1. Philippine National Railway vs.

CA
G.R. No. 1576568 October 15, 2007

FACTS: In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose Amores was traversing the railroad
tracks in Kahilumstreet, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the railroad track, he
stopped for a while then proceeded accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores was
crossing the intersection, a PNR train turned up and collided with the car. After the
impact, the car was dragged 10 meters beyond the center crossing. Amores died as a
consequence thereof. At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a
crossing bar in the intersection to warn the motorists of the incoming train. Aside for
the railroad track, the only visible sign was a defective standard sign board “ STOP, LOOK
and LISTEN. No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it finally bumped
the car of Amores.

The heir of Amores filed a complaint for damages against PNR and Virgilio Borja, PNR’s
locomotive driver at the time of the incident. In the complaint, they avvered that the
train’s speedometer was defective and that the negligence of PNR and Borja was the
proximate cause of the mishap for their failure to take proper precautions to prevent
injury.

In their answer, PNR denied the allegations, stating that the train was railroad worthy
and without any defect. According to them, the proximate cause of Amores’ death was
his own carelessness and negligence, and his wanton disregard for traffic rules and
regulations in crossing tracks and trying to beat the approaching train.

DOCTRINE:It is true that one driving an automobile must use his faculties of seeing and
hearing when nearing a railroad crossing. However, the obligation to bring to a full stop
vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any "through street" only accrues
from the time the said "through street" or crossing is so designated and sign-posted.
The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if
there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device
or equipment be installed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appellate court was correct in ascribing negligence on the
part of PNR and Borja.

DECISION OF THE RTC: The RTC held in favor of PNR and BORJA. The RTC rationalized
that the proximate cause of the collision was Amores' fatal misjudgment and the
reckless course of action he took in crossing the railroad track even after seeing or
hearing the oncoming train.

DECISION OF THE CA: The CA reversed the RTC decision. The appellate court found the
petitioners negligent. The court based the petitioners' negligence on the failure of PNR
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to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman, considering that the
crossing is located in a thickly populated area. Moreover, the signboard "Stop, Look and
Listen" was found insufficient because of its defective condition as described above.
Lastly, no negligence could be attributed to Amores as he exercised reasonable diligence
in crossing the railroad track.

SC RULING:
The honorable SC ruled that the Appellate Court was correct in ascribing negligence on
the part of PNR and Borja.

Negligence has been defined as “the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”
It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep signal
devices in working order. Failure to do so is an indication of negligence. The failure of
PNR to put a cross bar, flagman or switchman, or a semaphore is an evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public even if there is no law or ordinance
requiring it.

It is true that one driving an automobile must use his faculties of seeing and hearing
when nearing a railroad crossing. However, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles
moving in public highways before traversing any “through street” only accrues from the
time the said “through street” or crossing is so designated and sign-posted. From the
records, it can be inferred that Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required
of him to avoid injury to himself and others.

2.Mr. and Mrs. Dominador Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

104 PHIL 405, August 29, 1958
Bautista Angelo, J.

FACTS: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three recreational swimming
pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for
which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. In the
afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high
school student and Boy Scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's
swimming pools. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area
informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming
under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the
same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and
retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.

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DOCTRINE / LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

ISSUE: Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence
of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

DECISION OF THE RTC: After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is
untenable and dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

SC RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the negative. Since the present action is
one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that
the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by
the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his
employees. Appellants tried to prove through the testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and
Ruben Ong that when Eusebio Ong and Hagad, Jr. detected that there was a drowning
person in the bottom of the big swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help,
lifeguard Manuel Abaño did not immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon
the third call that he threw away the magazine he was reading and allowed three or four
minutes to elapse before retrieving the body from the water. This negligence of Abaño,
they contend, is attributable to appellee.
But the claim of these two witnesses not only was vehemently denied by lifeguard
Abaño, but is belied by the written statements given by them in the investigation
conducted by the Police Department of Quezon City approximately three hours after the
happening of the accident. Thus, these two boys admitted in the investigation that they
narrated in their statements everything they knew of the accident, but, as found by the
trial, nowhere in said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting with the
security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic magazine when
the alarm was given for which reason he failed to immediately respond to the alarm.

There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom
of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display
in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of
the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course
for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on
schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a
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time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards
who are available always in case of emergency. Clearly, the defendant cannot be made
liable for damages in this case.

