The Quest For A General Theory of Leadership PDF

The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership
NEW HORIZONS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

Series Editor: Joanne B. Ciulla
Professor and Coston Family Chair in Leadership and Ethics,
Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, USA
This important series is designed to make a signiicant contribution to the dev

elopment of leadership studies. This ield has expanded dramatically in recent
years and the series provides an invaluable forum for the publication of high
quality works of scholarship and shows the diversity of leadership issues and
practices around the world.
The main emphasis of the series is on the development and application of
new and original ideas in leadership studies. It pays particular attention to lead
ership in business, economics and public policy and incorporates the wide range
of disciplines which are now part of the ield. Global in its approach, it includes
some of the best theoretical and empirical work with contributions to funda
mental principles, rigorous evaluations of existing concepts and competing
theories, historical surveys and future visions.
Titles in the series include:
Beyond Rules in Society and Business
Verner C. Petersen
The Moral Capital of Leaders
Why Virtue Matters
Alejo José G. Sison
The Leadership Dilemma in Modern Democracy
Kenneth P. Ruscio
The New Russian Business Leaders
Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, Stanislav Shekshnia, Konstantin Korotov
and Elizabeth Florent-Treacy
Lessons on Leadership by Terror
Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic
Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries
Leadership in Context
The Four Faces of Capitalism
Mark N. Wexler
The Quest for Moral Leaders
Essays on Leadership Ethics
Edited by Joanne B. Ciulla, Terry L. Price and Susan E. Murphy
The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership
Edited by George R. Goethals and Georgia L.J. Sorenson
The Quest for a General
Theory of Leadership
Edited by
George R. Goethals
E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of Leadership
Studies, Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of
Richmond, USA
Georgia L.J. Sorenson

Research Professor and Founder, James MacGregor Burns
Academy of Leadership, University of of Maryland, College
Park, USA and Chair and Professor of Transformation, US Army
NEW HORIZONS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© George R. Goethals and Georgia L.J. Sorenson 2006
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopy
ing, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
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Montpellier Parade
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 1UA
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

136 West Street
Suite 202
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA
A catalogue record for this book

is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

The quest for a general theory of leadership / edited by George R. Goethals,
Georgia L.J. Sorenson.
p. cm. (New horizons in leadership studies series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Leadership. 2. LeadershipPhilosophy. I. Goethals, George R. II.
Sorenson, Georgia Jones. III. New horizons in leadership studies.
HM1261Q47 2006
303.3'401dc22
2006004803
ISBN13: 978 1 84542 541 8 (cased)

ISBN10: 1 84542 541 3 (cased)
Typeset by Manton Typesetters, Louth, Lincolnshire, UK

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
To the Leadership and Legacy of
James MacGregor Burns
Contents
List of igures and tables viii

List of contributors ix
Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction xiv
1. A quest for a grand theory of leadership 1

J. Thomas Wren
2. Leadership and the human condition 39
Michael Harvey
3. The theory and metatheory of leadership: the important but
contested nature of theory 46
Mark C. Walker
4. Power 74
Michael Harvey
5. Leader–follower relations: group dynamics and the role of
leadership 96
Crystal L. Hoyt, George R. Goethals and Ronald E. Riggio
6. A framework for a general theory of leadership ethics 123
Terry L. Price and Douglas A. Hicks
7. Causality, change and leadership 152
Gill Robinson Hickman and Richard A. Couto
8. A constructionist lens on leadership: charting new territory 188
Sonia Ospina and Georgia L.J. Sorenson
9. Contemplating context 205
J. Thomas Wren and Elizabeth Faier
10. What we learned along the way: a commentary 221
Joanne B. Ciulla
11. Afterword 234
Index 241
vii
Figures and tables
FIGURES
1.1 Periodic table of leadership studies 13
3.1 Gill Hickman’s holistic, social constructive model 66
7.1 The leadership of Barbara Rose Johns 174
7.2 Analytical and contextual elements 182
9.1 Egg yolk drawing 213
TABLES
3.1 Schools of thought in international relations 52
3.2 Mark Walker’s matrix: schools of thought in the study of
leadership 56
3.3 J. Thomas Wren’s theoretical matrix 58
3.4 Gill Hickman’s matrix 60
3.5 Terry Price’s matrix 63
3.6 The objectivist vs. experientialist view 65
3.7 Four perspectives on the nature of truth in the philosophy of
science 69
7.1 Social tensions 169
7.2 Conditions for change 172
viii
Contributors
James MacGregor Burns is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Williams

College. He teaches at the Academy of Leadership at the University of Maryland
and has taught at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of
Richmond, Virginia. He is the winner of the Pulitzer Prize and National Book
Award for his biography of Franklin Roosevelt. Author of the seminal book,
Leadership, in 1978, and senior editor of the Encyclopedia of Leadership, he is
a pioneer in the ield of leadership studies. A political scientist and past president
of the American Political Science Association and the International Society of
Political Psychology, he received his education from Williams College, Harvard
University and the London School of Economics.
Joanne B. Ciulla is Professor and Coston Family Chair in Leadership and Ethics
at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, the University of Richmond, Vir
ginia, where she was one of the founding faculty members. A BA, MA and PhD
in philosophy, her books include The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal
of Modern Work; Ethics, The Heart of Leadership; The Ethics of Leadership;
Honest Work; A Business Ethics Reader (coauthored); and The Quest for Moral
Leaders (coedited). Ciulla is associate editor of the Leadership Quarterly and
is on the editorial boards of Leadership and the Business Ethics Quarterly.
Richard A. Couto helped found the Antioch PhD program in Leadership and
Change as well as the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of
Richmond, Virginia. He held the Modlin Chair in the latter and is currently
Professor in the former. His recent books focus on community leadership, To
Give Their Gifts; democratic theory and practice, Making Democracy Work
Better; and higher education, Courses in Courage. His contribution to this book
permitted him the twin opportunities of detailing both an increasingly visible
incident of the civil rights movement and leadership as causality. He grew up
in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Being a Boston Red Sox fan, since birth, has
helped him to maintain hope in the face of disappointment. Thus, he still trusts
in leadership for the democratic prospect.
Elizabeth Faier directs the Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak Program for Leader
ship at Zayed University in the United Arab Emirates and was previously a
ix
x The quest for a general theory of leadership
member of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Rich

mond, Virginia. She holds an AB from Cornell University and MA and PhD
degrees from Indiana University, all in the discipline of anthropology. Dr Faier’s
early research focuses on emergent leadership and identity among Palestinian
activists in nongovernmental organizations. Her other research addresses leader
ship in urban spaces, focusing on the ways in which leadership and social
relations are spatialized and made concrete within the built environment. She
is the author of Organizations, Gender, and the Culture of Palestinian Activism
in Haifa, Israel (Routledge, 2005).
George R. ‘Al’ Goethals is E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of

Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. He was on the
faculty of Williams College for 36 years where he served as chair of the depart
ment of psychology, founding chair of the program in leadership studies, acting
dean of the faculty, and provost. His recent scholarship has explored peer inlu
ences on academic achievement, imagemaking in presidential debates,
presidential leadership, and the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.
Michael Harvey is Chair of the Department of Business Management at Wash

ington College, Maryland. He has a PhD in government from Cornell University
and a master’s in international business from the University of WisconsinMil
waukee. He has written on Machiavelli and on leadership, literature, and
imagination. He is also interested in how leaders communicate, and is the author
of The Nuts and Bolts of College Writing.
Gill Robinson Hickman is currently a Professor in the Jepson School of Lead

ership Studies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. She has held positions
as dean, professor of public administration and human resource director. Her
books include Leading Organizations: Perspectives for a New Era, and Manag-
ing Personnel in the Public Sector: A Shared Responsibility (with Dalton Lee).
She is currently working on a forthcoming book titled, Leading Change in
Multiple Contexts: Connecting Purpose, Concepts and Practices.
Douglas A. Hicks, PhD is Associate Professor of Leadership Studies and Reli

gion at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies of the University of Richmond
and Director of the University’s Bonner Center for Civic Engagement. He is
author of two books, Inequality and Christian Ethics (2000) and Religion and
the Workplace (2003), both published by Cambridge University Press. He is an
editor, with J. Thomas Wren and Terry L. Price, of the threevolume reference
work The International Library of Leadership (2004). He has held a visiting
faculty position at Harvard Divinity School and has received summer research
support from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
Contributors xi
Crystal L. Hoyt is an Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies at the Jepson

School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. She
completed her doctorate in social psychology at the University of California at
Santa Barbara. Her research and curricular interests include social behavior,
leadership and group dynamics, research methodology in the social sciences,
examining the effects of stereotypes and discrimination on women and minority
leaders, leader perception, and the role of conidence in shaping group leader
ship. Her research has appeared in journals including Psychological Inquiry,
Group Dynamics, Small Group Research, Journal of Leadership and Organi-
zational Studies, Presence, and Leadership Review.
Sonia Ospina, is an Associate Professor of Public Management and Policy and

Codirector of the Research Center for Leadership in Action at the Robert F.
Wagner School of Public Service, New York University. Her research interests
include organizational and management theory; leadership in public contexts;
and public management reform, governance, and collaborative problem solving
in public service in the USA and in Latin America. She currently directs the
Research and Documentation Component of the Leadership for a Changing
World Program.
Terry L. Price is Associate Professor at the Jepson School of Leadership Stud

ies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. He has degrees in philosophy,
politics, and psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and the University of Oxford, and he completed his doctorate in philosophy at
the University of Arizona. His work has been published in outlets such as
American Philosophical Quarterly, Encyclopedia of Leadership, Journal of
Political Philosophy, Journal of Value Inquiry, Leadership and Organization
Development Journal, and Leadership Quarterly. He is coeditor of the three
volume reference set The International Library of Leadership and of The Quest
for Moral Leaders: Essays in Leadership Ethics. He is also author of Under-
standing Ethical Failures in Leadership (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Ronald E. Riggio, PhD is the Henry R. Kravis Professor of Leadership and

Organizational Psychology and Director of the Kravis Leadership Institute at
Claremont McKenna College. Professor Riggio is the author of over 100 books,
book chapters, and research articles in the areas of leadership, assessment cent
ers, organizational psychology and social psychology. His research work has
included published studies on the role of social skills and emotions in leadership
potential and leadership success, empathy, social intelligence, emotional skill
and charisma. He is an associate editor of the Leadership Quarterly and is on
the editorial boards of Leadership, Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, and Leader-
ship Review.
xii The quest for a general theory of leadership
Georgia L.J. Sorenson, PhD is Chair and Professor of Transformation of the

US Army at the Army War College, Pennsylvania, and Research Professor at
the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership at the University of Mary
land. She is founder of the Academy as well as a founder of the International
Leadership Association. She was visiting senior scholar from 2002–2004 at the
Jepson School of Leadership Studies. Sorenson is coeditor (with George Goe
thals and James MacGregor Burns) of the fourvolume Encyclopedia of
Leadership (Sage, 2004), and coauthor of Dead Center: Clinton–Gore Leader-
ship and the Perils of Moderation (Scribner’s) with James MacGregor Burns.
Sorenson serves as editor or associate editor of several leadership studies jour
nals including Leadership, Leadership Quarterly, and Leadership Review and
is on the board of numerous organizations devoted to leadership studies. Email:
gsorenson@academy.umd.edu
Mark C. Walker is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations

at American University in Washington, DC. He is the author of The Strategic
Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy (Palgrave, 2003); his
article on the role of morality, selfinterest, and leaders in international affairs
was published in Leadership Quarterly in 2006. His research agenda is based
broadly upon the individual decisionmaker – singly and in aggregate – and the
methodology of conducting leadership studies. He has applied his analytical
framework to international and domestic politics comparatively with a recent
attempt to understand the determining factor that affects decisionmaking in the
US national security council. He earned his MA and PhD in political science
from the University of California at Berkeley and his BS in political science
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Email: mcwalker@alum.mit.
edu.
J. Thomas Wren is Professor and Interim Dean at the Jepson School of Leader
ship Studies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. He received his BA from
Denison University. He has an MA and PhD in history from the College of
William and Mary, an MA in public policy from George Washington University,
and a JD from the University of Virginia. He is the coeditor of the threevolume
International Library of Leadership (Edward Elgar, 2004), and editor of The
Leader’s Companion: Insights on Leadership through the Ages (Free Press,
1995).
Acknowledgements
The editors wish to thank all of those – family, friends, and colleagues – who
made this scholarly venture possible. First, we want to express our special ap
preciation to our friend and mentor James MacGregor Burns for initially
challenging us take up the task of creating a general theory of leadership. We
hope this book justiies his faith in the project.
A special note of appreciation must be extended to the three institutions that
initially supported our efforts, namely, the Program in Leadership Studies at
Williams College, the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership at the
University of Maryland, and the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the
University of Richmond, Virginia. Kenneth Ruscio, Dean of the Jepson School,
has been particularly helpful and supportive, and we are grateful.
We wish to thank the scholars who pushed us onward in our journey – chapter
authors as well as others who weighed in from time to time, namely, Bruce
Avolio, Zachary Green, John L. Johnson, Jean LipmanBlumen, Deborah Mee
han, Ronald Walters, and Gary Yukl.
Deborah Meehan of the Leadership Learning Community provided an early
grant to support the initial phases of our efforts. This support, in conjunction
with that of Shelly Wilsey, allowed several lively sessions focused on our project
at the International Leadership Association meetings in 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Support from Williams College allowed us to use the beautiful facilities at
Mount Hope in Williamstown, Massachusetts for our extended planning retreat
in 2002. Lisa Carey Moore worked tirelessly with great skill and diplomacy on
all retreat arrangements. We wish to thank Michael Cassin and the Clark Art
Institute for an afterhours tour of the Clark’s superb collection, an experience
that enlivened considerably our creative thinking during our retreat.
We want to thank Joanne Ciulla for encouraging us to publish this volume
in her series on New Horizons in Leadership Studies. Her support for the
project, and her own contributions to it, are greatly appreciated. Cassie King
helped edit several of the book’s chapters and we are deeply grateful for her
talented assistance. We want also to thank Alan Sturmer at Edward Elgar for
his encouragement, patience, and wise counsel.
Nothing would be possible without the support of our families. To Marion
Goethals, Olive Sorenson Jones, and Suzanna Strasburg we owe more than can
be said simply here. Thank you.
xiii
Introduction
The chapters in this book tell the story of an intellectual journey of nearly ive
years’ duration. Early in the year 2001 James MacGregor Burns, to whom this
book is dedicated, asked the two of us, irst Georgia Sorenson and then Al Goe
thals, whether we would like to join him and others in writing an integrative
theory of leadership. We accepted the challenge, knowing that the chances of
any group of scholars actually producing such a theory were, quite frankly, low.
There were two dificulties. One, coming up with an integrative, or what we
came to call a general, theory was daunting in itself. Few if any intellectual dis
ciplines or ields have a widely accepted overarching theory. There are highly
inluential theories in many disciplines, such as plate tectonics in the geosciences,
but few comprehensive models. Two, trying to get a group of scholars from dif
ferent disciplines to come up with a single theoretical statement of any kind, or
quality, seemed foolhardy. Theories are not generally formualted by groups. Nor
are most essays, stories, novels, treatises or briefs. One might argue that parts
of some of the founding documents of the United States of American were pro
duced by groups, but we may judge that the better parts were largely produced
by individuals, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Nevertheless, we
proceeded, and through a process described in the opening chapter of the present
volume, we engaged a stellar group of scholars to work on the project.
Since we began, the composition of our working group (eventually termed
GTOL for general theory of leadership) has expanded. But the authors of the
chapters in this book have been consistently engaged. All or most of us have
met on eight separate occasions, for up to ive days at a time. The collaborative
experience has been extremely stimulating, both personally and intellectually.
Although we did not accomplish exactly what we set out to accomplish, we are
very pleased with this book. It reveals process as well as product. We have
learned as much about leadership from working together as from producing our
individual chapters. The scholarly community still awaits a general theory of
leadership, but we have taken the irst steps toward the goal of creating one.
The story of our quest is summarized in Tom Wren’s superb chapter detailing
the intellectual obstacles that we faced at the beginning of our journey. It reveals
that we let spirit and excitement perhaps overrule judgment in undertaking our
quest in the irst place. That we got as far as we did is clearly attributable to the
deft and sometimes subtle leadership of our common mentor, James MacGregor
xiv
Introduction xv
Burns. Wren tells the story of getting to that place in thorough and compelling
fashion. As he explains, as our group thought about how we might ever under
stand leadership, we realized that we needed to come to terms with some basic
aspects of the human condition. It turned out that coming to terms was not the
same as coming to agreement. Coming to terms, in the end, meant agreeing to
disagree about some fundamental issues. The various conclusions that several
of us reached are quite eloquently discussed in Chapter 2, Michael Harvey’s
essay on the human condition.
We also decided near the beginning of our undertaking that we needed to
confront the nature of theory. If we were to construct a general theory, it was
important to consider what a theory was and was not, and what it could do and
not do. This point of view was articulated persistently and ultimately persua
sively by our late colleague, Fred Jablin. Mark Walker graciously bowed to the
group’s pressure to write about the nature of theory as it applied to our project.
His very useful paper constitutes Chapter 3 in this volume.
With the three abovementioned chapters providing some foundation, we then
took on the task of composing chapters that dealt with what we early identiied
as the fundamental aspects of leadership that any overarching theory must ad
dress. These were power and motivation, leader–follower relations, ethics and
values, change and causality, meaning making, and historical and cultural con
text. The next three chapters deal with the irst three of these topics. Michael
Harvey provides an erudite discussion of the faces of power, as they have been
described in various literatures, from Shakespeare to social psychology to
Foucault. As Harvey (Chapter 4) explains, power can be quite subtle, or it can
be very direct. It can be mutual, lodged in interdependence, or it can be largely
asymmetric, wielded almost totally by only one party in an interaction. Our
challenge is to see how the many different kinds of power are employed in
leadership, and in followership. In Chapter 5, Crystal Hoyt, Al Goethals and
Ron Riggio discuss social psychological aspects of group dynamics and the
leader–follower relationship that are crucial to understanding the perils and
potentials of leadership. It is clear from their analysis that the results of group
dynamics and leadership can be constructive or destructive, ethical or unethical,
and that the outcome is largely dependent on the methods and morals of leaders.
We turn next to Terry Price and Doug Hicks’s (Chapter 6) consideration of per
haps the most universal, though largely unquestioned, philosophical question
in leadership – namely, the apparent and sometimes real role differentiation (and
inequality) in the leader–follower relationship. The GTOL group returned with
regularity over our years working together to issues of inequality and justice.
Price and Hicks constructively take up these questions as they discuss trait, situ
ational, transactional, and transformational approaches to inequality as well as
traditional and modern philosophical attempts to comprehend the dilemmas
inherent in this central human relationship.
xvi The quest for a general theory of leadership
The philosophical tension apparent in the search for equality brings us

squarely into the realm of mindful action, the purview of the concluding chap
ters. While most people agree that there is a great need for better leadership in
all circumstances, our group came to see that the understanding and practice of
sound leadership has a crucial role in addressing inequality and its consequences
– unequal distribution of wealth, power, opportunity, and dignity. Gill Hickman
and Dick Couto (Chapter 7) bring issues of leadership and inequality to center
stage by examining a key but largely unknown leadership event during the US
civil rights movement: the effort to desegregate schools in Prince Edward
County, Virginia. Hickman and Couto take issue with the ‘Newtonian, mecha
nistic and old science’ view of a leader or leaders initiating change and instead
offer a complex net of coarising historical, economic, group and environmental
factors that ebb and low, push and pull, to collectively birth change. Using a
constructionist approach as opposed to an essentialist one, they deftly demon
strate the interpenetrating and complex nature of leadership in action. Sonia
Ospina and Georgia Sorenson (Chapter 8) deepen this analysis by intensifying
the constructionist illume. They assert that a leadership event ‘happens when a
community develops and uses, over time, shared agreements to create results
that have collective value.’ Understanding the meaningmaking process in
groups helps us to be cognizant of understanding leadership and change from
the essential actors’ point of view, and not from our own formulations. Leader
ship, they conclude, is thus relational – oft times invisible – emergent and
contextually rooted in community.
Much of the work of the general theory scholars was not coming to conclu
sion but rather coming to conversation. Over the years there had been
wideranging debate in our group about whether a general theory of leadership
could be ahistorical and acontextual. Could there be a universal theory which
would apply across cultures and times – to drill down into the essence of the
elemental nature of human leadership? Our inal chapter – prior to the Com
mentary chapter and the Afterword, ittingly a conversation – is about context
in leadership. Scholars Tom Wren and Liz Faier, elucidate the differences in the
understanding of context from their own disciplinary perspectives (Chapter 9).
Historian Wren perceives context as the environment in which leadership takes
place while anthropologist Faier considers context more abstractly, as a space
constructed and named by those participating in events. Thus Wren and Faier
return to the old familiar mind and matter terrain. Does consciousness precede
being, as politician and philosopherplaywright Václav Havel suggested? This
deliciously metaphysical question and chapter provides a itting transition to
the two concluding pieces of our volume.
Joanne Ciulla contributes a thoughtful Commentary (Chapter 10), examining
the book’s central themes and the connections between each of the chapters. A
‘synthesis’ is probably impossible, but Ciulla’s commentary usefully distills
Introduction xvii
much of what we have discussed. Finally, James MacGregor Burns contributes

an Afterword, the story of his own struggles with understanding leadership and
building the foundation for the ield of leadership studies. On that foundation,
those who follow Jim’s leadership can continue to transform the ield. We wish
them well as they carry forward the quest and question of a general theory of
leadership.
George R. Goethals,
Georgia L.J. Sorenson
1. A quest for a grand theory of
leadership
J. Thomas Wren
What happens when a collection of scholars from differing disciplines comes

together to create a grand theory of leadership? This is the question philosopher
Joanne B. Ciulla came to identify as particularly intriguing as a group of aca
demics assembled to attempt precisely that. Although the substantive challenges
of creating a grand theory of leadership had always been the group’s focus, it
gradually dawned on the participants that how they were going about the task
of coming together across disciplines to create an integrated product was as
signiicant as what they were creating. Political scientist Georgia Sorenson noted
that ‘there is a process and a product here. We need to write about the relective
process’ as well.1 Similarly, in the throes of a particularly dificult debate over
foundational assumptions, Joanne Ciulla commented: ‘Perhaps we could show
what it’s like to be in a group of people trying to do this and what it is like to
do it: to watch people struggling with this intellectual [challenge].’2 Or, as Ciulla
later phrased it, ‘A paper on what happened when leadership scholars tried to
create a uniied theory might be more interesting and useful to the ield than
one on [the] uniied theory [itself].’3 The substantive output of the academics
engaged in this initiative is an important contribution, and is presented in this
volume. This opening chapter, however, purports to trace the challenges and
achievements of the process itself. In doing so, it also illustrates the pitfalls and
potential of a multidisciplinary ield such as leadership studies.
BEGINNINGS: CALL AND RESPONSE

In November, 2001, Pulitzer Prizewinning leadership scholar James MacGregor
Burns convened an interdisciplinary group of leadership scholars at the Jepson
School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond, Virginia. The aca
demics hailed from three universities with established leadership programs: the
University of Richmond, the University of Maryland at College Park, and Wil
liams College. Disciplines represented included political science, psychology,
philosophy, communications studies, history, public administration, anthropology,
1
2 The quest for a general theory of leadership
and religion. Since that beginning the group has expanded signiicantly, and cur
rently numbers 25 scholars and practitioners from a dozen institutions.4
At that November meeting, Burns outlined his vision. In the description pro
vided by the Chronicle of Higher Education in a later article on the venture,
Burns expressed his desire to ‘provide people studying or practicing leadership
with a general guide or orientation – a set of principles that are universal which
can be then adapted to different situations.’5 In short, Burns desired, in his term,
a ‘general theory of leadership.’ He also articulated a related objective, which
was to ‘legitimize a ield that some skeptics still dismiss as lightweight and ill
deined… . We are intent,’ said Burns, ‘on making [leadership studies] an
intellectually responsible discipline.’6
Two fellow scholars joined Burns in launching the project: George ‘Al’ Goe
thals of Williams College and Georgia Sorenson of the University of Maryland
and the Jepson School. These three became the governing ‘troika’ of the group,
and project leaders. Their irst task was to establish the parameters of the project.
Sorenson expanded upon both the need for the project and the proposed ap
proach the group should take. ‘I believe we urgently need to understand and to
communicate what we know about leadership,’ she began. She cited leadership
scholar Jerry Hunt, who stated: ‘What is missing, in addition to quantity of
theoretical formulations or models is a “grand” or generalized theory of lead
er–subordinate relationships – if such a theoretical development is possible.’
Likewise, Sorenson quoted Ralph Stodgill’s assertion that ‘the endless accumu
lation of empirical data has not produced an integrated understanding of
leadership.’7 Sorenson remarked with conidence that ‘in time, there will be a
general theory of leadership,’ citing the successful examples of the general
theory of relativity and successes in the ields of economics and criminology.
‘But whether this is possible or not,’ she concluded her charge to the assembled
scholars, ‘it is certainly incumbent upon us to better integrate what we already
know.’8
Sorenson coupled her call for a general theory with a vision as to how the
scholars might go about achieving it. ‘A General Theory of Leadership Project,’
she elaborated, ‘would have, for me, features of the Genome Project – a “hot
group” whose task is a careful construction of what is known, an identiication
of what is not known and needs to be known, an accounting of ideas/variables
that are in dispute or contradictory, and some hard thinking about how it all
hangs together. In short, we would be building a leadership DNA.’ Sorenson
also called for a second group to conduct metaanalyses of existing literature to
feed to the Leadership Genome Group.9 In the tradition of the ‘hot group,’ she
envisioned the creation of ‘a group that will hole up in a place for a long time
until we come up with a general theory.’10
With Burns, Goethals, and Sorenson having given the call for the construction
of a general theory of leadership, the next several months were given over to
A quest for a grand theory of leadership 3
the responses of the scholars, in the form of an exchange of papers. As might

be predicted from a group of academics, particularly one as multidisciplinary
as this, the rejoinders were widely disparate and sometimes contradictory, but
each represented a reasoned response to this notion of a general theory that was
to extend beyond disciplines to structure an entire ield of academic endeavor.
Approaching these position papers with analytical care, it is possible to identify
several key issues that would continue to engage the group over the coming
months and years. These initial debates among group members reveal both the
challenges and the possibilities of such multidisciplinary undertakings.
To be sure, the very idea of a general theory met with some skepticism. ‘I
ind the idea of a general theory of leadership Quixotic,’ wrote philosopher
Ciulla. ‘I have no inclination to work on developing one, but I am curious about
why some of my distinguished colleagues think we should.’11 All the scholars
who had reservations, however – including Ciulla – presented cogent reasoning
to buttress their concerns, often with speciic recommendations for ways to
circumvent the perceived dificulty. The ensuing debate energized the initiative.
It is worthwhile, then, to parse out the issues upon which the academics seemed
to divide.
One of the foundational issues was the very idea of an integrative theory. Al
though by their very participation in the project all members were committed
to the possibility of integration at some level, there was debate among those
who favored integration along the lines of the Burns/Goethals/Sorenson vision
and those who advocated the advantages of retaining the ‘let a thousand lowers
bloom’ approach more characteristic of the current multidisciplinary ield of
leadership studies. This tension between an integrated, unitary articulation of
leadership and an approach that argued for a more diverse conceptualization
would become one of the permanent fault lines of the project, and presaged
what could very roughly be labeled a divide between the approaches of the hu
manities and the social sciences. The remarkable thing was not that there were
such divisions, which were predictable and perhaps inevitable, but that the
scholars determined to persevere despite the differences. That is part of this tale.
First, however, it is important to stake out the concerns.
Douglas A. Hicks, a scholar whose work spans the disciplines of religious
studies and economics, made the case for a more inclusive approach by citing
the experiences of those two disciplines. In the ield of economics ‘there exists
one predominant general theory of economic systems and behavior,’ posited
Hicks. That general theory is ‘the standard neoclassical model … [that] largely
corresponds to the practice of freemarket capitalism.’ This unitary capitalistic
paradigm excludes all competing conceptualizations. In contrast to the ‘“true
way” in economics,’ continued Hicks, ‘there is no one clear methodology or
general theory in the study of religion… . Approaches vary widely; sometimes
they are complementary and sometimes contradictory.’ Hicks then made a spe
ciic application of his argument to the matter at hand: ‘It should be clear by
now,’ he wrote, ‘that debates about the meaning of prevailing methodologies,
or general theories of a ield are not exclusive to leadership studies.’ Given the
present state of the ield of leadership studies, he concluded, ‘it does not seem
either possible or preferable to design a general theory of leadership that deter
mines who is out and who is within a discipline – as has happened in economics.
Rather, the religious studies model of emphasizing disciplinary approaches – and
how they can be incorporated in a boundarycrossing conversation – seems the
more promising way to go.’ Hicks went on to propose a better approach: ‘I rec
ommend that we consider proceeding in terms of mapping parallel disciplinary
approaches to leadership… . This does not require denying that common ele
ments of leadership processes exist across contexts,’ he conceded, ‘but it does
not settle the question before we start. It also takes an inclusive view of who
can it in the tent of leadership studies and it invites us to move beyond the dei
nitional questions to substantive matters.’12
As Hicks’s inal comments made clear, there was nothing in this criticism
that implied that the efforts of the group were of little worth; quite the contrary.
Joanne Ciulla took a similar tack, and elaborated upon the rationale for a more
inclusive and diverse approach. Drawing upon her knowledge of the philosophy
of science, she cited the writings of Inre Lakatos, who had opposed Thomas
Kuhn’s rather linear conceptualization of scientiic revolutions. According to
Lakatos, ‘a ield of knowledge does not need everyone working under one para
digm to advance… . There is nothing wrong with a ield has a number of
research projects going on that work from differing paradigms.’13 Somewhat
similar to Hicks, Ciulla proposed a different approach. ‘I don’t think we should
be developing a theory, but rather looking at what we already have and thinking
about how to put the pieces together.’ What is needed is ‘a serious discussion
of the state of the ield and how we might help pull it together, not under one
theory, but as a web of approaches and perspectives and problems that constitute
leadership studies.’14
Other scholars evinced concern for anything that tended to reinforce the dis
persed state of the ield. James MacGregor Burns lamented the fact that ‘the
study of leadership has become fragmented and some would say even trivial
ized.’ The proposal to create a general theory of leadership is ‘an attempt to
bring some sort of order to the ield.’15 Others applauded the effort to achieve
some sort of synthesis. Richard A. Couto agreed that ‘as the ield of leadership
studies develops, some scholarship will have to devote effort to a synthesis of
theories,’16 while Burns suggested that ‘for some time now students of leader
ship have been working toward a theory of leadership that is more integrated
and inclusive and yet applicable and “practical,” without sacriicing rigor and
depth.’17 The ‘General Theory of Leadership Project’ [GTOL], as it came to be
called, was merely an extension of this salutary development.
In relecting upon this series of exchanges, the ultimate tension was not a
matter of clearcut support or opposition to a general theory of leadership so
much as it was a debate over the impact of setting boundaries. As anthropologist
Elizabeth A. Faier phrased it, ‘We have some boundary issues [that involve the
question] “what counts as leadership?”’ In making integrative decisions, some
ideas and approaches will inevitably be excluded. ‘What are we going to ex
clude?’ was, to Faier, the troubling question.18 Philosopher Terry L. Price
expanded upon the essence of the concern. In his initial reaction to the project,
Price thought ‘that an integrated theory of leadership was an interesting, but,
ultimately doomed project. Because particular disciplines are not themselves
integrated,’ he continued, ‘any effort to integrate work on leadership from the
various disciplines would involve assuming away important substantive ques
tions… . Accordingly, parties to the project would be at risk of sacriicing the
intellectual value of truth to the intellectual value of integration.’19
This did not mean that a resolution of the tension was not possible. Price,
who had posed perhaps the most cogent rationale against integration, eventually
converted to a more optimistic stance. ‘I begin with a confession,’ he wrote in
the second round of papers. ‘Since writing for the last set of papers, I’ve changed
my basic view of the endeavor.’ His earlier concerns about the dangers of inte
gration had not disappeared, but ‘although I still think this risk exists, our
discussions have led me to believe that it is signiicantly less threatening than I
originally thought.’ Price thought that it might indeed be possible to integrate
the insights of multiple disciplines, although the result could be ‘we might end
up with more than one reasonable, internally consistent theory of leadership.’
But ‘this need not strike us as a problematic outcome.’20 Price, in essence, was
able to perceive a result that allowed integration yet still respected differences.
Douglas A. Hicks reached his own truce with the issue by envisioning a broad
model of leadership. ‘Leadership is richest when we create space, instead of
setting boundaries,’ he said. ‘[We] need a theory that allows for conlict; that
creates space for it.’21 Thus, out of this foundational conlict came what would
become one of the strengths of the project: a theoretical conceptualization that
aspired to embrace a multitude of approaches to leadership. Although these
tensions remain and have not been fully resolved, progress has been made.
A somewhat parallel foundational discussion centered on the nature of theory,
a discussion that elucidated some of the contrasting disciplinary approaches and
assumptions of social scientists and humanists. Indeed, the term ‘theory,’ and
in particular the term ‘general theory’ – even though that became a part of the
moniker of the group – occasioned no little debate and even some consternation.
From the very outset, then, there was some ambiguity regarding the nature of
the ultimate product of the group.
In her opening presentation to the group, project leader Georgia Sorenson
posed the challenge in traditional theoretical terms. In a section entitled ‘A Brief
Reminder of the Parameters of Theory,’ Sorenson, quoting social scientists

Chester Schriesheim and Steven Kerr, noted that, ‘at least from a social science
perspective, “a theory should irst have internal consistency; that is, its proposi
tions should be free from contradiction. Second, a theory should have external
consistency; that is, it should be consistent with observations. Third, it must be
… stated so that its predictions can be veriied. Finally a practical theory should
have the attribute of scientiic parsimony.”’ Elaborating further, Sorenson de
ined a ‘general theory’ as ‘a metaview – one in which theories and their parts
are imbedded.’22
On the other hand, James MacGregor Burns, although he selected the term
‘general theory of leadership’ as the group’s objective, made statements that
appeared to belie a strict reading of the term. In his opening communication to
the scholars, he expressed interest in exploring ‘the analytical possibilities of
the study of leadership that could [at] least provide “principles of leadership”
for a leadership 101 class, just as one expects to learn the principles of physics
or chemistry in an introductory course.’ He appeared to acknowledge that the
efforts of the group might ‘only be a preface to more integrated theories of
leadership. As we work toward that goal,’ he continued, ‘we can at least try to
work out some generalizations on leadership.’23
This ambiguity as to desired outcome continued through the ensuing discus
sions. For their part, the academic participants differed concerning what the
term ‘theory’ might mean for purposes of this project. In an early discussion,
this notion of theory engendered uncertainty as to whether it meant, for the
group, a traditional social science perspective, or some more ‘Proustian’ ap
proach. As the philosopher Terry Price pointed out, ‘This raises a deeper
question to begin with: in the end, we come from our own disciplines. The
question of what is theory is determined by this.’24 Political scientist Richard
Couto added, ‘the importance of theory varies among the disciplines that con
tribute to the study of leadership, and the nature of theory varies among the
disciplines that hold it to be important.’25 And so it proved.
Predictably perhaps, social scientists and humanists viewed both the nature
of theory and its value differently. Couto outlined the essential nature of the
social science approach when he wrote that ‘in general, the social sciences hold
steadfastly to hopes of theories that, like those of the natural sciences, will ex
plain phenomena and enable social scientists to predict them as well.’26 And
Frederic M. Jablin, a scholar in communication studies, was close to his social
scientiic roots when he urged the group to be precise in its approach. ‘Although
I am hopeful as to our ability to develop an integrative theory,’ he wrote, ‘I do
have concerns … about our work. First, I am still unsure as to whether or not
we have a common understanding of “theory” (e.g., axiomatic theory, grounded
theory, midrange theories)… .’27 Jablin went so far as to suggest that if the
group was serious about constructing a legitimate theory, it should hire a con
sultant to ‘present a primer on theory building to help frame what theory looks
like.’28
Others in the group, primarily humanists, resisted the social science perspective.
Joanne B. Ciulla, a philosopher, remarked: ‘Perhaps I have been misinterpreting
the phrase “general theory of leadership.” To my ears it sounds restrictive and
unrealistic, given the nature of leadership as a phenomena… . Leadership, unlike
physics, is about human behavior, which does not lend itself to deductions from
a theoretical system.’29 Another suggested in the initial discussion that ‘solutions
may come from other than traditional ways of looking at theory.’30
Again, the challenge the group faced was how to reconcile a difference in
perspective. And again, the members of the group demonstrated a willingness
to make the attempt. Social scientist Frederic M. Jablin, for instance, had ini
tially questioned ‘whether or not what we are shooting for as an outcome is a
“theory” or something else.’ However, he also went on to say ‘I’m OK with
“something else,” but I would like for us all to have a common understanding
of that outcome.’31 Unfortunately, Jablin’s call for a speciic resolution of the
nature of theory for purposes of the group’s work was not heeded. Subsequent
group activities suggest, however, that the resolution has been in favor of a
broader, more humanistic approach.
The discussion of the nature of theory generated also a critique by some
members of the group of the assumptions that apparently underlay the project.
Speciically, these scholars questioned the validity of the assumption of linearity
that seemed to undergird the theoretical discussion. This line of criticism seemed
to stem from two distinct rationales. The irst simply argued that the process of
leadership was too complex to capture in any sort of linear model or theory.
This usually took the form of advocacy for some sort of systems approach.
Joanne Ciulla was one who championed this sort of approach. Early on, she
posed the question: ‘Can we look at it from a systems perspective?’ This might
capture subtleties that ‘theories exclude.’ ‘If we look at it from systems theory,’
she reasoned, ‘we can learn a great deal about how to make connections and
inferences.’32 This criticism of traditional theoretical approaches, it would seem,
was not particularly devastating to the project. As Frederic Jablin noted, while
a systems approach is nonlinear, it remains a process model of leadership.33 In
any event, James MacGregor Burns seemed amenable to proceeding along these
lines, if it suited the will of the group. ‘Leadership,’ he said, ‘lends itself to a
systems approach.’34
Other members of the group posed a more fundamental critique of traditional
notions of theory as framing an understanding of the world, one that struck at
the heart of the idea of an a priori theoretical framework. Anthropologist Eliza
beth Faier articulated this position most forcefully. To Faier, the very idea of
some universal theory of leadership was problematic. To begin with, there was
a dificulty with any conceptualization of universalism. While admitting ‘we
[must] seek out ways to “make sense” … ,’ nevertheless ‘to fully understand
the ways in which leadership unfolds means that we have to recognize the limi
tations and positionality of “making sense.”’ Moreover, in addition to the fallacy
that there is only one, unitary, perspective to be had, Faier also rejected the no
tion that the leadership relation could ever be conceived of as static. To Faier,
‘leadership … is a process wholly dependent on human action, local problems,
social structures, history, and systems of beliefs, values, and symbols… .
[E]mbracing static models obscures the changes that occur within cultural sys
tems, individual acts of agency, and social practices of leadership… .’ Finally,
Faier argued, traditional theory does not allow for the dynamics of identity for
mation. ‘Leadership,’ she suggested, ‘stems from and plays into identity
formation. … Bypassing the impact of the multiple, overlapping, and competing
levels of leader and follower identities (age, gender, race, nation, community,
etc.) ignores fundamental elements of the human tradition.’35
Richard Couto also depicted a postmodern conceptualization of theory. Hav
ing explained the rational and scientiic approaches of social scientists, he
described other scholars who ‘distance themselves from an effort to “reduce”
human events to science altogether or to outdated paradigms of the natural sci
ences. Among the latter group of postmodern [scholars],’ Couto asserted, ‘the
effort to ind a general theory of leadership smacks of a quixotic Enlightenment
era quest promoted by a Newtonian scientiic view of a mechanical universe.
Some members of this group,’ he continued, ‘would assert that if there is a
general theory of leadership, it will low from new postNewtonian natural
scenarios, which emphasize systems and probability.’ Even that may be asking
too much of some, for ‘the group divides along the line of whether or not general
theories are possible.’36
For his part, Couto set about the task of suggesting how such an approach
might look. He began with a traditional ‘Analytical Framework of Leadership,’
complete with matrix. But this was clearly insuficient. ‘If only the study and
conduct of leadership were as easy or neat as a set of straight lines and boxes!’
Couto wrote. He then transformed it into a ‘Dynamic Model of Leadership,’
but, as he explained it, ‘moving leadership from the straight lines of the printed
page to actual day to day experience means moving to a dynamic system of in
terrelated parts and subsystems of constant change without clear boundaries – a
fractal, not a chart… .’ Thus, ‘all the elements of leadership and their compo
nents swirl in interrelated activity and in everchanging patterns of all the factors
of the framework, analogous to the activity at the subatomic level of matter.’
This model was suficiently complex that it ‘unfortunately cannot be placed on
paper,’ although the reader was given a link to ‘An Animated Model of Quantum
Leadership.’37
Clearly, the above critiques of linearity in thinking about leadership, if ac
cepted, have varying degrees of impact upon the group’s output. As suggested
above, systems thinking, while an important departure, can still be more or less
incorporated into traditional ways of thinking about leadership. The epistemic
and constructivist criticisms, and certainly the quantum view of leadership the
ory, are less easy to reconcile. Ultimately, the GTOL group has not passed
judgment one way or the other; one will ind elements of the competing views
in subsequent chapters of this volume. Tensions such as this have generated
some argument for substituting multiple narratives of leadership for an inte
grated approach. The nature of this debate within the group will be addressed
later in this chapter.
Although the above analysis has identiied the most serious challenges to a
general theory of leadership that the responding academics posed, it does not
exhaust the cautions and concerns that various scholars expressed. These can
be treated more briely.
Related to the earlier discussion of integration is the ‘is/ought’ paradox; that
is, the tension between descriptive approaches to theory and prescriptive or
normative ones. Philosopher Terry Price identiied this concern. According to
Price, ‘pure descriptivists of the empiricist ilk might claim that there is nothing
on the other side of the divide.’ On the other hand, while ‘pure prescriptivists
will hardly deny the place of the descriptive enterprise, … they might fail to
acknowledge its relevance to the task they have set for themselves, viz., discov
ering how leaders and followers should behave.’ It is possible, argued Price, that
the ‘is/ought gap’ is just too great for a general theory to straddle. ‘Unfortu
nately,’ he went on, ‘what we understand to be the nature of their interaction
may ultimately depend on our pretheoretical assumptions … about the interface
of descriptive and prescriptive considerations.’ If true, this could have serious
consequences for the project. ‘My guess, then,’ continued Price, ‘is that the na
ture of interplay between the prescriptive and descriptive components of
leadership is signiicantly more complex than much of the literature lets on.
This does not bode particularly well for a general theory of leadership,’ because
‘insofar as the project of coming up with a general theory of leadership takes
for granted that real integration is warranted, it unjustiiably privileges some
pretheoretical options over others.’ Price saw only one solution. ‘To do justice
to important intellectual values in addition to the value of integration, our gen
eral theory will have to make room for the full range of pretheoretical positions
with respect to the interface between the descriptive and … prescriptive sides
of the subject of inquiry.’38
While Price concerned himself with pretheoretical assumptions, Frederic
Jablin weighed in with concerns about the levels of analysis to be employed. ‘I
hope that as we proceed we consider the applicability of our work in terms of
“micro” (e.g., dyadic, interactional) as well as “macro” (e.g., culture and struc
tures) levels of analysis and in terms of everyday/mundane as well as
extraordinary contexts and processes. … I fear we lean toward the macro and
the extraordinary in our discussions of leadership and do not fully consider that
our ideas need to translate to lower levels of analysis (dyads, groups) as well as
to “ordinary”/mundane leadership contexts.’39
Still others had more general cautions to convey. Elizabeth Faier, an anthro
pologist, was concerned that nonWestern perspectives might get short shrift.40
She urged the group members to ‘move … beyond simplistic categorical and
deinitive notions of leadership that are not applicable to nonWestern contexts.’
Similarly, Faier cautioned that ‘Leadership theorized within different cultural
and historical venues must take difference and change into account; I have
doubts,’ she concluded, ‘as to whether an integrative theory could make room
not only for group variance but such changes in cultural systems.’41 In another
vein, Price urged the group to recognize also that its theorizing about leadership
would inevitably ‘raise important ethical questions.’ Creating a leadership theory
will necessarily involve a prescriptive aspect, Price argued, and this ‘focus on
moral leadership, and its analysis, will tell us something about not only what
ends ought to be pursued but also what constitutes their ethical pursuit.’42
There were, then, a number of important concerns. caveats, and cautions
voiced by the scholars in response to Burns, Goethals, and Sorenson’s call for
an integrated theory of leadership. In the ensuing months and years (as we shall
see), some were addressed and resolved, others rejected, and still others simply
ignored. But before we continue the narration of this quest for a general theory
of leadership, it is important to acknowledge that the response to the initial call
for such a theory yielded more than skepticism. Several scholars embraced the
challenge, and produced initial papers that sought to move the enterprise for
ward. A summary of these, and their implications for the project, is in order.
Not surprisingly, several of the scholars looked to their own disciplines for
insight. Social psychologist Zachary Green sought to explain leadership as a
part of a group phenomenon. ‘Leadership,’ he argued, ‘is a function of the group.
Beyond person or process, leadership is an expression of the actions or inten
tions of a human collective. Without the group, leadership remains in the realm
of the potential… .’43 Another psychologist, Al Goethals, asserted that ‘perhaps
the most important argument is to place more focus on the emotional and psy
chological bonds between leaders and followers, and to understand how these
dynamics combine with other factors, especially cognitive factors, to produce
leadership.’44 He proceeded to cite classic psychological studies such as those
by Sigmund Freud and by French and Raven, as well as studies of the persuasion
process and cognitive dissonance theory.
Elizabeth Faier also turned to her home discipline of anthropology for insight,
but with considerable caution. She acknowledged that traditional anthropologi
cal studies had much to offer the understanding of leadership. ‘Anthropology
studies leadership,’ she wrote, ‘as social structure, social practice, and a com
ponent of culturally speciic phenomena such as kinship, authority and power,
prestige, legal and economic systems, symbols, culture change, and identity
formation.’ But there were also signiicant dificulties posed by the anthropo
logical approach. For one thing, ‘one characteristic of anthropological research
is that data drive theory rather than data prove a hypothesis – this obviously
poses a great challenge to the incorporation of anthropology into an integrative
theory.’ Moreover, as was discussed earlier in Faier’s challenge to a linear theory
of leadership, modern anthropology tends to take a constructivist approach to
knowledge. As Faier put it, ‘anthropologists are not only intimately involved
with the collection of data but also with its construction.’ Still and all, Faier ar
gued that an anthropological approach holds out great hopes for the better
understanding of leadership. ‘I would like to suggest,’ she concluded, ‘that an
thropology’s contribution extends beyond case studies into ways we can theorize
the relationship among leadership, social practice, and cultural logic. Moreover,
linking leadership to broader questions of how people negotiate structure and
agency or to the relationship between the individual and society would enable
a “thicker” examination of leadership processes… .’45
It is useful to pause here and consider the implications of these disciplinary
references. By grounding their papers in their respective disciplines, these schol
ars implicitly adopted the stance of advocating the development of leadership
theory from a multidisciplinary perspective. It was, in a sense, a reprise of the
earlier debate about the risks of attempting to achieve an integrative theory.
There, it will be recalled, some group members argued that too much would be
lost by integration or, as some phrased it, drawing boundaries. Douglas A. Hicks,
whose arguments were cited in the earlier analysis, made the strongest statement
for this multidisciplinary approach. Drawing upon his specialty of religious
studies, Hicks noted that ‘the ield of religious studies is divided [much like
leadership studies] along methodological, even disciplinary lines. The phenom
ena of religion are studied via anthropological, historical, sociological,
philosophical, theological, and even literarycritical methodologies.’ Given this
state of affairs, Hicks relected upon his probable response if just such an integra
tive task were presented to his home academic ield. ‘If I, as a scholar of religion,’
he wrote, ‘were called upon to produce a General Theory of Religion, I would
think irst in terms of these disciplinary approaches. I would refuse to prioritize
some universal theory… . While there are points of tension and possible contra
diction among such views, they illuminate different dimensions… .’46
Yet despite the strong arguments of those among the group who supported
a multidisciplinary approach, there proved to be undoubted complications
arising from the fact that scholars from many disciplines were involved. Be
cause this became a reality with which the group would consistently struggle,
it is worthy of brief mention here. As Richard Couto put it, ‘the problem is not
with inclusiveness but with the conlicting nature of disciplines in interdisci
plinary study and of clashing paradigms within disciplines.’47 Although it
oversimpliies the matter, it is useful to think of the problem in terms of two

camps: the social scientists and the humanists. Joanne Ciulla framed this debate
well. She cited C.P. Snow’s comment that there are ‘two cultures’ of scholars.
‘In Snow’s day,’ Ciulla explained, ‘they were the humanities and the natural
sciences. Today the split is between the humanities and the social sciences.’
Returning to Snow’s remarks, he noted that these two categories of scholars
represented ‘two groups – comparable in intelligence, identical in race … who
had ceased to communicate.’48 Ciulla went on to cite also ‘the philosopher Carl
Hempel [who] offers insight into why it is so dificult to it together research
from different disciplines.’ Hempel focused not on methodology so much as
he did the differing contributions provided by the scholarly camps. Hempel
‘argues that the role of empirical science is to describe the world, but we also
need to explain and understand it.’ Ciulla then provided her own typology of
the scholarly world: ‘Description is generally done by social scientists, expla
nation by historians, anthropologists, religious scholars, etc., and critical
analysis by philosophers.’49
The collection of insights set out above reveals the Gordian knot set out before
the assembled scholars. As Ciulla makes clear, all the tribes of the scholarly
community have something important to offer this bold attempt to portray
leadership. On the other hand, as Snow and several of the debates outlined above
suggest, there are real and substantive differences among scholars in terms of
assumptions, focus, and methodology. Fortunately, the GTOL group never
reached the stage of noncommunication perceived by Snow. Indeed, the entire
process has been marked by remarkable openness among the participants.
Nonetheless, the differences among the disciplines have remained among the
most intractable of the challenges facing those seeking a general theory of
leadership.
Finally, in our analytical tour of the responses by the academicians to the call
for a general theory of leadership, some of the group members responded to the
initial charge by submitting proposed models or narratives of leadership in
tended to serve as the irst step toward the creation of a grand theory. These
scholars accepted the call for a general theory as a valid – albeit intimidating –
task for a group of interdisciplinary scholars to undertake.
J. Thomas Wren, for example, irst created a ‘Periodic Table of Leadership,’
in which he attempted to locate and classify ‘as many approaches to leadership,’
said Wren, ‘as I could recollect.’ (See Figure 1.1 as an example of this integra
tive approach).This typology, he wrote, ‘goes beyond … leadership theory per
se, and seeks to include what might be called the “liberal arts” approaches to
leadership, as well as some of the more recent qualitative models.’ Having at
tempted to portray the universe of leadership studies in an organized way, Wren
proceeded to outline what he called a ‘Process Model’ of leadership that began
with an ‘initiating event,’ followed by ‘constituent response,’ and so on through
I II IV
CONTEXTUAL INDIVIDUAL NORMATIVE
Hi Tt Ps Ci Il
Historical A. Trait Trait Personality Citizen Instrumental
Approaches Theory Approaches Leader Approaches
Cu Bv Ob Sr Tl
Cultural B. Behavioral Behavior Organizational Servant Transformational
Approaches Theory Behavior Leader Leadership
Cc Im At Mo Py E Tg
Cross C. Cognitive Implicit Attribution Motivation Psychological Ethical Transforming
cultural Theory Theory Theory Approaches Theory Leadership
Di F Ro Ch Ld Sf Va Cg
Diversity Follower Role Charismatic Leader Self Values Change
Approaches Approaches Theory Theory Development Leadership Approaches Theory
Od Rv
Organizational Revolutionary
Design Approaches
13
Gr
Gender III V
Approaches PROCESS METHOD
Cy Si De Pg Qu
A. Contingency Contingency Situational Decision PathGoal Quantitative
Theory Theory Theory Theory Method
Ic Lm Tr Ql
B. Transactional Idiosyncasy Leader/Member Transactional Qualitative
Credits Exchange Leadership Method
Po Co In Gp De Cr Au Pb
Power Communication Inluence Group Democratic Conlict Authority Problem
Approaches Theory Approaches Process Theory Resolution Issues Based
Ls St Tm Vi Sy Pr Aw Ar
Leader Strategic Team Vision Systems Participatory Adaptive Action
Substitutes Approaches LDSF Approaches Theory Approaches Work Research
Figure 1.1 Periodic table of leadership studies

leader emergence, policy debate, outcome, implementation, and feedback loop.

Wren then placed upon a diagram of his model ‘the abbreviations from the Pe
riodic Table to suggest some of the approaches to leadership that might be most
relevant to each particular stage of the model.’ Whether the model itself was
valid was less important to Wren than the fact that he had attempted to create
‘a model of the leadership process demonstrating how the disparate approaches
to leadership might be integrated into a coherent intellectual structure.’ From
that, believed Wren, could come a coherent theory of leadership.50
Gill Robinson Hickman, a scholar of public administration, similarly articu
lated a model of the leadership process that began with a need for action,
followed by a recognition of purpose, communication, concurrence and willing
ness to participate, and, inally, collective action.51 So, too, did political scientist
Richard Couto propose a model of leadership. ‘The ield of leadership studies,’
he asserted, ‘has work to do to create models of direct and deliberate democratic
leadership. This paper explains how this might be done within a synthesis of
recent leadership scholarship that amounts to a general theory of leadership.’
Then, drawing from the works of James MacGregor Burns, Howard Gardner,
and Ronald Heifetz, Couto discussed the role of narratives in leadership, the
range of values in democratic discourse, and the concept of adaptive work.52
Finally, James MacGregor Burns himself contributed an elegant narrative of
leadership ‘As a process leadership begins, in my view, with palpable human
wants and needs that can be broadly generalized. Potential leaders … respond
to these wants and legitimize them as needs deserving of recognition and re
sponse… . Conlict arises out of the competition of people for economic and
psychological satisfactions.’ Then, ‘as basic needs for food and shelter are met,
people develop hope for the satisfaction of “higher” needs.’ As Burns summed
it up, ‘the clues to the mystery of leadership lie … in a powerful equation: em
battled values grounded in real wants, invigorated by conlict, empower leaders
and activated followers to fashion deep and comprehensive change in the lives
of people.’ To this process ‘leaders bring their own resources, including their
skills, into play as they relect the underlying forces. They recognize and articu
late the wants and needs, mobilize supporters, sharpen conlict, fashion new
agreements among participants, innovate creative outcomes that transcend the
original parameters of conlict and – always – strengthen and elevate the whole
process by bringing to bear the most exacting moral criteria.’53
Faced with such a plethora of responses to the call for the creation of a general
theory of leadership, the group considered several possible alternatives. The irst
and most obvious one was to throw in the towel, write the experience off as a
‘learning’ one, and proclaim that the time was not yet ripe – if ever it would be
– for the creation of a general theory of leadership. It is a testament to the group’s
goodwill and dedication to the mutual endeavor that no one seriously put this
possibility forward. A second alternative, one quite familiar to academics, was
to continue to argue over the issues, imitating Grant, who once said ‘I am pre
pared to ight along this line if it takes all summer.’ This would have led to many
fascinating discussions, but would, in all probability, have proved fruitless. The
General Theory of Leadership group chose a third alternative, one suggested by
project leader Georgia Sorenson. Referring to her observations of university
politics, Sorenson noted that members of academe often adopt a iction. ‘Some
universities operate as … an “as if” organization. As faculty, we participate as
if students and learning are paramount, as if faculty had a voice, and as if ad
ministrators are not judged by capital campaigns.’54 This became known to the
group as the as if condition. As Terry Price articulated it, ‘Our modus operandi
[should] be one of acting “as if.” That is to say that we should act as if it were
possible to integrate what the various disciplines have to say about leadership.’55
In sum, the assembled scholars agreed to put aside their quite real reservations
and differences on some of the fundamental issues, and to move forward together
in a continuing discussion of leadership, with open minds and willing attitudes.
And so the work on a general theory of leadership continued.
A considerable amount of space has been devoted to a portrayal of the amal
gam of skepticism, fundamental differences in approach, and positive proposals
for going forward that greeted the initial proposal that a group of scholars from
multiple disciplines should create a general theory of leadership. This level of
detail appears justiied in a chapter which seeks to portray the intellectual chal
lenges of the creation of such a grand theory. The analysis of the ensuing stages
of the work of the GTOL group can be somewhat more condensed, as the schol
ars, for the most part, adhered to the as if condition and suppressed the sort of
fundamental criticisms that characterized the irst stage of the process. Still and
all, the group’s continuing efforts revealed both remarkable progress toward a
uniied understanding of leadership and underlying tensions in the process which
threatened the ultimate success of the undertaking. It is to the narration of that
story that this analysis now turns.
The collection of academicians that had come to be known as the GTOL
group continued to meet and exchange papers on a regular basis. For purposes
of analytical coherence, the remainder of this chapter will be divided into seg
ments linked to the gatherings of the group that produced key moments or
turning points in the process.
RICHMOND: DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE

PROJECT
Following the initial meeting with James MacGregor Burns, Al Goethals, and
Georgia Sorenson in November 2001 and an exchange of papers in early 2002,
the participants in the General Theory of Leadership project met again at the
Jepson School of Leadership Studies in Richmond for three days in March. This
represented their irst facetoface, substantive meeting of the participating
scholars. As might be anticipated from a gathering of a dozen scholars from
multiple disciplines who had been called together to address such a complex
and amorphous topic, the ensuing discussion was freewheeling and somewhat
undisciplined [at one point in the midst of a rambling exchange, James Mac
Gregor Burns, in near despair, reminded the group of the ‘need to refocus’].56
For purposes of coherence in the narration, if not perfect chronological accuracy,
the following analysis will impose more order upon the discourse than was ap
parent at the time. For example, many of the reservations and differences of
opinion regarding the notion of a general theory of leadership discussed in the
preceding section of this chapter were addressed in the March meeting, but for
purposes of this chapter, the relevant commentary has been folded into the ear
lier discussion, supra. With this caveat regarding editorial license, we can turn
to the insights of the Richmond meeting.
Because this is a chapter dedicated to exploring the intellectual challenges
posed by the attempt to create a multidisciplinary general theory of leadership
more than it is a report on substantive outcomes, a detailed report on the content
of the Richmond deliberations is unnecessary here. However, one of the things
that made the Richmond meeting important to the ongoing process was the
general tenor and scope of those substantive discussions. That is to say, as the
assembled scholars undertook the consideration of one topic after another, there
emerged a consistent pattern regarding the group’s level of analysis and what it
found to be important. More speciically, this particular gathering of scholars,
drawn from both the humanities and the social sciences, chose to discuss the
phenomenon of leadership at a rather high level of abstraction, usually in
‘macro’ terms, and with a perceptible concern for the normative consequences
of the leadership relation. Thus this initial discussion, although many of its
precise conclusions would not have a large impact upon later deliberations,
nevertheless was an important stage in the group’s progress toward its intended
goal. In sum, the Richmond meeting helped to frame the general outlines of the
group’s approach to a general theory of leadership.
Upon convening in Richmond, one of the irst orders of business was to con
sider how to begin the discussions in an organized fashion. Al Goethals, who
with Burns and Sorenson formed the troika who managed the project, suggested
that ‘a problemoriented approach may be useful.’ He went on to propose that
the group look to speciic cases, such as ‘9/11’ or school shootings, and attempt
to deduce insights into leadership. From such analysis could come insights into
such leadership issues as the role of leaders, decisionmaking, sensemaking,
and organizational structures.57 In the end, however, it was the agenda offered
by James MacGregor Burns that carried the day. Burns proposed that the group
could begin to move toward an integrated understanding of leadership by dis
cussing what he considered to be the key ‘elements’ of leadership: power,

motivation, leader–follower relations, and values. Once the scholars had parsed
these constructs from the perspectives of their respective areas of expertise,
thought Burns, the group could then begin the ultimate task of attempting some
sort of integration. The scholars acceded to this proposal, and the effort toward
constructing a general theory of leadership began in earnest.58
The group’s examination of the construct of ‘power’ provides a good example
of the expansive parameters of the approach taken toward leadership. The dis
cussion began in a rather traditional fashion. Acknowledging that ‘power is one
thing that distinguishes the leadership relation,’ it was suggested that one way
to pursue the analysis would be to consider (a) a deinition of power, (b) the
sources of power, (c) the use of power, and (d) the ethics of its use. Beginning
along this path, the initial deinitions of power tracked traditional social science
conceptualizations such as ‘the capacity to inluence.’ At this point, however,
the discussion took a turn. The deinition of power moved into a postmodernist
conceptualization. Citing Foucault’s notion that ‘power is in the system; … it
is imbedded in social relations and institutions,’ some argued that ‘power is a
relationship,’ often an unequal one. In another metaphor, power was depicted
as a ‘conversation’ which ‘is always going on – it is luid.’ This soon morphed
into a consideration of the consequences of power, particularly for notions of
human agency and capacity.59
This willingness to consider one of the central constructs of leadership in its
broadest reaches would become typical for the group. Moreover, this was joined
by an attempt to make linkages to a wide range of related constructs. This latter
tendency of the group became manifest in the discussion when Gill Robinson
Hickman and Douglas Hicks proposed consideration of an extreme case – that
of slavery, with its seeming exercise of absolute power by one side and the total
denial of human agency to the other. From that limiting case, Hickman and
Hicks derived separate portrayals of the dynamics of the operation of power.
Hickman explained her depiction: ‘One way to elucidate the workings of
power in leadership,’ she said, ‘is to look at three related continua, involving
power, motivation, and action.’ Power, when applied in an individual situation
such as slavery, is characterized by individual powerwielding and inequality.
At the other end of the spectrum is powersharing among a collective, which is
more egalitarian. Motivation in the case of slavery is mere desperation, while
in the collaborative case there is trust and the possibility of sustainability. Like
wise, when one looks to action, unequal powerwielding results in no individual
agency, while the sharing of power yields full agency. Hickman’s model, in the
words of one observer, represents a ‘move from parsimony to complexity,’ and
George Goethals suggested that ‘leadership’ may be the transitioning from the
limiting ends of the continua to that of a more collective, egalitarian allocation
of power and full agency on the part of the participants.60
Doug Hicks, building upon Hickman’s initial insight and Goethal’s comment,
constructed his own continuum, characterized as ‘Domination’ at one extreme
and ‘Leadership’ at the other. At the ‘Domination’ end, one inds ‘power wielded
by individuals or systems, coercion, desperation, no agency, and unequals’;
under ‘Leadership,’ there is ‘power distributed fairly amongst persons and sys
tems, freedom, sustainability, full agency and human potential, and moral
equals.’61
The discussion of power, then, began with traditional views of the construct,
moved to more relational and postmodern conceptions, and ended with a deep
discussion of human agency and the role of leadership in unleashing it. This
was typical of the group’s discussion, and of the richness of pursuing a multi
disciplinary approach to the topic.
A similar pattern can be detected in the discussions of the other constructs
postulated by Burns. The consideration of motivation, for example, began with
a rather prosaic discussion of the social science approach, with mention of
process theories, modeling, and intrinsic motivation. This quickly moved – in
a development typical of that richness created by having multiple disciplines in
the room – to a more fundamental discussion of the human condition, and its
implications for motivation. The scholars cited Kant, Mill, Smith, and Aristotle,
and notions of homo oeconomicus, homo individualus, and homo politicus. This,
in turn, led to an erudite discussion of the term ‘happiness’ as the essential mo
tivation of humans, and a consideration of the conceptions of that term from the
ancient Greeks through the Enlightenment. Other scholars brought in differing
cultural interpretations of the term, including nonWestern ones.62
When discussion turned to the dynamics of leader–follower relations, the
group’s predilections again surfaced. After desultory initial conversation, atten
tion, as was the group’s wont, turned to a discussion of a fundamental underlying
issue. As the initial conversation progressed, some of the humanists in the room
proclaimed their sense that the mainstream approaches to leader–follower rela
tions in the leadership literature were too mundane. What was needed, they
proclaimed, was a careful look at the ‘initiating conditions of leader–follower
relations, which is, after all, an exploration of the human condition.’ Philosopher
Terry Price framed the issue. The only way to really understand the nature of
the leader–follower relation is to investigate its roots: ‘What is there about the
human condition that makes us need leadership?’ he asked. ‘This leads us,’ he
continued, ‘to notions of justice, of agency. It leads to questions about the uni
versal human condition [is it collaborative?]; also to questions of what motivates
us [an unmet need?]; and it also brings up the sense of self.’ Only the considera
tion of such deep and complex matters could bring real understanding to this
issue.63
The inal construct on the group’s agenda – values – was in actuality a con
tinuing topic throughout the threeday conference. As Joanne Ciulla noted,
‘values should not be ghettoized; they are a subset of every part of leadership.’
This was demonstrated in the discussion of J. Thomas Wren’s ‘Process Model’
of leadership. Although the model as portrayed by Wren (and then applied to
the case study of Franklin Delano Roosevelt by James MacGregor Burns) ap
peared straightforward enough, observers noted that ‘values surround the
Process Model [such as assumptions of linearity] that some do not share.’64 The
same universality was true for the ethics of leadership. As Ciulla said, ‘Ethics
is the set of all human relationships. Leadership is a subset of human relation
ships.’ Ergo, it is ‘really impossible to separate issues of ethics out as
independent; we are always talking about ethics when we talk about leadership.’
This led to a discussion, spreading across two days, of the role of values – and
ethics – in leadership.65 The precise arguments presented in the ensuing debate
need not detain us here; sufice it to say that there were debates over everything
from deinitions to applications. What is important to take from the discussion,
however, was the group’s commitment to engage in an afirmative and overt
consideration of these matters as the discussions of a grand theory progressed.
In all of these examples, the assembled scholars chose to focus upon the
larger, humanistic approach to leadership, in opposition to the more circum
scribed approach demanded by traditional notions of theory. Thus the Richmond
meeting was as important for its seeming resolution of the question of scope
and focus of the project as it was for any of its substantive conclusions regarding
the speciic elements of leadership. The General Theory of Leadership group
was to build upon this at its next important gathering.
MOUNT HOPE: FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

