as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-
072219-004551. Both lands were situated in Jugen, Consolacion, Cebu. In her verified
application in LRC Case No. N-452, she claimed that she is the owner of the two parcels of
land.

She further alleged that the said parcels of land were last assessed for taxation at
P2,400.00; that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage nor
encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest therein, legal or
equitable; that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30
years, including the possession of her predecessors-in-interest; that she acquired title to
said land by virtue of the deeds of absolute sale; and that said land is not occupied.

The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18, 1995 to the application for
registration of title of Gielczyk, alleging among others that neither the respondent nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the respondent
attached to or alleged in the application do not constituted competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since
June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said muniments of title do not appear to be
genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended
possession of the respondent to be recent vintage; that the respondent can no longer avail
of the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant since she has
failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, the
petitioner further alleged that the instant application was filed on July 7, 1995; and that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the petitioner and
the said parcel is not subject to private appropriation.
 On November 3, 1999, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision in favour of the
responden. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent was able to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, complete, continuous, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over
the lands subject of the application for original registration for a period of over 40 years
through mere tax declarations and in the absence of proof when the subject lots were
declared alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

HELD:

No. The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State
declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public use, public
service, the development of the national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial
property, and to meet the period of possession and occupation required by law.

In the assailed decision granting the respondent's application for registration of title,
the CA explained that the RTC's decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and
not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. The Court agrees with the CA's finding that the
RTC's grant of the respondent's application for registration of title was based on Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the same decree. As the CA, citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, correctly explained, an applicant
may apply for registration of title through prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529,
stating that patrimonial properties of the State are susceptible of prescription and that there
is a rich jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least 30 years.

In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-
interest have exercised acts of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only
the respondent who testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not
present anyone else to support her claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation." Unfortunately, her testimony simply made general declarations
without further proof. In the continuance of her testimony, the respondent added no further
information for this Court to conclude that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion
aside from paying taxes. The respondent's cross-examination further revealed that she and
her predecessors-in-interest have not exercised specific acts of dominion over the
properties.

From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself),
the Court can deduce that, besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A,
the respondent did not exercise acts of dominion over it. Neither can the Court give
credence to the respondent's claim that her predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion
over the property since the respondent failed to present any witness who would substantiate
her allegation. The pieces of documentary evidence, specifically the tax declarations and the
deeds of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because the same revealed no indication
of any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the respondent exercised
specific acts of dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute sale simply said that the
improvements on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two coconut trees, one mango tree, one
caimito tree and one jackfruit tree. The tax declarations have not shown any indication
supporting the respondent's claim that she exercised specific acts of dominion.

As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed that there were 14 coconut
trees, eight jackfruit trees, and a residential building, which was actually possessed by the
vendor Constancio Ceniza. Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200, 04210 and
13275 where it was declared that a residential building has been built in Lot No. 3136-A.[58]
And based on the records, Tax Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building was
first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be said then that it was only in 1981 when the
respondent's predecessors-in-interest exercised specific acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-
A, the period of which consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the respondent has not completed
the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation."

Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence, and considering
that the respondent did not present any other witness to support her claim, the Court has
no other recourse but to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence
needed to award her title over the two parcels of land.