3. PURITA VESTIL AND AGUSTIN VESTIL vs. IAC

GR. NO. 74431, NOVEMBER 6, 1989

FACTS: Little Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of
the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of PuritaVestil at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was
treated for “multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead”. She was discharged after nine
days but was readmitted one week later due to “vomiting of saliva”. The following day,
the child died. Seven months later, the UYs sued for damages alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possesors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness. PuritaVestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or
of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are
other heirs to the property.

Doctrine: According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on the natural equity
and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

Article 2183: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Vestils should be liable for damages

HELD: YES. While it is true that the petitioners were not the owners of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda’s estate, there is no doubt that petitioners were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu
City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six
kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her
family regularly went to the house once or twice weekly according to at least one
witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was
playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog
itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda when the incident
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occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their
hospitalization expenses although Purita said she only knew them only casually. :
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on the natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

Therefore, the petitioners are liable for damages.

4. E. M. WRIGHTvs.MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

G.R. No. L-7760             October 1, 1914
MORELAND, J.:

Facts: The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in

the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's
residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to
enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the
night mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his
premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the rails,
resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries
complained of.

It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as described,
but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to
such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, to what extent?

Held:Yes, If the negligence of the plaintiff was the primary cause of the accident then, of
course, he cannot recover; if his negligence had nothing to do with the accident but
contributed to his injury, then the court was right in apportioning the damages, but if
there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff, then he should be awarded
damages adequate to the injury sustained.

A careful reading of the decision of the trial court leads us to the conclusion that there is
nothing in the opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court that the plaintiff was
negligent with reference to the accident which is the basis of this action. Mere
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered
with the other evidence tending to prove negligence.

As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant the
conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he

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would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to
say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be
sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to
conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a
drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and
guesswork.

5. PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.

G.R. No. L-21291

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss,
was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he
was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company,
close to midnight on the evening of Feb 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Pampanga,
in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force
Base; that at the time of the accident, he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then
returning in said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base; and that Corliss Jr. died
of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious
physical injuries and burns.
Summary of the testimony of two of the witnesses for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, He said that said jeep slowed down before
reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop.
Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear
and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train
coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was
not sufficient enough to avoid the accident.
Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified he was at the Balibago
checkpoint and saw the train coming. He stated that he heard the whistle of the
locomotive and saw the collision. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard
the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him
TeodoricoCapili who was at the engine at the time of the mishap," and who "testified
that before the locomotive approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he
blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep
suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25
kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the
middle of the tracks."

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Doctrine: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
Lower court: In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the
evidence, concluded that the deceased "in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the
oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but
unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation."
Issue: whether or not there is negligence on the part of the manila rail road co. hence
should be liable.
Held: No, The above finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to
defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company comes to us encased in the armor of what
admittedly appears to be a careful judicial appraisal and scrutiny of the evidence of
record. The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court
to hold that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the
gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a
collision and that TeodoricoCapili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at
the time of the accident. For one cannot just single out circumstance and then
confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance. What commends itself for
acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: "Predicated on the
testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his
familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the
further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said
witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the
oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident.

6. MALLORCA VS. DE JESUS, et al. G.R. NO. L-21486

FACTS: Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus
Company when it had a head on collision against a freight truck. Lolita and Valentin de
Jesus, her father, died. The bus had a tire blow out which resulted to the accident. A civil
case for damages was filed against La Mallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of De Jesus. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it argued that a tire blow out is a
fortuitous event and should not be taken as negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not a tire blow out is a fortuitous event?
HELD: No. The mechanical defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easily
discovered had the bus been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed to
hit the road. La Mallorca is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous
event for it could have been avoided had the bus been properly maintained. Moral
damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of

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contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of
the Civil Code.

7. Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al.

G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958

FACTS: SeverinaGarces and her son PrecillanoNecesito boarded a passenger truck of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines driven by Francisco Bandonell. The truck entered a wooden
bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right. The driver lost control, and after
wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where
water was breast deep. Garces died due to drowning while Necesito suffered injuries.

Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 were filed with the
Tarlac CFI against the carrier. The carrier pleaded that the accident was due to "engine
or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the
driver Bandonell.

RTC’s RULING: The trial court found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad
condition of the road and that accident was due to the fracture of the truck’s right
steering knuckle which could not be known by the carrier. Thus, it dismissed the
complaints holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous events.

RELATED LAW: Civil Code: ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for the all the circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering
knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised
the diligence required by law.