The next scheduled meeting of the GTOL group – and the next major intellectual
turning point for its deliberations – was a threeday retreat in June, 2002, at an
estate owned by Williams College and located in the countryside outside of
Williamstown, Massachusetts. Appropriately or inappropriately for the future
of the project, this estate is known as Mount Hope. In any event, it was at Mount
Hope that the project’s eventual product began to take form. In addition to an
illuminating session with special guest scholar Gary Yukl, the group got down
to the real business of considering a general theory. In terms of the intellectual
process we are detailing in this paper, Mount Hope is important for two things:
First, it represented a conirmation that the approach of the group was to be
largely humanistic in nature; namely, to be an exploration of leadership as part
and parcel of the human condition in the broadest sense. Second, the multiple
narrations of leadership that emerged from the Mount Hope deliberations helped
to pose the issue that was to shape all subsequent interactions of the group; that
is, whether a truly integrative approach was possible, or whether it is best to
acknowledge ‘multiple truths’ in the characterization and understanding of

leadership.
Prior to the Mount Hope meeting, participants engaged in another exchange
of papers, designed both to relect upon the outcomes of the Richmond session
and to look ahead to the retreat in Williamstown. Not surprisingly, the subject
matter of those papers ranged over most of the myriad issues discussed in Rich
mond. Their content, to the extent it became central to the group’s deliberations,
will be included elsewhere in this chapter. One noteworthy development that
emerged from this round of papers, however, involved the ongoing dynamic of
expectations among members of the group. In something of an ironic twist,
these expectations appeared to be somewhat luid. Terry L. Price had initially
‘thought … that an integrated theory of leadership was an interesting but, ulti
mately, doomed project,’ but opened his paper thusly: ‘I begin with a confession.
Since writing for the last set of papers, I’ve changed my basic view of this en
deavor… . [O]ur discussions have led me to believe that it is [more achievable]
… than I originally thought.’66 J. Thomas Wren, on the other hand, who had ini
tially embraced the possibility of an integrated theory, was now more
circumspect. ‘The challenges to our endeavor that were suggested by our indi
vidual papers,’ he wrote, ‘were conirmed by our discussions.’ After detailing
the principal points of contention, Wren noted that they were ‘suficient to create
[a] cloud of foreboding’ concerning the future of the project.67 For his part,
James MacGregor Burns, the inspiration for the project, was unwavering in his
belief in ultimate success. ‘Based on our early meetings and exchanges, and on
the recent submissions,’ he said, ‘I am all the more conidant that we have the
intellectual resources and determination to tackle our great objective, of a gen
eral or at least integrated theory of leadership,’ albeit ‘we are all also well aware
of the problems and dificulties and are approaching the project, I think, in a
realistic way.’68 These underlying expectations would become crucial when the
group later confronted strategic issues concerning the ultimate product of its
work.
One of the intriguing dynamics of the gathering at Mount Hope involved how
the membership of the group reshaped the initial agenda proposed by the
project directors to conform more closely to the thrust of the Richmond meeting.
A preconference communication by host Al Goethals had proposed ‘a possible
schedule for the meetings. We wanted to observe the principles of having smaller
groups work on the topics we identiied in March… . We propose having each
subgroup discuss the three topics that were agreed in March, and the fourth that
was discussed but not agreed on. These are values, leader/follower dynamics,
motivation and power, and culture and context.’69 Equally important, at least to
James MacGregor Burns, was the need for creating some kind of work product.
‘We have,’ he informed the group, ‘our threeday Mt Hope conference where it
is vitally important, in my view, that we develop written materials… . It will be
imperative for us to produce actual drafts, in whatever form, at the Mt. Hope
meeting. We will never have such a great opportunity both to discuss our subject
further but also to break down into group or individual activities where we pro
duce written documents.’70
The academicians who assembled at Mount Hope in June had no objections
to Burns’s call for written product, but they did question a return to a discussion
of the ‘elements’ of leadership that had been the focus of the Richmond meeting.
Elizabeth Faier, for example, observed that ‘categories … of leadership … might
not encapsulate its essence … . Some of March’s frustrating moments stem
[from] containing our conversation to a discussion of parts when leadership itself
is a process, … something greater than the aggregate of its parts… .’71 Similarly,
Joanne Ciulla chafed at the division of the discussion according to the discrete
elements of leadership. ‘This looks nice and neat,’ she admitted, ‘but we also
noticed in our discussions that these areas all tended to spill over into each other.
It seemed that every boundary bled into the next area. I have come to the conclu
sion that discussing the parts in isolation from each other [e.g., power,
motivation, ethics, leader–follower] would not be useful… . From our last dis
cussion the variety came, not from the elements of leadership itself, but how
people put these elements together.’72
‘So where does this leave us in terms of Mt. Hope discussions?’ Faier ap
propriately asked. Several participants came up with similar answers. Faier
herself responded: ‘I hope we can expand our discussion … [in such a way as
to] free us from overdeining components, itting them into a mosaiclike
model, and thus limiting ourselves to a theory that combines highly bounded
pieces rather than focuses … on process.’73 Ciulla was more speciic. ‘Here is
what I propose we do at Mt. Hope … . [We should] give each group the basic
pieces of the leadership puzzle and see how they put it together. Then we can
get together as a whole and see what the pictures look like.’74 J. Thomas Wren
proposed a similar idea, and suggested how it could contribute to the group’s
objectives. ‘Because I believe that we are neither ready (or in some cases, will
ing) to proceed with traditional theorybuilding activities, I propose an
alternative approach… .’ This charged each group with the task of ‘constructing
a narrative of how leadership works… . When we reconvene with our three
separate narratives, we can look for any commonalities or “family resemblanc
es.” From these might come some generalizations, and ultimately, some
propositions that might someday form the basis for a general theory.’75
It remained, however, to determine how to frame the narrative task of the re
spective groups. It was here that other members of the group harked back to the
larger themes about the human condition that had consistently drawn the interest
of the scholars in Richmond. It was Terry Price who put it best. Thinking back
to Richmond, he observed that ‘on the irst day of the last set of meetings, [Al
Goethals] made a claim to the effect that we have to understand the human
condition in order to understand the nature of leadership. The humanist in me

inds this a very attractive way of framing our enterprise. It roots the study of
leadership in the liberal arts and sees it as a broader feature of the human experi
ence.’ Price was not naïve, however. ‘Of course, the downside is that a general
theory of leadership that takes this framing as its starting point has its work cut
out for it. The theory must glean insights from a few thousand years of literature,
philosophy, and history and couple them with the indings of a hundred or so
years of social science research.’76
Fortunately for the sanity of the group, Price posed another possibility. ‘An
alternative interpretation of the claim that we have to understand the human
condition in order to understand leadership takes it to mean that we have to
think about what makes leadership necessary and what makes it possible if we
are to understand the phenomena itself… .’ Price elaborated: To build on this
… , we might consider the preconditions for leadership. First, what is it about
the human condition that makes leadership necessary? Is it, say, that social,
political and organizational life brings with it problems that can only be solved
or, at least, best be solved by leadership? Second, what must be true of humans
if we are to exercise leadership as a viable response to these problems?’ Price
suggested that ‘if we could answer these two main questions, our answers
would go a long way toward an understanding of the ends of leadership [as]
well as the means for achieving these ends. Put simply,’ he concluded, ‘on this
approach to theory building, the current stage of intellectual endeavor in which
we are engaged would be understood as articulating the foundations of the
study of leadership.’77
Taking its cue from Price and the others, each team was sent away to its cau
cus site with the following questions in hand: (1) What is it about the human
condition that makes leadership necessary? (2) What makes it possible? Finally,
once those foundational questions were answered, the groups were directed to
turn to a third: (3) What processes or conditions characterize the emergence,
maintenance, or transformation of leadership?
The teams were formed in such a way as to balance disciplinary approaches
and the demographics of the group, and named, respectively, Red, Purple, and
Gold (after the school colors of founding institutions Williams College, the
University of Maryland, and the University of Richmond).78 Following several
intensive discussion and drafting sessions, each produced a document that
contained at least the beginnings of a response to the designated questions. A
detailed portrayal of the content of each can be found in the next chapter of this
volume, an attempt at synthesis by Michael Harvey, who joined the group at the
Mount Hope meeting.79 For purposes of this analysis, it is suficient to sketch
in broad outline the contents of the resulting papers. Of more importance to this
analysis are the consequences of these multiple narrations of the foundations
of leadership.
The Red team responded to the question of What is it about the human condi-
tion that makes leadership necessary and possible? by creating what they called
a ‘leadership creation parable.’ In that parable, they made several assertions
about the human condition and the environment in which leadership initially
came into being. The Red team painted a rather bleak portrait of surrounding
conditions. It was a world of perceived disorder and entropy, where there was
material scarcity, a lack of knowledge, and a sense of insecurity. The nature of
the human condition that confronted that world was one of inequality: there was
considerable variability in individuals’ abilities, desires, and needs. Then, too,
there was an ‘inner tension’ between ‘the individual’s desire for both selfsuf
iciency and dependency.’ Humans also are torn between a desire for order and
an attraction to mystery. In sum, says the Red team, ‘These are the original
conditions – disorder, variability, the tensions of our desires for sociability and
selfsuficiency. Out of this comes a need for leadership.’80
The Purple team’s narrative of the foundational conditions for leadership
tended to track that of the Red team. Purple, too, envisioned a world of ‘per
ceived challenges and shortcomings,’ which call forth leadership in response.
Moreover, ‘the assumption of the Purple team is that inequality and dependence
are an inherent part of the leadership relation. Variability in competence and
access to power leads to differentiated roles and dependencies among the actors,
a relationship which [under normal conditions] must be negotiated… . As a
result of such negotiations,’ Purple argued, ‘the leadership relation can be seen
to be a product of “consent,”’ although ‘this notion of consent has an ethical
overlay.’ Once the leadership relation is in place, ‘leaders initiate narratives and
framings to help the group understand the world, themselves, and other groups,
as well as suggest solutions to external problems… . In addition, followers
contribute elements in an evolving, negotiated narrative about group roles, group
identity, group history, and the world.’81
The Gold team created a different sort of narrative, one that appeared to take
a more positive and more constructivist approach. Gold acknowledged that hu
mans differ in their capabilities, and that ‘leadership arises from physiological
and social needs and the human desire for expression.’ That being said, Gold,
more than Red or Purple, championed leadership as the act of constructing
meaning. ‘Being human involves having imagination and creative capacity,
ability to be selfrelective, and ability to use language to create and communi
cate meaning with each other.’ Moreover, ‘being human involves social
interaction through which humans construct reality.’ This notion of ‘constructing
reality’ was the nub of leadership. Indeed, ‘leadership … helps to construct or
create … human needs and wants… . Leadership is a creative act – literally
bringing new realities into being.’ For Gold, being human, and leadership, and
even power are ‘a matter of social relationships. Leadership must not be ana
lyzed in terms of individual actors alone. Actors come into leadership
relationships in the context of larger social terrains of meaning,’ and is a result

of both constructing reality and negotiating roles within that reality.82
With the production of the Red, Purple, and Gold papers, the General Theory
of Leadership group inally had what James MacGregor Burns had been seeking:
some written product from the group’s efforts, however tentative and prelimi
nary. Moreover, that product was consistent with the priorities of a group that
had chosen to focus upon the larger, humanistic aspects of leadership. It must
be noted, however, that these three preliminary essays essentially begged the
question of what would come next; i.e., whether the same type of narrative
would be extended to such matters as leader emergence and group processes,
or whether there would be any attempt to derive from these prose accounts of
leadership any propositions that could form the basis of a theory satisfactory to
the social scientists.
In the meantime, a more foundational issue came to occupy the GTOL
project: the question of the extent to which some form of true integration is
possible. This issue was brought frontandcenter by the three Mount Hope pa
pers. Some preliminary discussions occurred during and immediately after the
Mount Hope sessions, and the matter received more substantial attention
subsequently.
The debate revolved around the question of whether the group should create
one integrated document from the Mount Hope papers, or be content with mul
tiple narratives of the leadership relation, each differing in both its foundational
assumptions and in its particulars. From the beginning, there were supporters
of both schools, and, as the ensuing chapters in this volume indicate, the group
has been content to move along parallel tracks, keeping open the possibility of
either, or both, options.
The possibility – or probability – of conlicting analyses was manifest as soon
as the decision was made to work in multiple small groups at Mount Hope. In
a memorandum prior to the meeting, Burns wrote: ‘What I am more concerned
about – and this is simply to get this on the agenda for the planning conference
the irst day at Mt. Hope – is how we will plan to put together what I expect will
be a multiplicity of drafts on speciic aspects of the subject dealt with in small
groups.’83 Terry Price had anticipated something similar. ‘Admittedly,’ he wrote
in a preconference submission, ‘at the end of our meetings, we might wind up
with more than one reasonable, internally consistent theory of leadership.’84
So, too, were the two possible responses to this reality previewed prior to the
meeting. Burns demonstrated his unwavering commitment to an integrated
product. ‘It was agreed,’ he acknowledged, ‘as I recall, at the March meeting
that we would break down into smaller groups [at Mt. Hope], because of the
obvious likelihood that the larger group could not do any drafting… . I agreed
with this, but then the question is … through what process do we integrate these
indings into a groupendorsed document. I could imagine the different sub
groups coming up with totally or considerably different drafts, which would

make the integration quite fruitful but also very dificult.’ And, in a separate
communication, Burns urged the group to consider ‘how these discussions can
… be transformed into an overall agreedupon document.’85 Price, on the other
hand, while envisioning multiple, conlicting documents, did not fear that result.
‘This,’ he said, ‘need not strike us as a problematic outcome.’ If the group did
decide to prioritize one interpretation over another, Price simply advocated that
the group make this decision consciously, and be transparent in its rationale.86
The resolution of the integration/multiple perspectives debate was postponed
pending further relection and exchanges among the scholars. In the meantime,
a few of the participants suggested that an appropriate irst step would be to
isolate and identify the central assumptions underpinning each narrative. Such
an analysis could form the basis for further consideration of the likelihood and
desirability of creating an integrated theory. In the concluding discussions at
Mount Hope, Elizabeth Faier observed that ‘different cosmological views will
lead to different reasons for leadership,’ and suggested as examples assumptions
about the nature of man, the role of inequality, and the extent to which the
leadership process itself is negotiated or proceeds along some more predictable
pattern.87 Others contributed additional potential points of contention, but it was
left to J. Thomas Wren to address the issue most thoroughly.
In a paper entitled ‘The Mt. Hope Disaccords: Relections on Varying As
sumptions,’ Wren set forth his task. ‘Given our aspirations to create a uniied
depiction (I will not call it theory) of the leadership process,’ he argued, ‘irst
among our remaining challenges is to identify and address the underlying as
sumptions… . If we do not lay out our differing starting points, in order to debate
them and to make necessary linkages between our premises and our conclusions,
we can never hope to create a product (or products) worthy of taking forward
to a jury of our peers, and certainly never harbor aspirations of constructing a
uniied approach to leadership.’88 Wren proceeded to analyze the Red and Gold
papers from Mount Hope.
His irst focus was on epistemology. ‘The various approaches to leadership
theory raise important epistemological issues,’ he argued. ‘Theoretical ap
proaches with differing understandings of how one comes to know and relate
to perceived reality can yield dramatically contrasting views of the leadership
relation.’ Turning to the Gold and Red papers, he found ‘a discrepancy that …
requires illumination. The Gold team,’ he went on, ‘quite explicitly takes a stand
concerning how they perceive the acquisition of knowledge in the world,’ which
is ‘constructed.’ This ‘approach to making sense of the world,’ observes Wren,
has important theoretical consequences. ‘On the positive side, the Gold approach
appears well suited to a complex and interdependent world. On the other hand,
it promises to set us adrift in a postmodern sea of uncertainty and immobility
… . This does not mean that one adopting the Gold team’s perspective can say
nothing about leadership; indeed, a rather elegant description of how leaders

and followers interact (e.g., the utility of storytelling, etc.) can be set forth.
However, aspirations to propose any causative relationships become suspect.’
The Red paper, on the other hand, ‘takes a more linear approach’ regarding
cause and effect, ‘to include a deined and accepted beginning point [to leader
ship] that leads (seemingly inevitably) to a predictable response.’ In sum, Wren
concludes on this point, ‘each perspective is likely to yield a substantially dif
fering depiction of the leadership process.’89
Likewise, says Wren, the groups differ in their perception of the nature of
man. ‘Gold places a stress upon the fact that “humans are social beings.” Much
of Gold’s depiction of group behavior and meaningmaking is premised upon
a shared experience among members of the group. For Red,’ on the other hand,
‘the assumptions about the social nature of man appear to be … different… .
Red appears to view man in more individualistic terms.’ To illustrate Wren cites
the Red treatment of trust: ‘“one cannot easily depend upon others when it is
not clear what one has in common with them.”’ Again, these ‘differing assump
tions regarding the role of the individual visàvis society’ are ‘profound and
dificult to bridge.’90
So, too, is the perception of the leadership challenge different for the two
groups. This lows naturally from their earlier assumptions. As Wren put it, ‘The
two groups’ conceptualization of the external world and the challenges it poses
are predictably different, given their epistemological distinctions. If men, ac
cording to Gold, “construct many aspects of their reality,” the Gold view of the
world and the challenges it poses are likewise socially constructed.’ In contrast,
‘the Red approach has quite a different view of the world and the leadership
challenges it poses.’ Red’s narration of a world characterized by disorder and
entropy ‘has the air of universality; a sense that leadership always emerges in
response to perceived threats to survival. The Gold approach appears more luid
and open.’91
If the perceived leadership challenge is different, so too is the response, or as
Wren phrased it, ‘the underlying assumption about what it is that the leadership
relation is trying to accomplish,’ or to put it yet another way, the differing as
sumptions about the purpose of leadership. Given Red’s portrayal of a disorderly
world, the goal of leadership is ‘control… . For Gold, on the other hand, leader
ship is less about control than the mutual management of meaning. Again, Wren
concludes, ‘the Red approach appears more linear, while the Gold version is
more luid and open.’92
Finally, Wren turned to an issue that was less obvious. ‘Imbedded in the re
spective accounts of the two groups,’ he argued, ‘but nowhere adequately
articulated for purposes of challenge and discussion, is an implicit hierarchy of
values.’ The value that received most of his attention was that of ‘equality… .
The Gold Team … values equality as both the means and end of leadership.’ In
contrast, ‘for the Red Team, inequality is at the heart of leadership.’ Wren paused
to consider the implications. ‘The implications for leadership are profound,’
Wren intimated. ‘At the most obvious level, a theory grounded in assumptions
of inequality … is quite distinct from one that sees inequality as an evil to be
superseded, with the inequalities themselves subject to negotiation and deini
tion.’ For Red, then, ‘the actual process of leadership is portrayed as
“compliancegaining processes,” rather than Gold’s more egalitarian “negotia
tions.”’ ‘More subtly,’ he continued, ‘the matter goes to the heart of the
leadership relation.’ For Red, ‘inequality is not only real, but good and neces
sary. Perhaps some people (leaders) are better able to perceive and act than
others. The Red group appears to be open to this possibility; the Gold group,
with its embrace of “group social construction,” seems to reject this notion. At
the least’ concluded Wren, ‘this seems a central matter as we approach a theory
of leadership. Indeed, I suspect that our attempts at synthesis may founder on
the shoals of inequality before anything else.’93
In his conclusion, Wren did not reject the idea of an integrated theory, but
asserted that ‘it is important that we confront and debate our assumptions.’ He
acknowledged that, ‘in the end, the fundamental differences in our premises
[may] make it impossible to come up with an acceptable synthesis.’ This did
not daunt him. ‘If so, we should accept this,’ he reasoned, ‘and do our best to
move forward with multiple “narrations” of the leadership process, each but
tressed by a clear account of its founding assumptions.’94 Wren’s analysis of the
output of the Mount Hope meeting has received no little attention here, but this
seems justiied, in light of the fact that such matters preigured the next stage
of the General Theory of Leadership group’s process.
GUADALAJARA: INTEGRATED THEORY VS.

ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
The inal segment of the GTOL group’s work that will be the focus of our att
ention is not as chronologically deined as were the earlier sections of this
chapter. The developments chronicled here extended across an 18month period
from June 2002 to November 2003, and included a session with fellow scholars
and practitioners at the International Leadership Association meeting in Seattle
in November, 2002, and another session at the Jepson School in April, 2003.
The focal point, however – because it was the moment when the next stage of
the process crystallized – is a presentation and discussion conducted at the
International Leadership Association meeting in Guadalajara, Mexico, in
November, 2003.
During that 18month span, the GTOL project added several new participants.
A consequence of having the new contributors was that the group perforce re
visited some of the issues detailed earlier in this analysis. Although there was
at times a sense of drift, the return to the fundamental issues that inevitably
surround an attempt to create a general theory of leadership ultimately spurred
the group out of its brief doldrums and gave the project fresh energy.
Although many issues were addressed, the most important developments were
undoubtedly a reinvigorated discussion concerning the ultimate product of the
group’s efforts, together with more sophisticated attempts at a synthesis of the
group’s work. Certainly the most important matter that remained under discus
sion was the longstanding one of whether (and how) to create an integrated
result, as opposed to pursuing some other, more constrained, product of the
group’s efforts. The scholars, rather than coming to inal conclusions regarding
this essential issue, were content to pursue both tracks. That is to say, they con
tinued to experiment with various formulations of an integrated depiction of
leadership, while at the same time contemplating various alternative formula
tions that recognize the dificulties inherent in an integrated approach.
Certainly one of the two parallel tracks the GTOL group has followed since
Mount Hope has been one toward some sort of integration. The most important
of these was a paper by James MacGregor Burns, the most forceful proponent
of integration throughout. Burns drafted his paper following a session at the
International Leadership Association conference in Seattle, held in November,
2002. At that session, the members of the group presented a status report on
their deliberations, and then engaged in a productive dialogue among the pan
elists and an audience of scholars and practitioners. Later, drawing upon his
initial essay on leadership created in February as a starting point and interpolat
ing insights from the Mount Hope and Seattle discussions, Burns crafted a
statement of leadership.
He began with ‘a deinition of leadership that appeared to emerge from the
Seattle conference,’ which was ‘leadership as an inluence process, both visible
and invisible, in a society inherited, constructed, and perceived as the interaction
of persons in … conditions of inequality – an interaction measured by ethical
and moral values and by the degrees of realization of intended, comprehensive
and durable change.’95 Burns then proceeded to outline the dynamics of this
process.
He turned irst to ‘the human conditions of wants and needs among masses
of people.’ Unfortunately, ‘they lack … knowledge as to how to gain these
things.’ This creates the need for leadership. ‘It is the job of leadership,’ he ex
plained, ‘not only to legitimate certain wants … but to educate and instruct and
guide the victims toward solutions. This creates a leader–follower relation
ship.’96 ‘In the emerging leader–follower relationship,’ Burns continued, ‘the
irst – but by no means the only – task of leadership is interaction with follower
ship in meeting the priority of order. But,’ he went on to note, ‘order in itself is
hopelessly inadequate unless it is employed to protect high values, such as
freedom, justice, … equality of opportunity or condition, or ultimately

happiness.’97
Burns went on to explore the dynamics of the leadership process, in particular
the ‘functions of values and conlict.’ These are inseparable. ‘Values are not just
static or [integrated] entities;’ he argued, ‘they are very much in conlict.’ Thus
‘conlict is … [a] crucial aspect or element of leadership; … strong leadership
… does not reject conlict – it thrives on it.’ In turn, ‘the functions of values and
conlict cannot be separated from the causal role of power.’ ‘Power,’ according
to Burns, ‘is complex, despite all the simplistic accounts that impute vast and
permanent authority and supremacy to various leaders and rulers. Power is not
only quantitative, measured by dollars or guns or votes.’ In addition, power is
‘qualitative and subjective, measured by leaders’ and followers’ wants and feel
ings and attitudes.’ These dynamics culminate in the real purpose of leadership.
To Burns, ‘all of the above ultimately leads to the transcending question of grand
change – change that is intended, comprehensive, durable, and grounded in
values.’98
Having created his own effort toward an integrated depiction of leadership,
Burns ended his paper with a plea to his fellow members of the GTOL group.
Having cited historical examples of FDR and the Montgomery bus boycott to
demonstrate his points, he used them to encourage the group to coalesce behind
this effort at an integrated approach to leadership. ‘If those activists could inte
grate the complex processes and elements of leadership in practice, in reality,’
he reasoned, ‘should we not be able to do so in theory?’99
Meanwhile, other dynamics within the GTOL group militated against this.
Consequently, at the same time that efforts at integration continued, there was
also energy devoted to the other of the parallel tracks; that is, toward acknowl
edging the fundamental divisions among the members of the group, and
developing a product that recognized and honored these differences. This effort
gained traction as a result of yet another meeting of the group, at the Jepson
School in Richmond in April, 2003.
There, the group welcomed several new members to the conversation: schol
ars Bruce Avolio from the University of Nebraska, Sonia Ospina from the
Wagner School at NYU, Ron Riggio from Claremont McKenna, and Mark
Walker from American University, plus Deborah Meehan representing the
Leadership Learning Community and practitioner John L. Johnson. The addition
of the new voices occasioned another of the group’s long tradition of insightful
discussions. At the same time, these newcomers inevitably posed many of the
same issues that had been raised by the initial call for a general theory of leader
ship, concerns that had been placed aside by the as if condition.
For example, social psychologist Ron Riggio articulated many of the same
concerns as had been voiced by social scientist Fred Jablin at the outset of the
process: the need for rigor in deinitions, and for a theoretical design that can
become the basis for replicable research. Sonia Ospina, on the other hand, pre
sented a cogent argument for taking a constructivist position, drawing upon
arguments that had previously been voiced by anthropologist Elizabeth Faier.
She questioned the value of positivist theory, suggesting that meaning is jointly
constructed by participants, and that theories, at best, provide only partial views
of their objects, since it is impossible to capture a single reality. These differ
ences in premises and approach, so evident in the group’s early debates but put
to the side by the ‘as if condition’ [that is, the willingness of the participants to
ignore their differences for the moment, and to proceed as if a successful resolu
tion could be achieved], now could no longer be ignored.
In response to this development, the group turned to its next great initiative.
Group members were given a rather formidable task to complete prior to the
group’s next meeting at the International Leadership Association’s conference
in Guadalajara, Mexico, in November, 2003. The details of this assignment are
relatively important, since they structured the ensuing discussion.
In a communication drafted by Mark Walker and J. Thomas Wren, the coor
dinators of this phase of the project, the authors began by acknowledging that
‘we continue to confront two fundamental challenges to our aspirations of pro
ducing some form of integrated view of leadership.’100 These are worth quoting
in their entirety:
1. First, there continues to exist real skepticism about the entire endeavor. In part,
this is due to a discomfort with the notion of creating a ‘general theory.’ Scholars
disagree as to what is meant by, and what is encompassed within, the term. Much
of the disagreement appears to stem from the differing perspectives taken by
social scientists and humanists, or by positivists and constructivists (etc.). Rec
ognizing that the entire endeavor could run aground upon these shoals at the very
outset, participants agreed to set aside their respective concerns, and to proceed
‘as if’ the endeavor could succeed. Now, as we push toward the creation of some
publishable output, such concerns can no longer be ignored.
2. Second, although each meeting of the group has resulted in hours of intellectually
stimulating debate over a plethora of critical issues relating to leadership, our
attempts to integrate these insights into a coherent whole have not advanced far.
Our closest approximation has been the Mt. Hope narratives of the Red, Gold,
and Purple teams. If this project is going to be successful (at some level), we
need to consider how, if at all, we might create some way of bringing together
our disparate insights.101
Given the dual challenges of divergent premises and dificulties in integration,

the assignment given the group was twofold, each part designed to address one
of the identiied issues.
The irst assignment was to ‘create a matrix of fundamental issues and per
spectives.’ It was ‘designed to address the “as if” problem above,’ by asking the
scholars to identify with some precision the divisions or differences among the
members. More speciically, group members were asked ‘to create your own
analytical matrix of leadership studies.’ The top (horizontal part) of the matrix
should consist of ‘the differing perspectives that you believe are most central
to our understanding of leadership.’ Thus, this portion of the matrix might list
the differing disciplines, or perhaps ‘epistemological approaches’ such as ‘social
scientiic/humanistic’ or ‘positivist/constructivist.’ Once having identiied the
source of the disagreements, the side (vertical aspect) of the matrix should
‘identify the central issues upon which those perspectives tend to disagree.’ With
the matrix thus organized, the process of ‘ill[ing] in the cells … provides a
comparison of the differing conclusions from each perspective.’102
Although seemingly complex at irst blush, the assignment had the serious
objective of identifying the various points of contention. ‘Our goal,’ wrote
Walker and Wren, ‘is to utilize these matrices … to begin to address in a sub
stantive fashion the very real concerns and disputes among us. We should not
expect to resolve those disputes’ – at least in the near term, and, ‘in some ways
that might be detrimental’ – ‘but … to create a framework that allows us to
perceive where we differ and how.’103 Only with the group’s differences out in
the open could there be hope of addressing them productively.
The second assignment given to the group was less structured, and was ‘de
signed to help us with our challenge of integration.’ As Walker and Wren
explained it, ‘During our discussions, we often noted how we needed to bring
things together (probably in some format far short of a “theory”).’ Thus, ‘the
second, unstructured part of your assignment is to create your own metaphor,
model, narration, or … theory … that identiies what are, for you, the central
aspects of leadership and how they it together.’ Walker and Wren concluded:
‘Hopefully, at our next session, our consideration of the various responses to
this assignment may generate some insights as to how we might ultimately
present our conclusions in a way that is inclusive of our differences, yet integra
tive in terms of our understanding of leadership.’104
The sharing and presentation of the responses to this assignment was to take
place the following November (2003) in Guadalajara. In point of fact, only a
few of the group members actually contributed either a matrix, model, or meta
phor, but the submissions that were received were suficient to form the
foundations for an important dialogue. This was undoubtedly due to the fact
that the smattering of contributions was so diverse as to encompass most of the
central issues attendant to the process of creating a general theory of leadership.
Four individuals submitted matrices, one submitted a proposed integrative model
of leadership, and yet another proposed a metaphor intended to bring insight to
the leadership studies community without forcing upon it any unjustiiable in
tegration of dissimilar approaches. A brief summary of this varied body of work
is therefore justiied.
The irst matrix was by Mark Clarence Walker, entitled ‘Schools of Thought
in the Study of Leadership’ (see Table 3.2). Its purport was to delineate the dif
ferences in assumptions among several of the key theories of leadership. Walker

thus identiied on his horizontal axis Great man theory, behavioral theory, con
tingency theory, cognitive theory, moral leadership theories, and strategic
leadership theory as the primary theoretical approaches. He distinguished them
(vertical axis) according to their ‘key component; relative role of leader and
followers; related theories and concepts; and theorists.’ In creating a matrix of
this nature, Walker carefully denoted some key distinctions among the main
stream (primarily social science) approaches to leadership.105
J. Thomas Wren took a broader approach with his matrix. Labeling it a
‘theoretical matrix,’ Wren created three essential divisions among those who
approach the task of creating a theory of leadership: social scientists (or ‘posi
tivists’), humanists, whom he labels ‘interpretavists,’ and postmodernists, also
called ‘constructivists.’ Each of these categories of scholars differs, Wren sug
gested, in their answers to ive key questions: How is the problem deined?
What type of information/data is used in seeking an answer? What method is
used? How does one judge the validity of the outcome? How should the out
come be applied? By ‘illing in the cells’ with the answers to those questions
for each group, Wren created a way to readily identify some central differences
in premises that have hampered the efforts of the group to come to some inte
grated result.106 (See Table 3.3 as an example of this ‘matrix’ approach to
identifying areas of tension).
Gill Robinson Hickman took a somewhat similar approach with her matrix.
Her horizontal row identiied the ‘Leadership Perspectives’ of humanism, es
sentialism (positivism), social constructivism, environmentalism, feminism, and
pluralism (see Table 3.4). The matrix’s vertical column contained a listing of
issues upon which those perspectives differ. The issues included human nature,
mobilizing forces, the purpose of leadership, ethics, context, participants, power,
and level of action and analysis. The scope of her matrix, then, was broader than
Wren’s, but it, too, provided important insights into the source of differences
among those addressing the phenomenon of leadership.107
A inal matrix, by Terry Price, was devoted not so much to differences in
approach but more to underlying similarities across seemingly disparate ap
proaches. In a somewhat more complex approach, Price created two categories
of ‘ields’ or ‘disciplines,’ the irst of which he called ‘descriptive/explanatory,’
such as organizational leadership (see Table 3.5). The second he labeled ‘pre
scriptive/justiicatory,’ which embraced such approaches as social and political
philosophy. The two categories of ‘ield’ or ‘discipline’ – and Price invited the
inclusion of others – he suggested, address similar questions, albeit in differing
ways. Price identiied four characterizations of leadership (across the top of his
matrix), and indicated how the two identiied categories of scholarship approach
each by providing examples in his cells. Thus, under ‘leadership as personal
characteristics,’ organizational leadership draws upon ‘trait theories,’ while
social and political philosophy look to such sources as Plato’s Republic. Price
went on to provide a similar analysis for the characterizations of leadership as
‘situational response’, as ‘transaction’, and as ‘transformation’. With his matrix,
Price revealed the extent to which broadly differing approaches often seek an
swers to identical questions.108
Joining the four matrices submitted was one integrative model of leadership.
This was the work of Gill Robinson Hickman. Her complex model depicted four
‘dimensions’ of leadership: ‘mobilizing forces, levels of leadership action and
analysis, perspective, and effect or outcome’ (see Figure 3.1). Across those di
mensions, Hickman arrayed the ‘perspectives on leadership’ from her matrix;
i.e., humanism, essentialism, social constructivism, environmentalism, feminism,
and pluralism. The dynamics of her model were displayed by means of arrows
depicting ‘participant, process, conlict, change, ethics, and power.’ Further so
phistication was added by including levels of analysis such as individuals, dyads,
groups, and collectives. Hickman admitted that her twodimensional portrayal
really needed to be more of a threedimensional holograph in order to capture
adequately its complexity. Nevertheless, she succeeded in including in one all
encompassing representation most of the matters of contention that had occupied
the GTOL group during the two years of its existence.109
Finally, Joanne Ciulla contributed a metaphor that might productively occupy
the group’s next stage of deliberations. Ciulla advocated that the group ‘map
the territory’; that is, create an intellectual (perhaps even literal) cartographic
representation of the various approaches to leadership. This, argued Ciulla,
might be the most feasible possible outcome of the group’s effort, and at the
same time would prove quite useful.110
The discussion surrounding these contributions in the open session at the
Guadalajara conference, occurring before a standingroomonly congregation
of fellow scholars and practitioners, was remarkably rich and varied. Indeed,
Georgia Sorenson, who had been unable to attend, but had received considerable
feedback from members of the audience, later wrote: ‘It sounded like it was a
fantastic session… . I have had so many people tell me it was by far the best
session they ever attended on leadership.’111 The reason for such kudos was al
most certainly not the innate brilliance of the contributions, but more due to the
fact that those in attendance had the rare opportunity to witness scholars strug
gling with such intractable issues, and had a chance to offer constructive ideas
and criticisms. That has also been the objective of this chapter, and volume. In
this sense, just as in many ways the Guadalajara session marked a high water
mark of the GTOL process, it also caused the group to contemplate its inal
product.
WASHINGTON: EPILOGUE AS PROLOGUE

In two meetings following the Guadalajara conference, one at the Jepson School
in Richmond, and one at the International Leadership Association conference
in Washington, DC in November 2004, the GTOL group considered the next
steps. In those meetings, the member scholars determined that the results of
three full years of dialogue concerning the development of a ‘general theory’
had advanced suficiently to publish the various resulting insights. The lingering
issues of the tensions among approaches to leadership, temporarily masked by
the ‘as if condition,’ were to be left unresolved. So, too, did the group decline
to take a inal stand on the issue of the possibility and advisability of the ultimate
creation of an integrated theory, as opposed to taking some more diverse and
inclusive approach. Instead, the members of the group decided that the most
productive way to proceed was to create a volume of essays designed to capture,
to the best of our ability, the nuances of three years of scholarly debate and dis
cussion. This volume is the result.
The determination not to inally resolve the fundamental tensions that had
been an inherent part of the project was not (or, at least, not wholly) a conse
quence of despair over the possibility of success. Rather, it was seen as an
appropriate scholarly outcome. In the tradition of the best scholarship, the con
tents of this volume are presented not so much as conclusions as they are
invitations to further debate. Thus this, while the epilogue to the efforts of the
GTOL group, is merely intended as the prologue for a continuing discourse
concerning the integration of the varied understandings of leadership.
The challenges persist; the quest for a grand theory of leadership continues.
As the initial chapter of this collection, this piece has attempted to provide
the reader with a glimpse into the dynamics of a fascinating experiment into
multidisciplinary discussion and collaboration in the emerging ield of leader
ship studies. As suggested in the introductory paragraphs, this process may
prove as interesting to our fellow scholars in the ield as our ultimate substantive
conclusions. The remaining chapters, beginning with one by Michael Harvey
addressing the nature of the human condition, provide more of the substance of
the deliberations over the creation of a General Theory of Leadership.
NOTES
1. Georgia Sorenson, from J. Thomas Wren’s informal notes of Mount Hope meeting, June 22,
2002. Note that the bulk of the citations in this paper will be to unpublished papers circulated
among group members in several rounds of exchanges. On occasion, reference will be made
to informal notes of group meetings, which will be identiied as such. In the interests of a
coherent narrative, some chronological liberties have been taken with respect to the timing
of when points were made in the discussions.
2. Joanne B. Ciulla, ibid.

3. Joanne B. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the Mount Hope Meeting,’ (unpub. ms., ca. May, 2002),
p. 5.
4. Founding members were: James MacGregor Burns, Jepson School of Leadership Studies,
University of Richmond; Georgia Sorenson, Jepson School and the University of Maryland;
George Goethals, Williams College; Joanne Ciulla, Jepson School; Richard Couto, Jepson
School; Elizabeth Faier, Jepson School; Zachary Green, Alexander Institute; Gill Robinson
Hickman, Jepson School; Douglas A. Hicks, Jepson School; Frederic Jablin, Jepson School;
Terry L. Price, Jepson School; and J. Thomas Wren, Jepson School. The current roster also
includes: Bruce Avolio, University of Nebraska; Michael Harvey, Washington College; Ed
Hollander, Baruch Center; Robert E. Kelley, CarnegieMellon; Jean LipmanBlumen, Clare
mont; Deborah Meehan, Leadership Learning Community; Sonia Ospina, Wagner School,
New York University; Ron Riggio, Claremont McKenna; Mark Clarence Walker, American
University; Ron Walters, University of Maryland; and John L. Johnson, University of the
District of Columbia.
5. Katherine Managan, ‘Leading the Way in Leadership: The Unending Quest of the Discipline’s
Founding Father, James MacGregor Burns,’ Chronicle of Higher Education, May 31, 2002,
p. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Georgia Sorenson, ‘Preliminary Ideas about a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms.,
ca. Dec., 2001), p. 1, citing James Hunt and Lars Larsen, eds., Leadership, the Cutting Edge
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), and Ralph Stogdill, Handbook of
Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. vii.
8. Sorenson, ‘Preliminary Ideas about a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 1.
9. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Georgia Sorenson, quoted in Managan, ‘Leading the Way in Leadership,’ p. 1.
11. Joanne B. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the General Theory of Leadership Project,’ (unpub.
ms., ca. Feb., 2002), p. 1.
12. Douglas A. Hicks, ‘“But Is It Leadership?”: On Disciplinary Identity and a General Theory
of Leadership’ (unpub. ms., ca. Feb. 2002), pp. 1–4.
13. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the General Theory of Leadership Project,’ p. 3.
14. Ibid.
15. James MacGregor Burns, quoted in Managan, ‘Leading the Way in Leadership,’ p. 1.
16. Richard A. Couto, ‘Towards A General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., ca. March, 2002),
p. 11. See also J. Thomas Wren, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., ca.
Feb., 2002), p. 1.
17. James MacGregor Burns, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership?’ (unpub. ms., ca. Mar.,
2002), p. 1.
18. Elizabeth A. Faier, comments made in meeting, Richmond, Virginia, March, 2002, from J.
Thomas Wren’s informal discussion notes.
19. Terry L. Price, ‘Relections toward the Mt. Hope Meeting,’ (unpub. ms., ca. June, 2002),
p. 1
20. Ibid., pp. 1, 3.
21. Douglas A. Hicks, comment made in meeting, Richmond, Virginia, March, 2002, from J.
Thomas Wren’s informal discussion notes.
23. Burns, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership?’ pp. 2, 3.
24. Terry Price, comment made in group discussion, Richmond, Virginia, March, 2002, from J.
Thomas Wren’s discussion notes.
25. Richard Couto, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., ca. Feb., 2002),
p. 1.
26. Ibid.
27. Frederic Jablin, ‘Thoughts on Richmond and Mt. Hope,’ (unpub. ms., ca. June, 2002), p. 2.
28. Jablin, from Carmen Foster’s discussion notes of meeting at Richmond, Virginia, March 23,
2002, p. 8.
29. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the General Theory of Leadership Project,’ pp. 3, 1.
30. Commentator not identiied. From Carmen Foster’s discussion notes of meeting at Richmond,
Virginia, March 23, 2002.
31. Jablin, ‘Thoughts on Richmond and Mt. Hope,’ p. 2.
32. Joanne Ciulla, from informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren, Richmond, Virginia,
March 23, 2002.
33. Frederic Jablin, from informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren, Richmond, Virginia,
March 24, 2002.
34. James MacGregor Burns, from informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren, Richmond,
Virginia, March 23, 2002.
35. Elizabeth A. Faier, ‘What Anthropology Contributes to Leadership Studies,’ (unpub. ms., ca.
Feb., 2002), pp. 3–4.
36. Couto, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 1.
37. Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 7.
38. Terry L. Price, ‘Preliminary Ideas on a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., ca. Feb.,
2002), pp. 2–3.
39. Jablin, ‘Thoughts on Richmond and Mt. Hope,’ p. 2.
40. See Managan, ‘Leading the Way in Leadership,’ p. 2.
41. Faier, ‘What Anthropology Contributes to Leadership Studies,’ p. 4.
42. Price, ‘Preliminary Ideas on a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 2.
43. Zachary Gabriel Green, ‘Preliminary Ideas about a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub.
ms., ca. Feb., 2002), p. 1.
44. George R. Goethals, ‘Preliminary Ideas about a General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms.,
ca. Feb., 2002), p. 1.
45. Faier, ‘What Anthropology Contributes to Leadership Studies,’ pp. 1, 3.
46. Hicks, ‘“But Is It Leadership?”: On Disciplinary Identity and a General Theory of Leader
ship,’ p. 3.
47. Couto, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 2.
48. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the General Theory of Leadership Project,’ p. 2.
49. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
50. Wren, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 1.
51. Gill Robinson Hickman, ‘General Theory of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., ca. Feb., 2002),
p. 1.
52. Couto, ‘Towards a General Theory of Leadership,’ p. 1.
53. Burns, ‘Toward a General Theory of Leadership,’ pp. 1, 3, 6.
55. Price, ‘Relections toward the Mt. Hope Meeting,’ p. 2.
56. James MacGregor Burns, informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren from meeting at
Richmond, Virginia, March 23, 2002.
57. George Goethals, from informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren, Richmond, Virginia,
March 22, 2002.
58. Burns, in ibid.
59. From J. Thomas Wren’s informal notes of general discussion, Richmond, Virginia, March
23, 2002.
60. Hickman, from J. Thomas Wren’s informal notes of general discussion, Richmond, Virginia,
March 23, 2002. See also Carmen Foster, ‘Flip Chart Notes from General Theory of Leader
ship Session, March 23, 2002,’ p. 4.
61. Hicks, from Wren’s informal notes of general discussion, Richmond, Virginia, March 23,
2002.
62. From Wren’s general discussion notes, March 23, 2002; Foster ‘Flip Chart Notes,’
pp. 6–7.
63. General discussion notes by J. Thomas Wren, Richmond, Virginia, March 23, 2002.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., March 24, 2002.
67. J. Thomas Wren, ‘The Mount Hope Accords,’ (unpub. ms., ca. June, 2002), p 1.
68. James MacGregor Burns to GTOL group, ‘Supplement to Earlier Statement,’ ca. June, 2002,
p. 1.
69. George Goethals to GTOL group, ‘Planning Suggestion,’ June 6, 2002, p. 1.
70. James MacGregor Burns to GTOL group, ‘PreMt. Hope Conference Notes,’ ca. June, 2002,
p. 1; Burns, ‘Supplement to Earlier Statement,’ p. 1.
71. Elizabeth Faier, ‘Is Leadership Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?’ (unpub. ms., ca. June,
2002), p. 1.
72. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the Mt. Hope Meeting,’ pp. 4–5.
73. Faier, ‘Is Leadership Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?’, p. 4.
74. Ciulla, ‘Some Thoughts on the Mt. Hope Meeting,’ pp. 4–5.
75. Wren, ‘The Mt. Hope Accords,’ p. 3.
76. Price, ‘Relections toward the Mt. Hope Meeting,’, p. 1
77. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
78. Red Team members were Georgia Sorenson, Joanne Ciulla, Fred Jablin, and Michael Harvey,
a new addition to the GTOL process; Purple Team members were Carmen Foster, George
Goethals, Terry Price, and J. Thomas Wren; Gold Team members were Richard Couto,
Elizabeth Faier, Gill Hickman, and Douglas Hicks.
79. Michael Harvey, ‘Leadership and the Human Condition,’ (unpub. ms., Jan., 2004).
80. Sorenson, Ciulla, Jablin, and Harvey, ‘The Leadership Creation Parable’ (Red Team report,
June 22, 2002).
81. Foster, Goethals, Price, and Wren, ‘What Makes Leadership Necessary? What Makes Leader
ship Possible?’ (Purple Team report, June 22, 2002).
82. Couto, Faier, Hickman, Hicks, ‘The Integrated Leadership Report,’ (Gold Team report, June
22, 2002).
83. Burns, ‘Supplement to Earlier Statement,’ p. 1.
85. Burns, ‘PreMt. Hope Conference Notes,’ p. 1; Burns, ‘Supplement to Earlier Statement,’
p. 1.
87. Faier, informal discussion notes by J. Thomas Wren, Williamstown, Massachusetts, June 22,
2002.
88. J. Thomas Wren, ‘The Mt. Hope Disaccords: Relections on Varying Assumptions,’ (unpub.
ms., ca. Sept., 2002), p. 1.
89. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
90. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
91. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
92. Ibid., p. 4.
93. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
94. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
95. James MacGregor Burns, ‘Mount Hope and Seattle Followup,’ (unpub. ms., Nov., 2002),
p. 1.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p. 2.
98. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
99. Ibid., p. 6.
100. Mark Clarence Walker and J. Thomas Wren to GTOL group, ‘General Theory of Leadership
Group May–September 2003 Work Plan,’ (unpub. ms., ca. May, 2003), p. 1.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., pp. 1–3.
103. Ibid., pp. 2–4.
104. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
105. Mark Clarence Walker, ‘Schools of Thought in the Study of Leadership,’ from Walker,
‘Reconciling Morality and Strategy in the Study of Leadership,’ (unpub. ms., 2003).
106. J. Thomas Wren, ‘Theoretical Matrix’ (September, 2003).
107. Gill Robinson Hickman, ‘Leadership Perspectives’ (November, 2003).
108. Terry L. Price, untitled matrix (November, 2003).
109. Gill Robinson Hickman, ‘Concepts in Leadership Studies’ (November, 2003).

110. Joanne Ciulla, from informal discussion notes of J. Thomas Wren, November, 2003.
111. Georgia Sorenson to GTOL group, November 23, 2003.
2. Leadership and the human condition
Michael Harvey
I’d shape one impulse through the contraries

Of vain ambitious men, selish and callous … .
… All that’s low I’ll charm;
Barbaric love sweeten to tenderness.
Cunning run into wisdom, craft turn to skill.
Isaac Rosenberg, Moses
In June 2002 a dozen scholars met at Williams College’s auspiciously named

Mount Hope retreat to think and talk about leadership. Amid the wild profusion
of leadership theories and topics, and notwithstanding the epistemological di
versity of modern academics, we hoped to ind common ground in our thinking
about leadership. We began with two simple but in our opinion fundamental
questions: ‘In the human condition, what makes leadership necessary? And what
makes leadership possible?’ We broke into three groups, and each group wrote
a short essay seeking to answer these questions. These papers displayed all the
richness of thinking that typiies modern interdisciplinary approaches to leader
ship – signs of psychology, anthropology, history, political science, sociology,
ethics, philosophy, religious studies, and cultural and literary studies. But some
thoughts or suppositions about leadership could be traced throughout the essays.
What follows is a loose synthesis or free translation of these three short essays
– a meditation on the place of leadership in the human condition.
* * *
Leadership is part and parcel of the human condition. A mystery as modern as

the nationstate and as ancient as the tribe, it brings together the best and worst
in human nature: love and hate, hope and fear, trust and deceit, service and
selishness. Leadership draws on who we are, but it also shapes what we might
be – a kind of alchemy of souls that can produce both Lincoln’s ‘better angels
of our nature’ and Hitler’s willing executioners. In its constituent parts leader
ship includes three basic social organizing patterns – kinship, reciprocity, and
command. From kinship it draws a sense of connection (if often exploited) be
tween leaders and followers. From reciprocity it draws a sense of mutual
39
exchange and beneit (if often betrayed). But from command it takes its most
visible aspect, for leadership is above all a social relation of dominance and
consent (if often constrained), yoked uneasily together. At the heart of leadership
is a tension precipitated by our double nature – social animals with selfrelec
tive and often selish minds. What is it about the human condition that makes
leadership necessary – and that makes it possible? What problems does leader
ship solve? And what problems does it cause?
Leadership presupposes the group (the leader–follower subunit, the dyad, is
essentially an analytic artifact). From an evolutionary perspective, groups exist
because, for certain kinds of tasks and certain kinds of creatures, groups can
outcompete individuals. Wolves, for instance, hunt and live in packs. Within the
animal group, leadership originates in inequality. In a wolfpack the alpha male
and alpha female claim their position through strength or spiritedness, dominat
ing other members of the pack and defeating or driving out rivals. Among social
predators like wolves, and among our closest group of relatives, the two hundred
or so species of primates, the social group is structured by a welldeined hier
archy, by ritualized behaviors that economize the costs of violence, and by
constant attention to membership and ranking. Dominant animals gain privi
leged access to food and reproduction (in a wolfpack, for instance, typically
only the alpha male and female mate). The group gains security or access to
desirable resources. In such groups youth is a time of learning and testing.
Through play the young practice behavioral displays and signstimuli, try their
strength against each other, and assume their place in the social hierarchy. They
learn lessons, in other words, in how to follow and how to lead. Some of these
lessons are astonishingly powerful and redolent of human values: young adult
African wild dogs, for instance, will masticate and regurgitate meat for their
toothless elders rather than let them starve.
Analogies with other species, especially social predators and our fellow pri
mates, are a tempting place to begin when thinking about leadership and the
human condition. We share 98 percent of our DNA with our closest cousins,
chimpanzees. We know that our hominin ancestors, in a line that stretches back
ive to seven million years, lived, scavenged, and hunted in small groups, and
must have faced the same pressures and dificulties that other groups of social
predators face. And we ind pronounced hierarchies in every human community
anthropologists have ever observed. Nevertheless, such analogies may lead us
to false conclusions. For human beings, the relationship between leadership and
inequality is much more complex than it is for other animals. Because of Homo
sapiens sapiens’ radically greater cognitive abilities, human strength encom
passes more than force and spiritedness. Complex activities like hunting and
gathering, toolmaking and butchering (at least 2.6 million years old in the an
cestral record), exploration and invention, or conquest and defense require
coordination and communication. In human communities we ind inequalities
Leadership and the human condition 41
along many salient dimensions: not only physical strength and boldness but also
cleverness, empathy, memory, imagination, vision, humor, and artistry. ‘Inequal
ity’ tends to reduce these many differences into a single false scale, as the
manifold ideologies and fantasies of patriarchy and racism amply show. Thus
while we may begin with animal models to shape our original insight – that
leadership originates with inequality – we come quickly to the realization that
inequality in itself is too limiting a term to generate much useful thinking about
the nature of leadership. A irst conclusion, then: when we speak of the human
condition, we may say that leadership originates in differences deployed in
particular situations. We may expect to ind not one ideal instance or type of
leader, but leadership in many guises, in different situations and for different
problems.
The irst problem of the human condition is simply to survive. The material
circumstances of life on earth are rich but precarious. The world of our earliest
dreams is a mythic landscape charged with energy. Earth and sky, ire and water
bring both life and death. The days, the seasons, the years beat out a rhythm we
feel in our blood. But accident and chance, storm and earthquake, also play their
part. Stars fall from the heavens, order collapses into disorder, growth into decay,
birth into death – but then chaos is recognized as a new rhythm: change and
continuity in an endless cycle. To live in this world means to learn, to remember,
to overcome scarcity, to defend against insecurity, to solve problems, to make
mistakes. Just as walking is a constant (and painfully learned) almostfalling
down, physical survival is a constant almostfailing. The more successful that
people are at solving the problems of life – surmounting scarcities of food and
water, accumulating surpluses, safeguarding the young, harnessing new ideas,
devising new comforts and pleasures – the more jealous attention they attract.
Success carries the seed of ruin. To seize and waste will always be simpler than
to build and preserve – thus the ancient enmity of city and steppe.
The challenges of physical survival – hunger, disease, predation – may aflict
individuals but they are countered for the most part by common effort. (This
simple truth is sometimes obscured in the West by the remarkable success of
markets and technology in atomizing social relations. But markets and machines
are the endproducts of intricate and longstanding collective endeavors: a
market is in fact the most complex community ever devised.) The human condi
tion is one of interdependent but selfregarding individuals capable of both
cooperation and betrayal. For the past 30,000 years, at least, human communities
have hummed with all the dynamics of modern social life – emotion, art, in
trigue, politics, the yearnings and strivings of men and women. People interact
both for instrumental reasons – to survive and live as well as possible – and for
intrinsic reasons – the pleasure of human contact, wired into our makeup. Within
this swirl of collective life, people take on different roles, including those of
leaders and followers. (Adam Smith would emphasize the eficiency gains of
such division of labor.) Many roles include leadership ‘pieces’ – where collec
tive work requires some measure of coordination, of dominance and consent.
And individuals will have multiple roles, so that an individual may be primarily
a leader in one setting, primarily a follower in another. Roles are distributed
based on difference or negotiation or contestation (with no assurance that any
given distribution of roles – absent a Rawlsian veil of ignorance – will be sen
sible or ‘fair’ or satisfactory to all concerned). If a group endures, over time a
set of folkways, a culture, emerges as a known way to survive in the world.
Roles quickly adopted and contingently devised harden into identities – what
it means to be a man or a woman, warrior or shaman, lord or peasant, white
collar or bluecollar. The roles are never really ixed, but always subject to the
impact of new (or newly salient) differences, negotiation, contestation, or ex
ternal shock.
After survival, the second problem of the human condition is to make sense
of the world. To be human means to have imagination and creative capacity, to
be selfrelective, to use language to create and communicate meaning with each
other. We want to understand the world, and we want to share and afirm our
understanding with others. Modern Western thought has tended to make a hero
of the lone thinker – cogito ergo sum – but (as the older, wiser Greeks knew)
we are really social animals who make sense of the world together. No man is
really an island of thought. ‘Social reality,’ a shared deinition of what is true,
what is valuable, and how people should behave, is lodged within the group. It
is within this framework that individuals imagine and invent, and it is from the
repository of the group’s memory and experiences, stored in images, symbols,
and in language itself, that individuals express their thoughts and dreams, even
if only to themselves.
One way by which humans construct their reality is through storytelling.
Narratives fulill many purposes: to motivate, to reassure, to challenge, to pro
voke, to deine identities, to unite, to divide, to scapegoat, to set goals or limits,
to teach lessons, to inspire wonder, and to establish particular uses of power as
legitimate or illegitimate. Stories connect reason, emotion, intuition, and the
subconscious; they help us ‘see feelingly,’ in Shakespeare’s words. A story offers
an account of reality that seeks either to afirm or contest an existing terrain of
meaning. Because of the power of human imagination – the neverdistant
thought that things might be different – social reality is always in play. Leaders
frame stories and events to help the group understand the world, themselves,
and other groups, as well as to identify or solve problems. Often leaders are the
authors and tellers of stories; but they may also merely authorize particular
stories or interpretations. Often narratives concern the proper roles for group
members and proper degrees of agency and dependency. But followers are active
in this process, contributing elements in an evolving, negotiated narrative about
group roles, group identity, group history, and the world. In addition, while
leadership fashions an ‘oficial story,’ there are always counterstories, subver

sive and challenging authority to one degree or another. Thus social reality is a
contested terrain. Complicating all this is that we are deeply ambivalent about
mystery and explanation, about what narrative is supposed to do. We seek to
plumb the mysteries of our existence, for there is comfort in understanding. But
at the same time we crave a further experience of mystery, as if the experience
of wonder is one of our innate desires. Through framing and narrative, leader
ship plays with this tension of mystiication and demystiication.
The third enduring problem of the human condition, after survival and sense
making is to manage power – inding a path between the way of the group and
the way of the individual that respects the needs of both (I deine ‘power’ as the
capacity of an individual to inluence the actions and thoughts of another). Ants
and bees have no leadership, because in their life ‘the individual’ has no mean
ing. The need for – and the possibility of – leadership only emerge in a collective
made up of selfrelective, selfregarding individuals, among whom trust and
cooperation are fragile and easily betrayed. Hobbes noted that in the state of
nature even the strongest individual is insecure; no one can survive without
some measure of consent from at least some key constituency. Again, our di
vided double nature – both social and selfregarding – exacerbates the problem
of the divide between group and individual. We want to gain autonomy and in
dependence – but at the same time we want to share our lives with others, and
rely on them. And it is more than a desire; it is a fact of existence that we depend
on others to live. Solving – or at least coping with – this riddle and balancing
dominance and consent is the highest achievement of leadership.
The management of power takes place over time; so the time frame for think
ing about leadership must be broader than singular or speciic moments of
leadership. Dominance and consent exist almost as currencies within the group,
closely tracked by individuals (visible in such statements as ‘she owes me one’
and ‘I’m calling in my chits on this one’). And like other kinds of currency,
dominance and consent can change in value; thus those with power tend to
husband it, and those whose consent is sought are always looking back, to past
actions and outcomes, and to the future, to their expectations, in order to gauge
their degree of consent. Leaders derive beneits (material and psychic) from ef
fectiveness; how to be effective varies over time, and requires judgment and
lexibility. Followers accept their place in the bargain as long as they perceive
they are beneiting from the relationship. When followers no longer perceive
these beneits, they are less likely to comply or follow. Leadership in such situ
ations may turn increasingly into coercion, and lose legitimacy.
The workings of power are subtle, and much occurs in shadows. The constant
remetering of dominance and consent can play out almost invisibly, the par
ticipants seemingly unaware of their immersion in the group’s roiling social
calculus. In a similar way, many instances and acts of leadership within the
group will be in a sense invisible – unseen and unacknowledged within the

public space, often performed by those not recognized as leaders. (It is a mistake
to think that ‘leadership’ is owned by the most easily seen leaders – leadership
is a function of the group, a play of social relations, rather than a quality of in
dividuals.) Complicating the effort to see power in action, what does not happen
is often as signiicant as what does. The willingness of followers to refrain from
exercising certain forms of power is indispensable to stable leadership. Follow
ers typically have far more power than they employ, and more than leaders
themselves – when this potential energy becomes actual, as for instance in the
rise of the Solidarnosc movement in Poland the 1980s, a moment of crisis is
reached, and suddenly a longstanding leadership pattern can collapse.
We have looked at three basic problems of the human condition, problems
that make leadership necessary but also make it possible. The thee problems –
how to survive in the world, how to make sense of the world, and how to wield
power – are linked. The large and costly human brain – 2 percent of the body’s
weight, but consuming 20 percent of the body’s caloric intake – virtually com
pels human beings to take an aggressive orientation to life itself. Humans are
not designed to graze and stroll, but to strive and contend and invent and
imagine.
To imagine that the basic hominin tool kit of laked stone hand tools was de
vised millions of years ago is an extraordinary sign of their – our – imagination.
But that this tool kit did not change again for a million years is no less extraor
dinary, and reveals how much greater is the capacity of our young species (at
most 200,000 years old) to imagine. It is only when we became able to imagine
what was not there that truly human leadership became necessary, and possible.
Human imagination takes place within free spaces that allow individuals to
glimpse alternative terrains, ‘mightbe’ worlds. Totalitarianism and other sys
tems of oppression ultimately try to stamp out this capacity to imagine other
realities (think of the claustrophobic joylessness in Kafka, Koestler, Orwell, or
Primo Levi). Leadership may enlarge or it may constrict the space for human
freedom and imagination. Enabling the conditions for survival, while enlarging
the space for freedom and imagination – these are the true and highest ends of
leadership, its lasting contribution to the human condition. If we consider the
words of Moses as imagined by the poet at the beginning of this chapter, leader
ship may seem to be an enchantment of the simple by the sharp. But that is the
Machaivellian romance that leaders – and even their critics – like to tell. More
deeply and enduringly, leadership is a relation of the many, a dynamic of the
group, that promises – and sometimes attains – a unity out of the diversity of
individual experience, faculties, and imagination.
FURTHER READING
Tattersall, Ian. 1998. Becoming Human: Evolution and Human Uniqueness. San Diego:
Harvest.
3. The theory and metatheory of
leadership: the important but contested
nature of theory
Mark C. Walker
INTRODUCTION
In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phe
nomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold
aspects of our existence.
Niels Bohr, 1885–1962, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (1934)
Before Sir Isaac Newton, no one thought to link the reason why an apple falls
to the ground with the rotation of the moon around the earth. It had simply
never occurred to anyone to ask the question. It was Newton’s insight, his vi
sion, that offered a hypothesis about a more general, theoretical force called
gravity; no amount of empirical observation alone suggests such a relation
ship. It was theoretical not because it was as of yet unproven or unproveable,
but because the terms it uses to describe phenomena cannot be measured in
any direct way (Carnap 1988, pp. 162–4). Newton’s genius was that he sug
gested the existence of a general force that could describe similar but distinct
phenomena.
Scholars of leadership have presented themselves, as illustrated in Tom
Wren’s introductory chapter, with a similar and no less admirable, no less at
tainable task: what are the general, theoretical laws that govern the leadership
phenomena in all of its variety? Chapter 1 describes in detail the quest that a
group of scholars set out to fulill with no less integrity and diligence than simi
lar quests in the natural sciences. In doing so, the introductory chapter also
illustrates several challenges that have arisen in the attempt to build a general
theory of leadership. First, we need a better understanding of the nature of theory
in leadership. What role does theory play? Where should it come from? The
second challenge concerns making generalizations about leadership (Couto,
unpublished manuscript). Given the numerous and differing ields of study and
practice that pay attention to the leadership phenomenon, what does a general
theory actually generalize about?
46
The theory and metatheory of leadership 47
Scholars, educators, and practioners – both in business and the nonproit

world – see the need for theory – its importance, in other words – differently.
The importance of theory even varies among the scholarly disciplines. In gen
eral, the social sciences hold steadfast to the belief that theory, like theory in
the natural sciences, not only explains phenomena but also should enable social
scientists to predict future events. Phenomena such as economic cycles, dys
functional behavior within groups, and the causes of war have all been targets
of scientiic inquiry. Other social scientists resist the effort to make a direct ap
plication of the scientiic method and other theorymaking tools from the natural
sciences – which study physical matters – to explanations of human behavior.
Similarly, many philosophers, humanists, and postmodern social scientists
ind the effort to discover a general theory of leadership akin to a quixotic En
lightenmentera quest promoted by an outdated Newtonian view of a mechanical
universe (Ciulla, unpublished manuscript). Others suggest that if a general the
ory of leadership is to be found, it will spring from systems or probability
theory; even chaos theory. In sum, it seems that leadership scholars can be di
vided into two groups along the lines of whether or not they believe general
theories of leadership are even possible (Couto, unpublished manuscript).
Being able to make generalizations about leadership is directly related to the
above concerns. How do we synthesize what we know about leadership in order
to construct a common language? How do we incorporate the vast range of ap
proaches? The effort taking place in leadership studies, though new to us, is
nothing new in the history of science and social science. Scholars have been
attempting to understand the intellectual nature of what they do, how they do
it, and how to do what they do better for centuries if not millennia; a recent ex
ample of this type of intradisciplinary struggle – often described as ‘war’
between scholars – can be found in the study of linguistics in the 20th century
(Harris 1995). Thomas Kuhn and his study of paradigms, Larry Laudan and his
studies within the philosophy of science, Karl Popper’s plea for empirical sci
ence, and a regiment of constructivists have offered scholars general ways to
order our thinking about how we ‘think’ about the world. This chapter is an at
tempt to help order our own relections as we proceed.
The development of leadership theory is one of the few ways we have to de
termine if we are making any progress in understanding the leadership
phenomenon. As noted by Georgia Sorenson (unpublished manuscript), the call
to this task has been broad and long coming. Ralph Stogdill (1974) in the Hand-
book of Leadership wrote, ‘the endless accumulation of empirical data has not
produced an integrated understanding of leadership.’ In 1977, James Hunt – a
noted leadership scholar and future editor of Leadership Quarterly – stated
‘What is missing, in addition to quantity of theoretical formulations or models
is a “grand” or generalized theory of leadersubordinate relationships – if indeed,
such a theoretical development is possible’ (Hunt and Larsen 1977). James
MacGregor Burns helped to put out this most recent call for a ‘general theory
of leadership’ in part to ‘legitimize a ield that some skeptics still dismiss as
lightweight and illdeined … We are intent on making [leadership studies] an
intellectually responsible discipline’ (Managan 2002, p. 1).
This chapter has been organized to provide some illumination on all of these
issues. The irst section discusses what theory is and is not, and how it has been
used and developed in other disciplines like international relations and physics.
In physics we ind a very effective use of theory with respect to the scientiic
method. In international relations the use of theory has been agreed upon less
by scholars; nevertheless, signiicant progress in the discipline has been made.
These comparisons both give us pointers as to what we can do and solace in
that other disciplines have faced similar challenges. The second section shows
how a set of leadership scholars conceptualize the theoretical landscape of our
discipline with attention given to both what they agree upon and how they differ.
The third section attempts to explain why leadership scholars differ on the theo
retical landscape of the discipline and in their general approaches through an
understanding of metaphor and metaphysics. The inal section, in conclusion,
discusses how we will know if progress has been made in our understanding of
the leadership phenomenon.
A CALL TO WHAT? GENERAL, GRAND, UNIFIED, OR

(JUST) THEORY?
James MacGregor Burns has said that we seek a general theory of leadership
in order to ‘provide people studying and practicing leadership with a general
guide or orientation – a set of principles that are universal which can be then
adapted to different situations’ (Managan 2002, p. 1). But because all theory
generalizes, what do we mean by a ‘general theory’ of leadership? Is it distinct
from a ‘grand,’ ‘uniied,’ ‘integrated’ or just ‘plain’ or ‘average’ theory?
Albert Einstein’s success not only as a scientiic genius but also his elevation
to a cultural hero irst introduced the nonphysicist world to ‘general’ theory.
The notion of general theory has its popular origins in Einstein’s successful at
tempts to explain the relationship between space, time, moving bodies, and
gravitation. Einstein (1905) irst argued in a paper that the speed of light is the
same for all observers regardless of their motion relative to the light source and
that observers moving at the same constant speed will observe the same physical
laws. For this to be true, space and time must be relative to one another: in other
words, depending upon how fast one is moving with respect to the speed of
light, time intervals may be longer or shorter relative to another observer moving
at a different speed. This profound insight, later supported through empirical
tests, essentially gave birth to an equally important but more famous corollary:
that matter and energy are interchangeable where E (energy) = m (mass) × c2

(speed of light, a constant, squared). Einstein only later referred to this as the
special theory of relativity because it did not encompass the effects of gravity.
In other words, ‘special’ denoted a narrow treatment of the subject. Einstein
(1916) published a paper 11 years later in which he argued for his general theory
of relativity; now more ‘general’ because it encompassed what happens to mov
ing bodies and light in the presence of a gravitational ield.
The notion of uniied theory probably had its popular origins in part also due
to Einstein. Einstein’s original papers published in 1905 were an attempt to re
solve inconsistencies in James Clerk Maxwell’s equations that governed
electromagnetic theory. Maxwell, one of the greatest theoretical physicists of
the 19th century, developed equations that illustrate a ‘uniied’ ield theory that
show the basic interrelationship between two concepts: electricity and magnet
ism. Einstein’s paper that established what would later be known as special
relativity was actually entitled ‘The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (Ein
stein 1905).
‘Grand’ theory also probably has its popular origins due to the diligence of
physicists to explain the world. Beginning in the middle of the 20th century to
the presentday, the ‘Holy Grail’ that all physicists have lusted after is the dis
covery of the Grand Uniied Theory, or GUT, that uniies electromagnetic forces
with the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forces found inside of atoms. To date there are
various GUT theories, and they have had some success, for example, in being
able to explain the absence of antimatter in the universe, but none have been
empirically substantiated and some scientists still challenge their ability to ac
curately describe physical phenomena. At extremely high levels of energy, it
has been shown experimentally that the electromagnetic and weak force are the
same force, but no particle accelerator has been built with enough power in order
to provide an empirical test to go beyond that. Physicists have speciied their
world so thoroughly that these grand theories are an attempt to explain phenom
ena that existed in nature only in the irst few seconds of existence.
What Does Theory Do: Description, Explanation, or Prediction?
The contested nature of the concept of theory itself illustrates the dificulty of
creating a general theory of leadership: we can barely agree on what a ‘theory’
is in the irst place. Even in the hard sciences, the deinition of a theory can either
be broad or strict even though it describes the same essential idea. In short, dif
ferent disciplines have evoked that part of the construct known as theory that
best illustrates what happens within that discipline. Thus, theory could ‘de
scribe’ historical events, ‘explain’ the origin of disease, or ‘predict’ that light,
in the presence of a substantially strong gravitational ield, would actually
bend.
Even so, one would be hardpressed to argue that theory is not explanation.
The distinction between description and explanation, though the subject of great
debate at times, is often moot because each is a part of the same scientiic proc
ess. Those who ‘explain’ may expect that there should be some empirical
veriication to the process, for example, while those who ‘describe’ may say
that empirical conirmation is not necessary. But there is no real opposition be
tween description and explanation (Carnap 1988, p. 175). Even though most
physicists would say that explanation is only of minor value and that ‘the su
preme power of a theory is its power to predict new empirical laws,’ explanation
nevertheless is a valid and not insubstantial part of the scientiic process that
they adhere to (Carnap 1988, p. 166).
Something should be said here about ‘empirics.’ The term empirical veriica
tion, as used in the paragraph above, refers to the step in the scientiic process
in which an hypothesis is tested by new information; note that an hypothesis
could either have been deduced from a theory (deductive reasoning) or derived
inductively from an earlier set of facts (inductive reasoning). Facts, by them
selves, tell scientists very, very little. It is only the marshalling of facts at
different stages of the scientiic process that helps scientists verify hypotheses
and/or theory that makes ‘facts’ or ‘empirics’ useful. As noted by Louis Good
man several decades ago, ‘A fact, in fact, is quite abstract.’ This is also, in part,
a reason why generalizing about leadership is so dificult: people argue about
the meaning of and the conclusions that should be derived from the same set of
facts.
Making Generalizations about Leadership
What is the question?

