People VS Manabat GR 242947 17july2019
People VS Manabat GR 242947 17july2019
People VS Manabat GR 242947 17july2019
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, the essential facts of the instant case
are as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To prove the charges against the appellant, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of the following witnesses, namely: PCI Anne Aimee T.
Pilayre, POl Gilbert Daabay, PO3 Michael Angcon, PO2 Lord Jericho N.
Barral [(PO2 Barral)] and SPO2 Roy P. Vertudes [(SPO2 Vertudes)]. Their
respective testimonies as summed up by the RTC are as follows:
xxxx
xxxx
The defense, for its part, presented Mario D. Manabat as [its] sole
witness. The gist of his testimony is as follows:
xxxx
After trial on the merits, in its Decision6 dated September 5, 2017, the RTC convicted
accused-appellant Manabat of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
1. In Criminal Case No. 18353, the Court finds the accused MARIO
MAN AB AT y Dumagay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165 for selling 0.2079 gram of shabu,
and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE
Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00) pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 18354, the Court finds the same accused
MARIO MANABAT y Dumagay, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation Sec. 11, Art. II, RA 9165 for possessing 1.8515 grams of shabu,
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve
(12) years and one days as minimum to Twenty (2) years as maximum
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand (₱300,000.00);
The shabu, cash money, and cellphone used in the commission of the
offense are hereby forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed in
accordance with the prescribed rules.
SO ORDERED.7
In sum, the R TC ruled that the evidence on record was sufficient to convict accused-
appellant Manabat. The R TC did not give credence to accused-appellant Manabat's
defense of frame-up as it deemed the same self-serving and unsubstantiated. It held
that the defense of a frame-up could not stand against the positive testimonies of
PO2 Barral and SPO2 Vertudes whose testimonies enjoy the presumption of
regularity. The RTC ultimately held that the prosecution sufficiently discharged its
burden of proving accused-appellant Manabat's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8
After carefully reviewing the records of the case, the CA found that:
The Issue
For resolution of the Court is the sole issue of whether the RTC and CA erred in
convicting accused-appellant Manabat of the crimes charged.
The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits accused-appellant Manabat for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant Manabat was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of
Article II of RA 9165.
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 11
On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165 has the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug. 12
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the
law. 13 While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven
procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, 14 the
law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to
ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, 15 the applicable law at the time
of the commission of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police
operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as
evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official,
(c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This must be so because with the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need
for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with
which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great. 16
As held in the fairly recent case of People v. Tomawis, 18 the Court explained that the
presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at
this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the
source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug, viz.:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public
elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting,
contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court
in People v. Mendoza19, without the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official
during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was
evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.20
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest.
It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that
would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the
seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the
presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual
defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able testify that the buy-
bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their
presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and
confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time
of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the
intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the
inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation".21 (Emphasis in the original)
Based from the foregoing, the Court holds that the buy-bust operation
was not conducted in accordance with law.
First, it is not disputed whatsoever that the witnesses were called and eventually
arrived at the scene of the crime only after the accused-appellant was
already apprehended by PO2 Barral. On cross-examination, PO2 Barral readily
admitted that during the apprehension of accused-appellant Manabat, the witnesses
were not present:
Q You mean to say that during the arrest, the witnesses did not arrive
yet?
Further, as testified by SPO2 Vertudes, the buy-bust team did not contact the
witnesses at all before the team arrived at the place of the buy-bust operation. The
witnesses were contacted only after accused-appellant Manabat was already arrested
and handcuffed:
Q Before you proceeded to ABC Printing Press you did not yet contact the
witnesses from the DOJ, the media and from the elected officials of the
barangay right?
Q Only after Mario was arrested and handcuffed that you did contact
those witnesses, correct?
A Yes, sir.23
In fact, the Court notes that the prosecution offered conflicting testimonies as regards
the time of arrival of the witnesses.
According to PO2 Barral, the witnesses arrived "[m]ore or less ten minutes" 24 after
they were called. To the contrary, when SPO2 Vertudes was asked as to when the
witnesses arrived, he first answered "three to five minutes sir."25 But when pressed as
to the veracity of his answer, considering that the buy-bust was conducted on a
Sunday, SPO2 Vertudes eventually admitted that the arrival of the witnesses was
completed "[f]ifteen to thirty minutes. "26
Further creating doubt as to the presence of the witnesses during the buy-bust
operation is the admission of PO2 Barral on cross-examination that the photographs
of the inventory do not show the presence of the witnesses, except for Councilor
Epifanio Woo:
Q The witnesses are not shown in these pictures during the search, right?
A No, sir.
Q All these pictures are also taken close up?
A Yes, sir.
A None, sir.
xxxx
A Yes, sir.