SC’s RULING: Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, a
passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a
defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the
defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care
which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and
application of the necessary tests. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective
appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s
liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the
defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually
has. Carrier’s liability rests upon negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree
of diligence that the law requires, and in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier

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bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of
prudence required.

8.EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. ARCELITO B. TAN

G.R. NO. 165339 AUGUST 23, 2010

FACTS: Respondent ArcelitoB.Tan maintained a current and savings account with

petitioner Equitable PCI Bank. On May 13, 1992, Tan issued PCIB Check No. 275100
postdated May 30, 1992 in the amount of P34,588.72 in favor of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. As of
May 14, 1992, respondent's balance with PCIB was P35,147.59. On May 14, 1992,
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. deposited the aforesaid check to its account with Solid Bank, Carbon
Branch, Cebu City. After clearing, the amount of the check was immediately debited by
PCIB from Tan's account leaving him with a balance of only P558.87. However, from
May 9 to 16, 1992, Tan issued three checks, specifically: PCIB Check No. 275080 dated
May 9, 1992, payable to Agusan del Sur Electric Cooperative Inc. (ASELCO) for the
amount of P6,427.68; PCIB Check No. 275097 dated May 10, 1992 payable to Agusan del
Norte Electric Cooperative Inc., (ANECO) for the amount of P6,472.01; and PCIB Check
No. 314104 dated May 16, 1992 payable in cash for the amount of P10,000.00. Thus,
when presented for payment, the three checks were dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds. As a result of the dishonored checks payable to ASELCO and
ANECO, the electric power supply for the two mini-sawmills owned and operated by Tan
was cut off and was restored only after several days. This prompted Tan to file with the
RTC of Cebu a complaint against PCIB for the payment of losses consisting of unrealized
income together with other claims, contending that Check No. 275100 was a postdated
check in payment of Bills of Lading Nos. 15, 16 and 17, and that his account with PCIB
would have had sufficient funds to cover payment of the three other checks were it not
for the negligence of the bank in immediately debiting from his account Check No.
275100, in the amount of P34,588.72, even as the said check was postdated to May 30,
1992. PCIB, on the other hand, averred that the questioned check was postdated May
30, 1992 and claimed that it was a current check dated May 3, 1992. The bank alleged
that the disconnection of the electric supply to respondent's sawmills was not due to
the dishonor of the checks, but for other reasons not attributable to the bank.

DOCTRINE/LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

“The diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family. In every
case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank
must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as
promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time

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the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the
bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs.”

“The bank on which the check is drawn, known as the drawee bank, is under strict
liability to pay to the order of the payee in accordance with the drawer’s instructions as
reflected on the face and by the terms of the check. Thus, payment made before the
date specified by the drawer is clearly against the drawee bank's duty to its client.”

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PCIB ACTED NEGLIGENTLY IN DEALING WITH TAN’S ACCOUNT.

DECISION OF THE RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB, holding that it did not act
negligently and dismissed the complaint. Tan appealed.

DECISION OF THE CA: The CA reversed the decision of RTC and directed PCIB to pay
respondent the sum of P1, 864,500.00 actual damages, P50, 000.00 moral damages,
P50, 000.00 exemplary damages and attorney's fees of P30, 000.00.

PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

SC RULING: The SC affirmed with modifications the decision of CA, holding that PCIB
acted negligently. However, the award of moral damages was deleted and added the
award of temperate damages.

The Court had already imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required
under R.A. 8791 at the time of the untimely debiting of Tan's account by PCIB. In Simex
International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that as a business
affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks,
therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family. In every case, the depositor
expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity, whether such account
consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single
transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has
to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the
depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to
whomever he directs.