Unfortunately, there are far more pernicious challenges – two to be exact –
which must be dealt with in order to explain leadership phenomena. First, there
has been an attempt to provide an answer – in the form of a general theory –
without irst deciding upon the question; in some sense this is a metaphysical
issue but in a concrete way it is not. Second, there is no empirical test or valida
tion that can help us answer prescriptive questions or questions that ask, ‘What
should leaders do?’ The best way to show how to overcome the irst challenge
requires an examination of how other disciplines have achieved focus.
Theory usually develops in response to a particular problem. Einstein illus
trates this with his attempt to answer particular inconsistencies in Maxwell’s
equations with the special theory of relativity and his later attempt to integrate
gravitational forces into his theory with the general theory of relativity. In inter
national relations, a subdiscipline of political science that has wellestablished
theories and a successful history of theorymaking, the problem has always been
the cause of war between states, or, in the form of a question, what is the cause
of war (Waltz 1959)? This clearly stated query has allowed international relations
scholars to develop a set of well designed theories that at a minimum has disal
lowed different camps of scholars to speak past one another and at best has
shown some accumulation of knowledge over time.
Example: Schools of thought in international relations

The delineation of different schools of thought in international relations theory
has arguably shown some accumulation of knowledge by identifying elements
that are common among several different, but progressively advanced schools
(see Table 3.1). Neoliberalism, the newer study, acknowledges the parts of the
wellestablished school of realism that it inds convincing: the selishness of
human nature, the tenet that states are the most important actors, and the initial
description of the international system as anarchy. Neoliberalism as a school of
thought builds upon these elements of realism in order to create a perspective
that effectively explains more by showing that there are examples of cooperation
in the world based upon mutual selfinterest. Feminist, postmodernist, and
constructivist schools of thought do not explicitly build upon earlier schools of
thought but they do offer important critiques that have been effective at helping
scholars analyze not only the practice of international affairs but also issues
within its study. Most of these schools are still actively involved in theory crea
tion by remaking and reforming themselves as the world changes; most notably
realism has spawned an updated, more sophisticated version of itself in neoreal
ism beginning with Kenneth Waltz’s publishing of the Theory of International
Politics in 1979.
In fact, these different schools of thought in international relations have been
so successful that there has actually been little change in them over the last 15
years or so. This has frustrated some but to others this has done nothing but
justify the faith put into these schools of thought in the irst place. Although
new theories are presented every year, they must show themselves not only to
be distinct from what has come before but also able to explain more in order to
receive much praise.
For example, although some observers may see the Bush administration’s
handling of foreign policy in a new light beginning in the spring of 2005, inter
national relations scholars see three clear ‘eras’ in Bush administration policy
that fall within three distinct and wellknown schools. Realism describes foreign
policy in the White House from the irst inauguration to 9/11. Wilsonian ideal
ism explains it from 9/11 through the Iraq war until about the time of the irst
election held in Iraq in January 2005. Currently, many scholars believe that neo
realism explains the current shift in US policies as the checks and balances of
the international system and the fact that unilateralism has become too expensive
for the USA. In late 2005 the USA began to reinvigorate its alliances and be
more in unison with other countries, e.g. now openly discussing ‘incentives’ in
Table 3.1 Schools of thought in international relations
School Realism Idealism/ Neoliberalism Feminism Postmodernism Constructivism

Liberalism
Issue
Human Nature Selism Altruistic Selism Gendered Diverse Diverse
Most Important States States and States Individuals Everything People and
Actors others includ and everyone society
ing individuals
52
Causes of State Rational Psychological Rational Masculinity Multiple Language,

Behavior pursuit of self motives of pursuit of rules, and
interest over decision mutual gain norms
short term makers over long term
Nature of Anarchy Community Anarchy Masculine None; the Constructed

International tempered by international (by language,
System institutional system is norms, rules,
norms and nonexistent and/or culture)
regimes
its policy toward Iran and its nuclear program as opposed to rhetoric that places
Iran within an ‘Axis of Evil.’
The persistence of prescription and Laplace’s demon

Similar progress may be shown within schools of thought in leadership but the
issue of prescription must be discussed irst. International relations is a relatively
coherent ield with scholars being trained in similar – if not identical – perspec
tives. In contrast, leadership studies varies signiicantly because of its
interdisciplinary nature. The distinctions made between humanists, social sci
entists, and others are substantial and they express themselves in both subject
matter and methodological approach.
For example, the different scholarly disciplines that study leadership have
put different emphases upon the role of prescription. Social science often avoids
‘should’ questions while the humanities often embrace them, and thus, one of
the most signiicant obstacles to the creation of general theory is the divide over
prescription (Price, unpublished manuscript).
Within the philosophy of science, some believe that empirical tests and ob
servations cannot ever provide a moral answer. For example, what if there was
a being that could instantaneously understand and predict all cause and effect
in the universe? Marquis Pierre Simon de Laplace (1951) [1918] illustrates this
in the following passage:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause
of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that ani
mate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect
were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula
the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for
such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would
be present before its eyes.
Laplace used the above passage to illustrate his belief in causal determinism,
but others have used it to pose a question about morality. What if we hired the
being above – described by others as a demon given that Laplace was an athe
ist – to help us choose one of several actions to take. We want to know what
we ought to do. The demon could tell us ‘for any contemplated choice, what
its consequences would be for the future course of the universe, down to the
most minute detail, however remote in space and time. But, having done this
for each of the alternative courses of action under consideration, the demon
would have completed his task: he would have given us all the information
that an ideal science might provide under the circumstances’ (Hempel 1988,
pp. 340–341).
The demon could not resolve our problem because it requires a decision made
by us as to which alternate action is best. We must still make an unconditional
value judgment between alternative sets of consequences (Hempel 1988,

pp. 341). Fields that utilize mathematical decisionmaking recognize this limita
tion by having the researcher assign preference orderings or values over potential
outcomes. Instead of being sidelined by this challenge, formal theory – whether
it be rational choice, game theory, or strategic choice – recognizes this limitation
and allows the researcher to make the value judgment – often itself based upon
empirical observations – and move on (Walker 2004). As we shall see in the
next section, it is not always obvious how prescriptive questions should be
handled in leadership studies.
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN

LEADERSHIP THEORY
Your theory is crazy, but it’s not crazy enough to be true.
Niels Bohr, to a young physicist
Even given an understanding of the above caveats that may challenge our gen
eral thinking about leadership, scholars still differ on the way in which they
conceptualize the ield of leadership studies. These differences often relect how
scholars are trained in different disciplines and their own individual biases and
perspectives. These different perspectives on theories of leadership, however,
do not preclude the idea of an accumulation of knowledge within the study of
leadership. In fact, our ability to conceptualize the ield to any degree shows
that there is a substance to our work that can be manipulated, discussed, and
disagreed with but not easily dismissed. These foundational differences based
upon our diverse disciplinary perspectives do not simply provide limitations but
also possibilities for the future of leadership studies.
The next subsections provide some illustrations of these different perspec
tives in the form of matrices prepared by a diverse set of scholars. These
matrices are an attempt to describe the different schools of thought within the
interdisciplinary study of leadership and the basic or fundamental issues along
which they can be distinguished. The categories that describe these fundamental
issues or elements are just as important themselves as the distinctions that exist
between schools of thought. At a minimum, by delineating both the schools and
the fundamental issues that divide them, these matrices are an attempt to disal
low scholars of leadership from talking past one another and serve as a basis
for constructive debate. At best, these matrices may show us some accumulation
of knowledge.
Mark Walker’s Matrix and Perspective1
From this scholar’s perspective, the study of leadership has gone through several
stages of development, some of which have paralleled broader movements in
the social sciences (see Table 3.2). Although leadership studies has not seen the
type of paradigm shift described by Thomas Kuhn (1996) [1962], it has seen a
change in thinking by scholars that has exhibited more progress than one might
at irst realize. This matrix identiies six schools of thought starting with the
‘Great man’ or trait theories of leadership. These theories were once popular
among ordinary citizens and scholars, of whom Thomas Carlyle (1902) was the
most famous proponent, but they have been widely discredited by both empirical
evidence and sound theoretical arguments. Some still believe, however, that the
best leaders are determined by possessing certain characteristics, whether it is
a certain race, gender, height, intelligence, or just general good looks. Even
more people can easily be caught admitting that some people are born leaders
while others clearly are not.
One of the tenets of modern leadership theory is that leadership can be
learned. This does not mean, however, that having certain characteristics cannot
help to improve one’s skill set with respect to certain leadership tasks. Before
the age of radio and television, leaders often depended upon how far their voice
could carry in front of a crowd in order to communicate with them. Correspond
ingly in today’s world, individuals who are accomplished in front of a television
camera have an advantage.
Behavioral theories paralleled movements in other parts of the social sciences,
but in leadership studies it primarily provided the idea that leadership style is
very important. One popular analytical distinction that was made was between
taskoriented persons vs. peopleoriented persons (Stogdill and Coons 1957;
Kahn and Katz 1953; Bales and Slater 1945). This distinction basically said that
peopleoriented workers were more proicient when their primary job depended
upon interaction with persons while taskoriented people were more eficient
when given particular goals to satisfy where they were not dependent upon their
interaction with others. The related school of contingency theory improved upon
behavioral theory by suggesting that leadership style must be considered in the
particular situational context in which it was found (Fiedler 1972; Vroom and
Yetton 1973).
Leadership theories based upon internal processes of individuals include both
cognitive and moral theories. Cognitive theories of leadership perceive behavior
as being due to internal factors of individuals, and both leaders and followers
are perceived through the lens of individuals that may be affected by learning,
culture, past history, psychology, emotion, and anything that alters their con
scious state such as drugs, hunger, or perceived threats (Green and Mitchell
1979; Calder 1977; Ayman and Chemers 1983). Moral theories are also based
Table 3.2 Mark Walker’s matrix: schools of thought in the study of leadership
School of ‘Great man’ or Behavioral Contingency Cognitive Moral Strategic/

Thought trait-based leadership leadership leadership leadership transactional
leadership theory theory theory theory leadership theory
Element theory
Key component Traits of the Leadership Leadership style Behavior Attention to or Individual decision
individual leader style is the in a particular perceived as elevation of making that leads to
are the determinant of situational being due to morality as the goal fulillment
determinant of effectiveness context is the internal factors most desirable
effectiveness determinant of of individuals goal
effectiveness observed
Relative role of Leader Leader Leader Individual Leader–follower Leader–follower
leaders and centered centered centered perception of relationship relationship
56
followers leaders and

followers
Related theories Heroic ‘Task’ vs. Situational Culturebased or Servant Exchange &
and concepts leadership ‘people’ leadership sensitive leadership; transactional theories;
oriented theories citizen formal & game theory;
leaders leadership; LMX, strategic theory
transforming in management;
leadership military theories.
Theorists Carlyle Lewin; Stogdill Fiedler; Vroom Green and Greenleaf Frohlich,
and Coons; and Yetton Mitchell; (servant Oppenheimer, and
Kahn and Calder; Ayman leaders); Burns Young; Riker; Burns
Katz; Bales and Chemers (transforming (transactional leaders);
and Slater (crosscultural leaders) Lake and Powell; Hunt
theories)
upon an internal, individual process; however, leadership is now seen as a rela

tionship between leaders and followers where they all strive to attain mutual
goals (Burns 1978). Morality becomes the central component in these theories
and is often elevated to the most desirable goal. Various prominent theories it
into this category, including servant leadership (Greenleaf 1977), citizen leader
ship (Couto 1992), and transformational or transforming leadership (Burns
1978, 2003). But morality is not a strategy; it is a goal (Zakaria 2003). Some
times these works have emphasized morality as a goal without relection on the
strategic consequences of a leader’s decisions; other times moral action is em
phasized as a tactic but still without relection on the leader’s ability to succeed
at bringing into existence a particular outcome – hence part of the dilemma of
leadership studies from this scholar’s perspective.
Walker believes that various strategic and transactional theories capture
much of what is effective in the application of leadership theory in practice
(Walker 2004); this set of approaches encompasses strategic choice in political
science (Lake and Powell 1999), for example, and the strategic leadership
theory found in management and organizational studies (Boal and Hooijberg
2001; Phillips and Hunt 1992). Helpful leader characteristics feed into a lead
er’s skill set and his/her competence in taking certain actions, such as giving
a speech. Style can be captured by an individual’s preferences over actions,
and modeling the environment captures the situational context in which an in
dividual may ind him or herself. Both cognitive and moral theories are related
to a strategic approach because they depend upon internal individual prefer
ences and beliefs that have an effect upon the environment and the strategic
interaction of actors.
Tom Wren’s Matrix and Perspective
Tom Wren explicitly labeled his approach a ‘theoretical’ matrix in which he

categorized the type of scholars involved in the study of leadership and then
showed how they might respond to ive key questions (see Table 3.3). His
scholarly categories included (1) social scientists or ‘positivists,’ (2) humanists
or ‘interpretavists,’ and (3) postmodernists or ‘constructivists.’ He showed dis
tinctions between these scholars through the following sets of questions: How
is the problem deined? What type of information/data is used in seeking an
answer? What method is used? How does one judge the validity of the outcome?
How should the outcome be applied?
Wren illustrated in his matrix some of the differences in premise that have
hampered the efforts of scholars to come to some integrated result. These dif
ferences can be pithily summarized in the degree to which the ‘scientiic’
method is applied to leadership studies. Social scientists have been described
as strict positivists in approach through the application of empirical tests, col
Table 3.3 J. Thomas Wren’s theoretical matrix
Central Questions Social Scientists (Positivists) Humanists (Interpretavists) Postmodernists (Constructivists)
How is the problem There are extant causal patterns Ask a (general) question about the There are no ixed and immutable
deined? that can be discovered, topic under study, often shaped by institutions, processes, or relationships.
articulated, and tested discipline (e.g. history: what were Individuals, societies or institutions
longterm causative elements; ethics: negotiate their own reality. The task is to
was a certain action justiied?) understand the sources, process, and
product of this process of construction
What type of Look to data that can be Explore a wealth of quantitative and Look to wide range of physical, historical,
information/data is measured (directly or indirectly) qualitative information that is not psychological, and anthropological
used in seeking an replicable (historians); draw upon evidence (nonreplicable)
answer? understanding of moral reason
(ethicists)
58
What method is used? Emulates scientiic method to Method is to draw logical conclusions Go beyond description, and seek to
extent possible: is empirical, either by looking to unique non deconstruct the values and processes that
subject to empirical veriication, replicable sources (historians) or created the perceived reality
is explicit and replicable through the logical application of
moral reason (ethics)
How does one judge Is it predictive? Does the logic or argument have Is it explanatory?
validity of outcome? cogency and consistency? Does it bring
increased understanding?
How should the It is perceived to be non Can be either normative or non Goal is to understand. Some
outcome be applied? normative (other than the normative. Goal is to understand and to postmodernists have social agendas, others
occasional reference to relect critically upon the topic do not. While some seek enhanced clarity
‘effectiveness’). Goal is to regarding societal processes and
understand and predict institutions, others take a more critical
stance concerning power and inequality
lection of measurable data, and the use of a nonnormative frame of reference.

Theory that can predict is the ultimate goal, much like the perspective of
physicists.
Humanists, according to Wren, have a much broader mandate. Humanists
ask more general questions, unlike social scientists who search for causal pat
terns that can be articulated and tested. This does not mean that humanists are
not concerned with causality, e.g. history often looks for longterm causative
factors. The data that humanists collect span a range from quantitative to qualita
tive that is, unlike in the physical sciences, not replicable in the case of historians
or based upon moral reason in the case of ethicists. Instead of having prediction
as a goal, the validity of an outcome is judged by the cogency and consistency
of an argument, and if it brings about increased understanding.
The main task of postmodernists and constructivists is to understand and ex
plain the world around them. Their methodology, though more complex than
this, is to go beyond description and deconstruct the values and ideas that make
up one’s perception of reality. The evidence of postmodernists is also usually
nonreplicable, but with explanation as the goal of the theorymaking process,
postmodernists are not as dissimilar from other groups of scholars as one might
initially guess. One of the key tenets of postmodernism is that reality is ‘con
structed’ and thus not based upon any immutable criteria.
Gill Hickman’s Matrix and Perspective
Gill Hickman’s matrix has components of both Walker and Wren, but it also
goes farther than either of the above attempts in the number of categories of
scholars presented and the issues upon which they are contrasted (see Table
3.4). These scholars are broken down into six different camps: humanists, es
sentialists (positivists), social constructivists, environmentalists, feminists, and
pluralists. Most importantly, Hickman’s matrix illustrates some signiicant
consistencies between the different groups of scholars.
While most of these camps differ on issues such as human nature and the
purposes of leadership (see Table 3.4), Hickman identiies four out of six as
viewing ethics as being ‘essential’ to their task. Moreover, in the category of
context, all of the groups are posited with some type of system whether it is so
cial, socially constructed, natural, human, or an ecosystem. Although this may
be a semantic tick, the use of ‘system’ as a metaphor suggests something quite
speciic about how context in a leadership environment is viewed across the
board. All of the groups have participants serve as initiators, partners, challeng
ers, and passives. The level of analysis between the different scholarly
perspectives also has some interesting continuities given that the ‘groups and
collectives’ exist in every perspective whereas individuals do not. It could be
argued, however, that the individual level is important to constructivists along
Table 3.4 Gill Hickman’s matrix
Differing Humanism Essentialism Social Environmentalism Feminism Pluralism

Perspectives (Positivism Constructivism
Issues
Human Nature l Self l Observable & l Meaning l Interdependent l Gendered l Diverse –

determining Discernible making l Sustainable Multiple
l Problem l Veriiable l Categorizing
solving l Questioning l Relational –
l Capable of l Analytical Alliance
choice building
l Rational l Generative
Reorganizing
60
Mobilizing Forces
n Purpose of l Create, Inluence human l Legitimate l Sustain and Create human Expand
Leadership change or and human needs balance human systems of tolerance of
sustain human environmental and wants and environmental gender equality, multiple human
course of functioning or l Create or needs freedom and differences,
action actions using change common opportunity identities and
l Solve human factual meanings beliefs among
problems information l Imagine & interdependent
communicate groups
alternative
social realities
or arrangements
l Create, sustain
or change
constructed
realities or
arrangements
n Ethics Essential Differing or Essential Essential Essential Differing
Nonessential
n Context Human Systems Social and Socially Ecosystems Social Systems Social Systems
(Humanity) Natural Systems Constructed
Systems (Terrains
of meaning – e.g.
economic, political,
social cultural,
religious,
ecological, and so
on)
n Participants l Initiators and l Initiators and l Initiators and l Initiators and l Initiators l Initiators
partners partners partners partners and partners and partners
61
l Challengers l Challengers l Challengers and l Challengers and l Challengers l Challengers

and passives and passives passives passives and passives and passives
n Power Function of Function of Function of social Function of human Function of Function of

human self human relationships interaction & natural male systems dominant
determination & interaction (within and forces systems
problemsolving between terrains of
meaning)
Level of Action & Individuals, Individuals, Groups & Groups & Collectives Individuals, Groups &
Analysis Groups, Dyads, Groups & Collectives Dyads, Groups Collectives
Collectives Collectives & Collectives
with humanists, essentialists, and feminists but less of an argument may be made
for environmentalists and pluralists.
Terry Price’s Matrix and Perspective
Terry Price goes even farther than Hickman in showing some of the similarities
among schools of thought (see Table 3.5). In fact, he essentially sees only two
categories of scholars separated on a descriptive/explanatory vs. prescriptive/
justiicatory divide. Harkening back to the earlier discussion of prescription
and Laplace’s demon, Price believes that this challenge to leadership scholars
so dominates the discussion that, indeed, there is no basic distinction between
description and explanation, as also per an earlier discussion. Only Burns’s
theory of transforming leadership and Rousseau’s social contract bridge this
divide within the issue of transformation. Otherwise, descriptive/explanatory
and prescriptive/justiicatory disciplines have a different basis for personal
characteristics, situational response, and transaction in leadership – the issues
Price identiies as important in the study of leadership.
Toward an Integrative Theory of Leadership?
The similarities and continuities illustrated above not only show some possible
accumulation of knowledge but also point toward a possible integrated theory
of leadership. But for an integrated, or ‘uniied,’ theory to have validity, scholars
must agree upon the essential or basic elements that are being integrated. For
example, physics demonstrates this through a common understanding among
its scholars of not only electricity and magnetism but also such abstract concepts
as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forces. Without this basic, scholarly agreement as a pre
requisite, we in the study of leadership would be providing integration without
substance, or a map without landmarks.
Mapping the territory: a metaphor offered by Joanne Ciulla

Joanne Ciulla contributed what many consider to be a very helpful metaphor in
the task of constructing an integrated theory of leadership: a map. This map
would include the fundamental elements of leadership and how they it together
within the context of features with which we are all familiar: terrain, roads, hills,
oceans, etc. The above exercise of developing a matrix appeals to those who do
not mind making ‘classic’ distinctions between concepts. Ciulla’s contribution
suggests that the study of leadership may be more fruitfully theorized based
upon metaphor and a universal typology of concepts. This is opposed to a clas
sical view of the accumulation of knowledge, where a scholarly consensus
comes about unconsciously through discoveries – paradigm creations and shifts
– in some kind of evolutionary process. Natural scientists have done a better
Table 3.5 Terry Price’s matrix
Leadership As
Descriptive/Explanatory Personal Situational Response Transaction Transformation

Fields/Disciplines Characteristics
Organizational Leadership Trait Theories Contingency Theories Social Exchange Bass’s

(e.g., Path – Goal) Theories (e.g., LMX) Transformational
Leadership (1985)
63
Other Fields/Disciplines? Burns’s Transforming

Leadership (2003)
Prescriptive/Justiicatory
Fields/Disciplines
Social and Political Plato in the Republic Machiavelli in The Social Contract Rousseau on the
Philosophy Prince and Theory (e.g., Hobbes, Social Contract
Discourses Locke)
job than social scientists in creating consensus among themselves; is there a

reason for this based upon some correspondence between the nature of physical
and social phenomena?
The linguistic theories of George Lakoff (1987, 1992; and Johnson 1980) for
example, provide an alternate approach for how scholars categorize things and
the consequences for the way in which humans think, reason, and carry out sci
entiic investigations. These alternative classiications, based upon sound
empirical evidence in linguistics, cognitive science, psychology, anthropology,
and biology, may challenge the scope and explanatory ability of classical theories,
which suggest a Kuhnian paradigm shift in all modes of scientiic discourse.
Lakoff argues that metaphor is not only a valid way of thinking about con
cepts, but that it and other imaginative ways are essential. Simply put, the
classical, or ‘objectivist,’ view holds that categories are deined in terms of
common properties of their members. But evidence has supported a view re
ferred to as experiential realism or experientialism that is explained by the
theories of prototypes and basiclevel categories (see Table 3.6). The objectivist
view holds that thought is the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols.
The experientialist view holds, for example, that the structures used in thought
come directly from our bodily experience. Table 3.6 organizes and contrasts the
two positions.
Metaphorical systems impose a tremendous number of constraints on a con
ceptual system. This is because metaphor goes beyond language; metaphorical
systems are general mappings across conceptual domains. ‘In short, the locus
of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental
domain in terms of another. The general theory of metaphor is given by char
acterizing such crossdomain mappings. And in the process, everyday abstract
concepts like time, states, change, causation, and purpose also turn out to be
metaphorical’ (Lakoff 1992). The most important point drawn from above is
that those concepts that are not drawn directly from experience; we must employ
imagination to link them to experience.
A holistic, social constructive model of leadership by Gill Hickman

As a precursor to an integrated theory of leadership, Hickman offered a holistic,
socially constructed model of leadership that succeeded in including most of
the elements and issues that had occupied the GTOL group (see Figure 3.1).
Though drawn in two dimensions on a page, in reality it would be best repre
sented by a threedimensional model that, unbeknownst to her, resembles the
core instrumental device of an atomic bomb. At its center is the perfectly round
sphere of uranium, here denoting ‘leadership purpose,’ that serves as the source
of energy. A spherical shell surrounds this core representing different levels of
analysis through individuals, dyads, collectives, and groups. This core and
spherical shell sits in a device that provides explanatory power in the form of
Table 3.6 The objectivist vs. experientialist view
The Objectivist View The Experientialist View
l Thought is the mechanical l Thought is embodied; that is,

manipulation of abstract symbols the structures used to put
l The mind is an abstract machine, together our conceptual systems
manipulating symbols essentially in grow out of our bodily
the way a computer does, that is, by experience and make sense in
algorithmic computation terms of it; moreover, the core
l Symbols (e.g., words and mental of our conceptual systems is
representations) get their meanings via directly grounded in perception,
correspondences to things in the body movement, and experience
external world. All meaning is of this of a physical and social
character character
l Symbols that correspond to the l Thought is imaginative, in that
external world are internal those concepts which are not
representations of external reality directly grounded in experience
l Abstract symbols may stand in employ metaphor, metonymy,
correspondence to things in the world and mental imagery – all of
independent of the peculiar properties which go beyond the literal
of any organisms mirroring, or representation, of
l Since the human mind makes use of external reality. It is this
internal representation of external imaginative capacity that allows
reality, the mind is a mirror of nature, for ‘abstract’ thought and takes
and correct reason mirrors the logic of the mind beyond what we can
the external world see and feel. The imaginative
l It is thus incidental to the nature of capacity is also embodied –
meaningful concepts and reason that indirectly – since the metaphors,
human beings have the bodies they metonymies, and images are
have and function in their environment based on experience, often
in the way they do. Human bodies bodily experience. Thought is
may play a role in choosing which also imaginative in a less
concepts and which modes of obvious way: every time we
transcendental reason human beings categorize something in a way
actually employ, but they play no that does not mirror nature, we
essential roles in characterizing what are using general human
constitutes a concept and what imaginative capacities (Lakoff,
constitutes reason 1987, pp. xii–xv)
l Thought is abstract and disembodied,
since it is independent of any
limitations of the human body, the
human perceptual system, and the
human nervous system
Views of human nature held by leaders and
followers (e.g., people are driven by self-interest,
people are inherently good, people are not self-
Views of Human Nature motivated, people are altruistic)
Perspectives – Views or Effects & Outcomes
conceptions of leadership Essentialism Social Constuctivism
(Social Science)
Mobilizing forces of
leadership – These
Collectives
move people to act
Ethics Change
Humanism
Pluralism
Dyads
Effects or Outcomes – Leadership Groups
Change resulting from Purpose
leadership
Power Conlict
66
Environm s
Feminism Participants
Individuals Process Environmentalism
Changes in Wants and Needs

Shifting Terrains of Meaning & Contexts
Dimensions Levels of action or levels of analysis – e.g.

Mobilizing Forces = Purpose + means and motives for leadership groups, dyads, collectives, individuals
Levels of Leadership Action & Analysis
Perspectives = Views/conceptions of leadership
Effects or Outcomes = Shifts in terrains of meaning, contexts, wants & needs
Views of Human Nature
Figure 3.1 Gill Hickman’s holistic, social constructive model

different perspectives such as essentialism, social constructivism, humanism,

environmentalism, feminism, and pluralism. This entire mechanism is posited
within an environment of effects and outcomes based upon the shifting terrain
of meaning, contexts, wants, and needs of people.
The dynamic nature of this model of leadership is captured by forces, repre
sented by arrows that travel between the core of leadership purpose through the
shell and device into the environment. These forces include change, conlict,
process, participants, power, and ethics. These forces operate in both directions
and through the different levels of analysis of the shell and the perspectives of
the device. These forces operate with leadership purpose to create an overall
mobilizing force that captures, then, the leadership phenomenon.
METATHEORETICAL CONCERNS OF LEADERSHIP

THEORY
The engineer is the key igure in the material progress of the world. It is his engineer
ing that makes a reality of the potential value of science by translating scientiic
knowledge into tools, resources, energy and labor to bring them into the service of
man … To make contributions of this kind the engineer requires the imagination to
visualize the needs of society and to appreciate what is possible as well as the tech
nological and broad social age understanding to bring his vision to reality.
Sir Eric Ashby
Why is it important to understand the metatheory of leadership studies?

Throughout our attempts to develop a general theory of leadership, certain
metaphors and perspectives keep resurfacing without suficient explanation.
Why does or should morality play a central role? Why are the wants and needs
of society a factor in leadership studies? Why do some emphasize the transfor
mation of leaders and followers and neglect the more mundane transactional
relationships? Why do a signiicant number of leadership programs and practi
tioners emphasize ethics and service?
We need to understand what concepts and ideas keep resurfacing and why;
this is crucial to our goal of furthering the scholarly ‘progress’ of leadership
studies. Moreover, we need to be selfconscious about the process we use to
think about leadership in order to change how practitioners actually practice
leadership. For example, even the engineer quoted above perceives that he plays
a role in society; similarly, ‘service’ is one of the most durable metaphors to be
found in the study of leadership.
Metatheories are ‘theories of theories,’ or the explanations for the explana
tions we use to describe, explain, predict, and prescribe the world. At its root,
the simplest way to think of it is as metaphor, literally. For example, in interna
tional relations theory, we can group different theories by the metaphor that best
describes how they operate. There are ‘mechanical’ theories that are based upon
mechanics in physics. Examples of these have to do with theories of the ‘bal
ance’ and ‘distribution’ of power, the ‘structure’ of the international system,
and so on. There are biological theories that talk about the international relations
‘system’ and how everything is connected much like organs and tissue are con
nected in the human body. The global perspective or level of analysis would it
into a ‘biological’ metaphor. There are economic or market metaphors; this is
where politics is literally seen taking place like the transactions in a market
place and not necessarily as politics being inluenced by economics per se.
One challenge would be to attempt to ind the metaphors that help to explain
various leadership theories. As noted above, one possible metaphor might be of
‘service.’ There are many theories that belong in this metatheoretical category,
including most if not all of the theories explicitly based upon a morality, and
all those including servant leadership, citizen leadership, and transforming
leadership. Another possible metaphor would be that of the ‘market’ with trans
actional leadership being an example. Behavioral, contingency, and ‘Great man’
theories all could fall into a ‘paternal’ metaphor of leadership because at its core
each of these is focused solely upon the leader and not upon a relationship be
tween leaders and followers. Cognitive leadership theory, along with theories
based upon culture, might be based upon a metaphor of ‘perception, equality,
or diversity’ because at their heart these theories all trumpet how different
viewpoints, whether individually or groupbased, are all valid.
The philosophy of science and social science gives us a rubric or shorthand
for describing various theories of leadership (see Table 3.7). In this literature
there are four essential ways that people look at the world and they are all inti
mately tied to one’s conception of truth. Table 3.7 presents a theory of how
theories and theorists differ from one another. By applying this metatheory to
our study of leadership, we have the opportunity to end the practice of talking
past one another and perhaps understanding from where we derive our beliefs
and perspectives.
In the philosophy of science, how individuals – including scholars – concep
tualize the truth goes a long way in helping us explain how we can observe the
same person, place, thing, or event and assign to it different value or even mean
ing. Essentially, there are four different categories of individuals: positivists,
realists, pragmatists, and relativists. Positivists believe that there is one and only
one correct answer to a question; they also believe that the answer can be learned
or discovered. Realists believe that there are many answers to a question but that
there is one best answer. Pragmatists believe that there are many different poten
tial answers to a question but that the best answer depends upon the situation and
what is needed. The relativist believes that there is no such thing as a best answer;
in fact, all answers are equally valid. Because questions have no true answers,
many relativists believe there is no such thing as the truth (Laudan 1990).
Table 3.7 Four perspectives on the nature of truth in the philosophy of

science
Positivist Realist Pragmatist Relativist
‘There is one ‘There are many ‘There are many ‘There is no best
and only one answers to a different answers answer to a
correct answer to question, but to a question, question: all
a question, and it there is one best and the best answers are
can be learned answer.’ answer depends equally valid.
and/or upon the Questions have
discovered.’ situation and no true answer;
what is needed.’ thus there is no
such thing as the
truth.’
Given the above framework, it is clear that leadership scholars come to the
table with signiicant metatheoretical differences. Postmodernists and construc
tivists are relativists. Some social scientists come very close to being positivist.
Humanists and social scientists in general often range somewhere in between
being realist, pragmatist, or moderately relativist. Individuals run a signiicant
risk of talking past one another – listening without hearing and speaking without
understanding – unless they recognize the metatheoretical perspective not only
of those they are in dialogue with but also themselves.
There are other consequences of these underlying metaphorical attributes.
Positivistic and realist thinking can usually be described as linear while the
thinking of pragmatists and especially relativists is not. Linearity means that
one can achieve an accumulation of knowledge over time because things, in
general, improve with time; therefore, progress is a viable concept if one sub
scribes to linear thinking. Nonlinear thinking may not completely disallow
progress, but it comes about with greater dificulty and is certainly not assumed.
For example, if one believes strongly that history repeats itself and that human
beings are essentially the same now as they have always been – no more moral
or effective in their relations with one another and their environment – then one
believes very little in the notion of progress. On the other hand, if one teaches
leadership in a high school or undergraduate program, there is an implicit belief
in progress because one believes that students will become better leaders if not
also better people by the end of the program. Leadership scholars, therefore,
are confronted not only with differing theoretical and metatheoretical perspec
tives, but also with different ideas of progress in the study of leadership.
DISCERNING WHAT CONSTITUTES PROGRESS IN

LEADERSHIP THEORY
Honest differences are often a healthy sign of progress.
Mahatma Gandhi, 1869–1948
When will we know when we have begun to make progress in the study of
leadership? What constitutes an accumulation of knowledge? Can this determi
nation be made empirically, or does it necessarily involve a value judgment?
Indeed, the answer to this basic question has eluded the GTOL group during its
entire tenure. Is it good enough to show that there are different and signiicant
schools of thought in leadership; is that progress? Or is there a need for an in
tegrated theory that brings some, most, or all theories under the same
framework? Although a general theory of leadership, if developed, would cer
tainly denote progress, are there steps that can be taken short of a general theory
that would also signal progress? Can any of this be achieved without agreement
on the basic elements of leadership?
It should be recognized that there are different kinds of progress noted within
science. Economic progress denotes an increase in funding for research. Profes
sional progress means a rising status of the scientists and the institutions they
belong to. Educational progress means an increase in the skills and expert
knowledge of scientists. Methodological progress means the development of
new methods of research or the reinement of instruments. Cognitive progress
denotes the increase or advancement of scientiic knowledge. Technical progress
means an increase in the effectiveness of tools and techniques. Social progress
means an improvement in economic prosperity, quality of life, and justice in a
society (Niiniluoto 2002).
Moreover, it has been argued that the term ‘progress’ is valueladen or norma
tive itself as opposed to more neutral terminology such as ‘change’ (Niiniluoto
1995). However, this aspect allows it to be a goaloriented term that allows for
the use of backwardlooking or forwardlooking criteria. Should success in
leadership theory be judged by how far it has come over the last few decades,
or should it be judged by some ideal measure, such as the power and elegance
of general or uniied theory in physics? Speciically, should ‘uniication,’ ‘sim
plicity,’ or explanatory power be the criteria used to judge progress in leadership
theory?
This chapter will provide no answer to this debate as it is much larger than a
discussion of theory and metatheory. However, it should be noted that there
seem to be several different kinds of progress being sought after and not just
one; both cognitive (Stogdill 1974; Hunt and Larsen 1977) and professional
progress (Managan 2002) seem to be goals of many scholars of leadership.
Moreover, social progress seems to be a crucial element for others, including
those who see the needs and wants of a people as a central component (e.g.
Burns 2003). These distinct, possibly conlicting, but clearly enormous single
goals only serve to make the task of constructing a ‘general’ theory that much
more dificult given the collective criteria – cognitive, professional, and possibly
social – implied for its success.
NOTE
1. This summary description is drawn in part from Martin Chemer’s chapter ‘Contemporary
Leadership Theory’, in J. Thomas Wren’s (1995) edited volume The Leader’s Companion.
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4. Power
Michael Harvey
We have power in ourselves to do it, but it is a power that we have no power to do.
Third Citizen, Coriolanus (2.3.4–5)1
Coriolanus, a study of early 17thcentury English political anxieties set in an

cient Rome, is Shakespeare’s most searching meditation on power and
leadership. It’s a bitter and ambiguous play, illed with largely unlikeable char
acters jostling for power – one critic, Eric Bentley, called Coriolanus ‘the
struggle of wrong and wrong’ (1954, 186). Caius Marcius Coriolanus, the im
perious warrior who as a youth helped drive out the last king of Rome and bears
the scars of a lifetime of warfare and command, decides to seek the consulship.
The move from military to civil power requires him to learn a new kind of
leadership and cultivate a truly reciprocal relationship with the commoners he
has always disdained, for they have a crucial (though limited) voice in the elec
tion of a consul. Shakespeare begins the play with images of conlict and power
as physical force: mutinous citizens with rude weapons, Menenius’ fable of the
belly with its literal imagining of the body politic (‘the arm our soldier’
[1.1.105]), war between Rome and the neighboring Volscians, soldiers armed
with swords, and standing above all, the haughty, blooddrenched, heroic Cori
olanus (the word ‘hero,’ a Coriolanus scholar reminds us, derives from the
Greek word for ‘warrior’ [Maus 1997, 2785]).
In the play, it is not the aristocratic Coriolanus but an anonymous commoner
– one of the city’s vital but uncelebrated ‘apronmen’ (4.6.100) – who gives
voice to one of the mysteries of power: how its matteroffact corporeal simplic
ity – ‘we have power in ourselves’ – coils itself into complexities and
contradictions: ‘a power that we have no power to do.’ The Third Citizen puzzles
over how moral obligation is itself a kind of power, or curb on power. Picking
up his cue, the mob of mutinous citizens in Coriolanus soon show themselves
to be thoughtful students of power and of the making, meaning, and preservation
of community. The citizens’ quandary is whether to trust the man who would
be their leader – and beyond him, how to understand, use, and safeguard their
power. What allegiance do they owe a hero for his past service to the city? Does
his valor suit him to peaceful rule? What of his evident contempt for them? If
they defy him, what damage will they do to the city’s fabric?
74
Power 75
‘What is the city but the people?’ they ask (3.1.198), and this, the central
question of the play (ironically irst asked by the cynical and demagogic tribunes
of the people) leads us to ponder more questions: Where does power come from?
From a leader’s strength, resolve, or wisdom? From the people’s numbers, or
bodies, or voices? Or are such metrics of power less important than the power
of connections, neighborliness, or mutuality? Power is in one sense whatever
we agree or think it is, so that the names we give things (was the 2005 Lebanese
uprising against Syria the ‘intifada for independence’ or the ‘Cedar Revolu
tion’?),2 how we talk (and who talks), what we mean by ‘agree,’ and how we
remember our answers – even how we deine this collective ‘we’ – are them
selves vital sources of power. Power, in short, has many faces. That which seems
strongest – a general waving a sword at the head of his army – is weak if no one
follows him:
Marcius. So, now the gates are ope. Now prove good seconds.
’Tis for the followers fortune widens them,
Not for the liers. Mark me, and do the like.
[He enters the gates]
First Soldier. Foolhardiness! Not I.
Second Soldier. Nor I.
[MARCIUS is shut in]
First Soldier. See, they have shut him in.
Third Soldier. To th’ pot, I warrant him.
[Alarum continues]
First Soldier. … he is himself alone,
To answer all the city. (Coriolanus, 1.4.43–51)
Following Shakespeare’s lead in Coriolanus (or Michel Foucault’s in Discipline

and Punish) we’ll begin with images of power as strength and violence. Then
we’ll turn to other ways of explaining power, like charisma, authority, inluence
tactics, ‘soft’ power, and how power is embedded in social interactions and cul
ture. The direction of our exploration will be from a view of power as an individual
resource, beginning with the physical power of the body, to power as a social rela
tion, a circulation of energy in a human network. For some, like Foucault, this
view of power makes it an inescapable, embedded part of the (modern?) human
condition. For others, the notion of the ‘circulation’ of power raises the possibility
that power might circulate without any guidance from a ‘leader’ – and quickens
the dream, or the illusion, of ‘leading without power’ (DuPree 1997).
FORCE
Let us begin where Shakespeare does in Coriolanus, with power as physical
strength and violence. Force, absolute and stunning, is a kind of primal truth of
power, from the slap in the face to American ‘shock and awe’ in Iraq. Michel
Foucault calls violence ‘the primitive form’ of power, ‘its permanent secret, and
last resort, that which in the inal analysis appears as its real nature when it is
forced to throw aside its mask and to show itself as it really is’ (Foucault 2000b
[1982], 340). The God of the Old Testament bludgeons Job into silence with
the crudest of arguments: ‘Hast thou an arm like God? or canst thou thunder
with a voice like him?’ (Job 40:9).3 Moses, who learned something about leader
ship from God, responds to the crisis of the golden calf – when the Israelites
stray from civil order and proper worship of the true God – not by appealing to
the people’s better judgment or the newly carved holy commandments (or even
a Clintonian ‘I feel your pain’), but by smashing the stone tablets, grinding up
the golden idol, forcing the people to drink the gold dust in water, and com
manding the deaths of three thousand Israelites (Exodus 32:19–28). Gilgamesh,
an even older Near Eastern text, begins with the citizens of Uruk lamenting their
king’s unslakeable power, depicted as ravening lust:
There was no withstanding the aura or power of the Wild

Ox Gilgamesh. Neither the father’s son
nor the wife of the noble; neither the mother’s daughter
nor the warrior’s bride was safe. 4 (Gilgamesh 4)
Such ‘masculine stories of violence and bloodshed’ – the kind that Okwonko,
the brutal village strong man in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (1994), likes
to tell his reluctant son – represent an ancient tradition in thinking about
power.
Is violence perhaps a ‘typically’ male mode of power? Crime statistics, to
put it bluntly, support such a view. Men commit 80 to 90 percent of crimes in
Europe and North America, according to the United Nations (2003). In the USA
97 percent of inmates in federal prisons for violent crimes (murder, negligent
manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, sexual assault, robbery, and assault) are men
(US Dept. of Justice [DOJ] 1997, Table 4.4). American men are ten times more
likely than women to commit murder, and according to a 1994 DOJ study almost
99 percent of rapists are men. Three decades ago Susan Brownmiller (1975)
argued that rape was a crime of power rather than lust. Certainly the prevalence
of samesex rape among male inmates in American prisons, and its role in mark
ing status among inmates (Human Rights Watch 2001), supports the logic of
Brownmiller’s argument about power and male identity. (That American crimi
nal justice oficials and ordinary citizens tolerate a culture of rape and sexual
slavery in penal institutions suggests a common American view of sexual ag
gression as part of a kind of useful ‘natural’ order among men.) East and West,
yesterday and today, rape has long been a ‘normal’ part of the actions of male
warrior groups. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, rape and
sexual violence have been routine tactics during the ongoing civil war:
Power 77
During ive years of armed conlict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, or
Congo), tens of thousands of women and girls were raped or otherwise subjected to
sexual violence. Victims whose cases HRW [Human Rights Watch] documented were
as young as three years old… . There were several patterns of sexual abuse against
civilians. Soldiers and rebel ighters engaged in acts of sexual violence in the context
of military confrontations, to scare the civilian population into submission, punish
them for allegedly supporting enemy forces or to provide gratiication for the ighters,
sometimes after a defeat. In Ituri where armed groups of different ethnicity have
fought each other for years, combatants often used sexual violence to target persons
of ethnic groups seen as the enemy. (Human Rights Watch 2005, 7–8)
Some evolutionary biologists and psychologists seek to explain the ‘male

ness’ of violence as a mode of power by exploring our evolutionary history
and the intriguing parallels between human beings and our closest relatives,
chimpanzees. The evidence is striking. The most notorious episode from the
primatologist Frans de Waal’s yearslong study of the chimpanzee colony in
the Arnhem Burgers Zoo, for example, was the bloody, almost Senecan revenge
triangle among the three dominant males, Luit, Yeroen, and Nikkie. One night
the alpha male, Luit, was attacked by the other two. His toes and testicles were
bitten off and he died from loss of blood (de Waal 1989, 65–68). Such extraor
dinary violence was rare, to be sure, among the chimps – but physicality,
violence, and force were part of the ordinary power ‘toolkit’ among chimpan
zee troops, along with coalitionbuilding, alliances, and betrayals.
As Francis Fukuyama puts it in a summary of research by de Waal and oth
ers, ‘Only chimps and humans seem to have a proclivity for routinely
murdering peers’ (Fukuyama 1998, 25). Compared with other species, Fuku
yama notes, human and chimpanzee males are unique: ‘of the 4,000 mammal
and 10 million or more other species, only chimps and humans live in male
bonded, patrilineal communities in which groups of males routinely engage in
aggressive, often murderous raiding of their own species’ (1998, 25, summariz
ing Wrangham and Peterson 1996). Some evolutionary biologists conclude
from such studies that human males are virtually ‘demonic,’ to use Wrangham
and Peterson’s (1996) provocative term. Scholars inclined to this view conclude
that evolution has hardwired men to assert power by committing acts of vio
lence and sexual aggression. Male bonding, it is suggested, centers around
such behaviors – thus scholars like Wrangham and Peterson see a clear line
from the behaviors of chimpanzee troops and human ancestors to modern male
warrior groups, and even to many other manifestations of power by men. But
it is important to note that not all evolutionary scholars hold such a view, nor
is it unambiguously supported by such data as we have. Women in the armed
forces, for instance, played signiicant roles in the sexual degradation and tor
ture of prisoners at America’s prison at Abu Ghraib in Iraq. ‘The gendering of
war,’ concludes one scholar skeptical of the gender explanation for violence,
‘results from the combination of culturally constructed gender roles with real
but modest biological differences. Neither alone would solve the puzzle’
(Goldstein 2001, 6).
Whatever we may decide about evolutionary psychology, hardwired behav
iors, and ‘demonic males,’ we see that when men talk and think about power,
the trope of male sexual aggression is likely to arise. Consider what is probably
the most famous passage in the Renaissance thinker Niccolò Machiavelli’s
Prince:
It is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is neces

sary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down. And one sees
that she lets herself be won more by the impetuous than by those who proceed coldly.
And so always, like a woman, she is the friend of the young, because they are less
cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity. (Machiavelli 1985,
101)
Machiavelli, as the scholar Harvey Mansield notes, ‘makes the politics of the
new prince appear in the image of rape … ’ (Machiavelli 1985, xxiii–iv).
In the Western intellectual tradition, Machiavelli (1469–1527) was the irst
modern thinker to articulate a worldview based on force and violence. The
troubled landscape of 15th and 16thcentury Italy – a patchwork of weak and
fractious states relying on timid mercenaries, shaky alliances, and ostentatious
pageants, all the while threatened by strong foreign powers like France and the
fearsome Muslim ‘Turk’ – taught Machiavelli a simple lesson: to live, one must
be strong. ‘Prophets of force,’ the historian Felix Gilbert called Machiavelli,
Francesco Guicciardini, and the young men of Florence at the beginning of the
16th century, for they no longer believed in the old descriptions or justiications
of political power (Gilbert 1984, 129). Guicciardini, Machiavelli’s closest friend
and ‘the irst of the Machiavellians’ (Ridoli 1968, 136), distilled this disillusion
ment into one of his Ricordi: ‘Considering its origin carefully, all political power
is rooted in violence’ (Guicciardini 1965, 119). Machiavelli made the study of
violence his life’s work. He believed that men are predisposed to violence
(Machiavelli 1996, 55). Harnessing this power must be the leader’s chief task:
‘a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything
else as his art but the art of war and its orders and discipline; for that is the only
art which is of concern to one who commands’ (Machiavelli 1985, 58). We live,
Machiavelli insisted, in an anarchic world. Human beings must constantly ind,
make or take the means to live and procreate. Then they must ight to defend
what they have gained and constructed. History shows that most settled orders
soon fall, because there are always threats on the horizon or dissension within
the walls. It is much easier to destroy than to build something that lasts: ‘For
one can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, ickle, pretenders
and dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager for gain.’ Cooperation is shortlived
and usually shallow: ‘While you do them good, they are yours,’ but when you
Power 79
need them, ‘they revolt’ (Machiavelli 1985, 66). Force and selishness tear apart
the thin tissue of cooperation in anarchy. For Machiavelli, force is both the great
destroyer, and – if properly harnessed – the great hope.
How does Machiavelli propose to harness force? Three points are relevant
for our purposes. First, he noted that raw physical strength was not enough. A
leader should emulate not only the lion but also the fox, ‘because the lion does
not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So
one needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to frighten the wolves. Those
who stay simply with the lion do not understand this’ (1985, 69). Second, the
foxlike leader must carefully consider the nature of his relationship with his
followers. It is vital to avoid hatred, because feelings of hatred will provoke
passionate resistance among followers and make leadership impossible. Machi
avelli’s famous advice on fear and love – ‘it is much safer to be feared than
loved’ (1985, 66) – should be understood in this context. The best leaders use
both fear and love (religions that combine love of the deity with fear of damna
tion well understand this linkage); but that is a dificult balance, and if one must
choose, choose fear, for it goes deeper. James Hillman, in a recent meditation
on the nature of power, makes a similar point: ‘Of all the faces of power, fear
someness seems to serve as a profound stabilizing principle… . Shared fear
uniies people’ (Hillman 1995, 185–6). When we think of fearsomeness and
leadership, we are likely to imagine a leader making himself fearful, but that is
only one possible tactic. Skillful leaders often delect the fear outwards, using
fear of an external threat to drive action and win support. Hillman provides a
nice example:
A university administrator explained carefully to me that by predicting inancial dis

asters and scandalous embarrassments he could move his lethargic supervisory boards
and academic committees to make decisions. ‘I had to make them afraid; it’s deinitely
the best method for overcoming institutional inertia.’ (Hillman 1995, 185)
If the leader accurately perceives the external threat, this exercise of power can
be considered a kind of virtuous Machiavellianism.
The third point about how Machiavelli proposes to harness power is perhaps
the most interesting. For all his attention to the nature of individual power in
The Prince, Machiavelli preferred republics. Patriotism – shared love for one’s
country – was for him the surest base on which to build, and the best way to
discipline or harness the power of strong individuals.5 Machiavelli is justiiably
seen by scholars as a radical in political thought, the irst modern thinker to dare
to suggest that people had the power and capacity to govern themselves. (Jean
Jacques Rousseau, for one, held this view, observing in his Social Contract that
Machiavelli ‘professed to teach kings; but it was the people he really taught.
His Prince is the book of Republicans’ [Rousseau 1973, 123].) If a community
could solve the problem of trust – a big ‘if’ – then Machiavelli preferred the
power of the many over the power of one. But how to do that was left to an
English successor, Thomas Hobbes, to explore.
Hobbes (1588–1679), the irst great thinker in the English liberal tradition,
recast Machiavelli’s poetic insights in the more scientiic and mechanical lan
guage of the 17th century (‘For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves,
but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the
whole body, such as was intended by the Artiicer?’ (Hobbes 1960, 5). Hobbes
applied his selfconsciously scientiic approach (he was in a sense the irst ‘so
cial scientist’) to the study of human society. His unit of analysis was the
individual, and the individual’s power. He provides a surprisingly nuanced dei
nition of power, upon which three centuries of scholarship have done little to
improve: ‘The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means, to
obtain some future apparent good; and is either original or instrumental’ (Hob
bes 1960, 56). By ‘original’ power, Hobbes means power that inheres in the self,
like strength, intelligence, daring, or eloquence. By ‘instrumental’ power he
means power that inheres in social interactions. Instrumental power – the power
to draw on other resources or people – broadens our understanding of power:
Reputation of power is power … So is reputation of love of a man’s country, called

popularity… . what quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the
reputation of such quality, is power… . Good success is power; because it maketh
reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on
him. Affability of men already in power is increase of power; because it gaineth love.
Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power… . (56)
Life, Hobbes maintains, is marked by ‘a perpetual and restless desire of power

after power, that ceaseth only in death’ (64). Why? Because life is insecure: an
individual who has accumulated power or wealth or a comfortable life cannot
defend these ‘without the acquisition of more power’ (64). The drive for power,
thus, is rooted in the impersonal logic of competition in an anarchic setting.
This is what Hobbes means by ‘the state of war’ he sees as man’s natural condi
tion: ‘it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a
war as is of every man against every man’ (82). Life in such a world, Hobbes
says in his most famous phrase, is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (82).
The only solution to such a world, Hobbes concludes, is to devise a common
power – Leviathan, the state, with monopoly control on the use of force. But
Hobbes could imagine no logical check on the power of the state that would not
plunge society back into a state of nature, so his intellectual ediice, built on a
foundation of radical individualism, ends up producing the irst modern argu
ment for absolutist or totalitarian political power.
‘Political power,’ Mao Zedong famously proclaimed, ‘grows out of the barrel
of a gun’ (Mao 1954–56, 2:272). But it doesn’t stop growing there. By the end
Power 81
of their analyses, both Machiavelli and Hobbes develop rich and complex con
ceptions of power. Even if power is rooted in force and violence, mastery of
violence is not enough to build durable human societies. Frans de Waal, the
primatologist, makes the same point about chimpanzee politics: ‘Physical
strength is only one factor and almost certainly not the critical one in determin
ing dominance relationships’ (de Waal 1998, 87). The ability to form coalitions
and alliances is even more a part of the daily experience of chimpanzee society,
and the job requirement for male and female alpha chimps. Machiavelli felt al
most instinctively the power of relationships, but could not igure out how to
achieve them in the modern world; for him the solution lay in the distant past,
in the inspiring example of ancient, republican, preChristian Rome – and in
one or two remarkable passages about the lively energy of modern free societies
(e.g., Discourses on Livy, II.2). For his part Hobbes succeeded in laying out a
complete if barren vision of life under a totalizing social contract in which the
legitimized power of the state – a wholly realized Weberian ‘monopoly of vio
lence’ – stands as the sole remaining, but panoptic, threat to individual
freedom.
SOFT POWER
But let us not be too quick to presume that force, even a wholesale monopoly
on violence, is an accurate gauge of power. Such kinds of power can be virtually
futile in certain contexts – as George Orwell, a great student of power, expressed
in his beautiful essay, ‘Shooting an Elephant.’ Orwell spent ive miserable years
in Burma as a young colonial police oficer. As the representative of the empire,
he had a kind of supreme power in the village of Moulmein – but as an outsider,
a white man, he was utterly alone, hated, and, in a sense, powerless. One day,
he writes, he gets report of a rogue elephant in the town. Feeling that he must
deal with the situation, he picks up a rile and marches off. A crowd gathers and
follows him with amusement, excitement, and hostility. ‘And it was at this mo
ment, as I stood there with the rile in my hands,’ Orwell writes,
that I irst grasped the hollowness, the futility, of the white man’s dominion in the
East. Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed native
crowd – seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I was only an absurd
puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces behind. I perceived in this
moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys.
He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the conventionalized igure of a sahib.
For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend his life trying to impress the ‘na
tives,’ and so in every crisis he has got to do what the ‘natives’ expect of him. He
wears a mask, and his face grows to it it. (Orwell 1956, 6–7)
What at irst glance seems an image of power – a police oficer with a gun, at
the head of a crowd – is inverted into an image of weakness, or the anxiety of
power. We cannot conclude that Mao was wrong, but there are other kinds of
power than the power of the gun – and guns can only do so much.
Consider another Asian scene: A hot, steamy day in Burma’s Irawaddy River
delta, six decades after Orwell served there. Half a dozen government soldiers
block the road from the river into town. A woman walks toward the soldiers,
with a small group around her. The soldiers train their riles on the group. A
woman in the group motions her companions aside and walks alone toward the
line of armed men. A captain shouts an order. Suddenly a major runs up, shout-
ing and waving his arms. The soldiers lower their guns. The woman, followed
by the group, walk past the soldiers and into the town. Who had power here?
Who is the woman? Why didn’t the soldiers shoot? The date was April 5, 1989,
and the place was the town of Danubyu.6 The woman was Aung San Suu Kyi,
recently returned to her native Burma from private life and studies in England,
now campaigning for democratic reforms in postcolonial Burma. With Aung
San Suu Kyi, we encounter a very different kind of power; the power of
charisma.
Suu Kyi is the daughter of a seminal leader in Burmese history, Aung San,
who built and led Burma’s army during the Second World War and negotiated
independence from the British. He was assassinated in 1947, when his daughter
was two years old. Since independence in 1948 the army has dominated Bur
mese politics – behind the scenes until 1962 and openly since then. In 1988
popular desire for freedom sparked into mass demonstrations, to which the army
responded by declaring a state of emergency, establishing the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and killing thousands of protesters. It was
to this Burma that Suu Kyi returned from England, where she had spent years
studying and starting a family. She helped organize the National League for
Democracy (NLD) and at once became a prominent symbol of Burmese democ
racy. She began speaking across Burma on behalf of the NLD and the cause of
freedom. But she has spent most of the years since her return to Burma in 1988
under house arrest, separated from her husband and two sons, and while under
house arrest in 1991 won the Nobel Peace Prize. The men with guns who rule
Burma dare not kill Suu Kyi, nor free her.
Charisma, according to Max Weber, the great German sociologist, is ‘a certain
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraor
dinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least
speciically exceptional powers or qualities’ (Weber 1978, 1:241). These quali
ties, often interpreted as a kind of magic or divinity, manifest in extraordinary
strength and courage or in a prophetic or inspired message; the instruments of
charisma, Weber says in a strikingly Machiavellian phrase, are ‘revelation and
the sword’ (Weber 1946, 297; cf. The Prince, ch. 6).
Power 83
But broadly speaking, charisma cannot merely be asserted by a leader. It

arises, Weber says, ‘from collective excitement produced by extraordinary
events and from surrender to heroism of any kind’ (Weber 1978, 2:1121). Thus
charisma is bestowed on a leader by followers – who may withdraw their rec
ognition at a moment’s notice. The complex interplay between charismatic
leaders and their uncertain followers is a major theme in history and literature
from Moses and the ‘stiffnecked’ Israelites (Exodus 34) to the present day.
Charisma as a source of power, Weber notes, ‘is naturally unstable’ (Weber
1978, 2:1114). It arises ‘in moments of distress’ (2:1111), when familiar or ha
bitual solutions fail to address new crises, and it is associated with discontinuity
and radical change. As the story of Suu Kyi illustrates, charisma is also associ
ated with selfsacriice and risk on the leader’s part: ‘Charismatic leaders make
public demonstrations of their dedication to the cause, and in doing this, they
communicate clearly that they are willing to engage in signiicant personal
sacriice and danger’ (De Cremen 2003, 118). The essence of charisma is an
emotional connection between leader and follower; its power goes deeper than
physical force: ‘Charismatic belief revolutionizes men “from within”’ (Weber
1978, 2:1116).
But as scholars like Charles Lindholm (1990) have made clear, charisma has
a dark side. There is nothing inherently genuine or moral about cultivating a
strong emotional linkage to followers. Skillful leaders can exploit this emotional
power for their own purposes. In Chinua Achebe’s novel of postcolonial Ni
geria, A Man of the People, the young and wary Odili inds himself overpowered
by the practiced charisma of the canny politician, Kanga:
Our hands met. I looked him straight in the face. The smile slowly creased up into
lines of thought… . ‘You are Odili.’ ‘Yes, sir.’ Before the words were out of my mouth
he had thrown his arms round me smothering me in his voluminous damask… . ‘Odili,
the great,’ said the Minister boyishly, and still out of breath… . I became a hero in
the eyes of the crowd. I was dazed. Everything around me became suddenly unreal;
the voices receded to a vague border zone. I knew I ought to be angry with myself
but I wasn’t. (Achebe 1989, 8–9)
Charisma is a kind of authority, of power that is recognized as legitimate, that

is accepted and willingly obeyed: Weber deines authority as ‘power to com
mand and duty to obey’ (Weber 1978, 2:943). But authority can take form even
when there is no explicit duty to obey, when obedience is a matter of habit. In
his thoughtful study of power, Adolf Berle tells the story of a young man during
the 1965 blackout in New York City who, like many other volunteers, stepped
into the street and began directing trafic: ‘He had no authority. Everyone nev
ertheless obeyed him as faithfully as if he had been a uniformed policeman… .
Selfappointed, the power was momentarily illegitimate. It was recognized, and
thus became legitimate on the instant’ (Berle 1969, 44–45).
Weber perceived in history three distinct bases for authority: charisma, tradi
tion, and rationality. Each of these three modes implies a different kind of social
and political arrangement – and thus a different kind of power. Charisma is a
‘revolutionary’ power, Weber says (1978, 2:1115), associated with individuals
(heroes, prophets, entrepreneurs, visionaries) who establish new customs, ask
new questions, propose new answers. (Today the term ‘charisma’ is often used
more loosely but less usefully, to signify personal magnetism and the power of
personality.)
By contrast with charisma, the authority of tradition represents the routiniza
tion or institutionalization of power. Traditional authority rests ‘on an established
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those ex
ercising authority under them’ (Weber 1978, 1:215); it is ‘domination that rests
upon … piety’ (Weber 1946, 296). Since, as Weber notes, most traditional forms
of authority are patriarchal, one may see tradition as a common means by which
men have transformed force into authority. (An orthodox view, of course, would
see patriarchal rules as expressions of divine will. Thus a female professor of
Islamic studies in Egypt denounces a woman’s leading of Friday prayers in an
Islamic service in New York City in March 2005: ‘It is categorically forbidden
for women to lead prayers if they include men worshippers… . [T]he woman’s
body, even if veiled, stirs desire’ [Associated Press 2005].)
In the modern world, patriarchal and other kinds of traditional authority have
largely given way to Weber’s third kind of authority; rationallegal or bureau
cratic authority. Weber deines bureaucracy – literally, ‘rule by ofices’ – as ‘a
permanent structure with a system of rational rules’ (1946, 245). Bureaucracy
is how the modern world legitimizes power into its social institutions. Schools,
prisons, and workplaces operate by habits of power that we scarcely think about
– their legitimacy makes them almost invisible. College courses, workdays, and
prison sentences begin and end at set times, to the minute. In a school day,
teachers and students move according to a schedule. Students follow a sequence
of courses from their freshman to senior years, registering for courses by fol
lowing complex scheduling rules. Faculty and departments follow guidelines
in terms of what courses to offer, how many students to permit in a given course,
what rooms to select. New courses may be tried out, but if they are to become
habitual, they must run the gauntlet of curricular oversight – committees, divi
sions, deans, and faculty approval. The college itself must periodically be
inspected and accredited by an expert external review team – all of this activity
guided by and producing vast reams of records and documents. The power em
bedded in the system inds expression in a thicket of rules, policies, and
procedures. Kafka’s The Trial follows a nightmarish bureaucratic procedure to
its absurd yet logical result. Václav Havel’s play The Memorandum concerns a
bureaucratic plan to achieve more precise communication by devising an artii
cial language. A memorandum written in the language causes confusion and
Power 85
anxiety – but since it seems to have been duly issued by the bureaucracy, no one
who encounters the memo dares to point out the obvious, that no one can read
it.
After Weber’s three kinds of authority, the most inluential recent effort to
distinguish kinds of power comes from the psychologists John French and
Bertram Raven. In a classic 1959 paper, French and Raven deined power as the
ability of an ‘agent’ to alter the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors of one or more
‘targets,’ and distinguished between ive ‘bases of power’ to achieve this: re
wards, coercion, legitimacy, expertise, and reference. Reward and coercive
power refer to the agent’s ability to bestow positive or negative outcomes on a
target. Legitimate power depends on the target’s belief that the agent has the
authority to lead, and that the target has the duty to obey. Expert power stems
from the agent’s possession of special knowledge, or the target’s belief about
the agent’s expertise. Finally, referent power (for which the term ‘charisma’ is
often used in the literature) comes from the target’s identifying with the agent
in some dimension. (A sixth base of power, information power, was later added
to the model [Raven 1965].)
As inluential and useful as French and Raven’s model has been, it does not
provide an especially clear analytic framework. Despite the label of ‘bases,’ the
ive (or six) bases are not really distinct foundations or sources of power. Re
wards and coercion are resources or outcomes controlled by the agent, while
legitimacy and referent power are attributes of the agent as well as perceptions
by the target. Referent power has elements of reward and coercion, as Raven has
acknowledged: ‘the personal approval of someone we respect can also be a very
powerful reward, and a threat of rejection or disapproval from someone we value
highly can serve as a source of coercive power’ (Raven 2004, 1242). And infor
mation power and expert power trade in the same currency, access to valued
information or experience (itself a kind of reward). French and Raven’s third
base of power, legitimacy, is a complex concept not really comparable to inlu
ence tactics like reward or coercion. As Weber suggested, there can exist different
kinds of authority that make different claims about the legitimacy of leaders’
power. In addition, a reward or a punishment, or any of the other bases of power,
may be perceived as legitimate or illegitimate; the moral dimension of legitimacy
runs across all assertions of power by leaders or agents. Any particular inluence
attempt, in short, is likely to represent the workings of several bases of power at
once. A good deal of effort has gone into trying to bring more conceptual clarity
to the French and Raven scheme, for instance by reducing it to clusters of ‘per
sonal’ and ‘position’ power, or distinguishing between ‘interpersonal’ power
(all the French and Raven bases) and structural power (a scheme that oddly ig
nores the structural–institutional dimension of legitimacy) – but these efforts
(see for instance Yukl 2002 or Neider and Schriesheim 2004) have not yet suc
ceeded in producing a clear and compelling reworking of the scheme.
A much simpler analysis of power comes from the political scientist (and
Dean of the Kennedy School of Government) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who distin
guishes between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. Beginning with a standard deinition
of power – ’the ability to inluence the behavior of others to get the outcomes
one wants,’ Nye notes there are three main ways to achieve this: ‘You can coerce
them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and
coopt them to want what you want’ (Nye 2004, 2). The irst two ways, threats
and payments, are the usual tools of what Nye calls ‘command power.’ The
third, attraction, is the tool of cooptive or ‘soft power.’ Its essence is the ability
to make others ‘want what you want.’ Critical to this is that one’s goals and
values be desirable and legitimate by others. Thus the concept of soft power
yokes together powerwielders and those they hope to act upon, so that the suc
cess of soft power depends on willing partners.
So what constitutes ‘soft power’? There are two main approaches to ‘making
others want what you want.’ First, one can articulate and emphasize one’s values
and goals, if these resonate with what others value. Nye sees liberal democracies
like the USA as possessing vast amounts of soft power thanks to the wide appeal
of prosperity and democracy. Second, one can seek to educate or change others
to make one’s own goals and values more attractive to them, as the USA did,
with remarkable effectiveness, in Japan after the Second World War. A striking
example of soft power comes from Xenophon’s Cyropedia, one of the most re
markable ancient texts on leadership. Xenophon tells how, through assiduous
image management, the Persian emperor Cyrus was able to transform hard
power into soft power: ‘And who, besides Cyrus, ever gained an empire by
conquest and even to his death was called “father” by the people he had sub
dued? For that name obviously belongs to a benefactor rather than to a despoiler’
(Xenophon, Cyropaedia, VIII.ii.9). Cooptation has an obvious dark side, and
one of the worries about soft power is that it may depend on hidden reserves of
hard power.
The idea of soft power is a very old one. It is the central leadership idea of
Taoism, for instance. In the Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu dismisses the power of
weapons and armies, and says that the best rulers exert power indirectly and
lightly, like water: ‘Water is good; it beneits all things and does not compete
with them’ (Lao Tzu 2003, 177). Machiavelli himself, the father of modern
hardpower doctrines, preferred, as noted earlier, the soft power of republics to
the hard power of princes (and in chapter 20 of The Prince he cautions princes
that fortresses are less useful than the good will of their subjects). In the 20th
century, Mary Parker Follett dismissed ‘powerover’ – akin to Nye’s ‘command
power’ – as less useful to effective leadership than ‘powerwith,’ the power of
connections and mutuality (Follett 1951, 186). Robert Greenleaf buttresses his
case for servantleadership by noting the widespread existence of ‘countervail
ing power’ (Greenleaf 1977, 85) that arises against direct assertions of power.
Power 87
The only real way to achieve lasting purposes, Greenleaf said, was for leaders
to win the trust of their followers and gain their support. Thus for Greenleaf the
ultimate leader is really a servant, like Leo in Herman Hesse’s Journey to the
East, who tends to followers’ spiritual development and gives them what they
truly need.
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE

But who decides what the people need, how they ‘need’ power to be used? Even
if we answer ‘the people themselves,’ who has taught them? What lessons have
they learned? It was necessary, the Bible says, for the generation of Israelites
who accompanied Moses into the wilderness to perish during the journey so
that a new generation could grow up, more obedient to Moses’ leadership and
new laws (Numbers 29–35). Plato makes a parallel statement in the Republic
(540e–541b), when he has Socrates say that to establish an ideal commonwealth
one would have to send out of the city all those over ten years of age, as only
the young are capable of being radically reeducated. These passages suggest a
relativistic nature of power: power is always deployed in particular cultural
contexts, and different cultures may possess different understandings, and dif
ferent kinds, of power.
A modern theorist of culture like Edgar Schein would wonder what took us
so long to get to this basic point. Schein has devoted a career in leadership and
management studies to the role of culture in shaping organizations and how
power operates within them. To take one example, Schein spent decades study
ing the American computer irm DEC (Schein 2003, 2004). When Schein began
attending senior staff meetings at DEC in the 1960s, he was astonished at how
aggressive the executives were with one another. Schein initially tried to reduce
the level of conlict between senior managers, ‘trying to get the group to be
“nicer” to each other’ (Schein 2004, 47). But over time Schein came to under
stand that power worked in a particular way in DEC’s culture – that managers
and workers were expected to ight hard for their beliefs, that technological in
novation required constant challenges to every new (and old) idea. What Schein
had at irst seen as pathological inighting was in fact the way power lowed in
one cultural setting.
In similar fashion, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz employed what he called
‘thick description’ to study the cultural context of power. In Negara, his classic
study of a 19thcentury Balinese state, Geertz explores the workings of what he
calls a ‘theatre state,’ which channeled its energies and powers not toward con
quest or eficient rule, but toward a dramatization of its own virtues and status.
In this culture, Geertz concludes, ‘power served pomp, not pomp power’ (Geertz
1980, 13). Geertz’s approach has inluenced how a generation of scholars frame
the study of power. In literary studies, for instance, New Historicist scholars
insist that the cultural and historical context is crucial to reading literary repre
sentations of power. The leading New Historicist, Stephen Greenblatt, ties
Shakespeare’s depiction of Hal/Henry V to the broader nature of power in
Elizabethan England:
To understand Shakespeare’s conception of Hal, from rakehell to monarch, we need

in effect a poetics of Elizabethan power, and this in turn will prove inseparable, in
crucial respects, from a poetics of the theater. Testing, recording, and explaining are
elements in this poetics, which is inseparably bound up with the igure of Queen
Elizabeth, a ruler without a standing army, without a highly developed bureaucracy,
without an extensive police force, a ruler whose power is constituted in theatrical
celebrations of royal glory and theatrical violence visited upon enemies of that glory
… . Elizabethan power … depends on its privileged visibility. (Greenblatt 1988,
64)
Cultureoriented theorists like Schein, Geertz and Greenblatt have had a great
impact on how modern scholars think about power. But perhaps the most inlu
ential of such thinkers has been the French intellectual historian Michel
Foucault. Power, Foucault argued, is not simply control of material resources
or bodies or actions, but something that shapes who we are and how we think:
[I]n thinking about the mechanisms of power, I am thinking … of its capillary form
of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning
processes and everyday lives. (Foucault 1980, 39)
Here Foucault echoes Machiavelli’s ideas about the inescapability of power

relations in human identity. But whereas Machiavelli saw the workings of power
– its penetration into daily life and human hearts – as a simple and immutable
fact of human nature, Foucault, like most modern scholars of culture, argues
that different historical eras produce, and are produced by, different kinds of
power. There is a whiff of Weber in Foucault’s characterization of power in the
ancient world as ‘magical and religious’ (Foucault 2000a, 31) and of modern
power as administrative and rationalistic. But while Weber saw modern ration
alistic power as a kind of apotheosis or culmination of human development,
Foucault sees it as one more historical turn: ‘I don’t think I am a Weberian, since
my basic preoccupation isn’t rationality considered as an anthropological invari
ant’ (Foucault 2000a, 229). Rationality – or ‘governmentality,’ the broader label
Foucault preferred, is simply the most recent historical turn that power has taken.
Governmentality – a set of rationalizing procedures, statistical tools, and ad
ministrative disciplines assembled in 18thcentury Europe – has shaped the
modern world, which is to say us and how we see, experience, think about, and
judge power. This modern kind of power, founded on surveillance, examination,
Power 89
and science, seems at irst glance to be less coercive than the older power of the
sword. Yet it is more intrusive, more totalizing, than past efforts to use power
to control individuals and shape society:
If one were to do a history of the social control of the body, one could show that, up
through the eighteenth century, the individual body was essentially the inscription
surface for tortures and punishments; the body was made to be tortured and punished.
Already in the control authorities that appeared from the nineteenth century onward,
the body acquired a completely different signiication; it was no longer something to
be tortured but something to be molded, reformed, corrected, something that must
acquire aptitudes, receive a number of qualities, become qualiied as a body capable
of working. (Foucault 2000a, 82)
In Discipline and Punish Foucault called this new kind of power ‘panoptic,’
after Jeremy Bentham’s Orwellian vision of the panopticon, the single central
prison tower from which guards could monitor many inmates. Ceaseless surveil
lance is the foundation of modern power.7
Thus, while Robert Greenleaf drew on Hesse’s novel Journey to the East as
a spark for his ideas about servantleadership, Foucault would cast a darker eye
on the text. Hesse’s mysterious Leo understands better than the protagonist,
H.H., what his stage of spiritual development is, what he ‘really’ needs. Leo
never explains or teaches H.H. in a conventional sense; instead the story traces
the protagonist’s uncertain, painful journey toward selfunderstanding – with a
critical step being when Leo drops his servant’s disguise, dons his impressive
robes, and takes up the active role of judge of H.H.’s life and deeds. The very
power that Greenleaf celebrates – Leo’s ability to peer into H.H.’s soul –
Foucault would be more cautious about:
Christianity is the only religion that has organized itself as a Church. As such, it pos
tulates in principle that certain individuals can, by their religious quality, serve others
not as princes, magistrates, prophets, fortunetellers, benefactors, educationalists, and
so on, but as pastors. However, this very word designates a special form of power.
1. It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the

next world.
2. Pastoral power is not merely a form of power that commands; it must also be
prepared to sacriice itself for the life and salvation of the lock. Therefore, it is
different from royal power, which demands a sacriice from its subjects to save
the throne.
3. It is a form of power that looks after not just the whole community but each in
dividual in particular, during his entire life.
4. Finally, this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of
people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their
innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to di
rect it. (Foucault 2000b, 333)
Between Hesse’s Leo and Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, Foucault might point
out, there may be as many similarities as differences.
But in a sense, Foucault says, we are all little Grand Inquisitors, implicated
in the exercise of power even as we seek to study and understand it. Our very
attempts to think about power, Foucault says, are freighted, or infected, with
power. He dismisses as ‘a great Western myth’ the belief, dating back to Plato,
that power and knowledge can be separated (2000b, 32). In this Foucault may
be termed a postmodernist – but he is better understood as a faithful student
of Nietzsche, as he himself readily acknowledged.8 Such a stance, it has often
been said, leaves Foucault no ground on which to make moral statements about
power (though he frequently did, generally criticizing existing institutions of
power and praising, more or less, ‘resistance’). Certainly, when Foucault says
that ‘power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it
comes from everywhere’ (Foucault 1978–86, 1:93) or that ‘in a certain way,
one is always the ruler and the ruled.’ (3:87), it does seem hard to ind secure
ground on which to build an ethics of power. One sympathetic scholar has tried
to create space for an ethical dimension to Foucault’s thought by emphasizing
his interest in a ‘dynamics of power’ (Rouse 1994, 93), but even this gloss
concedes that Foucault was ultimately more interested in questions or ‘prob-
lematiques’ than in solutions (112). Like his teacher Nietzsche, Foucault
succeeds in undermining our conidence in the modern world’s chief forms of
authority, of powerthatisaccepted – but fails to supply any more trustworthy
basis for power. (Nietzsche at least imagined the outrageous igure of the Su
perman, whose will to power soared above the gray mediocrity of modern mass
society.) Foucault, in his ability to ask piercing questions about power but his
inability to develop a useful ethics of power, ends up, ironically, as yet another
disciple of the ‘great Western myth’ about the separate domains of power and
knowledge.
QUESTIONING POWER
We began with questions about power in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, and let us
close by returning to that text. In 1682 Nahum Tate, a notorious ‘improver’ of
Shakespeare and an unabashed propagandist for Charles II, reshaped Shake
speare’s play to suit the political moment of Restoration England. The play’s
moral, Tate explained in a dedicatory epistle, was ‘to Recommend Submission
and Adherence to Establisht Lawful Power’ (quoted in Ripley 1998, 55). Tate’s
dull version of the play, entitled Ingratitude of a Commmon-wealth, is useful
for helping us better recognize Shakespeare’s far more complex and thoughtful
treatment of power. The lessons about power in Coriolanus are primarily nega
tive. Shakespeare’s haughty general never learns how to connect with other
Power 91
people, how to create and sustain any kind of socially productive power. The
play’s other grand igures – the people’s tribunes, Coriolanus’ aristocratic
friends, the Volscian general Auidius – are themselves powerhungry and not
especially trustworthy or admirable. The commoners are a measure better – they
actually labor, and do their best to think and act fairly. But they lack the rawest
dimension of power, the ability to ight and defend their city. The closest the
play has to a hero is Coriolanus’ severe mother, Volumnia, who saves Rome by
convincing her son to abandon the Volscian army – but this Roman mother saves
Rome at the cost of her son’s life.
In an essay on the meaning of military leadership, the equally formidable
Burmese activist, Aung San Suu Kyi, confronts the ironies of her own life: the
army that her father created to liberate Burma now keeps the country, and his
daughter, imprisoned. Trying to teach her countrymen the meaning of real
power, she quotes the 18thcentury Burmese poet LetWeThondara:
How superior
The tactics of war
How potent
The weapons!
Without gathering in
The hearts of the people,
Without relying on
The strength of the people,
The sword edge
Will shatter,
The spear
Will bend. (Suu Kyi 1995, 189)
Our musings on power come back once again to seemingly simple things, to
weapons and bodies. A Congolese woman’s voice echoes: ‘Who will protect
me if I say who it was who raped me? The men with guns still rule here. The
UN only protect a small part of town and they will not help me if these men
come to my door’ (Human Rights Watch 2005, 42). Shakespeare and the Bur
mese poet play on the same theme: the sword’s edge, and the hearts of the people
– two kinds of power, both essential, neither suficient. Do we, one wonders,
truly have the ‘power in ourselves to do it’? – and what will we do? When the
men with guns appear, will we recognize them?
NOTES
1. Quotations from Shakespeare are from The Norton Shakespeare, (ed.) 1997, Stephen Greenblatt.
New York: W.W. Norton.
2. From an article in the Washington Post:
On the streets of Beirut, they call it the ‘intifada for independence.’ In the corridors of
Washington, they prefer to call it the ‘Cedar Revolution.’ In a media age, such branding
could be crucial. The name given to Lebanon’s popular political movement is shorthand
for its historical roots and its future direction. The label will help shape how the world un
derstands Lebanon’s small but telling part of the ongoing struggle for democracy throughout
the Middle East. (Morley 2005)
3. Quotations from the Bible are from the King James Version.
4. Gilgamesh can be read as a lesson in how to domesticate the power of strong men. The gods
fashion Enkidu, Gilgamesh’s only physical equal, in response to the people’s complaints. Gil
gamesh and Enkidu wrestle and become friends; their friendship humanizes Gilgamesh. When
Enkidu dies, Gilgamesh turns his lust for power into a lust for knowledge about death and im
mortality. When this project fails, he comes to realize that the most important use of his power
is to build his city and to be remembered through its greatness.
5. One of the more inluential recent studies of power in the ield of management, McClelland
and Burnham’s ‘Power Is the Great Motivator,’ might be termed almost neoMachiavellian in
its willingness to embrace power – McClelland and Burnham conclude that the most effective
managers have a high need for power – but also in its argument about how to yoke this strong
individual drive: ‘The manager’s concern for power should be socialized – controlled so that
the institution as a whole, not only the individual, beneits’ (2003, 126).
6. In a bit of historical irony, it was at this town in 1824 that British forces used superior technol
ogy to win a key battle against a Burmese army 60,000 strong in the irst Anglo–Burmese War.
British shells killed the Burmese commander Bandula (his glittering gilt umbrella, which he
refused to put away, made him an easy target). Two years later the British steamer Diana, the
irst steamship ever used in battle, defeated the Burmese navy’s great teak warboats (Thant
2001, 18).
7. News like this only makes Foucault’s vision more persuasive:
European Space Agency (ESA) oficials commissioned a study to streamline driving in

England and the Continent by allowing individual vehicles to pay road tolls via a direct
satellite connection.
The project builds on global positioning technology and is aimed at providing a uniied
approach to road tolling throughout Europe. In April, the European Union announced a
proposal that would require all vehicles to pay tolls electronically with the use of a black
box that would be tracked by satellites. That plan, ESA oficials said, would track distance
traveled, the class of road and the time of travel… .
ESA oficials envision a Europewide system that would provide automatic payment of
road tolls for drivers travelling not only in their own country, but across borders as well.
This means integrating existing satellite tolling systems in Germany and Switzerland and
developing the intelligence required for a satellite to deduce distancebased tolls across
multiple time zones… .
ESA intends to incorporate the Europewide tolling system into Galileo, Europe’s planned
satellite navigation hoped to begin operation in 2008. Galileo would consist of 30 satellites
arranged in three circular orbits to create a worldwide network. (Malik 2003)
8. See the irst of Foucault’s lectures given in Rio de Janeiro in 1973, collected in the essay ‘Truth
and Juridical Forms,’ (Foucault 2000a, 1–16), as well as this passage from the same essay:
With Plato there began a great Western myth: that there is an antinomy between knowledge
and power. If there is knowledge, it must renounce power. Where knowledge and science
are found in their pure truth, there can no longer be any political power.
This great myth needs to be dispelled. It is this myth which Nietzsche began to demolish
by showing, in the numerous texts already cited, that, behind all knowledge, behind all at
tainment of knowledge, what is involved is a struggle for power. Political power is not
absent from knowledge, it is woven together with it. (Foucault 2000a, 32)
Power 93
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5. Leader–follower relations: group
dynamics and the role of leadership
Crystal L. Hoyt, George R. Goethals and
Ronald E. Riggio
‘Man is by nature a social animal.’ – Aristotle
Tom Wren’s chapter detailing the deliberations of the general theory group
quotes Burns as suggesting that one way of moving toward an integrated theory
of leadership would be to examine the key ‘elements’ of leadership: power,
motivation, leader–follower relations, context, and values (p. 17). Although the
group has varied in its belief about the utility of concentrating on these elements,
at our inal joint meeting in May, 2004 we agreed that we needed to have chap
ters addressing power and leader–follower relations. Thus the previous chapter
on power by Michael Harvey and the present chapter are included.
Of course the story of Professor Burns’s interest in the dynamics of leader–
follower relations, and the closely related topic of human motivation, goes back
much further than the initiation of the general theory project. It can be traced
to his earliest thinking about leadership more than 30 years ago and his insight
that understanding psychology was essential to understanding leadership. In his
2003 book Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness Professor
Burns describes the action stemming from this insight. He went to talk to a
colleague in the Williams College psychology department who was interested
in leadership – Al Goethals, one of the authors of this chapter (Burns, 2003,
p. 9). After their conversation Burns delved into the psychology of motivation
and other relevant topics. All three authors of this chapter fully agree that
Burns’s insight from the 1970s was and is still compelling. Appreciating the
psychological aspects of leadership, particularly leader–follower relations, is
essential to an integrated theory of leadership. In this chapter, then, the three of
us, social psychologists all, attempt to spell out the basic theory and data from
psychology that are most important in understanding leadership.
We begin with discussions of the impact of other people, particularly groups
of other people, on the individual that go back to the very founding of social
psychology at the end of the 19th century. Gustave Le Bon’s disturbing and
96
Leader–follower relations 97
perceptive book, The Crowd, published in 1895, helped mark the founding of
social psychology as a distinct discipline (Goethals, 2003). The Crowd served
as the starting point for Sigmund Freud’s 1921 Group Psychology and the
Analysis of the Ego, one of the earliest systematic treatments of leadership.
Freud, quoting at great length from Le Bon, emphasized the excited, violent,
irrational, and mercurial side of crowds. For the most part, in group situations,
Le Bon and Freud claimed, human beings regress to violent, instinctual behav
iors. They act but do not think. Their analyses of group dynamics have been
applied to lynch mobs, panics, and crowds at soccer matches and rock concerts
but also to enduring organizations such as the Catholic Church and the army.
Despite their generally troubling account of group behavior, Freud also quotes
Le Bon’s assertion that ‘under the inluence of suggestion groups are also ca
pable of high achievements in the shape of abnegation, unselishness and
devotion to an ideal’ (Freud, 1921, p. 79). And he notes that ‘Le Bon himself
was prepared to admit that in certain circumstances the morals of a group can
be higher than those of the individuals that compose it, and that only collectivi
ties are capable of a high degree of unselishness and devotion’ (p. 82). In this
chapter we explore the nature of groups and the role of leadership in transform
ing group chaos and potential group violence into constructive and ethical
behavior that beneits humankind. How does leadership produce both the worst
and the best from individuals in groups?
We begin with a discussion of some basic group phenomena in a section
called Group Dynamics. In the most general sense, how do people in groups
behave? How do they make decisions? Our focus here will be on the impact of
the presence of others on collective processes. We will ind that at this level
group behavior is not particularly ethical, but neither is it irrational, savage, or
regressed. Our next section, Social Inluence and Persuasion, considers a phase
in the life of groups and individuals where one person, or a small group of in
dividuals, attempts to inluence others, or the larger group. Sometimes the modes
of inluence are raw and coercive, sometimes they are gentle and subtle. Often,
but not always, such inluence leads to socially undesirable behavior. The third
major section, Social Perception, focuses on followers rather than leaders. It
considers what followers expect of leaders and examines their schemas and
stereotypes of leaders and leadership, and how they perceive actual individuals
in positions of leadership when expectation meets the reality of a speciic
person.
With these matters of group dynamics, interpersonal inluence, and leader
perception as a background, we then focus on the nature of leader–follower re
lationships. We capitalize on Burns’s distinction between transactional and
transforming leadership to consider both the tangible and psychological ex
changes that are involved in leading, and also the ways transforming leaders lift
others to a higher level of motivation and morality. Leaders and leadership
processes make a tremendous difference in whether individuals within groups

and groups within larger societies behave ethically or destructively.
GROUP DYNAMICS
We begin this section with a broad overview of individuals’ behavior in the
presence of others. One signiicant concern that arose in the general theory of
leadership discussions involved levels of analysis. In this chapter we address
varying levels of analysis; our examination of these general group processes
considers how the presence of others affects individual performance, decision
making processes in groups, and behavior in large collectives.
The Effect of the Presence of Others on Individual Performance
Social facilitation
After observing that bicycle racers were fastest when competing with other cy
clists than when racing alone or with a motorized pacer, noted bicycling
enthusiast Norman Triplett proposed that the presence of others increases peo
ple’s performance. Conducting the irst experiment in social psychology, Triplett
(1898) supported his hypothesis when he studied the effects of children winding
ishing reels either alone or in a group. While initially the indings seemed to
indicate that the presence of others leads to performance enhancement, further
research revealed contradictory and equivocal indings. In 1965, Zajonc con
ducted a landmark review and analysis of the conlicting early literature in this
area. He demonstrated that the presence of others, whether they are coactors
or mere observers, serves to enhance performance on welllearned, or dominant,
responses (social facilitation) but impairs performance on novel, or subordinate,
responses (social inhibition). This effect is quite universal, occurring among
humans, other animals, and even insects. In classic research by Zajonc and col
leagues (1969), cockroaches ran a simple, straight runway or a complex runway
with a turn, and they ran either alone, in pairs, or with an ‘audience’ of cock
roaches watching. As predicted, both running in pairs and running in front of
spectator cockroaches facilitated performance on the easy runway (social fa
cilitation) but it hindered performance on the more complex runway (social
inhibition).
Zajonc’s model of social facilitation and inhibition effects proposes that the
mere presence of others is suficient to produce these effects. Alternate and more
cognitive interpretations of these effects have also received substantial support
(see Baron et al., 1992 and Guerin, 1993 for reviews). For example, evaluation
apprehension theorists proposed that individuals are motivated to make positive
impressions on and receive positive evaluations from others. Alternatively, the
distractionconlict theorists proposed that the presence of others produces an

attentional conlict in which individuals are torn between paying attention to
the audience or the task. The various explanations are not necessarily in conlict
indeed, it is likely that all mechanisms can affect performance in varying
circumstances.
Social loaing
Another topic of particular importance to leaders of small groups is the potential
for motivation loss and decreases in performance when individuals work col
lectively compared to when they work individually. In the 1880s, agriculturist
Max Ringelmann gauged how hard individuals pulled on a rope when they
worked alone compared with when they worked in groups of 7 or 14 people.
Counter to commonsense, Ringelmann found that as group size increased indi
vidual group members pulled less hard (Kravitz and Martin, 1986). This
reduction in individual motivation and effort when individuals work in a group,
termed social loaing, has received signiicant empirical support for over 25
years and is quite robust and prevalent (Karau and Williams, 1993). A familiar
example of social loaing occurs in restaurant settings: as the size of the dining
group increases, the cheaper the individual patrons become at tipping time, thus
explaining the familiar restaurant policy to automatically add gratuity to the bill
for large parties.
Social loaing is often described using an expectancy–value framework. For
example, Karau and Williams’s (1993) collective effort model states that peo
ple’s motivation within a group is dependent on their belief about how
important/necessary their contribution is to group performance and how much
they value the group’s success. Thus, a student who believes that her input on
a group project is valuable and who highly values receiving a good grade in the
course is less likely to loaf on the project than a student who views his input as
less valuable or who values the grade less. In general social loaing is more
likely to occur when individual outputs cannot be evaluated, when people work
on tasks they don’t value, when people work with strangers, or when people
expect others to perform well. The quality of the relationship between leader
and follower also plays an important role in social loaing such that people are
less likely to loaf when they have a highquality relationship with their leader
(Murphy et al., 2003).
Brainstorming
If a campaign manager is in charge of developing a memorable political slogan,
should she ask her staff members to work on developing ideas individually or
together as a group? Many people would suggest the staff should engage in
brainstorming, a technique in which group members are encouraged to offer
novel ideas in an environment devoid of criticism. Popularized by the work of
Osborn (1957), today many leaders continue this practice to facilitate the gen
eration of ideas and solutions; however, ironically, brainstorming groups are
illustrative of the problems groups face when working together. While brain
storming has intuitive appeal, the literature consistently reports that aggregates
of individuals are more effective in generating more and better ideas than brain
storming groups (Mullen et al., 1991).
A number of explanations have been proffered to explain why brainstorming
groups tend to underperform collections of individuals (Brown and Paulus,
1996). The productionblocking explanation emphasizes that group discussion
tends to interfere with individuals starting and maintaining a train of thought
(Nijstad, 2000). Also, although the environment is criticismfree some people
may experience evaluation apprehension, which may inhibit creative thinking.
Finally, through a process of social matching, group members may not produce
a great deal if a low group productivity norm is established. Fortunately, recent
research is beginning to highlight important measures that leaders can take to
minimize production loss in brainstorming groups, such as minimizing produc
tion blocking and evaluation apprehension, reframing the problem to decrease
‘derailment,’ and encouraging the use of electronic brainstorming groups (Kerr
and Tindale, 2004).
Group Decision Making
Leaders have to be aware of the forces that drive decision making in groups
such as juries, security councils, party caucuses, and faculty meetings. We will
discuss various group phenomena that undermine the effectiveness of group
decision making including oversampling shared information, the tendency to
make extreme decisions (group polarization) and an extreme concurrenceseek
ing that results in potentially disastrous decisions (groupthink).
Biased information sampling

By pooling the knowledge and information from all the individual members,
groups can potentially take into account signiicantly more information in mak
ing their inal decision than any single individual could. However, groups have
a tendency to focus primarily on shared information and neglect information
known to only one or a few members, especially when the task is perceived to
have a correct solution. This biased sampling can result in poor decisions when
the unshared information is particularly important (Stasser and Titus, 1985).
For example, if a hiring committee focuses their discussion on shared informa
tion that points to candidate A as the strongest candidate, they would make a
poor decision in the situation where all of the information together (unshared
and shared) identiied candidate B as the strongest job applicant. Fortunately,
the leader can play an important role in assisting information management in
groups by encouraging group members to disclose unshared information and

by ensuring that the unshared information is included in the discussion (Larson
et al., 1996).
Group polarization
Research revealing that group decisions tended to be riskier than individual
decisions challenged the widely held assumption that group recommendations
are less extreme than individual positions (Stoner, 1961). Discovery of this risky
shift phenomenon sparked considerable research, some of which contradicted
the initial indings by showing that groups sometimes make more conservative
decisions than individuals. Further investigations reconciled these equivocal
indings by elucidating a larger process of group polarization. Group polariza
tion refers to the tendency for group discussion to lead to more extreme
decisions, opinions, and judgments in the direction that was initially preferred
by the group members (Levine and Moreland, 1998). In a classic example of
polarization, secondary school French students’ attitudes toward both Charles
de Gaulle (initially positive) and Americans (initially negative) were assessed
both alone and after they discussed the issue in a group (Moscovici and Zaval
loni, 1969). Group discussion resulted in polarization of attitudes such that
postdiscussion attitudes were signiicantly more positive toward de Gaulle and
more negative toward Americans.
Polarization effects are extremely reliable and robust and occur across a wide
variety of issues. For example, prejudiced people become more prejudiced and
people who favor either a ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ verdict become even more con
ident in their position after talking with likeminded individuals (Myers and
Bishop, 1971; Myers and Kaplan, 1976). A number of explanations have been
proffered to help explain the group polarization effect (Levine and Moreland,
1998). The social identity perspective asserts that as individuals identify with the
group they feel pressure to conform to the extreme perceived norm of the group.
Alternatively, the persuasive arguments explanation contends that the shift results
from exposure to new and persuasive arguments during the group discussion. Yet
another approach suggests that when comparing themselves to other group
members, individuals perceive that others have similar yet more extreme posi
tions than they do and thus they shift in the direction of extremity to be viewed
favorably, to be ‘better’ than average. All of these explanations have empirical
support and group polarization is likely a multiply determined phenomenon.
Groupthink
Not only must leaders be cognizant of the potential for group decisions to be
polarized, it is also important to understand how strong desires for group con
sensus can harm the decisionmaking process. Groupthink occurs when
dynamics within a group result in group members engaging in a distorted mode
of thinking that ultimately results in serious errors of judgment and poor deci
sions (Janis, 1972, 1982). In groupthink, group processes cause members to
suspend their normal critical decisionmaking processes and arrive at a poten
tially lawed, premature decision. Examples of groups that succumbed to
groupthink include Nixon’s White House staff deciding to coverup the Water
gate breakin and the team of government and industry oficials deciding to
launch the space shuttle Challenger. Some likely causes of groupthink include
high group cohesiveness, isolation from outside scrutiny, a strong, directive
leadership style, lack of procedures to evaluate alternatives, and high levels of
stress or external threat. These antecedents lead members to rationalize the
correctness of their group’s actions and believe stereotypes of opposing groups,
to maintain an illusion of invulnerability and an exaggerated belief in their
group’s morality, and to feel extreme pressure to conform to the group and sus
tain group cohesiveness (Janis, 1972).
One clear outcome from investigations into groupthink is that the leader plays
a pivotal role in determining the quality of the decision making and in navigating
the group through potentially disastrous decisionmaking scenarios (Tetlock et
al., 1992). This crucial role of the leader is clearly illustrated in two prominent
decisions made by the Kennedy administration that resulted in dramatically
different outcomes. Kennedy’s ad hoc policymaking group’s decision to send
a group of commandos to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs is a classic example
of how a group of excellent individual decision makers can make a disastrous
decision. However, Kennedy was determined not to make a similar mistake
when, a year and a half later, he oversaw the executive committee of the National
Security Council addressing the Soviet Union’s construction of a missile base
in Cuba. With a focus on using effective decisionmaking techniques, correcting
misperceptions and limiting concurrenceseeking, Kennedy’s group made ef
fective decisions and the Cuban missile crisis was successfully resolved. While
these two examples point to the important role of the leader, they also call at
tention to potential problems with Janis’s theory. Arguably, stress and
cohesiveness were higher during the Cuban missile crisis, indicators of more
groupthink rather than less. Research into the groupthink process is somewhat
equivocal; it appears that the processes that cause groupthink may be more
complicated than indicated by Janis. While sometimes a seemingly reasonable
and intelligent group will make a disastrous decision, there are also times where
cohesive groups with strong leaders make good decisions.
Behavior in Large Collectives
Deindividuation
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, special problems arise in large groups
and crowds. Large collectives have left a trail of brutality throughout history
including the persecution of Jews in Europe, the lynchings of blacks in America,

and the massacre of Tutsis by the Hutu in Rwanda. In Le Bon’s (1969) discus
sion of the impact of collective inluence on the individual he identiied the
concept of social contagion: the notion that the behavior of individuals in crowds
is infectious. Social contagion is marked by a loss of a sense of responsibility
for actions and a breakdown of normal control mechanisms such as values,
ethics, and social rules that normally inhibit antisocial behaviors. Beginning
with Festinger and colleagues (1952), social psychologists have sought to ex
plain antinormative and disinhibited behavior within social groups through
decades of research into deindividuation theory.
According to Zimbardo’s (1969) framework, a number of circumstances
contribute to deindividuation including arousal, sensory overload, anonymity,
novel or unstructured situations, and reduced feelings of individual responsibil
ity. Reining and expanding this theory, other researchers have explained
deindividuation in terms of selfawareness, where in crowd situations individu
als’ attention is drawn away from the self (values, behaviors, internal standards
of conduct) to the external environment (Diener, 1980). However, a recent re
view of the deindividuation literature found little support for either antinormative
behaviors or a deindividuated state (Postmes and Spears, 1998). Rather their
results support the explanation that ‘deindividuation’ heightens individual’s
identity with the group and thus conformity to the situationspeciic group norms
is increased. Importantly, this social identity perspective highlights the potential
for deindividuated acts to be prosocial. This model also underscores the potential
for leaders to positively impact the group norms in deindividuating circum
stances thereby harnessing the collective energies for good rather than evil. In
Le Bon’s terms the leader can provide the ‘inluence of suggestion’ to impel
groups toward principled achievements.
SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND PERSUASION

The group level dynamics discussed above largely concern forces that govern
the group as a whole, and thus all the individuals in a group. Now we turn our
attention to examining how individual group members inluence and persuade
one another; that is, we begin our discussion of the leader–follower relationship
as it relates to inluence and persuasion. We begin with a general discussion of
social inluence processes and how individuals impact others in a group. Next,
we discuss obedience to legitimate authority, conformity to group norms and
the inluence that minorities can have on the larger group. Finally, we distinguish
between three forms of inluence and we address persuasion processes. Power,
one of the key elements of leadership that is explicitly addressed in the previous
chapter by Michael Harvey, takes a prominent role in this section.
Social Inluence
Social inluence can be deined generally as the ability to affect another’s be
havior. In everyday life, people use social inluence to try to persuade, convince,
induce, or cajole others to provide assistance, change an opinion, offer support,
or engage in certain behaviors. A great deal of research has focused on identify
ing speciic tactics of social inluence and trying to understand their dynamics
(Kipnis et al., 1980; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). Inluence tactics can be perceived as
‘positive,’ ‘negative,’ or ‘neutral’, and include: reciprocity/exchanges, assertive
ness, ingratiation, rational persuasion, appeals, threats, sanctions, and forming
coalitions.
Effective leadership can be seen as the successful application of inluence
to move followers to achieve the leader’s and the group’s objectives. Yet, social
inluence works both ways, with leaders attempting to inluence followers and
followers using their own inluence tactics to affect their leaders. For example,
a transactional leader in Burns’s sense might rely primarily on using social
exchange tactics (money and recognition in exchange for loyalty and perform
ance). A tyrannical leader makes liberal use of threats and sanctions. Followers
may be more likely to use rational persuasion or form coalitions with like
minded peers in order to try to inluence the leader. In fact, Ansari and Kapoor
(1987) found that followers were more likely to use ingratiation and blocking
tactics (e.g., threatening a work slowdown) with authoritarian leaders, while
followers tried to inluence their more participative leaders via rational
persuasion.
Effective leaders are typically, consciously or unconsciously, masters of social
inluence tactics. They know how to inluence followers’ attitudes and behaviors
and may have a better understanding of the underlying processes. Leaders can
develop this tacit knowledge or ‘common sense’ understanding of how to inlu
ence individuals and groups. Research has found positive relationships between
tacit knowledge for certain leadership positions and ratings of leader effective
ness (Hedlund, et al., 2003; Sternberg and Horvath, 1999).
Social Impact Theory
One useful approach to thinking about how individuals in a group affect others
is Social Impact Theory (Jackson, 1987; Latane, 1981). This theory draws
analogies to the impact that physical stimuli have on objects, and states that that
impact is a function of the strength, immediacy, and number of the stimuli. For
example, the amount of light that falls on a table is a function of how many
lamps are pointed toward it, how strong each one is, and how close they are. In
human terms, the amount of impact that one or more people as sources of inlu
ence have on an individual varies with the number of people, their strength, and
each one’s immediacy to the individual. For example, the impact that a group
of drill instructors has on an individual oficer candidate during boot camp in
the Marine Corps is a function of how many of them are shouting at the young
soldier, how loud each one is, and how close they are. Let’s consider the case
of a single drill instructor leading a small group. The intensity of his impact will
be determined in part by his strength, but not just the loudness of his voice.
Various dimensions of his power are relevant, including his physical strength,
his rank, how much he is admired, and his capacity to reward or punish (see
Chapter 4 of this volume; also, cf. French and Raven, 1959). The more ‘strength’
he has according to these characteristics, the greater his impact. As a single
leader he must combine his strength with immediacy, and be very ‘up front and
personal’ with his oficer candidates.
According to social impact theory, it is not only the number of sources of in
luence that matters. We must also consider the number of individuals those
sources are trying to affect. The impact of one or more sources is diffused across
one or more inluence targets. If there is one drill instructor yelling at three of
icer candidates, the instructor’s impact will be diffused across the three. It will
have less impact than if he were yelling at just one or two.
For a single leader trying to inluence a group, her impact will vary according
to her power or strength, how many targets her inluence is diffused across, and
how close she is to each target. Strong leaders who have close personal contact
with a small number of followers, other things being equal, have more impact.
We will see how important strength and immediacy are in some classic studies
of obedience to authority.
Obedience to Authority
A special instance of inluence concerns the tendency for humans to obey those
who are deemed to be authority igures. This often ‘blind’ obedience to authority
was demonstrated in Stanley Milgram’s (1975) wellknown shock experiments.
Under the guise of studying the effects of punishment on learning, study par
ticipants, who were always assigned the teacher role, were required to provide
increasingly stronger electric shocks to a learner (actually a confederate) each
time he failed to correctly identify a previously learned word pair. Milgram
found that the majority of participants would obey the experimenter – the au
thority igure in the experiment – and continue to shock the helpless learner
over his protests, cries of pain, and requests to be released.
In the initial experiments, the teacher was placed in another room, providing
distance between him and the mistreated learner. In these instances, rates of
obedience were quite high. In fact, nearly twothirds of the participants contin
ued to shock the helpless learner (even after the learner screamed in agony,
pounded on the walls, and eventually stops responding completely) until the
experiment was terminated. In subsequent experiments the learner was brought

into the same room, and in another condition the teacher had to force the learn
er’s hand onto a shock plate. As expected, as the teacher–learner distance
lessened, obedience decreased – but a substantial minority of participants con
tinued to obey the experimenter and force shocks on the helpless learner.
Additionally, as social impact theory predicts, these experiments also showed
that the closer the authority igure was to the teacher, the more the teacher
obeyed.
These studies, and others conducted by Milgram and other social scientists,
clearly demonstrate that people will obey authority igures even when there is
no preexisting relationship between the individual and the person of authority.
Furthermore, obedience occurs even when the authority igure has questionable
credentials. For example, Milgram demonstrated that people would readily obey
the directions of an individual wearing a generic security guard uniform. Imag
ine then, the power wielded by a legitimate leader over followers, particularly
if the leader is one of unquestionable authority and if the relationship between
leader and followers is a longstanding and close one.
Majority vs. Minority Inluence
There is a strong tendency for group members to change their opinions, behav
iors, or perceptions to be consistent with group norms. In a classic conformity
experiment, participants were asked to focus on a dot of light 15 feet in front
of them in a pitch black room and they were asked to indicate the distance that
the dot moved. Unbeknownst to the participants, the dot was stationary and only
appeared to move due to the visual illusion known as the autokinetic effect. In
groups of three, group members’ judged how far the dot moved and their judg
ments gradually converged over time illustrating conformity to the developing
group norm (Sherif, 1936). Substantial research has shown that conformity, or
majority inluence, occurs primarily for two reasons: people look to others for
information and people want to avoid appearing deviant.
Processes of conformity and obedience might lead one to believe that follow
ers are at the mercy of the group majority and their leaders. Fortunately, that is
not the case. Research by Moscovici (1985) has demonstrated that a group mi
nority can resist conforming to the majority and can inluence the group’s
processes and outcomes if the minority presents a realistic alternative viewpoint
and if the minority is consistent in advocating it.
In Solomon Asch’s (1955) wellknown conformity studies that involved hav
ing groups of students judge the length of lines, each group contained only a
single participant, with the rest of the group consisting of confederates who
gave predetermined incorrect responses. The measure of conformity was
whether the lone participant would give in to the group pressure and also give
an incorrect response even though the correct answer was obvious. Under this
subtle, but strong, conformity pressure, the majority conformed. However, the
presence of only one other group member who consistently gave correct re
sponses was enough to enable the participant to overcome the conformity
pressure.
This suggests that a minority – even a relatively small one – can have con
siderable impact on group decision making and group processes. As in the
famous ilm about a jury, Twelve Angry Men, the lone dissenter is able to even
tually persuade the entire jury to his point of view by being persistent and
consistent in advocating the defendant’s innocence. This illustrates the reality
that small groups of followers can play an important part in leading the larger
group. In this regard, the boxer Muhammad Ali provides an interesting example
of using effective nonconformity to achieve social change. He insisted that he
be called by his Muslim name, he refused to be inducted into the armed services,
and he consistently embodied a different way for AfricanAmericans to behave
in a Whitedominated society. The nation caught up with his initially reviled
point of view. It took 30 years for his image to appear on boxes of Wheaties
cereal, but by the late 1990s that seemed unremarkable. The notions of com
mitment and consistent advocacy are important strategies for the leader. Political
leaders are often valued for being consistent in advocating particular plans or
courses of action. In fact, too little consistency on the part of a leader can be
attacked as evidence that the leader is ‘wishywashy’ or a ‘liplopper.’
Compliance and Persuasion
In Milgram’s studies of obedience, the experimenter has great inluence, depend

ing on such variables as his proximity to the subject. Many participants obey
the experimenter’s orders, or comply with them. However, it is obvious that they
are not in any way persuaded that what they are doing is right, or even that it
makes any sense. Understanding leadership involves understanding obedience
or compliance to powerful individuals, such as authority igures, in the context
of other forms of inluence that potential leaders might have on potential fol
lowers. Herbert Kelman (1958) usefully distinguished three ‘processes of
opinion change’ that compare compliance with other forms of inluence.
Kelman irst discusses compliance as a kind of inluence that is produced by
pure coercion. Leaders or authorities, such as Milgram’s experimenter, must
have power to produce compliance, but they need no other attribute. Compliance
is a form of inluence that is relatively shortlived. It depends on constant sur
veillance by the authority to make sure that the target of inluence is complying
with whatever directive he or she has issued. In this volume we do not think of
leadership as having taken place when an individual or group is merely comply
ing with the coercive power wielded by an authority. Leadership happens when
people go along with an inluence attempt with some degree of volition. Kelman
identiies two other forms of inluence in which the targets of inluence do have
a degree of volition in going along.
The irst of these volitional forms of inluence is identiication. In this case a
person is inluenced because he or she wants to be like or form a relationship
with an attractive leader. The leader’s inluence is based on attractiveness rather
than power. A young musician might imitate his piano teacher because he ad
mires her, or a resident physician might take on the attitudes of the chief surgeon
because she admires the surgeon’s success. Identiication produces inluence
that is longer lasting than compliance. It does not require surveillance. On the
other hand, the behavior or attitude that results from identifying with a source
of inluence may not be fully integrated into the person’s overall view of the
world or overall standards for behavior. Thus the behavior or attitude may
change when attraction to the source ends and the identiication ceases. Several
authors (Bass, 1997; Freud, 1921; Gardner, 1995) believe that identiication
with a leader is a key element of leadership. We will discuss its role later in the
chapter.
Kelman’s third form of inluence, and the second volitional form, is internali
zation. Internalization results from inluence sources who are credible rather
than powerful or attractive. Internalization involves the person integrating an
attitude into his or her overall value system. This kind of inluence is the longest
lasting. It doesn’t depend on any continued contact, actual or psychological,
with the inluence source. It is fully integrated into the person’s way of thinking
and will last a long time.
Central vs. Peripheral Routes to Persuasion
Kelman’s distinction between internalization and identiication is related to an

important approach to persuasion called the Elaboration Likelihood Model, or
the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM distinguishes two routes to
persuasion. First, with the ‘central route to persuasion’ attitude change results
from thoughtful consideration of the arguments in a communication. In contrast,
with the ‘peripheral route to persuasion’ attitude change results from signals or
cues, other than arguments themselves, which lead the target to believe the
communication. For example, the inluence target might believe that the com
municator is honest, or the target may be in a receptive mood, or may be
impressed that the message is long and contains lots of bulleted points. In all
three cases, persuasion happens not because of a full consideration of the actual
arguments, but because of peripheral cues that suggest that the message should
be believed. Leaders can persuade followers by good arguments, or ‘stories’
(cf. Gardner, 1995). But other elements also matter greatly. Is the leader some
one with whom followers might identify, or trust and believe? Has the leader
presented his or her message in a manner that encourages receptivity and cre
dulity? Personal characteristics are important here, but so are contextual
features, such as illustration, easily remembered slogans, and impressivelook
ing documentation.
Induced Compliance, Self-persuasion and Internalization
Kelman’s distinction between compliance and internalization seems very clear.

The two are very different forms of inluence. This should not blind us to the
fact that compliance can be an extremely useful tool in leadership, and if used
properly, can produce internalization. Decades of experiments testing cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) using the socalled ‘forced compliance’
paradigm have shown that under some conditions people who have been induced
to comply with pressure to behave in a particular way subsequently internalize
the attitude implied by their behavior (Cooper and Fazio, 1984). In one classic
study students at Yale University were asked, with some gentle nudging, to write
essays in exchange for money, supporting the actions of the New Haven, Con
necticut, police who had rather brutally broken up a riot on campus (Cohen,
1962). Students who were paid the smallest amounts for writing the essay actu
ally came to believe what they wrote more than those given larger amounts of
money. When students were well paid for writing essays, they were unbothered
by any contradiction between their essaywriting behavior and their negative
attitudes toward the police. But students who were paid very little really didn’t
have suficient justiication for their behavior, so they reduced the ‘cognitive
dissonance’ produced by their contradictory behavior and actually came to be
lieve that the police action probably made sense. Their own behavior served as
a cue that the police action was justiied, and it seems that they actually internal
ized that belief. When people are subtly coerced into certain actions, they often
perceive themselves as having chosen freely, and justify the behavior by inter
nalizing attitudes that support it. Adept leaders will apply just enough pressure
to get followers to behave in ways they might not act without pressure, and then
to take responsibility for their actions by coming to believe it was right.
SOCIAL PERCEPTION
Now we turn our attention to the followers and we take a socialcognitive ap
proach to understanding people’s perceptions of leaders. Many recent theorists
have argued that leadership emerges from various cognitive and attributional
processes; that is, leadership is, at least in part, in the eye of the beholder. Indeed
Lord and Maher deine leadership as ‘the process of being perceived by others
as a leader’ (1991, p. 11). This perspective is consistent with the constructionist
approach brought forth by members of the general theory group wherein leader
ship is described as ‘a result of both constructing reality and negotiating roles
within that reality’ (Chapter 1, p. 24). According to Hickman and Couto (Chap
ter 7), ‘constructionists believe that humans construct or create reality and give
it meaning through their social … interactions’ (p. 152). In this section we will
review the role of schemas, stereotypes or role expectations, and social identities
as they relate to leadership.
Leader Categorization Theory
In a foundational paper, Hollander and Julian (1969) highlighted the importance

of the perceiver in leadership processes by maintaining that the individual who
best its the followers’ shared conceptions will emerge as the group leader. Im
plicit leadership theories refer to individuals’ preconceptions regarding leaders’
traits, abilities, and behaviors and these implicit theories are inluenced both by
individual factors, such as personality traits and individual’s values, as well as
cultural values and beliefs. Empirical research on implicit leadership theories
has demonstrated that there are widely shared beliefs about leader behavior and
traits that focus around both task skills and people skills (Kenney et al., 1996).
For example, leaders are generally thought to be active, determined, inluential,
and incommand while also being caring, interested, honest, and open to others’
ideas.
Building on the implicit leadership theories research, Lord et al., (1982)
proposed leader categorization theory, which asserts that individuals have both
general and taskspeciic cognitive schemas of types of leaders that are devel
oped through past experience with leaders. According to this theory, leader
schemas act like other schemas in that individuals are categorized as a leader
to the extent their traits and/or behaviors are perceived to match the prototypic
attributes (i.e., schema) of a preexisting leader category (Lord and Maher, 1991).
Thus, by observing the behaviors and traits of all group members, people com
pare those observations to their leader schemas and the individual who best
matches their schemas is preferred as the group leader. Once individuals are
categorized as leaders, the relevant schemas affect how followers both encode
and recall information about leaders and how they perceive and evaluate leaders.
For example, if followers think that leaders should be assertive they may re
member only the times when their leader was behaving assertively and forget
the times their leader was more timid. Indeed, followers’ ratings of leaders of
tentimes relect the followers’ leadership schemas more so than they relect the
leaders’ actual behaviors, and the effectiveness of the leader is often judged
from the it of the leader’s attributes and behaviors to those of the salient leader
prototype (Lord, 1985).
Role Congruity Theory
Now we turn our focus to a particularly pernicious effect of these leader sche
mas, in particular, how these preconceptions conlict with other cognitive
preconceptions such as gender stereotypes. According to role congruity theory
(Eagly and Karau, 2002) the agentic qualities considered necessary in the lead
ership role (e.g., independence, competence, assertiveness, competitiveness,
aggressiveness, and decisiveness) are incompatible with the largely communal
qualities associated with women (e.g., sensitivity, warmth, expressiveness,
helpfulness, sympathy, and nurturance; Heilman, 2001). There is considerable
empirical evidence suggesting that successful leaders are often thought to re
quire and/or possess stereotypically male attributes and that people combine
both gender and leader role expectations when perceiving leaders. For example,
people perceive male politicians as better suited for pursuing the more agentic
tasks of public policy, such as directing the military, the economy, and foreign
relations, whereas female political leaders are perceived as more appropriately
suited for more communal tasks such as helping the poor and working for peace
(Eagly and Karau, 2002). Also, research demonstrates that in order to be inlu
ential leaders, women must delicately combine communal qualities (e.g.,
warmth and friendliness) with agentic qualities (e.g., competence and directive
ness; Carli, 2001).
This perceived incongruity between the leadership role and the female gender
role results in two forms of prejudice against women leaders. First, the descrip
tive aspect of the gender stereotype (beliefs about how women and men are)
results in the perception that women are highly communal and thus less qualiied
for leadership positions than men. Second, the prescriptive component of the
stereotype (beliefs about how women and men ought to be) suggests that women
are perceived negatively when demonstrating favorable leadership characteris
tics because those behaviors do not meet the expectations of appropriate and
desirable female behaviors. For example, a successful female CEO may be
viewed effective as a leader but she will be disliked on a personal level, and may
be conferred an epithet, such as battleaxe, for her violations of stereotypical
feminine behaviors. Taken together, these forms of prejudice help explain a
considerable number of research indings: in spite of empirical evidence sug
gesting no actual leadership effectiveness differences between women and men,
people tend to hold less favorable attitudes toward female than male leaders and
women have greater dificulty attaining, and being viewed as effective in, top
leadership roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002).
Not only can this discrepancy between gender and leadership role expecta
tions affect others’ perceptions and evaluations of women leaders, it can also
affect the women leaders themselves. Recent research is starting to uncover
factors that determine the extent to which the ‘think leader–think male’ stereo
type affects women leaders. For example, when stereotypes are subtly activated
women assimilate to the stereotype and are less likely to desire a leadership
position whereas blatant stereotype activation results in a heightened desire to
assume a leadership position (Stoddard et al., 2003). Additionally, women who
are not conident in their leadership abilities demonstrate deleterious responses
to the stereotype whereas conident women show more positive responses (Hoyt
and Blascovich, 2005).
Social Identity Theory of Leadership
While leader categorization theory views leadership as a product of individual

information processing and rolecongruity theory addresses shortcomings of
this information processing, another recent perspective views leadership as
emerging from normal socialcognitive processes associated with group mem
bership. The primary thesis behind the social identity analysis of leadership is
that as group members identify more strongly with the group, the perception,
evaluation, and effectiveness of the leader is increasingly based on how repre
sentative, or how prototypical, of the group the leader is (Hogg, 2001). Hence,
in a group where intellectual and analytic ability is highly valued, the more
group members begin to identify with the group, the more the members will
look to highly analytical and intelligent members to be their leader. Importantly,
this social identity perspective acknowledges that leader schemas also play a
role in leader perception, but as group membership becomes more salient the
relative inluence of leadership schemas to group prototypicality decreases
(Duck and Fielding, 1999).
In addition to affecting perceptions, group prototypicality also affects group
members’ liking for one another (Fielding and Hogg, 1997). More prototypical
members are more popular and more liked than less prototypical members and
thus they have the status and ability to gain compliance from the other members.
Additionally, highly prototypical members are more likely to behave in a group
serving manner than less prototypical members, which not only increases social
attraction but also allows for the other members to begin trusting the leader.
This increased social attraction and perceived legitimacy gives the prototypical
members the latitude to be pioneering and nonconformist in their social inlu
ence and it imbues them with many attributes of leadership. The important role
of legitimacy in leader–follower relations is discussed further in the next
section.
While social contextual changes may change group prototypicality, the leader
can attempt to prevent a redistribution of inluence within the group by trying to
change the prototype in a selfserving manner. Methods for doing this include
emphasizing the current prototype, ridiculing deviant group members, or con
demning an appropriate outgroup. These tactics are often observed in national
leaders including Margaret Thatcher who, during the Falklands War, ‘accentuated
her nationalistic prototype of Britain, pilloried deviant groups within Britain who
did not represent her prototype, and demonized the Argentinian outgroup’ (Hogg,
2001, p. 191). Likewise, George W. Bush engaged in similar strategies, vowing
to rid the world of evildoers, to secure his prototypicality during the 2003 war
with Iraq. As alluded to in the last point, the prototypicality approach to leader
ship also takes into account the intergroup dimension of leadership. The very
notion of a leader being prototypical of their group is based, in part, on a com
parison to other groups. Oftentimes leaders not only lead their group toward goals
but also against other groups. For example, when considering various political
leaders, we often conceptualize them in intergroup terms; that is, we consider
how they achieve their group goals as well as how they lead their constituents
against opposing political parties. These intergroup interactions are examined
further in Terry Price and Doug Hicks’s chapter (Chapter 6), as they focus on the
ethics of treating one’s own group with more consideration than outsiders.
LEADER–FOLLOWER RELATIONS
In this inal section we explicitly focus on one of the major discussion themes
evident throughout the general theory of leadership conversations: the nature
of leader–follower relationships. From a social scientiic perspective we address
leader–follower relations by examining exchanges between leaders and follow
ers, the importance of followers identifying with the leader and perceiving her
or his procedures as just, and we end with a discussion of the transforming as
pects of leadership.
The Exchange Perspective
Some kind of leadership structure emerges or already exists in most groups, and
within that structure leaders and followers engage in a psychological exchange.
Leaders satisfy a number of needs for followers, including vision and direction,
protection and security, inclusion and belongingness, and followers give leaders
commitment, focus, gratitude, loyalty and cooperation, among other things
(Messick, 2005). One overarching element in the exchange is legitimacy. Hol
lander notes that followers ‘accord or withdraw support to leaders’ and thereby
have a key role in ‘deining the latitudes of a leader’s actions… . Inluence and
power low from legitimacy, which is in several ways determined or affected by
followers, and their response to leaders’ (Hollander, 1993, p. 29). In exchange
for competency, esteem and recognition, help in achieving group goals, and
providing meaning and vision, followers grant leaders legitimacy and follow
their direction.
A central element in Hollander’s social exchange theory, and a central concept

in understanding leadership, is the notion of idiosyncrasy credit. By bringing
rewards to the group and by demonstrating competence and conformity to group
norms, leaders are given ‘credit to deviate’, which allows later nonconformity
and innovation to be accepted (Hollander, 1993, p. 33–34). This idea is similar
to the one noted previously that social attraction and perceived legitimacy give
prototypical group members degrees of freedom in leading. In 1972 when
President Richard Nixon announced that he was going to visit Communist Chi
na, his Republican followers went along with little objection. Nixon had paid
his dues by competence, conformity, and success, and he had credit to deviate.
A Democratic president might have been accused of treason by Congressional
Republicans for giving the same opening to the ‘Reds.’
The concept of idiosyncrasy credit suggests that leaders spend their capital
down when they deviate or innovate, but in fact leaders are expected to deviate
to some degree, and if a novel departure brings the group success, the leader is
likely to build up further idiosyncrasy credit, rather than deplete it. One implica
tion of this analysis is that leaders who have little or no credit may well propose
new initiatives to deafening silence. Their suggestions fall lat. Followers no
longer regard them as legitimate. Legitimacy, like charisma, is a quality that is
‘invested by followers and accorded or withdrawn by them’ (Hollander, 1993,
p. 41). This idea resonates with Freud’s claim, borrowed from Le Bon (1969
[1895]), that ‘all prestige, however, is dependent on success, and is lost in the
event of failure’ (Freud, 1921, p. 81). Had Nixon’s China initiative failed, he
would have lost a great deal of credit with his followers, and his legitimacy
would have been seriously jeopardized.
The power of selfinterest underlies the social exchange approach to under
standing leader–follower relations, and it has been challenged by a number of
recent approaches to leadership. First, scholars of charismatic and transforma
tional leadership have argued that there is more to leadership than exchange or
transaction, or brokerage (Bass, 1998; Burns, 1978). There’s more to the lead
er–follower relationship than mutual backscratching. Followers respond to
moral, motivational, and emotional uplift. In return, Hollander argues that there
is no essential difference between transformational vs. exchange or transactional
leadership, and that the former is an extension of the latter ‘with greater leader
intensity and follower arousal’ (Hollander, 1993, p. 41). We will address these
issues shortly.
Procedural Justice
Another challenge to the social exchange model grows out of Tyler and Lind’s
(1992) relational model of authority in groups. Tyler and Lind’s work is funda
mentally concerned with legitimacy and the psychological factors that produce
it. They argue that more important than followers’ speciic outcomes are their
perceptions of a leader’s fairness. Furthermore, they found that a form of fair
ness called procedural justice is considerably more important than its
counterpart, distributive justice. Leaders and authorities who make decisions
fairly gain more voluntary compliance than leaders who simply distribute re
wards fairly. It is more important that your outcomes are allocated through just
procedures than that they seem just in relation to what has been distributed to
others. A leader might not give you what you think you deserve, but if he or she
has used fair procedures in deciding what you get, he or she is perceived as le
gitimate, and is likely to be followed.
During the construction of the Panama Canal, chief engineer George W.
Goethals won over the initially hostile labor force with a novel use of procedural
justice. He met with individual members of the work force starting early every
Sunday morning on a irstcome, irstserved basis without regard to rank, race,
or nationality. Their concerns were heard, and matters were resolved expedi
tiously. ‘The new approach was in fact wholly unorthodox by the standards of
the day. In labor relations Goethals was way in advance of his time, and nothing
that he did had so discernable an effect on the morale of the workers or their
regard for him.’ As a result they gave him ‘the best service within their power’
(McCullough, 1977, p. 538).
What creates procedural justice, and why is it so important? If people are
given a chance to make their case, if they are treated with dignity and respect,
and if the leader is honest and unbiased in making decisions, followers will feel
that they have been treated fairly, that they have had procedural justice. ‘Above
all, the leader must be concerned with the appearance of fairness, with convinc
ing followers that he or she is willing to consider their point of view, and that he
or she will be evenhanded and nondiscriminatory in decisionmaking’ (Tyler
and Lind, 1992, p. 161). When the leader accords followers procedural justice,
they feel validated as members of the group by the most prominent and credible
person in the group. The leader speaks for the group in treating individuals or
groups of followers in a way that shows that they are in good standing. Thus it
is people’s need for validation within a valued group, rather than narrow self
interest, that is central in getting them to willingly follow from a procedural
justice viewpoint. ‘The belief that the authority views one as a full member of
the society, trust in the authority’s ethicality and benevolence, and belief in the
authority’s neutrality – these appear to be the crucial factors that lead to voluntary
compliance with the directives of authority’ (Tyler and Lind, 1992, p. 163).
Thus, rather instrumental concerns and exchanges between leaders and fol
lowers are important in their relationship, but there are other motives, including
crucial needs for selfvalidation and selfworth, that strongly affect followership.
These and other important motives are activated by charismatic and transfor
mational leaders.
Charisma and Identiication with the Leader
Charisma, as irst deined by Weber (1947) and discussed earlier by Harvey