If the witnesses were indeed present during the entire photographing and inventory
of the evidence, obviously, it would have been easy and effortless on the part of the
buy-bust team to take photographs of the other witnesses. Yet, this was not done,
creating some doubt in the mind of the Court as to the presence of the required
witnesses during the buy-bust operation.
The apprehending team cannot justify its failure to ensure the availability of the
witnesses during the apprehension of accused-appellant Manabat, considering that
the buy-bust operation was conducted seven days after the day it received
information about accused-appellant and was instructed to conduct the buy-bust
operation. Simply stated, the apprehending team had more than enough time to
ensure that all the mandatory procedures for the conduct of the buy-bust operation
would be sufficiently met.
Second, the Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the prosecution was
irregularly executed.
To reiterate, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires that the copies of the inventory should
be signed by all the following persons: (a) accused or his/her representative or
counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Third, the Court notes that the marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was
irregularly done.
Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual,30 the conduct of
buy-bust operations requires the following:
xxxx
c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units
must be made;
f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that
suspect ge[t] hold of the same and his palm/s contaminated with the
powder before giving the pre-arranged signal and arresting the suspects;
i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect
for other concealed evidence or deadly weapon;
o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in
an evidence bag or in appropriate container and thereafter deliver the
same to the PNP CLG for laboratory examination. 31
At this juncture, it is well to point-out that while the RTC and CA were correct in
stating that denial is an inherently weak defense, it grievously erred in using the
same principle to convict accused-appellant Manabat. Both the RTC and CA
overlooked the long-standing legal tenet that the starting point of every criminal
prosecution is that the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent. 32 And this presumption of innocence is overturned only when the
prosecution has discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases and has proven the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, 33 by proving each and every element
of the crime charged in the information, to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or
for any other crime necessarily included therein. 34 Differently stated, there must exist
no reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and every element of the crime to
sustain a conviction.
To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus
immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs, that the
accused put forth a weak defense.
Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRRofR.A. No.
9165, a saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every
case of non-compliance with the procedures for the preservation of the
chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against
the accused. To warrant the application of this saving mechanism,
however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and
justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be
the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution
did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token
justification or explanation for them. The failure to justify or explain
underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the
evidence of the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been
compromised, the accused deserves acquittal.39
Lastly, it was an error for the RTC to convict accused-appellant Manabat by relying on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended in
favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.40 Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally
enshrined right to be presumed innocent.41 As the Court, in People v.
Catalan,42 reminded the lower courts:
Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust team with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, mainly
because the accused did not show that they had ill motive behind his
entrapment.
We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in relying on the
presumption of regularity.
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this,
accused-appellant Manabat must perforce be acquitted.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the San Ramon Prison
and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City, for immediate implementation. The said
Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
See Notice of Appeal dated September 3, 2018; rollo, pp. 19-21.
2
Rollo, pp. 3-18. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas with
Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Walter S. Ong concurring.
3
CA rollo, pp. 32-40. Penned by Presiding Judge Ric S. Bastasa.
4
Titled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
5
Rollo, pp. 4-10.
6
CA rollo, pp. 32-40. Penned by Presiding Judge Ric S. Bastasa.
7
Id. at 40.
8
Id. at 38-39.
9
Rollo, p. 18.
10
Id. at 13-14.
11
People v. Opiana, 750 Phil. 140, 147 (2015).
12
People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 198875 (Notice), June 4, 2014.
13
People v. Guzon, 719 Phil. 441, 450-451 (2013).
14
People v. Mantalaba, 669 Phil. 461,471 (2011).
15
The said section reads as follows:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
16
People v. Santos, 562 Phil. 458,471 (2007), citing People v. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273
(2000).
17
IRR of RA 9165, Art. II, Sec. 21 (a).
18
G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, accessed at
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64241>.
19
736 Phil. 749 (2014).
20
Id. at 764.
21
Supra note 18.
22
TSN dated October 25, 2016, p. 16.
23
TSN dated March 2, 2017, p. 21.
24
TSN dated October 25, 2016, p. 16.
25
TSN dated March 2, 2017, p. 22.
26
Id.
27
TSN dated October 25, 2016, pp. 18-19.
28
Records, p. 96.
29
See People v. Alagarme, 754 Phil. 449, 461 (2015).
30
Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [NG], the
precursor anti-illegal drug operations manual prior to the 2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF
Manual.
31
Id; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
32
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x."
33
The Rules of Court provides that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2)
34
See People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. 476, 503-504 (2012).
35
745 Phil. 237 (2014).
36
Id. at 250-251.
37
See People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 350 (2015).
38
797 Phil. 671 (2016).
39
Id. at 690. (Emphasis supplied)
40
People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 770 (2014).
41
People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).
42
699 Phil. 603 (2012).
43
Id. at 621.