Based on the facts, it is clear that PCIB did not exercise the degree of diligence that it
ought to have exercised in dealing with its client. Furthermore, the bank on which the
check is drawn, known as the drawee bank, is under strict liability to pay to the order of
the payee in accordance with the drawer’s instructions as reflected on the face and by
the terms of the check. Thus, payment made before the date specified by the drawer is
clearly against the drawee bank's duty to its client. As such, the Court finds that PCIB’s
negligence is the proximate cause of Tan’s loss.
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9. Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Cheah Chee Chong & Ofelia Camacho Cheah
G.R. No. 170865, August 25, 2012
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS: Ofelia Cheah (Ofelia) and her friend AdelinaGuarin (Adelina) were having a
conversation in the latter’s office when Adelina’s friend, Filipina Tuazon (Filipina),
approached her to ask if she could have Filipina’s check cleared and encashed for a
service fee of 2.5%. The check is Bank of America Check No. 190 under the account of
Alejandria Pineda and Eduardo Rosales and drawn by Atty. Eduardo Rosales against
Bank of America Alhambra Branch in California, USA, with a face amount of
$300,000.00, payable to cash. Because Adelina does not have a dollar account in which
to deposit the check, she asked Ofelia if she could accommodate Filipina’s request since
she has a joint dollar savings account with her Malaysian husband Cheah Chee Chong
(Chee Chong) with PNB Buendia Branch. The said accommodation party took place and
Ofelia was able to withdraw the amount. However, PNB Buendia learned that it was a
bouncing check, for which the bank demanded the return of the proceeds. Spouses
Cheah claimed that the proximate cause of PNB’s injury was its own negligence of
paying a US dollar denominated check without waiting for the 15-day clearing period, in
violation of its bank practice as mandated by its own bank circular.

RELEVANT DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Contributory Negligence

ISSUE: Who between PNB and Spouses Cheah was negligent and should bear the loss?

RTC Ruling: The RTC held that spouses Cheah were guilty of contributory negligence
because Ofelia trusted a friend’s friend whom she did not know and considering the
amount of the check made payable to cash, the RTC opined that Ofelia showed lack of
vigilance in her dealings. She should have exercised due care by investigating the
negotiability of the check and the identity of the drawer. While the court found that the
proximate cause of the wrongful payment of the check was PNB’s negligence in not
observing the 15-day guarantee period rule, it ruled that spouses Cheah still could not
escape liability to reimburse PNB the value of the check as an accommodation party
pursuant to Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. As such, the RTC held that
each party must suffer the consequences of their own acts and thus left both parties as
they are.

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CA Ruling: Applying the last clear chance doctrine, the CA held that PNB had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending loss of the money and yet, it glaringly
exhibited its negligence in allowing the withdrawal of funds without exhausting the 15-
day clearing period which has always been a standard banking practice as testified to by
PNB’s own officers. Accordingly, PNB cannot claim from spouses Cheah even if the latter
are accommodation parties under the law as the bank’s own negligence is the proximate
cause of the damage it sustained. Nevertheless, it also found Ofelia guilty of
contributory negligence. Thus, both parties should be made equally responsible for the
resulting loss.

SC Ruling: PNB and spouses Cheah are equally negligent and should therefore equally
suffer the loss. PNB’s act of releasing the proceeds of the check prior to the lapse of the
15-day clearing period was the proximate cause of the loss. As declared by Josephine
Estella, the Administrative Service Officer who was the bank’s Remittance Examiner,
what was unusual in the processing of the check was that the lapse of 15 banking days
was not observed. Ofelia deposited the subject check on November 4, 1992. Hence, the
15th banking day from the date of said deposit should fall on November 25, 1992.
However, what happened was that PNB Buendia Branch, upon calling up Ofelia that the
check had been cleared, allowed the proceeds thereof to be withdrawn on November
17 and 18, 1992, a week before the lapse of the standard 15-day clearing period.
Spouses Cheah are guilty of contributory negligence and are bound to share the loss
with the bank. Ofelia failed to observe caution in giving her full trust in accommodating
a complete stranger and this led her and her husband to be swindled. Considering that
Filipina was not personally known to her and the amount of the foreign check to be
encashed was $300,000.00, a higher degree of care is expected of Ofelia which she,
however, failed to exercise under the circumstances. Another circumstance which
should have goaded Ofelia to be more circumspect in her dealings was when a bank
officer called her up to inform that the Bank of America check has already been cleared
way earlier than the 15-day clearing period. The fact that the check was cleared after
only eight banking days from the time it was deposited or contrary to what Garin told
her that clearing takes 15 days should have already put Ofelia on guard. Wherefore, the
Court concurs with the findings of the CA that PNB and the spouses Cheah are equally
negligent and should therefore equally suffer the loss. The two must both bear the
consequences of their mistakes.

10. SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES

G.R. No. 169467February 25, 2010

FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent
Morales.

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Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting
incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is
the owner of the gun store.

On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales
agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which
killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs,
which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the
keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from
the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young
Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the
head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
“accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the
instant case.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to
pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization
and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence
this petition.

DOCTRINE: Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC,
the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176
states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is negligent?

HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision
reinstated.