(Chapter 4), involves the collective perception of followers that an individual
possesses certain extraordinary characteristics that make her or him worthy of
leadership. Therefore, according to Weber, leadership is a form of social inlu
ence that comes partly from the leader’s extraordinary qualities, but primarily
from followers’ collective identiication with and willingness to follow a chosen
person. Leaders of national or social movements, such as Mohandas Gandhi
and Martin Luther King, Jr., who were able to mobilize huge numbers of fol
lowers without formal authority, are good examples.
While this view of charisma relates to our earlier discussion of social perception
in that it views charisma as a leader personality constructed from socialcognitive
processes of followers, subsequent research has focused more on the character
istics and behavior of charismatic leaders. Conger and Kanungo (1998), and others
emphasize the abilities of charismatic leaders to inspire followers through a
compelling vision, strong commitment to the vision, and perceptions of the lead
er’s competence to achieve it. Followers therefore must strongly identify with the
chosen leader in order for him or her to remain in power.
Conger (2004) argues that charismatic leaders build strong follower identii
cation through being truly concerned with and responsive to follower needs and
through selfsacriice, such as the decision of Chrysler’s CEO, Lee Iacocca, to
take a one dollar salary when he came on board to try to turn the company
around. It also helps if the charismatic leader shows exceptionally strong devo
tion to the vision he or she articulates for the organization, even to the extent of
taking great personal risks to prove his or her dedication to ‘the cause.’
Other scholars have focused on personal characteristics of charismatic leaders
that play a part in inspiring followers and in building follower commitment. For
example, charismatic individuals are emotionally expressive and use their ex
pressiveness to energize, inspire, and motivate followers (Riggio, 2004).
Charismatic individuals are often exceptionally gifted speakers, using words to
inspire and to clearly and persuasively articulate their visions. A recent study
demonstrated that charismatic US presidents used more inspirational metaphors
in their inaugural addresses than did noncharismatic presidents (Mio et al.,
2005). Charismatic leaders can be exceptionally persuasive and wield great in
luence over followers through their use of inspirational and motivating speech
as well as emotional expressiveness.
Transformational/Transforming Effects of Leadership
In 1978 James MacGregor Burns introduced the concept of the transforming

leader – one who empowers followers to produce profound and fundamental
change. Burns argues that transformational leadership goes beyond the straight
forward social exchange relationship offered by transactional leadership, to
provide deeper levels of connection and higher levels of commitment, perform
ance, and morality on the part of both follower and leader.
The fact that transformational leaders are extraordinarily effective in many
leadership situations can be better understood by an analysis of group dynam
ics. Building from Burns’s conception of transforming leadership, Bass (1998)
argues that truly effective leaders are both transactional and transformational,
with transactional leadership representing the social exchange elements inher
ent in the leader–follower relationship, and transformational leadership
accounting for the more extraordinary levels of follower commitment and
motivation. In the Bass and Avolio model (Bass, 1985, 1998; Bass and Avolio,
1994), transformational leadership is made up of several components. Two of
these components, Idealized Inluence and Inspirational Motivation, are ele
ments of charismatic leadership. Idealized Inluence relates to the leader’s
ability to ‘walk the talk’ – to be a role model for followers and to truly lead the
way. Notions of embodying the prototypical, effective leadership role, as dis
cussed in role congruity and social identity theories, come into play here.
Inspirational Motivation is the leader’s ability to create and articulate the vision
in a way that inspires followers and builds their loyalty and commitment. The
elements of building strong follower identiication with the leader and com
mitment to the leader’s vision have already been discussed.
According to Shamir et al., (1993), leader charisma is particularly effective
because it raises followers’ collective sense of selfesteem and selfeficacy. A
transformational leader, for example, conveys conidence in followers and holds
high expectations for their performance. By articulating a shared vision, the
transformational/charismatic leader raises both the intrinsic value of the collec
tive goal and followers’ sense of being able to accomplish the goal. For example,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt demonstrated this element of transformational/char
ismatic leadership in his efforts to lead the USA out of the Great Depression.
He was successful in painting a vision of a better future and persuading the citi
zenry that they had the means and ability to accomplish it.
The remaining components of Bass’s transformational leadership are Indi
vidualized Consideration and Intellectual Stimulation. Understanding of these
elements is also enhanced by knowledge of group dynamics and processes.
Individualized Consideration relates to the leader’s ability to develop a strong
relationship with each follower – one that goes beyond the mere exchange
relationship and is characterized by the leader’s genuine concern for the fol
lower’s individual needs, perspective, and personal development. Through
this process, leaders can develop followers into leaders. Intellectual Stimula
tion is the transformational leader’s ability to intellectually challenge followers
to go the extra mile, to be innovative and creative, and to become an active
and a constructively critical participant in group decision making and

processes.
CONCLUSION
One point that was generally agreed upon in this quest for a grand theory of
leadership is that to understand the nature of leadership we must understand the
human condition. One aspect of the human condition that has long intrigued
those from the humanities and the social sciences alike is the social facet. In
this largely descriptive chapter we present a social scientiic perspective on un
derstanding the social animal as it relates to leadership.
We have seen that group life is marked with many dynamics that challenge
leadership. Groups can become extreme, they can produce nearly blind conform
ity, and they can permit or even encourage antisocial behavior. Individuals in
groups can become remarkably thoughtless, in both a literal cognitive sense and
a igurative moral sense, and they can be very lazy, thereby exploiting the good
will of others. Nevertheless, leaders can use their personal resources and their
persuasiveness to mobilize groups toward effective, moral ends and to bring out
Lincoln’s ‘better angels of our nature.’ Using both transactional and transfor
mational behaviors, leaders throughout history – Mohandas Gandhi, Nelson
Mandela, and Eleanor Roosevelt, for example – have attempted to transform
themselves and their followers in the service of goals or causes we applaud. The
world is a better place for their contributions.
There may be times when it is easier to judge whether leaders and their fol
lowers were successful than to judge whether their goals were moral. Morality
is often debatable, in the present and in historical hindsight. Of his famous
meeting with Robert E. Lee, when Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Vir
ginia, effectively ending the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant wrote ‘I felt like
anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long
and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I
believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there
was the least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass
of those who were opposed to us’ (Grant, 1886, pp. 489–90). Do we understand
Lee’s leadership differently depending on whether we agree with Grant’s as
sessment of the morality of Lee’s cause? While we believe that questions of
morality are central to understanding leadership, our chapter on leader–follower
relations does not much help address them. However, all of the contributors to
this volume believe that they must never be allowed to get too far from view.
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6. A framework for a general theory of
leadership ethics
Terry L. Price and Douglas A. Hicks
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of leadership presents a problem for moral philosophers and
social critics alike. Leadership is so central a response to the human condition
that it is dificult to imagine what we might do without it.1 Yet this relationship
is distinctive in its tendencies toward hierarchy and inequality.2 First, role dif
ferentiation between leaders and followers is something of a descriptive truth
about leadership. There are obvious disparities between the capacities and be
haviors of leaders, on the one hand, and the capacities and behaviors of
followers, on the other. For example, leaders generally exert greater inluence
than followers on the group, usually by means of the greater power and privi
leges derived from their positions of leadership. Second, associated with
leadership are standard assumptions about the permissibility of differential
treatment between groups. Leadership often demands giving special attention
to the group of which one is a leader or – for that matter – a follower, even when
so doing comes at the expense of outsiders. The problem, then, is to make moral
sense of a ubiquitous human relationship that cuts against some of our best in
tuitions and commitments, in particular, about the ethical importance of
equality.
This problem derives from the more general proposition that unequal treatment
requires justiication. Acceptance of this proposition is at least partially constitu
tive of what it is to be a reasonable participant in an argument. For example, if
an individual holds that two claims are similar in all relevant respects but that
one ought to be accepted and the other rejected, then he or she is being unreason
able. In such a case, the individual would rightly be subject to a charge of
arbitrariness. Moral argumentation about persons is hardly different on this score.
If an individual holds that two persons are similar in all morally relevant respects
but that one ought – morally – to be treated differently than the other, then he or
she is being unreasonable. More strongly, given the potential moral costs of un
equal treatment of persons, the argument against treating these two persons
differently has greater force than it would have from the more basic requirement
123
of reasonableness alone. We might go so far as to say that the two individuals

should be treated equally, unless and until we can identify some morally relevant
distinction between them. In other words, equality is the status quo in morality,
and deviations from the status quo require special justiication.3
Applied to the phenomenon of leadership, the presumption in favor of equal
ity generates a special task for moral philosophers and social critics. Speciically
their task is to analyze the features of this relationship for morally relevant dis
tinctions that would potentially justify particular inequalities, perhaps within a
wider frame of equality. The result of any such analysis would fall into one of
three types, which we can refer to as the conservative approach, the radical ap
proach, and the moderate approach, respectively. First, the conservative
approach maintains the inequalities we are inclined to associate with leadership
by showing that they are fully justiied in the end. Second, the radical approach
holds that some or all of these inequalities are unjustiied and that we must re
work leadership, perhaps forging it into a tool against inequality. On this
approach, leadership should combat inequality, not embody it.4 Third, the mod
erate approach articulates the grounds for justiied inequality in a way that sets
clear limits on differential treatment of followers and outsiders, all the while
maintaining a general frame of equality, speciically, the moral equality of citi
zens. Although it might be expected that a general theory of leadership would
resolve the tensions between leadership and equality, our goal in this chapter is
not to adjudicate among these options. It is rather to pull together the strands
of ethical thinking that arrive at the conservative, radical, and moderate ap
proaches and, in so doing, create a framework for future analysis in leadership
studies.
A framework for a general theory of leadership ethics thus offers a conceptual
organization of normative responses to inequality, not a determination of how
much inequality can be justiied in the relation between leaders and followers
or between groups and outsiders.5 The irst three substantive sections of the
chapter serve as historical background for this debate, focusing exclusively on
traditional social, political and moral theory. Sections II and III consider histori
cal understandings of inequalities in the leader–follower relation.6 Section IV
turns to historical understandings of inequalities between groups and outsiders
or, to borrow the language of social psychologists, ingroups and outgroups.
Section V then looks at contemporary moral debates about inequalities between
leaders and followers as well as inequalities between ingroups and outgroups.
Section VI examines these questions in light of three current approaches to
leadership. The conclusions of this chapter articulate some of the preconditions
for understanding ethical leadership, including the important task of naming
different assumptions and perspectives in competing moral frameworks.
A framework for a general theory of leadership ethics 125
TRAIT AND SITUATIONAL APPROACHES TO

INEQUALITIES IN THE LEADER–FOLLOWER
RELATIONSHIP
The idea that leaders and followers merit equal treatment rests on the assump
tion that leaders and followers are – in fact – equals. Those who do not accept
this assumption need not see inequalities in treatment between leaders and fol
lowers as any kind of affront to morality. As Aristotle articulates the formal
principle of equality, ‘[J]ustice seems to be equality, and it is, but not for every
one, only for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality, since indeed it is, but
not for everyone, only for unequals’ (Aristotle 2001, 1280a10–13). In the Re-
public, Aristotle’s teacher, Plato, utilized the assumption that there are
differences between leaders and followers to develop what can be read as a
conservative approach to the inequalities of leadership. According to Plato,
leaders in the just state are drawn from a special class of highly educated guard
ians or ‘philosopher kings’. Individuals in this class are ‘itted by nature both
to engage in philosophy and to rule in a city, while the rest are naturally itted
to leave philosophy alone and follow their leader’ (Plato 2001, 474b–c). Un
suited for rule, followers contribute to the division of labor as part of the
auxiliary and moneymaking classes. Given the inequalities between leaders
and followers (e.g., the guardians are ‘by nature good at remembering, quick to
learn, highminded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage,
and moderation’ [Plato 2001, 487a]), there is no need to treat leaders and fol
lowers equally. In fact it would be an injustice to do so: ‘exchange and meddling
is injustice … For the moneymaking, auxiliary, and guardian classes each to
do its own work in the city, is the opposite. That’s justice … ’ (Plato 2001,
434c).
For Plato, trait differences between leaders and followers justify the inequali
ties in education and training as well as the resulting inequalities in power
inherent in leader–follower relations. But the particular traits Plato extols cannot
be used to justify other commonplace inequalities between leaders and follow
ers, e.g., inequalities in wealth.7 In fact Plato argues that the guardians should
be strictly limited in their private property. Similarly, they must live in common,
publicly accessible places and survive on taxes from citizens. For ‘if [the guard
ians] acquire private land, houses, and currency themselves, they’ll be household
managers and farmers instead of guardians’ (Plato 2001, 417a–b). Yet Plato
thinks it is no mark against a theory of leadership that leaders do not get material
beneits from their positions. This is because we are not ‘aiming to give them
the greatest happiness’ but, rather, ‘to see that the city as a whole has the greatest
happiness’ (Plato 2001, 421b). Here the more general point, one that recurs in
the history of social and political theory, is that leadership is not for the good
of the leader. Even the philosopher who wants nothing more than to contemplate
the forms, which are the objects of knowledge for Plato, must ‘go down again
to the prisoners in the cave’ (Plato 2001, 519d). The guardians rule, then, not
for any kind of beneit to themselves. The most that they can expect is to avoid
‘the greatest punishment’, which is ‘to be ruled by someone worse than oneself’
(Plato 2001, 347c).
Aristotle agrees with Plato that the superiority of some individuals can con
stitute a good reason to entrench hierarchy between leaders and followers.
Aristotle writes,
[W]hen there happens to be someone who is superior in virtue … , people would not
say … that they should rule over him. For that would be like claiming that they de
served to rule over Zeus, dividing the ofices. The remaining possibility – and it seems
to be the natural one – is for everyone to obey such a person gladly, so that those like
him will be permanent kings in their citystates. (Aristotle 2001,1284b28–34)
But Aristotle’s reference to Zeus betrays his skepticism that there might be an
individual so superior in virtue. Such an individual would be a god, not a human
being. This means that Aristotle accepts the trait approach to leadership in theory
but not in practice. In practice, rulership must be ‘based on things from which
a citystate is constituted. Hence the wellborn, the free, and the rich reasonably
lay claim to ofice. For there must be both free people and those with assessed
property, since a citystate cannot consist entirely of poor people, any more than
of slaves’ (Aristotle 2001,1283a15). Aristotle thus moderates Plato’s conserva
tive approach to the inequalities of leadership.
So for Aristotle the justiication of inequalities inherent in leadership must
attend to a variety of realworld differences between leaders and followers. Of
course not just any differences will do. For example, ‘if some are slow runners
and others fast, this is no reason for the latter to have more [power] and the
former less [power]’ (Aristotle 2001,1283a10). Such differences between indi
viduals are plainly irrelevant to political leadership (but perhaps not, say, to
athletic or military leadership). Yet Aristotle holds that any of several other dif
ferences between individuals (e.g., whether one is wellborn, free or rich) can
be suficient to justify the rule of some individuals over others. Different con
stitutions can be ‘correct’, that is, regardless of whether they make the
‘authoritative element … one person, or few, or many’ (Aristotle 2001,1279a25).
The correctness of the constitution is based on its contribution to the common
beneit, which depends on the actual makeup of the citizenry. The actual makeup
of the citizenry determines whether a constitution in the form of kingship, aris
tocracy or polity would make the greatest contribution to the citystate. It is for
this reason that ‘[w]ithin each of [these] constitutions … the decision as to who
should rule is indisputable’ (Aristotle 2001,1283b5). Things are more dificult,
however, when ‘all these [with a claim to rule] are present simultaneously’
(Aristotle 2001,1283b8–9). In these circumstances, ‘[N]one of the deinitions
on the basis of which people claim that they themselves deserve to rule, whereas
everyone else deserves to be ruled by them, is correct’ (Aristotle 2001,1283b25).
Here the most we get from Aristotle is that in the best constitution, the citizen
takes his turn at both ruling and being ruled. He is ‘the one who has the power
and who deliberately chooses to be ruled and to rule with an eye to the virtuous
life’ (Aristotle 2001,1284a1–4).
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was also sensitive to the fact that no quali
ties are suficient to differentiate leaders and followers in all circumstances.
Machiavelli’s commitment to the situational component of leadership comes
out in his oftcited advice to leaders in The Prince: since we do not live an ideal
world, ‘you should be constantly prepared, so that, if these [positive qualities]
become liabilities, you are trained and ready to become their opposites’ (Machi
avelli 2001 [1532], p. 452). In this work Machiavelli is primarily concerned with
leadership behavior that is conducive to holding onto power, and he claims that
‘it is necessary for a ruler, if he wants to hold on to power, to learn how not to
be good’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1532], p. 448). In important passages in his Dis-
courses on the First Ten Books of Titius Livius, however, Machiavelli is less
concerned with the situational ethic that leaders must exercise to hold onto
power than with a general kind of behavioral lexibility necessary for effective
leadership. According to Machiavelli, ‘[W]hether men have good or bad fortune
depends on whether they adjust their style of behavior to suit the times’ (Machi
avelli 2001 [1531], p. 486). Here Machiavelli has in mind more morally neutral
leadership qualities such as cautiousness and impetuousness.
Machiavelli is hardly optimistic that individual leaders might adapt to chang
ing circumstances. He writes,
There are two reasons why we are unable to change when we need to: In the irst
place, we cannot help being what nature has made us; in the second, if one style of
behavior has worked well for us in the past, we cannot be persuaded we would be
better off acting differently. The consequence is that one’s fortune changes, for the
times change, and one’s behavior does not. (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 487)
Both nature and experience, that is, conspire against a leader’s ability to respond
to changing circumstances. As a consequence Machiavelli prefers republics to
monarchies: ‘a republic should survive longer and should more frequently have
fortune on its side, than a monarchy, for a republic can adapt itself more easily
to changing circumstances because it can call on citizens of differing characters’
(Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 486). Like Aristotle, then, Machiavelli thinks that
we will be hard pressed to ind particular differences between leaders and fol
lowers that justify the inequalities of leadership in all situations. Justiication is
a function of the ways in which individual qualities manifest themselves in dif
ferent situations and, as we shall see, the ways in which these qualities can be
combined in leader–follower relations to offset the inluences of each.
Social and political thinkers often begin with a creation story or a description
of the ‘state of nature’ to evaluate the morality of inequalities between leaders
and followers. Machiavelli’s creation story, which also explains why leadership
is a necessary part of social life, indexes the differentiating qualities of leaders
to the needs of a society at a particular time:
When the world began, it had few inhabitants, and they lived for a while apart from
one another as the animals do. As their numbers multiplied they gathered together,
and in order to be better able to defend themselves, they began to defer to one among
their number who was stronger and braver than the rest. They made him, as it were,
their leader and obeyed him. (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472)
Soon their needs evolved to include more than mere survival, and ‘when they
had to choose a ruler, they no longer obeyed the strongest, but he who was most
prudent and most just’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472). In both cases, then,
the fact that the rule of the monarch was for the common beneit justiies the
resulting inequalities. The same is true for the distribution of power that char
acterizes the other constitutions that Machiavelli considers to be ‘correct’:
aristocracy and democracy. Rule by the elite or the masses is justiied when
leaders put ‘their own interests second and the public good irst’ (Machiavelli
2001 [1531], p. 472).
Despite the fact that monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are justiied when
they work for the common good, Machiavelli ultimately dismisses them on
grounds of their instability. All three correct constitutions put too much faith in
a single set of attributes, those of a person, a class of elites or the masses. As a
result, each of the correct constitutions readily degenerates into its ‘pernicious’
counterpart: tyranny, oligarchy or anarchy. Monarchy becomes tyranny, and
aristocracy becomes oligarchy, primarily because both depend upon hereditary
succession. Similarly, democracy evolves into anarchy ‘once the generation that
had established it [has] passed away’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472). The
problem with the irst two correct constitutions is that the descendents of the
monarchs are often ‘inferior to their ancestors’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472)
and the descendents of the aristocrats were not alive to experience the excesses
of tyranny. Being unfamiliar with these evils, this new generation of aristocrats
oversteps the bounds of its proper authority and is ‘unwilling to continue treating
their fellow subjects as their equals’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472). As oli
garchs, they ignore relevant equalities between leaders and followers, thus
moving beyond the justiied inequalities in power that characterize this constitu
tion. In contrast, democracycumanarchy suffers not from a lack of equality
between leaders and followers but, rather, from too much of it: ‘neither private
individuals nor public oficials could command any respect. Each person did as
he chose, with the result that every day innumerable crimes were committed’
(Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472).8
Machiavelli concludes that ‘all these forms of government are pestilential:

The three good ones do not last long, and the three bad ones are evil’ (Machia
velli 2001 [1531], p. 473). Justiied inequalities are a function of individual
attributes in particular circumstances, but circumstances change to make the
attributes of particular individuals irrelevant. Moreover, the individuals with the
relevant attributes are replaced over time to make particular constitutions dan
gerous. The result is perpetual cycling between constitutions: monarchy to
tyranny to aristocracy to oligarchy to democracy to anarchy and back to mon
archy. Still, there may be a solution that draws on the attributes of the citizens
in each of the correct constitutions. According to Machiavelli,
Those who know how to construct constitutions wisely have identiied this problem
and have avoided each one of these types of constitution in its pure form, constructing
a constitution with elements of each. They have been convinced such a constitution
would be more solid and stable, would be preserved by checks and balances, there
being present in the one city a monarch, an aristocracy, and a democracy. (Machiavelli
2001 [1531], p. 473)9
TRANSACTIONAL AND TRANSFORMATIONAL

APPROACHES TO INEQUALITIES IN THE LEADER–
FOLLOWER RELATIONSHIP
The moral doctrine volenti non it injuria holds that individuals cannot be
wronged by that to which they have consented. Drawing on this line of argu
ment, social contract theory focuses on consensual transactions among
individuals in order to justify standard inequalities between leaders and follow
ers. For social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), the
justiied inequalities can be quite severe. Followers willingly transfer all power
to an absolute sovereign, ‘that great Leviathan’, to replace the ‘warre of every
man against every man’ that characterizes the state of nature (Hobbes 1991
[1651], p. 90) with the peace and security that only strong leadership can pro
vide: ‘For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the
CommonWealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on
him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to conform the wills of them all, to
Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad’ (Hobbes 1991
[1651], pp. 120–21). In fact on Hobbes’s view, no treatment of followers can be
properly deemed unjustiied, regardless of how unequal the treatment might
be,
because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgments
of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury
to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he
that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Commonwealth, every particular man

is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury
from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore
ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himself of injury; because to do
injury to ones selfe, is impossible. (Hobbes 1991 [1651], p. 124)
In other words consent makes followers the ultimate source of the unequal
treatment. They have no one but themselves to blame for the treatment they re
ceive from leaders.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that social contract theory puts no
limits on justiied inequalities between leaders and followers. Even Hobbes
holds that ‘[t]he Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect
them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else
can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished’ (Hobbes 1991 [1651],
p. 153). John Locke (1632–1704), also in the social contract tradition, was much
more cautious than Hobbes about justiied inequalities between leaders and
followers, expressing his reservations about absolute sovereignty this way:
As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all
of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain
all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by
Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what
Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it
Safety, to be devoured by Lions. (Locke 1988 [1690], p. 328)10
Accordingly Locke can be seen as advocating a moderate approach to the ine

qualities of leadership: ‘[T]he power of the Society, or Legislative constituted
by them, can never be suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but
is obliged to secure every ones Property’ (Locke 1988 [1690], p. 353), where
property is understood in a broad sense to include life and liberty, in addition
to estate. Still, within these limits, leaders are clearly differentiated from fol
lowers on the Lockean view, in that only the former have the power to act as
indifferent judges and executioners of established law. Moreover, according to
Locke, rulers should be granted the prerogative ‘to do several things of their
own free choice, where the Law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct
Letter of the Law, for the publick good’ (Locke 1988 [1690], p. 377).
Of the social contract theorists, no one expresses greater reservations about
the inequalities between leaders and followers than JeanJacques Rousseau
(1712–78). In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau claims that
the individuals in the state of nature were essentially duped into accepting the
inequalities of political society: ‘They all ran to chain themselves, in the belief
that they secured their liberty, for although they had enough sense to realize the
advantages of a political establishment, they did not have enough experience to
foresee its dangers’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 747). Worst among these dangers
were those arising from the system of property rights advocated by thinkers
such as Locke. According to Rousseau, ‘[T]he origin of society and laws …
gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich, irretrievably destroyed
natural liberty, established forever the law of property and of inequality, changed
adroit usurpation into irrevocable right, and for the proit of a few ambitious
men henceforth subjected the entire human race to labor, servitude and misery’
(Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 747). Far from allowing inequalities between leaders
and followers in an effort to combat injustice, political society simply entrenches
unjust inequalities.
How did leaders and followers ind themselves in this condition? On Rous
seau’s creation story, as on Machiavelli’s creation story and in the Hobbesian
state of nature, individuals were forced into social units by the harsh realities
of existence. But Rousseau holds that inequality arises not as a direct response
to these realities, as – for example – when a leader is selected because he is
‘stronger and braver than the rest’ (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 472). Rather, it
has its roots in ‘the petulant activity of our egocentrism’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755],
p. 743).
People grew accustomed to gather in front of their huts or around a large tree; song
and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the oc
cupation of idle men and women who had locked together. Each one began to look
at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a value. The
one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the strongest, the most adroit or
the most eloquent became the most highly regarded. And this was the irst step toward
inequality and, at the same time, toward vice … as soon as men had begun mutually
to value one another, and the idea of esteem was formed in their minds, each one
claimed to have a right to it, and it was no longer possible for anyone to be lacking
it with impunity. (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 743)
Leadership, then, is not a sacriice of equality for the common good. Social and
political organization provides little more than a context for people to make
morally suspect expressions of status: ‘they consent to wear chains in order to
be able to give them in turn to others. It is very dificult to reduce to obedience
someone who does not seek to command’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 752). In
other words, it is the desire to rule that irst puts people in a position to be ruled
by others.
Given Rousseau’s seeming preference for the state of nature over political
society, it might be hard to see why he would be characterized as a social con
tract thinker. After all, Rousseau sees natural man ‘satisfying his hunger under
an oak tree, quenching his thirst at the irst stream, inding his bed at the foot
of the same tree that supplied his meal; and thus all his needs are satisied’
(Rousseau 2001 [1755], pp. 726–7), whereas he sees social man living the life
of a fraud. But it is important to notice that natural man might nevertheless be
missing something valuable. Rousseau alludes to this possibility in his discus

sion of ‘the faculty of selfperfection’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 730). The
desires of savage man ‘do not go beyond his physical needs. The only goods he
knows in the universe are nourishment, a woman and rest; the only evils he fears
are pain and hunger’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 731). The problem, Rousseau
thinks, is that social and political arrangements as we know them do not engage
the faculty of selfperfection. Not only do they fail to engage this faculty, but
they also destroy natural instincts, putting man in a state of existence ‘even lower
than the animal itself’ (Rousseau 2001 [1755], p. 730). Rousseau makes this
point clear in his On the Social Contract. Under proper social and political
arrangements,
His faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are broadened, his feelings are
ennobled, his entire soul is elevated to such a height that, if the abuse of this new
condition did not often lower his status to beneath the level he left, he ought constantly
to bless the happy moment that pulled him away from it forever and which trans
formed him from a stupid, limited animal into an intelligent being and a man.
(Rousseau 2001 [1762], p. 778)
This transformation, Rousseau thinks, ultimately requires leadership. Rous

seau describes the true function of leadership this way:
He who dares to undertake the establishment of a people should feel that he is, so to
speak, in a position to change human nature, to transform each individual (who by
himself is a perfect and solitary whole), into a part of a larger whole from which this
individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being; to alter man’s constitution in
order to strengthen it; and to substitute a partial and moral existence for the physical
and independent existence we have all received from nature. (Rousseau 2001 [1762],
p. 786)
Ultimately this kind of leadership rests not in a person but in the citizenry. The
point of this radical approach to the inequalities of leadership is that all citizens
are legislators: ‘the sovereign is formed entirely from the private individuals
who make it up’ (Rousseau 2001 [1762], p. 777). Sovereignty is exercised
through expression of the general will, which prioritizes the common interest
over the private interest of each particular citizen. The citizen who must sacriice
his private interest has no grounds for complaint because the moral liberty that
characterizes obedience to the general will represents the highest form of free
dom, higher even than the natural liberty he had in the state of nature. Where
there is a conlict between his private interest and the common interest ‘he will
be forced to be free’ (Rousseau 2001 [1762], p. 778). As a complete equal with
other citizens, it only seems that this is a case of unequal treatment, when – in
fact – he is acting on his better self, a self transformed through social and politi
cal organization.
UTILITARIAN AND KANTIAN APPROACHES TO THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUPS AND OUTSIDERS
All of the social and political theories discussed in the previous sections agree
that good leadership must be in the interests of followers. Where they disagree
is on how much inequality between leaders and followers can be justiied in
pursuit of the common interest. Thus far we have equated the common interest
with the interests of leaders and followers alone.11 We turn now to a second
main question about inequality that arises when we notice that outsiders also
have interests, which sometimes compete with the interests of leaders and fol
lowers. Liberal moral theory, of which utilitarianism and Kantianism are
paradigm examples, is committed to the claim that individuals count equally,
regardless of group membership. On these theories at least, it is hard to see how
leaders and followers might be justiied in putting their interests and projects
ahead of the interests and projects of members of the outgroup. For example,
utilitarianism holds that the capacity for happiness and suffering is the only
morally relevant characteristic, and we can assume that this capacity does not
differ with membership in social groups.12 The same can be said for the central
characteristic that Kantians ind morally relevant, namely, the capacity for ra
tionality. On the face of it, then, both moral theories conlict with what many
see as a deining characteristic of leadership as we know it: leaders and followers
must be willing to put the interests and projects of group members ahead of the
interests and projects of outsiders. In most cases, without this kind of unequal
consideration, leadership would not be recognizable to us (Price 2006, ch. 4).
Utilitarian moral theory, as developed by philosophers such as Jeremy
Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–73), R.M. Hare (1919–2002)
and Peter Singer (1946– ), holds that the morality of an action is determined by
the overall happiness or wellbeing produced by that action. The right action is
the one that maximizes happiness over suffering and pain. Utilitarians have a
very straightforward answer to the question of whose happiness is the object of
maximization. Although leadership exercised in the interests of followers is
often described as ‘utilitarian’, such a description deviates from standard utili
tarian moral theory. According to utilitarianism, leaders should consider the
happiness of the whole, where this includes not just group members but mem
bers of the outgroup as well. In fact, the moral concern of contemporary
utilitarians typically extends to all sentient beings. So it is not enough to add
only the effects on the members of one’s group, society or country into the utili
tarian calculus. The morally correct action is the action that maximizes overall
utility, which can sometimes result in a decrease in utility for leaders and
followers.
Of course there can be utilitarian reasons for a leader to privilege the interests
of group members. For instance, shortterm attention to follower happiness and
wellbeing may be necessary for longterm increases in overall utility. In other

words, privileging the ingroup can be instrumental to achieving utilitarian goals,
as when making sure that members of the group are well fed, rested and satisied
is a means to getting them to work in service to others needier than they. Moreo
ver it is sometimes the case that attention to follower happiness and wellbeing
is justiied on utilitarian grounds because there is no one needier than followers,
or it would be an ineficient use of resources to attend to the happiness or well
being of those who are in fact the neediest. The point, however, is that
utilitarianism cannot allow leaders to favor some individuals merely on the
grounds they are part of the ingroup.
John Stuart Mill may have made it sound as though this kind of behavior
would be permissible for leaders. In Utilitarianism he suggests that there are
few occasions on which a person can be ‘a public benefactor’ and that ‘private
utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to’
(Mill 1979 [1861], p. 19). But Mill’s point is a practical implication of 19th
century social circumstances. As Peter Singer puts it,
This may once have been a justiication for being more concerned with the poor in
one’s own town than with famine victims in India. Unfortunately for those who like
to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift trans
portation have changed the situation … There would seem, therefore, to be no
possible justiication for discriminating on geographical grounds. (Singer 1972,
p. 232)
In this respect the demands of utilitarianism are very much dependent on facts
about the world. Mill and Singer are in basic agreement about the principles of
morality, but the application of these principles will vary according to changes
in social circumstances. Their disagreement, that is, is empirical.
One might object that the argument for equal consideration ignores stronger
utilitarian reasons for giving special attention to the interests of group members.
Support for this objection would point to what might be called ‘the moral divi
sion of labor’. It makes good utilitarian sense, so this objection goes, to ask
people to attend to the happiness and wellbeing of the ingroup, not humanity
as a whole. After all it would hardly maximize utility to spread our moral con
cern too thinly. For example, there is greater overall happiness and wellbeing
in a world in which parents attend to the interests of their own children, as
compared with a world in which parents give equal attention to the interests of
all children. The same might be said for giving exclusive attention to the inter
ests of one’s group, society or country. But this is a plausible utilitarian objection
only in circumstances in which the moral division of labor does not leave too
much room for members of the outgroup to have high utility deicits. If many
outsiders are completely ignored by the division of moral labor, perhaps because
they have bad leaders or disadvantaged economic opportunities, then overall
utility would be maximized by giving more attention to outsiders and less at
tention to one’s group, society or country. A similar point can be made with
respect to the utility of children. Many children do not have parents to attend
especially to them, or their parents are unable to give them the kind of attention
they need. In these realworld circumstances, overall utility would be maximized
if other parents would shift some of the moral concern they show for their own
children to much needier children.13
A second line of objection draws on a variant of utilitarianism called ‘rule
utilitarianism’ to justify special attention for the ingroup. Rule utilitarianism
holds that rules, not acts, are the proper object of moral deliberation. We should
act according to rules that, if followed by everyone, would maximize utility.
The argument for rule utilitarianism is simply that we do not want people de
termining whether, for example, lying in a particular case would maximize
utility. Giving this kind of discretion to moral actors would ultimately lead to a
decrease in overall utility. Accordingly the second objection to the claim that
utilitarianism does not allow leaders and followers to privilege the interests of
members of the ingroup is as follows: Although there are particular cases in
which giving greater consideration to the interests of outsiders would lead to an
overall increase in utility, the kind of lexibility moral actors would need to make
these determinations risks undermining the obvious utility gains achieved by
unwavering commitment to the group.
Now this general way of thinking about rule utilitarianism often makes perfect
sense. In some cases lying would certainly maximize utility, but allowing indi
viduals to make exceptions when exceptions are justiied opens the door to their
making exceptions when exceptions are not justiied. But the more particular
worry is that individuals will make exceptions of themselves not for the sake of
overall utility but for the sake of selfinterest. There is no analogy to the cases
in which leaders and followers might need to show less than exclusive concern
for the interests of the ingroup. Exception making in the irst set of cases thus
feeds on the psychological tendency of individuals to care more about them
selves than they care about others. This is why it is dangerous to give them moral
discretion. In contrast, behavior that shows greater concern for the interests of
the outgroup at the expense of ingroup competes with a different psychological
tendency of individuals, namely, to care more about group members than about
outsiders. This is what social psychologists call ‘ingroup bias’. As a conse
quence there should be little worry that by asking leaders and followers to
consider more than the interests of group members, we will somehow undermine
the utilitarian payoffs of group membership.
Kantianism is more able than utilitarianism to justify the much greater atten
tion that leaders and followers give to group members. This is not to deny that
morality sometimes requires strictly equal treatment. According to Immanuel
Kant (1724–1804), we must respect the rational faculties of all persons, treating
them ‘never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant
1956 [1785], p. 96). By way of example, this implies that lying is always unjusti
ied, regardless of whether it is to ingroup or outgroup members.14 Lying
bypasses the rational faculties of persons and, in so doing, treats them as instru
ments or objects in the liar’s plans. But it does not follow from this basic moral
demand that leaders and followers have all the same obligations to outsiders
that they have to group members. Like lying, promise breaking is also always
unjustiied because it treats the person to whom the promise was made as a mere
means. But notice that we can break promises only to those people to whom we
have made promises. Therefore, to whatever extent leadership can be understood
to embody promises between leaders and followers, leaders and followers can
have obligations to each other and to other group members that they do not have
to outsiders.
The moral demand that individuals not treat others as mere means is strong
in the sense that it applies in all circumstances, but it is relatively weak in the
sense that it does not require any positive consideration of others. This is because
it tells us only what behaviors we are morally not to do, not what behaviors we
morally ought to do. However the Kantian rider that we must treat others ‘al-
ways at the same time as an end’ (Kant 1956 [1785], p. 96) makes the demand
signiicantly stronger. By this Kant means that part of respecting the rational
capacity of others is to see their plans and goals as worthy of support and to
help them in the pursuit of their plans and goals, even when we have met all of
our negative duties to them. One Kantian argument for giving serious considera
tion to the plans and goals of those to whom we do not have special obligations,
e.g., outsiders, is that failing to do so constitutes a contradiction in will (Kant
1956 [1785], p. 91). If I refuse to help outsiders with their plans and goals, then
I must be willing to accept seeing my behavior universalized. But I cannot ac
cept seeing my behavior universalized because I will at some point in my life
need the help of someone who has no special obligations to me. It is unreason
able to will that I not provide help and, at the same time, to will that others help
me. The point here is not that my getting help as an outsider in the future de
pends on my helping an outsider now. It is rather that I contradict myself when
I will both that outsiders not be helped and that I be helped when I am an
outsider.
Still, for Kant, these duties are relatively weak. He calls them ‘wider’ or
‘meritorious’ duties to distinguish them from the ‘strict or narrow’ duties that
apply in all circumstances (Kant 1956 [1785], p. 91). When it comes to the wider
or meritorious duties, Kant holds that we have a fair amount of lexibility in
carrying them out. This makes perfect sense on Kant’s account. After all, any
Kantian duty we might have, for example, to help others in the pursuit of their
plans and goals, is ultimately traceable to the fact that we have our own plans
and goals to pursue. Without these plans and goals, the contradiction in will
cannot be generated. There is thus a sense in which our plans and goals, as well
as the plans and goals we pursue with others in groups, are conceptually prior
to any duty we might have to help outsiders pursue their plans and goals. It is
for this reason that it is easier for Kantians than for utilitarians to justify the much
greater attention that leaders and followers give to the ingroup. Leadership is the
social counterpart to individual rationality. People use this process to achieve
plans and goals that could not otherwise be achieved. Since these plans and goals
are conceptually prior to any duty they might have to help outsiders achieve their
plans and goals, the corresponding inequalities in treatment between group
members and outsiders lend themselves to Kantian moral justiication.
LEADERSHIP IN GOOD AND JUST SOCIETIES:

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES
The perspectives outlined thus far deeply inluence contemporary moral debates
about leadership in good and just societies. The two central questions raised in
the historical analysis – namely, inequality within leader–follower relations and
inequality between ingroup and outgroup members – remain foci for moral
analysis. In an era marked by increasing facility of communication and coordi
nation (and hence fewer practical dificulties, such as those described by Mill,
of extending one’s reach beyond immediate neighbors), questions of the bounda
ries of political, social and economic groups and of how much inequality is
tolerable between those groups have an increasingly prominent place in the
analysis of ethics and leadership. Technological advances and the phenomenon
of globalization add new ethical complexities to both leader–follower relations
and identiication with socalled outsiders.
Drawing on social contract theory and Kantianism, the political and moral
philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) framed contemporary questions of ine
quality and political society with his landmark book, A Theory of Justice.
Arguing that the subject of justice is institutions, not individuals, Rawls sees
the irst act of leadership as establishing a ‘just basic structure’ of society based
upon freedom and equality. Within his approach of justiceasfairness, fair
equality of opportunity assures that leadership positions should be open to every
one on an equitable basis. Coupled with the principle of equal liberty, Rawls
creates a framework that sets the limits of permissible political and economic
inequality among group members. Rawls’s difference principle does allow for
certain types of inequalities, as long as they beneit the least welloff in society.15
In overall terms justiceasfairness allows for leader–follower disparities, but
only under strict conditions meant to maintain political and moral equality. Thus,
on the irst question of permissible inequalities, Rawls advocates the moderate
approach within our framework.
As we turn to the question of inequalities between ingroups and outgroups,

it is important to note that the ideal framework of Rawls’s justiceasfairness is
that of a wellordered nation state. Accordingly Rawls’s principles of justice do
not apply directly to international arrangements because, as he argues in his
essay The Law of Peoples, the social contract applies to one’s principal political
community, and there are not suficient political or moral ties beyond the na
tional level to enact or maintain such strong agreement (Rawls 1999). Thus
Rawls argues for a morally relevant difference between ingroups and outgroups.
Justiceasfairness is developed by looking at a particular society as ‘a closed
system isolated from other societies’ (Rawls 1971, p. 8). Rawls’s account of the
law of peoples extends his theory ‘outward’ to consider justice in a more inter
national or transnational context. Despite objections that would have Rawls
begin at the global level, Rawls takes as his starting point the work he has al
ready undertaken, which begins with the domestic level and can be ‘extended’
to the global level as a second step. Rawls thus places primary emphasis on
leader–follower relationships within societies, treating as a secondlevel analysis
the question of relations between ingroups (citizens of nation states) and out
groups (noncitizens).
Because justiceasfairness builds upon the standard assumption of liberalism
that citizenship in a nation state is a person’s primary political identity, Rawls
permits signiicant levels of inequalities between the leaders and followers of
one nation, on the one hand, and people from other nations, on the other hand.
The very restrictive difference principle that operates within a wellordered so
ciety cannot be applied internationally. Societies that make ‘better’ economic
decisions need not compensate persons in other societies, and there is currently
no international body that could enforce this principle without becoming unjus
tiiably coercive. Rawls also notes that often the most serious problems of
deprivation in less developed societies are grounded in political culture and public
values; the difference principle would simply be the wrong way of going about
redressing such dificulties. Just as important, the requisite guarantees of equal
liberty and the fair equality of opportunity could not be established across national
boundaries.
Under the law of peoples, then, the stringent difference principle would not
be applied across societies. For this reason critics have charged that Rawls’s
approach to international affairs is overly conservative in its approach to ine
qualities. Not unlike Kantianism in this regard, the additional obligations to
members of one’s own community can permit signiicant inequality between
the ingroup and outgroups. Nonetheless, nation states do have some obligations
to one another. Rawls’s account of the duty of assistance extends to assuring
basic human rights and to meeting basic needs. Rawls argues that his presenta
tion of the law of peoples would at least compel wealthier societies and their
citizens to play a part – though Rawls does not specify exactly what part – in
assuring that persons in poorer societies are not left destitute. While not nearly
as strict as the limits of leader–follower inequalities, this does place some con
straint on the tolerable inequality between citizens of one country and another.
In a second response to questions about our responsibility to outgroups, Rawls
envisions a particular role for the enlightened leader – the statesman – to help
his followers transcend narrow national selfinterest in their involvements in the
international arena. These ‘[s]tatesmen are presidents or prime ministers or other
high oficials who, through their exemplary performance and leadership in their
ofice, manifest strength, wisdom, and courage [and] … guide their people in
turbulent and dangerous times’ (Rawls 1999, p. 97). Statesmen help their fol
lowers build the ‘afinity’ or solidarity among people within one’s society and
in other societies so that some degree of social bonds will be established and
antipathies will be suficiently reduced in order to allow mutual or oneway as
sistance. This latter point suggests that good leadership tends to reduce extreme
inequalities between nations in ways not developed in earlier social contract
theories.
While Rawls’s political liberalism has set the parameters of the moral debate
about leadership and inequality, communitarian and cosmopolitan critics alike
have questioned many of Rawls’s assumptions and conclusions. Communitarian
critics assert the problematic nature of liberalism’s foundations. Speciically,
they name what they see as a bias toward individualism over community, as
well as a bias toward autonomy over identity and commitment. Michael Sandel
(1982), for instance, criticizes Rawls for his methodology in which subjects
design a just basic structure from behind ‘the veil of ignorance’, which ensures
that the contracting parties do not know fundamental aspects of their identity.
In the eyes of his communitarian critics, Rawls views all commitments as ‘as
sociative’, or voluntary, rather than as ‘constitutive’, or nonvoluntary. Some
aspects of identity are not, however, subject to one’s own choice. Indeed, to
view commitments as voluntarily made by individuals, as if they are isolated
from family members and other accidents of birth, is to lose any sense of a social
whole that may be greater than the sum of its individual citizens.
Communitarians suggest that justice cannot be determined in the way that
Rawls imagines, via a thought experiment by which any rational individual be
hind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would ind justiceasfairness to be a compelling
conception. While Rawls intended his theory to be employed to condemn iden
titybased disparities, critics have maintained that his approach cannot provide
adequate critique of oppression based upon factors of identity (such as gender,
race/ethnicity and religion) in actual societies. On this point feminists have
joined the critics of Rawls in viewing liberalism as incapable of denouncing
some of the inequalities that it claims to reject.16
A different type of communitarian critique has been leveled against Rawls’s
justiceasfairness – namely, that the liberal biases in favor of equality are built
into his starting assumptions. Critics allege that there is no way to make the case
that the egalitarianism of Rawls’s justiceasfairness is superior to wellordered
hierarchy apart from assumptions that are inherent to liberalism itself. That is,
if a given society holds the general belief that women are morally inferior to
men, then nothing from Rawls’s approach to the contrary will be convincing.
On this point a group of economists and anthropologists argues that Western
inluenced economic development brings with it Western ideologies and
necessarily destroys local worldviews that tend to be hierarchical; this process
does not happen because the Western worldview is morally superior but, rather,
only because it has more economic, political and sometimes military power
(ApffelMarglin and Marglin 1990). Liberals have responded to such criticisms
with their own analysis of power – asserting that freedom, equality and democ
racy are not exclusively Western concepts. Amartya Sen, for example, suggests
that thinkers in many socalled ‘Asian cultures’ have articulated strong visions
of genderbased equality and human freedom, even if they have often been si
lenced by authoritarian voices (Sen 1999).
In general terms, then, liberalism holds a central place for equality; this is
not necessarily the case in communitarianism. Admittedly some utopian com
munities – and their advocates – have held at their core a vision of radical
egalitarianism as a means, and as an integral part, of realizing a strong commu
nity. More often, however, advocates of communalism over individualism favor
a conservative approach to inequalities, often in the stronghanded form, such
as Lee Kuan Yew’s Singaporean regime and its justiiers. While communitarian
ism can range from equality to hierarchy – and hence from the radical approach
to the conservative approach – it provides strong reason for permitting inequali
ties between ingroups and outgroups. Indeed, as Michael Walzer (a critic of
both unbridled liberalism and zealous communitarianism) asserts, membership
is the key good that comprises political society, and if there were no way for a
society to enforce its borders, it would not have an identity (Walzer 1983). While
Walzer and others caution against the excesses of parochialism (which can jus
tify superiority), communitarians permit the exclusive (or nearly exclusive)
focus upon one’s own people. For example, in Alasdair MacIntyre’s view, politi
cal morality ‘requires that I strive to further the interests of my community and
you strive to further those of yours’ (MacIntyre 1994 [1984], p. 309).17 This fo
cusing on one’s own membership and differentiating oneself from other persons
and groups can have the effect of justifying inequality between the ingroup and
outgroups.
In contrast to the communitarians, cosmopolitans criticize political liberals
for being too parochial – and thus too conservative in their outlook on interna
tional inequalities. Speciically they criticize Rawls and others for taking the
nation state as the starting point for analysis of politics and morality. Cosmo
politans, those who take world citizenship or membership as a principal unit
and proper scope for moral analysis, argue that national boundaries have little
or no moral signiicance. As noted in section IV, Peter Singer argues that prox
imity and distance have no relevance when assessing utility. The only reasons
to favor utility gains or losses of one person over another would be, irst, practi
cal concerns about ability to affect persons ‘far’ from one’s sphere of inluence
or, second, a related argument for universal preference for ‘nearby’ persons (this
is the ‘moral division of labor’ considered above). The foundational claim is
that the political starting point for both liberals and communitarians – namely,
the nation state – has little moral relevance. Outcomes that are permissible in
these two approaches – enabling vast inequalities with perhaps a weak duty of
assistance to save outgroup members from absolute destitution – would clearly
not be morally acceptable in fullledged utilitarianism.
A few further notes are in order regarding utilitarianism. First, for Singer the
analysis of utility extends beyond the human race to all sentient beings. To ana
lyze the impact of leadership on the pain and pleasure of sentient beings would
be radical indeed, including a fuller examination of the ‘environmental impacts’
(in which all nonhuman forms of life are standardly cast) of particular policies
and practices.
Another issue that arises for a utilitarian such as Singer is how strictly to ad
here to what he understands morality to require. In his classic article, ‘Famine,
Afluence, and Morality’, Singer offers both a strong and a weak form of what
morality requires in a worldwide case of vast resource disparity – in which one
group of persons suffers from acute hunger and another group enjoys prodigal
afluence (Singer 1972). The strong form of the principle requires assistance
from the richer person up to the point that giving any more would place his or
her marginal utility below that of the poorer person; this position is clearly a
radical approach to inequalities. The weaker form of the principle – which
Singer inds little reason to prefer to the stronger form – requires ‘merely’ giving
up those things that are not of moral signiicance in order to assist the person
who is clearly suffering. In a recent work Singer signiicantly weakens the posi
tion he takes in ‘Famine, Afluence, and Morality’, and he does so for what is
a secondorder utilitarian reason. In order to maximize overall utility by factor
ing in that persons will not respond well to overly demanding moral dicta, the
demands upon persons can be reduced. In this case Singer calls for the afluent
to contribute – as a minimum for an adequate moral life – 1 percent of their in
comes toward the assistance of persons in needier cultures and contexts. This
is a far cry, to be sure, from equalizing marginal utilities, but it is still a move
in the direction toward reducing inequality between human beings and between
countries (Singer 2002, pp. 185–95).
Presumably Singer would use similar thinking to justify those inequalities
between leaders and followers that tend to increase overall utility. Particularly
in his more recent writings Singer acknowledges the motivational problems of
convincing persons to uphold the demands of morality, and his recent shifts on
the duty of assistance can also justify signiicant privileges for leaders, as long
as they contribute to an overall rise in utility. Hence this shift opens Singer up
to the classic criticism of consequentialism – viz., that nearly any kind of privi
lege can be justiied in such calculations.
While pure utilitarians tend to be cosmopolitans, to be a cosmopolitan does not
require one to be a utilitarian. In her supportive analysis of cosmopolitanism,
Martha Nussbaum explains at least two types of possible motivations for cosmo
politanism. First, when a person has compassion for others and thus experiences
empathy for other human beings and other sentient beings, she or he can be led
to respond with aid. Exercising the moral imagination – seeing the predicament
that other persons face in their particular circumstances – can allow persons to
transcend their own narrow interests or the interests of their nearest neighbors.
Alternatively, cosmopolitanism can be based upon commitment to abstract prin
ciples, such as respect for the equal human dignity of all persons (Nussbaum
2003). On this point Nussbaum has in mind, above all, Kantianism. This is for
good reason. For its part, utilitarianism could be supported by a motivational argu
ment from compassion, but it is more convincingly a principlebased application
of the capacity of all persons and other sentient beings to experience pleasure and
pain. Singer, for example, is critical of the whimsical nature of compassion.
Upholding a commitment to dignity or some other value, regardless of one’s
emotions or sentiments or imagination, thus appears to be the more reliable of
the two kinds of motivation. While it can extend to all persons or beings, imagi
native compassion tends to allow persons to focus on those like themselves. It
takes extraordinary virtue to imagine the moral value of persons and beings near
and far away. Nussbaum herself criticizes the misapplication of compassion that
can readily turn into jingoism and care for only ‘one’s own kind’. At the same
time, adherence to abstract principles, whether equal dignity or maximization
of utility, may not generate the kind of motivation required to complete the task.
Perhaps this motivational problem helps explain Rawls’s call for the statesman
to act, communitarians’ retreat into their own group and Singer’s need to weaken
the moral demands of international assistance. Nussbaum’s own position is to
temper compassion with moral education about equality and respect for people
of diverse cultures. For her the motivation of compassion must be harnessed by
the constraints of dignity in order to achieve a sense of moral community beyond
the local or national level.
In its various forms cosmopolitanism is highly egalitarian in its approach both
to leader–follower relationships and to international relations among nation
states. The compassionbased view would call, as Rawlsianism does, for leaders
who are set apart by their capacity to spark the moral imagination of their fol
lowers. Howard Gardner, emphasizing the need to spark imagination and vision
through narrative, calls these persons ‘leading minds’ who reach the ‘iveyear
old mind’ of followers (Gardner 1995, pp. 25–9). It is reasonable to surmise that
Nussbaum and other advocates of enlightened compassion would allow special
privileges for such leaders, with the important constraint that privileges must
not violate the foundational ethos of equality among leaders and followers. Thus
cosmopolitans lean toward the radical position among our three approaches,
although some limited inequalities that promote overall equality among ingroup
and outgroup members can be allowed.
ETHICAL APPROACHES IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

This section examines three approaches to the study of leadership in terms of
the central questions explored in this essay: inequality within the leader–fol
lower relationship and inequality between ingroups and outsiders. Approaching
ethics and leadership by asking these two questions provides a fresh framework
for highlighting the distinctions among the approaches as well as ambiguities
inherent in each of them.
Arguably the most inluential recent theory of leadership is James MacGregor
Burns’s account of ‘transforming leadership’, which was set forth in his 1978
classic text, Leadership, and subsequently developed in his own writings and
in the work of other scholars. Transforming leadership is an alternative to, and
is more demanding than, transactional leadership, in which two parties come
together for an exchange of valued goods and, while they respect each other as
persons, they form no lasting bond or relationship. Traditional social contract
theorists, including Hobbes and Locke, have transactional leadership do most
of the work in maintaining a just society. Leadership by transactions addresses
issues of inequality principally in terms of commutative justice: the parties must
both have agency enough to come to the transaction of their own accord, without
coercion. At certain levels of political or economic inequality among a popula
tion, this requirement is dificult to attain.18 Thus it remains minimalist compared
with transforming leadership, which – in contrast – presumes a level of signii
cant, mutual engagement by leaders and followers. In Burns’s view, the
transformational process has the effect of increasing the level of motivation and
morality of both leader and follower. This account of transforming leadership
echoes the depth of commitment in the social order articulated in most detail in
the Western canon by Rousseau. Similar to Rousseau, Burns describes the highly
positive impact that being part of such a relationship can have upon leader and
follower. And not surprisingly this relationship is highly egalitarian at its core.
The ideal of the transformational process is that followers are raised up to the
level of leaders; followers, that is, become leaders.
This is not to say, however, that some forms of exceptions cannot be made
for leaders that create certain inequalities between them and their followers. On
the contrary, Burns leaves signiicant room for leaders to justify their privileges
by appeal to what he calls endvalues; he places special emphasis on the pursuit
of liberty that could allow a leader to overlook standard requirements of morality
that are otherwise equally applicable to leaders and followers alike. His exami
nation of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of deception during World War II is one
such case in point. Although Burns’s approach is at bottom egalitarian, trans
forming leaders are set apart – at least temporarily – from followers by the
special insight they have into the needs and values of followers.
It is through transforming leadership that lasting, signiicant social change
occurs. The heroes of Burns’s writing are those igures who risk their careers,
and their very lives in many cases, in order to achieve social transformation.
Mohandas K. Gandhi and Franklin D. Roosevelt are paradigmatic transforming
leaders. Enlightenment philosophers and politicians, who ushered in an era of
fundamental political change, also receive Burns’s praise. Conversely Burns is
brutally critical of leaders who approach leadership only in transactional terms;
even those broadly viewed as successful at transactional exchange, such as Bill
Clinton, earn Burns’s scorn for their failure to risk genuine progress and for
their concession to the status quo (Burns and Sorenson 1999).
Burns’s commitment to social change as well as his strong conviction about
the rights of all people as enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) place stringent constraints on the inequality that his frame permits
between group members and outsiders. To the degree that being an agent within
the transformational process is a positive good for Burns, this does create one
kind of inequality between participants and nonparticipants in the leadership
process. Yet Burns’s reply to this possible critique is that he would open the
leadership process to all persons as quickly as is practical. His recent call for
international ‘freedom leaders’ to work alongside local agents in the ight
against poverty in the developing world is one example of his desire to overcome
serious inequalities of material status as well as of participation (Burns 2003,
pp. 231–40). Although his vision is more egalitarian than Rawls’s law of peoples
in the international arena, his standard acceptance of the nationstate system
does not qualify him as a cosmopolitan. This fact, combined with his justiica
tion of certain forms of special status and function for leaders, makes Burns
more moderate than fully radical in his approach.
Robert K. Greenleaf’s servant leadership offers interesting answers to our
two central questions, but his account is not precise enough to provide detailed
philosophical answers (Greenleaf 1977). Greenleaf promises to turn some as
pects of the inequality questions on their heads, by suggesting that the leader
should make himself lower than the follower – and, potentially – lower than
other persons as well. This basic idea is communicated in an oftquoted
passage:
The servantleader is servant irst … [One] begins with the natural feeling that one
wants to serve, to serve irst. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. That
person is sharply different from one who is leader irst, perhaps because of the need
to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions. (Greenleaf
1977, p. 13)
Greenleaf suggests that the motivation of the leader should not be material or
other privileges. While he does not denounce leaders for holding signiicant
possessions (a point that undoubtedly makes it simpler than it perhaps should
be for CEOs and other privileged persons to dub themselves ‘servant leaders’),
Greenleaf implies by his examples that the leader should eschew privileges, live
modestly and lead quietly. Not unlike transforming leadership in this regard,
the test of good servant leadership is ‘Do those served grow as persons? Do
they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more
likely themselves to become servants?’ (Greenleaf 1977, pp. 13–14) The growth
in agency of followers is a key measure of servant leadership. Yet, unlike trans
forming leadership, the mutual beneits to the leader are not emphasized. Servant
leadership in its most literal form implies that inequalities run in favor of the
followers over the leaders. Critiques of servant leadership often focus on the
failure of an earnest servant leader to attend to his or her own legitimate needs
as a result (e.g., Hill 1991; Hicks 2005). While in practice wouldbe servant
leaders may not typically go this far, a strong reading of Greenleaf would seem
to justify inequalities that demean the servant leaders themselves.
What about the relationship between the participants (leaders and followers)
in the servantleadership process and outsiders? One might surmise that Green
leaf’s strong view of servant leadership suggests that leaders and followers alike
should subordinate their interests and wellbeing to those of the neediest per
sons in society. In other words leaders and followers are together servants to
the wider society’s most basic needs. If Greenleaf were to take such a line, his
approach would be subject to the same kind of critique about subservience just
noted. Yet Greenleaf takes a surprisingly reserved approach to this question.
His second test of servant leadership asks: ‘What is the effect on the least privi
leged in society; will they beneit, or, at least, not be further deprived?’
(Greenleaf 1977, p. 14). To be sure, the question of the beneit to the least
privileged is suggestive of the Rawlsian difference principle, whereby the
measure of success is increasing the wellbeing of the least welloff. But the
additional phrase, ‘at least not be further deprived’, seems to allow near indif
ference toward the neediest. If this latter condition applies, then servant
leadership can permit, counterintuitively, a signiicant increase in inequality
between the ingroup and outsiders.19 This feature of servant leadership makes
the theory dificult to classify. Greenleaf’s approach to leader–follower relations
is certainly radical, but his approach to the inequalities between the ingroup
and outgroups is moderate at best.
Several accounts of spiritual leadership suggest that goodness, truth and jus
tice will be increased when the spiritual dimension, variously described, of
leaders and followers is welcomed in the leadership process. There is no schol
arly consensus on the deinition of spiritual leadership; indeed, a survey of the
literature indicates that it is deined to include elements from selfdiscovery and
wholeness to creativity, community and interdependence. Consistently, however,
models of spiritual leadership, like transforming and servant leadership, place
high value on the full participation of leaders and followers. Indeed, advocates
of this approach assert that secular leadership processes generally force leaders
and followers to divorce important aspects of their identity – namely, their
spiritual or religious values – from their role in the leadership process. As we
will see, the different deinitions of spiritual leadership can justify either sig
niicant equality or inequality of various kinds.20
In theory, the spiritual leadership approach should tend to create equality
among leaders and followers, allowing them each to bring their ‘whole person’
to the leadership process.21 Secular forms of leadership, according to advocates
of the spiritual approach, entail unequal treatment of spiritual or religious per
sons who are forced to make undue sacriices of identity in order to engage in
the group and its process. While these discussions are often couched in terms
of spiritual expression or even religious freedom, they tend to have an equalizing
effect. One problem with this view, however, is that some persons, including
atheists, will believe that the prevalence and inluence of spiritual views makes
them less than full participants.
Religious and spiritual worldviews, as strong aspects of identity formed over
time among likeminded persons, are in many ways communitarian. Although
they can be based partly or wholly on rationality, religious convictions can be
seen as constitutive aspects of identity that are beyond moral analysis. As noted
above, if a religious person believes that women simply are inferior to men, it
is dificult to convince that person otherwise. Yet religious and spiritual convic
tions can also be sources of egalitarian social struggle (including along
genderbased lines). The key point is that welcoming a plethora of spiritual and
religious views into a leadership process may increase the importance of effec
tive communication and healthy negotiation of conlict.
In practice, the challenges of spiritual leadership are compounded by at least
two factors. First, while all spiritual and religious views may be welcome in
theory, the beliefs and practices of the leader can take a predominant place.
Spirituality or religion in leadership is often translated into a nearly exclusive
focus upon the faith of the leaders themselves.22 The beliefs and practices of
followers or subordinates are much less studied or emphasized in practice.
Second, the spirituality or religion of the majority can receive undue attention
or a privileged status. In the USA, for example, spiritual leadership often trans
lates into Christianbased leadership, which can lead to an acceptance of one
religious worldview as the oficial worldview of a group or organization. This

can have the clear effect of privileging persons from that background and of
marginalizing persons from minority traditions. This preference for one perspec
tive over another contributes to inequality. One measure of equality, then, is the
degree of respect afforded to leaders, and especially followers, from spiritual
or religious minorities.
Spirituality and religion in leadership are often strong aspects of group cohe
sion and identity. As critics of religion in public life frequently note, traditional
political liberalism, for its part, had its rise in response to the 16th and 17th
century wars of religion in Europe. Like other types of strong community,
religiously or spiritually inluenced groups may well ind conservative justiica
tions for treating themselves as different from – and in many cases, superior to
– outsiders. At the same time, however, the type of spiritually diverse groups
described above can model mutual respect amongst themselves. If this mutual
respect is based upon a fundamental conviction of the dignity of all persons,
then that same commitment can encourage equal treatment toward outsiders
and thus a more radical approach to inequalities. Yet as in other cases – such as
Kantianism, communitarianism and transforming and servant leadership – the
value of participation itself and deep obligations toward fellow group members
tend to justify inequalities that give preference to ingroup members over
outsiders.
CONCLUSIONS
While there are many ways to frame an analysis of ethics and leadership, this
chapter has suggested that historical and contemporary approaches can be fruit
fully dissected and distinguished from one another by focusing on how they
justify or condemn hierarchy and inequality. A background issue that often goes
unquestioned is the composition of the leaders and followers in the irst place.
Who is included as a participant? Who is left out? From the ancient Greeks, who
had speciic requirements for citizenship in the polis (excluding many men as
well as women, children and slaves), to contemporary cosmopolitans, who argue
there is no morally relevant reason not to include all human beings, the issue of
participation in the leadership process has been fundamental.
Within the leader–follower relationship, the classic answer has been one of
presumed equality unless and until inequalities of power, status and privileges
can be justiied. Some communitarian critiques of liberalism have suggested
that inequality can be justiied by simple reference to tradition, but this type of
hierarchicalism is increasingly hard to defend in the present era. The dificulties
of maintaining monarchy – beyond mere ceremony – in western European
countries (and, arguably, in the Middle East) is just one example. At the other
extreme servant leadership opens the possibility that leaders would actually
subordinate themselves to followers.
Disparities between group members and outsiders raise a question with a
wider array of answers among leadership perspectives. And since theorists tend
to focus exclusively on the leader–follower relationship, they also leave more
ambiguity in their particular answers to this second question. In most approaches
in which signiicant inequality is allowed, it is not because one group is consid
ered morally superior to the other. Rather it has to do with claims about special
obligations of leaders and followers to one another. It can also simply be an
unintended result of a preoccupation with treating followers appropriately. As
we have asserted, practical developments under the broad phenomenon of glo
balization may lessen some, but perhaps not all, of the reasons for upholding
special obligations. At the other end of the spectrum, for the cosmopolitans
(whether their motivation is based in compassion or moral principle), the rela
tionship between group members and outsiders can be seen as the more
foundational question. How leaders and followers relate to one another must
then be addressed within the context of the answer to this question.
To assert that moral philosophers and social critics alike generally begin from
a presumption of equality, and that inequalities must be justiied, is not to say
that both theorists and practitioners of leadership have not perennially bent over
backwards to justify exceptions not only for themselves, but for ‘their own kind’
within ingroups. The emphasis on equality in this chapter suggests that while
leadership often embodies hierarchy and inequality, leaders (and followers) who
would justify privileges for themselves bear the burden of proof.
NOTES
1. For the general theory group’s discussion of the question ‘What is it about the human condi
tion that makes leadership necessary?’, see J. Thomas Wren’s contribution to this volume ‘A
Quest for a Grand Theory of Leadership’.
2. This aspect of the problem is in the background of most all discussions within the general
theory group, and it serves as part of the justiication of the place within leadership studies of
what James MacGregor Burns refers to as ‘the key elements of leadership’: power, motivation,
leader–follower relations, and values. Again, see Wren, ‘A Quest for a Grand Theory of
Leadership’.
3. To be sure, a key question for moral analysis is ‘equality of what?’ While modern Western
thinkers generally accept a premise of equality, the currency of equality – whether utility,
primary goods, opportunity, etc. – is under debate. See Hicks (2000), ch. 2.
4. It is possible for an approach to leadership to be strongly hierarchical as a means toward
achieving the end of increased equality. See, for example, W.E.B. Du Bois’s account of the
‘Talented Tenth’ among AfricanAmericans, the aim of which was to elevate AfricanAmeri
cans as a whole and to create a more equal America (W.E.B. Du Bois 1996 [1903]).
5. In fact, a determination of acceptable inequalities may require contextdependent analyses of
particular cases.
6. These two sections draw on the basic framework of Terry L. Price (2004b), pp. 1195–99.
7. Plato also believed that women should be part of the guardian class and that they should be
educated as the men are educated. This egalitarian gesture is qualiied by his claim that men
are admittedly superior to women in most things (Plato 2001, p. 455d).
8. Notice the similarities to Judges 21:25, the conclusion of that book: ‘In those days there was
no king in Israel; all the people did what was right in their eyes’.
9. Machiavelli favors the Roman constitution, in which ‘two consuls … played the same role as
the kings’, the senate played the role of the aristocrats and the tribunes of the people provided
the democratic element (Machiavelli 2001 [1531], p. 473). See also Machiavelli’s claim in his
Discourses that
[f]or a people that governs and is well regulated by laws will be stable, prudent, and grate
ful, as much so, and even more, according to my opinion, than a prince, although he be
esteemed wise; and, on the other hand, a prince, freed from the restraints of the law, will
be more ungrateful, inconstant, and imprudent than a people similar situated. The differ
ence in their conduct is not due to any difference in their nature … ; but to the greater or
less respect they have for the laws under which they respectively live. (Machiavelli 2004
[1531], p. 220)
10. Commentators see Hobbes or, more likely, Filmer, as being the object of Locke’s critique in
this passage.
11. We have left to the side the important questions about nonparticipants within the same society
– for example, children, slaves and often, women – who were not considered citizens.
12. Admittedly, some have believed that class differences and even slavery can be justiied on
differences in the capacity for happiness and suffering.
13. This is not to say that parents are not justiied in attending primarily, or even solely, to the in
terests of their own children. It is rather to say that if this kind of behavior is justiied, it is
probably not on utilitarian grounds.
14. For a discussion of the contrasts between Kantianism and utilitarianism, see Price (2004a),
pp. 462–70.
15. In his Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls expresses his skepticism about the ability to attain
consensus among citizens holding diverse worldviews on a principle as strong as the difference
principle.
16. For one generally appreciative feminist reading of Rawls, see Okin (1989).
17. For a discussion of this point, see Price (2006), ch. 4.
18. Note that for Rawls a stronger basic structure would need to be in place – beyond merely as
suring no brute coercion takes place – in order to assure commutative justice.
19. See Price (2006), pp. 99–100.
20. The approaches to spirituality and leadership are analyzed in more detail in Hicks (2003).
21. See, for example, Robinson (1988) and also Mitroff and Denton (1999).
22. As one example, see Nash (1994).
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7. Causality, change and leadership1
Gill Robinson Hickman and Richard A. Couto
This chapter includes the invaluable contributions of our late colleague and friend,
Fredric M. Jablin, who provided his seminal insights during the conceptualization
and outlining phase of this project.
CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP AND

CHANGE
During the early stages of discussions at Mount Hope, we realized that scholars
in the project were working from different assumptions about human nature and
the conditions that give rise to leadership and change. Project leaders divided
the group into three teams – Purple, Red and Gold – to discuss our assumptions
and write a short paper summarizing each group’s perspectives.
Our different viewpoints roughly corresponded to essentialist and construc
tionist beliefs. In general essentialists maintain that social and natural realities
exist apart from our perceptions of reality and that individuals perceive the world
rather than construct it (Rosenblum and Travis 2003, p. 33). Conversely, con
structionists believe that humans construct or create reality and give it meaning
through social, economic and political interactions. Speciically, reality cannot
be separated from the way people perceive it (Rosenblum and Travis 2003,
p. 33). According to the constructionist view, therefore, people can change real
ity by changing their perceptions of it. Gold Team members, including the two
authors of this chapter, took a relatively constructionist position in contrast to
the other teams. We contended that:
Humans make sense of their world and seek meaning through processes of imagina
tion and interpretation, which are situated within social constructions of reality and
afirmed through language and intersubjective encounters. These processes enable
humans to conceptualize space, time, and conditions beyond their immediate context
and to employ linguistic discourses such as narrative to express and communicate
those alternative realities. As social beings, humans depend on others not only for
survival but also in the construction of frames of social reality through which people
understand their everyday experiences, collaborations, and conlicts. (Couto et al.,
2002, p. 1)
152
Causality, change and leadership 153
We argued that understanding differences in the perspectives of scholars and

practitioners is important to the study of leadership because these perspectives
shape the way we view problems, ask questions, conduct research, construct
theories and create solutions. If we posit, for example, that there are essential
and innate human differences among people that we categorize in certain racial
groups, then we formulate hypotheses, assign meaning and draw conclusions
about these differences that have a signiicant impact on the way each group is
valued and treated in society. If as humans we construct social differences in
power, status or opportunity based on variations in factors such as physical dis
tinctions in appearance or group characteristics, then we can change these
constructions to relect new or different arrangements. Accordingly, the Gold
team asserted:
From birth, each human is unique in terms of physical characteristics, dispositions,

social histories and environments, and cultural contexts. Through sociocultural cat
egories and language, humans organize and assign value to some attributes (e.g.,
along lines of sex, skin pigmentation, or age) and construct systems of social relations
in order to distinguish among individuals of the group and among groups. (Couto et
al., 2002, pp. 1–2)
Differences in perspectives affect the views of scholars and students of leader

ship studies and practitioners who endeavor to lead. Most do not adopt a strict
essentialist or constructionist view; rather, they synthesize the two perspectives
in a way that makes sense to them. Even Karl Marx, whom most scholars would
consider a constructionist given his championing of humans as change agents,
made some concessions to the essentialist view, observing that ‘men make their
own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under
selfselected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past’ (Marx 1869).
We start from the constructionist perspective in this chapter, framing the
discussion of change, causality and leadership around it. Based on this perspec
tive, we deine change as a collective effort by participants to intentionally
modify, alter or transform human social systems. This is not to assert that condi
tions change merely because a group of people wants them to change. As we
shall see, social reality is subject to historical conditions that can either foster
or hinder change beyond any single person’s or group’s ability to effect
change.
A Case Approach
Scholars in the General Theory of Leadership Project provided our annual update
on the group’s progress at the 2002 International Leadership Association Confer
ence using a different format from past presentations. Project leaders James
McGregor Burns, Georgia Sorenson and Al Goethals asked us to engage the

conference participants in our thinking and discussions by exploring the elements
and conditions for leadership in the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott case.
Similarly, we have chosen to present our thinking in this chapter by using a
case from the civil rights movement in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Through
this case we hope to uncover general concepts about the relationship among
causality, change, and leadership that are relevant to multiple contexts including
organizational, community, political, and social movements among others.
Barbara Rose Johns’s actions as a high school junior in 1951 contributed to
the end of public school segregation in the USA. She led a school boycott in
Prince Edward County, Virginia, which culminated in the federal court case of
Davis v. County School Board. Upon appeal to the US Supreme Court, this case
joined four other school desegregation cases as Brown v. Board of Education.
A review of both her actions and the profound consequences of school deseg
regation offers the opportunity to look at the conduct and causality of change.
To what extent did Barbara Rose Johns end school desegregation? The question
seems absurd, but it conveys how people often attribute change to the actions
of a single individual, such as crediting Rosa Parks’s actions with sparking the
Montgomery bus boycott that triggered the civil rights movement in a threelink
chain of causality or, even simpler, crediting Martin Luther King Jr. with leading
the civil rights movement.
If we change contexts, causality often becomes a twolink chain of cause and
effect. Airport book racks, for example, display titles that explain how corporate
leaders brought about proit, excellence or some other worthwhile outcome.
And too often we perceive the actions of nations as the decisions of a single
leader with good or bad consequences; for example, consider the book Bush at
War which details the war in Afghanistan. Change is frequently portrayed as
the effect of a leader – a person in a position of formal or informal authority –
acting heroically.
We take a different approach to leadership and change in this chapter. We
describe and analyze Johns’s actions as a cause of school desegregation and re
lated changes. But instead of focusing on change as it pertains to leaders, their
actions and outcomes, we address change in the context of the interdependence
and interaction of many actors, all of whom we may regard as leaders in light
of the consequences of their actions. Their actions, if intended to bring or hinder
change, we will call leadership.
By placing Johns’s actions in a broader ield of change related to school de
segregation, we are better able to see the domain of her intended change – thus
leadership – and its interactions and interrelatedness with other leaders and do
mains of leadership. Considering her actions within a broader ield of race
relations suggests myriad inluences upon her and myriad inluences of her ac
tions upon others in a ield of change. The chapter offers a synthesis on causality
from theories in the social sciences, the natural sciences and philosophy. Al
though grounded in social change, the case offers contextfree generalizations
of leadership, change and causality.
Barbara Rose Johns

As a junior at Robert R. Moton High School in Farmville, the county seat of
Prince Edward County, Virginia, Barbara Rose Johns knew that the segregated,
allblack school that she attended in 1951 was separate but certainly not equal.
She saw the same markers of inequality familiar to AfricanAmerican school
children and their parents throughout the South at the time: textbooks handed
down from the white students and, most of all, overcrowded facilities. In Johns’s
case, a school built in 1939 to serve 180 students instead housed 450 students.
The school accommodated some of the overlow students in three buildings
hastily erected in 1949. Built of 2 × 4s, plywood and tar paper, they were dubbed
‘shacks’ or ‘chicken coops.’
At the constant prodding of the Moton PTA and its president, the Reverend
L. Francis Grifin, pastor of the First Baptist Church, the allwhite school board
offered regular assurances but no action on a new high school for African
American children. Progress slowed and the assurances became so broad that
in April 1951, the school board suggested that the Moton High School PTA not
come back to the school board’s meetings. Johns shared her concerns about the
poor facilities and her frustration with the board’s delaying tactics with her fa
vorite teacher, Inez Davenport. Davenport replied, ‘Why don’t you do something
about it?’
So Johns did. During a sixmonth period she enlisted student leaders a few
at a time to take action themselves. Finally on April 23, 1951, following the
PTA’s failed efforts, the students put their plans in motion. They started by luring
M. Boyd Jones, the AfricanAmerican principal of the school, away from the
premises with a false alarm about students making trouble at the bus station.
He had received such complaints before and was anxious to put a stop to what
ever was going on. As soon as he left, Johns and the other student leaders sent
a forged note to every classroom calling for a school assembly at 11:00 a.m.
When the students and teachers arrived in the auditorium, the stage curtain
opened on Johns and other student strike leaders. She asked the two dozen
teachers to leave, and most of them did. She then laid out the already well
known grievances and said that it was time for the students to take matters into
their own hands by striking. No one was to go to class. If they stuck together,
she explained, the whites would have to respond. Nothing would happen to
them, because the jail was not big enough to hold all of them. Principal Jones
returned to school to ind the student assembly in full swing. He pleaded with
the students not to strike and explained that progress on the new school was
being made. Johns asked him to go back to his ofice, and he did.
Flush with their initial success, the student strike committee asked Rev.
Grifin to come to the school that afternoon and give them some advice. They
asked him if the students should ask their parents’ permission to strike. The
AfricanAmerican adult population in Prince Edward County was ‘docile’ in
the view of Rev. Grifin, who had spent time trying to organize an NAACP
chapter in the county. He suggested that the matter be put to a vote, which ulti
mately determined that the students should proceed without getting their
parents’ approval. At Grifin’s urging, Johns and Carrie Stokes, student body
president, wrote a letter to the NAACP attorneys in Richmond asking for their
assistance.
The next afternoon the strike committee met with the superintendent of
schools, T.J. McIlwaine, who was serving a fourth decade in that position. He
represented the softer side of Jim Crow – accepting things as they were and
doing his best to be fair and evenhanded in a system of injustice and oppression.
At the meeting, the opposing sides hardened their stances. McIlwaine insisted
on AfricanAmerican subordination and made numerous promises – assuring
the students that much had already been done and that more would be done in
time. He also previewed a gauntlet of reprisals – warning the students that unless
they went back to class, the teachers and the principal would lose their jobs.
The students left dismayed by McIlwaine’s elusive and evasive manner but en
couraged by their performance in the confrontation. They had held their own in
the face of white power.
On Wednesday, two days into the strike, NAACP attorneys Oliver Hill and
Spottswood Robinson III came by to talk with the strike leaders and their sup
porters in response to the letter they had received from the students. Both Hill
and Robinson were highproile civil rights lawyers who regularly engaged in
lawsuits. They had studied at Howard University, a training ground for advocacy
lawyers, and had joined the network of AfricanAmerican lawyers working to
redress racial inequality across the country. On the state and national level, the
premise of the NAACP’s advocacy had been that as long as Plessy v. Ferguson
was the law of the land, the government had to make equal what it insisted re
main separate. They had already won several lawsuits for equal pay and facilities
around the state of Virginia. Hill had even won a case for equal salaries for
Prince Edward County teachers before World War II.
Hill and Robinson were not encouraging on this day, however. They and other
NAACP members had grown tired of equalization suits which, although plenti
ful, only succeeded in changing the subordination of AfricanAmerican teachers
and students at the margins. They were interested in shifting their strategy to
confront school desegregation directly and were paying close attention to a case
from Clarendon County, South Carolina, that was moving toward the US Su
preme Court. In fact, when Hill and Robinson stopped to speak to the Farmville
student strike organizers, they were en route to Pulaski County, Virginia, to
determine if the plaintiffs in a case there were willing to transform their suit
from equalization to desegregation. They counseled the students to go back to
class.
The students, however, were adamant in their refusal to end the strike. Im
pressed by their determination and not wanting to dampen their spirits, Hill and
Robinson offered to help if the students would agree to return to school and
change their case from one of equalization to one of desegregation.
The next evening, April 26, one thousand students and parents attended a
mass meeting in Farmville. The secretary of the state NAACP urged the parents
to support their children. Without parental support, he said, the NAACP would
not initiate what it knew would be a long, hard suit that would require consider
able endurance. Initial assessments suggested that 65 percent of parents
supported the students and the NAACP intervention; 25 percent opposed it; and
10 percent had no opinion. No opponents spoke that night.
On April 30, the school board sent out a letter signed by Principal Jones,
urging parents to send their children back to school. The strange wording, which
stated that Jones and the staff ‘had been authorized by the division superinten
dent’ to send the letter, suggested that Jones was acting under duress. Rev.
Grifin, however appreciative of Jones’s dificult position, nevertheless under
stood that the principal’s prestige and authority could inluence many parents
to change or waver in their support of the strike and court action. Consequently,
Rev. Grifin sent out his own letter calling for another mass meeting on Thurs
day, May 3, and underscoring the signiicance of what the students were trying
to accomplish: ‘REMEMBER. The eyes of the world are on us. The intelligent
support we give our cause will serve as a stimulant for the cause of free people
everywhere’ (Smith 1965, p. 58). John Lancaster, Negro county farm agent,
helped Grifin get out the mass mailing.
On May 3 Hill and Robinson petitioned the school board for the desegregation
of the county’s schools. The meeting that night took the form of a rally and
served as a real turning point. J.B. Pervall, the former principal of Moton High
School, spoke in favor of the standard of equality but not integration and gave
many people in the packed church reason to pause and reassess what they were
supporting. The NAACP oficials attempted to regain the momentum, but it was
Barbara Johns who succeeded in restoring the crowd’s support. She reminded
members of the audience of their experience and the students’ action. In con
cluding, she effectively recounted the many small and large insults suffered by
AfricanAmericans in the history of race relations, challenging Pervall with
unmistakable metaphors of white oppression and black accommodation to it.
She admonished the huge gathering: ‘Don’t let Mr. Charlie, Mr. Tommy, or Mr.
Pervall stop you from backing us. We are depending on you’ (Smith 1965, p. 59).
Rev. Grifin took the cue and asserted Pervall’s right to speak but implied cow
ardice of anyone who would not match the students’ courage and back them.
The students consented to return to school on Monday, May 7. Hill and Robin
son promised that they would ile suit in federal court unless the school board
agreed to integrate by May 8.
The walkout becomes a federal case

On May 23, one month after the strike, Robinson followed through on the
NAACP’s promise in light of the board’s inaction and iled suit in federal court
in Richmond, Virginia, on behalf of 117 Moton students. In Davis v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County he argued that Virginia’s law requiring
segregated schools be struck down as unconstitutional. The attorney general,
looking at the facts, counseled that an equalization suit was indefensible for the
state but that integration was too radical a remedy. The state immediately began
improving the facilities in an effort to render the suit moot.
The prestigious Richmond law irm Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay &
Moore represented the school board. Two senior partners, Archibald Gerard
Robertson and Justin Moore, prepared a vigorous defense of segregation. During
the iveday trial, which began on February 25, 1952, they argued a very familiar
defense of poor facilities for AfricanAmerican children: to each according to
the taxes that they pay. The poverty of AfricanAmericans meant a low tax base
among them and thus a generous white subsidy of their schools.
Robinson and Hill presented a nowfamiliar cast of witnesses who discussed
the psychological impact of segregation. Moore rebutted one witness for the
plaintiffs speciically for his Jewish background and the others for their unfa
miliarity with the mores of the South. Moore ridiculed educator and psychologist
Kenneth B. Clark for his research methods and overreaching conclusions. Dur
ing Moore’s crossexamination of Clark, Moore and Hill clashed vehemently
– and just short of physically – over Moore’s contention that the NAACP and
Hill himself stirred up and fomented critical situations. The passions of this
exchange portended events to come.
The court found unanimously for the school board. The students and their
parents were disappointed, given their honest, albeit idealistic, belief that they
would win because their cause was just. Robinson and Hill were neither sur
prised nor disappointed; they were now prepared to appeal to higher courts.
Davis v. School Board reached the Supreme Court in July and joined with other
school desegregation cases for argument on December 8, 1952.
The drama of a local school strike reaching the US Supreme Court was not
over, although many of the original actors in the school strike had exited the
stage. Barbara Rose Johns left Farmville soon after the strike. Her family, con
cerned for her safety, sent her to Montgomery, Alabama, to live with her uncle
Rev. Vernon Johns, minister of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. The educa
tion board ired Boyd Jones, and he and his new wife, Moton High School
teacher Inez Davenport, also moved to Montgomery so he could attend graduate
school. Ironically, the couple became members of the Dexter Avenue Baptist
Church.
The arguments of December left the Court with the task of deciding the legal
ity of school desegregation and possibly the constitutionality of Plessy v.
Ferguson, the 1896 decision that found separatebutequal to be constitutional.
A divided Court, with at least two dissenting votes, was ready to overturn Plessy
but sought a stronger majority. Justice Felix Frankfurter bought some time for
the Court by developing a set of remaining questions, and the Court asked that
the case be reargued on October 12, 1953. In the interval Chief Justice Fred
Vinson died and Earl Warren, former governor of California, replaced him as
the new chief justice. Warren worked to gain a consensus among his fellow
justices, who had become deeply divided during Vinson’s tenure regarding civil
liberties in the McCarthy era. Firmly opposed to the constitutionality of Plessy
v. Ferguson, Warren relied on diplomacy and compromise in language to make
it possible for the Court, including a hospitalized member, to render a unani
mous decision on May 17, 1954. The Court ruled that school segregation was
unconstitutional and that separatebutequal could not be applied to schools.
Local authorities and their reactions

The Court’s decision engendered a severe backlash in the South, particularly in
Prince Edward County and other parts of Virginia. As long as the courts did not
set a remedy for segregation, one of Warren’s compromises, segregation re
mained the de facto practice in Prince Edward County and other parts of the
South. In 1956 the courts inally ordered desegregation but still did not set a
timetable for it. Prominent Virginia politicians and editors invoked the theory
of interposition – the right of state government to position itself between the
federal government and those otherwise bound by its laws. They called for
‘massive resistance’ in much the same way that Johns had, certain that they
could avoid punishment for noncompliance with the new federal law by present
ing a united front. Extremists promised to put an end to public schools rather
than integrate them.
Reprisals and resistance hit Prince Edward County particularly hard. On the
personal side John Lancaster lost his job as Negro county farm agent and Rev.
Grifin, besieged by every creditor, was left penniless. His wife suffered a nerv
ous breakdown as a result of the stress. On the policy side the Prince Edward
County Board of Supervisors had been providing funding for the public schools
one month at a time as long as the schools remained segregated. But in 1959
the federal appeals court ordered Prince Edward County and the rest of Virginia
to desegregate its schools in September. In response, the board of supervisors
did not allocate any funds for public schools. Instead it provided tuition assist
ance to students desiring to attend allwhite private schools that had been
established in the county in the event of courtordered integration. The county’s
public schools remained closed until 1964, perhaps offering the most radical
example of massive resistance on the local level in the nation.
For the ive years the public schools were closed, the NAACP litigated for
public funding of integrated schools. AfricanAmerican residents established
learning centers for their children. A few families were able to send their chil
dren to live with relatives outside the county where they could attend public
schools.
New tensions arose in the AfricanAmerican community. Attorneys for the
NAACP sought a legal remedy rather than a local remedy that they feared might
undermine their case. Intent on having the courts decide the controversy, the
NAACP did not want the learning centers to approximate the quality of school
instruction and steadfastly avoided a compromise with oficials that would lead
to the reopening of the public schools. AfricanAmericans heeded the NAACP’s
advice and began to register to vote in an effort to vote local authorities out of
ofice rather than submit to them.
By 1960 Prince Edward County had gained notoriety and came to represent
what needed to be changed in the South. It attracted organizations other than
the NAACP and more direct action protest: Black Muslims supported separate
and better schools; the SitIn Movement inspired direct action; and the Student
NonViolent Coordinating Committee sent in organizers to plan boycotts as well
as to tutor the children locked out of their schools. Grifin managed to bridge
the gap between the increasingly ‘old’ efforts of NAACP litigation and the ‘new’
methods of movement organizing. He supported the latter in the county even as
he became president of the NAACP statewide. Ironically, the ‘new’ movement
tactics of direct action had an exemplar: a school boycott organized in 1951 by
high school junior Barbara Rose Johns.
ANALYTICAL ELEMENTS
What elements contributed to change in this case? Are these elements present
in organizational, community, political, and other social contexts? In this section
we explore these questions by proposing several analytical elements that may
be useful for understanding this case and others.
Causality
Accounts of leadership often reduce causality to a limited set of factors. This

enables us to portray leadership as links in a chain of cause and effect, such as
when we credit Clinton’s iscal policies with the prosperity of the 1990s or a
CEO with the turnaround of a company, without considering the many other
factors that played a part in these outcomes. In the case of Prince Edward
County, Barbara Johns’s leadership undeniably inluenced school desegregation.

But an exclusive focus on her role relects an oversimpliication of the chain of
events and seriously underestimates the nature of leadership. Leadership is in
initely more complex than the efforts of any one individual; rather, it is the
impact of efforts to inluence the actions of leaders and followers opposed to
and supportive of the same or related changes. This perspective on leadership
requires attention to a network of actors and the sea of other changes in which
a leader’s inluence efforts take place. Four analytical frames help us to attend
to this network of inluence rather than to a speciic leader: Kurt Lewin’s ield
theory; Gunnar Myrdal’s principle of cumulative effect; Stephen Jay Gould and
Niles Eldredge’s theory of punctuated equilibrium; and Margaret Wheatley’s
work on systems.
Kurt Lewin, ield theory

Kurt Lewin’s ield theory espouses that effective change requires understanding
‘the totality of coexisting facts which are conceived as mutually interdependent’
(Lewin 1951, p. 240). Lewin, a psychologist with training in physics and math
ematics, concerned himself with individual and group behavior, including
change. He contributed ‘action research’ to the ield of problemcentered schol
arship. Problem solving, just like effective change, requires placing a problem
within a system or ield with as many relevant and interdependent elements as
possible. Within this ield each individual also becomes a dynamic ield with
interdependent parts, including ‘life spaces’ of family, work, church, and other
groups. People take positive and negative inluences from their experiences that
shape their identity and help explain their behavior. Lewin advocated assembling
all the relevant, mutually independent factors to explain social phenomena such
as leadership and change. For example, Johns may or may not have been aware
that before she met school superintendent McIlwaine he had tangled with her
uncle Vernon Johns over black students’ access to county school bus transporta
tion and with Oliver Hill over black teachers’ pay a dozen years before.
Nonetheless, McIlwaine remained aware of those experiences, and they un
doubtedly inluenced his assessment of Barbara Johns’s efforts to lead and his
judgment about the nature of the student strike. Because of their inluence on
McIlwaine, these prior conlicts became part of the ield of the controversy.
Their hidden nature suggests the dificulties of gathering and assessing all the
facts relevant to an event.
Gunnar Myrdal, the principle of cumulative effect

Gunnar Myrdal and his colleagues completed their epic study, An American
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, before the appearance
of Lewin’s ield theory. They offered a theoretical framework for the condition
of AfricanAmericans very much like Lewin and extrapolated it to a method of
social research (Myrdal 1944, p. 1066). Myrdal’s study begins with the notion
of a system in stable equilibrium and rejects it as inadequate to provide a ‘dy
namic analysis of the process of change in social relations’ (Myrdal 1944,
p. 1065). The static equilibrium of a system is merely a starting point of the
balance of opposing forces. In the simplest of systems, with only two opposing
elements, a change in one brings about a change in the other, which in turn
brings on more change. The changes may be subtle enough to appear stable but
only because of the constant state of adjustment. Any system is far more com
plex with many interrelated elements; even the simplest system with two
opposing elements becomes complex when we examine the composites of each
element.
Myrdal proposed a principle of cumulation to explain change within a system
of dynamic social causation. Change accumulates as one change brings on an
other change, and the elements of a system and their composites or subsystems
represent a second form of cumulation. The principle states, assuming an initial
static state of balanced forces:
[A]ny change in any one of [its] factors, independent of the way in which it is brought
about, will, by the aggregate weight of the cumulative effects running back and forth
between them all, start the whole system moving in one direction or the other as the
case may be, with a speed depending upon the original push and the functions of
causal interrelation within the system. (Myrdal 1944, p. 1067, italics in the
original)
Myrdal elaborated that the inal effects of the cumulative process may be out of
proportion to the magnitude of the original push. More to the point of our case,
although the initial push may be withdrawn – the school strike ended – ‘the
process of change will continue without a new balance in sight’ (Myrdal 1944,
p. 1066). This happens largely because the system in which any change occurs
is far more complicated than it appears. Every element of the system interrelates
with every other element, and every element has its peculiarities and irregulari
ties (Myrdal 1944, p. 1068).
Myrdal concluded in terms central to our concern about causality: ‘This
conception of a great number of interdependent factors, mutually cumulative in
their effects, disposes of the idea that there is one predominant factor, a “basic
factor”’ (Myrdal 1944, p. 1069). This includes leadership.
Indeed, the notion of leadership may be a construct of our attempts to under
stand causality within a system of change. This radically alters the enduring
debate: Does change create leaders or do leaders create change? The cumulative
principle would suggest that the actions of leaders may inluence others to take
action that in turn inluences others in a continuing chain – thus the answer to
the question is neither and both. Change does not create leaders nor do leaders
create change and change creates leaders and leaders create change. Observers
apply the construct of leadership to people’s actions – actions that are intended
to inluence the actions of other people – within a system of change. The con
struct of leadership may be used retroactively to suggest causality. The accuracy
of that assessment depends upon the boundaries of the system; the broader the
boundaries, the less likely any set of actions has a primary causal relationship
to systemic change. Leadership is more easily applied to actions in a system of
static equilibrium and a circumscribed set of cumulative factors.
Both Myrdal and Lewin borrowed heavily from quantum mechanics in par
ticular for concepts of ield and the steady state of disequilibrium. Both men
emulated physics in their hope that human behavior and systems of change,
however complicated, could be expressed mathematically.
Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, punctuated equilibrium

Concepts of equilibrium and change also feature prominently in the work of
scientists Stephen Gould and Niles Eldredge (1972). Their theory of punctuated
equilibrium explains major changes in nature after long periods of stasis that
cause divergence or branching of a new animal or plant species (Gould 1991).
Real change occurs if this divergence establishes a trend wherein the new spe
cies succeeds more frequently than the previous one.
Like ield and systems theories, social scientists extrapolated the concept of
punctuated equilibrium to explain changes in social systems that occur after
long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods of major change
(Schlager 1999). This phenomenon helps to explain how Johns and the other
student leaders could launch a successful trend of mass resistance to racial ine
quality after decades of incremental change facilitated by previous generations
stretching back to the era of slavery. Brief periods of punctuated equilibrium,
such as the creation of a community of free blacks in 1810 (Ely 2004), estab
lished a trend of sustained resistance to an unjust racial system in Prince Edward
County and other black communities, even in the face of retribution from white
power holders.
Margaret Wheatley, the new science and leadership

Margaret Wheatley’s work (1992) permits us to bridge the concepts of punctu
ated equilibrium in paleobiology and the physics of quantum mechanics to
leadership in a manner that builds upon the ield theory of Lewin and the cu
mulative principle of Myrdal. Wheatley explains that physics had introduced
ield theory to explain gravity, electromagnetism and relativity. The common
element of ields in each of these is that they are ‘unseen structures, occupying
space and becoming known to us through their effects.’ The space of ields and,
we may add, their time, is not empty but ‘a cornucopia of invisible but powerful
effective structure’ (Wheatley 1992, p. 49). Both Lewin and Myrdal also sug
gested that to understand human behavior and social change we need to
recognize that time and space are not empty and begin to ill in their invisible
but effective structure.
Wheatley also explains the relevance of ield theory in the life sciences in a
manner analogous to Myrdal’s principle of cumulation. Morphogenic ields
develop through the accumulated behaviors of a species’ members. Successive
members ind it easier to acquire a skill, such as bicycle riding, in a setting where
many others have accumulated it. Contrary to Newtonian concepts of causation,
it is the energy of the receiver that takes up the form of a morphogenic ield
(Wheatley 1992, p. 51). In leadership terms the eficacy of leaders comes from
shaping a ield in which others, by their own actions, may participate in the en
ergy and forms of the ield. Barbara Johns certainly did this for students, their
parents and many others. But she was also within the ields that others – includ
ing Rev. Grifin, Superintendent McIlwaine, Principal Jones and teacher Inez
Davenport, and the other teachers at Moton High School – had shaped.
Wheatley elaborates on the consequence of this conception of ield for leader
ship. The idea that leaders have vision, set goals and then marshal their own
energy and that of others to achieve these goals is a Newtonian view of change
focused on a prime mover and a mechanistic concept of change. Although par
tially true – some elements of old science still hold in the new science – this
focus overlooks the complex ields of cumulative interactions across time and
space in which all of this takes place. We might conceive of change as a destina
tion sought through the leader as engine – a linear and railroad track analog.
This would ignore the fact that even railroads function within ields – including
elements from appropriations to weather – that inluence when and where trains
arrive or if they run at all. Better, Wheatley argues, to think about organizational
culture and the deliberate and intentional formation of ields that reinforce the
values and goals of an organization and ill its spaces and history with coherent
messages (Wheatley 1992, pp. 52–7). Of course, this view is limited to those
ields within an organization – such as the Moton High School PTA – and does
not take into account the ield in which these organizations interact with other
actors with opposing values and goals – such as the Prince Edward County
School Board.
Dynamic Systems of Interdependent Parts, Change and Causality
Wheatley’s work invites us to view the ield of leadership as a dynamic system

in which change is a constant. Myrdal describes it as rolling equilibrium and
alerts social scientists that they have to study ‘processes of systems actually
rolling in the one direction or the other, systems which are constantly subjected
to all sorts of pushes from outside through all the variables, and which are mov
ing because of the cumulative effect of all these pushes and the interaction
between the variables’ (Myrdal 1944, p. 1067). Peter Vaill describes this system
as ‘permanent white water’ (1996, p. 2) and ‘chaotic change’ (1989) but at
tributes these conditions to recent changes rather than newly discovered
enduring attributes of systems as Wheatley does.
Regardless of these important differences, many leadership scholars acknowl
edge that in the context of a dynamic, interdependent system, leaders play a far
different role than the one often ascribed to them. For example, Adam Yarmo
linsky takes issue with James MacGregor Burns about leaders initiating change.
Yarmolinsky (2007) points out that leaders join a system in the midst of change
and simply do their best to mediate and direct change in a shifting environment.
Ronald Heifetz similarly, if implicitly, acknowledges that leaders, especially
those without authority, modulate the distress within dynamic systems (Heifetz
1994, p. 207).
Likewise many leadership scholars acknowledge the complexity of such
systems of ields and recognize that these ields undergo constant change. Vaill
writes of organizations as universes with galaxies of knowledge and information
(Vaill 1989, p. xii). Heifetz (Heifetz and Linsky 2002) and Vaill also place im
portance on the personal attributes of the leader, thus opening up a whole other
dimension that can affect and further complicate the ields of organization and
change, much as Lewin predicted.
The organizational and personal complexities of this constant change were
fully evident in the Prince Edward County case. For example, the series of events
that played such a pivotal role in the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision on
this case were at least as complicated as the events comprising the racial history
of Prince Edward County. To offer only one example, the death of Chief Justice
Vinson made possible a strong majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.
Earl Warren, who assumed the role of chief justice, was determined to have a
unanimous decision. His determination was no doubt inluenced by the guilt he
felt for the role he had played in the internment of West Coast Japanese Ameri
cans when he was governor of California during the Second World War. Brown
v. Board of Education gave him the opportunity to repent his own transgressions
and to end those of the nation (Kluger 1975, pp. 661–2).
Warren began his penance before Brown. In 1946 a federal district court de
clared the segregation of MexicanAmerican school children in California
unconstitutional in Mendez v. Westminster. The case anticipated the issues of
Brown, although the grounds of segregation were national origin rather than
race. After the federal circuit court upheld the lower court, Governor Warren
lobbied the legislature in 1947 to pass bills that ended legal segregation for all
groups in California. Even a scholar as conscientious as Richard Kluger over
looked how inluential this experience would prove to be for Warren. The
California case, like the Brown case, was a complex ield that developed its own
twists and ironies. Gonzalo Mendez, the lead plaintiff in the case, was able to
pursue his grievance because of the income he derived farming land that he had
leased from the Munemitsus after the JapaneseAmerican family had been ‘re
located’ to an internment camp. Warren’s most egregious public policy indirectly
provided him the opportunity to pursue one of his most progressive oficial acts
(Teachers Domain n.d. 2001).
Wheatley offers another element of ields that Lewin and Myrdal did not
foresee, namely, the manifestation of the entire system in each of its parts. Frac
tals best express this property of systems of dynamic change. Zoom in on any
part of a chaotic system and one inds recurring patterns. Every part of a ield of
change may manifest the transformative change of the entire ield, but a focus
on a minute part of the ield may obscure the perception of the pattern that comes
from examining subsets in relation to large sets. The pattern of the entire system
may be found in each of its elements, but without some sense of the whole, the
pattern may go unrecognized. Needless to say, without a sense of that pattern the
nature of each part of the system may be misunderstood. When considering each
part of the system of change in the Prince Edward County case, for example, ele
ments of other systems of change are readily apparent. The school strike had
precursors in other forms of resistance within the slave and freed black commu
nity of the county and in the repressive measures of the white community. The
fullest meaning of those preceding resistance acts and the school strike emerges
from the pattern they share with each other. An exclusive focus on one or the
other or on any other factor apart from its relationship to the system of change
limits its meaning and our perception of the recurring pattern among them.
The principle of uncertainty, which Wheatley mentions and which makes up
part of the new science, provides particularly rich insight into causality. Physicist
Werner Heisenberg helped to usher in the new science of quantum mechanics.
Heisenberg resolved many of the controversies of quantum mechanics by ex
plaining that one cannot know the position and momentum of a subatomic
particle at the same time. The more one knows about its position, the less one
knows about its momentum and vice versa. The properties of the observed de
pend upon the instruments used to observe them. The leadership of Barbara
Johns depends then upon what other factors we take into account in the system
of change in racial segregation. When considering the Moton High School strike
factor, her leadership plays a preeminent role. At the level of federal decisions
for school desegregation, her leadership fades into a fractal subsystem of a larger
system. Moreover, a fair evaluation of Johns’s leadership depends upon examin
ing this system of change from her perspective. Her leadership would be less
prominent if we examined the system through the efforts and actions of Rev.
Grifin, Oliver Hill or Superintendent McIlwaine. In terms of the uncertainty
principle, the more we focus on the leadership of Johns, the less discernible
other leadership becomes.
This has profound implications for causality. If our certainty about one actor
comes at the cost of uncertainty regarding other parts of a dynamic system, how
can we be sure that the actions of one inluenced the intended change? Although
the case is quite clear that Johns’s leadership spurred the student strike, we might
also consider the other factors that inluenced people’s action and argue that
Johns’s exhortations would not have had any effect had it not been for the interac
tion with other elements of the system – the lack of success and frustration of
the Moton High School PTA; the World War II service of Rev. Grifin, Principal
Jones and Johns’s father; the support of the initial small band of student strike
leaders; etc. This uncertainty seems to demand that we examine every inexhaust
ible subset to the greatest microscopic level of scrutiny and then relate them. In
truth, we could never examine every relevant fact and interrelated event in sufi
cient detail to explain with certainty what caused what. According to Heisenberg,
‘In the sharp formulation of the law of causality – “if we know the present ex
actly, we can calculate the future” – it is not the conclusion that is wrong but the
premise’ (American Institute of Physics and David Cassidy 2005). The academic
implications of these matters are that we can understand the leadership of this
case only by the patterns that we look for and, once we ind them, we may be
surprised to learn that constituent elements of the case may vary from what we
would expect. In this case, for example, it is possible that some white residents
of the county wanted integration more than some AfricanAmerican residents.
The practical implications are that such microvariations do not affect our un
derstanding of the leadership of Johns and others. However, our understanding
will be insuficient without incorporating enough elements of the system into
our analysis to make clear the patterns of behaviors and the probability of their
interrelatedness. This is precisely the caution that authors such as Wheatley and
Vaill offer: a focus on leaders and their actions distorts our understanding of
leadership in systems of change.
Mindfulness
Underlying this investigation into the theories and observations of Lewin,

Myrdal, Gould and Eldredge and Wheatley is the common emphasis on mind
fulness – a central tenet of Buddhism. In order to understand and practice
leadership, it is necessary to engage in critical relection on the acts of leaders,
the context in which those acts take place and their likely consequences. The
tenets of this critical relection include conceptualizing acts within a ield of
interactive and interrelated parts rather than in a straight line from acts to results.
In this manner both leaders and those who study leadership are more likely to
anticipate unintended and unwanted consequences. Our perception of these
consequences increases with our knowledge of the boundaries of the system of
change or ield in which someone attempts to lead.
In the I-Ching Chinese scholars posit a universe composed of a single unify
ing element with two complementary and opposing parts – a yin and a yang.
The complexity of the universe is contained in its basic element and in all the
derivative elements that low from the original Tao. These elements combine in
systems of equilibrium based on complementarity and in a dynamic low of
energy, Feng Shui, founded on their oppositional characteristics (Couto and Fu
2004). The premises of this realm – ields of energy, change and stability, com
plementarity and opposition – provided Neils Bohr and other pioneering
physicists a metaphysical context for discovering quantum mechanics and ex
panding scientiic thought beyond theories of Newton and even Einstein.
Physicist Werner Heisenberg and his colleague Erwin Schroedinger found their
inspiration in the metaphysics of Hinduism. These systems of thought provide
a very different metaphor for causality than the mechanics of a machine, to
which Scottish philosopher David Hume subscribed. Instead causality is rooted
in dynamic, interactive systems of interrelated parts that resemble and differ
from each other (Capra 1982, pp. 79–89).
Lest it appear that we have strayed too far from causality, change and leader
ship, let us not forget the numerous references, albeit cursory and oblique, to
LaoTsu, Taoism and Confucius in leadership scholarship. Peter Vaill deals
somewhat more substantially with Taoism, after irst confessing to the elusive
ness of its elliptical thinking. Vaill dwells on the concept of wu-wei, or
nonaction, and its place in leadership. Wu-wei was evident in the Johns case
when the teachers and principal left the assembly hall at the students’ request
during the organization of the strike. Vaill also hints at the signiicance of ex
amining this and other epistemological and ontological systems for the
understanding of change. He envisions the possibility of organizations beneiting
from the Eastern realization that the meaning of organizational capabilities, in
cluding leadership and change, ‘can emerge only through the most careful and
continuous contemplation’ (Vaill 1989, p. 190).
Social Tensions
In our conversations about the links of causality and mindfulness to actions that
result in change, Fred Jablin suggested that the impetus for change might emerge
from social tensions. This idea resonated as a meaningful way to understand
the dynamic and socially constructed nature of change in human systems.
Social tensions arise among groups from conlicts about identity, resources,
power and ethics. These tensions are embedded in interactions within and be
tween groups as they form and continually reform the structures and systems
that comprise society. Table 7.1 identiies several social factors and ensuing
tensions that underlie change. In the Johns case, conlict arising from these
tensions created pervasive conditions for change in Prince Edward County.
Table 7.1 Social tensions
Factors Social Tensions
Identity and Meaning Assigning identity – Asserting identity

Rendering insigniicant – Establishing value
Resource Availability Restricted resources – Accessible resources

and Distribution Individual resources – Collective resources
Power Disenfranchised power – Authorized power
Ethics Inequitable actions/conditions – Equitable actions/

conditions
Identity and meaning

Individuals and groups create meaning in society by naming, deining and as
signing value to themselves and others in their environment. Social tensions
concerning meaning commonly develop as strains between assigned identity
(naming) and asserted identity (selfclaimed) and upon rendering identities in
signiicant (worthless). When one group assigns a name and lower social worth
to another group, the resulting tensions can evolve or erupt into social change.
Rosenblum and Travis (2003) assert, ‘Because naming may involve a redeini
tion of self, an assertion of power, and a rejection of others’ ability to impose
an identity, social change movements often lay claim to a new name, and op
ponents may express opposition by continuing to use the old name’ (p. 6).
In 1951 whites identiied AfricanAmerican citizens of Prince Edward County
as ‘coloreds’ in the most polite terms and as dehumanizing epithets in the worst
terms. There was no doubt that African Americans were deemed inferior and
unequal, while white citizens were valued highly and deemed superior. These
name and value distinctions shaped disparities in other aspects of society includ
ing the rights of blacks to resources, power and ethical treatment.
Resource availability and distribution

Tensions concerning resources emerge from the availability and distribution of
goods, services, wealth, property and other beneits or needs that groups in so
ciety value or require. Accessibility and restriction of resources are more often
determined by social mores (the haves and havenots) than natural abundance
or limitations. Tensions for change emerge from struggles over who has the
right to possess resources – the individual, the collective or some combination
of both.
US citizens established the right to universal public education as a valued

collective resource long before Barbara Rose Johns entered Moton High School.
In 1951 resources for educating black children in Prince Edward County were
sorely lacking, even under the separatebutequal standards of Plessy v. Fergu-
son. Moton High School’s PTA, principal and community members continuously
appealed to the allwhite school board to upgrade buildings and supplies only
to be placated or summarily ignored. Even when funds for buildings and supplies
were available, white school board members had no intention of supporting
equal public education and facilities for AfricanAmerican children.
Power
Participants in the change process create, leverage or challenge power constructs
to bring about major change. In our session at Mount Hope, members of the
Gold Team agreed that ‘power is not fundamentally a thing that individuals
possess in some greater or lesser quantity but is more than anything an aspect
of social relationships’ (Couto, Faier, Hicks and Hickman 2002, p. 3). The capac
ity to impact social relations is affected by a group’s attainment of or restriction
from various forms of social power and the group’s ability to use power to inlu
ence others. Tensions develop among groups that have attained various forms
of power (authorized or legitimate, reward, coercive, expert, informational or
referent [French and Raven 1959]) and groups that are restricted, disenfran
chised or negatively impacted by the exercise of these forms of power.
The exercise of legitimate power contributes to stability and organization in
social interactions; however, misuse or exploitation of power bases results in
inequality and loss of rights or freedoms for selected groups. In 1896 with the
landmark case Plessy v. Ferguson, white Southerners succeeded in reversing
and suppressing any gains African Americans had made in terms of civil rights
and human dignity. The US Supreme Court used its power in this case to estab
lish a legal basis for separatebutequal conditions for blacks and whites in the
South. The result of this decision gave tacit permission to white power holders
to create separate but decidedly unequal conditions for black citizens.
Ethics
Joanne Ciulla (2004, p. 4) maintains that ethics is ‘the heart of leadership’;
likewise, inequity, inequality and excessive selfinterest are at the heart of social
tensions and conlict. Ethics in social interactions compel members of society
to take into account the impact of their actions on others and consider what
‘ought to be’ done in situations with other human beings. Al Gini explains that
‘ethics, then, tries to ind a way to protect one person’s individual rights and
needs against and alongside the rights and needs of others’ (Gini 2004, p. 29).
Social tensions emerge when groups experience or perceive inequitable treat
ment at the hands of power holders and dominant groups.
Inequities in the treatment of black and white citizens in the Jim Crow South
were intentional and inhumane. In 1939 the Prince Edward County School
Board built its irst public high school for AfricanAmerican students with no
cafeteria, auditorium, locker rooms, inirmary or gymnasium – features that
were standard in white schools in the county. Moton High School was built to
hold 180 students, but in 1947 it served more that 360 students.
The county school board responded by building temporary facilities made of
wood and covered with tar paper behind the school. These ‘shacks,’ as they were
called by local citizens, leaked when it rained and were poorly heated. Barbara
Johns and other Moton High School students were well aware of the superior
quality of facilities and equipment at the white high school. These inequities
coupled with longterm neglect and disregard by school board oficials increased
frustration and tensions among students.
From an ethical perspective, change in its most humane and enlightened form
intentionally uplifts the human condition of some without harming the welfare
of others, while change in its most detrimental form fosters the aims of egocen
tric or amoral individuals and groups at the expense or demise of others.
Leadership studies research examines both elevating and harmful forms of
change. Scholars James McGregor Burns (1978, 2003) and Bernard Bass (1985;
& Avolio 1994) examine the uplifting effect of transforming and transforma
tional leadership, just as scholars Jean LipmanBlumen (2005), Barbara
Kellerman (2004) and others research the causes and consequences of toxic or
bad leadership.
Illustrations of both harmful and elevating forms of change permeate the story
of Barbara Rose Johns and school desegregation in Prince Edward County.
Leadership by Southern whites created and sustained social arrangements that
legitimated their own amoral needs and wants by denying the civil rights and
wellbeing of black citizens. In contrast, strike organizers at Moton High School
used their moral agency to advocate for improved educational conditions for
black students without harming the rights of white citizens.
Conditions for Change: Climate, Timing and Threshold Points
Though social tensions underlie change, tensions alone do not initiate change.
The elements in Table 7.2, climate, timing and threshold points, are essential
factors in prompting change. Climate encompasses the totality of environmental
cues, feelings and experiences of groups in social contexts. Conditions for
change emerge over time as social climates affecting the wellbeing of speciic
groups become more threatening or uncertain.
Threatening conditions were present in the situation surrounding events in
Prince Edward County. Moton High School’s PTA, principal and community
members advocated for improved resources and facilities for their children on
Table 7.2 Conditions for change
Factors Conditions
From To:
Climate Passive Threatening
Timing Premature Opportune
Threshold Points Lacking Prevalent
a continuous basis. In the existing separate and unequal environment it was evi
dent that postponements and rejections of their requests were not isolated
incidents. As a result, each obstacle contributed to the black community’s cu
mulative experience of discrimination and mistreatment.
Timing is also a central factor in change. Cumulative acts, that when taken
together are larger than any singular or speciic moment in history, create op
portune openings where concerted action is capable of sparking change – a
punctuation in social equilibrium. The previous actions of many African Ameri
cans to defy segregation – including the actions of Johns’s uncle, Rev. Vernon
Johns, that resulted in better school bus services for AfricanAmerican children
in the county in 1939 – paved the way for Moton High School students to stage
a sustainable strike. The actions of Vernon Johns formed part of a complex web
of change leading to desegregation.
The concept of thresholds provides further insight into conditions that trigger
change. Mark Granovetter (1978) describes threshold as ‘that point where the
perceived beneits to an individual of doing the thing in question … exceed the
perceived costs’ (p. 1422). By extending the idea of threshold to groups, we
conclude that signiicant social change is set in motion when a group collectively
reaches a threshold point.
It is conceivable that thresholds are also points where courage transcends
fear. Legalized racism and accepted acts of violence toward African Americans
reinforced fear and uncertainty in people who dared to assert their objections
to an unethical structure. At the same time these acts served to build cumulative
experience, conviction and collective courage.
There were several major threshold points in the Moton High School case.
One threshold point occurred when Barbara Johns recruited a small group of
trusted friends to meet secretly and plan a student strike in the foreseeable event
that efforts by the school principal and PTA would not result in a decision to
build a new high school. When the school board failed to announce plans for a
new school, Johns’s strike group put their plan into action.
The group arranged for the school principal to be away from campus, then
notiied each classroom that there would be a brief assembly in the auditorium.
Johns and her compatriots then called on the 450 students gathered at the as
sembly to unite in collective purpose and stage an orderly strike on the school
grounds. On April 23, 1951, Johns and the entire student body marched out of
Moton High School determined to change the abysmal conditions in their
school.
Another crucial threshold point occurred on the fourth day of the strike.
NAACP lawyer Spottswood Robinson asked students to bring their parents to
a meeting where he would determine whether they supported their children’s
willingness to proceed with a lawsuit to end segregation in public schools. Rev.
Francis Grifin held the mass meeting at his church and urged black solidarity
in the ight to end segregation. Barbara Johns spoke passionately on behalf of
the students. The desegregation plan received a rousing endorsement from the
majority of those present, though there were some dissenters. At the close of
the meeting, Rev. Grifin summarized the sentiments of the group: ‘Anyone who
would not back these children after they stepped out on a limb is not a man’
(Kluger 1975, p. 478).
Leadership as Intended Change
This detailed account permits us to address questions of change and causality.

In what way did Barbara Rose Johns provide leadership to end school desegre
gation? Did her actions pass the litmus test that James MacGregor Burns set for
leadership – ‘the achievement of purpose in the form of real and intended social
change’ (Burns 1978, p. 251)? Clearly, there is a succession of related events
from the school strike to Brown v. Board of Education. There is also, clearly, a
succession of related events, albeit less direct, from the school strike to the
campaign of massive resistance. Figure 7.1 outlines some of the sequential re
lationships of events and actors from the school strike to Brown v. Board of
Education. It includes subsequent events such as massive resistance on both the
state and county level and occurrences on both the national and local level in
the civil rights movement.
If Johns was a leader in school desegregation because her actions tied into
the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education ruling, was she also a leader
in the campaign of massive resistance for the same reason? Did her leadership
cause the closing of the schools in Prince Edward County as well as their even
tual reopening and integration? Clearly she intended improved school facilities
and not school closings. Was she then only responsible for the changes she in
tended? If so this might suggest a very low ethical standard, namely, that leaders
are responsible only for their intended outcomes and not for the consequences
of their actions. As a leader did she bear any responsibility for the poverty that
Rev. Grifin was reduced to or for Lancaster’s loss of his job as Negro county
farm agent?
US Supreme Court
Brown v. Board
Massive Resistance and subsequent decisions and denials of certiorari
Continued segregation of state and county
schools, 1954–59
Closing of county schools 1959–64
Civil Rights Movement
National
Prince Edward County
Legal Representation and State US District Court
Officials Davis v. County School Board
Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay &
Local voter registration efforts
Moore
Archibald Gerard Robertson
Virginia Attorney General and
Governor James Lindsay Almond Jr. NAACP Howard University
T. Justin Moore Oliver Hill NAACP Legal Defense
Spottswood W. Robinson III Fund
Shift in purpose from new or
equal facilities to a protest of Law Partner Martin A. Martin
segregated education
White Opposition
School board Strike Participants and Supporters
Superintendent Carrie and John Stokes
174
Strike committee members

Rev. L. Francis Griffin
Strike to protest unequal school Students and parents
facilities and to demand new Principal M. Boyd Jones and teachers
Black Opposition facilities or access to the all-white
Former principal Farmville High School
Current principal
Family
Parents Robert and Violet Johns
Grandmothers Mary Croner and
Barbara Rose Johns Sallie Johns
Uncle Vernon Johns
Preceding Efforts
Docility of African Americans
School board and superintendent Preceding Efforts
Busing protests 1930s Landownership for African Americans
Construction of additional buildings 1949 Busing protests 1930s
Moton PTA Moton PTA
Prince Edward NAACP
Figure 7.1 The leadership of Barbara Rose Johns

Perhaps we can absolve Johns of these negative outcomes to the extent that
we cannot hold her responsible for the expected and unexpected actions that
others took in reaction to her leadership. Max Weber, however, made acceptance
of the intended and unintended outcomes of our efforts to inluence public events
a mark of the calling to political leadership. Johns was in a system of change
and, according to Weber, it would be irresponsible for her not to acknowledge
the interdependence of contending factors in these ields. Johns and the school
board had their own separate but interdependent systems of power. Each bears
responsibility in the dual sense of causality and moral accountability for their
system’s actions, actions which they intended to inluence. But, again citing
Weber, responsibility in the sense of moral accountability also requires that we
use judgment to anticipate negative reactions and outcomes and attempt to avoid
them. An ethic of responsibility requires that we pursue values with proportion
ality (Weber 1946, pp. 115–16). Weber helps us understand that Johns and the
school board operated in separate but interrelated dynamic ields. Johns can
only be held responsible for the negative outcomes of massive resistance and
school desegregation in Prince Edward County if those outcomes can be traced
to her intentions or to an excess in her actions. Clearly, they cannot.
Just as clearly we have identiied a sobering caveat of leadership. Burns’s
litmus test of the achievement of real and intended social change comes with
Weber’s measured melancholic observation: ‘The inal [and intermediate] result
of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and
often even paradoxical relation to its original meaning’ (Weber 1946, p. 117).
Questions remain about the role of intended change in Johns’s leadership.
Initially she did not intend to desegregate the schools but only to improve the
facilities of Moton High School. She supported and championed the NAACP’s
shift to desegregation as a means to gain improved facilities. Do we test her
leadership by the achievement of desegregation or the improvement of facilities?
The state immediately took steps to improve facilities as a means to avoid de
segregation, but by that time the NAACP’s position had hardened to the point
of preferring closed schools to improved ones. In this sense, the NAACP bears
more responsibility than Johns for the lost educational opportunities from 1959
to 1964.
Just as the overall Brown decision had some unintended consequences (Sul
livan 2004), Johns’s actions brought about some changes she intended and some
she did not. While her initial goal was one of equalization, the NAACP viewed
equalization as a very limited form of change because racial subordination could
and often did continue even after students of all races obtained equal facilities.
When the county ultimately desegregated its public schools, Johns achieved her
intended purpose – equal facilities for black and white students – albeit in an
unforeseen, unintended way. In this sense did equalization and desegregation
symbolize a deeper form of change: the recognition of the value and intelligence
of all the county’s students and the end of all forms of racial discrimination
within the school system? How do Johns’s leadership and the NAACP’s leader
ship rate against these intended outcomes? The difference the efforts of Johns
and the NAACP made in improved educational opportunities, processes and
outcomes provides the best measure of their effectiveness.
Although she played a part in the formative stages of the lawsuit, Johns did
not play a part in subsequent events in the county after her parents, fearing for
her safety, sent her to live with her uncle Vernon in Montgomery, Alabama,
shortly after the student strike. Johns married on New Year’s Eve 1953 and
subsequently moved to Philadelphia, far removed from the consequences of the
strike and its ensuing controversy. Did her leadership stop after she launched
the strike or did it continue because of the consequences of her initial action?
Regardless of intention then, did her role as leader end when she no longer in
luenced events in the present? Or did her leadership remain to inluence later
events, again regardless of her intentions? Can we distinguish her role as leader
from her leadership – the former being the actions that she took to inluence the
actions of others, and the latter being the consequences of those actions? If we
are to accept the time and space of a ield as relevant to the actions of inluence
within it, then Johns’s leadership remains a factor in the ield of civil rights
movement in Prince Edward County and beyond.
Leadership as the Cause of Change
Johns did not operate in a leadership vacuum; rather, she interacted with other
leaders in this narrative of change. It is instructive to examine the inluences on
each of the other leaders involved in the Prince Edward County case: the Howard
University Law School education of Oliver Hill and Spottswood Robinson; the
conlict that Superintendent McIlwaine had with Vernon Johns over transporta
tion for AfricanAmerican children twelve years prior to meeting his niece; the
impact that ighting a war of liberation in a segregated army in World War II had
on Rev. Grifin, Principal Jones and Barbara Johns’s father as well as the effect
of the subsequent desegregation of the armed forces by President Truman in
1948. This examination suggests that a set of interdependent actors each with
their own set of inluences comprised a system of change in the Prince Edward
County case, a system limited only by our ability to ferret out all of its conditions.
In this type of immense and interactive system, Johns’s actions might be con
sidered analogous to a butterly lapping its wings in the Amazon basin, thereby
setting off a string of events that ultimately causes rain in Des Moines, Iowa. Or
Johns’s actions might have had much more of a direct impact, causing us to ana
lyze the speciic circumstances of the case, such as the conversations in the
Johns’s family store; Inez Davenport’s reasons for encouraging Johns to take a
lead in improving the school facility; and Principal Jones’s determination to run
a democratic school and support studentled initiatives, a determination that ex

tended to his momentous decision to leave the assembly hall at Johns’s request
at a time when he could have squelched the strike before it got started.
Events did not unfold in a straight line from Johns to the US Supreme Court.
Johns dealt directly with students, students’ parents, other residents in the county
and the Richmond ofice of the NAACP. She aligned herself with the elected
student leaders of Moton High School who should possibly also be considered
leaders in the school desegregation effort. Johns received advice and assistance
irst from Inez Davenport and Rev. Grifin and later from the NAACP. Did the
boundaries of her leadership diminish when the NAACP entered or did they
broaden under the inluence of all the people who interacted with her? If it was
the latter, should we then examine the inluences on those people who inluenced
Barbara Rose Johns – not only those mentioned in this account but also her
family members and the community of propertyowning AfricanAmerican
farmers served by her family store?
Some of these inluences were small and personal – a spoken word. Some
were momentous and public – the inability of the Moton PTA to make progress.
Some inluences were speciic to that time and place, while others had historical
roots, which although long forgotten, were compelling nonetheless. For exam
ple, historically large numbers of free blacks lived in Prince Edward County
during a time of legalized slavery. In the years preceding the desegregation case,
an economically independent group of AfricanAmerican farmers and landown
ers had grown and lourished in Prince Edward County, of whom Vernon Johns
was just one example, albeit the most dramatic. In time Johns’s efforts in the
Prince Edward County school desegregation case may fade from the collective
memory just as memories of some of these earlier historical events had faded
by 1951.
Burns’s litmus test of leadership as the achievement of real and intended
change sets a high standard. Clearly Johns achieved her purpose of conducting
a school strike and, as a consequence, she inluenced the actions of others. It is
relatively easy, as we have seen, to detail the action that leaders take to inluence
others. It is much more dificult to judge the inluence of those actions on other
leaders. Whereas leading is replete with intentions, leadership concerns the as
sessment of the consequences of leaders’ actions. And how do we deal with and
assess the changes that ensued because of a leader’s action? Joseph Rost’s cri
tique of Burns only compounds the problem. His deinition of leadership as ‘an
inluence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes
that relect their mutual purposes’ (Rost 1991, p. 103) obfuscates the possibility
that some inluence relationships may make real changes, although unintended,
and may stimulate some to act for contrary purposes. In order to move beyond
the dilemma of unintended changes and contrary purposes, we may have to
distinguish between leading and leadership.
Leading is an attempt to inluence others in the present moment. The story

of the strike offers numerous examples of efforts to lead, including the students’
letter to the NAACP lawyers, the massive resistance tactics employed by some
of Virginia’s politicians and newspaper editors and Earl Warren’s determination
to win a unanimous opinion in the US Supreme Court. We can deine these at
tempts at leading as leadership only after assessing their full impact. Even then,
what is and is not leadership depends upon what is and is not included in the
system of change.
By limiting the inluence relationship to leaders and followers and insisting on
intention, Rost and many, many others confuse the nature of leadership. The ac
tions of a person may inluence a leader to take action even though it was not
intended. Barbara Johns’s paternal uncle and grandmother both instilled a great
deal of conidence in her and served as role models of resistance to racial subor
dination in personal and public matters. Their actions would not be considered
leadership in an ordinary interpretation of Rost’s deinition, but an extraordinary
interpretation – which focuses on inluence relationships primarily – would in
corporate their actions into the leadership that brought about school desegregation.
Although they did not directly affect the change effort in the way that Rev. Grifin
and the NAACP lawyers did, Johns’s uncle and grandmother nurtured Johns’s
selfesteem, making it possible for her to assert herself in the school desegregation
case. The omission of signiicant inluential relationships is but the irst shortcom
ing in any theory of change that limits its focus to leaders and followers.
The second shortcoming of Rost’s conception of leadership is that it tends to
concentrate on the efforts of one set of leaders and followers. In truth and in
practice, leaders – those who take action to inluence others – set off reactions
in other leaders for conlicting purposes. Obviously, Johns’s plans for the school
strike had severe critics who took action to prevent the strike and desegregation.
There were AfricanAmerican leaders opposed to the strike and efforts to inte
grate who vied with Johns for inluence in the AfricanAmerican community.
Principal Jones, for example, wrote a letter to parents asking them to send their
children back to school. In sum, a system of change does not have only one set
of leaders and followers; rather, it has many interdependent and interactive sets
of leaders and followers.
These two factors of change, namely, myriad inluences and many sets of
leaders and followers, came into play most dramatically on the morning of April
23 when Principal Jones left the assembly at the request of Johns and the other
strike leaders. He could have refused to leave and ordered the students to return
to their classrooms, protesting that their strike plans would only harm his own
change efforts. Certainly his boss, the superintendent of schools, thought this
is exactly what he should have done. And had he done so, it is very unlikely that
events in Prince Edward County would have unfolded as they did. Here was a
leader, a person in authority, who did not use his inluence to coerce compliance.
Several factors might have inluenced his action: he might have withdrawn his
opposition because he tacitly supported the students’ actions; he might have
been making a concession to Inez Davenport, Johns’s favorite teacher and
Jones’s iancée, who had encouraged Johns to take some action to address the
poor facilities; he might have wanted to show support for the orderly and demo
cratic manner in which the students conducted themselves regardless of whether
he agreed with their plans. He sought to instill initiative and organization in his
students and may have been reluctant to squelch their efforts for this reason.
Richard Kluger describes Jones as a man trapped between his convictions as a
black leader and his obligations to his white employees (Kluger 1975, p. 469).
His convictions won out at the moment he was asked to leave. The assembly
was itself the result of his inluential encouragement of student initiative and
his own example of striving to acquire better resources for the school. Ironically,
Jones was a leader in terms of the inluence he had on an action he could not
ultimately support. His leadership, his inluence on the school strike, came from
his decision not to use his authority, or to act by inaction.
When we examine change through one particular leader, we can see how
seemingly unrelated events become a network of inluence because of their ef
fect on that one person. When we analyze a change event from the perspective
of different leaders, we must add and subtract elements of inluence and think
about how the consequences of the events affected different leaders differently.
For example, if we choose to examine the whole system of change in Prince
Edward County through T. Justin Moore, lead attorney for the school board, we
would have to consider very different inluences and consequences than we
would if we were considering the same system of change from the perspective
of Johns or Jones.
Leadership as Action for Change
Action to bring about change entails more than a single leader or initiator, as
the Prince Edward County school desegregation case illustrates. Individuals can
achieve a common purpose only when they join together in an act of generativity
– forming a group to accomplish goals that an individual could not achieve alone
(Forsyth 1999, p. 67). During our Mount Hope discussions, the concept of gen
erativity was especially important in the Gold Team’s conceptions of leadership.
The scholars at Mount Hope grappled with the question: What processes or
conditions characterize the emergence, maintenance and transformation of
leadership and followership? The Gold Team responded, ‘Leadership is a crea
tive and generative act – literally bringing new realities into being through
collaboration with others’ (Couto et al., 2002, p. 2).
Members of the Moton High School student body assumed active roles as
leaders or followers in an effort to attain their common goal. Robert Kelley
(1995) explains that leadership and followership are equal but different roles
often played by the same people at different times. Individuals who assume
leadership roles have the desire and willingness to lead as well as a clear vision
and interpersonal, communication and organizational skills and abilities. Effec
tive followers (or participants) form the other equally important component of
the equation and are distinguished by their capacity for selfmanagement, strong
commitment and courage. Individuals involved in leading change are willing to
bring their respective abilities to the change effort in whatever roles they choose
or accept.
Leaders and participants achieve momentum or movement through their
coordinated actions (coacting) for change. Paradoxically, individuals who as
sume leadership roles rely on their imagination – an invisible thought process
– before attempting to implement a plan of action. Groups seeking change must
be able to imagine or envision alternative social arrangements and deine prob
lems or issues in new ways (Couto et al., 2002, p. 2). A pivotal role of leaders
in the change process involves communicating imagined futures and creating
new meanings that inspire action. During our discussions at Mount Hope, the
Gold Team proposed the following:
Leading change frequently entails competing narratives about the necessity, sufi
ciency, and possibility of change. Narratives fulill various purposes; they motivate,
deine group identity, make limits, provide the building blocks for imagination and
creativity, teach lessons, and legitimate or undermine forms of power, authority, and
coercion. One way in which humans convey these social constructions of knowledge
is through storytelling, a uniquely social discourse of human life.
Telling a story offers an account of reality that seeks either to afirm or contest an
existing meaning, which expresses the nature and origins of a particular set of social
relations that can have economic, political, and/or cultural dimensions. The need for
change results in contested or negotiated interpretations, deinitions and values.
(Couto et al., 2002, p. 2)
Barbara Rose Johns and the group of student leaders envisioned a high school
for black students that provided them with facilities and resources to receive the
quality education to which they were entitled. They developed a plan for Moton
High School students to challenge an existing power structure and gain parity
with white schools in Virginia. The climate, timing and threshold points con
verged to form a prime opportunity for movement – a point of punctuated
equilibrium (Gould and Eldredge 1972) where signiicant and sustained change
became possible for black children. The strike committee put their plan into
action by calling together the entire student body, communicating a collective
vision for change and proposing a strike plan. The strike plan gave form, mean
ing and power to a common purpose that seemed attainable through collective
action by the students. Certainly this cadre of leaders met the criteria for the
role of leaders described by Kelley (1995): they had the desire and willingness
to lead as well as a clear vision and interpersonal communication and organi

zational skills.
The role of the student body represented an equally important component of
this equation. A successful strike was fully dependent on the willingness of the
students to assume roles as effective participants or followers. These roles would
require an equally strong commitment to the goal and plan of action, a capacity
for selfdiscipline and selfmanagement and tremendous courage in the face of
danger. No one knew what would actually happen once the strike committee
revealed its plan and put it into action. The risks of punishment, expulsion, vio
lence and other repercussions loomed ominously. What the students did know
was that the conditions in their school were totally unacceptable. They had
waited long enough and were determined to remain steadfast until their situation
changed.
The school principal, teachers, parents and community members comprise
a second group of effective participants or followers in the school desegrega
tion case. The decision of the principal and teachers to leave the auditorium
when asked by student leaders required commitment to the students’ common
purpose (or at least commitment not to interfere), selfcontrol to refrain from
using their positional power and courage in the face of imminent sanctions
from the school board. The parents and community members exhibited a simi
lar commitment and a willingness to embrace the actions of their children.
They, too, refrained from using positional authority to stop the strike and ex
hibited exceptional courage despite inevitable repercussions from white power
holders.
The Prince Edward County school desegregation case also illustrates Kelley’s
(1995) assertion that the same people often play different roles of leadership
and followership at different times. The school principal, teachers, parents and
community activists functioned in leadership roles and advocated tirelessly for
better conditions in black schools. Yet on April 23, 1951, the adult leaders as
sumed roles as followers and let the students take on leadership roles.
CONCLUSION
This discussion of leadership, change and causality grounded in the leadership
of Barbara Rose Johns and the Moton student body offers an opportunity to
provide several generalizations about leadership across contexts. Figure 2 sum
marizes the analytical factors discussed throughout this chapter. These factors
will likely take distinct forms and occur at varying stages or degrees based on
contextual elements at macro and micro levels. Our challenge as a community
of leadership scholars, educators, practitioners and students is to identify the
broadest range of contributing factors, understand their impact, generate new
CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS
Historical Social Cultural
ANALYTICAL ELEMENTS
Organizational Community Political Societal
PRECURSORS TO CHANGE
Causality
• Systems and field theory (interdependency,
co-existing facts)
Subsystems Causality
Patterns – fractals
• Dynamic social causation (cumulation)
• Invisible (unseen) structure
(time, space, energy, uncertainty)
Mindfulness
• Critical reflection Mindfulness
• Seeing total context
• Consequences or costs
CHANGE
Social Tensions
Social Tensions
• Identity and meaning
• Resource availability and distribution
• Power
• Ethics
Conditions for Change Conditions for Change

• Climate
• Timing
• Threshold points
LEADERSHIP
• Intentional and predictable
• Unpredictable and unintentional
Leadership as the Cause of Change

• Interdependent actors and influences Leadership as the Cause of Change
• Direct influences and indirect influences
Leadership as Action for Change

• Purpose
• Co-actors – leaders and participants
• Momentum or movement Leadership as Action for Change
Imagination and generativity
Communication and meaning-making
Co-action
OUTCOMES
Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes

• Intended consequences
• Unintended consequences
• Impact on future events and change
Figure 7.2 Analytical and contextual elements
factors that contribute to the leadership of change in human systems and use
them ethically.
Barbara Rose Johns and the Moton High School students proceeded with in
tention, purpose and collective action to gain facilities and conditions equal to
their white counterparts. Yet they had no idea when they met with attorneys
Oliver Hill and Spottswood Robinson that their actions would ultimately lead
to the overthrow of legally segregated schools in the United States. The student
strikers achieved more than separatebutequal schools; they achieved legal
desegregation of schools throughout the country. Major unintended conse
quences also accompanied this major change – the closure of Prince Edward
County schools, job losses and the unanticipated relocation of many teachers,
families and students, including Barbara Rose Johns.
How can leadership groups in any context anticipate and prepare for the in
tended and unintended consequences of their actions and thus be responsible in
Weber’s sense of intention and proportion? In truth, there is no absolute way to
foresee and plan for the various outcomes that change may bring. However the
Native American wisdom of the Iroquois advises us to consider the impact of
the decisions we make today on the seventh generation of humans (Lyons
1992).
Peter Schwartz advocates a process of scenario development that helps deci
sionmakers take a long view in a world of uncertainty (1996, p. 3). He contends
that scenarios are not predictions but mechanisms to help people learn. Scenario
building involves more than guessing. It requires a process that uses factual in
formation and indicators of early trends to project alternative futures. The
process entails eight sequential factors:
1. Identifying a central issue or question