YES

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This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under
Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on
the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to
file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of
enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners
opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they
alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP
Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a
person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition
must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or
no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms

safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that
all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and
separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such
as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the
gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was
not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept
a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally
checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was
not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this
case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair
defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good
father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with
dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

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11. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, et al v. MARIANO MEDINA
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Facts: On September 13, 1952, Juan Bataclan was among the passengers in bus no. 30
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina. At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
while the bus was running, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag
until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of
the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them could not get out of the
overturned bus.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of
the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow,
Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

Doctrine and related laws:

Proximate cause is th at cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by

any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.

Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

Issue: What is the prximate cause of Bataclan's death?

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Ruling of the trial court: The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.

SC Ruling: The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger,
merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by
the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in
the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a
torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through
is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.

12. TEODORA ASTUDILLO VERSUS MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

GR NO. L-33380
December 17, 1930

FACTS:A group of boys sauntered over the electric post, located to the congested
district in the Walled City in Intramuros. For unknown reason, Juan Diaz Astudillo,
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looking outward Intramuros, placed one foot on projection, reached out and grasped a
charged electric wire. Astudillo was electrocuted when he placed his right hand on a
wire connected with an electric light pole near Intramuros. The pole conforms to the
height requirements and the feeder wires are of the insulated type, known as triple
braid weather proof as required by the franchise. It was last expected by the City
Electrician in 1923 or 1924 and according to him, if these wires, if touched by a person,
would endanger his life by electrocution. Her mother filed an action to secure from
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) damages amounting P30,000. MERALCO set up as
special defenses that Astudillo’s death was due solely to his negligence and lack of care
and that the company employed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the injury.

DOCTRINE/LAWS RELATED
Foreseeability Test – Negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk. It necessarily involves a
foreseeable risk, a threatened danger or injury and conduct unreasonable in proportion
to the danger.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO is liable under the circumstances

DECISION OF RTC: MERALCO is guilty of negligence.

DECISION OF CA: MERALCO is guilty of negligence and cannot be gainsaid that it has
fully complied with the provisions of its franchise and of the ordinance of Manila City.  It
is undeniable that the violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute might constitute
negligence. But the converse is not necessarily true, and compliance with a franchise, an
ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof that there was no negligence. The
franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the minimum conditions. The fulfillment
of these conditions does not render unnecessary other precautions required by ordinary
care.

SC RULING: While companies are not insurers of public safety, considering electricity as
an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required for electric companies must
be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
The poles must be so erected and the wires and appliances must be so located the
persons rightfully near the place will not be injured. Particularly must there be proper
insulation of the wires and appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of
human contact therewith.

It can hardly be deposed that the negligence of Astudillo was the exclusive cause for the
mishap. The cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded
against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila Electric Company in so placing
its pole and wires as to be within proximity to a place frequented by many people, with
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the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a
highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

13. SILVA v PERALTA

G.R. No. L-13114

FACTS: SpousesSaturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva pray for reconsideration of the
Court's decision claiming that —

(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peralta's
unauthorized use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva";

(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by
the facts and the law.

The facts are that the Esther in good faith regarded herself as Saturnino's lawful wife,
and that the man himself led her into this belief prior to his desertion. That later on,
unknown to Esther, Silva should have married his co-appellant in the United States. The
two appellants were living together as husband and wife.

It has also been established that Silva was previously married to an Australian woman, a
matter which was concealed to Esther.

Estherwas forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva for the reason
that it was proved that she was not legally married to him, and because he is now
lawfully married to Elenita Ledesma.

DOCTRINES
Article 2202: In crimes and quasi delicts, the defendants shall be liable for all the
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
been foreseen by the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct
consequence of Silva's deceitful maneuvers

DECISION OF RTC: In favor of Esther Peralta.

RULING:Yes. While the Saturnino’s liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under
the Civil Code of 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same
manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for
such damages, whether he had foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not
only for dumnumemergens but also for lucrumcessans, as required by Article 1106.

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Silva knew all the time that he could not marry Esther Peralta because of his undissolved
marriage to an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee. It is
clear that Esther would not have consented to the liaison had there been no
concealment of Silva's previous marriage, or that the birth of the child was a direct
result of this connection. That Esther had to support the child because Silva abandoned
her before it was born is likewise patent upon the record, and we cannot see how said
appellant can be excused from liability therefor.

Silva's seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his illegitimate child
were likewise the direct cause for the filling of the support case in Manila, and in order
to prosecute the same, appellee had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case
could have been filed in Davao, we do not believe that this error in selecting a more
favorable venue be allowed to neutralize appellant Silva's responsibility as the primary
causative factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee.

NO RES JUDICATA. Plainly, the issues and parties being different, the result of the child's
action can not constitute res judicata with regard to the mother's claim for damages
against the father on account of the amounts she was compelled to spend for the
maintenance of their child.

On the contrary, the very fact that the child was not allowed to collect support from the
father merely emphasizes the account of his birth and rearing, which, in turn, was a
direct consequence of appellant's tortious conduct.

ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED. The award for moral damages was based, not on the
deceit practiced by Silva in securing Esther's assent to live maritally with him, but on his
subsequent harassment of her in 1945, by filing suit against her in different provinces
and otherwise applying pressure to cause her to abandon her child's case. As this cause
of action arose less than three years before the present action was filed, the defense of
prescription is rendered untenable against it, for the limitation period had not yet
expired when the suit was brought.

14. PAULAN v SARABIA

104 PHIL 1050

FACTS: On July 31, 1951, a truck driven by Emilio Celeste fell into a creek after it collided
with another truck owned by the Mary Lim Line. The truck driven by Celeste was owned
by ZacariasSarabia. Because of the collision, GaudencioBasco died, who was a passenger
in Sarabia’s truck. Subsequently, Basco’s heirs filed a complaint for damages against
Sarabia and Celeste on April 19, 1955. On July 11, 1955, Sarabia and Celeste filed a third-
party complaint against Juan Cadungan, who was the driver of Mary Lim’s truck. In order
to include Maria Lim herself, the complaint was amended on January 24, 1956.

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DOCTRINE/LAWS APPLICABLE:

Art. 1150, Civil Code

The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision
which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

Art. 1146, Civil Code

The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict

ISSUE: Has the action filed against Mary Lim already prescribed?

RULING: Yes. The action filed against Mary Lim is based on quasi-delict. Evidently, the
action was filed beyond the four year period allowed by law, which started to run from
the time the action accrued.

Art. 1150 of the Civil Code states that: The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,
when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought. This is to be understood with Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which
states that: The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict. Hence, in collision cases, the
action accrues on the day the collision occurred. This is without prejudice to Sarabia’s
right to demand for damages if he could prove that it was Mary Lim’s driver who was
negligent in the said accident.

15. Bustamante vs. CA

G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS:A cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del
Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was
registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a
passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado. Immediately before the
collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming
from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters
away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also
observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance
due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from
fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand
tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was
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in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching
the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the
impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby
residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.

LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the
plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of Last Clear Chance should be applied in the case
at bar.

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court found the negligent acts of both drivers
directly caused the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons. The
court did not apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: The CA on the contrary, opined that the bus
driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in
proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

SC RULING:No. The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a
test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason
of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants
concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by
pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the
injury.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants,
since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving
the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

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16. The Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA and Lilian Juan Luis et al.
G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989
Paras, J:

FACTS:On June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon "Gening" hit Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy
rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede, Isabel Lao Juan (“Nana Belen”) ventured out of
her son-in-law’s house and proceeded to Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the
owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been
damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, she was followed by Aida Bulong and Linda
Estavillo when she screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into water. When her son-in law was
informed about it, he passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the
people of Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) to cut-off the electric current. When
the floodwater receded, the body of Nana Belen was recovered about two meters from
an electric post. The heirs of Nana Belen filed an action against INELCO for Nana’s Belen
death.

LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

Article 2179: “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.”

Article 2214: “In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce
the damages that he may recover”.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death; and
(2) Whether or not the legal principle of “Assumption of Risk” bars private
respondents from collecting damages from INELCO

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court found the facts in favor of INELCO and
dismissed the complaint but awarded damages to the private respondent P25, 000 in
moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45, 000.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: The CA issued a controverted decision.

SC RULING:
(1) Yes. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
negligence that death took place. The finding of the lower court, however, was
based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what
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 they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion
of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon. In times of calamities,
extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to
prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The
evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence
discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor
even manning its office. The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may
not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely
due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the
injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".

(2) No. The maxim “volenti non fit injuria” relied upon by INELCO finds no
application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances, which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and
brave the subsiding typhoon. a person is excused from the force of the rule, that
when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly,
an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the
time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be
without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from
recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

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