2. Listing key factors in the microenvironment that may directly affect the
central question
3. Identifying forces in the macroenvironment that may affect the central
issue
4. Assigning rank and weight to the micro and macroenvironmental factors
based on their impact on the original issue or question
5. Identifying the forces that are most signiicant and most uncertain, cluster
ing and plotting each force along an axis from uncertainty to certainty or
the reverse and choosing the two most signiicant axes to form a grid with
four distinct quadrants
6. Amplifying details of each quadrant to form four different plots (or
scenarios)
7. Considering the implications of each scenario
8. Taking action based on early indicators of movement toward or away from
a desirable scenario. (Schwartz 1996, pp. 241–7)
A inal factor, ‘acting with feedback’ (Harman 1998, pp. 193–4), fosters ongo
ing learning and lexibility as leaders and participants move toward a desired
common goal. Although scenario building is a method used most often in busi
ness or organizational settings, it provides a useful means for developing

informed action in other settings, including community, social and political
environments.
We offer several concluding observations for further relection based on our
use of four analytical factors – ield theory, cumulative effect, punctuated equi
librium and systems thinking – to examine the Prince Edward County school
desegregation case. We hope these analytical factors and the observations they
provide are useful across contexts.
l We can assess leadership only after some change has occurred. We can
observe leaders acting to inluence outcomes in the present.
l The nature of leadership in any change effort corresponds to the historical
and social context in which we place it and the leader(s) through which
we examine a network of change.
l The less we consider historical and cultural context, the fewer inluential
events and factors we take into account.
l The interaction of a leader’s effort with the efforts of other leaders and
participants shapes the outcome and hence the signiicance and nature of
leadership.
l Every change effort takes place within a system of change that provides
opposition and modiication of other leadership.
l The more credit a particular leader is given for change, the less we rec
ognize the impact of systems in which events take place and the
contributions of coactors to the outcome.
Our Mount Hope colleagues asked members of the Gold Team how we could
ever know or conclude anything or sustain order and stability if we believe that
reality, including leadership and change, is socially constructed. If we extrapo
late lessons from the natural sciences to social systems, we conclude that the
‘long view’ provides perspective on human capability to imagine and change
social systems. While social construction of human systems can result in re
stricted or inequitable systems of power, privilege and access, our hope for social
relationships is in leadership that helps people imagine and effect humane fu
tures for themselves and the seventh generation. In the words of the Gold Team,
‘Imagination enables selfrelection and social criticism, as well as socialization,
and thus makes possible a form of leadership that proposes alternative social
arrangements and new forms of legitimate human needs and wants’ (Couto et
al., 2002, p. 2).
NOTE
1. The framework and concepts for this chapter emerged over various sessions with scholars in
the General Theory of Leadership (GTOL) project. We also incorporated considerable portions
of the Gold Team’s concept paper, written by Richard Couto, Elizabeth Faier, Douglas Hicks
and Gill Hickman during the GTOL project.
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8. A constructionist lens on leadership:
charting new territory
Sonia Ospina and Georgia L.J. Sorenson1
The April, 2003 meeting of the general theory scholars included invitations to
scholars utilizing actionresearch methodologies as well as to practitioners on
the frontline of leadership development in communities. Scholars like John L.
Johnson, Professor Emeritus, University of the District of Columbia; Deborah
Meehan, Executive Director of the Leadership Learning Community; and Sonia
Ospina, faculty of NYU’s Wagner School, joined the group for a robust
discussion.
Ospina discussed the participantcentered research she and her colleagues
are undertaking for the Ford Foundation’s Leadership for a Changing World
program and shared with the other scholars some indings emerging from this
approach. 2 Using a constructionist lens, Ospina and her colleagues are working
with social change leaders to understand how leadership emerges and develops
in communitybased organizations engaged in social change agendas.
A constructionist lens suggests that leadership happens when a community
develops and uses, over time, shared agreements to create results that have col
lective value. Grounded in culture and embedded in social structures such as
power and stratiication, these agreements inluence and give meaning to mem
bers’ actions, interactions and relationships, and help people mobilize to make
change happen. Among the agreements that help to illuminate the nature of so
cial change leadership in the studied communities, Ospina and her colleagues
have identiied a worldview composed of implicit assumptions about the nature
of knowledge, change, humans and the world; articulated formulations of the
expected outcomes of change, mediated through levers of personal and organi
zational power; and a set of ethical references or core values of social justice
that help anchor decisions and actions. From these agreements, in turn, emerge
authentic practices that coincide with the group’s worldview, visions of the fu
ture and values (Ospina et al., 2005).
This chapter addresses the constructionist view in leadership studies and
touches on some promising interpretative approaches, notably narrative inquiry
and cooperative inquiry. All of these approaches rest on the assumption that
leadership is intrinsically relational and social in nature, is the result of shared
188
A constructionist lens on leadership 189
meaningmaking, and is rooted in context or place. Leadership from this per

spective is not only necessary and possible, to restate the Mount Hope challenge
put to the scholars, but ubiquitous and emergent.
CONSTRUCTIONISM, REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

As Gill Hickman and Dick Couto discuss in Chapter 7, there are two existential
stances taken in leadership research. Essentialists maintain that reality (social
and natural) exists apart from our perceptions of that reality and that individuals
perceive the world rather than construct it (Rosenblum and Travis, 2003, p. 33).
Conversely, constructionists believe that humans construct reality and give it
meaning through their social, political, legal and other interactions (Crotty,
1998).
The emergence of constructionism was rooted in the early work of 19thcen
tury scholars as distinct as Karl Mannheim, George Herbert Mead, and Karl
Marx. It is embedded in important intellectual movements of the 19th and 20th
centuries, such as pragmatism, existential phenomenology, critical theory, and
later the postmodernist movement, especially in the works of Michel Foucault,
Jacques Derrida, and Kenneth Gergen. Empirical work has been undertaken in
the ields of sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckman, 1966), sociology
of science and technology (Grint, 2004), and the history of science (Sorenson,
1992).
Constructionism ‘is the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful
reality as such, is contingent upon human practices being constructed in and
out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and
transmitted within an essentially social context’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 42).3 A con
structionist lens suggests that meaning is not discovered in the world, but
constructed from it. Furthermore, meaning is not created in the mind, but it is
constructed from the world and its objects. In other words, meaning results when
human beings engage in the world that they experience and interpret (a world
that also includes other human beings).
Constructionists bring together the ideas of an ‘objective’ reality and a
‘subjective’ interpretation of it into a single perspective. It suggests that mean
ing (and therefore understanding, knowledge and truth) results from the
interplay of object and subject, that is, of humans engaging with the world.
Crotty illustrates this deining feature of a constructionist lens as follows: ‘The
chair may exist as a phenomenal object regardless of whether any conscious
ness is aware of its existence. It exists as a chair, however, only if conscious
beings construe it as a chair. As a chair, it too is constructed, sustained and
reproduced through social life’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 55). The generation of mean
ing is always a social, rather than an individual process, because to engage in
meaningmaking human beings draw from existing previous meanings in their

culture, and the latter, in turn, is embedded in historically grounded social
structures.
A CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW OF LEADERSHIP

A constructionist view presumes that our understanding of leadership is socially
constructed over time, as individuals interact with one another, rather than being
something embodied in individuals or possessed by them. It is relatively recently
that leadership scholars have employed various constructionist ideas in their
search for leadership constructs which transcend individual leader qualities or
traits. Yet the idea that leadership is relational – or as Sorenson says ‘emerging
in the space between’ people rather than ‘in’ a person – has been percolating
over the last 30 years in the leadership and organizational literatures. This per
spective has gained currency over the years as traitbased, leaderfocused
research has given way to more grouporiented perspectives such as described
in the preceding chapter.
Organizational scholars like Pfeffer (1977), Smircich and Morgan (1982),
Smircich (1983), Tierney (1987) and Tierney and Lincoln (1997) pursued the
idea that leadership emerges from the constructions and actions of people in
organizations. More than two decades ago, Smircich and Morgan posed an in
vitation to look deeper into the leadership phenomenon and to ‘focus on the
way meaning in organized settings is created, sustained, and changed [to] pro
vide a powerful means of understanding the fundamental nature of leadership
as a social process’ (Smirchich and Morgan, 1982, p. 261). Only recently have
scholars started to take this invitation seriously in developing an explicit con
structionist perspective of leadership.
According to a constructionist view, leadership becomes a reality when one
or more individuals in a social system succeed in framing and deining how the
demands of the group will be taken up and who will address the need for direc
tion in collective action. Through a process of attribution, people agree to assign
each other different roles and functions, including the role of leader, to help
move the work forward, or to satisfy other social needs (Hunt, 1984; Meindl et
al., 1985; Meindl, 1995; Drath, 2001).
Recent approaches move the study of leadership away from personcentered
leadership into a more complex role analysis. While this shift has moved the
literature closer to a more subtle understanding of leadership, constructionists
would claim that the leadership of a group is more nuanced and interpenetrating.
They pose that ‘the leader’, while relevant to action, represents a different phe
nomenon than that of ‘leadership’, and that each demands to be treated distinctly.
This shifts the attention from individual persons to communities of practice
(Drath and Palus, 1994; Drath, 2001). Ospina and Schall (2001, p. 4) writing in
an earlier article describe this challenge:
It [constructionism] will help us explore the ways people understand and attribute
leadership and allow us to distinguish between the emergence of the collective prac
tices that constitute the work of leadership and the individuals involved in those
practices. By highlighting these dimensions, we hope to contribute to the development
of the body of literature that views leadership as a collective achievement, or the
property of a group, rather than something that belongs to an individual.
Thus scholars using a constructionist lens see leadership as a groupwide process

and despite only rudimentary tools at their disposable to discern it, they are clear
on their objectives: to allow exploration in ‘the ways people understand and at
tribute leadership and also … [to] distinguish between the emergence of
leadership as a collective process and the practices designated leaders engage
in’ (Ospina and Schall, 2000, p. 1). Constructionism examines leadership as a
process of meaningmaking: it investigates the unfolding of leadership over
time, rather than a snapshot of a particular moment, such as ones utilized in
critical incidents or case studies. In short, constructionism views leadership as
a dynamic and ongoing undertaking. The following sections develop a con
structionist view of leadership by exploring its relational, systemic, emergent
and contextual dimensions.
The Relational and Systemic Dimensions of Leadership
First and foremost, constructionists claim that leadership is relational. This, of

course, is not a new thought. The relational view of leadership is present, im
plicitly or explicitly, in some of the most insightful contemporary work on
leadership. For example, Burns’s seminal work starts with the premise that
leadership, like power, is ‘relational, collective and purposeful’ (Burns, 1978,
p. 18). Burns’s view is that leaders convert followers to leaders and in some
cases followers convert leaders to moral leaders. In his later work, Transforming
Leadership: The Pursuit of Happiness (Burns, 2003) Burns explores how people,
rather than leaders and followers per se, create environments conducive to social
change.
Other contemporary work on leadership calls attention to the shared and
distributed nature of leadership, as evidenced by the increasing importance given
in the leadership literature to concepts like dialogue, collaboration, and collec
tive, shared and dispersed leadership (Crosby, 1999; Gronn, 1999; Goldman
and Kahnweiler, 2000; Hesselbein et al., 1999; and LipmanBlumen, 1996). For
example, by focusing on leadership as activities that stem from a collective
challenge, Heifetz’s work (1994) directs attention away from an exclusive focus
on the ‘leader’ to consider the acts of leadership, leadership in process, and the
public aspects of leadership work, all elements that point to the importance of
relationship.
Others have explored particular forms of leadership that are based on the
sharing of authority relations. For example, Bennis and Biederman (1997) and
their associates document cases of shared leadership and coleadership as types
that differ considerably from the individual model. Chrislip and Larson (1994)
as well as Huxham and Vangen (2000) describe a different type of leadership
in the collaborative processes they study. They suggest that collaborative leader
ship creates the conditions and mechanisms for people themselves to do the
work they need to do to address their collective problems.
To some degree, however, even the most sophisticated thinking about leader
ship still vests the ‘power’ in individuals. Constructionists are attempting to
change the lens. Lambert et al. (1995) deine leadership as ‘the reciprocal process
that enables participants in [a] community to construct meanings that lead toward
a common purpose’ (Lambert et al., 1995, p. 32). They continue, ‘[s]ince leader
ship represents a possible set of actions for everyone in the community, anyone
can choose to lead’ (Lambert et al., 1995, p. 50). In this deinition, the leader qua
leader is replaced by a community whose individual members have the potential
to engage in leadership acts (not roles). While not empirically based, Lambert’s
approach to leadership highlights the importance of community, reciprocity and
purpose for understanding leadership, making more explicit its social and rela
tional aspects, while eliminating almost entirely the igure of the leader.
JuanCarlos Pastor takes these ideas a step further in suggesting that leader
ship is ‘a collective social consciousness that emerges in the organization’ as
individuals interact with one another (Pastor, 1998, p. 5). As this process of so
cial construction goes on, as people develop a shared understanding of the work
and the roles assigned to members in pursuing it, leadership takes on an inde
pendent life that continues to be enacted over time. In this sense, as it emerges,
leadership becomes the property of the social system, rather than being just a
shared idea in people’s minds, or a quality located in a single individual, ‘the
leader’.
Sorenson and Hickman’s work on invisible leadership (Sorenson and Hick
man, 2002) its nicely within these novel discussions. They argue that much
leadership is invisible because it transpires in the ‘space between’ people. They
compare this form of leadership to Thelonious Monk’s masterly use of ‘blue
notes’ in music. Blue notes comprise the music that takes place in the ‘space’
between notes. Jazz critics attribute the genius of Monk’s remarkable music to
the nuance, phrasing and rhythm of the spaces between the formal notes. That
space of course, is completely invisible. But it is the relationship between notes
that makes them powerful, not the notes themselves. If we extend this analogy
to leadership, invisible leadership takes place in the space between people, in
everyday life and in extraordinary circumstances.
Applications of other theoretical perspectives such as critical interpretivism,

critical theory and feminism link more explicitly this relational, systemic view
– and its cognitive orientation – to an outside material world, by connecting the
systems of interdependency to historically grounded structures of power (Ospina
et al., 2005). This more grounded constructionist approach emphasizes culturally
derived and historically situated interpretations of leadership in context, in
contrast to universal traits, ixed contingent styles, or disembodied cognitive
structures. This approach also challenges the dynamics of exclusion that have
incorporated very few voices in the mainstream narratives of leadership, and
uses conceptual tools to understand the structural dynamics of exclusion that
characterize social relationships. Finally, this approach tries to ‘ill the gaps’
(Crotty, 1998) in traditional narratives of leadership because of the dominance
of a masculine, and thus partial, perspective in the construction of earlier leader
ship theories.
To sum up, from a constructionist view, leadership is relational and systemic.
It emerges and manifests itself through relations and in relationships, and it
cannot exist outside of these relations. These relationships, in turn, are grounded
in wider systems of interdependence and constrained by social structure.
The Emergent Dimension of Leadership: Meaning-Making in

Communities of Practice
A second important dimension of constructionism is the notion that reality is a

shared construction and that the process of making sense and ascribing meaning
to events is central to human life. Constructionists recognize that people col
lectively construct our world and give it meaning. They would argue that even
the most basic human concepts such as ‘death’ (Grint, 2004), ‘love’ and ‘work’
are culturally and historically bound. So, too, is ‘leadership’. Constructionism
asserts that leadership is essentially about makingmeaning in communities of
practice (Drath, 2001; Drath and Palus, 2004), and is thus an emergent reality.
But all meaningmaking does not produce leadership. Leadership is a unique
type of meaningmaking process compared with more general cognitive proc
esses that are part of human life. This is so because the shared agreements that
produce leadership are articulated and generated within a community of prac
tice, that is, a group working to achieve results. These agreements are purposive
and ‘other regarding’. They connect wills and help transform wills into
action.
The potential for leadership exists when there is a collective need to accom
plish something, that is, a need for purposive action that involves change. Any
group who shares that need faces a set of demands to attain it. Parsons et al.
(1953) described the four functional prerequisites of organizing that all groups
coping with any material problem face: setting direction, actualizing the goals
of the enterprise, sustaining the commitment of the group, and creating adaptive
mechanisms to recreate the process as needed. If a group does not respond to
these demands, it will not survive to serve its purpose. When the individuals in
the group are willing and are able to address these demands, leadership
happens.
As Wilfred Drath (2001) puts it in The Deep Blue Sea: Rethinking the Source
of Leadership, these demands call for leadership and thus leadership can be
viewed as the result of the group’s efforts to address them successfully.4 He
states that leadership happens when members of a community create a shared
understanding of the moral obligations each has with the others to make sure
that these demands are taken care of, so that the common cause is realized. The
work of leadership is the work the community achieves together in setting direc
tion, creating and maintaining commitment and facing adaptive challenges. In
this sense, ‘leadership is people making sense of events and circumstances
within a community, as the community invents and pursues its activities’ (Palus
and Horth, 1996, p. 54). Rather than a ixed phenomenon or a set of qualities
that belong to an individual, as meaningmaking, leadership is an emergent
phenomenon that develops in community, over time.5
An example illustrates this view. Even in our own GTOL group, most of the
members would agree that the leadership of the GTOL group was an emerging
phenomenon, rather than a personcentered activity. While three of us initially
presented the idea of a quest for a general theory, others emerged who took on
critical aspects of the functioning and production of the group’s efforts. Certain
aspects of the intellectual work of the group were managed by various theorists
at different times.
The GTOLgroupasawhole examined theories but also processes to some
degree: seniority, discipline, voice, and place were all taken up, often more than
once. Sometimes the work was in the context of the groupasawhole, and other
times it was taken up between individuals. While a core group of people stuck
with the process over three years (and there was substantial debate about the
use of ‘core’), the group tolerated a few newcomers and visitors as well as ven
turing out into the International Leadership Association and the Leadership
Learning Community gatherings, with varying degrees of comfort.
In the end the group settled on two complementary approaches addressed by
Wren at the start of the book: We would tell the narrative of our quest rather
than attempt to come to a conclusion about our search for a general theory and
we would allow leadership in our own group to emerge in our ‘as if’ group. For
a group of independent leadership scholars intent on inding a general theory
as well as retaining our intellectual independence, that in itself was an
accomplishment.
The Importance of Context
The meaningmaking processes that help construct leadership and the attribu
tions of leadership made in particular settings do not just occur in people’s
minds, nor are they disembodied from material environments. These processes
are always social, rooted in social interaction, and therefore sensitive to identii
able contingencies associated with the material aspects of these settings. How
communities agree to undertake the demands of direction, commitment and
adaptation to realize their common cause, is context speciic.
For example, the degree of complexity of the system affects how a community
agrees to address the tasks that call forth leadership. Over time, as happens with
all collective sensemaking, some takenforgranted sets of ideas and rules about
how to best deal with these demands have become articulated as leadership
formulas, or shared understandings of leadership; what Drath (2001) calls
‘knowledge principles’. These core sets of ideas become ‘shortcuts’ that other
people use to address the demands of collective work. With increased complex
ity, simpler tools of sensemaking for action have hit a limit of usefulness, and
new formulas have become more acceptable. Even though people are not born
with these principles in their minds, they can easily absorb them through culture
and use them as needed in their particular contexts. One way to understand
leadership in a community is to uncover the underlying dominant knowledge
principle that its members are using to make sense of their work.
Drath argues that Western society has favored three knowledge principles of
leadership which have emerged over time, as social systems have become in
creasingly more complex: personal dominance, interpersonal inluence and
relational dialogue. Sometimes these are combined, because the formulas that
help solve more complex challenges incorporate elements of those used to ad
dress simpler ones.
Leadership as personal dominance is a knowledge principle in which a
dominant igure – the person of a leader – is the source of leadership. This
formula has worked best in simple systems. More complex systems may rely
on the knowledge principle of interpersonal inluence, a formula where the
source of leadership shifts from a single individual to the roles of actors in ne
gotiation and competition to inluence each other. Finally, in the knowledge
principle of leadership as relational dialogue, the source of leadership is not a
person or a role, but a system, as leadership emerges by way of dialogue and
collaborative learning to achieve a shared sense of the demands of collective
work.
An effective way to understand how these principles work and how leadership
happens is ‘by entering into the community and inquiring into the shared mean
ingmaking languages and processes of the community’ (Drath, 2001, p. 49). In
other words, leadership can only be understood in context and by way of un
derstanding how people make sense of it as they tackle the challenges of

collective work.
Finally, the claims that leadership is relational and systemic, emergent and
contextual, and that it is socially constructed, do not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that it always takes a collective form; nor does it mean that it is by
nature democratic. Formal and informal leadership takes many forms, depending
on the attributions those in relation make about each other in concrete historical
and organizational contexts. Emerging from collective processes that support
it, visible leadership can manifest in strong charismatic individuals; or in dyads,
as in the case of codirectorships; or in groups as in the case of committees with
authority to make decisions; or in organizations with very lat and democratic
structures where leadership is collective. Similarly, the tasks that call forth
leadership can be, in fact, distributed so that different individuals take up dif
ferent roles and leadership emerges in many places within a given system or is
rotated over time. Furthermore, while all individuals in a given system have the
capacity to exercise leadership, and not all do, those that do may choose to enact
their choice in ways that evidence any style from democratic to autocratic. What
form leadership takes, and how individuals exercise leadership are, in fact,
questions that must be answered empirically, by looking at leadership and its
manifestations in the real world.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

To explore, with a constructionist lens, the nature of leadership and how it hap
pens in a community, requires a new approach to research, with implications
for how the research agenda is conceptualized, designed and implemented
(Ospina, 2003). A constructionist approach sensitizes researchers to the dangers
of confusing leadership with the person who is identiied as the leader (Rost,
1993; Vanderslice, 1988). It also challenges the assumption that leadership must
be embodied in the leader–follower relationship, an assumption that greatly re
duces the scope of what constitutes the work of leadership.
A new approach is grounded in at least four premises. First, viewing leader
ship as a social construct and as something that is relational, emergent and
contextual suggests a research agenda that shifts attention away from the indi
vidual leader and toward the work of leadership; from leadership qualities to
collective agreements and the actions that embody them; and from behaviors to
practices and experiences. Second, a constructionist view poses that a participa
tory approach (involving those engaged in the work of leadership as coinquirers
rather than subjects) will yield deeper understanding of the experience of leader
ship as meaningmaking for action. Third, because context is central, this
perspective suggests that a participatory approach must be grounded in com
munity. Fourth, from this view, understanding the way leadership emerges in a
particular community requires eliciting a range of perspectives within the com
munity. Hence a multimodal approach to research, one that engages diverse
methodologies, is best suited to this task.
Researchers using a constructionist lens will pay attention to the nature of
the challenges and questions that the community faces as its members try to
achieve change, and the ways people make sense of these challenges. Research
embedded in context – in community – would explore questions such as: How
does a community clarify what matters most? What stakeholders participate in
this clariication process? What dificulties do they experience when facing the
demands of organizing and collective work? These questions may require iden
tifying the extent to which the roles of leadership concentrate on a single person,
but this is not a given, and must be answered in context. In fact, a critical empiri
cal question is: If one person becomes responsible for clarifying the community
strategy, how and why does this happen?
Appropriate methodologies for implementing a participatory multimodal
approach that is grounded in community include, among many possibilities,
narrative inquiry, participatory ethnography and cooperative inquiry. Narrative
inquiry is a promising methodology for understanding experience and the sense
people make of it because of the power of stories as a sensemaking tool (Dodge,
Ospina, and Foldy, 2005). Ethnography, done with a participatory approach,
offers an excellent opportunity for an indepth look at leadership in a community
over time. Cooperative inquiry is an actionoriented approach in which all in
volved act as both coresearchers and cosubjects that inquire together into
burning issues of their practice, thus exploring the experience of leadership from
the inside out.
The process of a cooperative inquiry (CI) offers great potential to explore
leadership as a relational, emergent and contextual reality. CI itself as a meth
odology is also relational, emergent and grounded in the context of its
participants’ practice (Heron and Reason, 2001), as illustrated by the four stages
that characterize it:
Stage I. Examining areas for inquiry, identifying initial research questions

and propositions to test through action
Stage II. Initiating the agreed actions and observing and recording the out
comes of their own and each other’s behavior
Stage III. Bracketing off prior beliefs and preconceptions and intending to see
experience in a fresh way
Stage IV. Returning to consider original theories in light of experience, modify
ing, reformulating, and rejecting them, or adopting new propositions
to be tested again in the next cycle of action
Lastly, a constructionist approach to research demands a broadening of the

scope when determining where to study leadership. Scholars have too often
looked for leadership only in the expected places, often in hierarchical organiza
tions or systems. Indeed, we may be ‘looking for leadership in all the wrong
places’ (Allen, 1990, p. 8). Kathy Allen (1990) identiies three assumptions un
derlying the most typical sampling techniques in leadership research: sampling
by position, by individual reputation or by organizational success. The irst as
sumption is that leadership happens at the top of the hierarchy, in formal
positions, and can be enacted only with organizational authority or power re
sources. The second assumption is that there is a shared cultural deinition of
leadership. The third assumption is that there is a direct cause–effect relationship
between the leadership of a single individual and success.
Reliance on these assumptions and the consequent choice of sampling criteria,
argues Allen, decreases our ability to ind leadership because it reduces the pool
from which to sample. Allen argues for the need to ‘look where we have not
looked before’ (Allen, 1990, p. 8) to better understand leadership and to expand
our present knowledge of it. We would add that as scholars we should not only
look at different kinds of people, but most importantly, look at different kinds
of contexts, as well as pay greater attention to the nature and content of work
in these contexts.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

The currency gained by the application of constructionist ideas to leadership
has implications for practice, as has been documented by actionoriented schol
ars. Indeed, with the shift in understanding of organizations as rational machines
to one of organizations as living organisms, new ideas of leadership effective
ness have started to shift from the mental model of the heroic leader to that of
postheroic leadership, characterized by ‘leadership practices embedded within
a network of interdependencies at different levels within the organization’
(Fletcher, 2002).
This perspective emphasizes relational processes that depend on social net
works of inluence, so that leadership is enacted at all levels of the network. The
‘visible’ leaders represent only the tip of an iceberg (McIntosh, 1989, cited in
Fletcher, 2002), or the white caps in the ocean (Drath, 2001), but they are sup
ported by many other people, practices and processes that make things happen.
These underlying leadership dynamics support visible leaders in the same way
that the underlying piece of the iceberg supports and balances its tip, or in the
same way that the deep blue sea produces its sea caps (Fletcher, 2002, p. 3).
Actionoriented leadership scholars propose to translate these ideas into
leadership practices that are more in accordance with the demands of contem
porary organizations. This proposal approximates Drath’s notion of relational

dialogue as the most appropriate knowledge principle or leadership formula to
cope with the challenges of complex systems. For example, in their work on
public leadership, Terry (1993), Bryson and Crosby (1992), Crosby (1999) and
Luke (1998) suggest that the interconnectedness of contemporary society de
mands a different kind of leadership to address public problems, one that is
more collective than individual, so that the interdependencies of the environment
are addressed. While these scholars do not consider themselves constructionists,
their work is premised on assumptions such as the relational, emergent and
contextual nature of leadership.
Some scholars propose fully developed programs that are directly consistent
with a constructionist lens on leadership. For example, focusing on the agenda
of social change for global transformation, Kaczmarski and Cooperrider (1997)
argue that the cooperative work required today demands a type of leadership
that helps bridge diverse knowledge systems, that is, cultures of inquiry, which
are typical of the global commons. The authors deine leadership as the ‘art of
creating contexts of appreciative interchange whereby people from different
traditions of knowing come together to create a new culture of valuing in which
differences are embraced rather than being a source of dominance and conform
ity pressures’ (Kaczmarski and Cooperrider, 1997, p. 251). This type of
leadership, they argue, is required in contexts where diverse perspectives and
truths coexist and where the complexities of organizing are extreme.
In the context of the USA, Raelin (2003) proposes a new type of leadership
practice for contemporary organizations, where the collective demands for di
rection, actualization, commitment and adaptation are distributed across all
organizational members. The result, he says, would be a system full of leader
ship, or a leaderful organization. Leaderful practices, Raelin argues, are based
on an understanding of leadership that shifts from the traditional notions that
leadership is serial (one leader at a time), individual, controlling and dispas
sionate, to the notions of leadership as concurrent, collective, collaborative and
compassionate.
To make the shift toward a leaderful organization, Raelin argues, one must
believe that more than one person can offer their leadership to a community at
the same time, from their position, without taking away the leadership of others
(concurrent). From this it follows that mobilization of action or decisionmaking
emerges from multiple members as needed (collective). The shift also requires
believing that all group members represent the community and control it by way
of dialogue around differences (collaborative). Finally, the shift is based on the
value of respect for the worth of each member (compassionate). Leadership
practices derived from these ideas provide normative guidance to develop more
democratic and participatory approaches to organizing.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
As scholars and practioners involved in understanding leadership, we carry as
sumptions about the concept and practice of leadership that are consistent with
the underlying assumptions of the culture within which it is embedded. Peter
Senge refers to these assumptions as ‘mental models’ – similar to Sorenson’s
‘cognitive structures’ – described as ‘deeply ingrained assumptions, generaliza
tions or even pictures or images that inluence how we understand the world
and how we take action’ (Senge, 1990, p. 8).
Contemporary dominant mental models of leadership are shifting gradually,
but most people still carry (and use in practice) a perspective of leadership as
personal dominance and interpersonal inluence, to use Drath’s knowledge
principles as reference. These mental models of leadership offer only a narrow
understanding of how leadership works. Therefore, these models keep us from
recognizing the multiple sources of leadership, the multiple forms leadership
may take, and the multiple places where it can be found. Sorenson (1992) and
Ospina and Schall (2000, p. 2) describe what they see as a dominant leadership
model in the USA, as shaped by narratives about individuals, generally men,
and all too often white men. They ‘offer incomplete understandings of how
leadership works because they rely on a “heroic” version compiled from a nar
row set of voices’ (Ospina and Schall, 2000, p. 2). They further claim that the
dominant mental model has ‘kept the public from recognizing alternative models
of leadership and the extent to which they are developing in communities’ (Os
pina and Schall, 2000, p. 2). Sorenson writes of the personal cost of the heroic
myth, ‘involving tremendous personal sacriice and struggle’ (Sorenson, 1992,
p. 328).
The use of mental models both facilitates and inhibits our understanding of
leadership. Telling the leadership story (or naming it) as dominance or inluence
may serve a social function in our collective minds by allowing people to at
tribute actions with personal qualities a critical role in explaining existential
dilemmas and anxieties of the times. In this sense ‘leadership’, as Hunt suggests
(Hunt, 1984, pp. 159–78), could be thought of as a cognitive tool that helps
people make sense of events that otherwise would be linked to social forces too
intangible and removed to be controlled. Heroic leadership may be a collective
way to constructively cope with uncertainty. At the same time, there is also a
danger that scholars and practitioners may be inhibited by these agreedupon
mental models of leadership.
The constructionist approach to understanding leadership invites us to look
anew at the focus and insights of existing empirical research and normative
approaches to leadership. Attention to traits, behaviors, styles, processes, re
lationships and activities, for example, can add to our understanding of how
things happen when a group with a purpose tries to achieve it. The construc
tionist approach views the gestalt of the social relationships, the meaning
constructed in the process, and the context within which leadership happens.
This approach invites questions such as how people working together make
leadership happen, what role individuals and groups play in bringing leadership
into being, and how contexts affect the actual work of leadership in
communities.
Narrativist Wallace Martin suggests that ‘by changing the deinition of what
is being studied, we change what we see; and when different deinitions are
used to chart the same territory, the results will differ, as do topographical, po
litical and demographic maps, each revealing one aspect of reality by virtue of
disregarding all others’ (cited by Barry and Elmers, 1997). A constructionist
lens on leadership offers precisely this: An opportunity to look at the same ter
ritory of leadership that we all share by virtue of our membership in
contemporary society, in a way that will help reveal aspects of leadership that
we have missed before.
NOTES
1. The authors want to acknowledge the earlier work Ospina coauthored with Ellen Schall (2000,
2001) where several ideas developed in this chapter were irst proposed and reined.
2. See the ‘Research’ link on the program’s website: www.leadershipforchange.org.
3. Crotty’s important distinction between constructivism, which focuses on the meaningmaking
process of individuals and constructionism, which focuses on the collective generation and
transmission of meaning has implications for understanding leadership through a constructionist
lens, because it renders meaningmaking as collective rather than individual.
4. Drath summarizes the demands that trigger a call for leadership in a group in three rather than
four tasks: direction, commitment and adaptation – and deines the latter in Heifetz’s terms.
5. This perspective is consistent with the new understandings of complexity theory, a branch of
chaos theory that gives primacy to the idea of emergent, luid social orders developing out of
chaos (Marion, 1999).
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9. Contemplating context
J. Thomas Wren and Elizabeth Faier
In the following dialogue, historian J. Thomas Wren and anthropologist Eliza

beth Faier, both original members of the General Theory of Leadership group
convened in 2001, embark on a journey to ‘contemplate context’ within a gen
eral theory of leadership. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume, initial
discussions within the general theory group exposed rather deep rifts concerning
the importance and role of context in the leadership relation. These early debates
inspired Wren and Faier to sit down and relect more thoroughly on the troubling
issue of the role of context. As the ensuing exchange makes clear, the two have
some basic disagreements. It is evident that the more traditionalist Wren and
the more constructivist Faier diverge in their approaches with regard to the role
of context. Wren perceives context as an environment in which leadership takes
place while Faier considers context more abstractly, as a space constructed by
participants through performance. Despite the disparate starting points, Wren
and Faier approach some middle ground through the creative exploration of
metaphors and applications. The ensuing dialogue is a conceptual piece, de
signed not to establish authoritative answers but to lay bare essential questions
regarding the ways in which context might inform theoretical thinking about
leadership.
* * *
T. OK, Liz. We have decided that the best way to approach our topic of the
role of context in leadership theory, given our different perspectives, is by having
a dialogue. The working title is ‘Contemplating Context.’ We’ve come up with
our title, so let’s contemplate.
L. I was thinking – even though I’ve been trying not to think about this – I
was thinking this morning about one of the problems we face in beginning this
discussion is the same problem you face in considering context itself, which is
that it is very hard to jump into something. I think such a discussion will treat
context as a container, and you’re either in it or you’re out of it. And so in some
ways, you know, if you’re in the discussion or out of the discussion it is like the
205
false reality of context being bounded, because obviously you have to start
somewhere and through the starting you create something, but of course some
thing exists already.
T. I ind it ironic that our constructivist has been thinking about this conversa
tion ahead of time, while I have not. But let’s start with the boundedness.
L. But I’m an empiricist; don’t forget that.
T. OK. Let’s start with the boundedness that we were talking about. You say
that the context boundedness is like a vessel. I’m always the historian. I’ve per
ceived the context of a surrounding situation as a vessel if you will, within which
things happen – although I think we are going to come to some middle ground
where players interact with that surrounding vessel. I believe that there are these
longterm political, social, economic and intellectual forces that create oppor
tunities and constraints for people who operate within them. Knowing something
about these longterm forces helps one to perceive what the leadership possibili
ties are between leaders and followers. I’m not sure that I would call that some
vessel or container like you perceive it, but I certainly perceive a more traditional
way of viewing context than you do, so that might be a starting point for our
discussion. Ultimately, of course, we have to think about how we would it our
conceptions into a theory of leadership.
L. Let me back up. I’m not sure that a vessel is quite fair. I tend to think of
context as a membrane, and there’s movement in and out. For example, when I
think about doing research on leadership as an anthropologist, I think about
going to another context. So context is often some kind of conlation of geog
raphy and people. But at the same time it is very hard not to recognize my own
participation in the creation of context because it is an artiicial construct that I
make, in saying that this is my community. But it’s also hard to not recognize
that lots of things are going in and out of this membrane. I move in and out of
the context and my subjects move in and out of the context. It seems to me that
one of the problems with me thinking about context and culture is that it sug
gests or it puts the brakes on those types of lows. So context at the same time
becomes something out there but also something produced. I think the same
thing, for me, when I think about history. I don’t know if you’ve read Michel
Rolph Trouillot. He is either a cultural historian or an anthropologist of history,
I’m not sure, but he is very critical of both the positivist approach and the con
structivist approach. He tries to chart a happy medium by saying that in history
we are both actors and narrators, and so the historical object is somewhat elu
sive. You have the narration, but every time you retell the story we recreate, you
know, the context, but in a slightly different way. I guess my inal thought is after
Contemplating context 207
reading Trouillot and after hearing you talk about what does it mean to do his
tory and think about leadership; I’m as unclear when history begins as when
cultural difference begins. I’m unclear when we move from one context to an
other and I’m unclear, for example, how perspective affects that. So obviously
if you did history of Jefferson and Jefferson’s time period it might look different,
right? Than today, or not?
T. I’m not exactly sure what you mean. Jefferson’s time period is certainly
different from our time period.
L. I mean if you were a historian, how does the historical object or the way
we think about context change depending on who is looking at them?
T. I think that historians long have acknowledged that every generation re
writes history, as they sometimes say, because you’re looking at issues. You
choose issues that are important to you and you interpret them in light of things
that seem important to you. So it depends on what is going on in your own age.
Historians choose differing topics and things of that nature, so that I don’t think
there’s any doubt that it is acknowledged widely that when historians look at
things it is not an objective pursuit, it is in many ways a subjective pursuit. But
I guess the goal is to move toward some kind of objectivity or something along
those lines if that’s possible to do.
L. That’s what we anthropologists do, by the way, too. You’re dealing with
archives and people and we’re dealing with people and observations of people.
It would be nice if it isn’t simply our own story.
T. Right, right, that’s why historians amass all the detailed sources and the
citations and things, so that theoretically people could go back and retrace the
same track. Nobody ever does because there’s too much to do but …
L. That’s why we don’t call ourselves postmodernists. I believe in the empiri

cal trail of something.
T. Well, we may be getting somewhere then. We may have more in common

than we irst believed. I don’t think any historian would have any problems
suggesting that the kinds of trends that I mentioned before, when traced forward,
become the building blocks of what you call culture; indeed, become the culture.
If one deines ‘Culture’ as that which is learned, shared and transmitted, the
things that are learned and shared and transmitted certainly, to historians, link
back to the types of things that have gone on in the past. So in some ways we’re
probably talking about two related facets of the same phenomenon. But it seems
to me that one issue that we should be talking about before we get done, is the
issue of human agency and the interactions between humans and their surround
ing context. As a historian I’m comfortable saying that we have this sort of
context that surrounds us, although it is an immensely complex type of thing.
But we also need to understand how each individual has to interact within that
context, and there is where the agency is. Now I would say I do think that the
historical context does make some actions or reactions less likely to occur be
cause it just doesn’t it the possibilities in that context. But it doesn’t deny that
any individual could react in any certain way. So I guess my point is that any
human agent can do anything he or she wishes, but that the context makes some
actions more likely or, perhaps, more ‘rational’ than others.
L. I think much to our horror we are going to ind out that we are much closer
than we ever thought at some levels. Are you suggesting then that context is not
deterministic but creates a framework in which agency occurs and perhaps even
agency structures?
T. Yes, I think that’s exactly right; I think we do agree on that. Where we may
differ more is in our emphasis. I might think that the surrounding context prob
ably may do more in the way of structuring than you do. That may be where we
have some difference of perspective on things. But both interpretations may be
important as we think about how we work this into a theory, ultimately.
L. Can I jump in? Do you mind if I interrupt for a second?
T. No.
L. Are you sure? One of the reasons I’m so hot under the collar about context
is because when people talk about culture, it doesn’t account for movement,
doesn’t account for agency. To me it’s just a reductionistic, deterministic ap
proach to context and it is important for me in thinking in terms of humans
actively engaging with and shaping their context.
T. Well that may be a good starting point to go on further down the path.
Maybe we can ultimately determine, be thinking about what that ultimately
means, in theoretical terms. We need to see if we can consider the implications
for a human relation like leadership.
L. One thing that might be interesting to think about – and we’ve already
started talking about it – is the relationship between the individual actors within
speciic – can we say spaces, or contexts?
T. Yeah, spaces is, again, not something we historians talk about. Context is
something historians are comfortable with.
L. OK. So we can think about how different people in contexts construct their
inner vessel, so to speak, and how it relates to the outer.
T. And your inner vessel is?
L. Well I’m using your terms.
T. I don’t think I said that.
L. No, we have proof, Tom.
T. I’ll be drummed out of the historical profession if I said inner vessel.
L. When I do interviews I’m essentially tapping into people’s perspectives.

[Authors’ subsequent annotation: According to Liz, ‘inner vessel’ and ‘outer
vessel’ refer to the relation between different frameworks. For example, gender
might be an inner vessel context while nongovernmental organization might be
the outer vessel context. ‘Inner’ refers to a more personalized yet still socialized
construction of context.] For anthropologists the inner vessel is not a psycho
logical inner vessel and I think probably for you, too, it is not a psychological
inner vessel, is it?
T. I’m suspicious of historians who try to get into the psychology of people
because there’s not enough proof for it.
L. So let’s get down to basics: Do we think that context is socially constructed

or socially produced?
T. It might be a semantical problem that we struggle with when you say so
cially constructed or socially produced. To me, not knowing what either of those
terms really mean, ‘socially produced’ sounds more logical to me than ‘socially
constructed.’ My sense of context is that the world happens around you and it
shapes you. One of the jobs of a historian is to look at that world to see what
has happened and why it has happened and who has been involved in creating
what. And ultimately we get to the point where it has some impact on somebody
in real time.
Let me suggest one thing – and I’m gonna play to your strength and away
from mine because you’ll know more about this. As a demonstration, let’s think
in leadership terms about what is occurring in Iraq. Let’s compare how a his
torian and an anthropologist might study leadership there. Maybe we’ll come
up with something that will be useful that we can translate into theoretical
terms.
As a historian, if I were to go to study Iraq, I would look at longterm things
like their religious beliefs, their cultural beliefs, how men and women interact
with one another, the roles of families, how they look at leaders and how they
perceive the role of followers and things, but I’d also be looking at the longterm
economic factors, and all these things that go in to make modernday Iraq. And
then I would say OK, now the leadership challenge for these Iraqis is that they
are encountering, or having imposed upon them, the opportunity for democracy
of some sort. So, the historian’s analysis of this context would go like this: As
a historian I would essentially say, OK, these people are dealing with democracy
but they are constrained by their long history of belief in a certain religious order
and their economic situation, and so on and so on and they also have, perhaps,
some possibilities. What I would do is look at the longterm situation that
brought them to this point. Then, I would assess the likely impact of the sur
rounding circumstances, to ascertain how they shape possible responses to the
challenge facing a leader or a follower, or some participant in this situation. So
to me it is, I think it is – not dangerous, that’s too strong – but it is not wise,
when we are thinking of theorizing, or thinking about predicting leadership, or
thinking about integrating ideas about leadership, to ignore those longerterm
things that create the circumstances within which our actors participate. If that
makes any sense at all.
L. Yeah. I’m gonna disappoint you in a second.
T. It will be the irst time you ever disappointed me, Liz.
L. I also have that on tape. I agree with just about everything you say. If I were
to go and address leadership in Iraq, I would do it in a similar fashion. I’m not
fond of people who use context in a predictive or a deterministic manner. I am
much more comfortable when they use it in a suggestive manner, as you do.
Does that make any sense? I would do probably the exact same thing that you
would do. I would talk to people, I would take note of the changes in political
structure, social structure, I’d look at speciic events, I would look at speciic
discourses and how they’ve changed over time. I would look at the role individu
als have played. I would give agency a pretty strong role there. And I would do
much of what you were discussing in terms of trying to address whether demo
cratic procedure or democracy is what is in store for Iraq given its turbulent
history. At the same time, though, I would try to address or I would try to com
pare and contrast Iraq with other cultural contexts that might be appropriate.
Normally when people say cultural contexts they mean other geographic areas
where there are similar peoples. When talking about Middle Eastern culture, I
may actually be talking about Iranian dissidents in France, I may be talking
about other Middle Eastern spaces or communities. I would look at how they
also dealt with some of these issues and then I would look at the ways in which
people negotiate meaning.
I constantly battle the question of context. It is very clear to me that context
matters but what is unclear to me is how do you get a handle on it? I don’t be
lieve in context being only the here and now, but at the same time I think that
context constantly shifts. I think it matters, but I think it is constantly being
shaped and I’m back to the old discussions of agency and structure.
T. OK. Can I… . Whenever I hear things I’m always synthesizing them in my

head, so let me say what I’ve been hearing and thinking as we’ve been talking
here and where I think we might be.
L. We’re doing great.
T. It seems like there are lots of areas of agreement here. I think we both see
context as suggested rather than predicted, [L. Yeah.] which is good. Neither
one of us is deterministic about it. We both, I think, see a role for human agency
within the context – we’re all on board there. But there’s a couple of differences
that are important, that I see, and that we might want to have to play out a little
bit more.
One is the extent to which our views of context are capable of being general
ized; in other words, whether our approaches to context are so idiosyncratic
to each particular study that it is impossible to make any grand statements
about the role of context (which, of course, is our ultimate goal here). Histori
ans, for example, are quite skeptical about their ability to make generalizations.
They’re just interested in their particular chain of events and causation of
things and so they wouldn’t worry about taking the next step. In fact that’s one
reason that historians tend not to like leadership studies because leadership
studies tends to try to make this kind of connection to things. But if you’re
going to look at context in leadership terms then I think you have to go beyond
the pure historian and think about using some generalization you can make or
else again you run into problems. The issue is: Can we generalize in a theoreti
cal way? And this is where you hit your anthropological stumbling block, you
know.
L. Sure.
T. If context is purely only localistic, then the theoretical possibilities I think

are limited. We might be able to come up, at the most, with some structured
way to think about context. That may be as far as we can go, however, if it is
truly localistic, and if it is impossible to make any generalizations from the study
of a particular context.
In terms of making a theoretical statement, I don’t know if we can get there.
The pure historian also tends to be, in your terms, localistic, saying: ‘All I can
say is what I have found through the study of these documents. I am not com
fortable making any further claims.’ But, if we both acknowledge that context
is important as part of the leadership relationship, we need to get beyond such
narrow thinking. It seems to me that somehow it would be nice if we can come
up with a way that people can think productively about context as they look at
interactions that could be deemed leadership interactions. Otherwise we mar
ginalize ourselves into this corner and say, well, if you want to know about this
particular thing, hire me for 12 months for several thousand dollars and I will
give you a study on that, and you would do the same thing – you’d probably
charge more.
L. Less … we’re cheap.
T. But anyhow, you see my point. And so I guess we’re at the stage of our
conversation where we can begin thinking about whether we can make a con
tribution to this project [i.e., creating a General Theory of Leadership] in those
terms. Now, let me just shut up and let you talk.
L. OK. A couple of things came to mind. I think it’s one thing to talk about
context as being locally speciic. The question is, I’m going to use slightly dif
ferent language.
T. You may have to deine your terms.
L. I’m going to start speaking to you in Arabic.
T. I wouldn’t know the difference.
L. I know, exactly! Let’s see if we can proceed in this way: It seems to me

that context is not completely constructed. That is, it is not completely the crea
tion of the participants.
T. Right.
L. Here is one way to think about it. Look at this pretty egg yolk diagram.
Figure 9.1 Egg yolk drawing
We have the subject here [pointing at the center of the yolk], and it has some
kind of personal immediate context [the remainder of the yolk], and we have
some sort of larger structural context that has porous boundaries [indicating the
white of the egg]. This larger context, it seems to me, could be the values of a
time period, could be political events, whatever.
T. Those are all deined as structural for you?
L. Yeah.
T. OK.
L. Or at least structural in that they provide a parameter in which our little

subject guy [the center of the yolk] can bounce around in the bigger picture [the
remainder of the yolk and the egg white]. Our theoretical problem, it seems to
me, is: How do we convey the importance of context as a ‘thing,’ yet still enable
people to engage it in a dynamic way? That is the crux of things from both our
perspectives.
T. OK, let me build on that a little bit because you’re right, and I like your
idea of the egg with the yolk in the middle. One time my students and I came
up with what we called the leadership amoeba, which is a similar type of thing
to what you’re talking about.
L. Yeah.
T. But instead of having yolk in the middle we called them ‘Lcells,’ meaning
‘leadership cells’ – I know, I know, amoebas don’t have cells, they were really
vacuoles or something – but the point was that the amoeba was being pushed
into different shapes by the surrounding luid [context], and the Lcells were
being rearranged accordingly. This image, I know, is too passive for you, and
it needs more active engagement, but it was in some ways the same type of
metaphor. But let’s stay with your egg and yolk things.
L. I like the amoeba.
T. Well maybe we can end up with the amoeba, but let’s just talk now. Your
yolk is the… . Well let’s start with the white. The white is the structural, political
and social context that we talked about. The yolk is the individual or group that
exists within that context. What happens within the yolk is what I understand
as personal agency. That is to say, the individual has free will to interact with
his or her surrounding context in an ininite number of ways [in theory], but the
reality is that the surrounding context makes some actions more ‘rational’ and
more likely than others. That is represented by the shape of the boundary be
tween the egg white [context] and the yolk [personal agency within that context].
What I’m saying is that although we cannot predict with precision how any
speciic individual will act within a given context, we can nevertheless construct
a rigorous way in which we can analyze the context and can thereby identify
the parameters within which each actor in the leadership relation operates. This
doesn’t get us to the level of a theoretical statement, but it does give us some
organized way to think about context and its effect.
L. Yeah, and I’ll explain it to you more in a second. I just realized what I actu
ally meant. Go on.
T. OK. But if that’s so, we’re thinking in theoretical terms about what we can
say that’s beyond somebody’s personal case study [which is a step in the right
direction]. One way that you could think about it is, well, is there a set of stand
ard questions that we could devise that participants in the leadership relation
[or, for that matter, observers] could ask. This would get to the structure part.
It might not get to our agency part. You might ask, for example: ‘What is it about
the economic and social and intellectual context that seems to be important?’
This gets us to the constructivist aspect of context, and should satisfy your
constructivist genes. Because I do agree that much of what we are talking about
is perception, and not some sort of ixed ‘reality.’ If something doesn’t seem to
be important to an individual, s/he is unlikely to respond to it or take it into ac
count. Of course, the traditional historian in me insists that there are some
objective things, I guess. You are in Iraq, not in Iowa. You know what I mean;
there are some things like that. But what I suggest is that we ask some questions
about people involved in the leadership relation, to try to articulate what it is
out there and how they perceive its impact upon them and things.
L. Mm hm, right.
T. But anyhow, there may be some potential here. It is nowhere near the point
of theory, maybe, but at least it may suggest useful ways of going forward, of
using and drawing upon our insights about the importance of the context.
Now I’m a little less clear about how we can generalize about agency, because
by deinition it is so individual. But even here there might be some theoretical
potential. Everybody engages in it, I think we’ve both agreed on that. That is to
say, we both agree that everybody acts, and that their actions are not determined;
that is, it’s not a deterministic type of thing. There might be a way we can get
at that too in a way that’s productive.
L. Two thoughts. I like the question idea. As academics, we begin with ques
tions. But we need to take care that we devise the appropriate questions. What’s
unclear to me is, how do we structure questions so that they’re not so broad,
that you don’t have to take on everything. In other words, how do we begin to
question? We need to determine what part of the context or the structure is in
fluential either on the actual agent or in making certain things more
important.
So let’s think more deeply about the ‘agency’ part; that is, how we can better
understand an individual’s response to the surrounding context. There’s a theo
rist named Pierre Bourdieu, who wrote a book called The Outline of a Theory
of Practice in the 1970s. He was trying to play with the structure and agency
thing, and what he basically said was that the structure is out there; it is all the
different things that inluence human agency but every individual has what is
called a ministructural habitus – it is a nontranslatable French word – but it
basically suggests that all of these points of inluence created by the larger
context create a kind of a microstructure that is unique to each individual. Within
that we all engage in what’s produced by our own experiences that are relective
of larger structural pieces out there.
T. You sounded like a psychologist – be careful.
L. No, it’s experiential. So for example let’s say that in a larger structure
[context] we have racism, and then the ways in which our subject experiences
racism begins to create a microstructure that’s much more immediate in his or
her actions. So one’s actions are relective of his or her experiences; this is the
stuff that really shapes the agency of the subject. I’m not so comfortable with
Bourdieu because his outside structure is ixed. What happens is that his inside
structure is constantly in lux in response to this subject’s interaction with the
larger structure. I would argue that the larger context is also in a state of lux,
but I do like his idea that we constantly learn context.
T. There is still, I fear, a disagreement between us. I thought we were moving

toward some kind of consensus, but now I hear you suggesting that one’s interac
tion with the surrounding context is so individualistic as to defy any valid
generalizations. Our disagreement may come regarding how much agency a
person has within that surrounding context. Can a person invent their own reali
ty? I’m not sure. I don’t want to take that too far. My thinking is that, as a general
rule, context kind of constrains how they respond. I acknowledge that anybody
can do anything they want, although it may not be rational in terms of the con
text, but, like I said, as a general rule context does structure the possibilities.
L. But it seems to me that you are missing something here. Even if context
can be constraining, you ignore the possibility that individuals can be spurred
by the context to rise above it, and even change it. If you think about leadership,
one way of talking about leadership is people as change agents. And then we
have to think about the ways in which agency breaks open structures and recon
igures them.
Let me give an example. I’ll use one of my activists (in my study of Palestin
ians who are citizens of Israel). She told me that she’d bought her daughter a
double bed. Not a big deal in our society, but in that society it implies that
someone else is going to be sleeping in that bed, and that becomes an issue, a
public concern if it’s a daughter.
T. We’re trying to sell books, huh? Let’s get some sex in here.
L. Yyyeah. It’s actually in my book that came out in October. So … but for
her it was a natural way of changing the larger structure of her community. So.
Let me back up again. Let me shift.
T. Before you leave that example, I want to ask a question. By buying that
double bed, she was acknowledging what she was doing but she was accepting
the meaning of what it meant to have a double bed. She was constrained by her
cultural beliefs and expectations. By buying that double bed she was acknowl
edging that that double bed had a speciic meaning within her culture and her
world, and so in a way the structure was imposing itself upon her. I mean she
was being the agent but she was accepting or acknowledging…
L. I think I see your point. On the one hand change agents recognize that there
is a surrounding context and generally accepted structures. They reafirm the
meaning of certain structures while at the same time trying to challenge it as
part of the change.
T. I’m OK with that. I think we can agree on that one.
L. Let’s talk about agency and its relationship to the surrounding context, to
see how much we disagree.
T. Good. That gets us back to the theoretical plane.
L. You go irst.
T. Let me just say that in my work I build up an elaborate historical context

within which people operate. All I’m saying is I cannot predict what any one
individual will do in response to that, to their perception of that context, which
is their agency. They can choose to be totally conformist, or they can choose to
be change agents, or any other level of response to the contextual cues and
constraints. That to me is their agency. As a historian I can look back to choices
already made and try to explain what people did, and, hopefully, why they did
it. But as a leadership scholar all I can do is to suggest the contextual constraints
and opportunities in which individuals operate. That’s the best I can do; I can’t
predict what any individual will do, given agency as I have described it.
L. OK. But we’re both interested in how we convey the importance of con
text. So we are both suggesting that context is not simply background. It is
inluential, but at the same time it is not foreground; it is not the main story,
but it is important in – I don’t know – something. I guess another way of putting
it, and I’m not comfortable saying that context is deterministic, but I think it’s
inluential.
T. I will agree with that.
[In a separate session sometime after the preceding dialogue, the authors re
convened and agreed upon the following as an appropriate conclusion]
L. & T. So, it is time we came up with something that might help those who
think about leadership with some way of integrating the construct of context
into ‘theoretical’ discussions of leadership. Permit us to propose some tentative
conclusions, and to suggest a way that contextual aspects can be addressed in
a prospective manner.
First, let us summarize (which we trust draws faithfully from our discus
sions):
1. The surrounding context does create both opportunities for and constraints
upon the actions of individuals.
2. The inluence of context upon actors is not, however, a oneway street, with
the context impinging upon passive individuals. In dealing with the sur
rounding context, individuals are moreorless (within reason) free agents
to respond to its cues as they will. As suggested in (1), above, however, the
context will make it more likely or less likely that any leadership action
will succeed.
3. Nor do individuals just react to contextual realities. They can also be pro
active. Our conception of context does not obviate the possibility of change
agents. Even here, one can view the surrounding context as being the insti
gator or catalyst for such change. But it also suggests that actors can shape
the context just as much as vice versa. However, this implies that those who
seek to confront an existing or hegemonic context will face formidable
challenges.
4. We are rejecting a purely constructivist interpretation of context. Although
we acknowledge the centrality of an individual’s interpretation of the sur
rounding contextual cues, we are at the same time suggesting that there are
suficient observable features of the context that an outside observer – say,
a theorist – can use to suggest or understand behavior.
This brings us to our suggestions for ways in which contextual factors in any
leadership situation can be taken into account – which is as close as we can
come to a theoretical statement about context. As we suggested above, this can
be accomplished by positing a set of questions about any leadership situation:
a. What are the interests or aspirations of the respective actors in the leader-
ship situation? Only by knowing (or deducing) these do we gain a baseline
from which to gauge the impact of the surrounding context.
b. What aspects of the surrounding context stand to enhance or impinge upon
such interests and aspirations? This requires the insights that can be pro
vided by the analysis of historians, sociologists, and the like.
c. How does the actor in question perceive these contextual attributes? This
portion of the assessment looks to the ‘interior rationality’ of the actor. That
is, it seeks to view the surrounding context from the perspective of the actor,
irrespective of whether that view appears ‘rational’ to the observer. For
example, even terrorists respond to their contexts in ways they think are
rational. This helps us to uncover the individual perceptions that are so
important.
These queries lead us to a consideration of context in a theoretical sense, and

bring us to the inal question of our protocol:
d. How does or can our knowledge of these matters help explain/predict the
impact that context might have on a particular leadership relation? This
question simply calls upon the observer to pull the above observations to
gether into a conclusion that advances our understanding of the role of
context.
Upon relection, we think this is about as far as we can go in addressing the

role of context in leadership. It is not theoretical in any pure sense. But if you
think about it, what we have accomplished is not too shabby. We have created
an interesting dynamic of agency and constraint, of context and constructivism.
It seems as if we are thinking about context with more clarity than prior to our
debate here.
* * *
As the preceding dialogue makes clear, Wren and Faier differ in their approach
to the role of context in the leadership relation, yet ind much common ground.
As their exchange illustrates, historians and anthropologists tend to pursue dif
ferent objectives in their examination of context: the former uses context to
create a web of surrounding institutions and inluences within which to place
actions and events, while the latter sees context as an inherent element in the
construction of meaning. Despite this fundamental disparity in perspective, both
scholars acknowledge surprising similarities in the dynamics of their respective
models. Neither views context as deterministic, but instead elaborates a vision
of individuals with agency interacting with (and to some extent creating) the
context that shapes the leadership relation. Both acknowledge that the context
can be constraining, yet also offers opportunities for conduct and, for some
change agents, catalyzes action. These similarities ultimately allow them to
agree upon a protocol of questions that can help bring understanding to the role
context plays in leadership.
In the process of achieving this result, Wren and Faier confronted several
challenges that have signiicance for developing a theory of leadership, which
in turn generated corresponding lessons for anyone who aspires to theorize about
the role context plays in leadership. It is worthwhile to briely summarize these
here.
First – and again, partly due to their disciplinary differences – language posed
a problem for the two scholars. As the dialogue proceeded, Wren and Faier had
to grapple with how to speak about context. They had to negotiate a shared un
derstanding of such constructs as agency and structure, objectivity and
subjectivity, and the role of rationality. For those hoping to incorporate context
when thinking theoretically about the leadership relation, this suggests the im
portance of articulating with speciicity the understanding and use of such
constructs.
A second challenge that follows from Wren and Faier’s discussion relates to
the extent to which one can generalize theoretically about the role of context.
It is almost a truism that all contexts are distinct, and that individual agents will
interact with such contexts in unpredictable ways. Yet Wren and Faier recognize
that an inability to generalize at some level beyond the idiosyncratic and the
localistic dooms any pretence to a theoretical statement about the role of context
in leadership. The two scholars eventually agreed that grand deterministic state
ments about the role of context are not possible. They must content themselves,
ultimately, with that protocol of structuring questions that help the analyst per
ceive the dynamic interaction between the individual and her/his context. While
falling far short of a theoretical statement in any traditional sense of the term,
this nonetheless does provide a technique for understanding the role of context
more thoroughly.
This dialogue between Elizabeth Faier the anthropologist and J. Thomas Wren
the historian, spurred by the dificulties the idea of context posed for a theory
of leadership, becomes one more thread in the complex tapestry that is the quest
for a general theory of leadership.
REFERENCES
MichelRolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Bos
ton: Beacon Press, 1997).
Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977).
10. What we learned along the way:
a commentary
Joanne B. Ciulla
If the only purpose of our quest was to arrive at a general theory of leadership,
then it was a terriic failure. We sometimes disagreed on which way to go, we
got irritable and lost, and we did not even visit all of the areas of leadership
studies. Nevertheless, like all great quests, ours was never really about inding
the Holy Grail of leadership studies; it was about the journey. It took us away
from the constraints of our disciplines and homes in academia. When we got
lost, we found ourselves in surprising new places, some of which are described
in this book. This chapter is a commentary on the journey and what we learned
along the way.
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The chapters in this book are eclectic in style and content. For example, we have
Tom Wren’s dialogue with Liz Faier on context, and Michael Harvey’s account
of our Mount Hope papers, framed as a story about the beginnings of leadership
in some primordial state of nature. Not only are the styles of writing in the
chapters different, the essays themselves are idiosyncratic. Each chapter relects
the research interests, and academic background, of the authors. Mark Walker
compares theories of leadership to theories of international relations. Gill Hick
man and Dick Couto anchor their discussion around a case study from the civil
rights movement. Terry Price and Doug Hicks use the concept of equality to
write about ethics. Like the rest of the chapters, this commentary relects my
own discipline and research lens – other members of the group would have
written it differently. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I take the view that ethics is
about all human relationships and that leadership is simply a speciic variety of
human relationship. Hence, I see the study of leadership as the study of a distinct
type of moral relationship and my commentary relects that assumption.
The chapters also differ in tone. When Crystal Hoyt, Al Goethals, and Ron
Riggio write about group dynamics, inluence, and social perception in Chapter
5, they do so with a crisp conidence. I would not call them positivists, but their
221
chapter does sound more positive than the rest and it covers familiar terrain in
leadership studies. Contrast the Hoyt, Goethals, and Riggio chapter with Sonia
Ospina and Georgia Sorenson’s somewhat angstridden constructionist view of
leadership in Chapter 8 or Liz Faier and Tom Wrens’ struggle to understand
each other in Chapter 9. The difference in tone relects a difference in epistemol
ogy. How we know about leadership is inseparable from what we know about
leadership.
I originally suggested that by the end of the project, we would be able to map
leadership studies. There are already plenty of maps in Chapter 3. The tables in
Mark Walker’s chapter on theory are conceptual maps, drawn from the perspec
tives of both the content of the study of leadership and various epistemological
approaches to it. In retrospect, the last thing that we needed was another map
of leadership studies. The group clearly had a general idea of what is there. For
example, after over two years of discussion, it was relatively easy to decide what
chapters to put in this book. Maybe this is because, as leadership scholars, we
have known all along that there are clearly certain things one takes into account
when one studies leadership. Leadership is part of the human condition and, as
such, is about wants, needs, power, conlict, equality, liberty, change, causality,
group dynamics, cooperation, coordination, leader–follower relationships, eth
ics, meaning, context, culture, etc. There are also certain things one talks about
in regard to the epistemology of leadership. They include methods of research,
theory, and metatheory. The problem that became clear to our group was that
we knew what the pieces of leadership studies are, but we did not know how to
put them together. In short, we did not need to ind a map, we needed to ind a
navigator.
Early on in the project, Jim Burns said it would be nice if the GTOL project
could simply come up with some basic principles that could be taught in a
leadership course. This sounds like a modest request, but it reminded me of how
dificult it is to decide what one teaches in a leadership course. In 1991, Richard
Couto and I, along with four colleagues, designed the curriculum for the Jepson
School of Leadership Studies. Despite the fact that, at that time, none of us
considered ourselves leadership scholars, it was fairly easy to draw up the cur
riculum. The curriculum took us a day to write. The introductory course took
us a whole semester, and the resulting course was a nightmare. Our curriculum
encompassed two very broad aspects of leadership literature – traits and context;
or to put it another way – the leader and everything else. The actual relationship
of leaders to followers seemed to fall in between traits and context. Even today,
most contingency theories only scratch the surface of how these two areas in
tersect. The same tension between leaders and context was a reoccurring theme
in our discussions.
The context of leadership heavily inluences the way that a scholar thinks and
writes about it. Most of the authors in this collection were not thinking about
What we learned along the way 223
business leadership when they wrote their chapters. All of the chapters, except
for the one on groups, assume leadership in politics, communities, and social
movements. Most of the leadership literature comes from business schools and
researchers with backgrounds in organizational behavior and social and indus
trial psychology. When we study leadership as a phenomenon, we look for
features of it that span across different contexts. Nonetheless, there exists one
major difference between the relationship of leaders and followers in business
and in politics – business leaders are not democratic. Moreover, I think that as
sumptions about democracy make a bigger difference in how scholars theorize
about leadership than we generally acknowledge. The work of this group was
theoryladen with Enlightenment ideas and democratic assumptions. It would
be very interesting to see what a group of scholars from different disciplines or
from a nonWestern culture would do if they were asked to come up with a
general theory of leadership. Sadly, this is the kind of literature that is missing
in leadership studies.
Another curious outcome of our project was the emergence of Thomas Hob
bes as a key player in our discussions. There were no Hobbes aicionados in the
group, but the questions that concerned Hobbes about human nature and leader
ship kept popping up. While Niccoló Machiavelli’s work is a staple in leadership
studies, his near contemporary Hobbes is not. So why does Hobbes’s spirit or
Hobbes himself show up in Chapter 2 on the Mount Hope papers, Chapter 5 on
power and conlict, Chapter 6 on ethics and equality, and Chapter 7 on causality
and change? First, because we started the Mount Hope project with a stateof
nature question: ‘What is it about the human condition that makes leadership
possible?’ Hobbes offers a theory of human nature based on common wants,
needs, dispositions, conlict, power, liberty, equality, and justice – many of the
same elements of leadership discussed by the GTOL group. Hobbes gives us a
baseline account of why we need leaders. We need them to give us order and
security so that we can be free to pursue our wants and needs. This idea of
leadership applies to the sovereign of a state or to the volunteer who stepped
into the street to direct trafic during the 1965 blackout in New York. The second
reason why Hobbes kept coming up in our discussions is because of the way
that he links equality to questions about morality and power. These are speciic
themes that run throughout these chapters even though the authors do not neces
sarily embrace the same conclusions as Hobbes. So, let us begin by looking at
equality.
EQUALITY
Hobbes talks about equality in a descriptive and prescriptive sense. He says
people are equal in the sense of having the same needs and they are morally
equal as human beings. Price and Hicks’s Chapter 6, while perhaps not by intent,
is a Hobbesian project of sorts. The important underlying question is: Are leaders
equal to followers? They answer that if leaders are unequal to followers, then
this has to be justiied under some larger claim of equality (p. 124). Their use of
equality here is normative, meaning should leaders get different treatment?
Another way to ask this question is: ‘Are leaders different from followers?’,
which is actually a rendition of ‘What is a leader?’ Most leadership scholars
answer the irst question with a resounding ‘Yes’ and go on to explain how
leaders are different, based on research into inluence tactics, social perception,
personality traits and a number of other psychological factors discussed in the
chapter on groups. Psychologists regard leadership as a cocktail of behaviors
and types of relationships. The leader plays a different role in relationships or
exhibits different behaviors. Historians and biographers chronicle the deeds and
lives of people who made great contributions to the world, whereas constructiv
ists argue that leaders are not different as individuals with special traits or
personalities, but differentiated by the way that society constructs the idea of
leaders or by the context. Research on social perception and implicit leadership
theories seems to imply the same thing as the constructivists, but they do so us
ing different terms (Chapter 8, p. 200). If we take the theories discussed in the
chapter on groups as a whole, they say leaders are not the same as followers
and followers construct ideas about leaders and their relationship to leaders.
These may be different routes to the same conclusion.
Some leadership scholars and members of the GTOL group seem to have a
discomfort with leaders. We see this in Price and Hicks’s chapter, but also in
Chapters 4, 7, and 9. This is a strong democratic, egalitarian and perhaps liber
tarian unease with the idea that anyone is better than the rest or that anyone has
the right to tell us what to do. So one aspect of the equality question as started
by our man Hobbes and continued in Price and Hicks, is part of the dialectic
between traits and context. Their concern is that we should not give leaders
special rights and privileges even if they possess superior traits, skills, and intel
ligence like Plato’s guardians in the Republic. Price and Hicks criticize Plato
because he proposed picking out the best and the brightest and most it to rule,
and then giving leaders special treatment.
In the Republic, Plato says leaders are not at all equal to followers in the de
scriptive sense of ‘same’ but he believes they are morally equal and equal under
the law. I think is it even more interesting to notice that Plato changed his mind
on this point later in life. He lost faith in his conviction that leadership was about
‘the Great man.’ In Epistle VII he wrote, ‘the older I grew, the more I realized
how dificult it is to manage a city’s affairs rightly. For I saw that it was impos
sible to do anything without friends and loyal followers’ (Plato, ‘Epistle VII’
[1971]). Plato also concedes that leaders are like their followers. In the Republic,
he portrays the leader as a shepherd to his lock. But in a later work, The States-
man, he says that a leader is not at all like a shepherd because shepherds are
quite different from their locks, whereas human leaders are not very different
from their followers (Plato, ‘Statesman [1971]). Furthermore, Plato argues,
people are not sheep; some are cooperative and some are very stubborn. Hence,
Plato’s revised view was that leaders are like weavers. Their main task is to
weave together different kinds of people such as the meek and selfcontrolled
and the brave and impetuous into the fabric of a society (ibid., 310e). Notice
the difference between the idea of a leader as a philosopher king and the leader
who facilitates group processes.
Leaders may not be equal in the sense of being the same as others, but Price
and Hicks argue that leaders should be morally the same as others. So in some
respects, leaders are born and in some respects leaders are in the eyes of the
beholders. One reason why leadership scholars may feel like they were spinning
their wheels is because they rarely go any farther than this in their analysis. Here
is where the ethics and history ill out the picture and the second meaning of
equality comes into play.
The normative sense of equality is fundamental to almost all ethical systems.
It is the idea that all people are deserving of equal respect and consideration as
human beings. Followers and leaders are moral equals. Immanuel Kant offers
a nice way to think about the moral equality of people. He says we all live in a
‘Kingdom of Ends’ in which all people legislate morality and are subject to it
(Kant 1993). This idea is a reinement of the Golden Rule, which Hobbes cites
as essential for society – ‘do unto others as you would have others do unto you’
or ‘do not do unto others as you would not have them do unto you.’ The ‘others’
in the rule are the same as you and me. They are human beings whom you must
assume are rational and hence, capable of being able to reciprocate. Even if they
do not look or act like you, you assume that you share enough of the same ca
pacities for reason and imagination. Kant alters this rule by removing the idea
of reciprocity. He tells us to act as you would want everyone to act. This implies
that you cannot make yourself an exception to the moral rules that you would
want everyone else to live by. John Rawls’s theory of justice draws from these
basic concepts.
Yet, when we read history or the daily newspaper, we see that the issue of
moral equality is the source of problems with leaders and their relationship to
followers. Some leaders believe that they are not subject to the same moral rules
as everyone else. Other leaders do not regard other individuals and groups
worthy of the same moral consideration as everyone else. We read about leaders
who do not think that they have to pay taxes, or of leaders who persecute or kill
minority groups in their own countries or exploit their workers. The irst kind
of problem stems from what Price and Hicks call the privileges of being leader,
or as comedian Mel Brooks once said, ‘It’s good to be the King!’ Kings or un
elected leaders think they are unequal by birthright or by their position.
Institutions and organizations socially construct the role of a leader and implic
itly or explicitly give extra advantages to leaders. In the case of democracy, Price
and Hicks say that when followers are the source of unequal treatment, they get
the leaders they deserve (Chapter 6, p. 130). But this is not the complete story
either. Context matters, but it also depends on who the leader is. Psychologists
have written extensively on the problems with narcissistic leaders, leaders who
have a weak internal locus of control and socialized and nonsocialized uses of
power (Maccoby 2000). People in a democracy do not always know what they
are getting when they vote for a leader. They can sometimes be fooled, but usu
ally not for long.
A leader’s job description is inherently utilitarian. It is interesting to note how
John Stuart Mill’s replies to critics of utilitarianism help us understand the moral
responsibilities of leadership (Mill 1987). One objection is that most people
cannot or do not know what the greatest good is for the greatest number of
people. Mill points out that, usually, we do not make utilitarian judgments that
concern everyone in the world. We know from our own experiences what other
people want and we make choices based on what is good for a speciic group
of people, not the whole world. Yet, it is the case that some leaders actually do
make choices that have an impact on large numbers of people, many of whom
they never know about or meet. Another objection to Mill’s theory is that the
utilitarian calculation concerning how to determine what will bring about the
greatest happiness or serve the common good is too cold and calculating and
does not consider individual relationships. Mill replies that morality is about
the application of principles such as the greatest good and the minute you start
molding your idea of the good to the relationship you have with particular indi
viduals, you lose the principle.
Utilitarianism emphasizes moral equality and consistency that does not allow
for exceptions for family and friends. While Mill is talking about morality that
applies to everyone, if you think about it, this is an explicit part of a leader’s
job. Consider, for example, the absurdity of this job description: ‘Wanted: lead
ers who will make exceptions to laws, policies, and procedures for themselves,
friends, family, ethnic and religious groups, and people that they like better than
their other constituents.’ While there are leaders who behave this way (it is de
scriptively true), we would not consider this part of what it means to lead (so
in this sense it is descriptively false). This is one reason why I think certain basic
moral principles are embedded in the concept of what it means to be a leader.
POWER
All leadership scholars recognize that one of the factors that differentiates lead
ers from followers is power and inluence. Power is both a cause and an effect
of inequality. There are many good reasons to want strong leaders, but there are
just as many reasons to fear them. As Harvey points out, we ind stories about
the violent abuse of power in history, the newspaper, and the even in the jungle.
This kind of power is crude and some leadership scholars would not even want
to call people who used fear and intimidation leaders (the ancient Greeks called
these people tyrants not rulers). Such leaders also do not pass any test of legiti
macy. In the business literature on leadership, there is an implicit desire for what
Max Dupree called the illusion of ‘leading without power’ (Chapter 4, p. 75).
Notice in the irst part of the chapter on groups, Hoyt, Goethals, and Riggio ex
plain how leaders can intervene to make work groups more productive. Does
understanding group dynamics allow one to lead without power? Academics
who are skeptical about leadership programs argue that such programs teach
students how to psychologically manipulate people. That might be the case if
you only taught the psychology of leadership without teaching students anything
else about literature, art, history, ethics, society, etc. The dark side of understand
ing the psychological aspects of leadership is manipulation; the bright side of
it is that it enables leaders to help groups lead themselves.
What kind of power sustains leadership over time? Harvey tells us it is the
power that followers are willing to give the leader. In his example from Shake
speare’s play Coriolanus, a commoner says, ‘We have power in ourselves’ and
then says ‘a power that we have no power to do’ (Chapter 4, p. 74). Followers
make the leader, but sometimes only so long as the leader does what they cannot
do. Leadership is a constant power transaction. Sometimes it is an open conlict
and struggle and at other times it is a silent accounting process. Followers
sometimes get the upper hand, as in Orwell’s story of ‘Shooting an Elephant,’
where the social inluence of the crowd forces the leader to do something that
he does not want to do – namely, shoot the elephant. As Le Bon observed,
sometimes crowds act but do not think. Nonetheless, there are also instances
when the morals of a crowd are higher than those of the individuals in it (Chapter
5, p. 97).
Machiavelli tells us power is about the emotions of love and fear, but I would
argue these emotions often run parallel to the morality and immorality of lead
ers’ vision, values, behaviors, and relationships to followers. Morally good
leaders are more likely to evoke love, and bad ones are more likely to evoke
fear. By morality, I mean the basic rightness or wrongness of how leaders and
followers treat each other, starting with respect for persons, which has been
discussed as moral equality by Price and Hicks. We morally assess leaders and
followers in three areas that can be summed up this way: Do they do the right
thing, the right way, and for the right reason?
We may need leaders for order and control, but we will always face the prob
lem of controlling the controllers. Democracy and the law offer ways to do this
in public life. The structure of organizations is supposed to do this in business.
Trust is a combination of faith and security. When people do not trust their
leaders, they feel insecure because they cannot tell whether a leader will keep
promises, tell the truth, etc. In this way, morality negotiates the distribution of
power. Leaders who do not have the trust of their followers have less power and
need more power to lead. Leaders who trust and have the trust of their followers
have more power and need less power to lead. Tyler and Lind’s experiments
with leader–follower relations in organizations found that people regarded lead
ers who practiced procedural justice fairer than those who practiced distributive
justice (Chapter 5, p. 115). This is not surprising because procedural justice es
tablishes a structure for trust that is somewhat separate from the leader. The
process is public and hence outside of the leader. Leaders who use procedural
justice make part of their notion of fairness visible. It is easier to trust things
that you can see. Distributive justice requires more faith in leaders when fol
lowers cannot see the process that is used to make decisions. There is always
the chance that these leaders will not distribute the rewards fairly in the
future.
Aung San Suu Kyi offers an interesting illustration of how morality negotiates
power. Harvey describes her power as ‘the power of charisma.’ He cites Weber’s
deinition of charisma: ‘a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue
of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatu
ral, superhuman, or at least speciically exceptional powers or qualities’ (Chapter
4, p. 82). The scene that Harvey describes of Suu Kyi leading people past sol
diers with guns, is at least as much about the moral rightness of what she
represents as it is about her personality. Some people become leaders because
they represent things that people recognize or come to recognize as fundamen
tally morally right or just. The word charisma has come to mean so many things
these days that it is dificult to tell if it is the source of a leader’s power and
success or the result of a leader’s power and success.
The source of Suu Kyi’s power, like the power of Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson
Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr. rests on a solid moral foundation. Even
today we recognize these three leaders as great because they tried to do the right
thing, the right way, and for the right reason. In some cases, charisma may be
the cause of such leaders’ success, but in other cases charisma is the effect of
their success or their efforts. People can have moral power without charisma
and they can have charisma without being moral. The distinction is important
because charismatic leadership based on the feelings that a personality evokes
may not be as sustainable a force as the moral principles that a leader represents.
This is what Kelman calls internalization of inluence (Chapter 5, p. 108). Lead
ers who behave morally or represent important ideals of justice, fairness,
equality, liberty, etc. are more likely to have lasting inluence on people, regard
less of their personalities or their proximity to or contact with followers.
CHANGE
It is useful to look at how morality negotiates power in the case of Barbara Rose
Johns, the 11th grader who contributed to the end of school segregation in 1951
(Chapter 7). Hickman and Couto never mention anything about her charisma.
It seems unnecessary when describing someone who is doing something that
he or she feels is morally right. One might assume from the description in their
chapter that Barbara Rose is tenacious, brave, and talented at inluencing and
mobilizing people. Another reason why the authors of Chapter 7 do not dwell
on her personality is because their essay addresses the question: Do leaders
create change or does change create leaders? Their interest is in the social condi
tions of change. Most conditions of social change rest on questions of justice,
fairness, equality, or some kind of harm to people. These are all moral problems
as well as social problems. In the Johns story, the ethical issue is inequality in
the education system. As Hickman and Couto analyze the social conditions of
the case, the causal connection between Johns’s leadership of the school strike
and the Supreme Court decision of Brown vs. Board of Education is not at all
a straight one. They conclude that action to bring about social change requires
more than one leader. It requires a web of committed followers and groups.
Clearly leaders cannot do things alone; as a matter of fact, by deinition they
do things with followers. This raises a number of questions about the agency of
leaders. First, history frequently gives credit to leaders as initiators of change.
Second, researchers such as Jim Meindl and his colleagues found that people
tend to attribute events and control to individual senior leaders. They call this
‘The Romance of Leadership’ (Meindl et al. 1985) and note that it is irrelevant
whether leaders actually have control over events. People want to believe that
the heroic single leader changes the world. Leaders may not have agency if we
analyze the entire system or context of a social change in history or if we try to
draw a linear path of causation from the leader to the intended change, but
maybe this is not important. Perhaps what is important is that people think that
they do. Going back to Hobbes, if the primordial function of a leader is to create
order or have someone in control, wouldn’t we also want someone who could
be held responsible? Those who are reluctant to give leaders too much credit
for a positive social change, are often not reluctant to blame leaders for prob
lems. For example, if the police killed some of the students in Johns’ student
demonstration, would not there be a sense in which she was responsible, even
though the actual events were out of her hands?
Herein lies one of the moral peculiarities of people who take on leadership.
Leaders, like everyone else, are responsible for the things that they do but they
are also held responsible for things that they do not do either because of the
position that they hold or because ‘they started it.’ Leaders are praised or blamed
for their own actions, the actions of their followers, and for a variety of factors
that go wrong in the environment. For instance, politicians have won and lost
elections because of economic conditions that are beyond their ability to control.
In short, when it comes to the context of leadership, some leaders experience
good or bad moral luck. They try to do the right thing, but are defeated by ex
ternal factors that are outside of their control, or they do something careless,
stupid, or risky and things turn out all right (Ciulla 2004).
The question of agency takes us back to the tension between the leader and
the context. Another way that the GTOL group differed from traditional leader
ship scholars is that several of its members held the view that the context of
leadership was more important than the leader. As Ospina and Sorenson point
out in their essay, the popular literature and the literature of social psychologists
has focused on the inluence process and the heroic notion of leadership. Hick
man and Couto also frame the relationship between the leader and the context
as a debate between the essentialists and constructivists. Essentialists are those
who believe ‘that reality (social and natural) exist apart from our perceptions
of that reality and that individuals perceive the world rather than construct it.’
They tell us, ‘constructionists believe that … reality cannot be separated from
the way people perceive it’ (Chapter 7, p. 152). There is an inherent contradic
tion in the constructivist position. If reality is what people perceive it to be and
if society believes that leaders cause social change, then does it not follow that
in that society leaders cause change? (This may be a little like Meindl’s Ro
mance of Leadership.) A constructivist would have a dificult time refuting this
point without assuming certain objective ideas about causation.
AGENCY AND CONTEXT

Questions about agency lurk in the corners of every chapter in this book. They
are fundamental to understanding what a leader is and what a leader does in rela
tion to others. Wren and Faier’s dialogue on context speciically addresses the
question of human agency but in a slightly different way than Hickman and
Couto’s chapter on change. They frame the question of agency in terms of how
people interact with their context. Through dialogue, Wren and Faier discover
to their surprise, that they agree – ‘context is not deterministic but creates a
framework in which agency occurs and perhaps even structures’ (Chapter 9,
p. 208). The issue then shifts to whether context structures what is possible or
whether it produces what is possible. How one responds to this question deter
mines how much agency a leader has.
Underlying the agency/context question is a larger question about free will
and determinism, which is the mother of all philosophic questions. Are human
actions free or are they determined by a variety of outside forces? Different
people ask this question in different ways. A historian might wonder, did a leader
or an event cause change or did things just fall into place? Free will lurks in the
shadows of theories and research in psychology. No matter how sound the re
search is about causes and patterns of behavior and human interactions, people
can still decide to behave differently. The psychologist’s question of free will
and determinism is bound up with the moral and theological questions. If human
behavior is determined by a variety of individual and group factors or, in the
case of religion, by God, then how can we hold individuals morally responsible
for their actions? For example, does the fact that the mass murderer was an
abused child morally excuse him? Would we treat him differently if he had a
happy welladjusted childhood? For the theologian who believes that God is
good, allpowerful, and omniscient, there is the question: ‘Why do we have so
much evil in the world?’ As you can see, these huge questions still point back
to old Hobbes. They are questions about how much control we have over our
lives, the lives of others, and the world around us. As such, they are also ques
tions about power, inluence, and responsibility for our actions. It is in the
context of these fundamental questions that leaders have played a distinctive
role or, if you like, have been perceived as playing a distinctive role.
I have never been happy with the idea that leaders create meanings. It sounds
a little too much like demagoguery. This probably relects my discomfort with
charisma as well. I think that meaning is something that, by its very nature, has
to be found, not spoon fed. Most would agree with Ospina and Sorenson that
meaning is socially constructed. As we see in the chapter on groups, there is
clear empirical evidence that people are inluenced by the meanings in a group,
but I still think that the individual intervenes in the process. Meaning is a norma
tive concept that is intimately intertwined with what is important to people, what
they value. Sometimes leaders help people to realize what is important. As Os
pina and Sorenson note, leaders play a role in helping communities clarify what
matters most (Chapter 8, p. 193). Harvey’s description of Suu Kyi and the case
of Johns are both about leaders who believed in justice enough to do something
about injustice. Those who chose to follow them may have always believed in
the same thing, but were never motivated to do anything about it.
Leaders may bring about change or groups may bring about change, but as
human beings, the connection between human agency and context is important
because causation is an essential part of responsibility. We need responsibility
for order and for justice. Like answers to all great questions, the best answer to
the free will/determinism question is that we have some of each – our choices
are free and they are determined. Philosophers, historians, theologians, psy
chologists, and others, continue to debate it, because few agree on exactly how
much of each we have. I would frame the discussions of context and the agency
of leaders by asking the transcendental question: What is it that makes it possible
for this particular person to be a leader in this particular context? In doing so,
it forces us to consider leaders and context, but it also opens up the possibility
for a variety of answers. For example, sometimes leadership does come, as

Thomas Carlyle said, from great men and women. Other times it comes from a
group or a complex web of individuals, as in the case of Johns and school de
segregation. There are also times when leadership is thrust upon a person by
circumstance. As William Shakespeare observed, ‘some are born great, some
achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them’ (Shakespeare
[1994]). No matter what the genesis of a leader is, he or she only leads as long
as people follow.
AT THE END OF THE ROAD

Throughout the years that the GTOL group met, I wondered if Burns was being
coy about his real goals for this project. In the beginning, he said that leadership
studies needed a ‘grand’ or generalized theory of leaders and subordinates. He
suggested that such a theory would ‘legitimize a ield that some skeptics still
dismiss as lightweight and illdeined … . We are intent,’ said Burns, ‘on making
[leadership studies] an intellectually responsible discipline’ (Managan 2002).
These are different agendas that are tied together by the assumption that you
have to have a theory to have legitimacy. But maybe the idea of inding a theory
was just a ruse to get people talking.
I think this project demonstrated, irst, that you do not have to have a theory
to be legitimate; second, a grand theory would not be helpful. The academic
world, like today’s social and political world, has become increasingly polarized.
Scholars live behind the closed walls of their departments, sometimes divided
into theoretical camps that talk only to other true believers. While there is noth
ing wrong with having a theory or holding a strong philosophical position, such
approaches rarely get us closer to the truth, unless we engage in dialogue with
people who hold different views and come from other academic and cultural
backgrounds. Psychologists and organizational theorists have been working in
leadership studies the longest, but even they complain that they do not seem to
be getting anywhere. They have discovered many things about human behavior,
but without the rich context of the humanities to put it in, their work on leader
ship appears fragmented and incomplete. Humanists look at leadership against
an enormous social, cultural, and philosophic landscape. Without the empirical
work of psychologists and other social scientists to either verify or falsify their
impressions of human behavior, the humanists’ observations on leadership ap
pear speculative or anecdotal.
When we step back and look at the ruminations about leadership in this book,
we see that the study of leadership provides another way to ask very big ques
tions about who we are, how we live together, and how we shape the course of
history. It reinforces my belief that leadership is ultimately a moral endeavor.
When it is done right, leaders help to create the conditions for people to lourish
physically, mentally, and as human beings, and they do so without harming
others or the world around them. At the end of the road, the GTOL met one of
Burns’s goals. These chapters are not perfect or all encompassing expositions
but, taken as a whole, they demonstrate that the real problem with leadership
studies is not that it is too lightweight, but that it is too heavy. It takes more than
one scholar, discipline, or theoretical approach to understand leadership. The
study of leadership forces us to tackle the universal questions about human na
ture and destiny. For those questions, there will probably never be a general
theory.
REFERENCES
Ciulla, Joanne B. ‘Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness,’ in John Antoniakis, Anna T.
Cianciolo, and Robert J. Sternberg (Eds.), The Nature of Leadership. Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications, 2004, pp. 302–27.
Kant, Immanuel. J.W. Ellington (Tr.), Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Indi
anapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.
Maccoby, Michael. ‘Narcissistic Leaders,’ The Harvard Business Review, 78, 1.1 (2000):
69–75.
Managan, Katherine, ‘Leading the Way in Leadership: The Unending Quest of the Dis
cipline’s Founding Father, James MacGregor Burns,’ The Chronicle of Higher
Education, 31 May 2002, p. 1.
Meindl, J.R., S.B. Ehrlich and J.M. Dukerich. ‘The Romance of Leadership,’ Administra-
tive Science Quarterly, 1985, 30: 521–51.
Mill, J.S. Alan Ryan (Ed.), Utilitarianism and Other Essays, New York: Penguin Books,
1987, pp. 276–97.
Plato, ‘Epistle VII.’ L.A. Post (Tr.), ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns The Col-
lected Dialogues of Plato, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 325c–326.
Plato, ‘Statesman.’ J.B. Skemp (Tr.), in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 1971,
275b–c.
Shakespeare, William. ‘The Twelfth Night or, What You Will,’ William Shakespeare:
The Complete Works, New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994, p. 654.
Afterword
Like other members of the GTOL group, I expect, I turned years ago to the study
of leadership because I wanted to broaden my range of thought beyond my tra
ditional disciplines. I had been teaching and writing for many years in my
professional ield of political science and in American history. Both of these
ields had become so allembracing and hence fragmented – as evidenced by
their annual professional meetings – that I sought a rewarding ield of study that
had more intellectual unity, or at least coherence. As I began work in this new
ield, however, I found that I needed to educate myself further in psychology,
because motivation is a central force in leadership, and in philosophy, because
it posed the moral and ethical tests of leadership.
All this raised a further dificulty. Was I moving beyond political science and
history because of their extreme specialization only to encounter even more
fragmentation in the study of leadership? This depended on the state of leader
ship studies. History and political science were old and established, with little
intellectual discipline in their disciplines. No one expected more from them.
But the study of leadership in the late 1900s was still developing. There still
might be an opportunity to develop a general theory or take a major step toward
it. Thus I challenged my colleagues to attempt to develop the general theory.
By the time the General Theory of Leadership Project held its long meeting
at Mount Hope Farm in Williamstown in June 2002, the doughty participants
were fully aware of the daunting intellectual endeavor that lay ahead. We came
from different disciplines, as we had planned, but our work would be both en
riched and complicated by the diverse ields and backgrounds of the participants.
Still, we had some advantages. We had long worked together, at the Academy
of Leadership at the University of Maryland, at Williams College, and especially
at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond. Some
had ‘teamtaught’ leadership classes across different disciplines. And we knew
how to disagree agreeably.
Why, speciically, were we there? To try to work out a general – even a grand
– theory of leadership, or at least an ‘integrated’ one, or failing even that, to lay
the intellectual foundations for others to build on. We knew, with Joanne Ciulla,
that we could not make progress unless we engaged ‘in dialogue with people
234
Afterword 235
who hold different views and come from other academic backgrounds.’ At
Mount Hope we had hope but no illusions.
And what, speciically, did I want when I envisaged a general theory of
leadership? I wanted an intellectual frame within which I at least could organize
my own thinking. I wanted a strenuous effort to prevent the study of leadership
from becoming as morselized as other ields of study, or even worse, trivialized.
I wanted to use leadership as a better way of understanding the crucial factors
in historic causation and social change – factors that can be prioritized such as
ideas, motivation, political structures (such as parties), and historic openings
and closures within which these variables operate. Above all, I wanted a disci
pline that tested action by a clear set of moral values and ethical norms.
My own understanding of the relevant crucial variables begins with the human
conditions of wants and needs among masses of people experiencing hunger
and happiness, order and disorder, tension and mystery. People in want thor
oughly know only one thing – their wants, whether food, a good school, a road
to that school, medical aid, literacy, sanitation, shoes, etc., etc. What they lack
is knowledge as how to gain these things – they lack also the selfconidence,
selfeficiency, selfrespect, and the skills necessary to gain what they wish.
Rather they feel powerless, hopeless, clueless, perhaps also angry and violence
prone. It is the job of leadership to legitimate certain of their wants, just as a
mother legitimates milk rather than soda to her thirsty child or a doctor pre
scribes one kind of drug and not another. Complicating this process is the
likelihood that the wants are not only simple deprivations but varieties within
every want of poor nourishment, lack of transportation, medical condition, edu
cation, etc., which again the impoverished can feel but cannot solve on their
own.
It is the job of leadership not only to legitimate certain wants or collections
of ‘subwants’ but to educate and instruct and guide followers toward solutions.
This creates a leader–follower relationship. Can we generalize about this rela
tionship? We agree that all people are interdependent, that they know the
necessity of coordinated action, that coordination does not just happen but has
to be constructed, that people have different roles and capacities, that people
have different goals (which for the moment we can generalize and simplify as
‘happiness’), and that leadership is necessary to articulate these goals as well,
of course, as to the means of realizing them.
In the emerging leader–follower relationship the irst – but by no means the
only – task of leadership is interaction with followership in meeting the priority
of order. But order in itself is hopelessly inadequate unless it is employed to
meet a second challenge; that of protecting core values, such as freedom, justice,
opportunity, equality of opportunity or of condition, or ultimately happiness
What might serve as examples of the leader–follower relationship? A seem
ingly simple example might be that of a politician walking down a city street,
spotting a person walking up the opposite sidewalk, and approaching her. He

would like her support, especially since she is a women’s rights activist, and
she of course wants his support in the legislature or city hall. Perhaps they do
a deal, or disagree and part. But is it that simple? In what political context does
this interaction take place? Ideological? Purely transactional? Psychological?
Who are the other players on each side? What women’s rights organizations or
party organizations may be involved on each side? In short, on what terrain of
action and of meaning is each side operating?
An epochal incident in American civil rights history offered a reallife exam
ple of the interaction. The example of a single black woman refusing to go to
the back of the bus electriied Americans. Here was ‘individual eficacy’ per
soniied. But again, the situation was far more complex. Rosa Parks was by no
means all alone. This was her second effort, not a sole act of courage out of the
blue. She had long been considered as a possible test case. More important, she
was part of a large group of activists that had been planning a strategic act for
some time. Some of these were, or would become, famous, such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. Others, perhaps more inluential than the highly visible, were
persons who received little publicity. Some of the key players were, in fact,
wholly invisible, for tactical and other reasons. The bus boycott took place in
the historic context of the national and international civil rights movements, the
campaigns of the NAACP and many other organizations, judicial decisions such
as Brown, battles in Congress, and/or state legislatures and city councils, lynch
ings, the deaths of civil rights workers in the South, the shift of black support
from the old Abolitionist Republican party to the New Deal and LBJ Democratic
Party, etc. So Rosa Parks was by no means alone. But this is not to undervalue
the potential of a single courageous act. She maintained her ground – literally
her seat – under immense direct pressure and intimidation. And she became in
effect a moral leader in the nation and the world, for moral followers to seek to
emulate. And many of those followers would become leaders.
The dramatic events in Montgomery and outside raised acute moral and ethi
cal questions for participants including, one hopes, the segregationists as well
as observers around the world. In the leadership literature today, the debate over
the essence of leadership is largely a debate over what we think is the morally
right way to lead. It is about how leaders should lead, and not so much about
the jobs leaders actually do. Leaders have been doing the same kinds of things
for a long time – they organize people, initiate change, arouse conlicts and settle
them. Ethics concerns the morality of their goals and what they do and how they
treat people in the course of achieving those goals.
On the causal impact of the broadest values, our group noted that the world
wide debate over principles will focus even more directly, over the decades
ahead, on the mutually competing and reinforcing values of liberty and equality.
How these values will be deined, how they will relate to one another in hierar
Afterword 237
chies of principles, how ‘subvalues’ of liberty such as privacy, for example, or

freedom of innovation, will be protected under 1st Amendment free expression
– these other issues must be dealt with. In response to the above, we also noted
that the normative theory of leadership leaves the practical task of reconciliation
to the leaders themselves. So in the midst of intense value conlict, what will
serve as a moral constraint on the behavior of strong leaders? Can a leader be
freed of constraint when he or she proposes to deine the weightiest basic value?
Allowing leaders that much freedom to make exceptions of their preferred key
values would appear to be unjustiied deviations from generally applicable moral
requirements.
Values are not just static or integrated entities; they are very much in conlict,
as the Montgomery bus episode dramatized. Conlict is another crucial aspect
or element of leadership; some scholars indeed hold that leadership is simply
conlict and hence conlict is the essence of leadership. The leadership–conlict
relationship is not that simple. Conlict is not just interpersonal but intraper
sonal. Many involved in the boycott had internal struggles along with their
external battle. Some of the great American leaders had such internal conlicts
– think of Lincoln agonizing over the political and human alternatives in over
coming slavery. Even more, there is conlict over the nature and need of conlict
in a democratic society. Is progress toward the realization of ‘higher’ values
achieved more surely and lastingly through consensual, stepbystep ‘mutual
satisicing,’ or through confrontation, choosing of sides and hence clearly and
even dramatically posed conlict? There was a school of sociology in the USA
that described in exquisite detail the great balancing forces that conserved the
harmonious equilibrium of a nation or community, and that studied how ‘deviant
tendencies’ – sources of conlict – could be ‘counteracted’ and the system re
stored to that lovely equilibrium. This school of thought did not ignore disruption
and dysfunction – it simply deprecated and marginalized them. Strong leader
ship, on the other hand, does not reject conlict – it thrives on it.
The functions of values and conlict cannot be separated from the causal role
of power. We use the concept of power in two ways – humans empowering other
humans, and the empowering of values in bringing about comprehensive change.
The human empowerment, Joanne Ciulla (2004) wrote, gives people ‘the con
idence, freedom, and resources to act on their own judgments’ and ‘entails a
distinct set of moral understandings and commitments between leaders and
followers.’ But she warns of ‘bogus empowerment,’ when leaders ignore ‘the
moral commitments of empowerment,’ instead using the forms and language of
empowerment to exploit followers more eficiently. Richard Couto examined
(cf. Ciulla, 2004, p. 70) the differences among communitybased organizations
engaged in the exacting leadership task of forging coalitions of grassroots fac
tions. He contrasts ‘psychopolitical empowerment that boosts people’s
selfesteem and mastery of their own lives,’ as well as promoting democratic
participation in actions for a common beneit, with ‘psychosymbolic empower

ment’ that may elevate people’s selfesteem and mastery of their own lives but
leaves them politically powerless in an unchanged set of circumstances.
How about the role of power on a broader terrain, involving vast numbers of
people? The bus boycott indicated the power of the single person, but only in
the context of hundreds of supporters and fellow leaders. And, as noted, the
boycott demonstrated the power of invisible leadership as well as visible, in an
immediate context of supportive leaders and followers. Also, power takes many
forms, for example in the impact of stories and storytelling. Another aspect:
empowering leadership is not simply onedirectional. Thus if leaders as initiators
evoke positive motives like selfeficacy from followers, why should not the
followers satisfy the selfdirected motives of the leader, such as wanting to be
heard, to have her ideas accepted, his special brand of leadership acknowledged?
These various effects of empowerment need not diminish the role of leadership
but rather enhance it.
It is in the linkage between the role of values and the function of power that
leadership as action offers compelling historical explanations and at the same
time provides an example of integrative possibilities in the study of leadership
theory. Values invigorate leadership by helping to sustain the mobilization of
leaders and deepen the empowerment of followers under conditions of competi
tion and conlict. Values strengthen leaders’ capacity to reach out to wider
publics and to gain support for still broader values (i.e., equality of opportunity
as well as condition) and to empower leaders by providing a foundation for
governing. Even more, by addressing basic questions of human nature, values
help to clarify such questions as the relationship between liberty and equality,
selfinterest and altruism, individualism and collectivism.
Power is complex, despite all the simplistic popular accounts that impute vast
and permanent authority and supremacy to various leaders and rulers. Power is
not only quantitative, measured by dollars or guns or votes. It is qualitative and
subjective, measured by leaders’ and followers’ wants and feelings and attitudes.
Motives empower leadership, but leadership also empowers or at least legiti
mates motives. The various power relationships between leaders and followers,
rulers and subjects, ‘wielders’ and ‘targets,’ relect a parallelogram of dynamic
forces: each has motivations, each has physical resources, whether gold or guns
or merely their own bodies. And just as leadership can be carried out invisibly,
so power can be exerted through inaction, as in the famous case of the Russian
General Katuzov, who instead of marching his army out against the advancing
Napoleon, stuck to his rear quarters and allowed the Emperor to be defeated
largely by General Winter.
All the above ultimately leads to the transcending question of grand change
– change that is intended, comprehensive, durable, and grounded in values. Each
of these elements or aspects is crucial. We have not made suficient progress to
Afterword 239
offer much to review here – the subject has been treated, rightly, as both the
embodiment and the culmination of all the foregoing and much else perhaps
bringing us closer to a more integrated conception of leadership.
As the search for a general theory of leadership continues, that theory will
require a deinition of leadership in action. We know that leadership is the mo
bilization, by activists, of followers, some of whom become leaders of the
original activists. How this collective leadership is mobilized is tested by ethical
values; what this leadership is mobilized for – its purposes or ends – by moral
values. The interplay of these factors will be grounded in the economic, social,
political, and cultural forces that our group has analyzed. These forces will lie
at the heart of a general theory of leadership.
If I can summarize the general theory group’s collective wisdom and offer
our best thinking about the construct of leadership, we now see leadership as
an inluence process, both visible and invisible, in a society inherited, con-
structed, and perceived as the interaction of persons in human (and inhuman)
conditions of inequality – an interaction measured by ethical and moral values
and by the degree of realization of intended, comprehensive, and durable
change.
Let me leave you with a challenge and a question. The amazing events that
unfolded in Montgomery and the state and nation are that the people in action
embraced every major aspect of leadership and integrated it: individual leader
ship, collective leadership, intragroup and intergroup conlict, conlict of
strongly held values, power aspects, etc. – and ultimately produced a real change
leading to more change. They made our country a better country.
If those activists could integrate the complex processes and elements of
leadership in practice, in reality, should we not be able to do so in theory?
REFERENCES
Ciulla, J. (eds) (2004), Ethics, the Heart of Leadership, Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 59,
70.
Index
Abbott, A.S. 101 Bible 76, 83, 87
abstract symbols 65 Biederman, P. 192
Achebe, Chinua 76, 83 Bishop, G.D. 101
actionoriented leadership 198–9 Blascovich, J. 110, 112
action for change 179–81 Boal, K.B. 57
action research 161 Bohr, N. 46, 54, 168
agency 8, 17, 18, 42, 210, 219 Bourdieu, P. 215–16
context and 208, 229, 230–32 brainstorming 99–100
structure and 211, 214–16, 217, 220 Brown, V. 100
Allen, K. 198 Brownmiller, S. 76
American Institute of Physics 167 Bryson, J.M. 199
anarchy 51, 78–9, 128–9 bureaucracy 84–5, 88
Ansari, M. 104 Burns, J.M. 1–2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 14–21,
anthropology 10–11 24–5, 28–9, 47–8, 56–7, 62–3, 96,
ApffelMarglin, F. 140 99, 114, 116–17, 143–4, 153–4,
aristocracy 126, 128–9 165, 171, 173, 191, 232, 234–9
Aristotle 18, 125–7 Bush administration 51, 53, 113
Arthur, M.B. 117
as if condition 15, 29, 30, 34, 194 Cacioppo, J.T. 108
Asch, S.E. 106 Calder, B.J. 55, 56
Ashby, Sir E. 67 Capra, F. 168
authority 83–5, 115, 129–30, 181, 192 Carlyle, T. 55, 56, 232
obedience to 105–6, 107 Carnap, R. 46, 50
power and 10, 29, 140, 170 case approach 153–60
autokinetic effect 106 Cassidy, D. 167
Avolio, B.J. 29, 117, 171 causality 152–84, 230
Ayman, R. 55, 56 central route to persuasion 108–9
change 229, 238–9
Bales, R.F. 55, 56 action for 179–81
Baron, R. 98 causality and 152–84, 230
Barry, D. 201 change agents 153, 216–17
Bass, B.M. 63, 108, 114, 117, 171 chaos 47
Bay of Pigs (Cuba) 102 charisma 82–3, 84, 85, 114–17, 196, 228,
behavior 32, 55, 56, 68, 102–3 231
BenZeev, T. 112 Chemers, M.M. 55, 56
Bennis, W. 192 choice
Bentham, J. 89, 133 rational choice theory 54
Bentley, E. 74 strategic choice theory 54, 57
Berger, P. 189 Chrislip, D.D. 192
Berle, A. 83 Christensen, C. 101
biased information sampling 100–101 citizen leadership 56, 57, 68
241
citystate 126–7 critical theory 189, 193

Ciulla, J.B. 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 18–19, 21, 31, Crosby, B. 191, 199
47, 170, 234, 237 Crotty, M. 189, 193
mapping metaphor 33, 62, 64, 65 Cuban missile crisis 102
civil rights movement (case study) culture 10, 20, 87, 88, 207–8, 210–11
154–61, 164–84 cumulative effect 161–3, 164, 184
climate (condition for change) 171–2,
180 DEC 87
Clinton, B. 144 decisionmaking 16, 54
coercion/coercive power 43, 85, 97, 107, group 100–102
109, 170 De Cremen, D. 83
cognitive dissonance theory 10, 109 deductive reasoning 50
cognitive structures 200 de Gaulle, C. 101
cognitive theory 32, 55, 56, 57, 68 deindividuation 102–3
Cohen, R. 109 democracy 86, 128–9, 210, 223, 226, 227
collective effort model 99 Department of Justice (USA) 76
collectives (behavior) 102–3 dependency 42, 43
command/command power 39, 86 Derrida, J. 189
commitment 116, 117 description (role of theory) 49–50
‘common sense’ understanding 104 descriptive/explanatory ield 9, 32–3, 50,
communitarianism 139–40, 142, 146–7 62, 63
communities of practice 107–8, 109, 112, determinism/free will question 230–31
190–91, 193–4 Diener, E. 103
compliance 107–8, 109, 112 difference principle 137–8, 145
conceptual perspectives 152–60 distractionconlict theorists 99
conlict 29, 74, 99, 237 distributive justice 115, 228
social tensions 168–71 Dodge, J. 197
conformity 106–7, 114, 118 dominance 40, 42, 43–4
Conger, J.A. 116 domination 18
consent 23, 40, 42–4, 129, 130 Drath, W. 190–91, 193, 194, 195,
conservative approach 124, 126 198–200
constructionist approach 11, 109–10, Duck, J.M. 112
152–3, 188–201 Dukerich, J.M. 190
constructivism 11, 30, 47, 51, 52, 206, Dupree, M. 75, 227
230 duty of assistance 138–9, 142
context 20, 59, 61, 195–6, 226 dynamic systems 8, 164–7
agency and 208, 229, 230–32 see also group dynamics
role of (contemplation) 205–20
contingency theory 32, 55, 56, 63, 68, 222 Eagly, A.H. 111
control 26 economics 3–4
Coons, A.E. 55, 56 egg yolk diagram 212–14
Cooper, J.L. 109 Ehrlich, S.B. 190
cooperative inquiry 188, 197, 199 Einstein, A. 48–9, 50, 168
Cooperrider, D. 199 Elaboration Likelihood Model 108
Coriolanus (Shakespeare) 74–5, 90–91, Eldredge, N. 161, 163, 167, 180
227 Elmers, M. 201
cosmopolitanism 139–44, 147, 148 Ely, M.P. 163
countervailing power 86–7 empiricism 9, 47, 50
Couto, R.A. 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 46–7, 57, empowerment 237–8
152–3, 168, 170, 179–80, 184 endvalues 144
Index 243
Enlightenment 8, 18, 144, 223 free will/determinism question 230–31

environmentalism 32, 33, 59–60, 62, 67 French, J. 10, 85, 105, 170
epistemology 25, 26, 222 Freud, S. 10, 97, 108, 114
equality 26–7, 123–4, 137, 223–6 Frohlich, N. 56
see also inequalities Fu, C. 168
Erdogan, B. 99 Fukuyama, F. 77
essentialism 32–3, 59–60, 62, 67, 152–3,
189, 230 game theory 54, 56
ethics 19, 59, 61 Gandhi, M. 70, 228
framework for general theory 123–48, Gandhi, M. 116, 118, 144
221, 225 Gardner, H. 14, 108, 142–3
in leadership studies 143–7 Geertz, C. 87, 88
morality and 123–5, 128, 133–6, gender stereotypes 111–12
141–4, 236 general theory of leadership
social tensions 169, 170–71 deinitions 48–54
ethnography 197 ethics (framework) 123–48, 221, 225
evaluation apprehension 98–9, 100 foundational assumptions 19–27
exchange perspective 113–14, 117 grand theory 1–34, 232
existential phenomenology 189 integrated theory/alternative outcomes
expectancyvalue framework 99 27–33
experientialist view (of metaphor) 64–5 next steps (challenges) 34
expert power 85, 170 project (call/response) 1–15
explanation (role of theory) 49–50 project meetings see Guadalajara
meeting; Mount Hope meeting;
Faier, E.A. 5, 7–8, 10–11, 21, 25, 30, Richmond meeting
152–3, 170, 179–80, 184 project scope 15–19
on context (dialogue) 205–20, 230 generalizations 46, 47, 50–54, 211–12
fairness 115, 137–40, 228, 229 generativity 179
Falbe, C.M. 104 Gergen, K. 189
Fazio, R.H. 109 Gilbert, F. 78
fear/fearsomeness 79 Gilgamesh 76
feminism 32, 33, 51–2, 59–60, 62, 67, Gini, A. 170
193 global commons 199
Festinger, L. 103, 109 globalization 137, 148
Fiedler, F.E. 55, 56 Goethals, G.R. 2, 3, 10, 15–18, 20, 21,
ield theory 161, 163, 164, 184 96–7, 154
Fielding, K.S. 112 Goethals, G.W. 115
Fletcher, J. 198 Gold team 22, 23–4, 25–7, 30, 152–3,
Foldy, E. 197 170, 179–80, 184
Follett, M.P. 86 Goldman, S. 191
followers see leaderfollower relations Goldsmith, M. 191
force 74, 75–81, 227 Goldstein, J.S. 78
‘forced compliance’ paradigm 109 good societies 137–43
Forsyth, D.R. 179 Goodman, L. 50
Foti, R.J. 110 Gould, S.J. 161, 163, 167, 180
Foucault, M. 17, 75, 76, 88–90, 189 governmentality 88–9
foundational assumptions (of GTOL grand theory of leadership 1–34, 232
group) 19–27 Grand Uniied Theory (GUT) 49
fractals/fractal subsystem 8, 166 Granovetter, M. 172
Franz, T.M. 101 Grant, U.S. 118
great man theory 32, 55, 56, 68, 224 Horvath, J.A. 104
Green, S.G. 55, 56 ‘hot group’ 2
Green, Z. 10 House, R.J. 117
Greenblatt, S. 88 Hoyt, C.L. 112
Greenleaf, Robert K. 56, 57, 86–7, 89, human condition 18, 19, 21–3, 28,
144–5 39–44, 118, 223, 235
Grint, K. 189, 193 human nature 59, 60, 88, 152, 223, 233,
Gronn, P. 191 235
group decisionmaking 100–102 human rights 76–7, 91, 144
group dynamics 96–103, 117, 118, 227 Human Rights Watch 76–7, 91
group polarization 100, 101 humanism/humanists 3, 5–7, 12, 16, 19,
groups, outsiders and 133–7 32–3, 53, 57–60, 62, 67, 232
groupthink 100, 101–2 Hume, D. 168
Guadalajara meeting 27–33, 34 Hunt, J. 2, 47
Guerin, B. 98 Hunt, J.G. 56, 57, 70
Guicciardini, F. 78 Hunt, S. 190, 200
Huxham, C. 192
habitus 215
happiness 18, 133–4, 235 idealism 52
hard power 86 Idealized Inluence 117
Hare, R.M. 133 identiication with leader 108, 116
Harman, W.W. 183 identity, meaning and 169
Harris, R.A. 47 idiosyncrasy credit 114
Harvey, M. 22 imagination 44
Havel, V. 84–5 imaginative capacity 65
Hedlund, J. 104 immediacy 104–5
Heifetz, R.A. 14, 165, 191 implicit leadership theories 110, 224
Heisenberg, W. 166, 167, 168 individual performance 98–100
Hempel, C.G. 12, 53–4 individualism 139, 140
heroic leadership 56, 198, 200, 230 Individualized Consideration 117
Heron, J. 197 induced compliance 109
Hesse, H. 87, 89–90 inductive reasoning 50
Hesselbein, F. 191 inequalities 26–7, 40–41
Hickman, G.R. 14, 17–18, 152–3, 170, leader–follower 123–4, 137–40, 147–8
179–80, 184, 192 trait/situational approaches 125–9
holistic social constructive model 64, transactional/transformational
66–7 approaches 129–32
matrix and perspective 32, 33, 59–62 inluence 228
Hicks, D.A. 3–5, 11, 17–18, 145, 152–3, Idealized 117
170, 179–80, 184 power and 103, 105, 107, 109, 226–7
Hill, T.E., Jr. 145 social 97, 103–9, 112, 116, 227
Hillman, J. 79 ‘inluence of suggestion’ 103
Hobbes, T. 43, 63, 80–81, 129–30, 223, information sampling, biased 100–101
224, 225, 229, 231 informational power 85, 170
Hogg, M.A. 112–13 ‘inner vessel’ 209
holistic, social constructive model 64, Inspirational Motivation 117
66–7 integrated theory 3, 5, 9–11, 19–20, 24–5
Hollander, E.P. 110, 113–14 alternative outcomes versus 27–33
Hooijberg, R. 57 basic elements/forces 62, 74–7
Horth, D.M. 194 deinitions 48–54
Index 245
Intellectual Stimulation 117–18 power and 87–90

intended change 173–6 reality and 189–90
internalization 108–9, 228 tacit 104
International Leadership Association 27, knowledge principle 195, 199, 200
28, 30, 34, 194 Koestler, A. 44
international relations 48, 50–53, 67–8, Kravitz, D.A. 99
221 Kuhn, T. 4, 47, 55
interpretavists 32, 57, 58–9
interposition theory 159 Lakatos, I. 4
invisible leadership 192, 238, 239 Lake, D.A. 56, 57
‘is/ought’ paradox 9 Lakoff, G. 64, 65
Lambert, L.D.W. 192
Jablin, F.M. 6–7, 9, 29, 168 Lao Tzu 86
Jackson, J.M. 140 Laplace, Marquis P.S. de
Janis, I. 102 (Laplace’s demon) 53–4, 62
Johns, B.R. 154–61, 164–84, 229, 231 large collective (behavior) 102–3
Johnson, C. 100 Larsen, L. 47, 70
Johnson, J.L. 29, 188 Larson, C.E. 192
Johnson, M. 64 Larson, J.R., Jr. 101
Julian, J.W. 110 Latane, B. 104
just societies 137–43 Laudan, L. 47, 68
justice 125, 143, 225 leader–follower relations 17, 18, 20, 28,
distributive 115, 228 196, 228, 235–6
as fairness 115, 137–40, 228, 229 group dynamics 96–103, 117–18, 227
procedural 114–15, 228 inequalities 125–33, 147–8
nature of 113–18
Kaczmarski, K. 199 social inluence/persuasion 103–9
Kafka, F. 44, 84 social perception 109–13
Kahn, R.L. 55, 56 leader, identiication with 116
Kahnweiler, W.M. 191 leader categorization theory 110
Kant, I. 18, 135–6, 225 leadership
Kantianism 133–7, 138, 142, 147 as action for change 179–81
Kanungo, R.N. 116 causality and 152–84, 230
Kaplan, M. 101 as cause of change 176–9
Kapoor, A. 114 change and 152–84, 229–30, 238–9
Karau, S.J. 99, 111 constructionist approach 11, 109–10,
Katz, D. 55, 56 152–3, 188–201
Kellerman, B. 171 dynamic systems 8, 164–7
Kelley, R. 179–80, 181 ethics see ethics
Kelman, H.C. 107–8, 109, 228 general theory see general theory of
Kennedy administration 102 leadership
Kenney, R.A. 110 generalizations 46, 47, 50–54, 211–12
Kerr, N.L. 98, 100 human condition and 18, 19, 21–3, 28,
Kerr, S. 6 39–44, 223
King, M.L., Jr. 116, 154, 228, 236 as intended change 173–6
kinship 10, 39 periodic table 12–13, 14
Kipnis, D. 104 quantum view 8, 9
Kliengklom, T. 112 relational/systemic dimensions 191–3
Kluger, R. 165, 173, 179 role 96–118
knowledge 25, 54, 195, 200 role of context 205–20
social identity theory 112–13, 117 Mandela, N. 118, 228

studies (ethical approaches) 143–7 Mannheim, K. 189
study outcomes/observations 221–33 Mansield, H. 78
theory/metatheory of 46–71 Mao Zedong 80, 82
transformational/transforming effects mapping metaphor 33, 62, 64, 65, 222
116–18 Marglin, S.A. 140
‘leadership creation parable’ 23 Martin, B. 99
Leadership Genome Project 2 Martin, W. 201
leadership theory Marx, K. 153, 189
fundamental issues/perspectives matrix, perspective and 30–33, 54–63
54–67 Maus, K.E. 74
general see general theory of Maxwell, J.C. 49, 50
leadership Mead, G.H. 189
generalizations 46, 47, 50–54, 211–12 meaning, identity and 169
grand theory 1–34, 232 meaningmaking 26, 189, 190, 191,
metatheory 46–71 193–6
progress in 70–71 Meehan, D. 29, 188
Le Bon, G. 96–7, 103, 114, 227 Meindl, J. 190, 229, 230
Lee Kuan Yew 140 mental models 198, 200
legitimacy 43, 84, 85, 112, 113–15, 170, meritorious duties 136
227, 232 Messick, D.M. 113
Levi, P. 44 metaphor/metaphorical systems 31, 33,
Levin, S. 116 48, 62, 64, 65, 67–8
Levine, J.M. 101 metaphysics 48, 50, 168
Lewin, K. 56, 161, 163, 166, 167 metatheory of leadership 46–71
liberal arts 12, 22 Milgram, S. 105–6, 17
liberalism 52, 138, 139–40, 147 Mill, J.S. 8, 133, 134, 137, 226
Liden, R.C. 99 Miller, N. 98
Lincoln, Y. 190 mindfulness 167–8
Lind, E.A. 114, 115, 228 minority inluence 106–7
Lindholm, C. 83 Mio, J.S. 116
linear approach 4, 7, 8–9, 11, 19, 26, 69 Mitchell, T.R. 55, 56
linguistics 47, 64 moderate approach (to inequality) 124
Linsky, M. 165 monarchy 127, 128–9, 147, 225
LipmanBlumen, J. 171, 191 Monk, T. 192
local authorities 159–60 Montgomery bus boycott 29, 154, 236–7,
Locke, J. 63, 130–31 238, 239
Lord, R.G. 109, 110 moral accountability 175
Luckman, T. 189 moral division of labor 134–5, 141
Luke, J. 199 moral leadership theory 32, 55, 56, 57
Lyons, O. 183 morality 67, 68, 118
equality and 123–4, 223, 225–6
McCullough, D. 115 ethics and 123–5, 128, 133–6, 141–4,
Machiavelli, N. 63, 78–81, 82, 86, 88, 236
127–9, 131, 223 power and 125, 223, 227–8, 229
McIntosh, P. 198 Moreland, R.L. 101
MacIntyre, A. 140 Morgan, G. 190
Maher, K.J. 109, 110 morphogenic ields 164
majority inluence 106–7 Moscovici, S. 101, 106
Managan, K. 48, 70 motivation 17, 18, 20, 96, 117, 238
Index 247
Moton High School 154, 155–61, 164, paradigms 4, 47, 55, 64

165, 166–7, 168–70, 171–84 Parks, R. 154, 236
Mount Hope meeting 19–27, 39, 152, parochialism 140
170, 179, 180, 184, 189, 221, 223, Parsons, T. 193
234–5 Pastor, JC. 192
Muhammad Ali 107 patriarchal authority 84
Mullen, B. 100 Paulus, P. 100
murder 76 perception, social 97, 109–13, 224
Murphy, S.M. 99 performance, individual (effect of
Myers, D.G. 101 presence of others) 98–100
Myrdal, G. 161–3, 164, 166, 167 periodic table of leadership 12–13, 14
peripheral route to persuasion 108–9
NAACP 156, 157, 158, 160, 173, 175–8, perspective, matrix and 30–33, 54–63
236 persuasion 10
narrative inquiry 188, 197 central/peripheral routes 108–9
narratives 9, 12, 14, 19, 21, 23–4, 27, compliance and 107–8
42–3, 152, 180, 193, 200 deinition 104
see also stories selfpersuasion 109
nation state 39, 138, 140, 144 social inluence and 97, 103–9
National League for Democracy (Burma) Peterson, D. 77
82 Petty, R.E. 108
National Security Council 102 Pfeffer, J. 190
needs, wants and 14, 28, 223, 235 Phillips, J.S. 110
Neider, L.L. 85 Phillips, R.L. 57
neoliberalism 51, 52 philosophical approaches (leadership in
new science, leadership and 163–4 good and just societies) 137–43
Newton, Sir I. 46, 168 physics 48–9, 62, 163, 166
Nietzsche, F. 90 Plato 33, 63, 87, 90, 125–6, 224–5
Niiniluoto, I. 70 pluralism 32, 33, 59–60, 62, 67
Nijstad, B.A. 100 polarization effects 100, 101
Nixon administration 114 Popper, K. 47
Nussbaum, M. 142 positivism 30, 32, 33, 59–60, 62, 67, 68,
Nye, J.S., Jr. 86 69, 206
Postmes, T. 103
obedience (to authority) 105–6, 107 postmodernism/postmodernists 8, 32, 51,
objectivist view (of metaphor) 64, 65 57, 58, 59, 90, 189
objectivity 207, 220 Powell, R. 56, 57
oligarchy 128, 129 power 20, 61, 116, 126–7
Oppenheimer, J.A. 56 authority and 10, 29, 140
organizational structures 16 coercion 43, 85, 107, 109, 170
Orwell, G. 44, 81, 227 consent and 43–4, 129, 130
Osborn, A.F. 99–100 deinition 17–18
Ospina, S. 30, 188, 191, 193, 196, 197, empowerment 237–8
200 as force 74, 75–81, 227
others, presence of (effect on individual inluence and 103, 105, 107, 109, 170
performance) 98–100 knowledge and 87–90
outsiders, groups and 133–7 morality and 125, 223, 227–8, 229
questioning of 90–91
Palus, C. 191, 193, 194 social tensions 169, 170
‘panoptic’ power 89 soft power 75, 81–7
pragmatism/pragmatists 68, 69, 189 reward power 85, 170

prediction (role of theory) 49–50 Richmond meeting 1–2, 15–19, 34
prescription 9, 10, 53–4, 62 Ridoli, R. 78
prescriptive/justiicatory ield 32–3, 62, Riggio, R.E. 29, 116
63 Riker, W.H. 56
Price, T.L. 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 18, 20, 21–2, Ringelmann, M. 99
24–5, 53, 133 Ripley, J. 90
matrix and perspective 32–3, 62, 63 role congruity theory 111–12, 117
probability theory 47 roles (survival) 42
problem solving 161 Roosevelt, E. 118
procedural justice 114–15, 228 Roosevelt, F.D. 19, 29, 117, 144
process/process model 1, 7, 12, 14, 19 Rosenberg, I. 39
product, process and 1 Rosenblum, K.E. 152, 169, 189
production blocking 100 Rost, J.C. 177–8, 196
progress in leadership theory 70–71 Rouse, J. 90
project scope (Richmond meeting) 15–19 Rousseau, J.J. 62–3, 79, 130–32, 143
property/property rights 130–31 rule utilitarianism 135
prototypicality approach 112–13, 117
punctuated equilibrium 161, 163, 180, Salas, E. 100
184 Sandel, M. 139
Purple team 22, 23, 24, 30, 152 scenario building 183–4
Schall, E. 191, 200
quantum mechanics 163, 166 Schein, E. 87, 88
quantum view of leadership 8, 9 Schlager, E. 163
questioning power 90–91 Schmidt, S.M. 104
questions (in generalizationmaking) schools of thought
50–51 in international relations 51–3
matrix 31–2, 56
radical approach (to inequality) 124 Schriesheim, C.A. 6, 85
Raelin, J. 199 Schroedinger, E. 168
rape 76–7, 78 SchwartzKenney, B.M. 110
rational choice theory 54 Schwartz, P. 183
rational persuasion 104 science 68, 69, 163–4
rationality 84, 88, 133, 137, 218, 220 selfpersuasion 109
Raven, B. 10, 85, 105, 170 Sen, A. 140
Rawls, J. 137–40, 142, 144, 225 Senge, P. 200
realism/realists 51, 52, 68, 69 sensemaking 8, 16, 42, 43, 44, 195–6
reality 24, 26, 110, 230 servant leadership 56, 57, 68, 86, 89,
knowledge and 189–90 144–5, 147–8
social 42, 152 Shakespeare, W. 42, 88, 232
Reason, P. 197 Coriolanus 74–5, 90–91, 227
reciprocity 39–40, 74, 104 192 Shamir, B. 117
Red team 22–3, 24, 25–7, 30, 152 shared leadership 191–2, 198
Reese, R. 116 Sherif, M. 106
referent power 85, 170 Singer, P. 134, 141–2
relational dimension of leadership 191–3 situational approach 56, 125–9
relativists 68–9 situational response 33
religion 3, 4, 11, 89, 146–7 Slater, P.E. 55, 56
republics 79, 81, 86, 127 Smircich, L. 190
resource availability/distribution 169–70 Smith, A. 18, 41–2
Index 249
Smith, R.C. 157 survival 41–2, 43, 44, 128

Snow, C.P. 12 Suu Kyi, AS. 82, 83, 91, 228, 231
social constructivism 32, 33, 59, 60 systemic dimension of leadership 191–3
holistic 64, 66–7 systems theory 7, 9, 47, 161, 162–3,
social contagion 103 164–7, 184
social contract theory 62, 63, 81, 129–30,
131, 132, 137–9, 143 tacit knowledge 104
social exchange theory 56, 63, 104, Tate, N. 90
113–14, 117 Terry, R.W. 199
social facilitation 98–9 Tetlock, P.E. 102
social identity theory 101, 112–13, 117 Thatcher, M. 113
social impact theory 104–5, 106 ‘theatre state’ 87
social inluence 112, 116, 227 theoretical matrix 32, 57–9
persuasion and 97, 103–9 theory of leadership
social inhibition 98 deinitions 48–54
social justice 188 generalizations 46, 47, 50–54, 211–12
social loaing 99 nature of 5–8, 46–71
social matching 100 roles of 46–7, 49–50
social perception 97, 109–13, 116, 224 see also general theory of leadership
social reality 42, 152 thick description 87
social sciences 3, 6–7, 12, 16, 18, 22, 53, threshold points (condition for change)
55–6, 68–9 171, 172–3, 180
social scientists 5, 6, 12, 32, 57, 58, 59 Tierney, W. 190
social tensions 168–71 timing (condition for change) 171, 172,
socially constructed model, holistic 64, 180
66–7 Tindale, R.S. 100
soft power 75, 81–7 Titus, W. 100
Somerville, I. 191 tradition 84
Sorenson, G.L.J. 1, 2, 3, 5–6, 10, 15–16, trait approach/theories 32–3, 55, 56, 68,
33, 47, 144, 154, 189–90, 192, 200 125–9, 224
sovereignty 129–30, 132 transactional approach (to inequalities)
Spears, R. 103 97, 129–32
spiritual leadership 146–7 transactional leadership theory 55, 57,
Stasser, G. 100 114, 117, 118, 143–4
State Law and Order Restoration Council transformational approach (to inequali
(SLORC) 82 ties) 129–32
statesman 139 transformational leadership 114, 115,
Sternberg, R.J. 104 116–18, 171
Stoddard, T. 112 transforming leadership 56, 57, 62, 63,
Stogdill, R.M. 2, 47, 55, 56, 70 68, 97, 116–18, 143–4, 145, 147,
Stoner, J.A.F. 101 171, 191
stories 42–3, 108, 180 Travis, TM.C. 152, 169, 189
see also narratives Triplett, N. 98
strategic choice theory 54, 57 Trouillot, M.R. 206–7
strategic leadership theory 32, 54, 55, 57 trust 26, 79–80, 87, 115, 227–8
strength 104–5 Tyler, T.R. 114, 115, 228
structure 211, 214, 215–16, 217, 220 tyranny 128, 129
subjectivity 207, 220
suffering 133 uncertainty 6, 166–7, 183, 200
Sullivan, K.M. 175 uniied theory of leadership 48–54, 62
see also integrated theory Weber, M. 82–4, 85, 88, 116, 175, 183,
United Nations 76 228
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Wheatley, Margaret J. 161, 163–4, 165,
144 166, 167
utilitarianism 133–7, 141–2, 226 Wilkinson, I. 104
Williams, K.D. 99
Vaill, P.B. 164–5, 167, 168 Wrangham, Richard 77
values 17, 18–19, 20, 28–9, 236–7, Wren, J.T. 12–14, 19, 20, 25–7
238–9 on context (dialogue) 205–20, 230
Vanderslice, V. 196 matrix and perspective 30–31, 32,
Vangen, S. 192 57–9
‘veil of ignorance’ 42, 139
violence 74, 75–81, 91, 97, 227 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 86
Vroom, V.H. 55, 56
Yarmolinsky, A. 165
Waal, F. de 77, 81 Yetton, P.W. 55, 56
Walker, M.C. 29 Young, O.R. 56
matrix and perspective 30–32, 55–7 Yukl, G.A. 19, 85, 104
Waltz, K. 51
Walzer, M. 140 Zajonc, R.B. 98
wants, needs and 14, 28, 223, 235 Zakaria, F. 57
Washington conference 34 Zavalloni, M. 101
Wayne, S.J. 99 Zimbardo, P.G. 103

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The Quest for a General Theory of Leadership

NEW HORIZONS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

This important series is designed to make a signiicant contribution to the dev­

Georgia L.J. Sorenson

NEW HORIZONS IN LEADERSHIP STUDIES

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

A catalogue record for this book

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

ISBN­13: 978 1 84542 541 8 (cased)

Typeset by Manton Typesetters, Louth, Lincolnshire, UK

List of igures and tables viii

1. A quest for a grand theory of leadership 1

James MacGregor Burns is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Williams

member of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Rich­

George R. ‘Al’ Goethals is E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of

Michael Harvey is Chair of the Department of Business Management at Wash­

Gill Robinson Hickman is currently a Professor in the Jepson School of Lead­

Douglas A. Hicks, PhD is Associate Professor of Leadership Studies and Reli­

Crystal L. Hoyt is an Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies at the Jepson

Sonia Ospina, is an Associate Professor of Public Management and Policy and

Terry L. Price is Associate Professor at the Jepson School of Leadership Stud­

Ronald E. Riggio, PhD is the Henry R. Kravis Professor of Leadership and

Georgia L.J. Sorenson, PhD is Chair and Professor of Transformation of the

Mark C. Walker is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations

The philosophical tension apparent in the search for equality brings us

much of what we have discussed. Finally, James MacGregor Burns contributes

What happens when a collection of scholars from differing disciplines comes

BEGINNINGS: CALL AND RESPONSE

the responses of the scholars, in the form of an exchange of papers. As might

Reminder of the Parameters of Theory,’ Sorenson, quoting social scientists

oversimpliies the matter, it is useful to think of the problem in terms of two

Figure 1.1 Periodic table of leadership studies

leader emergence, policy debate, outcome, implementation, and feedback loop.

RICHMOND: DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE

cussing what he considered to be the key ‘elements’ of leadership: power,

MOUNT HOPE: FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

acknowledge ‘multiple truths’ in the characterization and understanding of

condition in order to understand the nature of leadership. The humanist in me

relationships in the context of larger social terrains of meaning,’ and is a result

groups coming up with totally or considerably different drafts, which would

nothing about leadership; indeed, a rather elegant description of how leaders

GUADALAJARA: INTEGRATED THEORY VS.

freedom, justice, … equality of opportunity or condition, or ultimately

Given the dual challenges of divergent premises and dificulties in integration,

ferences in assumptions among several of the key theories of leadership. Walker

WASHINGTON: EPILOGUE AS PROLOGUE

2. Joanne B. Ciulla, ibid.

109. Gill Robinson Hickman, ‘Concepts in Leadership Studies’ (November, 2003).

I’d shape one impulse through the contraries

In June 2002 a dozen scholars met at Williams College’s auspiciously named

Leadership is part and parcel of the human condition. A mystery as modern as

leadership fashions an ‘oficial story,’ there are always counter­stories, subver­

group will be in a sense invisible – unseen and unacknowledged within the

Scholars, educators, and practioners – both in business and the non­proit

A CALL TO WHAT? GENERAL, GRAND, UNIFIED, OR

that matter and energy are interchangeable where E (energy) = m (mass) × c2

What Does Theory Do: Description, Explanation, or Prediction?

Making Generalizations about Leadership

What is the question?

This important series is designed to make a signiicant contribution to the dev

ISBN13: 978 1 84542 541 8 (cased)

member of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Rich

Michael Harvey is Chair of the Department of Business Management at Wash

Gill Robinson Hickman is currently a Professor in the Jepson School of Lead

Douglas A. Hicks, PhD is Associate Professor of Leadership Studies and Reli

Terry L. Price is Associate Professor at the Jepson School of Leadership Stud

leadership fashions an ‘oficial story,’ there are always counterstories, subver

Scholars, educators, and practioners – both in business and the nonproit

School Realism Idealism/ Neoliberalism Feminism Postmodernism Constructivism

upon an internal, individual process; however, leadership is now seen as a rela

lection of measurable data, and the use of a nonnormative frame of reference.

Human Nature l Self l Observable & l Meaning l Interdependent l Gendered l Diverse –

Coriolanus, a study of early 17thcentury English political anxieties set in an

Some evolutionary biologists and psychologists seek to explain the ‘male

It is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is neces

A university administrator explained carefully to me that by predicting inancial dis

distractionconlict theorists proposed that the presence of others produces an